Introduction

This book explores the work of Stuart Brisley, the path-breaking English multi-media and performance artist. Hailed as the ‘godfather of British performance art’, Brisley became well-known in the 1960s and 1970s for a series of live actions that were feats of endurance as he subjected himself to hunger, extreme discomfort and exhaustion. His art is also known to be political and deals with a number of challenging social issues. Brisley’s practice, developed over nearly seventy years, encompasses sculpture, installation, painting, photography, film, sound and writing. At its core lies a concept of performance art as a temporal process that resists the power of the permanent image, intimately tied to the image of sovereign power. This resistance is expressed through Brisley’s commitment to keeping the revolution alive, as a past whose consequences remain undetermined. Yet, despite Brisley’s seminal influence on British art, there is no major study that considers the body of his work, and his preoccupation with the practice and concept of revolution has scarcely been explored. Nor has there been any sustained consideration of the political context of his work, which presages the politically and socially engaged art practices of the twenty-first century.

This book considers Brisley’s extensive engagement with the histories and imaginaries of revolution. In and through this engagement, it also asks whether and how performance can be used to think critically about the legacies of the revolutionary past. My aims are at once modest and ambitious. On the one hand, what I present in these passages is essentially an exercise in reframing. Elaborating Brisley’s own allusions to the histories of revolution, rebellion and revolt as they appear in his works, I use the ‘trope’ of revolution to expand the range of references that can be used to understand and appreciate Brisley’s artistic practices. On the other hand, this reframing also raises questions as to how these historical references should be treated. What happens to our understanding of revolutionary history when refracted through Brisley’s performances? Can performance extend beyond its original context as an art activity to provide critical insight, even knowledge, about the past? And what is the role of historical reflection in establishing the meaning and value of performance?

These questions go to the heart of performance art, an opaque activity that continues to generate considerable debate over its meaning and value. Since its emergence during the 1960s, performance art has been closely associated with the presence of the artist’s own body and its use to perform an action or series of actions. This conjunction of physical presence and presentness in time – something happening in the here and now – has distinguished performance art from other types of art as well as other time-based performances. Real skin is cut, real food consumed, real vomit spewed. Such liveness is frequently evoked as a guarantee of authenticity. It is what connects art to life, and cannot be choreographed in advance. Performance art, on this understanding, not only takes place in time but unfolds through time. Duration constitutes the frame and vehicle of its expression.

But performances also differ from everyday events in several important ways. They happen whenever an artist decides to intervene, break or otherwise suspend the ordinary experience of time and duration. Moreover, as it takes time for the consequences of any given action to unfold, a situation is created whose meaning is revealed in retrospect, by those who see it, talk about it, remember, record or register it in some way. For these reasons, performance has been frequently associated not just with the artist’s presence and the time of the event, but also with the notions of absence, lack, repetition and trace.¹ This suggests, at a minimum, that performance is constituted out of not one but several layers of duration, each of which belongs to a different time frame. From the declaration of an artist’s intention – always oriented towards the future – to the time of the event – always experienced as here and gone – to the situation created by the performance – whose meaning unfolds in retrospect – performance reveals itself through what it is not. This extends to the many afterlives through which any given performance is reconstructed and reworked, whether through the memories of eyewitnesses or, more likely, the traces that are left behind. These in turn reveal their meaning through yet another time frame: what we might call the distant past of historical reflection, inferred but never directly experienced.

From the outset, then, any writing on performance confronts the challenge of how to recover these multiple temporalities. Performance, after all, is an event that is difficult to locate. It is both dead and gone, yet kept alive so long as it is communicated and talked about. For all these reasons, since the 1990s, the discourse on – and practices of – performance art have shifted from emphasising the ephemerality and singularity of the event to focusing on how such events are captured by different media: photography, film, video and so forth.² But while much has been written about the different strategies of documentation used in performance art, less attention has been paid to the role of historical reflection in unfolding its meaning. This is even though all performances, even those that are personally witnessed, reveal their significance retrospectively, as events that have receded into the past. Subsequent events or the discovery of additional events may change our understanding of the performance, but not the event itself, which can be experienced only once.

This book proposes that historical modelling is a key component of any performance. It further suggests that the historical frameworks used to assess performances cannot be taken off the shelf or given in advance, because performances imply a certain participation in the event, whether we are direct witnesses or distant observers who remodel the traces left behind to create new meanings and interpretations of the event. Such a history must confront the role of real, physical time in altering our relation to the past. Although events may not change, our relationship to them does. Whatever framework we use, therefore, cannot be arbitrary but requires a decision to be made about what part of the past is still capable of generating meaning, and in relation to whose present and future.

These concerns are also central to Brisley’s own understanding of his performance practice, intimately tied to an exploration of both individual and collective behaviours.³ Brisley’s performances stand out for their durational aspect, with some lasting weeks and even years. He is equally known for utilising the experience of lived, physical time to explore a number of political and historical conflicts: the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the First and Second World Wars, Britain’s labour history, to name just a few. In each case, a past or ongoing conflict is probed for what it can tell us about present-day tensions and conflicts in the effort to imagine or enact a radically different future for the past. Brisley of course is not the only artist who began working in this vein in the 1960s; Chris Burden, Gina Pane, Marina Abramović and others were all experimenting with body art at the time. Nor is he alone in using a long time frame; Abramović, Burden, Tehching Hsieh and Linda Montano have all used long durations.⁴ But Brisley’s performances stand out for the steadfastness of their attempt to instigate a deep, potentially revolutionary, change. Revolutionary rupture is the red thread that connects his political concerns with equality, republicanism and dissent to his conception of performance as a temporal process that continually overturns entrenched hierarchies. It is also the subject of Brisley’s ongoing confrontation with images of sovereignty, particularly those of the British monarchy, that feature in several performances as well as multi-media work.

Revolution also informs Brisley’s work conceptually, insofar as every performance attempts to bring about a fundamental change of some kind, whose outcome cannot be known in advance. For Brisley, this essential incompleteness of performance makes it analogous to revolutionary events, which also seek to bring about a transformative change and whose meaning cannot be prescribed in advance. Like any revolution, his performances begin with a decision to act, a decision to make a cut in time. Once declared, this action needs to be carried out, regardless of the outcome. In addition to this time of intention, Brisley’s performances emphasise how the meaning of any action unfolds over a much longer duration than the event itself. As with any revolution, the significance of a given performance lies not in its failure or success but in the way its consequences continue to reverberate and unfold, soliciting new kinds of commitment. By drawing attention to the duration over which an original event gains or loses meaning, Brisley’s performances ask us to shift our critical vocabulary away from a narrative of events and towards an exploration of their many afterlives. Breadth and expansion become key terms, alongside a related terminology of dissolution, exhaustion and disappearance.

This last point is crucial. For if Brisley’s performances enact a revolutionary cut in time, they also reflect on what happens when a revolution fails to take place, or when a rupture with the past is experienced only negatively, as an ongoing crisis or catastrophe. Given the collapse of the revolutionary paradigm worldwide, and, in Britain at least, the ongoing presence of the monarchy, Brisley’s performances situate themselves firmly in the aftermath of a revolutionary history. They explore what happens when revolutions are treated as completed events that belong to a firmly historical past, rather than as events whose future remains undetermined. In other words, Brisley’s performances ask us to think about whether and how the revolutionary desire for a deep, transformational rupture with the past can remain intelligible when hopes for a future revolution have been depleted. In a vital sense, then, Brisley’s performances are made in – and are about – the wreckage of revolution. They pose the question of what is to be done with the remains of revolution, including the remains of his own previous attempts to bring about a transformative change of some kind. Is there a way to make sense of the effort to create a break in time in the face of historical failure?

Rarely, however, has the temporal form of Brisley’s political commitments been assessed; much less used as a diagnostic tool through which to reconsider our own relation to the revolutionary past. This book sets out to develop the striking homologies between performance and the revolutionary process as suggested by Brisley’s own artistic practice. It also goes further, to reflect on the impact of time and duration in how we receive and write the histories of both kinds of phenomena. I see Brisley’s works, in their joint focus on duration and situatedness, as analogous to a revolutionary situation. Every performance – like every revolution – effectuates a cut in time. Through abstraction, performance re-enacts the dual aspect of revolutionary time as an event – a rupture with the past – and duration – the quest for permanent change. By bracketing time from the normal course of events, performance creates a space to reflect on the human capacity for change, that is to say, the ability of humans to liberate themselves from past habits, assumptions and reflexes to start anew. In its situatedness, however, performance also exposes the habits that the past transmits and which, inevitably, limit the scope for change.

There are, of course, important precedents for my attempt to link performance and revolution in this way. As Karl Marx famously argued, ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found and given and transmitted by the past’.⁵ For Marx, performance and performativity were central to the revolutionary experience. It is because the cut in time is so difficult to make that the French revolutionaries dressed up as ancient Greeks or presented the French Republic as ancient Rome incarnate. The cut in time requires a leap back in time that is also a way of springing forward into a future whose contours are yet unknown. At the same time, there is always the risk of parody, even self-deception, when a revolution repeats itself. For Marx, a true revolution is one that continually interrupts itself in the attempt to begin anew. What holds for revolution also holds, mutatis mutandis, for Brisley’s performances, which can work only with what is already there, making cuts in time while remaining situated within time and history.

More recently, Alain Badiou has explored the ontology of revolution – in politics, art and love – in a manner that is morphologically similar to the approach of this book. Badiou emphasises real time as crucial for unfolding the intention as well as consequences of any revolution, which he defines as the attempt to create a cut in time.⁶ For Badiou what distinguishes a revolution from other kinds of change is the effort to make it permanent. This requires a commitment on the part of the revolutionary or militant to remain faithful to the event regardless of the outcome, a commitment moreover that is clarified retrospectively by the situation that is created. He gives the example of 18 March 1871, the foundational event of the French Commune, when, for the first time in history, the workers constituted themselves as a political authority. Badiou argues that it was only subsequent events – including a fateful decision made on 10 May ‘to save the revolution of March 18, which it had begun so well’ – that transformed the events of 18 March from a relative beginning into an absolute one.⁷ This was the moment when the revolutionaries declared themselves committed to the sequence of events that had been instigated by their actions. Revolutionaries, Badiou contends, are those who remain faithful to a ‘certain organised control of time’.⁸ This naming of the event and commitment to the ongoing experience of rupture – rather than its success or failure – enables a potentially endless and amorphous sequence of events to be seen as belonging to one and the same situation.

For Badiou, a similar relationship holds for artworks. The ‘truth’ of art is located ‘neither in the work, nor the author, but rather the artistic configuration initiated by an eventual rupture’.⁹ Art activity, in other words, is something recognised retroactively, whenever a creation is placed in a sequence of works that is publicly affirmed as the start of something new.¹⁰ The break in time and the trace: these are Badiou’s key terms. They are also central to the concerns of this book, which insists that the meaning of any performance is not found per se in the photos, films, videos or other kinds of documentation left behind by live actions but, rather, is something actively created – promoted even – through a retrospective reflection that unfolds the latent possibilities associated with the break in time, which always exceeds whatever historical trace it leaves behind.

To be sure, analogy and abstraction are usually considered anathema for any properly historical study of the past. Nevertheless, this book shows how the abstraction of performance can provide us with a type of knowledge about the historical pasts of revolution, precisely by refocusing attention on the multiple layers of time that condition any lived experience. Brisley’s performances stretch out – sometimes over an almost intolerable duration – the revolutionary attempt to make a cut in time. In so doing they illuminate aspects of the revolutionary experience not normally visible from the historical record alone; namely, how a rupture may have been experienced in its own present, as a bodily action that solicits a range of reactions. This prolonged suspension of chronological time and sequence not only affects how the artist’s own body is experienced and perceived but also extends to those reactions that influence the form and outcome of the action, regardless of whether they take place in the moment or long after the event has receded in time. These actions and reactions, I argue, shed new light on the ambiguous emotions that accompany any attempt to make a rupture with the past. This includes the dense, often subterranean connections that relate the experience of revolutionary revolt to feelings of revulsion; acts of destruction to the longing for conservation; or, indeed, the razing of symbols of vertical hierarchy to fear of the wasteland and the establishment of new monuments in their place – all subjects treated in this book.

An analogy is convincing, however, only if it changes our understanding of both terms under comparison. Conversely, therefore, I show how we can use what is known about historical revolutions to illuminate unnoticed, ignored or poorly understood elements of Brisley’s performances. These range from Brisley’s allusions to the history and legacy of revolutionary art, to formal considerations – such as the repeated use of the ten-day revolutionary calendar as a temporal frame – to his understanding of performance itself as a potential rupture in time that requires completion by others. Adopting this longer time frame of revolutionary history recontextualises not just the artist’s physical actions but also the found objects, narrative texts, films, paintings, photos, even a virtual museum of ordure, all of which Brisley has manipulated in various ways in his efforts to instigate a revolutionary point of departure. As these references come equipped with their own histories and meanings, by expanding on their significance this book too aims to contribute to the artist’s attempt to suspend chronological time and put the future into question. In this sense, what you will read in these pages is also a kind of performance, albeit one rooted in Brisley’s practice and my own understanding of the history and imaginary of revolution.

As should be clear by now, this book is more than a monograph on a single artist. For I suggest that this interlacing of past and present is critical not just for writing a ‘history’ of Brisley’s performances, but for all attempts to understand how the revolution was experienced in its own present, in a period of convulsive or even catastrophic change when the boundaries between past, present and future were incessantly redrawn. Reinhart Koselleck is one prominent theorist who has argued that historical narratives should integrate the perspective of the protagonists themselves, by focusing on how individuals come to express collectively shared experiences of time and duration.¹¹ Borrowing a structure from Fernand Braudel, Kosellek identified three different layers of temporality that make up historical time: that of events, which humans experience as singular; that of recursive structures that enable patterns to emerge and structures to be established against the linear flow of time; and the cyclical and repetitive time of nature and biology that do not belong to history, properly speaking, but condition historical self-understanding, intimately connected to our perception of the mortality and finality of human life.

I argue that this tripartite understanding of time as consisting of multiple durations is also essential for understanding Brisley’s own work as a performance artist. First, there is the singularity of any performance as a one-time event which, as such, is unpredictable and open. Second, Brisley’s performances tend to focus on simple tasks which themselves are embedded in recursive structures associated with social behaviour and expectations of what is to be done. Finally, in working with the limits of the human body and its capacity for self-expression, Brisley’s performances draw attention to the possibilities but also constraints of natural, biological time which impede our capacity for radical change. Performance thus provides a unique space in which to address the more vexing issues that are thrown up whenever experiences of time and duration are addressed. How does an ontology, and maybe even anthropology of human time, as explored through Brisley’s performances, relate to epistemological claims about historical events in the past? And if performance is conceptually productive in some way, for whom is this knowledge produced – the performer, the participants or both?

On this last point, the parallels with the revolutionary situation are illuminating in yet another way. Performance, after all, can mean any number of things to different people. There is no established framework for interpreting performance, for the same reason that there can be no ‘school’ for learning performance art. Any interpretation, therefore, is not produced sequentially, as something located in a linear time that goes forward from the work to its reception, but takes place simultaneously, as something produced by the performer and participant together in a time frame that consists of several overlapping layers of duration. Revolutionary ruptures reflect a similar orientation in time. They too are events for which the appropriate historical framework cannot be given in advance, for what is at stake is the emergence of something new, whose consequences cannot be foreseen. This lack of historical framework makes any intent to create a revolutionary rupture an extremely fragile, potentially ambiguous experience, continually open to fractures, revisions and retrospective judgements. For these reasons, revolutionaries and other partisans of historical ruptures have always had to model their own understanding of where they situate themselves in relation to a past, present and future that they are in the process of actively constructing. In a political situation, this modelling matters, because the bodily cost can be very high whenever revolutions fail. Hence why revolutionaries always have to publicly rationalise their historical model in some way, not only to obtain public support but also to keep it in the event of loss or failure. Although Brisley’s performances are not political revolutions of this kind, they too require a historical model that needs to be publicly acknowledged in some way. Naming a process is a way to give it a value. It is what makes the effort to create a break in time something other than a completely subjective or voluntaristic intention.

It is far from obvious, however, that such a public exists for the reception of Brisley’s performances. Even if it were to exist, this public affirmation is recoverable only intermittently via the artist’s own anecdotes or the few eyewitness accounts that have come down to us through reviews, interviews and other publications. Apart from this dispersed, and often overlooked, discursive framework, Brisley’s performances, like those of any other artist, are subject to evaluation by external measures and criteria, be they the historical chronologies of the art galleries and museums that collect his work, the art schools through which he has been associated or the students he has influenced, or, indeed, the commercial interests of an art market which increasingly treats even performance art as a vehicle for investment. Given this inherent instability – even weakness – of performance when faced with historical revisionism, the capacity of any performance to sustain its own historical models is doubtful at best.

But where an emphatic public is lacking, or perhaps never even existed, there is always conversation with others. Brisley’s performances have long stood out for their conversational aspect. Often, he would break the frame of the performance to ask others about what they felt or thought was taking place, in the effort to destabilise any sense that there could be a final meaning or ‘end’ to the work. Indeed, most of the extant art-historical writing ‘about Brisley’, takes the form of conversations ‘with Brisley’.¹² And while recorded or published conversations overlap with the interview and oral history – genres, as we shall see, that are also central to Brisley’s artistic practice – they also differ from it insofar as conversations too are unique, unreproducible performances that require the participation of others for their completion.¹³

This attitude carries over to the structure of this book, which first emerged as a series of conversations with the artist about revolutionary time, a subject that I had previously written about in the context of the French Revolution.¹⁴ Instigated by the novelist Tony White in 2013, these conversations initially concerned the prominent use of the ten-day week of the French revolutionary calendar in several of Brisley’s performances. Since then, my ongoing conversation with Brisley over nearly a decade concentrated on the problem of how to recover and understand the revolutionary experience of time in his own performances and more generally. These discussions have taken a variety of forms, ranging from published and unpublished conversations, including with Brisley’s partner and frequent collaborator Maya Balcioglu, public talks, correspondence as well as new performances created in response to these conversations. In a crucial sense, this problem of how to recover the role of real, physical time in constituting our relationship to the past is reflected in the overall shape of this book, which oscillates between a historically distant perspective on works that I have never encountered personally, but are still alive in Brisley’s recollections, and those that I happened to personally witness or even have a hand in elaborating. What you will find in these pages, therefore, is not a standard art history based on a contextual or biographical study of the artist and his work. Rather, it is the outcome of a sustained collaboration between the artist and myself to identify what a revolutionary process of historical modelling entails and why it may be significant for the reception of performance art. For I too am interested in exploring whether it is possible to ‘expand and stretch’ the potential meaning of Brisley’s performances to the point where they cease being art and become something else: a novel kind of activity for which prior references and knowledge no longer hold.

A key challenge of this book, therefore, is to reconstruct a history of Brisley’s performances that takes seriously the artist’s own commitments as well as attempts to model a revolutionary future for the past. At the same time, this book uses Brisley’s performances to ask a more general question about where to situate the role of intention in constructing a legacy for a revolutionary past that for many people has become a relic of a historical process that is over and will never be repeated. It is well known, for instance, that revolutions challenge conventional habits of time and measure, drawing attention to the performative function of any historical frame. In its own time, for instance, the French Revolution cast itself variously as a regeneration, a restoration, a return to a golden age and the beginning of a new Year I of history. Viewed from the standpoint of how things turned out, these claims to be living in Year I of a new time can easily be dismissed as ‘utopian’, ‘illusory’, even ‘fictional’; in short, as epiphenomena that have left the underlying trajectory of historical events largely untouched. Yet, to consider such events solely from the standpoint of historical outcomes, established with the benefit of hindsight and after the fact, fails to capture how the revolution was experienced in its own present, as an event still open to futures other than the one that came to pass. This raises the critical issue of whether such cataclysmic events should be judged externally, using conventional historical timelines, or whether they should be evaluated internally, according to measurements that are self-produced and reflect the subjective understanding of participants.¹⁵

I want to suggest that this problem of where to locate revolutionary intention – and in what historical time frame – also faces Brisley’s performances and, by extension, all art activity that seeks to make a transformative change. How do we make sense of an activity that, should it succeed, would transform all prior understandings of the nature and limitations of art? What is the appropriate measure for an art activity that tries to cross the boundary into life? And when these efforts fail to make a break in time, how should we consider them in retrospect? As political gestures now empty of meaning? Or as traces of a commitment that may still be valid? In the case of Brisley in particular, it matters enormously whether the various radical social and political movements of the 1960s that inspired his first forays into performance are considered ‘ironically’, as events without consequence, that is to say, as ‘illusions’ that have left the underlying course of history more or less intact, or whether their intentions can still be considered valid, because their future is undetermined. These questions, in turn, are inseparable from the more general question as to whether and how far the politically motivated performance art of the 1960s can or should be reintegrated within a broader historical framework that goes back not just to the events of the 1960s but to an entire dimension opened up by the French Revolution of 1789, leading to the revolutions of 1848, the Commune of 1871 and the October revolution of 1917, as well as the various movements of anti-fascism, anti-colonialism, feminism and socialism whose future-oriented struggles for equality have so marked the history of the twentieth century and continue to influence contemporary discourses.

To be sure, this is a deeply unfashionable, not to say retrograde, way of thinking about history. We cannot deny that its coherence has been severely challenged by the far-reaching reappraisal of the meaning and function of historical time that has followed the collapse of Marxism and the various historical narratives that have been spun in its name. The definitive end of communism in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia in 1989 seemed to vindicate the common sentiment that, with no more revolutions to look forward to, history would cease to function as a vector or locomotive of future change. The bicentenary celebrations of the French Revolution that took place the same year consolidated this vision. As the intellectual historian François Furet expressed it, the rational response to this ‘shock of a closed future’ was to accept that ‘we are condemned to live in the world as it is’; that history would once again become a ‘tunnel that we enter in darkness, not knowing where our actions will lead’.¹⁶ In place of the ‘mythology of beginnings and endings’ that had characterised the revolutionary tradition, revolution would henceforth be just one story to tell in histories that could be constructed out of any number of ruptures and revisions.¹⁷ For Furet and the generation that followed him, there is no such thing as absolute beginnings, only relative ones. Once this horizon of future promise is depleted, so too is the intelligibility of ruptures and breaks. As Bruno Latour remarks, ‘Revolution is only one resource among others in histories that have nothing revolutionary; nothing irreversible about them.’¹⁸

These battles over how to conceptualise revolutionary historiography may appear a far cry from the concerns of most performance art, and as having little or nothing to do with how we write about it. But, as I show over the course of this book, this missing frame of revolutionary history forces us to rethink the ways in which we evaluate socially or politically committed art in the absence of a future revolution. Revolutionary history used to be oriented towards a utopian future that gave meaning to past struggles. Today