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    Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
    Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
    Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
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    Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics

    By John Dewey

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    "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics" by John Dewey. Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone in a high-quality digital format.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherGood Press
    Release dateNov 5, 2021
    ISBN4066338056726
    Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
    Author

    John Dewey

    John Dewey was the most famous teacher of philosophy in the early twentieth century, and he was known for his lifelong work to reform America’s educational system. Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, in 1859 to strict Calvinist parents. After graduating from the University of Vermont, Dewey taught high school and studied philosophy in his spare time. He finished his doctorate degree at Johns Hopkins University and continued to teach at various universities around the country, finally landing at Columbia University. While in New York, Dewey became involved in political groups and founded what would become the progressive education movement, which purported that students should learn to think for themselves to become active participants of a democratic society. He was also a founding member of the NAACP and ACLU. At this time, Dewey was influenced by Karl Marx, and after traveling to different countries to study their educational systems, praised Soviet education and came under scrutiny in the United States. Dewey continued his political and philosophical efforts until his death in 1952. 

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      Book preview

      Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics - John Dewey

      John Dewey

      Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics

      Published by Good Press, 2022

      goodpress@okpublishing.info

      EAN 4066338056726

      Table of Contents

      PREFACE.

      INTRODUCTION.

      PART I. FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL NOTIONS.

      Chapter I. —THE GOOD.

      Chapter II. —THE IDEA OF OBLIGATION.

      Chapter III. —THE IDEA OF FREEDOM.

      PART II. THE ETHICAL WORLD.

      PART III. THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

      Chapter I. —THE FORMATION AND GROWTH OF IDEALS.

      Chapter II. —THE MORAL STRUGGLE OR THE REALIZING OF IDEALS.

      Chapter III. —REALIZED MORALITY OR THE VIRTUES.

      CONCLUSION.

      INDEX.

      PREFACE.

      Table of Contents

      Although the following pages have taken shape in connection with class-room work, they are intended as an independent contribution to ethical science. It is commonly demanded of such a work that its readers shall have some prefatory hint of its sources and deviations. In accordance with this custom, I may state that for the backbone of the theory here presented—the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing—for this backbone I am especially indebted to Green's 'Prolegomena to Ethics', to Mr. Bradley's 'Ethical Studies', to Professor Caird's 'Social Philosophy of Comte' and 'Critical Philosophy of Kant' (to this latter book in particular my indebtedness is fundamental), and to Alexander's 'Moral Order and Progress'. Although I have not been able to adopt the stand-point or the method of Mr. Spencer, or of Mr. Leslie Stephen my obligation to the 'Data of Ethics' and to the 'Science of Ethics' (especially to the latter) is large.

      As to the specific forms which give a flesh and blood of its own to this backbone, I may call attention to the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession; to the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment; to the treatment of the social bearings of science and art (a point concerning which I am indebted to my friend, Mr. Franklin Ford); to the statement of an ethical postulate; to the accounts of obligation, of moral rules, and of moral badness.

      While the book is an analysis, in outline, of the main elements of the theory of ethics rather than a discussion of all possible detailed questions, it will not be found the less fitted, I hope, to give a student an idea of the main methods and problems of contemporary ethics. Other teachers, indeed, may agree that a general outline is better than a blanket-mortgage spread over and forestalling all the activity of the student's mind.

      I have not been unmindful of the advisability of avoiding in presentation both undue polemic, and undue dogmatism without sufficient reference to the statements of others. I hope the method hit upon, of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of discovering a theory apparently more adequate, will help keep the balance. I have quoted freely from the chief modern authorities, hoping that the tastes here given will tempt the reader to the banquet waiting in the authors themselves. The occasional references introduced are not bibliographical, nor intended as exhaustive statements of authorities consulted; they are meant as aids to an intelligent reading on the part of the general student. For this reason they are confined mainly to modern English writings.

      INTRODUCTION.

      Table of Contents

      I.

      Definition of Ethics.

      The term ethics is derived from a Greek word meaning manners, customs, habits, just as the term morals is derived from a Latin word with a similar meaning. This suggests the character of the science as an account of human action. Anthropology, ethnology, psychology, are also, in their way, accounts of human action. But these latter branches of knowledge simply describe, while the business of ethics is to judge.

      This does not mean that it belongs to ethics to prescribe what man ought to do; but that its business is to detect the element of obligation in conduct, to examine conduct to see what gives it its worth. Anthropology, etc., do not take into account the whole of action, but simply some of its aspects—either external or internal. Ethics deals with conduct in its entirety, with reference, that is, to what makes it conduct, its end, its real meaning. Ethics is the science of conduct, understanding by conduct man's activity in its whole reach.

      Three of the branches of philosophy may be called normative, implying that they deal with some norm, standard or end, estimating the value of their respective subject-matters as tested by this end. These are Logic, dealing with the end Truth, and the value of intellectual processes with respect to it; Æsthetics, dealing with Beauty and the value of emotional conditions as referred to it; and Ethics, as defined above. But this norm in no case comes from outside the subject-matter; it is the subject-matter considered in its totality.

      II.

      Meaning of Moral.

      In its widest sense, the term moral or ethical means nothing more than relating to conduct; having to do with practice, when we look at conduct or practice from the point of view not of its occurrence, but of its value. Action is something which takes place, and as such it may be described like any objective fact. But action has also relation to an end, and so considered it is moral. The first step in ethics is to fix firmly in mind the idea that the term moral does not mean any special or peculiar kind of conduct, but simply means practice and action, conduct viewed not partially, but in connection with the end which it realizes.

      It should be noted that the term moral has a wider and a narrower sense. In the wider sense it means action in the moral sphere, as opposed to non-moral, and thus includes both good and bad conduct. In the narrower sense it means moral, as opposed to immoral. See Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 53, note, for a further meaning.

      III.

      Meaning of Conduct.

      Ethics then has to do with conduct or action viewed completely, or in relation to its end. But what is conduct? It must be distinguished from action in general; for any process of change, the working of a pump, the growth of a plant, the barking of a dog, may be called action. Conduct implies more than something taking place; it implies purpose, motive, intention; that the agent knows what he is about, that he has something which he is aiming at. All action accomplishes something or brings about results, but conduct has the result in view. It occurs for the sake of producing this result. Conduct does not simply, like action in general, have a cause, but also a reason, and the reason is present to the mind of the agent. There can be conduct only when there is a being who can propose to himself, as an end to be reached by himself, something which he regards as worth while. Such a being is a moral agent, and his action, when conscious, is conduct.

      IV.

      Division of Ethics.

      The main ethical problem is just this: What is the conduct that really deserves the name of conduct, the conduct of which all other kinds of action can be only a perverted or deflected form? Or, since it is the end which gives action its moral value, what is the true end, summum bonum of man? Knowing this, we have a standard by which we judge particular acts. Those which embody this end are right, others wrong. The question of the rightness of conduct is simply a special form of the question concerning the nature of the end or good. But the end bears another relation to specific acts. They are not only marked off by it as right or wrong, but they have to fulfill it. The end or good decides what should be or ought to be. Any act necessary to fulfill the end is a duty. Our second inquiry will be as to the nature of obligation or duty. Then we have to discuss the nature of a being who is capable of action, of manifesting and realizing the end; capable of right (or wrong) of obligatory and good action. This will lead us to discuss the question of Freedom, or Moral Capacity and its Realization. The discussion of these three abstract questions will constitute Part I of our theory; Part II will take up the various forms and institutions in which the good is objectively realized, the family, state, etc.; while Part III will be devoted to an account of the moral experience of the individual.

      V.

      The Motive in Conduct.

      Before taking up the first problem presented, the nature of the good or the end of conduct, it is necessary to analyze somewhat further the various sides and factors of conduct in order to see where the distinctly ethical element is to be found. The elements particularly deserving consideration are (1) the Motive; (2) the Feelings or Sentiments; (3) Consequences of the Act; (4) Character of Agent. We shall begin with

      1. The Motive. The motive of the act is the end aimed at by the agent in performing the act. Thus the motive of Julius Cæsar in crossing the Rubicon was the whole series of results which he intended to reach by that act of his. The motive of a person in coming to college is to gain knowledge, to prepare himself for a certain profession. The motive is thus identical with the ideal element of the action, the purpose in view.

      2. The Feelings or Disposition. Some writers speak of the feelings under which the agent acts as his motive. Thus we may suppose Julius Cæsar 'moved' by the feelings of ambition, of revenge, etc., in crossing the Rubicon. The student may be 'moved' by curiosity, by vainglory, by emulation, by conscience, in coming to college. It is better, however, to regard the motive as the reason for which the act is performed, and to use the term moving or impelling cause for the feelings in their relation to action. Thus we may imagine a parent asking a child why he struck a playmate, meaning what was the motive of the action. If the child should reply that he struck his playmate because he was angry, this answer would give the moving cause or impelling force of the action, but not its motive. The motive would be the idea of punishing this playmate, of getting even with him, of taking something away from him. The motive is the end which he desired to reach by striking and on account of which he struck. This is implied by the fact that the parent would ask, "What made you angry?"

      VI.

      Moral Bearing of These Distinctions.

      It is the feelings which supply the impelling force to action. They may be termed, collectively, the natural disposition. The natural disposition in itself has no moral value. This has been well illustrated by Bentham.

      Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 49-55. Bentham here uses the term 'motive' to designate what we have called the moving cause.

      We may select of the many examples which he gives that of curiosity. We may imagine a boy spinning a top, reading a useful book and letting a wild ox loose in a road. Now curiosity may be the 'motive' of each of these acts, yet the first act would generally be called morally indifferent, the second good, the third abominable.

      What we mean by the 'natural' feelings, then, is the feelings considered in abstraction from activity: Benevolence, as a mere feeling, has no higher moral value than malevolence. But if it is directed upon action it gets a value at once; let the end, the act, be right, and benevolence becomes a name for a moral disposition—a tendency to act in the due way. Nothing is more important than to distinguish between mere sentiments, and feeling as an element in conduct.

      VII.

      Relation of Consequences and Conduct.

      Do the consequences of an act have anything to do with its morality? We may say no, pointing to the fact that a man who does his best we call good, although the consequences of his act may be far from good. We say his purpose in acting was right, and using as he did all the knowledge that he had, he is not to be blamed for its bad consequences. On the other hand, it is evident that we do take into account consequences in estimating the moral value of an act. Suppose, to use one of Bentham's examples, a person were about to shoot an animal but foresaw that in doing so there was a strong probability that he would also wound some bystander. If he shot and the spectator were wounded, should we not hold the agent morally responsible? Are there not multitudes of intended acts of which we say that we cannot tell whether they are good or bad until we know how they are likely to turn out?

      The solution of the difficulty is in recognizing the ambiguity of the term 'consequences'. It may mean the whole outcome of the act. When I speak, I set in motion the air, and its vibrations have, in turn, long chains of effects. Whatever I do must have an endless succession of 'consequences' of which I can know but very little; just so far as, in any act, I am ignorant of the conditions under which it is performed, so far I am ignorant of its consequences. Such consequences are wholly irrelevant morally. They have no more to do with the morality of the act than has the fact that the earth is revolving while the act is taking place.

      But we may mean by consequences the foreseen consequences of an act. Just in the degree that any consequence is considered likely to result from an act, just in that degree it gets moral value, for it becomes part of the act itself. The reason that in many cases we cannot judge of the morality of an intended act until we can judge its probable results, is that until we know of these results the action is a mere abstraction, having no content at all. The conceived results constitute the content of the act to be performed. They are not merely relevant to its morality, but are its moral quality. The question is whether any consequence is foreseen, conceived, or not. The foreseen, the ideal consequences are the end of the act, and as such form the motive.

      See on Sections 6 and 7, Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 36-46; on Section 7, Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 317-323.

      VIII.

      Character and Conduct.

      We have seen that the moral sentiments, or the moral disposition (distinguished from the feelings as passing emotions), on one side, and the consequences as ideal or conceived (distinguished from the consequences that, de facto, result), on the other, both have moral value. If we take the moral feelings, not one by one, but as a whole, as an attitude of the agent toward conduct, as expressing the kind of motives which upon the whole moves him to action, we have character. And just so, if we take the consequences willed, not one by one, but as a whole, as the kind of end which the agent endeavors to realize, we have conduct. Character and conduct are, morally, the same thing, looked at first inwardly and then outwardly. Character, except as manifest in conduct, is a barren ideality. Our moral judgments are always severe upon a man who has nothing to show but 'good intentions' never executed. This is what character comes to, apart from conduct. Our only way of telling the nature of character is the conduct that issues from it. But, on the other hand, conduct is mere outward formalism, excepting as it manifests character. To say that a man's conduct is good, unless it is the manifestation of a good character, is to pass a judgment which is self-contradictory.

      See Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 48-50 and p. 39.

      From this point of view we are enabled to identify the two senses of motive already discussed—the ideal of action and the moving feelings. Apart from each other they are abstractions. Cæsar's motive in crossing the Rubicon may have been 'ambition,' but this was not some bare feeling. It was a feeling of ambition produced in view of the contemplation of a certain end which he wished to reach. So a boy's motive in striking a playmate may be anger, but this means (if the act is anything more than one of blind physical reaction) an anger having its conscious cause and aim, and not some abstract feeling of anger in general. The feeling which has its nature made what it is by the conceived end, and the end which has ceased to be a bare abstract conception and become an interest, are all one with each other.

      Morality is then a matter pertaining to character—to the feelings and inclinations as transformed by ends of action; and to conduct—to conceived ends transformed into act under the influence of emotions. But what kind of character, of conduct, is right or realizes its true end? This brings us to our first problem.

      PART I.

      FUNDAMENTAL

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