Preface

There were few—if any—Hungarians among our contemporaries who could write about Europe and the European Union with the same intellectual depth and credibility as György Schöpflin did. Prior to his death in 2021, György Schöpflin was—as a practicing politician—Member of the European Parliament representing a Hungarian political party, Fidesz-KDNP, for 15 years.

Previously, as a descendant of a renowned emigrant family, he studied in Britain, where he lived and worked in exile. He taught at British universities for many years, was a researcher at Chatham House, but also worked for the BBC before embarking on a political career. From the beginning of the regime change in 1989–90, he consciously chose the intellectual community of Fidesz as his political family, built close friendship with the founders and intellectuals of the party. He actively attended the very first and then numerous subsequent Bálványos Summer Free Universities in Romania. György Schöpflin gave intellectual weight and authority to the Hungarian center-right political community having deep Hungarian national commitment.

As an extremely productive author he has published books, written a series of essays and articles both during his years in the United Kingdom and later, too. As an esteemed and sought-after speaker at international conferences, he primarily sought answers to the problems of national minorities, national identity, nationalism and Central and Eastern European politics. His works, his speeches in the European Parliament and his conference presentations were characterized by an eclectic style coupled with superior professional knowledge, which always contained the subtle, delicate and, unfortunately, vanishing English irony.

The volume is the work of a par excellence européer. Today, we can confidently say that this is the will of György Schöpflin, which reflects the rather contradictory changes in the European Union in recent years, but is also accompanied by the author’s fear: The disintegration of the Union would be a disaster for Hungary and the whole continent!

This hope does not prevent him from revealing with surgical precision the disruptions of the spirituality and institutional functioning of the European Union, or explaining in great detail that he believes: the European Union is heading in the wrong direction today. The volume should be a must-read from university students on the subject to practicing politicians for anyone who participates responsibly in the affairs of their political community like members of the demos of ancient city-states!

Zsolt Németh,

MP, Chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hungary

Foreword

We at Helena History Press are deeply honored to release the English edition of George Schopflin’s A Contested Europe, the last major work emanating from the pen of one of the most distinguished political scientists dealing with matters related to Central and East Europe in the 20th Century. This English edition was in galleys when he passed away in November of 2021.

We mourn his passing and offer this volume as a tribute to the author, to his years of dedication to scholarship, his generous support of emerging scholars and for his gentlemanly yet rigorous analysis of contemporary affairs within Europe and the world. His service in European Parliament as a Hungarian delegate for FIDESZ from 2004–2019 provided him with a unique perspective on the European Union and its myriad challenges. Always an independent thinker, György Schöpflin did not need to take a back seat to anyone intellectually. Prior to serving in European Parliament, he had a distinguished academic career that culminated as Jean Monnet Professor of Politics at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London.

We were pleased to work with him translating and bringing the memoir of General Vilmos Nagybaczoni Nagy to the reading public for which he wrote the Introduction. Professor Schöpflin knew of the memoir and its historically valuable observations and asked us to publish the book, a first-person account by a key participant in the decision making of the Hungarian government during WWII.

It was our great privilege to work with György Schöflin in the last decade of his life. His legacy includes this, his last important work which showcases the range and depth of his analysis of the European Union and its member states. A must read for scholars of modern Europe.

Reno Nevada 4/21/22

Katalin Kádár Lynn PhD

Editor in Chief/ Publisher

Helena History Press LLC

Thanks

It is customary to offer a long list of those who have helped the author in completing the text, always with the rider that faults, flaws and fallacies are the author’s own. So be it, done. I would like to thank the editors of Hungarian Review for publishing my articles and above all to my loyal parliamentary team Emese Csörsz, Dóra Czifra and Gertrúd Kendernay-Nagyidai for their company, suggestions and infinite patience. And for taking care of me. It’s been a pleasure working with you.

Introduction

I have called this section Introduction, but it might be more accurate to use either prolegomena or Allgeimeines Teil. What I’m trying to convey here is that these preliminary comments apply as methodological and structural principles to the entirety of the text, and can be seen as guides to interpretation.

This collection of articles were written over several years, in that sense they were occasional pieces, but as the occasion was generally much the same, they have a certain intellectual coherence. Readers should note that I closed the text with the end of June 2019 to coincide with the end of my time as a member of the European Parliament. As a terminus ad quem, it’s no more arbitrary than any other.

What has been happening in Europe, why has there been friction between the European Union and Central Europe, notably Hungary? What has Fidesz been trying to achieve? Why is nationhood still around, contrary to liberal expectations? What has happened to Central Europe after the end of communism?

In this book, I have put together a thoughtful synthesis, drawing on my thoroughly unusual, even unorthodox intellectual hinterland. Near enough uniquely, I write as someone with a deep background in political theory and political practice. I taught at the University of London for the best part of three decades and then spent a decade and a half as a Hungarian member of the European Parliament.

These papers and polemics reflect this twofold background. They are controversial in challenging established perspectives, going against the mainstream on issues like nationhood and liberalism. At the same time, the argument is based on a deep knowledge of Europe as itself and Europe of the European Union – they are not the same – and, not surprisingly, a thoroughgoing understanding of Central Europe, not just Hungary, obviously, but the other countries and nations of the region. It is in this positive sense that the book is multicultural, it builds its argument on the broad Central European past and present.

I have a few thoughts on the methodology that underlies this text. The motto of the London School of Economics is rerum cognoscere causas, to learn the causes of things or, in more elevated language, to understand the aetiology, notably that correlation is not causation. This means looking at structures and processes and taking note of necessary and sufficient conditions. The accumulation of data is often interesting and the construction of a narrative based on this data can be useful, but useful or not, writing a narrative requires the selection of one’s data and then we, the readers, would like to know the selection criteria. This is where the social sciences at their best – I should stress that best – do something different from history, and why the turf war between the two has no ending. Causation is, freely admitted, difficult to isolate when human actors are concerned. This is the realm of the double hermeneutic and of relational sociology which seek to understand human action and its causes in interactivity.

Second, I believe very firmly in the message of the Enlightenment, that there is no privileged knowledge, that any and all questions can be asked, even when there is a strong taboo in play. And these are frequent enough. This introduction is written in the era of trigger warnings, safe spaces, privilege, no platforming as delegitimating rhetorical devices, accusations of racism (ditto) – these are all sacralised propositions, hedged in with taboos and proclaimed apodictic. I see no reason why they should not be ignored or questioned or deconstructed. Indeed – how fashions change – two decades ago it was de rigeur to be transgressive and decentering. Does anyone still remember?

Third, and this should be an obligatory requirement, a duty even, that one’s sources should be checked and data that do not confirm one’s argument cannot be screened out. Furthermore, being clear about one’s sources is fair to the reader. I know that some think this is showing off, others that so doing is blinding the reader with science, or, as was once thrown at me, disguising dubious propositions in scientific language, or yet others that reference to sources gets in the way of the argument. Not for me, it doesn’t.

Fourth and last, the underlying and in places explicit issue is power – the uses of power, the asymmetries of power, agency, the reproduction of power, its legitimation and delegitimation. All of these demand some explication. Power will exist in all human relations and transactions. The neutrality of power is only to be found where there are no interactions and/or in the cemetery. Hence some regulation of power will always be established, whether this is brute force or a complex institutional framework like a code of law.

Human collectivities seek to ensure predictability, hence the codification. Enlightenment rationality came with a promise that once the mumbo-jumbo of religion was done away with, power would become rational and injustice would disappear. Codswallop. On the one hand, new sacred spaces and objects were constructed, on the other, Enlightenment rationality could not reconcile the asymmetries of power deriving from wealth or influence or birth or intelligence or knowledge or the incommensurability of values. Hence human institutions were and are always plagued by asymmetries and this has given rise to a current of ideas that suspects all power (except one’s own, I rather imagine).

My own attitude to European integration should be clarified for the sake of fairness. I spent a postgraduate year at the College of Europe (1962–1963) and what I learned there strengthened a predisposition to be generally in favour of a more closely integrated Europe. I don’t think that I would have put it in these terms at the time, but the trauma of the war and as someone who lived through the siege of Budapest would have made me strongly committed to a never again attitude.

When elected to the European Parliament in 2004, I had lived in the UK for decades and had absorbed various British values (some Scots, some English), but I remained well disposed towards integration, especially after the slow, but irreversible emergence of an English national current that indubitably gained some of its energies from self-differentiation from the Continent. English nationhood, whether ethnic or civic or a melange, was something I could never identify with, as I realised in 1996 when football fans started to appear with English flags (white background, red cross).

Hence the idea of being close to the EU and to European integration as an MEP certainly appealed to me, quite apart from being a Hungarian MEP with extensive experience of the EU. But then, things changed over the years.

In 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty and that led me to the conclusion that a broad, strategic deepening did not have democratic support. And that placed a significant question mark over the integration project as a whole as far as I was concerned, given that the EU was simultaneously singing its commitment to democracy. I recall the then Portuguese prime minister, José Socrates saying in 2007 that democracy was Europe’s DNA (chapeau to his speech writer). But then, how was integration to be reconciled with a democratic no?

Matters were made worse for me when I started encountering the European federalists. Listening to them as I did, I was forced to conclude that they had something in common with other single issue visionaries – they would brook no counter-argument, thereby abandoning one of Europe’s central values, reasoned argument. I have a particular memory of an address by the great German sociologist Ulrich Beck in 2010 (I think), whose triumphalism reminded me of the way in which nationalists used rhetorics, obviously the content having been different. It was thoroughly off-putting for me and I gradually understood that there was no place for me in the Europe that Beck and his confrères were advocating.

After 2010, when Fidesz came to power and I was no longer an opposition MEP, matters became worse, as an entirely irrational wave of hostility to Fidesz swept through the pro-Europeans (discussed elsewhere in this book). None of this hostility was evidence-based, thereby again there was an abandonment of European values by the left. Worse, integration was increasingly appropriated by the left, parallel to the monopoly ownership claim over democracy by what called itself liberalism. Indeed, what we have today is a hegemonic claim by liberalism that there is only one Europe – theirs. All else was anti-European, Europhobic, Eurosceptic, quite apart from the scattering of words like populism, nativism, xenophobia, illiberalism, racism, fascism, Nazism etc. What this slow turn in attitudes created was the denial of any possibility of reform of integration that was not sanctioned by the monopoly. And there I parted company.

So I became Eurocritical, a category not recognised by the Manicheans of the left. I continue to see integration as strategically desirable, but do not accept further integration as the answer to everything. There are, indeed, areas where a European level solution works best, like food safety, but this goes hand-in-hand with deep and irresoluble problems of democracy at the EU level.

I would argue that the complex relationship between the EU institutions – Commission, Parliament, Council, Court, agencies and agency-like bodies, high level working groups and, no doubt other bodies that operate outwith the glare of publicity – and the member states does add up to a European polis. But with the best will in the world, this polis does not meet the criteria of democracy. It is too remote from the citizens who are for all practical purposes unable to make inputs into policy making at the European level and are dismissed as populists if they try. I could at this point offer a lengthy account of the European Citizens’ Initiative (see article 11 of the Treaty) seeing that I was Parliament’s rapporteur on this file, but I’ll exercise self-limitation in order to avoid drowning in technicalities. Suffice it to say, that the European polis does not welcome inputs from below unless they conform to the liberal integrationism of the elites.

The problem of the polis goes beyond remoteness. It is important to recognise that the two-level identification expected of citizens – being a citizen of Europe and a citizen of one’s member state (the latter is necessary condition of the former, Article 9) – is a hard act to bring off. The identification is made yet more difficult by the deliberate weakening of the symbolic and ritualistic aspects of the European identity, these being essential parts of identity maintenance. Europe Day is celebrated, but its European dimension is weak, and the European flag has not really made a breakthrough into wider consciousness. In this light, the polis evidently does not have much of a demos. And can there be a democracy without a demos? The latter is a necessary condition of the former.

What is beyond dispute is that an enormous amount of power has accumulated in the polis, in the symbolic Brussels. And that’s where further problems arise. Often enough this power is desirable and effective, like food safety or water pollution regulation, but – this where emergent properties are relevant – this power is greater than the sum of its parts and, for that matter, continues to accumulate. When I arrived in 2004, the acquis communautaire, the rule book, was around 120,000 pages (or so it was widely supposed). Currently, 15 years on, it’s probably double that. This accumulation necessarily raises three issues that are central to democracy – accountability, transparency and feedback. On all three, the polis performs badly.

As far as accountability is concerned, Parliament’s oversight is adequate on financial and budgetary matters, but decidedly less so when it comes to governance. By way of example, EU agencies are set up without much input from the wider public, there is a little from Parliament and there the matter ends. Lobbies, NGOs will play a role here, but their accountability does not exist. The media play no role in this process. Yet some agencies have the power to issue regulations and some, like Frontex or Galileo, have sizeable budgets and affect the citizens. In this area power is exercised technocratically, not least because what the power is used for is indeed highly technical. But that still leaves the strategic and governance side of things well beyond civic oversight.

Transparency looks better, at first sight anyway. In reality, and this is a central problem of state power everywhere, giving rise to the deep state issue or Nordlinger’s autonomy of the state over society – there are decision-making processes that are informal and secretive. To be fair, transparency is an infinite demand and whatever is out in the open will be paralleled by processes in the background, with the result that what becomes public policy is de facto irreversible, because too many decisions have been taken informally and these then become the assumption set on the basis of which other policy is formulated. As far as Parliament is concerned, the plenary sessions are theatre and ritual, little else. Minds are not changed by these debates, they merely sanction decisions taken in committee. Occasionally, of course, a text adopted by committee is amended by plenary, for better or for worse, but these usually reflect party political interests and not the putative interest of the citizens, mythical or otherwise.

Feedback I’ve already touched on. There is some. Commissioners do visit the member states, MEPs do consult with their constituents, albeit it is very hard to communicate with one’s voters whose understanding of the EU is overwhelmingly about the conflict between the member state and Brussels, because that is how the local media serve it up. From the point of view of the rulers of the polis, the Brussels elite, feedback is seldom welcome, because that can contradict the elite’s way of doing things. Thus the campaigns against TTIP and glyphosate were not seen in Brussels as, oh how wonderful, the citizens are taking us seriously, far from it.

It is worth adding another shift here, one concerning the use of language. In the 2000s, there was widespread discussion of the EU’s democratic deficit in EU circles. By 2019, that phrase had disappeared from common parlance. Shifts of this kind have their significance and my assessment of it is that it is linked causally with the undercurrent of popular discontent with the EU, with the consequent strengthening of its defences by the liberal elite which had quietly begun to monopolise its control over integration and, hence, was not really interested in popular inputs into the polis, other than at a formulaic level.

This did not, of course, mean that the deficit had disappeared or been countered; it was a cognitive screening out of a disagreeable factor that disturbed the liberal narrative of Europe. Thereby the definition of democracy itself was changed. The consent of the governed was downgraded and a vaguely defined pluralism had tacitly taken the place of consent. I recall an exchange with Frans Timmermans, the commissioner having charge of the EU institutional order, when he expressly defined democracy as being pluralism. I insisted that democracy, to be worthy of the name, had to be based on the consent of governed. And, the killer thrust, added that China was indubitably pluralistic, but by no stretch of the imagination was it democratic.

One further aspect of the European polis requires attention here, the role of legality and the courts. One of the lessons I learned while visiting Canada (as a member of a parliamentary delegation) was that legality on its own is not enough, there must also be legitimacy. This is a lesson that the European polis stolidly ignores, not surprisingly as it has little time for the demos. The ultimate authority of the European polis is the Treaty