SELECTED WORKS OF

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN

ELEVENTH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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1 OCTOBER 1985–30 SEPTEMBER 1989

Joint History Office
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC ♦ 2013

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Crowe, William J., 1925-2007, author.
[Works. Selections]
Selected works of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN : eleventh chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 1985-30 September 1989 / compiled and edited by MG Julian (JB) Burns, USA (Ret.).
pages cm
1. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff--Archives. 2. United States--Armed Forces--History--20th century--Sources. 3. United States--History, Military--20th century--Sources. 4. United States--Military policy--Sources. I. Burns, Julian, 1947- editor of compilation. II. United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Office, issuing body. III. Title.
UA23.7.C76 2013
355.00973'09048--dc23

2013023633

FORWARD

This volume is published under the auspices of the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It presents material drawn from the public record of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., US Navy, while serving as the Eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 October 1985 through 30 September 1989.

The text arrays in chronological order selections of his congressional testimony, published articles, public and official correspondence, public appearances, and interviews to illuminate a decisive period in the Nation's history which saw the continuing buildup of US Armed Forces and those of our alliances; tumult in the Philippines and Central America; confrontation in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf; and the denouement with the Soviet Union in the *Glasnost* period.

These pages portray Admiral Crowe's unceasing efforts to rebuild America's Armed Forces and his devotion to the men and women of her military. Of particular note are his success in reorganizing the Joint Chiefs in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act; his work to establish Unified and Specified Commands in support of the Unified Command Plan, to include Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM); and his acumen as principal military adviser to the National Command Authorities under two Presidents and three Secretaries of Defense in operations in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf. Arguably one of his greatest successes, and one for which he was most proud, was opening relationships with the military leaders of the Soviet Union.

Selection of the volume's content was the responsibility of Major General Julian (JB) Burns, USA (Ret.), who served for a time on the Admiral's personal staff. Brigadier General John L. Shortal, USA (Ret.), the Director for Joint History, reviewed the manuscript and Ms. Penny Norman prepared it for publication.

This volume is an official publication of the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs, its contents do not represent the official position of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Julian (JB) Burns
Major General, USA (Ret.)

John F. Shortal
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Director for Joint History

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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With much valuable assistance from

Admiral Carlisle Trost, CNO, Retired
The Honorable Jim Locher, Former OSD SOLIC
The Honorable Frank Miller
RADM Joe Strasser, USN, Retired
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Susan Lemke, Special Collections Librarian, NDU
Mark Patrick, Administration, OCJCS
MG Robert Williams, USA, Retired, Commandant US Army War College
Michael Waesche, Program Manager, National Archives, Suitland, MD
BG John Shortal, USA, Retired, Director of Joint History, OCJCS
Penny Norman, Editor, Joint History Office, OCJCS

With particular thanks to

Mr. Bob Murphy and Mr. Frank Pope, BAE Systems, INC
Linda Ramsey, Security Manager, BAE Systems, INC
Mr. Greg Sharp, The Spectrum Group
Lucy Haynes, TRURO Angelican Parish

With Special thanks to

Brigadier General Blake Crowe, USMC; Bambi Crowe Coval; and the entire Crowe Family

and

Ruth Ann Schumacher Burns, for use of the Dining Room Table

Admiral William James Crowe, Jr., was appointed the eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, by President Ronald Reagan on 1 October 1985. He was reappointed to a second two-year term in 1987. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Command. Admiral Crowe served as Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, prior to appointment as Chairman.

Born on 2 January 1925, in La Grange, Kentucky, Admiral Crowe moved to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at the age of five and grew up there. He attended Classen High School and then the University of Oklahoma for one year. He completed a war-accelerated course of study and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1946 with the Class of 1947. His further academic achievements include a Master of Arts in education from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton.

His initial sea tour was aboard the USS *Carmick* (DMS-33), followed in June 1948 by studies at the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut. He qualified in submarines on 31 March 1950 in the submarine USS *Flying Fish* (SS-29), then served as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander, Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet. He was assigned to the submarine USS *Clamagore* (SS-343) from 1952 to 1954 and as Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President of the United States from 1954 to 1955. He served as Executive Officer of the submarine USS *Wahoo* (SS-565) in Honolulu, Hawaii, and as Commanding Officer of the submarine USS *Trout* (SS-566) in Charleston, South Carolina, prior to assignment as Commander, Submarine Division THIRTY-ONE in San Diego, California.

Significant shore assignments prior to attaining Flag rank include: Aide to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy); Director of East Asia and Pacific Branch, Politico-Military Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Senior US Advisor to the Vietnamese Riverine Force, Republic of Vietnam; and Director of the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of the Interior.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in June 1974, he reported as Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy, Nuclear Systems and National Security Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. From January 1975 to June 1976, he served as Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). On 30 June 1976, he assumed duties as Commander, Middle East Force, a command based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, which he held until July 1977. In August 1977 as a vice admiral, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations), as well as Senior US Military Representative to the United Nations. His promotion to admiral was approved by the Senate on 28 March 1980. He

became the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, on 30 May 1980. He assumed the additional responsibility as Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces Europe on 1 January 1983. Admiral Crowe became Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, on 1 July 1983.

Admiral Crowe was married to the former Shirley Grennell of Okeene, Oklahoma. They have three children: Blake Crowe, Brent Crowe and Bambi Crowe Coval.

SERVICE RECORD

Promotions	**Dates**	
	Temporary	**Permanent**
ENS	05 Jun 46	
LTJG		05 Jun 49
LT		01 Jun 52
LCDR		01 Jan 58
CDR		01 Jul 62
CAPT		01 Jul 67
RADM	25 Jul 73	01 Jun 74
VADM	23 Aug 77	
ADM	30 May 80	

Assignments	**Dates**	
	From	**To**
USS *Carmick*	1946	1946
Naval Mine Warfare School, Yorktown, VA	1946	1946
USS *Carmick*	1947	1948
Naval Submarine School, Submarine Base, New London, CT	1948	1948
USS *Flying Fish*	1948	1951
Staff, Commander Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet	1951	1952
USS *Clamagore*	1952	1954
Naval Administrative Unit, Potomac River Naval Command	1954	1955
Student, Stanford University	1955	1956
Executive Officer, USS *Wahoo*	1956	1958
Head, New Development/Special Weapons Branch, Personnel Research Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC	1958	1959

Assignments	Dates From	To
Aide to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), Washington, DC	1959	1960
Commanding Officer, USS *Trout*	1960	1962
Student, Princeton University	1962	1965
Staff, Commander Submarine Squadron THREE	1965	1966
Commander, Submarine Division 31	1966	1967
Head, East Asia and Pacific Branch, Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1967	1970
Senior Adviser, Amphibious Task Force 211 and Commander, Task Force 210; Senior Adviser, Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao, Binh Thuy, from 6 Apr 1971 to 20 Aug 1971, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	1970	1971
Director, Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations and Deputy to President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC	1971	1973
Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy and Nuclear Systems Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1973	1974
Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington, DC	1974	1976
Commander, Middle East Force	1976	1977
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations, and Senior Navy Member, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee, Washington, DC	1977	1980
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe	1980	1983
Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (redesignated US Pacific Command on 11 October 1983)	1983	1985
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1985	1989

Principal US Military Decorations and Qualifications

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star (with "V" device)
Air Medal

Submarine Officer and Submarine Commanding Officer

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April	Interview excerpts on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Soviet threat, and US naval military readiness with *Sea Power* magazine Editor-in-Chief James D. Hessman and Contributing Editor Vincent C. Thomas	

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July 16	Statement on the Reorganization of Special Operations Forces before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness
July 19	Remarks at the Banquet held by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
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August 13	Letter on JCS Reorganization to Chairman Barry Goldwater, Senate Armed Services Committee
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November 19	Remarks at the 1986 National Convention of the Retired Officers' Association
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1985
SELECTED WORKS

Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony as the Eleventh Chairman
The Pentagon | October 1

Secretary [Caspar] Weinberger, distinguished guests:

I'm very grateful for those kind remarks, Mr. Secretary. I think they were a little over-generous, and I usually have a witty saying, but the newspapers publish all of my comments. So, I do appreciate that you did not mention my jokes, my hat collection, or my rumpled dress in the newspapers.

To say that I have a full heart today is an understatement, and you can no doubt deduce this is an exciting and moving occasion for the Crowe family. I must confess also to a certain amount of apprehension as I assume the duties of the Chairmanship—duties that were so ably performed by General Jack Vessey. He leaves us a legacy of professionalism, commitment, and integrity. Above all, he has set an example of leadership, a high example of leadership that will challenge and ennoble all those who follow.

Shirley and I have lived almost half our married life in Washington, DC, and in turn have developed a deep affection for this city. Many of my most satisfying years—and also many of my toughest years—were spent right here and in that building right over there. In a very real sense we are coming home. I would like to acknowledge at the same time the many personal friends that are here today—many of them who have come a great distance. Shirley and I are flattered by your presence.

I think a particular mention should be made of the Oklahoma delegation. As those of you who know me well can testify, I have a deep loyalty to my home state. The warm support that I have continually received from "Sooner" friends and boosters has always been an inspiration to me.

I came into the Navy as a young man persuaded that a career devoted to the defense of our country, its institutions, its ideals, its way of life would be both worthwhile and fulfilling. Some forty-three years later, I hold that conviction more strongly than I ever have before. In today's turbulent and uncertain climate, American ideals, know-how, and leadership are crucial to the peace and survival of the entire free world. And over the years, the US military has come to play an integral role in this drama. I have always felt blessed to have the opportunity to serve in such a full and exciting period of our history. Although I must admit that the Chairmanship, I believe, is going to involve some fullness and excitement more than I had bargained for, in any event.

As I assume this office, I am heartened by the fact that I will be serving alongside of four exceptional and highly regarded Chiefs of Service. I have worked with all of them previously, and they are friends of long-standing. I look forward with great anticipation to renewing my association. Mr. Secretary, I can assure you that I will make every effort to nurture the maturity and the thoughtfulness that has characterized the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs under my predecessor.

I would like to direct a brief word to the men and women of the Joint Staff. I have been genuinely impressed with the quality of the work which you render to the Chairman, and I look forward to serving with you—to sharing your frustrations and your successes. The Joint Staff is a military organization, and as such, I expect your loyalty; but I am fully aware that your respect must be earned. I pledge to you that I will bend every effort to do exactly that—to earn your respect as we work together enhancing the security of this great republic.

I am well aware of the difficulty of shedding your individual Service orientations and addressing the broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, however, that the need for "joint" operations, "joint" thinking, and "joint" leadership has never been greater as we meet the global challenges and in order to get the most out of our finite resources.

I understand there is one group on the Joint Staff which is quite concerned about my arrival. I wish to put any misgivings to rest. I am a tennis player, but I assure you that there will be no discrimination against golfers while I am the Chairman. Although I do harbor some bias against golf stories—it just seems to me there are never any new ones.

Secretary Weinberger, the greatest reward of a military career is the opportunity to associate with young American men and women in uniform, day in and day out. I have seen those people react to stress and boredom, war and peace, good times and bad times. They consistently give 110 percent and meet every test, often without the amenities and the advantages which are enjoyed by their civilian counterparts. I am very grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to continue to work with those magnificent soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who give so much of themselves on behalf of this great nation.

Mr. Secretary, let me close by assuring you that I will devote my total energies and abilities to supporting you as we labor together to keep our country strong, safe, and peaceful.

Oath of Office

I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter.

So help me, God.

Remarks to European Command Officers and Wives at the Officers' Club

Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany | October 28

It's no coincidence that I'm visiting you on my first stop on my initial visit as Chairman to Europe. It was by plan, because I appreciate and recognize the great importance of this Command and the work that you do. I think the last time I was in Stuttgart was probably three years ago when I spoke at the Navy Ball here. I've always enjoyed my visits to Germany. At the time, I was on duty in Naples as the Commander in Chief of the Southern Command. We always enjoyed coming up here because everything was so rational and orderly compared to Naples, and also clean. I must confess to you, though, that after we had been here three or four days, we began to yearn for Naples. We started driving on the correct side of the road and not parking on the sidewalks, and even stopping at the red lights. It's always refreshing to get back to the disorganization of Naples. It does have a certain amount of charm. It begins to grow on you if you live there very long. Of course, the autumn in Germany is always lovely, too. The turning leaves, for instance, and we look forward to Oktoberfest and Fasching. All of which mark autumn in Europe as well as the constant stream of visitors from Washington. Is it to buy crystal for Christmas?

I'm pleased to see so many of your spouses present today. I've always been told that behind every great man stands a surprised mother-in-law. You're really a responsive audience. It's amazing how many people laugh at your jokes when you're the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I do want to say, though, in a very, very serious vein, how important it is that families are here and that what they do for the military is deeply appreciated by your spouses and also by your leadership. I've discovered over the years that no organization can perform effectively without strong support from the distaff side. You are as much a part of the military as those people in uniform. Not only do you help your country and the Service by your presence but you're also a part of a much larger entity—you represent the United States. Each of you plays an international as well as a national role. I can't stress how much each of you play the role in maintaining the peace—which, after all, is our fundamental mission.

I'm brand new as the Chairman, and it's premature and way too early for me to be making any great pronouncements. I've found already that this job keeps you quite busy and very beleaguered. I thought that in just the few minutes that I have today that I'd like to say something about the general view of the US military role in supporting our government's policy as I see it from the perspective of the Chairmanship, and talk about what I see and what I will be dealing with primarily in the next few years. I warn you at the outset that I am fundamentally an optimist. It should come to you as no surprise.

Despite the depressing headlines and the pressure of everyday business and problems, it is my belief—and it is a strong belief—that if you step back from the everyday press and look back over the long term of the last 35 years, you will see that the United States has enjoyed considerable success in its military policy. Where you are living—Western Europe—is blessed with the longest period of uninterrupted peace that it has

enjoyed in this century. It has fully recovered from the devastation of World War II. It is manifested with a firm belief in the rights of the Free World. And NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] has played an integral part in this process—politically, socially, as well as militarily. The area where I just came from, the Pacific and the Far East, for the most part is prosperous and secure across the board. They are enjoying unprecedented affluence and steady political progress and are becoming more self-reliant militarily and involving themselves in the international community. These are all marks that Asia has proven itself to be an area that has to be reckoned with.

The point I want to make is that the United States has been a strong contributor to these two vital areas—Western Europe, and East Asia and the Pacific. We have produced policies of broad stability—socially, politically, economically, culturally. This stability has paid off. We encourage democratic initiative, with economic free enterprise, and we have attempted to promote stability and peace. If there is one thing we have learned, it is that any place we have affluence and stability, we will have peace and the democratic way. The other side is trying to promote dissidence, instability, and that's what we're fighting. That is what you are all about.

The United States is trying to promote these foreign goals to go hand-in-hand with our own national policy. Throughout this 40-year process, American strength and American power have been a vital part in the element of our overall policy posture. We must continue to maintain our strength if we are to continue to deter Soviet intimidation, adventurism, and interference. The NATO Alliance has formed a response to the Soviet threat. The United States has contributed and participated heavily. In the Far East, we literally threw a military shield over Europe, and with this umbrella, we have permitted our allies and this country and our Third World friends to concentrate on internal development to realize their own potential, in their own fashion and at their own pace. To put it simply, the American people can take great pride in the role their military forces play in fostering and securing progress in Europe and Asia.

Therefore, on balance, I find the political picture encouraging. Of course, there are day-to-day problems, and you and I deal with them every day. Some of these are of genuine concern. We must worry about them. We must manage them and deal with them. Paul Harvey once said, "In times like these, it's helpful to remember that there have always been times like these." I think that is absolutely true. I am convinced that we can manage our problems if we continue to be determined, thoughtful, and energetic.

Looking into the future it is in our nation's fundamental interest to continue to promote stability, to encourage a healthy economic environment, and to support our friends and allies. It will require a mix of far-seeing policies, tailored to foreign sensitivities. It will not always be easy, but, if successful, great rewards will be ours. And from our perspective, even more important is to recognize that American strength is an integral part of this process. If the Soviet Union were one day to achieve a decided military superiority, it would erode, if not destroy, the very foundation of our foreign policy, not to mention the dangers in the event of hostilities. It is imperative to recognize that our military forces underwrite US diplomatic and economic policy; they fulfill our commitment to regional security and

assist our friends and allies to promote the peace that we cherish and seek to preserve. American strength is the indispensable pillar not only in our individual world but also those of the entire free world.

What this means to you and me is that what you are doing has not only been important in the past but that it will also continue to be important for the foreseeable future. The vigor and health of the NATO partnership is a cornerstone of world peace and stability.

Looking briefly to what I see as the Chairman's perspective is those kinds of things I know we are going to be preoccupied with in the coming months—time prohibits me from running out a comprehensive list or going into any detail. If you desire, I can stand to elaborate during the question period.

First, clearly from a military perspective, the persistent Soviet military buildup will continue to absorb our energies. In many respects this is a manifestation of our success. The Soviet ideology and economy are essentially bankrupt. Moscow sees the strong roots of freedom spreading to, in some cases, communist countries—witness the PRC [People's Republic of China]—resorting to an incentive philosophy to nurture or restore their economies. There is one thing that is important to control unilaterally—armed conflict. You are as aware as I am of the character of the Soviet military machine, so I won't dwell on it, but it will undoubtedly cast a shadow over the Free World in the foreseeable future. It will shape our own military program in the coming years. Part of our job as military professionals is to make the world aware of the Soviet capabilities and their relentless drive to become the predominant power.

A throw-off of this phenomenon is the current arms control effort. The Free World is rightfully apprehensive about the balance of nuclear terror. Certainly in Washington, the Pentagon is a heavy contributor in this dialogue—I mean positively, not negatively. Of course, we have the arms control negotiations that we are engaged in. The problem that faces military leadership, as I see it, is to look for ways to nudge the process forward where it is in the interest of all the free world and in the interest of our international commitments—if we can get a viable lasting arms control agreement. We are looking for ways to nudge the process forward without jeopardizing the nation's security.

This is a tough problem. In the public affairs world, as Jay Coupe would say, "It is a problem of perceptions," particularly when you're working in a bureaucratic maze like Washington. There are a lot of vested interests and a lot of points of views in arms limitation. The fact remains that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working very hard to do exactly what I just said: manage ways to achieve meaningful arms control without in any way threatening the security of the Free World.

Another sign of Soviet frustration has been its encouragement and involvement in fostering terrorism and Third World instability. It has been unsuccessful in achieving its major goals, so it has turned to peripheral activities, supporting the insurgent and disruptive causes around the world. In practical terms, it has challenged the United States in a very direct way by involving itself with Central American politics. It has done so in a very heavy fashion, as a direct counter to the free world deterrent strategy. Combined with such activities is the current wave of terrorism that is sweeping a large part of the

globe. Our own military is being forced to configure itself for limited conflicts and to find ways to counter terrorism. We have no choice. Frankly, we are meeting the challenge very well. We have created and structured capabilities for a counterterrorist system. And I think we are making progress—slow and gradual but, nevertheless, persistent, progress—in Central America.

The Middle East problems, I'm afraid, are still unresolved. Although it's painful for us to make in the military the kind of adjustments that we are being forced into—that is, a change in priorities on top of our already heavy commitments—it is, nevertheless, imperative that we do so. We are doing it in a thoughtful, consistent, and I believe what will ultimately be, a successful way.

European Command's participation the other night in the *Achille Lauro* affair is symptomatic of the kind of responses we will be asked to provide. I can't tell you how proud of your performances we were in the Pentagon, and what a shot in the arm it was to the people in our country—I'm talking about the whole country. I received an avalanche of comments, letters, and phone calls about your success and what you have done. I hope you understand how much your country appreciated and how proud they are of you and what you have done.

Underlying all this is the constant campaign for resources. This effort is exacerbated in the current climate by a number of factors. Being at peace and involved in various arms negotiations, it's difficult for many Americans to appreciate the need for military modernization, for vigorous training, for correcting the deficiencies of the Vietnam War, and the necessity for us to remain constantly ready. The drumbeat on disclosures on waste and abuse have certainly not helped our case, although, they have very little to do with the special needs of a strong national defense. Above all, the national deficit imperils the President's security program. In essence, the prospects of the next few years are just simply not good. We are in for a long siege. Zero growth or even less is a strong possibility and probably a more realistic possibility. And even that may be overly optimistic. I guess I don't look forward to this struggle.

In a lighter vein, but, nonetheless, troublesome, there is still the pressure of Congress on Defense reorganization. I had no more than arrived in Washington than they started talking about eliminating my job. If they are going to do that, I wish they would hurry before I go to all this trouble. Frankly, my own thinking on this subject is still in flux. I am not a good judge of how serious the pressure is or what the outcome might be. It will, however, be a growing debate. We're going to hear a lot of arguments mixed up in the next few months, particularly in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the hearings Senator [Barry] Goldwater and Senator [Sam] Nunn will be holding. There is also a bill reported out in the Subcommittee in the House as well as a whole host of proposals from private citizens on the subject. Everyone will have their say before it's over. It will furnish a certain amount of "gossipy type" material that the public so much enjoys. It will be unfortunate, but I will say we just have to live with it. *C'est la vie*.

I want you to understand that I'm very serious about this. The contest over reorganization is not a criticism of our military people, or the job they are doing, or your skills,

or your dedication. Everyone I speak to who is involved in this process stresses this. I speak nationwide when I say I have never seen so much pro-military sentiment. I have been inundated with complimentary letters since the hijacking, which I mentioned a moment ago. It is just one of the anomalies of life in a democracy that translating such sentiment into tangible fiscal support is not always easy—particularly when there is not a direct threat outside your window. I can tell you that I have been assured by Senators Nunn and Goldwater and others that everybody in the military should understand their proposal is a nonpartisan effort—an effort based on 40 years of history, not on one administration—and has never been directed toward the people in the military. Their effort is directed towards helping, not deriding, the military. We must be careful where we wear our feelings as we approach this debate.

Security is the business of the military in this country, and our mission is peace. But we can see that keeping up our strength seems to be more difficult. That is just one of the occupational hazards of our trade.

Remarks on the 210th Birthday of the United States Marine Corps

Chairman's Dining Room, the Pentagon | November 8

This is a great day for the Marine Corps. You are celebrating 210 years of service to the country—a phenomenal success in war and readiness in peace. Based on these achievements which you all are very familiar with, I think you have every right once a year to "let it all hang out."

I have been to a number of these occasions, and I couldn't help thinking about them—at shore, at sea, and in foreign countries. They are always festive occasions. I think it's appropriate that the first Marine recruiting station was formed in a bar in Philadelphia. It did make a great deal of sense to me.

I couldn't help thinking, as I always do, when I hear General LeJeune's words about what drives the Corps and what the motivation is that seems to distinguish them—it's the pride. It's not a false pride. It's the pride that's based on tremendous achievement. It's also based on an awful lot of hard work, not only coaching new Marines but also preserving that tradition.

I watched my own son let the Marine Corps tear him apart and rebuild him from a child to a man. The main characteristic that it gave him is pride—pride in his country, pride in the Corps, pride in his self. And this is characteristic of all Marines.

One of the characteristics that I have always admired is that Marines, no matter what their expertise or specialty, are always Marines. I've heard it said, "If you scratch a Marine aviator, you will find an infantryman. If you scratch a naval aviator, you'll find him in sick bay."

The important point, of course, is that the Marine Corps and Marines have a special place in the hearts of all Americans and in our history. Every schoolboy learns early in his life that the Marines are noted for steadfastness and devotion to duty—for patriotism,

for their ability to tell exaggerated sea stories, for their reputation as a lover, and above all, of course, for their courage with a capital "C." We've heard that referred to all the way from Mexico to Korea, from Tripoli to Vietnam. Marines exhibit their courage time and time again.

So, on behalf of the nation and on behalf of your fellow Services, I would like to extend to you every good wish and my deep admiration and affection. Happy Birthday. Thank you very much.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Central Command

MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida | November 27

General [Paul Xavier] Kelley, distinguished visitors and guests, and soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen of the United States Central Command:

It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here this morning. Tampa Bay was the historic point for Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders' departure. Contrary to popular rumor, I was not present on that occasion. Nevertheless, Tampa Bay has since that day turned into a wonderful harbor and haven among two beautiful and progressive cities on this planet. Contrasting today's weather with Washington's drizzle and cold, I can assure you that it is really enjoyable to be here basking in the warmth of Florida hospitality and sunshine. I can understand why Bob Kingston was so reluctant to come to the DRB [Defense Resources Board]. I'm sure that is partially the reason, if not the whole reason.

It is also a privilege for me to be a part of this ceremony today. We are passing to General George Crist the stewardship of the United States Central Command, one of America's seven unified commands, and we are simultaneously marking the retirement of a most distinguished combat leader and veteran, General Bob Kingston.

Changes of command are a time-honored custom among military organizations, wherein total responsibility is transferred from one individual to another. A responsibility that is so necessary for effective military organization is retained even though the colors pass from hand to hand. Today, as we watch these symbols of authority pass, I think that it is appropriate that we pay particular honor to the incumbent, Bob Kingston, who has led this force from its inception and in the intervening three years established it as a full-fledged unified command respected and supported by our Middle Eastern friends and allies throughout his AOR [area of responsibility]!

I will not dwell on the sentiment felt by us all at the departure of Bob Kingston—he, of course, was a soldier, diplomat, fighter, and promoter of US interests worldwide. It goes without saying that he will be sorely missed. Rather, I want for a moment to celebrate and to honor an exceptional career marked by unusual accomplishment, which comes to a close today. It started in Brookline, Massachusetts, 36 years ago.

It has been an extraordinary 36 years of understated heroism and service for Bob and his lovely wife, Jo, who has gone from post to post fashioning his career. It has also been

a highly varied career—from the fire-swept hills of Korea to the jungles of Vietnam…, and finally on to a certain hangout here in Tampa for revenue-runners called "Crawdaddy's." I'd like to visit Crawdaddy's, but unfortunately I'm not going to have the time today. But I'm told that I can go there any time for alligator steak, and all I have to do is take Bob Kingston and I will be well-received and welcomed.

Bob and I are of the same generation. In the several decades that we have been in the Armed Forces of the United States, the world and our country have undergone a host of changes. Technological advances have transformed our physical world and permitted our country to reach unparalleled levels of prosperity. On the other hand, these same changes have shrunk the globe incredibly and thrust our nation four-square into the international community—with all the benefits and all the problems that entails.

In the process, our Armed Forces have become an indispensable pillar of the tranquility and well-being that we enjoy as Americans. We have not always been at peace, and oft-times our personnel in uniform have had to fight and sacrifice to protect our way of life and our global interests. Throughout his impressive career, Bob Kingston has been in the forefront of such men and women—in the very heart of battle. He rose through the ranks, having spent a year as an enlisted man. He drew two combat tours in Korea—participating with distinction in the Inchon landing, and later undertaking the hazardous duties of clandestine amphibious operations behind enemy lines. This, of course, was not the only unique and remarkable part of his career.

In the 1960s, he served as an exchange officer to the United Kingdom with the 16th Independent Parachute Group, where he commanded a British company in the parachute regiment. During the Vietnam War, he served as adviser to the Vietnamese Rangers and later as Commanding Officer of the First of the 35th Infantry. During that tour, he received the Distinguished Service Cross, our nation's second highest decoration for valor. It is particularly noteworthy that after two tours of combat in Korea and another in Vietnam, he returned to Indochina a second and a third time.

For a career soldier like Bob Kingston, the war in Vietnam could not come to an end until his fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were accounted for. He became the Commander of the Joint Casualty Center in Thailand. Many of you are familiar with the important work he did there—recovering and accounting for our missing comrades in arms. As Admiral [Noel] Gayler, one of my predecessors as Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, said, "Bob Kingston consistently demonstrated high standards in judgment, leadership, and common sense. He can handle big jobs." And the big jobs did come. You heard them recounted today in his biography: training billets where he shared his tremendous knowledge and experience to others; a major post in Korea, as well as a major command; and then, of course, the biggest of all, CINCCENT [Commander in Chief, Central Command], where his performance certainly fulfilled the assessment that Admiral Gayler made.

I know I speak for every member of this command when I say that we will feel a particular sense of loss at your departure, Bob. Throughout over four years of service here, you brought your unique perspectives to your task. You have dedicated yourself totally to enhancing the effectiveness of this command. I can assert from my experience as a

former fellow-CINC that Bob Kingston vigorously insisted on realism in exercises, encouraged broader participation by US forces and friendly nations in the region, dramatically improved command and control and intelligence capabilities, and promoted ingenious means to test and train US forces.

You will forgive me if I cut off the list right there, because it goes on and on. Suffice it to say that he leaves the Command a fully ready force, equal to the tasks first set out for it in 1979 when the Rapid Deployment Force was first conceived. This is no mean achievement. We are deeply indebted as a nation to Bob Kingston. Bob and Jo, on behalf of your many friends in Tampa and our citizens throughout the country and overseas, I wish you well and every good fortune in your coming endeavors. As we say in the Navy, "May you always have fair winds and following seas."

It is well that General Kingston has succeeded so thoroughly in his work. CENTCOM's area of responsibility is large and diverse, extending from Egypt east to Pakistan; from Jordan south to Kenya—vast land areas bridging two continents and a region as far from our shores as any strategic area. It encompasses important trade routes. It is the seat of the world's three leading religions. It contains vast mineral wealth and encompasses 19 sovereign nations with a variety of political leanings. Today the region unfortunately is plagued with a bitter war and considerable turmoil. Most important, it comprises diverse, proud peoples who share a common hope for security and stability—many of whom look to the United States for assistance and for leadership as they search for peace.

That is why my predecessor, Jack Vessey, on 1 January 1983, activated USCENTCOM as a full-fledged unified command. Its purpose: not to wage war but to prevent it—to deter hostilities by the demonstration of our willingness and capability, manifested in this command, to support our interests and our friends throughout the region. Today, the task of carrying on that challenge passes to General George Crist. George and Barbara, I bid you welcome to CENTCOM and Tampa. I speak for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in saying that we are pleased to have you here.

George, your selection for this important position underscores the faith the President has in your skill, leadership, and devotion to duty. When you settle in and survey your command, I am confident you will be impressed by its capabilities and above all by its dedicated people. I think that I can say happily that this is a banner year for the Villanova Wildcats, George Crist's alma mater. Not only did the Wildcats win the national basketball title but they also see one of their own as the first marine ever to lead a unified command.

To the men and women of the Command, let me say how much I have admired your accomplishments and evident operational talents. Your achievements in support of our national strategy are legion. I have known General Crist well for several years. He is a proven combat veteran, a man of unflagging energy and devotion, and an officer of broad strategic vision, more than equal to the tasks before him. I am confident he will lead the CENTCOM team to new levels of achievement. I charge you to give him your full measure of loyalty.

Finally, to all present today, I am mindful we meet here on the eve of our great national holiday. I wish you all—and especially to Bob and Jo Kingston as they depart—a blessed, safe, and happy Thanksgiving.

Remarks at the Change of Command and Retirement Ceremony USLANTCOM and SACLANT

Norfolk, Virginia | November 27

[Lieutenant] General [Maurice J. L.]Gysemberg [of Belgium], distinguished guests:

It is always a great pleasure to return to Norfolk, historic haven for American fighting ships and within cannon shot of the first battle between ironclads. It is difficult to imagine that these lands were purchased over three centuries ago from an Old Dominion carpenter for only five tons of tobacco—a realization made all the more difficult in view of the current prosperity of the Tidewater area. Of interest today, this community embodies and fosters a close civil-military partnership. As the home of the Atlantic Fleet, Hampton Roads has welcomed thousands of sailors, and its citizens have always been staunch supporters of a strong defense posture. The city of Norfolk is particularly apropos as a site for this occasion, because it annually honors our nation's commitment to NATO with its renowned Azalea Festival.

It is hard to realize that the next Azalea Festival will be the 33rd, which reminds us that NATO itself is now past its middle age. While this great alliance has suffered the normal pangs and trials that attend all multinational undertakings, it is the largest and most successful peace movement the world has ever witnessed—offering the people of Europe and North America the longest sustained period of tranquility in this century. For four decades, through the wisdom of our statesmen and the readiness of our arms, Western Europe has avoided external aggression. This is no mean achievement.

In turn, the US Atlantic Command has been a crucial player in this drama. Certainly, all of us here today appreciate the great collective stake we have in liberty and our institutions and our way of life, but also in the ocean highways that connect and bind together our coalition. Ever mindful of our past, our nation and our allies are committed to the freedom of the seas as the sine qua non of the effective defense of NATO-Europe itself. Recent Soviet activity and deployments in the region have underscored Moscow's recognition of how important international seaways are to the security of the West.

Put simply, the Atlantic can either be a bridge or a barrier. Given the character and great resources of our great alliance, to win the land battle we must win at sea. Hence, Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force elements in this great command guard and promote our interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean regions.

The Atlantic Command graphically testifies to the multipurpose nature of American power. Our strength buttresses NATO's political designs; it signals US determination to resist aggression; it serves as an inspiration to those of us who labor in the alliance vineyards; it is an integral part of the Coalition's deterrent posture; it contributes heavily to Washington's ability to respond to regional crises; and, in the event of major hostilities, it would play a crucial role in the defense of the entire Free World. These truths have not

been lost on the Kremlin. Every day we see increasing evidence of Soviet respect for this command and the power it represents.

It follows that excellence in LANTCOM's combat readiness, training, and leadership is not merely desirable; the command's ability to fight and to fight well is an indispensable pillar of our national policy. We can all be grateful, extremely grateful, that under Admiral Wes McDonald's guiding hand extremely high standards have been set and surpassed—that his forces have met every test with superb performance.

It is a high privilege for me to participate in this ceremony today as we acknowledge our deep debt to Wes McDonald for three years of peerless leadership and welcome Admiral Lee Baggett as he assumes the LANTCOM mantle.

This festivity has special poignancy because not only does it symbolize the continuity of responsibility in the passing of the symbol but it also marks the close of a distinguished military career. I will not dwell on Admiral McDonald's superb performance: his decisive responses to the Soviet threat as SACLANT; his promotion of new doctrine and tactics among the Fleet and among our allies to integrate new equipment more thoroughly; and, as CINCLANT, his incisive direction of the Grenada rescue operation. Certainly, these and other achievements are legion and well-known to you all. I want to focus instead on an unusual and exceptional lifetime of service. Let it be clear—I do not consider this a sad occasion, but one of celebration and recognition. I don't consider military retirement an ending, but the beginning of another adventure, particularly for someone of Wes McDonald's personality and considerable talents. The Navy's loss is the civilian world's gain, particularly when a man of Wes' stature joins its ranks.

The US Navy has a World War I recruiting poster that says, "Don't read history, make it." A review of Wes McDonald's career vivifies this poster for me—he is a rare combination of history books and a world atlas. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946, but he is a member of the Class of 1947—don't ask me to explain that, just take my word for it. I have spent a great deal of time explaining it, because Wes and I are classmates. We are the only two still on active duty. The rest have gone on to be Presidents like Jimmy Carter, CIA directors like Stansfield Turner, chief executive officers like Tom Pownall, and Medal of Honor winners like Jim Stockdale. It was pointed out to me one sour note about the whole business today, and I hesitate to repeat it, but there's a distinct possibility that after this ceremony, I may be the oldest man in the Navy. I am neither going to confirm or disaffirm that statement. I am going to ignore it.

The world has changed dramatically since Wes McDonald left Annapolis. He first flew in the "SNJ" and in the cloth-covered, tail-dragging "SNB"—otherwise known as the "Secret Navy Bomber." Today, F-14 jets can go faster straight up than the SNB could straight down. His first ship was CV-47, the *Philippine Sea*—remarkably simpler than this magnificent vessel, USS *America*. When he was a midshipman, nuclear power, satellites, missiles, and lasers were more comic strip material than reality and the volunteer Navy was over two decades in the future.

In the 39 years since he graduated, he has served with distinction in peace and war: ranging from a tour as an Air Force exchange pilot—the greatest sacrifice of his career,

a trip to the South Pole accompanying Admiral Byrd in 1946, and leading the initial air strike on North Vietnam in 1964. In time, he commanded a carrier, oversaw a naval district, led a fighting fleet, became a personnel management expert, and as OP 05 was a prime mover in shaping today's naval aviation.

Above all, Wes has managed to move with the times and to adjust as the world has undergone economic, technological, and political change. He is one of the new breed of leaders who is attuned not only to technological advance but also to the social pressures of the modern world. He is a humanist with great empathy for those he leads and who commands, not by fiat but by example. He is at home on the bridge of a ship, before Congress, talking to civic clubs, managing funds, negotiating with foreign military leaders, as well as telling exaggerated sea stories about the "good old days." If I were to characterize his most singular attribute, it would be as he was portrayed in the *Lucky Bag* [the US Naval Academy yearbook] by his classmates at Annapolis 39 years ago: "Never too busy to extend a cheery hello…, his genuine interest in others has made him one of the best-liked fellows in the class." That is still true today. Incidentally, he is the president of our class today.

When we graduated thirty-nine years ago, the commencement speaker was James Forrestal. I'll be candid. I don't remember a great deal that he said, but he gave us one piece of advice that has stuck in my memory vividly over the years. He said, "Always conduct yourself so that you are welcomed when you return to your hometown." Wes McDonald will always be welcome to return to his hometown.

In an age when many young men and women are searching for someone to emulate, I would advise them to focus on Wes McDonald's record of exceptional achievement and of dedicated service to our great nation. His major accomplishment, of course, was marrying Norma, a warm and very impressive lady. I'm sure that there is no one here that would disagree. For some forty years, Wes and Norma have followed the colors, savoring their life together. The *Navy Times* tells me on a full-page advertisement that the toughest job in the Navy is being a Navy wife. I frankly agree full-heartedly. Despite Wes' long hours, his numerous jet-setting trips across the Atlantic, and the demanding operational requirements, Norma has always kept a steady hand on the helm as the First Lady of the Atlantic—a superb representative of the command, the military services, and the nation. Her leading role in the publication *Wife Line* in raising support for Navy relief and in supporting the American Cancer Society has made her a most valued member of the Navy community. We will all miss her patriotism, optimism, calmness, and graciousness. Norma, I'm told that at retirement you have twice as much husband and half as much pay, and I hope you can handle that.

The bottom line is that in richness of life and in the fullness of accomplishment, Wes and Norma have outdone that recruiting poster by making history, not reading it. They are graphic examples of how wonderful military life can be and how husband and wife can work as a team. They are the best recruiting poster we could devise for young men and women entering the Services today. This nation is blessed to have people like the McDonalds who give so much of themselves in the behalf of others.

Wes and Norma, speaking for your many friends in Hampton Roads, throughout the Atlantic Command, our country, and in NATO, I wish you the best of everything in the coming years.

As military people, change is a constant for us. With the departure of a comrade comes the arrival of new friends. This continual process refreshes, stimulates, and ensures quality armed forces. It is one of the great attractions of military life.

Today, we greet Lee Baggett and his lovely wife, Doris, from Pascagoula, Mississippi. Lee is a distinguished officer with an enviable reputation. He fought in Korea and Vietnam. His credentials in NATO are also well-established: he has just completed a tour as Commander of Allied Forces in Southern Europe and CINCUSNAVEUR. Like Wes, he is totally familiar with the political-military world. But, unlike Wes, Lee and Doris are avid golfers—fortunately, I believe they have the talent to overcome that handicap. Your selection for this important position, Lee, underscores the faith the President and the Secretary of Defense have in your skill, leadership, and devotion to duty. When you settle in and survey your command, I believe that you will be impressed by its capabilities and, above all, by its dedicated people. Lee and Doris, welcome aboard!

I am confident you will find many rewarding challenges here. At the same time, I urge you to enjoy the hospitality of Hampton Roads and all the richness of life it has to offer. Finally, to all present today, I am mindful that we meet here on the eve of our great national holiday. I wish you all—and especially to Wes and Norma as they depart Service life—a blessed, safe, and happy Thanksgiving.

Statement on Defense Organization before the Senate Armed Services Committee
December 12

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to share with you my views on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commands. I believe your current review of these matters to be timely, appropriate, and important to the Nation.

As you are aware, I have been in my post only ten weeks. It is probably a little premature for me to be making grand pronouncements about the duties of the Chairman since I am still looking for some of the light switches in my office. However, I am not a newcomer to the general subject, having served the last five years in command of joint and unified forces and three years before that on the JCS as the operations deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations. In any event, despite my recent arrival, I intend today to call the shots as I see them at this juncture.

Senate Staff Report and House Bill

As you know, we are engaged in a three-track process of review and possible reform of the national security machinery. On November 20th, the House of Representatives passed by a wide margin HR 3622, modifying the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Concurrently, this committee is considering the House bill and the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report with a view toward legislation not yet defined. Finally, a Presidential Commission, headed by the Honorable David Packard, is examining operational and organizational arrangements in the Department of Defense, including, but not limited to, the JCS.

I have not as yet seen any of the work or products of the Packard Commission, so I cannot comment on its findings. However, I have read the report prepared by your staff on "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." Similarly, I have studied the House Armed Services Committee report on HR 3622, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985," as well as the bulk of the testimony taken by this committee.

The SASC staff report includes some excellent historical material, treats thoughtfully selected subjects (e.g., civilian control, German General Staff, etc.), and illuminates a number of problem areas that deserve examination. Nevertheless, I would argue that where the JCS is concerned, it is flawed in three respects.

First, it builds an imbalanced case while quoting extensively from critics of the system; it does not address the extensive role of the JCS in everyday operations and management of our global forces. Overall, the one-sided approach of the report conveys a picture of confusion and breakdown, which I believe is misleading. Moreover, the report leaves the impression that the Chiefs of Service are unduly parochial, extremely self-serving, and that log-rolling dominates the JCS. Even in the short time I have been aboard, it is manifest to me that such a description does the JCS a disservice. I have never served with a more thoughtful and broad-minded group of senior officers. They are human, of course, and on occasion make mistakes, but all the organizations I have ever been associated with suffer from those imperfections. I would not quarrel with the conclusion that improvements can and should be made in the JCS organization. On the other hand, it is not necessary to distort the picture in order to make that case.

Second, this same study has given short shrift to the changes made in the last three years by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to improve internal management, to encourage cross-Service cooperation, and to promote joint solutions to problems. The testimony of the four Chiefs of Service this week treated these steps in some detail, so I will not dwell on them. Suffice it to say, these recent improvements are especially pertinent for your deliberations, and I would have preferred that the SASC report had emphasized them in its analysis.

Last and most disturbing, the principal recommendation of the report—to replace the JCS with a body of advisers divorced from both the operational and administrative worlds of the Services—would add another layer to an already overloaded bureaucracy, and its adoption would be, in my view, a serious mistake. I will have more to say on this question later.

The House Armed Services Committee report differs from the Senate staff effort in two important ways. First, it does not attempt to judge JCS performance over the last 40 years—a matter on which honest people can genuinely disagree. Rather, it focuses attention on the needs of today and suggests that the JCS and the Joint Staff should be more detached from Service interests, deal more objectively with some tough resource-related issues, and move further to integrate US Armed Forces along lines envisioned in the National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Act of 1958. Second, it does not propose to completely reorganize the Department of Defense as it now exists.

Rather, the House report seeks further improvements in the JCS organization and recommends some shift in lines of authority within the JCS structure.

Own Assessment

At this point I believe a few words about my own view of the JCS system are in order.

You are generally familiar with functions assigned to the JCS and the Joint Staff by public law and DOD directive—i.e., to serve as principal military advisers; prepare strategic, military, and logistics plans; and so on. But these crisp statements of function do not begin to describe real-world demands placed upon the JCS system. To a great extent, these tasks cut across the entire spectrum of Defense management, military preparedness, peacetime operations, and war planning, with or without participation of our allies. They involve strategic concepts, threat assessments, force development, current military planning on a global scale, peacetime assignment of forces to the unified commands, joint reconnaissance activities, worldwide exercise schedules, security assistance requirements and priorities, overseas base negotiations, host nation support agreements, forces and options in support of diplomatic objectives, crisis management, counterterrorism, and a host of complex issues surrounding arms control initiatives and ventures. Given such a range of demands and achievements, I would argue that the JCS has served the Nation rather well.

At the same time, I would readily admit that we should be seeking organizational improvements. Unquestionably, the global strategic and military environments are in flux. The worldwide sweep of our commitments, the burgeoning Soviet challenge, and the complexity of our alliance network are taxing our ability to develop a resource-efficient and coherent strategy, which will carry us into the future. Similarly, increasingly constrained resources dictate that we get the maximum return on our investment. In military terms, that means we must more and more operate jointly and make the plans and programs of the Services more complementary. Complicating the picture is terrorism and low-level conflict in the Third World. Keeping pace with these developments is straining our capabilities. In response, Secretary Weinberger, working with my predecessor, [US Army] General [John] Vessey and the Service Chiefs, has for some time been seeking ways within the bounds of current legislation to improve Defense organization and introduce more efficient procedures. The JCS views this challenge as a continuing one, and you have had a succession of government witnesses testify that there is indeed room for further modest organizational changes. I readily concur with this assessment.

Philosophy

With this background and in the light of my own experience, I would like to share some personal observations that condition or guide my approach to reorganization. These thoughts are not new, but they seem to have a tendency to get lost as the debate intensifies. The principle of civilian control is deeply rooted in our Services from top to bottom. This is not just a product of carefully crafted rules, but of our society's mores, our educational institutions, our recruitment and training system, and our way of life. In the spate of recent reorganization studies, I have seen no serious recommendations that would threaten civilian control. Clearly, national security is a complex and challenging business. The predominant reason (but by no means the only one) that Defense organization does not always perform as desired is that issues and choices facing the decisionmakers are both diverse and thorny. This fact of life will not change no matter what organization we adopt.

When one addresses reorganization, he is essentially talking about redistributing power, and this fact introduces a great deal of passion into the dialogue. One of the most difficult tasks your committee faces will be to separate emotional from intellectual arguments. Where so many vested interests and threads come together, evolutionary steps are preferable to sharp and dramatic reform. If change is to be successfully implemented in a large and complex organization such as the Defense Department, it must be done in modest steps with at least a modicum of agreement among the competing elements. Unintended and unpredictable consequences will inevitably attend every change. Moving in a deliberate rather than a precipitate fashion will allow managers to uncover and better deal with such consequences as they emerge. The Joint Staff is directly dependent on contributions from all the Service staffs and/or from the Service Chiefs themselves. Every joint operation depends in part on specialized knowledge or expertise resident in the Services, not to mention the necessary equipment and forces.

Organizational changes must honor this fundamental reality. Similarly, no matter how much authority the Chairman has, he cannot know everything, and he will, of necessity, be relying on others for assistance. No Chairman who takes his responsibilities seriously would function in any other way. Thus, no matter what changes are made, it is imperative that the Chairman's ties and two-way channels of communication with the Chiefs of Services be kept open. The balance of authority can be shifted somewhat, but the Chairman's effectiveness will always rest in large part on his ability to do business with the individual Chiefs and Services. No matter what changes are made, it is vital to preserve the JCS channel for getting unvarnished military advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

Detailed Proposals

Let me now move from the general to the specific. I intend to speak to those recommendations which impress me as the most important and to state my views briefly. If you desire, I will be happy to expand on my reasoning or to comment on other issues during the questioning period.

The JCS System Overall

I believe that the JCS system is the best mechanism this nation has for coordinating the preparations for and the conduct of modern warfare. It brings together, as no other system would, the views of Service Chiefs responsible for building forces (organizing, equipping, training, and providing for the US Armed Forces) and the advice of the unified commanders responsible for carrying out operational missions. It is also flexible enough to furnish a mechanism for the President to direct discrete military operations, as in counterterrorism or other limited operations with a high political content from Washington with direct advice and support from the JCS. Such flexibility is very important in today's dynamic climate. If you have concluded from the thrust of these remarks that I would oppose replacing the JCS with a new body of advisers, such as the "Joint Military Advisory Council" recommended in the SASC staff report, you would be correct. I strongly believe that such a group would not be as effective as the current JCS in rendering National Command Authorities practical military advice, in influencing service programs to support the needs of the operational forces, or in assisting the Chairman to carry out his duties. I am aware, of course, that the "dual" responsibilities of the chiefs are on occasion difficult to fulfill, but I believe the strengths that derive from this arrangement on balance outweigh the demerits. As mentioned earlier, my own experience argues strongly for keeping the Chiefs of Services tied into the central mechanism.

Military Advice to National Command Authorities

Under the existing rules and practices, I do not feel particularly hampered in furnishing my personal advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. I believe there is merit, however, in designating the Chairman as the principal adviser, so that there is no question about the Chairman's right to express his own views on military issues. At the same time, as emphasized earlier, it is important that the JCS' right to render their collective advice on their own initiative, as opposed to "on request," should be protected. In this regard, I support requiring the Chairman to set forth the dissenting views of other Chiefs if they do, in fact, disagree with the Chairman. Some of the Chiefs testified last week that they would like the Chairman to act as principal adviser "on behalf of" the JCS. I have no problem with this proposal.

Management of the Joint Staff

I join a commonly held view that the management of the Joint Staff needs more attention. With respect to the Joint Staff, I already have considerable authority. As Chairman, I set the agenda for the JCS, can force items forward whether there is agreement or not, and can task the Joint Staff to meet my own requirements. The one area that concerns me now is the control of the Staff's workload. As others have noted, the Joint Staff handles thousands of issues annually, representing requests from many directions, including the service chiefs, commanders of the unified commands, the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, OSD, and the Congress. I know of no other civilian or military staff that receives taskings from so many sources. The Chairman sees a few hundred of these papers as they move

to the top of an agenda, which he controls. But I am equally concerned about those other actions that may be diverting the Joint Staff from more important and relevant business. Thus, I strongly believe that the Chairman, assisted by the Director, should be authorized to review and screen all taskings to the Joint Staff with discretionary authority to return low-priority or ill-defined items to the originator. The Chiefs and I have discussed this problem and I believe we can resolve it without legislative action. No matter what management system we adopt, it is vital that any chief be permitted to table questions that he feels are important to our security and have them aired in the JCS. Thus, whatever authority you give me, I would move to see that such access for the Chiefs is protected.

Military Chain of Command

I tend to agree with those concerned about having the JCS as a corporate body in the military chain of command. DOD Directive 5100.30 partially solves the committee problem by specifying that "the channel of communication for execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations shall be from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the executing commanders." Additionally, I favor the chain of command running through the Chairman, as a standard practice, if the Secretary of Defense or President deem it desirable.

Deputy or Vice Chairman

One proposal for strengthening the Chairman's position is a four-star deputy or vice chairman. Several variants have been discussed during the course of these hearings. I personally concur with promoting the Director to four-stars and designating him as a "vice chairman." To me this is a logical step toward sharing the Chairman's duties, thereby permitting him to manage his time better and strengthening management of the Joint Staff. I do, however, subscribe to the present arrangement where the Chiefs of Service act in the Chairman's stead during his absence from Washington and assume this responsibility for a set period. My short time in office has convinced me that both the Services and the JCS benefit from the Chiefs' experience as Acting Chairman.

Role and Authority of the CINCs

Having just completed serving as a unified commander for two years in the Pacific, I am concerned with one other issue—the role and authority of the CINCs. I expressed myself in writing on this subject last year in response to queries from this committee. In essence, it is my strong belief that the directives governing the CINC's place in the chain of command should be reassessed and their role somewhat strengthened. The JCS have discussed this issue and have already initiated a review of the governing document, "Unified Action Armed Forces", colloquially known as JCS PUB 2. At this reading, it appears we can achieve what needs to be done without legislation. In any event, I would urge you not to act on this particular question until we have completed our assessment and reported the resulting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. We anticipate that this action will be completed in six months. In this regard, the House bill recommends that the Chairman

be given responsibility to "supervise" the CINCs in addition to his current responsibilities. In a limited sense, I do that now as the agent of the Secretary of Defense. But I do see some merit in codifying this relationship, since it would dispel any confusion.

Mr. Chairman, these remarks cover my principal concerns and suggestions. Overall, I am deeply impressed by this committee's effort to come to grips with Defense organizational issues which, to quote your staff report, have confounded some of the "most thoughtful, decisive, and experienced" minds we have. Your decision to broaden these hearings, with reference to work already accomplished by the House, has made it easier for me to survey the landscape of possibilities and to express my preference for the general direction of change. I can assure you that I and the Chiefs collectively and individually are taking very seriously your efforts to improve the Defense machinery.

We have a vested interest in improving our ability to carry out our responsibilities and are determined to work with you in this endeavor.

1986
SELECTED WORKS

Statement on FY 1987 DOD Budget before the Senate Budget Committee
February 6

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee today and provide my assessment of the nation's Defense establishment. While I am convinced that the current posture of the Armed Forces is sound, I likewise believe there is a great deal yet to be done to insure the nation's future security—particularly in the face of a steadily increasing Soviet threat and Moscow's broadening use of surrogates. I am, of course, aware that there is some pressure to cut back Defense appropriations in an effort to assist in reducing the current national deficit.

Therefore, I believe it important, in my first opportunity as Chairman to testify on the budget, that I comment not only on the status of our Armed Forces but as well on the role military strength plays in US policymaking and in the American relationship with the international community. I would strongly argue that deliberations on the military budget should commence with a clear understanding of what our Defense establishment does for us.

The Role of US Military Strength

The Secretary of Defense has provided the Congress with a comprehensive statement of US defense policy. That statement notes, among other things, that the fundamental goals of our National Security Policy have remained essentially unchanged since the 1940s to:

- Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United States;
- Preserve US and allied vital interests abroad; and
- Shape an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can survive and prosper.

These are not just empty words—they genuinely describe what our strength can and does do for us. It has provided us a great deal more than simply a shield against direct attack. That same power underwrites our dealings with the international community—for example, to use the sea lanes, to communicate with friends overseas, to approach arms

control negotiations with confidence, and to cement alliances which, in turn, enhance our own security. In fact, our strength has been an indispensable pillar not only of our own freedom but also the freedom of our friends and allies around the world.

For five years before returning to Washington, I served in command billets that brought me in touch with most of our major allies and a good share of the Third World. In NATO, I observed firsthand that our military contribution to that coalition anchors its unity and political structure. When I served as USCINCPAC, a succession of Asian leaders emphasized to me the importance of a strong America with forces forward-deployed in the Western Pacific. In their view, our strength has deterred Soviet interference and intimidation. Behind that bulwark they have been able to seek economic prosperity and political maturity in their own fashion and at their own pace. I was continually warned that a decided Soviet military superiority in the Pacific would be disastrous.

In the last month, I have visited both Central America and the Middle East. Clearly, the leaders in both areas want a strong America as a backdrop for their efforts to build free and functioning societies. To allow our strength to deteriorate would seriously undermine their efforts as well as sacrifice our own goals.

In essence, our military capability provides us a host of benefits in terms of both national security and foreign policy. Every day we are realizing a return on our investment as the Armed Forces provide an umbrella under which all our other cards are played.

These considerations have, over the years, shaped our general military strategy. Its key components are:

- Collective security coupled with a vigorous overseas defense of the United States;
- A strong and credible strategic deterrent to either nuclear or conventional military attack on the United States and its allies;
- Capable forward-deployed conventional forces to assist allies and to deal quickly with emerging crises;
- A central reserve to augment forward-deployed units or deal with the unforeseen circumstances over a wide spectrum of violence (to include low-intensity conflict and counterterrorism) and in a variety of climes;
- The sea and airlift capability to project and support US forces on a global basis;
- The ability to ensure America's free and uninterrupted use of the seas for trade and security purposes;
- A vigorous security assistance program to aid allies and friends in improving their ability to defend themselves; and
- A willingness to engage in meaningful arms limitation negotiations.

These principles, of course, combine to make up our military policy. Granted, it is a demanding strategy, but one that befits our goals and our position as a leader of the Free World. Even though this strategy does not call for the United States to match its adversaries weapon for weapon, I often hear the argument that we should cut back our commitments to better fit our resources. But the proponents of such a philosophy don't

seem to be able to reach agreement on what commitments to cut back, what regions to neglect, or what allies to cut adrift. Without such a consensus, the argument has little force, particularly, in today's interdependent and uncertain world.

The Threat

By definition, our strategy is determined not only by our own interests but also by the actions of our opponents. As Secretary Weinberger emphasizes in his statement, "in this respect the Soviet Union remains the dominant consideration," Moscow still harbors dreams of unlimited expansion and of the ultimate defeat of the free world. Yet communism's ideological appeal has steadily lost ground, and the Kremlin has been plagued with a host of intractable economic and political problems. As a result, Soviet leaders are turning more and more to raw power to achieve their objectives, either directly or indirectly—witness Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. The thrust of their military buildup is ambitious, hostile to free governments, and persistent.

Over the last 30 years, every one of my predecessors has expressed concern about the Soviet worldwide threat and the evolving military balance. Today, the sheer size of current Soviet forces and the scale and momentum of the Kremlin's modernization efforts are of significant concern. Tremendous advances have been made in hardware over the last two decades, upsetting many of the advantages we held in the immediate post-war period.

For example, the strategic nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The Soviets now enjoy superiority in ICBMs, medium-range nuclear forces, and in mobile ballistic missiles. They are a burgeoning nuclear power intent on achieving dominance over the US strategic deterrent. As to conventional arms, they lead the world. The Soviet inventory includes about a 4-to-1 advantage over the United States in tanks, 2-to-1 in aircraft, and 5-to-1 in artillery. These gaps will likely continue to grow, since the Soviets have historically produced more weapons than the combined efforts of the United States and NATO. The personnel picture is no different. Active Soviet military forces outnumber US active forces by about 2-to-1. Similarly, their progress in space commands deep respect: e.g., satellites, ABMs, and ASATs. Perhaps most impressive is the rise of the Soviet navy in the last 30 years from a short-legged regional force to a blue water fleet with a global reach. I won't dwell on statistics because Russian accomplishments are well-documented in our Posture Statement and Defense literature. In sum, this buildup is unprecedented in world history and on sheer momentum will carry well into the 1990s, if not longer. In this regard, it is important to note:

Soviet military doctrine consistently stresses the offense and a "war winning" philosophy.

- Their forces vastly exceed those necessary to defend their own shores.
- They are today capable of waging war on two fronts, both in the east and in the west.
- Given their modern navy and political connections with satellite countries, they now have a global military reach.
- The Soviets possess an overwhelming superiority in the area of offensive chemical weapons.

Most disturbing, the qualitative edge the West has long enjoyed is being eroded. This has been achieved through large R&D investments, emphasis on technological education (4 times as many engineers as the United States in the last 10 years), piracy of Western technology, and a willingness to accept inefficiencies in the process.

Special mention must be made of the increasing Soviet tendency to act through surrogates. The USSR is the world's largest arms salesman, delivering some $95 billion in weapons over the last decade. Approximately $80 billion worth of equipment, some new and some outdated by Soviet standards, has been funneled into the Third World during the same period. In turn, Soviet customers are emerging as the military powerhouses of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Moreover, Moscow continues to be successful in having its clients act against Western governments and peoples. The result is a burgeoning terrorist threat, more small but fierce regional conflicts, and an increasing willingness of small anti-American regimes to challenge Washington. Perhaps this trend is the result of our success in preserving a rough balance of power which deters direct Soviet action against the West, but the fact remains it presents a serious and growing challenge to the US military.

Concurrently, we see new leadership in the Kremlin, which appears to be reinvigorating the [Communist] Party apparatus. We also know that with all of its military muscle, the Kremlin faces some very thorny political, economic, and social problems. How all of this will affect Soviet behavior over the next few years remains to be seen. I am convinced, however, that the United States will be in a far better position to influence the Gorbachev regime if we continue discussions and negotiations from a position of increasing rather than sagging military strength.

Whatever you decide, let it be based on a full and unemotional appreciation of the peril we face. These threats cannot be assumed away, nor is it necessary to overstate them. They are impressive and ominous in their own right.

Current Status and the FY 1987 Budget

Let me now move to the state of our Armed Forces. Last year, General Vessey testified before this committee that "by every common sense measure, our forces are more ready than at any time in the recent past." That statement remains valid today and is made possible by the support of our citizenry and the Congress. On behalf of the men and women in the Armed Forces, I thank you. Each of the service chiefs will testify in some detail as to the major concerns and the requirements of his service. I will speak to our overall war-fighting capability from my perspective as Chairman. To do this, I have selected five broad areas of interest—manpower, modernization, training, sustainability, and Special Operations Forces. Before proceeding, however, a few words are in order concerning the FY 1986 fiscal climate.

As a result of a decision to level Defense spending this year and subsequent across-the-board cuts, mandated by Public Law 99-177, we already have seen a number of funding dislocations which will impact our military posture. This includes a 5 percent

reduction in operations and maintenance funding, which is forcing some belt-tightening in such areas as base management, operations tempo, and essential maintenance. Further, we see some freezes in civilian hiring as well as realignments in military personnel rotation and travel accounts. While we are striving to work around these problems, I cannot emphasize too strongly the adverse impact of such cuts on the readiness of our forces and the stability of military life. They threaten to undo much of what has been accomplished in the last few years as we have fought back from the neglect following Vietnam.

Manpower

In particular, I would not want to see reversed the remarkable improvements in our manpower situation, which is the heart of our force structure. Overall, personnel readiness is at its highest level of any peacetime period in our history. About 50 percent of the forces are careerists, and as a result, we have a solid cadre of mid-grade officer and enlisted personnel. The Nation can be extremely proud of the high caliber of its Service men and women.

FY 1985 was another successful year for all the Services. The quality of our recruits exceeded that of FY 1984. Among our non-prior service enlistees, 93 percent were high school diploma graduates and 93 percent scored average or above on the enlistment test. However, as you are aware, the youth population from which the Services can recruit continues to shrink, and recruiting can be expected to become a growing challenge in the future.

Retention continued at very high levels for FY 1985 as well, but not without potential warning signs. Overall, enlisted retention declined from FY 1984 levels for all Services in all categories except for first termers in the Army. This has aggravated shortages in some of our enlisted skills. In addition, the Navy still is having difficulty retaining sufficient nuclear officers and, along with the Air Force, continues to lose experienced pilots. In and of itself, none of this is cause for great alarm at this time. But it does serve to remind us that personnel readiness, recognized as the cornerstone of our national defense, is very fragile indeed.

The bottom line is that our most precious asset is quality personnel; consequently, as we approach the FY 1987 budget, a healthy personnel structure is the first priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is imperative that we have programs which will attract and retain adequate numbers of dedicated, intelligent, and disciplined soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Under no circumstances can we afford to return to the unstable manpower picture of the 1970s.

Modernization—Strategic Nuclear Forces

Turning to force modernization, the United States has no choice but to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent for itself and for those non-nuclear allies who depend upon it. Stated in different terms, we should be able to tell the Soviet Union: "You cannot coerce us with your nuclear arsenals, because if you launch those weapons you will suffer as much if not more damage than the United States."

Unfortunately, US strategic force modernization lagged far behind Soviet efforts during the 1970s. As a result, we have been forced to refurbish all three legs of the triad at the same time—notably with the Peacekeeper missile, the B-1 bomber, and the Trident submarine. Current plans call for placing 50 Peacekeepers into modified Minuteman silos. In addition, we urgently need to continue research into more survivable modes for basing the second 50 missiles and development of a smaller ICBM/mobile launcher.

By the end of this year, the first 20 of 100 B-1 bombers will have been delivered to the Strategic Air Command. Over the next several years, this program will partially and temporarily modernize the manned bomber element of our triad. Concurrently, we must move ahead with the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), so that it can be ready for deployment in the 1990s.

Thereafter, we will have a prudent mix of B-1B and ATB types. Additionally, we now have five deployable Trident submarines, with two more on sea trials. Each carries 24 improved C-4 missiles. In various phases, contracting and construction work continues on an additional six submarines funded by Congress through FY 1986.

This budget would fund the 14th Trident plus the D-5 missile. Because of its hard-target kill capability, the D-5 goes a long way toward increasing the potency and credibility of our strategic nuclear posture. In order to guard against tactical and technical surprise, it is essential to have an updated and healthy triad which will see us into the next century. The President's modernization program will give us that capability if it is fully carried out. We cannot afford to do otherwise.

Looking to the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wholeheartedly support the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which will muster the Nation's technological talent to determine whether an alternative to sole reliance on mutual assured destruction is feasible. It is both prudent and moral for the United States to explore means for ending the dominance of offensive ballistic missile weaponry.

Modernization—Chemical Warfare

Additionally, the JCS fervently support efforts initiated in the FY 1986 budget to develop an updated deterrent chemical capability. This program is necessary to offset a serious disadvantage on the battlefield and to counter offensive and defensive asymmetries strongly favoring the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the American fighting man in the field, it is difficult to overemphasize this request.

Modernization—General Purpose Forces

I have just returned from Europe and was able to witness firsthand some of the modern weapons and equipment which have come into the inventory as a result of investments made over the last six years. Similarly, during my tour in the Pacific, we received a stream of modern weapon systems. It is most impressive and is benefitting Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces alike. My FY 1987 Posture Statement documents these advances in some detail. It's not just quantity we are adding, but quality as well. Test scores in gunnery and bombing are steadily climbing, in great measure because

of improved munitions and fire control systems for use with tanks, artillery, fighter and attack aircraft, and ships. Higher speeds in the M-1 tank and Bradley fighting vehicle have permitted a quantum jump in the pace of our land warfare capabilities. Improved reliability and less time spent in maintenance are characteristics of these new weapon systems, which equate to increased capability.

Similarly, recent investments in airlift and sealift have materially enhanced the ability to project power in every theater. I personally watched the fast sealift ship (ALGOL) unload in Antwerp port a few days ago during exercise REFORGER. In six days it moved from Norfolk to Western Europe 33,000 metric tons, including 1,150 pieces of major equipment. Everything was unloaded in 21 hours. The integrated Aegis system is at sea and exceeding expectations in missile kill capability.

While we have made great progress over the last six years, it is also important to stress that we are only midstream in the conventional force modernization process. To cite some FY 1985 figures from the Active Army, about:

- One-third of our tank battalions have the new M-1;
- One-fourth of our mechanized battalions have the Bradley fighting vehicle;
- Two-thirds of aviation companies have the improved Blackhawk helicopter; and
- One-fifth of the air defense SAM missile batteries are equipped with the new PATRIOT.

In general, these modernized units give our people a fair chance to deter and defend in areas where they may be "first to fight," as in the Central Region of NATO. But those units not modernized—a majority of Active Army battalions and many in Reserve components—remain behind the power curve in equipment quality, particularly as reinforcements for NATO.

With respect to US tactical air forces, I find similar trends. Over the last ten years, roughly two-thirds of the Air Force's tactical fighter squadrons have been modernized with the F-15, F-16, and A-10. During the same period, the Navy modernized over half of its tactical air squadrons with such types as the F-14 or F-18. For both Services, this modernization process has not trickled down as much or as fast to the Reserves as we would like to see.

Our "blue water" Navy also is only partially into the modernization process, particularly with the new Aegis-equipped ships, which will add protection to our carrier battle groups in tomorrow's sophisticated electronic environment and help compensate for the Soviet numerical superiority. Only four battle groups are now so equipped. In addition, we remain midstream in efforts to modernize our nuclear attack submarine force, with only 33 of the 688-Class in a force of 96. If we are to face the future with the confidence that we can reinforce our allies, as on the flanks of NATO, or keep Soviet pressure off the sea lines of communication, then we must persevere with these modernization efforts.

In summary, we have made great progress over the last six years updating our conventional forces so that they can survive on the modern battlefield and compete with the Soviet threat of today and over the horizon. More progress will be seen over the next two

years as equipment currently in the pipeline reaches our combat forces. But it should be clearly understood that we are still midstream in the modernization effort. To falter now would not only stretch out the entire process but would also erode many of the gains already made and, frankly, prove more expensive in the end. The FY 1987 budget recognizes this reality and continues the momentum.

Training and Exercises

New acquisitions have been complemented by a rigorous training program designed to capitalize on their enhanced capabilities: our exercises are bringing together all the Services and increasingly include National Guard and Reserve units. Over the last year, the JCS scheduled some 95 exercises designed to evaluate doctrine, tactics, procedures, and command and control arrangements involving multiservice and multinational components. Concurrently, overseas deployment training by Army Reserve component soldiers is up by nearly 50 percent compared with five years ago.

Likewise, we are stressing more and more the logistics side of war fighting. A few examples are illustrative. The REFORGER exercise in Western Europe recently tested every aspect of reception and onward movement of reinforcements from the continental United States using host-nation support from our European allies. TEAM SPIRIT performs a similar function for the reinforcement of Korea. Central Command's BRIGHT STAR exercise is growing in realism every year and enhancing our ability to project power into the Middle East. These are just the tip of an exercise iceberg. In sum, our training is steadily becoming more joint, realistic, and innovative.

Sustainability

Other improvements can be seen in the sustainability or combat "staying power" of our forces. As a system, sustainability includes war reserve stockpiles (munitions and spares), transportation capabilities, and industrial surge capacities. We worry about potential "war stoppers" or their impact on the theater nuclear threshold. Thus, our goal in sustainability is "logistic support to our conventional forces from initiation to successful termination of any conflicts."

In line with this goal, we have seen substantial growth in US expenditures for sustainability over the last six years. In the past four years, the funding for ammunition has grown by over 25 percent; spare parts funding has doubled; and ammunition inventories of all services have improved substantially. In Europe, for instance, ground ammunition tonnage is up 18 percent, and it has almost doubled in the Pacific. Munitions deficiencies which plagued us for years are improving steadily, but at the current rate of expenditures, it will be several years before we can near our goals and breathe easier.

The FY 1987 budget still puts considerable emphasis on sustainability—and rightfully so. But years of neglect cannot be remedied easily or quickly. We simply must stay the course if we want a genuinely sustainable force as well as a modern and well-trained one. Otherwise, we will be spending a great deal for modern equipment with one hand and then reducing its effectiveness with the other.

Special Operations Forces

A particular word about Special Operations Forces [SOF] is in order. While small in total strength, our Special Operations Forces have enormous utility and value in peace, crisis, or war. Some are specifically tailored, dedicated, and readily available to protect American lives and property overseas against international terrorists or other nongovernmental groups hostile to the United States.

SOF units are comprised of the US Army Special Forces and Ranger battalions, US Air Force Special Operations Forces, and the US Navy SEAL teams. Major equipment initiatives include more helicopters with specialized mission equipment, improved AC-130 gunships, air transports, long-range communications, dry-deck shelters on submarines, and SEAL delivery vehicles, along with related support facilities. Overall, the program remains on track in FY 1986 with:

- An increase in Army contingents including CH-47D helicopters and related support;
- Expansion of the Navy's Special Warfare Training School and number of SEAL platoons; and
- New equipment acquisitions by the Air Force to upgrade the SOF aviation support fleet.

Simultaneously, considerable thought has been put into the command and control problem. I am persuaded that we now have a system which gives us considerable flexibility and permits us to exercise whatever degree of operational supervision is indicated by the circumstances.

Essentially, we have made remarkable improvements in SOF capabilities and readiness since the early 1980s. I also support the incremental approach toward improvement embodied in the general SOF revitalization program and in particular the FY 1987 submission. Many specialized and unique capabilities simply cannot be achieved on a "crash" basis. The program will require careful monitoring and management over the next few years to ensure that various components of the revitalization effort remain on track.

Overall Capability

Overall, the war-fighting capability of the US Armed Forces, Active and Reserve, remains at a high state. Keeping it there requires us to focus on two facts of life.

One, readiness is a composite of several factors: combat equipment, personnel, maintenance, exercises, and supply levels. As General George Brown observed exactly ten years ago, neglect in any one of these areas can stress separate parts of the system with an impact on overall posture. The process of deterioration may seem gradual, but the breakdown in credible military capability, should it occur, would be instant.

Readiness does not determine by itself how well a force will acquit itself in combat. A force less than fully ready may do very well. Conversely, a 100 percent ready force still

may not have adequate military capability because of quantitative or qualitative deficiencies in force structure. The obvious conclusion is that force structure and readiness are not an either/or proposition. We need to be strong in both areas. The President's budget for FY 1987 strikes such a balance.

Summary and Conclusions

Mr. Chairman, our military posture today is driven by a number of real-world demands, many of which have evolved over the last 30 years. If anything, we have become more rather than less dependent upon global peace and security than we were two or three decades ago. Layered on top of these demands is a Soviet threat which has steadily increased over time in all dimensions of modern warfare and in all of the regions which concern us most. In this environment, I see no substitute for peace through strength. Further, I believe that the prospects of influencing the Soviet Union toward a constructive posture in world affairs will depend inevitably upon our capability to negotiate from a position of strength, both today and over the long haul.

Beyond these strategic imperatives, the President's budget for FY 1987 has several other military qualities, which I support. It:

- Strongly emphasizes those capabilities essential to US security while covering others which only we can provide as a superpower and as a partner in global security arrangements;
- Continues to flesh out essential improvements in our strategic nuclear and conventional force structure, along with new initiatives in the high frontiers of technology and improvements in military compensation;
- Maintains a carefully crafted balance between equipment modernization, personnel readiness, training and exercises, maintenance and supply, and sustainability;
- Provides that growth necessary not only to continue improvements in our military posture but also to lead our allies toward a similar commitment of resources; and
- Most important, it sends a strong message of deterrence to our enemies.

This is not to say that this budget eliminates risk. Our challenges are many and our adversaries are large, powerful, and dedicated. On a typical day, we have roughly 475,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines serving on or around the Eurasian continent—essentially where our forward defense commitments abut or overlap the forward posture of Soviet Armed Forces. We count on these Americans and our allies to deter in a very high threat environment. We also recognize that they must be backed up by capable and ready forces in the United States for both deterrence and defense purposes. Yet, over $35 billion has been removed from the FY 1986 budget from what we counted on just a year ago. This is negative real growth of about 6 percent. Decrements of this nature require significant changes and rebalancing. The price in defense is in stretching out and increasing the cost in modernization and in reaching sustainment goals. We will also give up more desirable levels of flying hours, combat vehicle mileage, and steaming days. We are hitching up our britches and taking a greater risk. But this is as far as I

advise we go. We need a balanced program that allows for some real growth in FY 1987. The President's budget does that.

Excerpts of Remarks at the Dining-In for the Joint Staff

Fort Myer, Virginia | February 7

General McKnight, on behalf of all of us, I'd like to extend a hearty thank you to you and the Marine Corps for tonight. We've enjoyed it so much. I don't know when I've seen so much health concentrated in one group. I certainly haven't seen it in the Joint Staff.

It's my intention not to be too serious for a few minutes, but before that, there is one serious note I would like to strike. I've had a tough week, and I found out why General Vessey left when he did—I'm surprised General Olson didn't go with him. It was a tough week, and it raised the question: If pro is the opposite of con, is progress the opposite of Congress?

I came here tonight expecting to have a good time, but I was really surprised. I was shocked and moved to find out how the knowledge of tonight's event was so widespread.

Before I get too deeply into my remarks, I'd like to read to you a message I was handed just prior to tonight's festivities. It says, "Dear Bill, Nancy and I want to wish you and the officers of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a festive and fun evening as you partake in one of the military's oldest traditions—the dining-in. We want you to know that we appreciate all of the important contributions you have made and are making to our nation's defense. The hard work and dedication shown by you and the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of the many reasons we remain at peace. Enjoy your evening and our best wishes." The message is signed, "Ron and Nancy Lieberman of Falls Church, Virginia."

I am always a little intimidated by invitations to address a dining-in. They have the reputation of beginning at 1830 sharp and sometimes ending at 2300 dull! I was more intimidated tonight when I looked at the uniform being worn by Mr. Vice, Dale Jones. A few years ago, I was asked to be the guest speaker at an Air Force dining-in. After delivering what I believed to be a respectable effort—although I must admit there were some needles aimed at the Air Force in my remarks—the President of the Mess asked Mr. Vice to toast the guest speaker. A repulsively self-confident young second lieutenant stood up and proposed the following: "We thank the Air Force for our bread and gravy; for our indigestion we thank the Navy." I just hope that tonight's Mr. Vice has a little more respect for his elders—although obviously Table One does not. Speaking to this group is like being the point man for "Rotor-Rooter"—you never quite know what you may get into, but you're pretty sure you're not going to like it.

I talked over my invitation tonight with our Mess President, General McKnight. He wasn't exactly the picture of confidence. I don't know what he expected when I asked how many people would be there or how big the dining room was. He said, "Well, it sleeps about 300." As many of you know, Mac came to us after serving as the Commanding General of the United States Army Information Systems Command. Pretty impressive title, isn't it? General McKnight is a man of many parts, few of which work. Someone on

his staff at ISC said that when he left the Information Systems Command and came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff it *raised* the intelligence level of both staffs. I don't know what you're laughing at. I don't think you understand the joke. (That would be funny if they were kidding.) General Vessey told me before he left that Mac has come a long way since getting his third star—so much so that he now has delusions of adequacy. Please bear in mind I owed Mac a few digs. On the way over, when I expressed some apprehension about my own remarks, he told me, "Don't worry, they don't expect much."

Of course, I would be remiss if I didn't pay my respects to another valued member of the Staff—Dale Vesser. Some of you may not know Dale; he's seldom around. He's usually at the Pentagon Athletic Center beating up on some second lieutenant on the squash courts. He's the only member of the [Joint] Staff whose phone rings at the POAC. Around the building, it's said that Dale Vesser is the only one that can make me look good in a uniform. When I became Chairman, there were a lot of remarks made that I dressed like an unmade bed. A reporter covering the swearing-in ceremony described my uniform as "slightly rumpled." With Dale, you can take out the word "slightly." Dale, of course, is doing a superb job as our J-5, but I must admit I was a little concerned when we had our first meeting and he told me that he didn't think "international relations" were any worse than any other kind of in-laws.

It's good to see the Assistant to the Chairman here tonight. You wouldn't think you could make fun of John Moellering. Just wait. He is filling one of the most important jobs in our organization—one in which you have to know a lot about politics. I knew I had to hire John while I was interviewing him, because of his attitude toward politics. He told me that "Politics was a lot like sex—you don't have to be good at it to enjoy it." (I saw that proved graphically in the Congress this week!) You may not know this but in his spare time John has done some creative writing—and the IRS wants to talk to him about it.

John is a West Pointer and I am a Naval Academy graduate. We were reminiscing one day, and I asked John why West Point had a jackass for a mascot. (I hope you guys take this joke all right!) He told me that it was because the Army had first choice—Navy got the Marine Corps! Is there nothing sacred? Not this evening, there isn't.

As I look around the room tonight, the only one I see taking notes is Al Hansen, our J-4. I understand that he is an absolute information fanatic and has to know everything that is going on. I have to really question a man like Al when he says that he is really looking forward to testifying before the Congress about logistics. That's a lot like asking for a ride on the *Titanic*. Any Air Force pilot who can graduate from the Air Force Aircraft Maintenance Officer's Course with honors—he never talks about that in front of other Air Force officers. He's got a number of weird organizations down there, but I discovered one this week that's really quite interesting to me. It's a medical office. He's got a couple of medical officers, including Commander Haurahan. I didn't quite know what they did down there, but I know they were connected with medicine in some fashion. I discovered last week that they've been suggesting that Bo Derek dedicate her body to medical science—every Thursday afternoon here in their office. Has a certain ring about it, doesn't it?

I'm especially pleased to see the newest general officer on the staff here tonight—Dick

Burpee. It's good to have you here, Dick. Dick flew F-4s in Southeast Asia back in the late sixties and still thinks he is a fighter pilot. He's the only fighter pilot I've ever met who wasn't named Ace, Buzz, Zippy, or Moose. Aviators are a constant source of amazement to me. They are so shy and retiring. Actually, if over-confidence were an event in the Olympics, I'm sure we'd send a fighter pilot.

The next man I want to welcome to the festivities tonight is Lenny Peroots, the man with the Intelligence, or something like that. Lenny told me recently that the best three years of his life were spent in the fourth grade. He told me right after he became the head of DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] that before he got the job, he led a lonely, shallow, and meaningless life. Now he is no longer lonely. We are currently reviewing his job description.

I understand that the idea for tonight's dining-in came from Brad Hosmer. Brad, on behalf of all of us, thanks a lot! Brad joins John Moellering as being the only two people around that are old but still look like their graduation photos in their academy yearbooks. At Christmas, I thought about giving John Moellering a razor as a present. His wife said, "Fine, but he doesn't use blades yet." Sort of sickening, isn't it? Both still get asked for proof of age. It serves you right, Brad, to have to work for Powell Carter. Powell's the only man that Dale Carnegie ever punched in the mouth! (I'm sorry Powell's not here tonight.) Brad's so smart that he was once turned down by the television show "Real People" because he didn't qualify.

I think it's appropriate that I say something about the people in my immediate office. John Bitoff and I have been together for a long, long time, off and on. He believes a religious experience is a bottle of Blue Nun.

Howie Chandler is an F-16 pilot who works for me as an aide. He is single—at least for the moment. Very fine young man. He is an incurable romantic. That's the reason he needs 30,000 units of penicillin every day. He's the man who told me that the difference between a dog and a fox is five martinis.

Eva Pedene is a very fine young lady. When she first came in, I told her that I would never ask men and women who work for me to do anything that I wouldn't ask my aide to do.

Joe Donnell and I have been together for a long time. You do notice Joe occasionally. Joe is a light drinker. Whenever it's light, he drinks.

I have had quite a bit of association with Dean Sackett, who is now advising us on one of the most difficult problems the country is facing—of course, arms limitations. I'm not so sure we're getting the best advice. Dean was driving out to Dulles Airport and came to a sign that says, "Dulles, Left." So he thought about it a minute, turned around, and came back. Reminds me of E. F. Hutton—when Dean talks, nobody listens.

Of course, I'm close-aided, assisted, and plagued by the Chairman's Staff Group. Waldo Freeman and I have become cohorts, compadres in crime, regarding NATO. Waldo is a pretty forbidding person, and I didn't realize how much until we were walking through an airport and a Mooney came up and told him to have a bad day.

Before I wear out my welcome here tonight, I want all of you to know that my address is given in the spirit of friendly rivalry. I say that so I can get out to my car after this dining-in is over.

As you no doubt have deduced, I enjoy a good joke, and I attach great importance to an individual's ability to see the humor that surrounds us all. A third grader, when asked what would happen if there were no stories in the world, replied that we would all die of seriousness. There's a lot of truth in that.

I have attended many dining-ins in my life, and it has always seemed to me that a good offense is the best defense. Since you are going to offend someone before the evening is over, I have always adopted a policy of offending as many people as possible. Neither time nor my knowledge permit me to offend everybody here this evening. However, I apologize to those I missed. I am sure that there are many in the audience who deserve some attention.

Despite these foregoing irreverences, I consider this occasion primarily an opportunity to pay tribute to you—the men and women of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and tell you how much I appreciate the blood, sweat, and tears you have shed on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, on behalf of your Services and your country.

I must admit that as I look across the audience this evening, I am filled with an immense feeling of pride; a pride that comes from close association with all of our Services. Since our country's founding, we have enjoyed a rich heritage of freedom and security. This has been due, in large part, to the unswerving dedication and determination of Service people such as yourselves.

In my travels around the country and the world, I am continually impressed with the quality of young people serving in our Armed Forces today. They are the best I have ever seen in 40 years of service. I'm not worried about the future of our country, because I have seen evidence that it is in good hands. I see it in the faces of our young people. All the Chiefs are unified to keep it that way. The challenges we face together as a nation have never been greater. Yet, as I see the people assembled here and think about your fellow service men and women deployed throughout the world, I am confident that we will continue to meet and overcome our problems.

The current commitment to defense demonstrated by America's leaders and the public at large, when combined with the professionalism and patriotism of our nation's Armed Forces, provides the greatest guarantee that our peace and freedom and that of our allies will be preserved.

Our military continues to maintain a significant qualitative edge over all our potential adversaries. This is due not only to our modern, highly-sophisticated weapons systems but, more important, to the men and women that keep them operating. While our enemies will continue to strive for scientific breakthroughs to close the gap, our personnel edge will remain secure—I'm confident of that because the character, spirit, imagination, flexibility, courage, and commitment of our individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines remain unequalled. This is our nation's greatest strength and most effective bulwark against aggression.

I must admit to a certain amount of optimism about the future. It really can't afford to be otherwise. American people, and in turn their military forces, are a direct reflection of our security and can take a great deal of pride in the crucial role that we here tonight have played in enhancing the prospects for a safe future.

I believe today the trends and the mood, both in America and among our friends and allies around the world, are very encouraging. We are moving in the right direction, House Budget Committee notwithstanding. What is necessary now is to maintain the momentum. Mark Twain said it best: "Even if you're on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit there." The bottom line is that freedom is not free. It requires the kinds of sacrifice that our republic is noted for, and our military strength is an essential pillar of our freedom.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I salute you for your selfless devotion to duty and for your special contribution to the greatest nation in the world—whose principles you both exemplify and preserve. You truly labor in behalf of a noble cause.

Mr. President and Mr. Vice, I would like to propose a toast. To the men and women of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who work hard, play hard, and if necessary fight hard—there are no finer military men and women in the world.

Excerpts from an Interview on Meet the Press with Mr. Kalb, Ann Garrels, and Albert Hunt

March 2

Good day from Washington. I am Marvin Kalb. The US military is under unusually sharp criticism and scrutiny. Is it spending too much? Does it have a strategy? Can it fight? Answers now from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, in his first major television interview.

Kalb: Admiral, let's get down to business. The official US position has always been on the Philippines that we were neutral as between the two sides struggling for power. Now it turns out that the United States was actually providing some kind of military assistance to the rebels. Could you tell us what kind of assistance?
Crowe: I think our position throughout was that we were in contact with both sides, both the Marcos forces as well as the opposition forces. Our general posture and our goal throughout were to avoid bloodshed, to work out a negotiated settlement, a successful peaceful transition, one way or another. I think we were very successful at that, and I'm not sure I follow your question about helping.

Kalb: Well, for example, did the United States, one of its radio technicians, for example, not at a certain point, a critical point, help the rebels get a certain message to the Marcos forces that they should not be attacking?
Crowe: I think we were facilitating messages back and forth between both groups to make sure they understood each other. And I think that was a proper and appropriate mission.

Kalb: Was the United States using any of its military power there?
Crowe: No.

Hunt: Admiral, you were said to have worried in the inner circles that a continuation of President Marcos might benefit the communists. Conversely, I'd like to ask you what leads you to believe that Mrs. Aquino is better equipped to combat the communist insurgency in the Philippines?
Crowe: I'm not so sure that I have ever said that she's better equipped. I think that we now support that government, and we're looking forward to the Aquino government straightening out and sorting out many of the problems which the country faces.

Hunt: You don't think she's better equipped, sir?
Crowe: I think she's the President of the Philippines right now, and she's got to face up to that.

Hunt: But the question is whether you think she's better equipped to combat the communist insurgents than was President Marcos?
Crowe: I think we're going to find that out in the coming days. I will say that the steps that General Ramos has taken, for example, in the military, which I'm more familiar with, the initial steps—his leadership appointments, his attempt to reform, I think, are very encouraging. And if he continues in this vein, I would say the military's going to sort itself out and, yes, be in a better posture.

Garrels: Intelligence reports have said that the rebels could prevail in three to five years. Today, do you feel any more optimistic with Mrs. Aquino there?
Crowe: It's more intuitive than anything else. But, yes, I do feel more optimistic because I know General Ramos very well. I know what his views are. He wants to defeat the insurgency. He has long been a reformer in the military. There are many things that he wanted to do. He has not had the authority or the latitude, and I believe he's going to have that under President Aquino.

Garrels: What about Minister Enrile, though? He was there before, and he didn't do such a great job.
Crowe: He didn't have a lot of authority under Mr. Marcos, and that's a fact.

Kalb: Admiral, there has just been given to the President a commission report, produced by David Packard, who used to have a lot to do with the Defense Department when President Nixon was here. There is a basic recommendation, and that is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to be revamped and your job, Chairman, ought to be made much more powerful. Do you buy that? Do you have sympathy for the idea?
Crowe: I think—some of the language that I heard in your pre-program or at the beginning of the program characterizing the Packard report, and your term "revamped"—I think this is a little bit overstated. The Packard report was just released yesterday. I have gone through it, although I'm not extremely familiar with it. We are studying it, and it makes

some suggestions on improvements. It suggests that we do some things we've already done, and I hope that these will enhance the way we do business. We're going to try to work with it. But to say it revamps the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I think that's a little strong.

Kalb: All right. Let me try to be a bit more specific. Senators [Barry] Goldwater and [Sam] Nunn have talked of a revamping of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. They don't think it works well. They think there are four and five voices when there ought to be one clear military voice giving a military recommendation to the President. That is also something that the House of Representatives has said, and now, that is also something that the Presidential Commission has said. So, what I'm asking you is: do you agree that that should be the case?
Crowe: In very specific terms, what you're saying is that these call for me to be the principal adviser to both the Secretary of Defense and to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that would be helpful, and we are on board on that, so to speak.

Kalb: You're on board on that? I don't think we can be that vague about it though, Admiral. Do you believe that you should have primary responsibility for passing on a unified military recommendation to the President? That is not the way it works now.
Crowe: I do that all the time. I'm not quite sure I follow you in this. I also, when I am asked, can express my personal opinion now to my superiors and seniors, which I do. In many respects, the legislation you're talking about codifies what we do in practice. But I am charged by law to pass on the corporate view of the Joint Chiefs, which I do. Now, they're talking about changing that in some respects.

Kalb: That's right, and I'm trying to get from you whether you agree with those changed recommendations.
Crowe: I basically agree with the thrust of the House legislation.

Hunt: Admiral, another thing that Mr. Packard said in his report, or said after his report was issued, is that it's quite clear that we are not getting our money's worth as far as defense spending is concerned. I'd like to find out if you agree with that, and if so, why aren't we?
Crowe: I would never pretend that we don't have some problems in various areas and things that we can improve, and so forth. But I would be very careful of the fundamental statement that we're not getting our money's worth. Acquisition and procurement, of course, are not directly under the JCS, but I do not have—in my observation and in my business, I do not see the evidence for that.

Hunt: Well, sir, you have a degree in politics, and you know that what the public thinks is terribly important. Perception sometimes may be more important than realities. The public clearly thinks we're not getting our money's worth.
Crowe: Of course, I think it's important to understand the very budget itself, the amount of money that we're dealing with every year. The Department of Defense gets some 15

million contracts per year. Do you know how many that is a day? That's in the thousands per day. Three hundred thousand contractors are involved in this. So, to say that we have found some evidence of mismanagement or something where we're spending too much, that's really not too alarming in that regard. But the Defense Department has made great efforts to do something about that.

Hunt: Let me just try one more thing here, though. And that is that four or five years ago there was a clear public consensus for higher Defense spending. Now that consensus clearly has evaporated. Why has it evaporated?
Crowe: I'm not so sure it has completely evaporated. But one of the reasons it's eroded is that we have been rather successful in building up our strength over the last five or six years. And I'm afraid that in many people's minds, they feel that they have achieved what they set out to do. I would argue with that, but I think in many respects we have to overcome our success, so to speak.

Garrels: You say you've succeeded. On the other hand, the President this week said that the United States is still behind in every offensive category.
Crowe: He said we still have a ways to go, and I think that's true. I would agree with that. But we have succeeded in building up our strength a great deal over what it was in the late '70s. As a matter of fact—of course, I've been in the military for 40 years, and I watched us in the nadir of the '70s, when military advisers were telling what great risks this country was running in its military strength. We have turned around many aspects of that, and we are overseeing a much more capable, a much more efficient, and a much stronger military today than we were in the late '70s.

Kalb: Admiral, let me quote Senator Goldwater at you. "There will be those who say the system ain't broke, so don't fix it. However, it is broke, and we need to fix it." Do you agree with the Senator that there are areas of this system that are broke and need fixing?
Crowe: There are areas that need improving. I don't like the word "broke," and I have told Senator Goldwater that I do not agree with that statement.

Kalb: All right. What are the areas that need improvement?
Crowe: I think that some of the areas which the legislation addresses will be very helpful. You've probably heard the argument about the study. You've heard the argument about the JCS, with the Chairman having more control over the Joint Staff and the ability to control it.

Procurement is dealt with in the Senate bill. The Congress is now holding hearings on procurement. And the Packard Commission addresses procurement more than the other two bills.

Garrels: Do you want to be involved in procurement? That would be your job.
Crowe: It increases my responsibilities in that regard, and we will be studying that very closely. I have some concerns about the JCS getting more into the procurement. It isn't

really in procurement as much as it is in the recommendations on the budget—not the procurement side, but on what will be spent and in what fashion.
I'm trying to say that there's politics in all of this, and the professional military man wants to make sure that whatever we do on the budget for the Defense Department, it's done on the debate about defense, a full and unemotional appreciation of the threat we face, the state of our Armed Forces, and the linkages of those armed forces with the benefits it gives us. Mr. Packard is putting his emphasis on acquisition and procurement, and I think that's going to require some looking at. We may very well do exactly what it says. The President has said he's going to try and implement the Packard Commission report. I'm much more interested and knowledgeable, of course, on my own business and in the JCS, rather than procurement and acquisition.

Kalb: Admiral, President Carter let loose with a strong criticism today of President Reagan, saying that President Reagan is misstating the facts on the recent history of Defense procurement, and so on. President Carter is saying that in his administration and that of President Ford there was the origin and development of Stealth, of the MX, of the Trident sub. Is President Reagan misstating the facts, as President Carter put it?
Crowe: I'd prefer not to get in the middle, no matter what. But I can say, for a man that lived through that era in the career military, I think there were some programs that we are today profiting from that were started in the late 1970s, around the '78-'79 period. But I lived through that period and it was a very, very depressing one for the professional military. The state of our strength and our readiness was very, very alarming. That has been turned around markedly in every respect in the last five years, primarily in personnel. We've had some very serious deficiencies, which have now been corrected. I think I can speak for every major military commander in this country, and he will tell you the same thing.

Hunt: Admiral, in that same interview, President Carter also said that support for the Contras in Nicaragua, who we are, of course, supporting, is—I believe he used the term "withering away." I would like to ask you, from a military vantage point, if you still think a military victory by the Contras is within the realm of possibility in the next couple of years?
Crowe: I would take vigorous issue with that. The number of Contras, of course, in the last year has doubled. And I think in Nicaragua the Contra movement has displayed a remarkable robustness, irrespective of that lack of support.

Kalb: Admiral, do you believe that it is a good idea for the United States government to stop all nuclear testing by March 31, which is the time the Soviet Union has its ban extended to?
Crowe: I wouldn't think so, no. Given the fact that we do have to rely in our security and our strategy on some nuclear weapons, to stop all nuclear testing doesn't make good sense to me. We need the reliability and stability and the safety of our weapons to be proved and demonstrated all the time.

Kalb: But would it not make sense, sir, since testing is the basis for any new weapons system, that if you intended, as the President and [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev said at the summit they intended to do, to get major agreements this year and next year in arms control, that an end to nuclear testing would be an excellent first way, first step?
Crowe: It would be an excellent first step if you don't object to living with nuclear weapons you're not quite sure will work or not quite sure are safe. That doesn't make any sense to me at all.

Kalb: Wouldn't it make more sense if there were just one unit in charge of all of these space flights, the military or NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], one or the other?
Crowe: Perhaps from a management or an efficiency standpoint, but that overlooks the warfighting, depending on what systems you're talking about and so forth. This is a constant dilemma when you're talking about efficiency. Can we take a function from all the Services and put it in one place? We have in a number of agencies. And from a management standpoint, it saves money, and so on, and so on. But does that help when those systems have to be supported in war? Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't. It'll have to be looked at very closely.

Hunt: Admiral, throughout this program you seem to be saying, on the one hand, that we really need the big Defense budgets that have been requested by President Reagan, that are causing such controversy on Capitol Hill. On the other hand, you seem to be saying we're doing an awfully lot better and we've made enormous strides in the last four or five years. There's no doubt that we have and that we're in an era of terrific fiscal restraints. If that's the case, why do we need those sorts of big budget increases? Why can't we instead basically keep spending at current levels and try to increase efficiency?
Crowe: I hear a very great deal about fiscal reality and political reality, and I think my job and my function and my responsibility are to talk about military reality. As I said earlier, I hope that the decisions, whatever they are, are made on a full and unemotional appreciation of the state of the Armed Forces, of the threat that we face, and the benefits that strength gives us. If that's done, that's probably all the military can ask for. And in that regard, I think that we have increased our readiness and our strength. On the other hand, we're midstream. Only one-third of our forces have the new tank, only one-fourth have the Bradley fighting vehicle, only one-third of our carrier groups have the new weapons systems, only one-third of our submarine force is new. We are midstream and have a long ways to go. That's the point.

Letter on Soviet Arms Control Cheating to Representative Jim Courter
March 4

Dear Mr. Courter:

Thank you for your letter of concern regarding the *New York Times* article "Joint Chiefs Find No Soviet Cheating." The story cites an alleged discrepancy between Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) numbers contained in the December 1985 Compliance Report and those in the FY 1987 Military Posture Statement. Actually, both numbers are correct because they portray different information.

The author incorrectly interprets the numbers from the unclassified FY 1987 Military Posture Statement as numbers of SALT-accountable SNDVs. The charts in the Military Balance chapter of the Military Posture Statement depict comparable Soviet and US strategic offensive forces. The Military Posture Statement figures are representative order of battle figures but do not include all SALT-accountable US or Soviet systems. The Compliance Report contains all SALT-accountable systems whether they are still battle worthy or not. For example, under the SALT accounting procedures, the United States must include all B-52s, even those in non-operational storage at Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. Similarly, the Soviets have additional non-operational SALT-accountable aircraft which are included in the Compliance Report but not shown in the Military Balance chart. In short, the author attempted to draw conclusions from incompatible data.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support the finding on Soviet SNDVs contained in the 23 December President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance. In that report, the US government found the Soviets to be in violation of their political commitment to abide by SALT II at a level of SNDVs which was in existence at the time of the signing of that agreement. The US government determined that the Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 cap.

I understand your concern with the article's allegation and trust my explanation eliminates the perceived discrepancy. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Remarks at the Armed Forces Staff College on March 5 and the Air War College on March 6

Thank you for that fine introduction.

I am very pleased to be able to speak to you today. I envy your stay here and urge you to make the most of it. I labor under the belief that not only you personally but the services and nation genuinely profit from this year of study and reflection. My special interest is that this experience will lead you to think more deeply about jointness and the importance of cooperation between services.

My intent today is to attempt to contribute some real-world flavor to the national and joint concerns you've been studying here in an academic atmosphere. I've been in my current post about five months now, and I am facing the facts of life—which are not always pleasant.

I have been surprised how little control I have over my own agenda. The press of events in the world is unceasing, and sometimes it seems I'm right at the eye of the storm. I often use the word "beleaguered" to describe my predicament. "Badgered" is another good one. Maybe even "bewildered," too. These are the real "killer bees."

One compensation—it's not boring. I deal with a spectrum of interesting subjects and some of the country's most capable people. But I'm afraid the result is that I know something about everything but am not permitted the time to do anything really well. So, if I sound disjointed today there is an explanation.

Putting aside my personal burdens, let me say a word about my general view from the Pentagon. It is inevitably shaped by my last five years in command billets where I had the opportunity to observe and work closely with our forces in a variety of circumstances.

First and foremost, it is clear that the current posture of our Armed Forces is sound—by any common sense measure. We have acquired new weapons systems, made great strides in training, and our logistics support is growing steadily.

Most encouraging, we have made remarkable improvements in our manpower situation in the last few years—personnel readiness is at the highest level I've seen in peacetime.

From my perspective, and I believe the Chiefs all share this view, people are our number one priority. No matter what other advantages or resources you have, if you don't have good people, you're going to be in trouble.

So, it is with a great deal of pride that I say to all audiences—including Congress—that the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines we now have in the Armed Forces are the brightest, most educated, best trained I've seen in over four decades of military service. I've observed them in stress and in boredom, in good times and in bad; they meet every test, often far from home and without the amenities enjoyed by their civilian counterparts.

That pool of energy, dedication, and skill is the bedrock of all our endeavors. We can be proud of it, and must work hard to preserve it. Facts such as those are all too easy for our general citizenry to overlook—or never even to hear about in the press of everyday events.

Stepping back and taking a more detached view, I think we can say with conviction that our overall foreign and security policies have been quite successful over the last 35 years, Vietnam notwithstanding. For example:

- Western Europe has been blessed with the longest period of uninterrupted peace it has enjoyed in this century. It has fully recovered from the devastation of World War II and is firmly entrenched in the ranks of the free world.
- In the Far East and Pacific, the free nations of that region are enjoying unprecedented affluence and steady progress toward political maturity. They are becoming more self-reliant militarily and involving themselves in the international community. Asia is a region that is literally coming of age.

- The United States has been a key participant in all of this progress. Our broad policies of support—social, political, economic, and cultural—have paid off handsomely in terms of peace and stability and attracting friends and allies.

If there is one thing we have learned over the years, it is that where there is affluence and political stability, there will be peace, and most likely freedom and pluralism in some fashion will eventually take root.

The Kremlin, meanwhile, promotes dissidence, turbulence, and instability, because those are the conditions in which their values and objectives are served and their prospects are best.

Throughout this period, this forty-year process of development, American military strength has played a vital role.

NATO's power has frustrated Soviet machinations by providing the secure foundation for political and economic growth and interaction in Europe; this is not to mention deterrence of major hostilities for forty years.

In the Far East, our military shield has prevented Soviet intimidation and permitted allies and friends to concentrate on internal development and to realize their own potential, in their own fashion and at their own pace. A succession of Asian leaders continuously stressed the importance of the US umbrella, and forward deployed forces, in promoting their progress.

To put it simply, the American people—and we, ourselves—can take great pride in the role US Armed Forces and American military policy have played in fostering and securing progress in Europe and Asia, attracting friends to Washington, promoting our international trade, and underwriting arms control efforts. In essence, our strength has been an indispensable pillar of our freedom and the freedom of our friends and allies.

As I have watched these events play out, I have become more and more persuaded that time is on our side vis-à-vis the Soviets. As every year of peace goes by, we advance in this "peacetime" struggle that has been forced upon us by the Kremlin.

A few years ago, it was fashionable to say that America and the forces of democracy always seemed to be on the wrong side of history. I think the long view of this century tells us that the wave of the future will be freedom, not despotic alternatives—just this week witness what happened in the Philippines.

Therefore, on balance, I find our political-military situation encouraging. Though I am optimistic about the long-term trend of things—the patterns of development we have helped to set in motion and to foster—this doesn't mean that we don't have problems or that we can sit back and passively rest on our laurels. As Mark Twain once said, "Even if you're on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit there."

Certainly from a military perspective, there are day-to-day problems that we must confront and overcome. That's the stuff of our business. So let me outline the more significant ones I see the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with in the coming months. These are what I will be dealing with every day—when I am not attending ceremonies.

Let me begin with one of my most pressing current afflictions: the debate about the

Defense budget and the effort to get these discussions focused on the central realities. As you know, I have been testifying before several committees on our defense posture. It's the first time that I've been exposed to this trauma from the Chairman's standpoint. It makes one happy to leave Washington to address friendly audiences, I assure you. It raises the question: if pro is the opposite of con, is progress the opposite of Congress? It's clear to me that we're in some trouble with the Congress, and indeed with the public at large. Gramm-Rudman is just the most prominent manifestation of that. We in the so-called defense sector are clearly competing with non-defense programs in the minds of many legislators, and the outlook for our critical defense needs is not bright.

The consensus for our defense programs that brought us the impressive gains of the last few years is dissolving. A number of factors have brought this about. The waste-fraud-abuse headlines simply do not go away and still hang in the background of the public discussion. There's also a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric being thrown around that holds defense programs responsible for the budget deficit. I know you've heard it all. It is, of course, patently wrong. But it convinces a lot of people, at the emotional level, that defense programs have to be cut because of, as they say, "fiscal realities."

Another difficulty is that many voters do not understand the everyday contributions of American strength in the Nation's life. In part this stems from a habit of thought that distinguishes sharply between peace and war. In times that look "peaceful" to many Americans, it's hard for them to feel any immediate threat justifying military strength. They don't realize that all the Nation's dealings with the world are underwritten by that strength—that they get returns every day on their investment in the armed forces. But perhaps the central difficulty for those of us who have been making the case for preserving strength is that we confront a bona-fide dilemma. On the one hand, we acknowledge what is true, that we have made great progress in the last few years. On the other hand, we must ask for still more effort, indeed more sacrifice. The public and the Congress hear the first part, the progress we have made, and note that we are "at peace." It's very hard for them to hear the second part, too, that we need more, in a time when resources are becoming more and more scarce.

This is a thorny problem that will not go away and that we all need to address in every way we can. The President is leading the way very visibly in his public statements. We have to get the message across that US military strength does more than shield us from attack. It underwrites everything we do in the world—use of the sea lanes, commercial activities, pursuit of arms control with confidence. We get dividends from that investment every day. We have to communicate, too, that we are midstream in the modernization of our capabilities and that to slacken the effort now will yield dangerous gains to the Soviets.

And we have to keep the eyes of all participants in this debate on the ball: the military realities we confront. If we delink defense programs from the military threat, from our alliances, from arms control negotiations, we run the risk of re-inventing the unhappy days you and I lived through in the 1970s, when forced austerities dangerously reduced our military strength. We don't argue that we have to match the Soviets weapon for weapon, man for man, bullet for bullet. In fact, we have known that if we go into a major

conflict with the Soviet Union, we will be outmanned, outgunned, and outnumbered. American leaders understand that and attempt to compensate for lack of numbers with excellent people, quality equipment, realistic training, broad and responsive logistic support, and the help of friends and allies around the globe. But those realities are not well understood. We must communicate our military perspective. Nobody is better prepared to do that than each of you.

Let me turn now to another prominent JCS concern: arms control. We have been negotiating with the Soviets on a wide array of arms control and security issues in the last few years. Overall, the American approach has had four basic elements:

- The first is reflected in the President's statement: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." We seek to ensure that defense of our vital interests never requires the United States to fight a nuclear war, and we try to reduce the risk of nuclear war to the lowest possible level.
- Second, arms reduction is not an isolated objective or independent instrument—it is one of the ways we pursue national security objectives.
- A third principle is that arms agreements must reduce arms, not legitimize increases. They must also establish comprehensive verification regimes that facilitate US monitoring and deter cheating.
- Finally, we are pursuing a number of initiatives that seek to reduce the risk that conflict could occur through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications.

I have been pleased at the constructive role the JCS has played in this process. Interestingly, our voice is heard, especially on the question of military sufficiency. It is a good example of military input to national security decision making. Frankly, I have been pleasantly impressed with our role in this dialogue. We have had a flurry of activity in connection with the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last Fall. The two sides are still far apart in some basic principles—such as approaches to regional conflicts—and this complicates the process. Also Gorbachev is no doubt still "shaking down" his new team. There will likely be more developments, but through it all we must keep this in mind: strength has brought Moscow back to the bargaining table. There is a direct linkage between our security investments and the Kremlin's flexibility.

The issue of Defense reorganization, and particularly JCS reorganization, has been much in the news, too, and on my mind. This subject has created a large cottage industry lately. My own feeling is that most of the studies and critiques have tended to stress the negative side of the equation and to ignore what the DOD and the JCS have accomplished on their own initiative to make things better.

The JCS deals successfully with hundreds of tough issues annually and has an extensive role in everyday operations and management of our global forces. But the one-sided approach of much of the debate conveys a misleading picture of confusion and breakdown. Moreover, I've found particularly wrongheaded and harmful the criticism that the Service Chiefs are unduly parochial and that log-rolling completely dominates JCS business. I readily admit that we should be seeking organizational improvements. The global strategic

and military environments are in flux. The Soviet challenge is growing. Technology moves on apace. Constrictions in resources loom ahead and dictate that we get maximum benefit from our investments. No doubt we need some change in the JCS system to match altering circumstances. But to say we should seek improvements is not to say the system is broken.

There are a plethora of reform proposals. Some are silly and over-reactive. Others tend to codify what has already been done. Some go a little beyond where we are today and are overdue. From my perspective, I have two bottom lines.

- I favor evolutionary, not revolutionary change.
- I tend to support proposals that would modestly strengthen the role of the Chairman as an adviser and give him better control of the Joint Staff. Likewise, I would increase the authority of the unified commanders.

Congress seems to be moving in those general directions. On balance, I believe we will get a bill and that it will be reasonably restrained.

Still speaking about programs and tools, there is another important strategic resource that I have been trying to raise the visibility of: security assistance.

The President noted that "dollar for dollar, security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget," and Secretary Weinberger's recent report to the Congress highlights it as a central element of American coalition strategy. Unfortunately, the prospect of zero-growth or even declining budgets is likely to put this very valuable program into a severe squeeze, just at the time when it would be of great value to us.

From the military perspective, the program has important ramifications in our total force planning process—something that often gets lost in the political arena. Everything we do—or do not do—under this program ultimately has an impact on our collective ability to deter acts of aggression. Of all our programs, we could get more return on our investment from this one. For my part, I will continue to pursue all efforts to vitalize and raise the profile of this neglected dimension of strategy and to increase the military's role in those determinations. It will not, however, be easy.

Let me turn, lastly, to several regional concerns that I am sure will occupy much of my time in the months ahead, as they have already.

First the Philippines

We all saluted, of course, the achievement of the Filipino people and welcomed the outpouring of democratic energies in that peaceful revolution. Those of us in the military can be particularly proud of the role of some of AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] military leaders in that episode, vindicating the overarching interests of popular sovereignty and the rule of law.

The odds are now greatly increased that the Philippines will be able to cope effectively with its severe domestic problems and the insurgency movement. It is imperative to rebuild healthy relationships between our own forces and the Philippine professionals who serve

President Aquino and to do all we can to help them secure the recent democratic gains.

Historically, our attention has focused on the future of the bases, and they are still critical interests for us. But, we now have five years to work with President Aquino on the bases. The insurgent problem is now, and we have a crucial role to play in preparing the AFP for this challenge. That's another reason why I'm so concerned about cutbacks in our security assistance programs.

The problem of how to deal with the regime in Nicaragua will remain high on the President's agenda, as witnessed by his statements this week. Our interests in promoting democracy there, and securing the efforts of friends in our own backyard to develop economically, socially, and politically according to their own lights, are clear.

I think generally we have turned the corner in Central America, but we're not yet out of the woods. The democratic process in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is still fragile. There are many endemic economic and social problems to be solved before we can rest easy. Most disturbing is that Cuba and Nicaragua continue to make trouble.

Some of the basic building blocks for success are in place: the Caribbean initiative, especially as it applies to trade, development and aid, and measured doses of security assistance. What is most desperately needed is enhanced aid for the Contras and the time to let our initiative work.

I have no crystal ball on what will happen to the package the President has requested from the Congress. But it is clear to me that troubling sentiments have emerged in the debate. Some simply seem not to understand the nature and implications of Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan activities in the region. They tend not to see the "hidden hands" of strong, external, and militarized powers in the actions of Managua. They tend, therefore, to believe the US response should be a relaxed one, to let nature take its course. It is not, however, nature at work in Central America. The US security response must, generally, emphasize increased material assistance, intelligence sharing, and close military ties—including exercises that will help create the conditions under which nations of the region can work for stability.

We have come a long way from the 1970s, when we rolled with the punches; and we are avoiding the tendency to lean on our own armed forces to resolve regional conflicts. Above all, we need the national will to persevere.

Finally, the Middle East

This troubled region has occupied much of my time. I see no prospect of that changing. The area is important to the economic health of the free world and thus to US security. Access to oil and limitation of Soviet influence are significant US objectives.

Jordan and Egypt are the immediate keys to peace, but each is confronted with serious challenges. Jordan is caught up in animosities between Syria and Israel. It has bona fide national security problems that would concern any defense planner. But it is caught in a political bind: from the United States, the Kingdom hears that they must have "peace before arms"; from other quarters, King Hussein hears that Jordan pursues peace with Israel only at its own peril. The King has shown much courage in supporting the

peace process while he was threading the shoals of Middle Eastern politics. But nothing can relieve him of the responsibility for keeping his defenses strong or being responsive to his own subjects. We ignore those realities at the peril of the peace process. Egypt, meanwhile, struggles to maintain domestic harmony while staying the course with the Camp David Accords and fending off constant political pressures from more radical forces within the Arab Bloc. The Egyptian leadership deserves both our praise and support.

Unfortunately, there is no light at the end of this tunnel. For the foreseeable future we will be temporizing—i.e., concentrating on crisis management, contingency plans, and preparedness to protect US lives and property. I wish I could offer more comfort on this subject.

That concludes an all-too-brief tour of my in-box and my upcoming agenda, as I see it. It's been a genuine pleasure to get outside the beltway and visit your fine institution. I urge you all to contribute to the defense dialogue whenever you have occasion to do so.

I sincerely hope my very brief tour of the defense horizon has not been too depressing. It might be helpful to recall the advice of that famous philosopher, Paul Harvey, who said: "In times like these it is helpful to remember that there have always been times like these."

I genuinely believe with determination we can and will continue to manage our problems and, in turn, to keep our nation—the greatest nation in the world—safe.

Chairman's Memorandum for Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, on Oversight of Intelligence Activities

March 27

1. I appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the memorandum to you from ATSD (IO) [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight] concerning compliance by OJCS, unified and specified commands and joint task forces with DOD Directives (DODD) 5240.1 and 5240.1-R.

2. Executive Order (EO) 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," requires the Secretary of Defense to issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement the order. DODD 5240.1, 3 December 1982, "Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons," and DODD 5240.1-R, December 1982, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons," implement EO 12333. These directives apply only to intelligence activities of DOD intelligence components, which, as specifically set forth in the directives, do not include OJCS, unified and specified commands, and joint task forces. Additionally, these directives contain a general provision whereby they apply to other organizations, staffs, and offices when used for collection of information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents. The purpose of the Executive Order is to enhance human and technical collection techniques while achieving the proper balance between acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests.

3. As Mr. [Werner E.] Michel's memorandum correctly points out, OJCS and the intelligence staffs of the unified and specified commands act as taskers, analysts, and consumers of intelligence from all sources and play an important role in the overall DOD intelligence community. However, these staffs are intelligence consumers, not intelligence collectors, and under DODDs 5240.1 and 5240.1-R are subject to these governing procedures only in the event they are used as intelligence collectors. These directives correctly do not treat these intelligence staffs as intelligence components and, therefore, do not subject them to the same procedures as intelligence collection agencies such as NSA, DIA, and the Services.

4. I must point out that, contrary to the ATSD (IO) memorandum, OJCS, unified and specified commands, and joint task forces in compliance with your memorandum have never refused to establish an intelligence oversight program and have never contended that they are not subject to the requirements of EO 12333 and implementing DOD directives. Rather, OJCS has sought to implement these directives by preserving the important distinction between intelligence consumers and collectors and by requiring compliance with the specific provisions of these directives in the event intelligence staffs are used as intelligence collectors. One critical, underlying reason for preserving this distinction is, of course, to avoid setting a precedent for possible oversight by congressional intelligence oversight committees. Director of the Joint Staff Memoranda of 29 November 1984 and 2 May 1985 demonstrate the intent to follow the broad guidance established in the Executive Order. Additionally, because of the inference of noncompliance in the ATSD (IO) memorandum, I also point out that there has been full compliance with your request for an annual oral briefing by CJCS concerning "sensitive" national security activities in compliance with your memorandum of June 1985.

5. Throughout the contact with ATSD (IO) on this subject, OJCS personnel have stressed a willingness to establish a program to ensure that intelligence staff personnel are familiar with the procedures of the governing directives and are aware of the obligation to report any questionable intelligence activity should they be required to conduct intelligence collection activities.

6. Notwithstanding that the intelligence staffs of the OJCS, unified and specified commands, and joint task forces are not technically required to comply with the provisions of DODDs 5240.1 and 5240.1-R unless they are used to conduct collection activities, I have determined as a matter of policy that appropriate OJCS and joint intelligence staffs fully comply with these directives. Accordingly, unless you direct otherwise, I will issue a memorandum directing that these intelligence staffs, as a matter of policy and not as a legal requirement, comply with these directives. I trust that this decision will meet the oversight requirements of the ATSD (IO) and, at the same time, preserve the distinction between intelligence consumers and intelligence collectors as well as providing congressional intelligence committees an opening they might exploit in their quest for greater oversight of OJCS.

Excerpts from Remarks at the Navy League Joint Services Luncheon

Sheraton-Washington Hotel, Washington, DC | March 27

Let me begin my remarks with just a few words about our host, the Navy League. I have always had the highest respect and admiration for the League. I've had a great deal of experience with it, with its activities, and with the fine people who make it work so well. The impressive events of this exposition are just the latest example of a long and multi-faceted tradition of public and national service.

You know how much tradition means to the Navy. I understand you have already had a couple of spirited speeches about the Navy; I don't consider my responsibilities necessarily naval now, but I do take great pride in my Navy background and Navy traditions. I came across a piece of memorabilia that I thought I might share with you. I'll read it to you: "On the 23rd of August, the USS *Constitution* set sail from Boston with 475 officers and men; 48,000 gallons of fresh water; 7,400 cannon shot; 11,000 pounds of black powder, and 79,400 gallons of rum. Arriving in Jamaica on 6 October, she took on 826 pounds of flour and 69,000 gallons of rum. She then headed for the Azores, arriving on the 12th of November. She provisioned 550 tons of beef and 64,000 gallons of Portuguese wine. On 13 November, she set sail for New England. In the ensuing days she defeated five British men-of-war, sank 12 British merchant ships, salvaging only their rum. By 27 January, her powder and shots were exhausted. Nonetheless, she made a raid on the Firth of Clyde. Her landing party captured a whiskey distillery, transferring about 40,000 gallons. She then headed home. The *Constitution* made port at Boston harbor on the 23rd of February with no cannon shot, no powder, no food, no rum, no whiskey, no wine, but with 48,000 gallons of stagnant water."

But more to the point, and to be a little more serious for a moment, the League has always been a prominent voice speaking out for national defense. In fact, for years, and in various ways, the League has led informed discussion on strategic issues not only inside the Washington Beltway, but outside it as well. Its efforts have markedly enhanced the level of public education about the Nation's security problems and posture, and more important, they have helped to move our Defense policies in directions that make the world a less dangerous place.

These activities have earned the admiration of all of us, particularly those now on active service, and those who lead the Armed Forces are especially indebted to you. Part of our responsibility is to explain our Defense needs to our public and to their representatives in the Congress. In recent weeks I have been extensively involved in that job of explanation, here in Washington and also around the country. It's a demanding task, not always a rewarding one, and I deeply appreciate the amplifying voice of organizations like the Navy League.

Remarks at the 28th Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State

The Pentagon | April 14

Welcome to the Pentagon. It is a distinct pleasure for me to be able to greet you this morning and to contribute to your very important program of study. The subjects you are examining in this seminar—the domestic underpinnings, and the interrelationships, of American foreign and security policies—are key determinants of how our nation fares in dealing with international challenges. I envy your chance to reflect on them in a setting removed from the press of everyday events.

I have been thinking about these matters a great deal lately, especially as I prepared for several extended sessions of congressional testimony explaining the rationale for our Defense programs. Those travails—and the ongoing public debate about what emphasis Defense should receive in the budget—amount to a very large, and very important, "practical exercise" in the interplay of domestic forces and national security policy.

I'd like to share with you some reflections on all that. The points I would like to leave with you are, first, that just as you need to understand America in order to make and implement policy for the Nation (your seminar takes this as its premise), so does America need to understand you and the perspectives and capabilities you represent. There is a need for mutual understanding and communication in other words.

Second point is that, from my own standpoint as Chairman, we need especially to promote better understanding of the everyday contributions of military strength in the Nation's life. That would make the resource allocation scramble, in my view, much more likely to produce results that serve the Nation's strategic interests well.

A few years ago, Professor Michael Howard wrote an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* about "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." Perhaps you remember it. His point was that Western strategists tend to focus on one element of strategy, the operational—how to conduct campaigns and to win wars—while neglecting others that are equally important, including societal solidarity and public support for government policies.

Jean-Francois Revel's now famous and gloomy book about the disabilities of democracy explored that theme at some length, but from another angle. His concern is the weakness of the social dimension of strategy in times that seem tranquil, or normal, to democratic people—when their survival is not obviously at risk. He said that free societies do not understand that, even in what appears to be "peacetime," they are confronted by a voracious Marxist-Leninist "democracy-eating machine" that works incessantly for the Free World's demise. Revel has a wonderful gift for epigrammatic expression, of course, but behind the hyperbole there is this telling point that many of our citizens do indeed tend to forget. Descendants of Lenin understand very well the competitive and conflicting nature of international relations, and they struggle constantly and by all means to bring about their ascendancy and our eventual decline and subjugation, and do this outside wartime scenarios.

It is very hard for us to maintain public support for the policies needed to deal with that challenge. This isn't a new problem. The American tendency to take peace for granted

is a recurrent one; it has produced a familiar pattern of peaks and valleys: declining Defense budgets and atrophied military strength in "peacetime," and then immense surges of effort when the dogs of war bark literally at our doorstep.

It is obvious enough that we can't wage a war without solid public support. But it is just as clear to me that we can't maintain and manage the peace successfully without support for programs that produce sustained military strength. In my view, our current budget debate illustrates exactly this problem, and it is one that will bedevil your time in leadership as it has my own. Gramm-Rudman is just the most prominent manifestation of something larger: the threatening erosion of the consensus for Defense programs that brought the Armed Forces such impressive gains in the last few years. A number of factors have brought this about:

- The waste/fraud/abuse headlines simply do not go away, for one thing, and the image of a profligate military, though distorted, has been hard to dispel. Actions taken by the government in the last 24 months have gone far toward correcting our major deficiencies, and other remedies are on the way. As a result, I sense that this issue is no longer as prominent as it was, but it still has residual influence.
- There's also a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric being thrown around that holds Defense programs responsible for the budget deficit. It is, of course, patently wrong, unfair, and dangerous. But it convinces a lot of people, at the emotional level, that Defense programs have to be cut because of, as they say, "fiscal realities." In testifying before the Congress in the last few months, I've heard a great deal of talk about fiscal realities. When people argue that we can't afford Defense expenditures, they are really saying that they have other things they would rather fund. Incidentally, they never mention "military realities."
- Another difficulty is that many Americans do not understand the everyday contributions of American strength in the Nation's life. In part this stems from a habit of thought, highlighted by Revel and others, that distinguishes sharply between peace and war. In times that look "peaceful" to many Americans, it's hard for them to feel any immediate threat justifying military strength. My colleague Jim Watkins, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], has thought long and hard about this problem. He characterizes today's world as "violent peace," trying to make the point that reality is much more mixed than the peace–war dichotomy suggests and that we need tools to deal with a wide spectrum of conflict scenarios. Because we are not at war in the traditional sense does not mean that we are not threatened or that our enemies are not working for our destruction, or that military strength is not necessary.
- But perhaps the central difficulty for those of us who have been making the current case for preserving US strength is that we confront a genuine dilemma. On the one hand, we acknowledge what is true: that we have made great progress in the last few years. On the other hand, we must ask for still more effort, indeed more sacrifice. The public, and the Congress, hear the first part, the progress we have made, and they note that we are "at peace." It's hard for them to internalize the second part, too: that we need more, in a time when the pressures on resources are becoming more and more intense.

I have testified before the Congress that the current status of our Armed Forces is sound, thanks to the advancements we have made in recent years that reversed the most alarming downward trends of the 1970s; but, I have also said that there is still much to do to insure the nation's future security, particularly in the face of a steadily increasing Soviet threat and Moscow's broadening use of surrogates. We are midstream in a process of modernizing the Armed Forces, and we need to keep that momentum and to develop a rational defense policy and posture for the long haul. For that, we need the strong, patient, and continuing support of the American public—which means we have to rehabilitate the public consensus for defense that brought us the gains of the early 1980s. That's easy to say, but it will be far from easy to do.

There is a critical job of communication ahead of us. It involves more than just answering uninformed allegations about inefficiency or fending off unrealistic proposals for altered strategies. It is a matter of promoting wider understanding of the rationale for military strength.

The American people must understand and support our defense rationales not just in time of war, or when the President sends forces in harm's way, but also in relatively tranquil times when most citizens prosper in their chosen civilian occupations.

The message that the American public needs to understand is, in fact, the second point I wanted to make this morning: that strong armed forces are the indispensable undergirding of all other components of national strategy.

American military strength underpins everything this nation does in the world, buttressing other tools of policy and making America a more effective nation internationally. We can use the sea lanes for vital commercial pursuits without interference because our strength permits it. Recent events in the Gulf of Sidra testify to the need for strength to affirm navigation rights conferred on us—and on all nations—by international law. Every day, US military strength protects—usually in less visible fashion than we needed in Mr. Qaddafi's case—all our international communications. It solidifies our alliances, which in turn enhance our own security. It permits us to pursue arms control with confidence—indeed, the credible strength produced by our defense programs in recent years is what has finally brought Moscow back to the arms control table. More generally, American military power provides the Soviet Union and its kindred regimes the incentive to seek peaceable solutions to international problems.

Further, US strength provides enormous benefits to our friends and allies and plays a key role in fostering democratic institutions and practices around the globe. Our military shield in the Far East has permitted free nations there to concentrate on internal development and to realize their own potential, at their own pace and in their own fashion. In Europe, the American strength reflected in forward-deployed forces is not only the military but also the political cornerstone of the alliance. In the Middle East and Central America, it is clear that leaders there want a backdrop of American strength for their efforts to build functioning and pluralistic societies. I have seen all this firsthand and have heard it directly from leaders in those regions.

In the end the message comes to this: US military strength, as the undergirding of

American activities and policies in the world at large, is an indispensable pillar of American freedom and the freedom of friends and allies around the globe.

It is that nexus between military strategy and strength, on the one hand, and effective management of the peace, on the other, which we have to illuminate for the general public. You can, and should, help. Your backgrounds, and the course of study and reflection you are undertaking in this seminar, make you uniquely qualified to contribute. I urge you all to continue to develop your thoughts on these matters and to participate in public discussion of them, as time goes by. The Nation will be better informed, and better off, if we all find ways to enhance the public dialogue on these matters and on security issues in general.

And now, for the time remaining, I'd like to focus on any questions you might have, on these or other subjects.

Interview Comments with *Time, Newsweek,* and *US News & World Report* on the Attack on Libya

April 16

You probably saw this chart the other night, which is basically the route which the F-111s and the tankers took from England.

All the time zones used are Eastern Standard Time; England is five hours, Libya is seven hours different. That is one of the most confusing things about an operation like this. We are talking about three or four different time zones. I used Eastern Standard Time; that's what I'm more familiar with. I followed it right here on the clock. We started the operation at 1213, and they actually began taking off. It took them an hour or more to get the entire group off. They went in a number of ways. You can see from the chart they came from a number of airfields. This includes F-141s and F-111s, which are suppression birds, electronic suppression, as well as tankers. The total route was about 2,600 nautical miles. The hack-marks are fuel. They had four fuelings on the way and two fuelings on return. We actually took off with more birds than we needed, so that if systems went down early in the raid we could send some back and substitute birds that were diverted.

And then some tankers went back with them. The reason I mention this is because there is a report out of England today, that some F-111s were driven off and returned with ordnance. The birds that were returned did have their ordnance, and anti-air had nothing to do with actions emanating from Libya. It had to do with some system that had gone down—the radar or the navigation system. Another bird was substituted, and those returned.

Q: How many returned?
A: We had six spare birds, so six were bound to return one way or another.

Q: Was this before the refueling points?
A: No, I don't think it was before. The birds that returned from Libya did not have ordnance on them. It just makes sense, if you think about it. When you come home, it's not going to carry as much weight, no matter what is over the target. That report that the gentleman gave is wrong. The *America* and the carriers deployed in this configuration and the American *Coral Sea* started launching about 1745 hours in the afternoon. They put in the air not only attack birds but they also put in the bulk of the support package for both the Air Force attack and the Navy attack. I'm talking about things like P-2Cs, which coordinate our lanes and traffic control; our E-3s which is electronic suppression; our A-7s and F-18s, which can be used for HARM [high-speed anti-radiation missile], strikes, and suppression. The F-18s and F-14s can be used for counter-air and air-to-air in case it's necessary to protect the force. They were deployed over the entire area.

Q: There were Tomcats up?
A: The F-14s are Tomcats. About 1854, the circus started seriously. The last tanking was done with the F-111s. After the last tanking, the various aircraft went down to a low level at one end.

Q: How low?
A: All the way; somewhere below 500 feet. The carrier attacked and they did the same thing. About six minutes before they came in, our attack force was at low level to avoid running them up. We thought we had threatening missile electronics, and we attempted to suppress with strike force to suppress them. Following closely upon that, of course, right at 1900 was the first strike. The raid on what we characterize as Sidi Bilal, the raid on Azizzia, the raid on Benghazi Barracks, on Benina—all came in at 1900.

Q: The six minutes before the first raid came was when you began suppression for that fact to 1850. There was no indication that the Libyans were responding or even had detected the attack until the planes went up and fired the HARMS and strikes?
A: That is a little confusing. The honest answer is that we don't totally know. But number one, we achieved surprise. That is pretty clear. There was some talk about the Libyans confusing contacts, that there had been something going on probably as early as ten minutes, but no definite period in the raid with orders to shoot or fire or anything like that.

Q: They didn't detect the planes leaving the carriers? Everything was kept low enough that their radars didn't detect them?
A: No, they did not. The target, which was the Tripoli Military Airport, was not attacked until around 1906 hours. All the A-6s had cleared the area and had reported what we call "feet wet" by 1911 hours. They didn't report it at 1911 hours, but the attack was minutes long, and we had subsequent reports received that all the F-111s were accounted for. That was the first report. Then we received the report that they were not all accounted for.

Q: When was the second report?
A: I don't know. I'd say after about four or five minutes.

Q: Your assumption is that there is no question that the F-111 was in that specific region when we lost him?
A: We will talk about that in a few minutes. I'll tell you what I know about it. I don't know everything about it.

Q: Those reports went from the aircraft to the *America*?
A: They went to the tanker, which was on the *America*.

Q: There is no indication then that Soviet ships may have been tracking the fleet out in the Mediterranean? Were there not ships out there tracking?
A: We have no indication that they did.

Q: They didn't even know where you were? They don't stay close enough?
A: They try. I don't want to elaborate too much, but we made an effort. Generally, in peacetime operations, the Soviets are in close vicinity and they can usually, when they see fit, intercept us. And when they do, they can track us, depending on the speed of the ships. Sometimes carriers can run away from them. When they do that, they report it, and somebody else runs up. But we timed the attack, and we knew where they were, and we made an effort. I don't know how much of an effort they were making, but we know very little about the Soviets. All we know is that they were there, and we assumed they were trying to intercept us, and we made an effort to avoid them.

Q: Just to clarify: there were no Libyan ships at sea?
A: Please understand that in all this, despite the conventional wisdom, there are a lot of things we don't know. Hostilities are a tough proposition, despite what the media says. We don't exactly know what the solution is, but we knew what we wanted to do.

Q: There were no Libyan military ships at sea that you know? No Libyan aircraft?
A: Again, we didn't have evidence that there was. But you understand we were not searching this area, because we were trying to achieve surprise. Sometimes we would be reconning there, but in this case we were reconning nothing because we wanted no indication that something was going to happen. Now, we might have, as we came in to sea, seen some Libyan ships—but we didn't. If that would have been the first time, we would have run into them.

Q: No Libyan aircraft in the air?
A: No. There was no Libyan aircraft as far as we know. We were prepared for them. Let me just finish the times and we can come back to that.

When they cleared the area, the F-111s went back up to refuel again and to congregate and check out who was there. That was the first indication that one was missing. They lingered awhile to sort that out and alert the *America* and form a search and rescue operation. Then the F-111s started back and did two fuelings on the way home.

One aircraft developed an overheating line coming around the corner and the main emergency line eroded. It had nothing to do with being hit. It was just an operational incident. By then the fuel had gone. They had been in the air for 5,000 miles, 9-10 hours, something like that. The last airplane landed in England at 0310 hours.

Okay, having gone through the whole thing like that, I think it is important first of all to talk about the target, which was part of the planning process. It was a very complex time involved. Not only because of the character of the mission, but—let's be real candid about it—the nature of the world today is such that it's not like planning a World War II raid. When we are going to put out an oil refinery and we fly from A to B and we get so much flak, then go in there and kick the hell out of them. We wanted targets that would, first of all, achieve the purpose of the political objective, which others have spoken to as well as the Secretary of State and Secretary Weinberger. But you don't stop there when you select targets in this day and age. Naturally, it's not only important in a moral and ethical sense but also in a political sense that we are as secretive as possible. So, whenever we start saying we are going to reduce our losses, we talk night attack. That means that you are probably going to have to make a low-level night attack. You are going to have to rely on your sensor systems which means that your targets are distinguishable by radar or some fashion like that.

Preferably, choose targets with the biggest payoff and the least amount of collateral damage. It's as simple as that. So we don't have to come around again. And preferably, which incidentally we didn't have a choice in Libya, should not be in a heavily defended area. Unfortunately, almost every target that is worth hitting is in a heavily defended area. But those targets may not be radar distinguishable, and if you drop something on it, you are not sure you hit anything. You just kick up a lot of dust. That doesn't make a lot of sense.

Q: Are you talking about camps in the desert?
A: Terrorist training camps. Terrorist training camps are interesting things. People keep talking about terrorist training camps. There are usually a few with a bunch of tents. Guys get out early in the morning to do their thing—shoot some bullets at targets, what have you. So what kind of target is that? Our main parameter is collateral damage. To pick a target is a very important part of our targeting process. There is no way you are going to eliminate all collateral damage, but you can certainly try. We tried very hard. You can try in the planning process. You can try in the rules of engagement process.

Q: One point references giving guidelines to pilots. What guidelines can you give?
A: There are some things you can't say. But in regard to targets, we give careful instructions that we try to avoid collateral damage. What they do, of course, is try and plan their

bombing patterns and so forth to do certain things like that. Then they are told that this is a night attack. You have to depend very heavily on technology, and they told the F-111s that when they ran the area, there might be some possibility of collateral damage; if all our systems were not working, we were not to drop. We would not do that during war in the conventional sense. If a man is over the target with ordnance, no matter what is working, he's going to let it go. We don't do that. And we had very few planes that didn't get off because their systems weren't working.

Q: What do we know now about that, and how?
A: Let's get into that in a minute. I just want to say a thing about forces before we do that. We, of course, had the two carriers on the scene. It was logical and natural. We had those forces there to use them. It was clear to us that if we wanted to hit the target that we hit and do a reasonable amount of damage, having concluded that it would be difficult for the two carriers alone to do what we wanted to do. So we wanted some help, and given the political situation in Europe, the best place to get it was our aircraft base in England, particularly, since our F-111s are very well suited for what we wanted to do, for several reasons.

They have the technology. They fly low at night. They train to fly low at night, and they are trained to do the kind of work that was involved here. They carry heavy loads, and they also added a very important element. When you are looking at the carriers, you get another element of surprise. Using that, we thought we could do it in one night without having to re-attack. Cut down our losses and make the attack more effective, administer in a shorter time.…

I think that certainly from a professional standpoint, that it was quite an achievement: to get that many aircraft that far with ordnance.… Also, the coordination between the Air Force and the Navy was impressive.

These planes are arriving from 2,600 miles away. I was standing in the Command Center knowing that the attack was going at 1900. And 30 seconds after 1900, I was listening to a guy on CNN in Tripoli, and he said, "My God, there's an airplane overhead." That's an amazing thing to know that we wanted them to be in at 7 o'clock and this guy is looking out his window saying, "My God, there's something going on here."

Q: Did the Libyans have some significant radio monitoring?
A: We can't afford to assume otherwise. In any event, I'm very proud of the team. You know, we get a lot of criticism in my business about not working together, and there wasn't a single instance that I know of in the pre-planning and planning stage, and then the execution phase, where there was an argument or difficulty or any problem we couldn't solve.

We worked very hard to achieve surprise, and I thought we were reasonably successful with that. We can live in that SAM environment, and we don't know as much as we would like to know about the effect of our HARMS, because we are more interested to find out what happened to the targets.

Some of these radars at SAM sites are spread around the countryside, and it's been difficult to find out exactly what happened at the targets. We know we put a bunch of

them out of commission, because they just quit radiating. And we heard some guys say, "My radar doesn't work." They told the SA6 site to fire, and he said that "…it was out… it's gone…we can't do it." We could not live probably in that SAM environment, extensive as it is. And it is extensive. It is probably the most heavily defended site today in missiles as anywhere in the world.

Interview excerpts on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Soviet threat, and US naval military readiness with *Sea Power* magazine Editor-in-Chief James D. Hessman and Contributing Editor Vincent C. Thomas

April

Sea Power: How rapidly will our defense risk increase if you fail to get the 3 percent Defense growth that you, your colleagues in the Joint Chiefs, and Defense Secretary [Caspar] Weinberger believe that you need?
Crowe: First of all, I believe you have to look at it on a broader basis than in terms of just one year. Is it going to be just one point on a graph, or are we seeing the beginning of a steady trend over the next few years. If it is the latter circumstance that we are confronting, then I believe we are going to be back in the slump of the 1970s very quickly. If, on the other hand, we are seeing only a dip, and then the budget begins to climb again, I would hope we could overcome this problem and get back to modernizing, updating, and correcting our deficiencies in a year or two. But those are uncertainties about which I don't have answers at this point.

Sea Power: If you do sustain cuts, what will be the plan of attack on your part, and [on the part of] the Secretary of Defense to get across your concerns about the increases in risk to the American people—and, through them, to the Congress and to the media as well?
Crowe: I believe we have to be a part of the educational process and must make certain that our voices are heard. Whether they accept our judgment is another point, but we would like our day in court. And it is a problem not only for the Secretary of Defense but also for the military and all the service leaders and all the major commanders. They all have to be on the circuit and they have to be speaking up, because who else has the information that you need to make these kinds of decisions? And the fact is that we are facing a burgeoning threat.

Secretary Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense during the Carter administration, said many years ago, "We build, they build. We stop, they build. We start building again, they keep right on building." And that has not abated, and I see no prospects for it abating.

Sea Power: How do you analyze the change between what you saw when you first went to CINCPAC and CINCSOUTH and what you see today?
Crowe: It is interesting that you bring up those different parts of the world. Of course, there are many differences in those two commands, particularly in the cultures in the

parts of the world where they are located, and the societies, and so on. But for the purposes of what we are talking about, the real constant in both parts of the world was the Soviet global threat. We were seeing them increase their strength when I was in the Mediterranean; they not only were modernizing their forces in central Russia but also the forces of their satellites in Bulgaria and Romania. They were filling out their cadres in the Caucasus, and they were modernizing their air defense and their offensive air in the Mediterranean. It was really imposing and impressive.

Then you turn around and go to the Pacific, and what are you looking at? You are looking at an increase from the 1960s until 1982 from 20 to 53 divisions on the Chinese border and seeing a buildup from around 1,200 to almost 3,000 offensive combat land-based aircraft. You are seeing a third of their entire SS-20 IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) force in the Pacific, as well as 80 Backfire bombers. The largest of their four fleets is there, and every year they augment that fleet with new construction. There are 86 major combatants in that fleet and over 60 nuclear submarines. It is quite an armada!

To top that off, they have facilities in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cam Rahn Bay; the latter is, of course, the largest forward-deployment base the Soviet Union has.

Sea Power: The Soviets always have had a huge numbers edge. Now, as you point out, they have a true global presence and are increasing that all the time. You also told Congress that you were concerned about the United States losing its technological edge. Can we keep that edge, and what do we have to do to keep it?

Crowe: I believe people must understand about the basic problem that senior military commanders in America face. When I was testifying before Congress, I must have heard a dozen times the terms "political reality" and "fiscal reality." In my view, it is just as important to understand "military reality." And there is very little talk about military reality. It seems to be overwhelmed by fiscal imperatives or whatever else you might want to call them. But from a basic standpoint, for forty years the United States has understood that, vis-à-vis the Soviets, we were going to fight outnumbered. And a military man of my generation has lived with that so long that we accept it. We always have understood that we cannot match the Soviets weapon for weapon, bullet for bullet, man for man.

So the American military leadership has assumed that we have to compensate for that in a variety of ways. And one of the fundamental ways we compensate for it is to participate in a coalition, in some alliances. But that doesn't solve the problem in itself. We have striven for years now to take advantage of our technological superiority and quality, and in that way compensate for some of the inferiority in numbers from which we suffer. And this, of course, is your question.

But an important part of that has not only been quality of equipment but quality of people, which means you have all those things that attract good people. You have to have sufficient pay, you have to have amenities, you have to have a quality of life that attracts the type of people we know are necessary for our outnumbered forces. It also means the best leadership you can get, so that you make the wise tactical decisions that help compensate for being outnumbered.

It also means intense training. You can do a lot of things with people who are well trained, even though they are outnumbered. The point I am trying to make is that, because of that basic asymmetry that we face, we have built a philosophy that requires a lot of things, and these elements are interdependent. You not only have to have good equipment but you have to have good training, you have to have good people, you have to have good logistics support.

If you have all those things, you will have an effective deterrent even though you are outnumbered. And the military leadership in this country has been fairly successful in seeing that we have those elements, even though they didn't know how much money they were going to get the next year, or how much in the long run they could plan on. They had to live with a one-year budget system.

But, conversely, that means that when you start cutting back there is not one of those things that you can cut back without really carving into your philosophy. Many people would say, "Well, it takes longer to build equipment than it does to train, so we will cut down on your training this year, and then if we have a crisis you can train quickly." But given the fundamental problem we have, if you cut out any one of those four elements, we deteriorate very rapidly.

Sea Power: Your number one priority right now, we would judge from hearing your testimony, would have to be people, would it not?

Crowe: Absolutely! From my perspective, and I believe the Joint Chiefs all share this point of view, that is our number one priority. You can fight sometimes without some things if you have good people, but no matter what other advantages you might enjoy, if you don't have good people, and particularly when you are outnumbered and outgunned, you will lose. Good people are the most crucial element.

Statement on Nuclear Testing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Washington, DC | May 8

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I appreciate this opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on various proposals to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. You have asked me to address the issue of nuclear testing broadly and comprehensively, with emphasis on:

- The relationship between nuclear testing and defense policy;
- Linkages between testing and deterrence, the prime mission of our nuclear forces;
- The military impact of nuclear arms reductions and associated proposals for a comprehensive test ban;
- Safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness considerations embedded in the technical aspects of nuclear testing; and

- Issues surrounding compliance with and verification of existing limits on nuclear testing.

Nuclear Deterrence

To begin, I share the view of many on this committee that the world would be better off without nuclear weapons. But until that occurs, some of us have to mind the store, making sure that we have a nuclear deterrent as reliable and as credible as we can make it, with minimum risk to our national security, as Secretary Weinberger stated in his FY 1987 report to the Congress.

We seek to prevent war by persuading potential adversaries that the cost of attacking us will exceed any gain they could hope to achieve. This is the core of our defense strategy today, as it has been for most of the postwar period.

I am not sure that the Soviet military establishment looks at deterrence in exactly the same context. I do know that we and they approach the strategic balance in far different ways. For their part, the Soviet Union takes a very robust and multifaceted approach toward this balance:

- An unusually large mix of nuclear offensive forces: 10 types of ICBMs, 3 classes of ballistic missile submarines, 6 types of SLBMs, 6 types of nuclear-capable bombers, 5 cruise missile variants, 2 types of long-range intermediate-range missiles, and a host of theater nuclear-capable weapons positioned to strike across the Warsaw Pact front with NATO;
- An air defense system with extraordinary radar coverage and interceptor density around the nation's periphery;
- The world's only operational ABM system featuring interceptor missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads;
- An anti-satellite system operational for more than two decades, including missiles with a conventional warhead designed to blast satellites out of the sky;
- A shield of earth, rock, concrete, and steel around many of their nuclear forces, coupled with a concurrent program hardening command, control, and communications facilities and equipment; and
- A heavy emphasis on damage limitation through civil defenses.

Thus, while the Soviet Union has pursued a comprehensive nuclear testing program over time, that program is only one component of a military strategy forged around a massive array of offensive and defensive forces. These forces are composed of conventional and nuclear arms which support a doctrine concerned with the essence, purpose, and character of a possible future war and the preparation of the country and its armed forces for conducting such a war.

For our part, we have never tried to emulate the Soviet "fortress" mentality. Nor do we replace our strategic offensive forces at the same pace as one sees in the Soviet Union. Instead, we have historically let our deterrent rely heavily on the incremental modernization of existing launch platforms with recurring emphasis on nuclear weapon

technologies. To illustrate this point, over the years, we could have emphasized large ICBMs and mega-tonnages in warheads; instead, we leaned toward more accurate missiles and new warheads of lower yields.

We might have moved more quickly toward an entirely new design for our ballistic missile submarines, featuring larger tubes or more missiles per submarine, or a larger inventory of SSBNs; instead, we applied the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) solution. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, a decision not to replace the aging B-52s was accompanied by development of an entirely new weapon system centered around cruise missiles. For better or worse, many of these decisions were made on the basis of fiscal constraints. Sometimes, they were accompanied by an illusion that nuclear disarmament was just around the corner. In any event, improvements to our systems placed proportionately greater emphasis on weapons rather than proliferation of basic platforms. This in turn led us to rely on a comprehensive nuclear testing program. We know it, and the Soviets know it. That is why they have pushed weapons and nuclear testing to the foreground in propaganda and in recent nuclear disarmament proposals.

Today, of course, we are forced to replace aging platforms with the new Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and the Peacekeeper. We fully expect that these new platforms will be around for a long time—the mainstay of our nuclear deterrent force. In turn, we must retain the flexibility to make incremental improvements in weapon systems designs and validation of such designs through the nuclear testing program in order to ensure that these systems remain an effective and credible deterrent.

The Strategic Balance

Because the United States and the Soviet Union approach the strategic balance in such different ways, we also find occasional confusion over where the two sides stand in that balance. When one limits the discussion to offensive nuclear arms, it is possible to conclude that we lead the Soviets in some areas and they lead us in others, resulting in a situation perceived by some as rough nuclear parity.

But if we consider the totality of Soviet military forces and capabilities—offensive nuclear arms, together with other nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological warfare components of their strategic posture—we find that the United States and its allies are considerably underpowered in comparison with the USSR. To restore and stabilize the strategic balance—and in seeking to reduce our current reliance upon offensive nuclear arms—we are moving ahead with efforts to determine the technical feasibility of a strategic defense. In the interim, the need to maintain an effective triad is clear. We must leave the door open for the incremental improvements necessary to ensure that effectiveness.

Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Proposals

As you know—and might expect—nuclear testing figures prominently in recent nuclear disarmament campaigns and proposals by the Soviet Union. With respect to nuclear testing in general, the Soviet Union has been reaching for the high ground in political and social rhetoric, condemning in particular the US program. In reality, however, the

official Gorbachev proposals of mid-January do not contemplate a worldwide ban on nuclear testing until the late 1990s—more than a decade from now. In the interim, these proposals suggest only that the United States and the Soviet Union join in a moratorium or delay in nuclear testing—an arrangement which can be broken and which, in fact, worked very much to our disadvantage in 1961 when the Soviets broke out of a three-year moratorium with the most intensive nuclear test program in history. Even their recent suspension of nuclear testing seems to have been a temporary expedient. They are now gearing up for a resumption of such tests.

Nuclear Disarmament and National Security

You also will find that the Soviet proposals of mid-January weave the whole issue of nuclear testing into a much broader package which, through the year 2000, would enhance their security and flexibility while undermining the foundations of US and allied security. We should not expect otherwise. But even if we are able to find a more equitable road to nuclear disarmament that road will have its own asymmetries, uncertainties, and potential instabilities in the East-West military balance.

As the process evolves, both sides can be expected to place a premium on the survivability, reliability, and effectiveness of that last component of their nuclear capability. In this regard, General Secretary Gorbachev was correct when he noted, "the interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof." What he did not mention are some very obvious efforts by the Soviet Union to strengthen such linkages within their own force structure, including but certainly not limited to an earth and space shield for many of their nuclear strike forces, national command structure, and communication assets. For deterrent purposes, it is absolutely essential that we be able to place such protected targets at risk. To do this, we must be able to perfect our nuclear weapons, as necessary, and that in turn requires continuity within the nuclear testing program.

We also face major uncertainties surrounding the mix of launch vehicles apt to evolve from a nuclear disarmament process. We don't know whether the Soviets will emphasize mobile or hardened ICBMs, more dispersed and sheltered bombers, or ballistic missile submarines, some of which may be berthed in coastal tunnels. In any event, uncertainties surrounding the evolving mix and location of Soviet offensive forces underscore the importance of remaining flexible in weapon system design and validation of such designs through testing.

Lastly, the whole process of eliminating nuclear weapons on a worldwide basis is fraught with extraordinary problems of compliance and verification. We do not know, in the first instance, whether nuclear disarmament is an achievable proposition by the year 2000. Further, we have no way of knowing whether a nuclear disarmament treaty, even one pursued diligently by the United States and the Soviet Union, will capture the last weapon on earth. Thus, we will have to maintain a deterrent to nuclear attack right down to the last moment and, from a US and allied security perspective, we want that deterrent to be as effective and credible as possible. Nuclear testing is required to guarantee this. To put all of this in perspective:

- A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, now or later, will contribute absolutely nothing to nuclear disarmament. It will not eliminate a single nuclear weapon.
- Conversely, continuation of a comprehensive nuclear testing program can assure that we go down the road of nuclear disarmament with minimum degradation in the safety, security, survivability, reliability, and flexibility of our nuclear deterrent and, in turn, minimum risk to our national security and that of our allies.

Technical Requirements

Thus far, I have focused upon the strategic and military requirements for nuclear testing. Let me now turn to the technical side. In general, the design and development of a nuclear weapon represents a great extension beyond the usual engineering experience of any technology on which we depend:

- Temperatures of 100 million degrees, or hotter than the surface of the sun;
- Pressures higher than in stars;
- Operations measured in millionths of a second; and
- Internal velocities of 100 kilometers per second.

Safety and Security

These characteristics demand, first and foremost, the highest standards in safety and security. We can never rest on our oars. Similarly, we must ensure that all of the complex mechanisms of achieving safety and security do not, in some unexpected fashion, degrade the reliability of that weapon as part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We can satisfy ourselves on that score only by maintaining a nuclear testing program. A strong emphasis on safety and security also reinforces our concerns about nuclear arms control. We go to great lengths to minimize the possibility of unauthorized access or tampering, radiation exposure to troops engaged in weapon maintenance, and hazards associated with an accident during storage or transportation.

Further, the basic precept that American-built products should be put through a program of rigorous testing is deeply entrenched in our industrial culture and in laws of the land. We insist that a vast range of commercial goods possess a requisite degree of safety and reliability, and we ensure this through testing at the factory by the National Bureau of Standards or some other independent agency. Similarly, the Department of Defense is under constant pressure to assure that conventional weapon systems—tanks, fighting vehicles, aircraft, missiles, and so on—perform as designed and expected on the battlefield. In this context, I frankly do not understand why Congress would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent—namely, the warhead.

Weapons Reliability and Effectiveness

With respect to weapons reliability and effectiveness, we are dependent upon the testing program in five distinct ways.

- It gives us confidence in our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons. Our hope is that we will never have to use such weapons, but like other systems not used over many years, we must be sure that they will perform as designed—and that our potential adversaries are aware of this fact. We require this same confidence of our conventional war reserves (ammunition, missiles, etc.). It is inconceivable that we would place weapons constructed of the most exotic materials known to man and incorporating the most advanced physical principles on the shelf for an indeterminate period of time without ascertaining the indiscriminate effects of aging.
- Testing provides information essential to the effective employment of nuclear weapons—confidence that the right weapon is applied to the right target. The lethality of nuclear weapons, theirs and ours, against hardened targets is one of our major concerns. So too is the expected survival and performance of such weapons in a nuclear environment featuring the synergistic effects of blast, high intensity radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
- Testing enables us to determine critical nuclear effects on such nonnuclear systems as surveillance, command, control, and communications systems. For example, it is common knowledge that radiation can be a serious problem. We must continue to explore the nature of the entire spectrum of nuclear effects problems and develop fixes to deal with them.
- It helps us to verify that a weapon modified for reliability, security, or safety reasons, or a weapon tailor-made for a new delivery system, such as cruise missiles, the Peacekeeper, or the Trident D-5, will emerge as a reliable and effective component of our nuclear deterrent forces. At one time, for example, we had to recall all of the Polaris warheads because of reliability problems that degraded inventory effectiveness by as much as 75 percent. Only nuclear testing allowed us to verify that Polaris modifications had solved the problem.
- And, testing helps us design entirely new weapons of smaller size and weight for a given yield. For years, the United States has led the world in this aspect of nuclear technology, with considerable savings in the size and cost of delivery systems. But each new delivery system and associated weapon requires thorough testing before it can be counted as part of our strategic or tactical nuclear deterrent.

Overall, nuclear testing is a bargain in the maintenance and modernization of our nuclear forces. But the lack of testing can make this process more costly over the long haul. To illustrate this point, if we had to assess weapon reliability and survivability based upon paper calculations, unsupported by empirical tests, we would encounter a number of unacceptable uncertainties and unknowns, the nature and extent of which we would be unable to determine. One could conceive of these unknowns translating into compensatory measures that could result in markedly different types of weapons or, possibly, a requirement for more weapons per target than we plan today. That's an expensive proposition no matter how you look at it.

In all of this, I would emphasize that we do not detonate a weapon underground simply for stockpile reliability, weapons development, or physics studies of new concepts. The Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Agency have a broad-based schedule of scientific and technical observations, supported by an extensive array of measuring devices, to study effects on the various nonnuclear components of our strategic deterrent forces as well as those incorporated in command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. While I do not want to get into details, it is not uncommon for these tests to produce technical surprises, something not predicted in either simulations or computer-based analyses.

I believe that the Soviet military has a similar range of technical requirements. Certainly, this was suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev's statement last March that "during seven months of non-testing the Soviets had paid a price militarily" and their subsequent decision to resume testing. Thus, on purely military grounds, I suspect both sides agree that nuclear testing is essential. In turn, this tends to push the whole issue of testing toward compliance with existing agreements.

Verification and Compliance

As this committee is aware, the US government has been trying for several years to get its arms around the verification and compliance problem. So far, objective results are not very assuring. Most government experts agree that seismic techniques, used to estimate the yield of a Soviet nuclear test under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, are inadequate to ensure effective verification and compliance. Others have testified that, even with seismic sensors, it is possible to circumvent this technology by testing in cavities, thereby decoupling the energy of an explosion from the surrounding medium; or testing in outer space, in remote areas, or in the atmosphere above parts of the world, areas where attributing the test to a particular country would be extremely difficult.

In the interest of exploring the technical side of verification, the President has repeatedly sought an honest exchange of views with the Soviets. They have been invited, for example, to measure the yield of a US nuclear test using any instrumentation devices they deem necessary. But they have refused to participate in this relatively straight-forward approach to the problem. Additionally, the President offered to demonstrate, in the third week of April 1986, a new direct-yield measurement technique, known as CORRTEX, which US scientists believe will enable both the United States and the USSR to improve verification and ensure compliance with the current Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The CORRTEX method has a number of features important to understand. It does not replace remote sensing by seismic detectors; rather, it would eliminate some of the uncertainties associated with remote sensing by on-site measurement of specific nuclear tests. The US government does not intend that such measuring be accomplished by a third party. Americans would monitor Soviet tests, and citizens of the Soviet Union would monitor our tests.

The Soviet government turned aside the President's latest proposal. Instead, Moscow continues to maintain that agreement on methods of verification and compliance will

not be difficult if we ignore problems associated with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and move on to a more comprehensive moratorium on nuclear testing, a maneuver that would completely ignore effective verification concerns in a regime where these factors are even more critical and demanding. I have trouble with their "good faith" approach, particularly when other aspects of their nuclear disarmament package envision a continuing military struggle for world power and influence. I doubt the Soviet Union will ever be able to square this circle. Thus, we must assure that verification and compliance mechanisms surrounding any nuclear testing arrangement be as direct, straight-forward, and objective as possible.

Summary

To sum it up, I believe that the US way of managing its nuclear deterrent and the strategic balance is far less burdensome on our society and our economy than the Soviet way. But you must recognize that our approach to nuclear deterrence puts a premium on high technology rather than brute force. So too does our effort to develop a strategic defense unaccompanied by a government and a people digging in for survival.

In defense planning, we are drawn toward nuclear testing by one simple fact: we expect to achieve effective deterrence from a relatively small mix of strategic nuclear forces in service over a relatively long period of time. To maintain that effectiveness and credibility over time, we must have a weapons modernization and maintenance program supported by rigorous underground testing—the only environment left to us. We cannot assume, even in view of the Soviet proposals, that nuclear disarmament is just around the corner.

For something as exotic and potentially lethal as a nuclear weapon, such testing also is embedded in the highest standards of safety, security, and survivability, as well as reliability. We should regard with the utmost concern any suggestion that we could allow our nuclear weapons stockpile to degrade "gracefully" over time.

Further, virtually everything about the nuclear disarmament process—asymmetries, uncertainties, and potential instabilities in the evolving military balance—suggests that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should only occur toward the end, rather than at the beginning, of this process. Certainly, this is the case for the United States and its allies, if not for the Soviet Union.

Overall, I believe we stand a better chance of achieving near-term progress in nuclear disarmament by approaching weapons reductions directly rather than obliquely through a comprehensive test ban. The United States has formally proposed such reductions in both theater systems and strategic systems. The Joint Chiefs fully support these proposals and would welcome a constructive response by the Soviets to them.

Excerpts from Remarks at a Joint Chamber of Commerce/Kiwanis/Lions/ Rotary Luncheon for "Bill Crowe Day"

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | May 15

What I'm trying to say in a sort of roundabout way is that it is a very special treat for Shirley and me to take this brief respite among friends and to collect our thoughts in the state where we grew up.

I want to tell you a story that I acquired in 1984. I had come back for the graduation ceremony at OU. I was given an award there, and I brought with me a few members of my staff from Hawaii who were sort of a cross-section of this country. They were with us for the two days we spent here, meeting people and seeing things in Oklahoma. As we were flying out, I was talking to two or three of these officers, and they said, "You know, we've been all over this country, and it's just great to visit a place where the people are proud of where they live. And it's not true everywhere." They just were amazed at how proud Oklahomans are to be here, to live here, and of their state. And it's a great tribute to you. Shirley and I, likewise, are very proud to call this state our home. Sooners, you know, just make no bones about the strong attachments they have to family and to the free way of life. They seem to have a special feel for this country and its values. And as today's events show, they have a deep sense of patriotism and appreciation for the people in uniform who secure the Nation's interests all around the globe, every day.

Remarks on Career Reflections: Thoughts for 1986 USNA Graduates at the Graduation Ceremonies, US Naval Academy

Annapolis, Maryland | May 21

Admiral [Charles R.] Larson, members of the Naval Academy faculty and staff, proud parents, guests, and above all, graduates of the Class of 1986:

It is an understatement to say that I am thrilled to be here today to share with you the sense of excitement, anticipation, and freedom that attends all graduation ceremonies. Forty years ago I went through a similar commencement. As a matter of fact, the only substantial differences that I can detect are that there are some very talented young women graduating today and the admirals seem to me to be much younger and handsomer than the ones who attended in 1946. It's amazing what four decades will do to your point of view.

One other thing experience tells you is that commencement addresses fade rapidly—perhaps in a matter of seconds—but what will not be forgotten today is that the Class of 1986 has successfully completed a challenging four years and is graduating. You have crossed all the rivers, slain all the dragons, and knocked aside the windmills which four years ago stood between you and a diploma and a commission in your nation's military service. Today, we are rightly celebrating those achievements, and on behalf of all the

parents, guests, and friends assembled, I salute you and extend our warmest wishes and congratulations.

Speaking of parents, I strongly believe that they, likewise, should be accorded special recognition today. I am confident that our graduates would be happy to divide their glory with you. After all, you have made a substantial contribution to the whole process—including encouragement, comfort and solace, no doubt some worrying, and probably a respectable amount of nagging and praying. At the same time, if my own experience is any guide, you have also paid a physical, mental, and psychological price. I feel it appropriate, therefore, in the name of new Ensigns and 2nd Lieutenants, to thank the parents for their vital role. Would all the parents please stand so we can acknowledge you?

One further aside. If as parents you have found the road to this day unduly taxing, you might profit from a bit of advice saw I on a bumper sticker a few days ago. It said, "Avenge yourself—live long enough to be a problem to your children."

As a rule, a graduation speaker is never given a topic, but at the same time is expected to inspire and encourage his listeners with stirring remarks about nothing in particular. Today's event was no exception. I learned early in my life that people in the academic world have a strong tendency to speak in generalities and, when you most want specific answers, to leave you on your own. As a young and struggling student I had a number of teachers insist that a man becomes what he thinks about—that was, of course, designed to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But if it was true that I would become what I thought about, by the time I was eighteen I would have become a girl.

In any event, lacking a subject or definitive instructions, I turned to my own experience for help. As I contemplated the 40 years since I graduated from this institution—since I faced the world as you do now, with a degree but little work experience; with high hopes but little actual know-how—a few special thoughts seemed to spring out. They are not specific directions but philosophical benchmarks which have made it easier to keep my bearings under pressure; to adjust to change, to disappointment, and also to good fortune. In sum, they concern how you use your education in making your way in today's complex world, either in or out of the Service. I would like to share these thoughts with you for the next few moments.

There is a strong tendency today in this country—especially among speakers on occasions such as this—to deplore the state of the world and to wring one's hands and to fantasize about the past—the good old days. These prophets of doom overlook an awful lot that has gone on in the past and simply ignore the steady progress that has been made over the centuries. This is not to say that we don't have global anxieties. Clearly our own society has strains; we live under a number of clouds. You have no doubt discussed them in many a classroom, seminar, forum, and bull session. But to conclude that because we have serious problems we are going to the dogs is sheer nonsense. Paul Harvey once said, "In times like these, it's useful to remember that there have always been times like these." I think that's excellent advice.

The European of the 1400s who experienced the Black Plague—who didn't even know why his friends were dying—would not agree that we have not progressed; neither would

the Spanish seaman who sailed with the Armada; nor the Bedouin Arab who lived for centuries on the margins of starvation; nor those unfortunate peoples overrun by the Mongol conqueror Tamerlane; nor Galileo, who would be ecstatic over the advances of modern science. These are only a few examples from countless thousands.

In fact, previous ages have faced more disease, more poverty, more hunger, more corruption, more racism, and more killing than your generation. The globe since its beginning has confronted terrifying challenges, and yet it is still revolving on its axis. It is more exciting and vibrant today than it ever has been.

Art Buchwald, another famous philosopher, put it this way, "I don't know whether this is the best of times or the worst of times, but I can assure you it's the only time we've got." He cites Watergate as the ultimate test. Two hundred million people were able to change Presidents overnight without "one tank or helmeted soldier in the street" or "one bayonet being unsheathed." Any country that can do that can't be all bad.

The bottom line is: You should direct your energies to further improving our condition without being burdened with worrying about our decline and fall. And you should help others to do the same. With time, you will discover that such an attitude not only better accords with the facts but it will assist you in leading a more balanced and fruitful life.

Of course, it takes more than optimism to thread the rocks and shoals which block the way. In my experience, the greatest joy a human being can know is the joy we celebrate today—accomplishment—the joy of completing a job well done. This joy can be boundless when we make full use of our minds, our talents, our time. But there are no guarantees with either your diploma or your commission. They may widen your opportunities, but "future" achievement, results, and satisfaction depend on what you have yet to do. An individual who does not continue to learn and grow as a person is no better than one who cannot. Newton D. Baker wisely pointed out that, "The man who graduates today and stops learning tomorrow, is uneducated the day after."

Think of your life as a piece of farmland. It can only return to you what first you give to it. Making full use of your abilities, your plot of ground will return to you and yours an abundance that will amaze and delight you. I never use that analogy that I'm not reminded of the small town minister who was driving through the countryside. He came upon a particularly well-tended farm. It was green and productive and just generally impressive. He stopped and walked over to the fence and saw the farmer who obviously worked the land, and he said, "Brother, the Lord has seen fit to give you an awfully wonderful farm." The farmer thought about it a minute and said, "Well, I guess that's right, Pastor, but I wish you'd seen it when he gave it to me."

Let me assure you that these thoughts apply to all jobs and all stations in life, and especially to a military career. You will soon discover, as you disperse and report to your first duty station, that you do in fact have a great deal more to learn and that, in turn, Service life has a lot to teach. In fact, if you want some specific home-cooked advice, I would recommend that early in the game every Ensign and Second Lieutenant latch on to one or more good chief petty officers, or gunnery sergeants, and absorb their wisdom. You will greatly profit from what experience has taught them and the depth of their knowledge.

If you are genuinely willing to learn, they will be happy to share it with you. In return, they will expect enlightened leadership. Leaders, not technicians, are the number one product of this institution, and that's what is most needed in the fleet. Believe me, leadership can and does make a crucial difference in every successful group—and this is even more true in a platoon, a ship, or a squadron where men may someday be ordered to perform at the risk of death. A winning military capability is inevitably built upon quality leadership.

Successful commanders differ greatly in their styles and techniques—but they have a few common qualities. They know the mechanics of their business; they inspire others to excel; and they always keep the organization's fundamental goals firmly in focus. I urge you to cultivate those talents. Both you and our country will profit from such efforts, whether you make your ultimate career in or out of the service.

In preparing these remarks, I read several graduation addresses. In practically every instance the speaker mentioned that his career had on one or more occasions taken a completely unforeseen turn—normally for the better. In most cases, this good fortune was not the result of clever manipulation or some master plan, but opened up because the individual had drawn attention to himself by doing a good job—often a job that had little direct relation with the new offer.

At times the path ahead of you will be difficult, boring, discouraging, and certainly not well marked, but if you remain fully engaged, and take each step as well as you can and keep on walking, you will ultimately reach high ground. In this regard, you enjoy an advantage you must never overlook. As graduates of the US Naval Academy you are part of a long and impressive tradition that you can call on in times of strife and peril. You are steeped in the history and the standards of the world's foremost navy and Marine corps team. You inherit a code of perseverance and victory second to none, and it rests on the achievements of men like Farragut, Dewey, Sims, King, Nimitz, Spruance, and a host of others. I can testify that there will be times when you will personally draw on the Navy's traditions for strength and that you will, in turn, find them genuinely sustaining.

Right now I suspect that most of you feel that you are approaching the future with comparatively open minds, willing to entertain new ideas and varying points of view. In fact, you probably deplore what appears to be the narrow outlook and predictability of many of your elders. Mark Twain said, "You tell me where a man gets his cornpone, and I'll tell you what his opinions are." He was right about that, of course. Senior military leaders, not unlike bankers, doctors, journalists, farmers, lawyers, stock brokers, and television executives, all develop their own stereotyped view of the world, which often leaves little room for change or invention or appreciation for the opinion of others.

Don't forget, they were once just like you—new graduates dozing through a commencement ceremony and determined to remain open-minded. But it didn't work that way. They entered their profession and were gradually entrapped in its patterns of thinking and doing. The columnist Jane Bryant Quinn dubbed such people "prisoners of their vocabulary—the vocabulary of their work world. Their minds pick up today's ideas, then

close and sink like a stone." In turn, their intellects soon "vanish without a trace." In other words, they became "the narrow-minded adults, whose existence they once failed to understand." I urge you to reject that path and to nourish the spirit of inquiry which the last four years has imparted to you. This involves keeping a broad circle of acquaintances, wide reading, developing interests outside of your work, seriously listening to others, even your critics, and constantly seeking fresh points of view. Quinn says, "You should begin to worry when you start sounding like everyone else you know."

I personally witnessed a man wrestling with this problem a few months ago in New York City. I was in a taxi and asked the driver who he was going to vote for in the next election. He said that his whole family—including his grandparents, parents, and brothers—had always voted for Party X. I surmised that, therefore, he would vote for Party X this time. He said, "No"—he was going to vote for Party Y. He went on to explain, "There comes a time in every man's life when he must ignore his principles and do the right thing." I could not have put it better.

Your mind is something like a parachute. It won't help you if it won't open when you need it. But do not underestimate this task. Given the pressures and the specialization of the modern world, and especially of the military profession, you will have to work continuously at keeping an open and questioning mind. But the rewards are great. This capacity is the foundation on which a man or woman can build genuine integrity and self-esteem. You could pay no greater tribute to the Naval Academy or to yourself than winning the constant fight to maintain your intellectual freedom, independence, and perspective.

Let me offer one more piece of amateur wisdom. As you progress and mature, nothing will stand you in better stead than a sense of humor. In a perfect or ideal world, this would not be so important. We could be serious about every subject without harm. But, unfortunately, life does not meet that criterion. There is no line of work, no endeavor, no institution, no achievement, no failure that doesn't have its ludicrous or ridiculous aspects, and to recognize that simple lesson is a first step toward maturity.

Alan Alda, better known as Hawkeye of "Mash" fame, expounding on his own philosophy, contends that "to be playful about the most serious things is a trait of the most dedicated person." He insists that "to kid authority is to humanize it" and to endow it with "a strength that rigidity will never give it." He suggests that such an approach is a "mark of closeness and involvement, not antagonism." He may have been rationalizing his own rather irreverent attitudes, but I do believe there is a great deal of truth in what he says.

I must emphasize that I do not just mean the ability to appreciate a joke or tell a good story. In my book, a man who cannot make fun of himself does not have a sense of humor. The fringe benefits of being able to laugh at your own frailties, pomposity, pretense, or mistakes are many. It is an essential part of remaining humble, relaxed, and in touch with reality.

I watched Mr. George Burns on television the other night. At the age of 90, he is still going strong. He said that in his career he had tried singing—no one listened. He tried dancing—no one liked it. He tried comedy—no one laughed. He tried serious acting and everybody laughed. But, by the time he discovered that he didn't have any talent, he was

too big a star to quit. His sense of humor has kept him healthy and successful for more years than most of us will see.

When asked what would happen if there were no stories in the world, a third grader replied, "People would die of seriousness." That's not too farfetched. In essence, a genuine sense of humor oils the gears of personal relationships, lends perspective to complex problems, and above all, helps to keep you sane when the world closes in—and believe me, it will close in at times. I simply cannot imagine going through this life without lots of laughter.

It is hard to believe that it has been four decades since my own graduation. For me, the years of following the flag, literally around the globe, have been full of challenge, and in the end they have brought me quite unexpected responsibilities. Now I am the last one of my class—826 strong—on active duty. Those years included a great deal of conflict and crisis for my country; they spanned Korea and Vietnam and all gradations of troubled peace. Nevertheless:

- Our people are still free, and prospering;
- The prospects for the future spread of democracy are bright;
- Hopeful peoples around the globe still look to the United States of America for inspiration and help; and
- The enemies of freedom have been more often thwarted than successful, and their star is in decline, more and more as time goes by.

My class has played a significant role in that drama, both in peace and war. Of my classmates, two were POWs in North Vietnam for over seven years, two are Medal of Honor winners, 34 attained flag or general rank, and an impressive number are CEOs or heads of their own companies. One has served as President of our nation. The list could go on and on. Your class will likewise be heavily involved in shaping US foreign and military policy and in every aspect of our national life over the next forty years. It will be an exciting journey, and I envy the prospects and challenges you will face. President Lincoln in the Civil War used to tell his generals, "Gentlemen, always remember, when you are in the field, you are the republic." That is no less true for the Class of 1986—you are the republic!

In preparing for this address, I tried desperately to recall the events of my own graduation, but with very little success. If you choose to remember anything about today, perhaps you could recall that the remarks were given by a JCS Chairman who didn't talk about congressional appropriations, that he was high on life and service and on doing a good job, that he counseled open-mindedness and believed that people should laugh a great deal—particularly at themselves.

With that, I commend the keeping of our country's ideals and institutions into the hands of the Class of '86. May you always have fair winds and following seas.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
June 23

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, and men and women of the United States Strategic Air Command:

It is indeed a great honor to participate in this ceremony, to witness a transition of leadership at the helm of this first-rate command. It is a great pleasure also to visit the state of Nebraska once again. Military people have always said that any duty outside Washington is good duty, and that, by the same token, any trip outside the Washington beltway is a good trip. I certainly don't disagree with that folk wisdom, and I confess that I do welcome these brief escapes from the Washington swirl, but this visit today—and this event—have special significance and meaning, for several reasons.

It is most gratifying, first of all, to be part of a gathering that includes so many prominent Nebraskans—and I say this in all sincerity, despite my deep roots in the great state of Oklahoma (and my fondness for the Oklahoma football team). Our presence here today recreates, in a symbolic sense, the partnership that built this great nation and each of its states: citizens who have used their freedom well, and people in uniform dedicated to preserving that freedom and protecting those accomplishments. In these ceremonies, we renew the great civil-military tie which has always been strong here in the Nation's heartland, and which we together must carefully nourish in the years ahead to secure our society from the persistent efforts of those who would seek to harm it or to bring it down.

To keep that partnership healthy, we must always remember what it reflects: the historical combination of the fruits of peace and the military strength that keeps the preconditions for peace firmly in place. The American people are free, and their prospects are good, because the Armed Forces have raised a shield against the enemies of democracy, whose efforts never slacken. For forty years the Strategic Air Command has been a central element of the strength that has deterred war with our most dangerous, and most determined, adversaries, and that has permitted the citizens of this nation to go about their civilian pursuits so successfully, Through the years, the men and women of SAC—116,000 strong in 100 locations around the globe—have had much to be proud of. In recent years especially, the ongoing modernization of our strategic forces has brought important new systems and capabilities on line and placed others in the pipeline. All of you, from General [Larry] Welch on down, can be proud of these tangible enhancements.

But the final measure of your accomplishment is the preservation of peace for the United States and its allies around the globe. You deal daily with the most awesome responsibilities of the nuclear age. Your success in that endeavor ranks among this country's—and indeed mankind's—highest achievements. Moreover, you have not only helped this nation deter war but you have also provided a powerful incentive for our enemies to return to negotiating tables where reductions in armaments can be pursued. You have helped to keep the peace and also to make it safer. There is no nobler mission, nor any

higher accomplishment in the annals of our military services. It is a great honor for me to have a chance today to recognize and applaud your efforts. You deserve the best—and you have certainly been blessed with the finest leadership the Nation can provide.

As you say goodbye to General Welch, we in Washington prepare to welcome him to his new responsibilities as Air Force Chief of Staff. He leaves behind an impressive legacy of achievement despite a relatively short tenure as your commander.

He has led the Strategic Air Command at a time of great pressure on the Nation's resources, and also at a time when we have made determined efforts to restore the health of our deterrent. He has been a forceful and persuasive advocate, and he has done much to help us maintain the modernization momentum we need. His successor, General John Chain, will be challenged to continue that effort, which the President himself has declared a first priority for this nation. I can think of no one better suited to that task. Having worked with John and observed him for many years, I have the greatest respect for his talents, and I know—and the President knows—that SAC is getting a very fine commander.

When we—you and I—depart these proceedings today, there are three good reasons why we ought to feel good about this nation and about its future prospects. The first is that the change of command we are observing demonstrates not change of direction or resolve, but reaffirmation and rededication. It displays, for all to see, the continuity of enlightened and talented leadership that has become, thankfully, characteristic in America's Armed Forces. The second reason for optimism and confidence is the evident strength and cohesion of SAC, and ultimately the capabilities and commitment of its people. You have made this command work so well that many of our citizens elsewhere take your product—peace—literally for granted. It can be a thankless job, but there is no more important one in America, and you have done it well. And the third cause for encouragement is the health and vitality of the civil-military tie here in Nebraska, the bond that animates and sustains all of us who wear the uniform. As these are reasons all Americans can have confidence in their defenses, they are also signals to friends and enemies alike that America's position as leader of the free world's defenses remains strong and determined.

In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, I extend our very best wishes for both General Welch and General Chain, and their families, as well as the whole Strategic Air Command, in the days ahead.

Statement on the Reorganization of Special Operations Forces before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness

July 16

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I welcome this opportunity to testify on the future organization of our Special Operations Forces. I will not repeat, word for word, the JCS position on this subject, forwarded to you by Secretary Weinberger's letter of June 26th. Rather, I would like to focus on things

that are working right, areas where we agree changes are necessary, and why the new Special Operations Force Command is recommended over other alternatives.

First, a few descriptive words about Special Operations Forces are in order. They are specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct operations against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national security objectives during peace or periods of hostilities; they can support conventional operations or be employed independently when conventional force is either inappropriate or infeasible; and traditionally, they have been manned by volunteers of high physical and mental agility, relatively free of administrative burdens, very mobile and lightly equipped, and often acting as small units or individuals in hazardous or otherwise unusual missions.

Today, like other warfare specialists—pilots, submariners, and paratroopers—Special Operations Forces are prepared for combat by their parent Services.

SOF Organization

With respect to overall organization, I find a mixed picture of things working right and arrangements which could be improved. There is little question that a great deal of progress has been made in the last few years. In 1981, the SOF budget was around $441 million; the 1987 budget request calls for $1.3 billion; and there are urgent calls for new equipment across a broad spectrum and marked force structure increases. I seldom hear complaints about the selection, training, and qualification of volunteers. They either make it or drop out, depending upon how they are judged by professionals in the business. This up-front quality control is especially important for a force expected to increase in size over the next five years.

Civilian Oversight

I have no problems with civilian oversight of activities conducted by our Special Operations Forces. Given their focus on overseas rather than domestic employment and necessary coordination with the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs seems to be a logical place for such oversight to reside. With respect to in-theater arrangements, I can verify that the CINC's Special Operations Command (SOC) is an appropriate and satisfactory arrangement whereby the CINC normally exercises command and control over Special Operations Forces.

We would not want it any other way for global conventional war planning or for major contingencies short of general war within the unified commander's theater—like those requiring us to:

(1) Deter state-supported terrorism or subversion;
(2) Inject various forces to safely evacuate Americans from a country in turmoil; or
(3) Quickly reinforce a friendly country or government under attack.

Next, I believe that National Command Authorities (NCA) are generally satisfied with the organization of one small but important element of our Special Operations Forces—

JSOC. This element has a high state of readiness, and it can be called into action quickly under a very streamlined national command and control system. I have personally observed the system work under stress and find no reason to change it.

Preparation

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs agree that Special Operations Forces could be better prepared for combat, especially as a multi-service team, and initiated a review a few months ago to examine the subject from a number of perspectives—e.g., Congress, JCS, Service Departments, and CINCs. It quickly became clear that there was considerable confusion among different groups as to what the capabilities of Special Operations Forces were and as to what missions they could perform. With a force growing to 30,000 or more active and reserve personnel, there is a genuine need for much more emphasis on joint or unified training and exercises, a standard doctrine, developing special use equipment, supporting intelligence, and more imagination concerning their combined utility in support of national security objectives.

Similarly, today's circumstances require an increasing stress on Special Operations Forces in the professional educational patterns of all Services. We also know that small forces invariably have difficulty competing against larger forces for budget dollars in general and new combat equipment in particular. This problem is going to grow rather than diminish over time, especially if Congress continues a downward path in real spending for defense. Every warfare community will be circling its wagons and bracing itself against deep cuts in force structure, modernization programs, manpower, and operations and maintenance funding. For our Special Operations Forces to survive and flourish in this budget environment, more top-level support will be essential. As I understand it, these concerns are very similar to those expressed by Congressman Daniel and this committee.

Special Operations Forces Command

To meet these challenges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now recommended to the Secretary of Defense that a new Special Operations Forces Command be created under a three-star general or flag-rank officer. Conceptually, this command would have the following characteristics:

- Headquarters for the command would be located in Washington, DC. The commander would report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS in the same manner as a Unified or Specified Commander.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as spokesman for the commander or, depending upon the outcome of pending legislation, overall supervisor on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
- Special Operations Forces would be assigned to the Command after achieving certain skills at the level of individual or team training, which would continue to be a service responsibility. The new Special Operations Forces Command essentially would take the ball from there, preparing all Special Operations Forces to operate jointly.

Such joint preparations would include war-fighting concepts, doctrine, focused military education, training, equipment development, interoperability, and readiness. The SOCOM commander would, of course, be the senior adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the rare event of an operation that was outside of the charter of JSOC, and which was not assigned to a unified commander, the SOF commander (suitably reinforced) could assume direct control of the operation, if directed to do so.

Planning

Turning now to resource planning, the separate Services would continue to program, procure, and maintain equipment assigned to or earmarked for Special Operations Forces. Similarly, the Services would be responsible for maintaining the personnel pipeline to units assigned to the CINC. To me, these supporting arrangements make a great deal of sense, especially when you want combat forces relatively free of administrative burdens. Moreover, I see no organizational structure that could cut Special Operations Forces off from Service resource and logistic support without becoming prohibitively expensive and creating a completely separate Service with all the administrative machinery that involves.

Having concluded that it was necessary to develop initiatives to more closely monitor Service support of the Special Operations Force Command and to integrate the efforts of the logistics services into a smoothly working entity:

- The Special Operations Force commander will have a major voice in resource planning, following practices now common among Unified and Specified Commands. This includes an early opportunity to review Service Program Objective Memoranda, to recommend such changes as he deems necessary, and to attend all meetings with Unified Commanders.
- The Commander also will have direct access to the Chairman for purposes of voicing requirements, positions, and priorities to be addressed in the Defense Resources Board. As Secretary Weinberger informed you, I have accepted personal responsibility as military proponent for Special Operations Forces. Additionally, Assistant Secretary [Richard] Armitage, who already is lashed into planning, programming, and budgeting activities for Special Operations Forces, will join me in monitoring and sponsoring resource requirements of the Command.

If we trace the problem back to Service support, that is where we will seek solutions.

Personnel Aspects

With respect to the personnel aspects, the JCS want to see the Special Operations Force preserve its community spirit, with pride in the past and confidence in the future. But frankly, we are wary of philosophies holding that one community is more elite than another. I have seen this approach in the past—in the long run, it does not work. Even SOF people will not all like an elite label—if it means divorcing themselves from their parent Services.

We can see that they become more integrated, achieve greater stature as a multiservice community, and receive proper recognition and promotion. We have done it before with other communities. It takes a top-down push, and we are going to give that push with both the creation of a Special Operations Force Command and the commitment of the Chiefs of Service to a more vigorous SOF program.

Plan of Action

Administrative mechanisms are now in motion to have our SOF reorganization plan in place and functioning within about six months. It will take time to shake down such an organization (true of any scheme), but I am firmly convinced that it will work and do so without alienating the SOF from the parent Services.

Summary

To put all of this into perspective: Many arrangements peculiar to our Special Operations Forces are working well—excellent personnel quality control, civilian oversight within the Department of Defense, command relations within the unified commands, and separate arrangements for JSOC. At the same time, we all agree that the time has come to develop a new organizational structure which will keep pace with the revitalization program, more fully exploit their potential across a spectrum of contingencies, better integrate them as a combined force, and assure that their resource requirements receive top level attention in a fiscally constrained environment.

The JCS have developed what we consider to be a forward-looking plan of action to deal with these challenges and opportunities. Though this plan may not go as far as some would like, and many of the specifics have yet to be fleshed out, it does have several qualities to commend it. It:

- Affords the Special Operations Forces community an unparalleled opportunity to apply their professional knowledge, skills, and imagination to new war-fighting concepts, doctrines, and plans in support of national security objectives;
- Provides a greatly expanded and open-ended opportunity to regularly train and exercise as a multi-service team;
- Gives them a voice in the resource planning process they have never enjoyed before; and above all,
- Enjoys strong support from civilian as well as military leadership (of all the Services) within the Department of Defense.

I urge the Congress to give this plan of action a fair chance to succeed. Nothing prevents us from reviewing the situation annually, near the end of our SOF revitalization program, or whenever Congress considers it necessary to ensure that the SOF community is moving smoothly and effectively into the next century.

Remarks at the Banquet held by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia

Washington, DC | July 19

It's a genuine privilege to be here this evening. I have followed the efforts of the National League of Families since its founding. All Americans are indebted to the League for keeping the Nation's attention focused on the POW and MIA issue. Your membership literally led the way in turning the government from an agnostic, head-in-the-sand approach to an active POW policy during the war. The end of hostilities did not quench your determination, and you have not allowed the nation to forget its debt and obligation to those who fought and may still be serving. Today, the League's voice is respected throughout the land as a spokesman on this issue.

You can be justly proud of your organization. In passing, I should note that your Executive Secretary, Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths, enjoys an enviable reputation in Washington for her skill, integrity, and dedication. Similarly, she has become an international figure and is particularly well known in Hanoi, where she has represented your interests so ably and firmly. You are indeed well-served by her stewardship.

This evening I want to do three things:

- Assure you that you are being listened to;
- Briefly discuss some recent signs of progress; and
- Look at the future.

I am well aware, of course, that over the years your organization has had to overcome inertia, apathy, and direct resistance in a number of quarters, starting in Washington. Dealing with North Vietnam has proven to be protracted and, at times, infuriating. Given the high frustration level, there is a natural tendency to overlook your successes and to question whether your message has fallen on deaf ears. I want to reassure you that it has not. In fact, your record of accomplishment is a proud and positive one—and, more important, it promises to be an enduring one.

The Nation has become sensitized to the problem of our unaccounted-for Servicemen. The media—TV, newspapers, and magazines—furnish daily evidence of this trend. I speak in every corner of this country, and I am always queried on the MIA issue. I can confirm from personal experience that the knowledge of and devotion to your cause is alive and healthy throughout our country. Moreover, this groundswell is not receding but building. I predict it will continue to do so until the goal is achieved.

As Mike Armacost mentioned this evening, you have a President and administration solidly committed to resolving this issue. Just this morning President Reagan reaffirmed his interest and support in a moving radio address. Obviously, with him it's a matter of nonpartisanship, commitment, and conscience. He has literally set the tone not only for the bureaucracy but for the Republic as a whole. The succession of national leaders appearing before the League, pledging their support, testifies to the key role you are

playing. The bottom line message has been—and will continue to be—that the US government is going to persist until the fullest possible accounting is rendered.

In the Armed Forces, from top to bottom, we have a very personal interest in this issue, especially those of us who saw action in that war. Many who fought in Vietnam have a lingering sense of uneasiness. For some of us, it was the unsatisfying outcome. For others, it was the ambivalent attitudes on the home front. For others, it was the sights and smells of a particularly brutal war. But, most poignantly, all veterans of that conflict share the searing memory that some of their comrades remain unaccounted-for and may still be held against their will in Indochina.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff embody this feeling. General John Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff, who is present this evening, led a battalion of infantry soldiers in combat. He was severely wounded in battle. General Larry Welch, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, also at the head table, flew over 120 missions over North Vietnam. General P. X. Kelley, the Marine Corps Commandant, commanded both a battalion and a regiment, and I might tell you a very interesting story. On the 4th of July, General Kelley announced his decision to retain in place the magnificent cross at Camp Smith in Hawaii. Eighteen hundred feet above sea level, it is lighted at night and can be seen for many miles. It is dedicated to the memory of our Vietnam MIAs. His decision was made in the face of a concentrated campaign by civil libertarians in Hawaii to remove it. He has no intention of changing his mind.

For myself, I had the privilege to fight alongside all our Services and with Vietnamese combat units in the Delta as the senior advisor to the Riverine Force. Rest assured that the JCS, individually and collectively, does not only remember but are unified in our commitment to those left behind.

The government's determination has been manifested in a very tangible way by the machinery that is in place to deal with this issue. You are too familiar with it for me to dwell on the details. Suffice it to say that it ranges from Colonel Childress' office in the National Security Council, to the Office of International Security Affairs in the Pentagon, to a large dedicated section in the Defense Intelligence Agency, to elements in the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department, to very active oversight committees in the Congress, and to the specific JCRC and CIL [Central Identification Laboratory] organizations in the Pacific. There are, of course, occasional criticisms about particular performance, but this does not obscure the fact that there are a great many dedicated and skilled people throughout this network laboring to overcome the barriers. Moreover, we are striving constantly to improve our organization and to be responsive to our critics. I assure you this is not a temporary structure, but is geared for the long pull, and if a breakthrough occurs in Hanoi, it will be expanded accordingly.

One further note: I am personally convinced that in the final analysis the most significant contribution of the League will probably be felt by future generations. Historically, it has been difficult for Americans to deal with the aftermath of a painful conflict. Time and again, an armistice is negotiated and in the rush to return to peaceful pursuits, arrangements to adequately account for the missing have either received short shrift or suffered in implementation—e.g., World Wars I and II and Korea. I don't believe that

will happen again. Due to the remarkable and lasting progress you and veteran groups have made in stirring America's conscience, our citizenry and future governments will never again write off any war until a full accounting has been concluded. That's no mean achievement; you can take great pride in it.

Yes, you are being heard.

At this annual meeting you've met with a whole constellation of officials who have had substantive roles in moving this problem forward in government-to-government dealings and at the technical level. Policymakers and technicians alike have provided you information on where we are and what we are doing. Let me briefly summarize some of the recent progress.

We have refined our intelligence priorities and brought the entire intelligence apparatus to bear more directly on the problem. The Pentagon has more than tripled the manpower assets at DIA since 1981, and similarly reinforced the identification lab in Hawaii. And our staffs—including my own personal staff—have been augmented with full-time advisers in uniform. Across the board, at all levels, we are working on this problem longer and harder—and hopefully smarter—than ever before.

Since the last League of Families meeting, there has been a long-overdue increase in responsiveness by the governments of Vietnam and Laos on a spectrum of US concerns. We have had four policy-level meetings with the Vietnamese, including the highest-level US government delegation to visit Hanoi since the end of the war. This week Mrs. Griffiths briefed me on the last trip—it was another successful step in the agonizing process of moving forward. Our delegation delivered a letter formalizing the understandings and commitments of Washington regarding Vietnam's two-year work plan. Specific agreements reached on that visit will put technical meetings back on track and provide for exchanges of information, expertise, and further visits that will facilitate cooperative efforts in the future.

You are aware that we have taken major steps in joint crash site excavations. Last November and December, the first such project was conducted with the Vietnamese, at a site near Hanoi. And in February, the second joint US-Lao excavation took place, in Savannakhet Province. We were gratified that the second effort in particular did recover remains that are now being examined. The work near Hanoi was by comparison disappointing, but its very occurrence was a breakthrough of sorts, demonstrating at last the willingness of the Vietnamese to permit joint excavation efforts and also evidencing excellent cooperation on their part. These are hopeful signs for the future.

Overall, remains of our Servicemen have been repatriated at an increased rate—more than fifty since Hanoi's announcement last July of their two-year work plan. For our part, we are prepared to surge forward in response to significantly accelerated progress on this issue. We will be ready to do whatever is required. You have my word on that.

Turning to a more sensitive subject, I want you to know that the JCS have taken a searching look at the possibility of live prisoners being held in Indochina, and we fully support the President's current policy. The US government operates on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive (which we believe is the only responsible position to take). Moreover, every report is tracked to the best of our ability with all the

resources at our command to affirm or disaffirm it—there are no exceptions. Should any report prove true, we will take appropriate and decisive action. For us, as for you, this is a most haunting prospect: that our comrades in arms may still be serving their country, but in captivity. The Indochinese governments are very aware that the live prisoner issue is our highest priority.

Finally, I want to say a word about the ongoing work at the Central Identification Laboratory. I know that this morning you received a CIL briefing and that their work is currently under close scrutiny. Here are my own thoughts.

Let us make no mistake on this subject: Fate has dealt us the cruelest of hands; crash sites and gravesites that in many cases are not known with any precision or are inaccessible; the inexorable ravages of time, weather, and untold jungle elements; the trauma of violence; and suspicious foreign custodians.

Consequently, successful recovery and identification presents a host of challenges. Nevertheless, we persist, and will persist. Like many of you, I have personally witnessed the devotion and professional skill applied by our people in the JCRC and the CIL. I have never failed to be impressed and, yes, moved, by their dedicated work.

This is what America is all about: mustering expertise and technology to overcome adverse and unkind circumstances and then making these techniques and findings open to the public. We are not omniscient, certainly, but we grapple with the challenge with good and committed hearts and with skill and sincerity. I urge you to keep the whole picture in balance when addressing identification issues.

I wish my list of recent progress was longer, but that is the nature of this frustrating matter. Still, our humanitarian appeals have at last found some resonance in the other governments with which we must deal. And the prospects for future movement are the best they have been in years.

Now, looking to the future—despite hopeful signs—we must be realistic. The fact is that this is a painful process and final success remains elusive. It will still depend on determination, hard work, and stamina.

As for those of us in government, we must persevere—continue to chip at the rock in every way open to us. We must keep seeking answers, tracking leads, applying resources, looking for imaginative suggestions, and making clear to the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the Cambodians that we mean it when we say that we will be satisfied with nothing less than a full accounting. I cannot promise that it will be done in a way that always satisfies everyone, or that each step will be neat and tidy, but I can pledge to you that the US government in general, and the JCS in particular, will remain staunch and true to their commitment.

What should the League do? In a few words, "Keep the pressure on." Keep us honest. As the younger generation would say, continue to do your thing. Of course, there are reasonable limits as to what can be demanded or expected, but a great deal has been accomplished because of your strong loyalty to your loved ones and your resolve to see that the nation pays its debt to those who sacrificed in its behalf. This conference is a graphic example of the Republic at work, as you meet with those in government seized

of these issues. Dialogue, debate, and reasoned argument are all a proper part of the process, and you must continue to use those instruments to influence policy, and to keep the issue moving ahead. You must not flag now—in sum, keep the pressure on.

At the same time, all of us must maintain our perspective. We are Americans and we share a common goal—a full accounting. In our own councils, clash and disagreement are both appropriate and profitable. But as we move out to other arenas, there is a need for coming together and for joint commitment, the two most vital ingredients in dealing with communist governments. Disunity will only serve the interests of those who do not share our goals and who do not wish us well. The key to resolution lies with the Indochinese governments. It is to them that our maximum efforts and our unified message should be directed. As the President said today, "We will continue to make progress as long as we stick with the facts and keep faith with each other and demonstrate the unity so fundamental to our cause."

Let me close by quoting a passage from the Book of Jeremiah that speaks to the families engaged in this noble endeavor. "Thus said the Lord, 'Refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes from tears; for thy work shall be rewarded, and they shall come again from the land of the enemy.'"

Thank you for inviting me tonight, and for your unstinting efforts on behalf of your loved ones, and my comrades, who have not yet come home from the war. May God bless you all.

Letter on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to the Honorable Jim Wright, House Majority Leader, House of Representatives

Washington, DC | August 5

Dear Mr. Wright:

I fully support the President's Strategic Defense Initiative and urge your continued backing of this important national program as you address the difficult budget decisions before you. Funding for SDI substantially below the FY 1987 President's budget would jeopardize a balanced and efficient follow-on effort to the promising initial research. Our significant commitment to SDI has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to seriously discuss nuclear arms reductions. Further, SDI technology research will have important applications for conventional force capabilities, especially as a potential solution to the theater tactical ballistic missile threat we face together with our allies.

SDI is a vital component of our total program for responding to the Soviet strategic threat. The three elements of this broad, continuing program are to modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces, attempt to negotiate radical reductions in offensive nuclear arms, and take vigorous steps now to research future options for ensuring stability over the long term through effective strategic defenses. Since each of these efforts is interdependent and complementary, to reduce our commitment to one is to undermine the effectiveness of the others.

While much remains to be done, we have made excellent progress. To continue that progress, and our commitment to investigate effective strategic defenses as a means of self-protection and deterrence, I strongly urge you to fund SDI at a higher level.

Letter on JCS Reorganization to Chairman Barry Goldwater, Senate Armed Services Committee

August 13

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing this letter to ensure that the conferees on the pending legislative proposals relating to the reorganization of the Department of Defense are aware of my views on the major issues relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commands. I have consulted with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, but I want to stress that these are my own thoughts.

At the outset, I ·must note that I fully support the views of the President as expressed in his message to Congress on April 24. Additionally, I want to point out that I recognize and applaud the hard work and conscientiousness that characterized this effort in both Armed Services Committees. Moreover, although I would have preferred a different result in some areas, I want to state for the record that I agree with the general thrust and the vast majority of the legislative provisions enacted in both chambers of the Congress on this subject.

I have approached the proposed legislation, which, if enacted, would be the first comprehensive reorganization of the Department of Defense in 23 years, as creating a structure within which the Department will have to operate for another two to three decades. With that perspective, I must express my concern with three features of the House draft and two features of the Senate version.

On the House bill, I am very concerned with those provisions on Joint Personnel Management which I believe would result in the creation of an elite category of "joint specialists" who would enjoy special advantages with respect to assignments and promotions. I believe that the officers detailed to joint assignments must be of the highest quality. I am convinced, moreover, that the quality of those personnel has risen dramatically and that the Services are committed to continued progress in that area. I do not believe that the creation of a separate and elitist cadre is the wisest course. Similarly, I am opposed to any action that could threaten the integrity of the Military Departments' promotion selection process. I would prefer no legislation at all in this area, but I can support the alternative proposal submitted by the Department if legislation is mandated.

The integration of the civilian secretariat and military staffs also contains significant drawbacks. First and foremost, despite report language to the contrary, the actual bill provisions create uncertainty as to the authority and responsibility of the senior military member in each Service. My interest, of course, is to ensure that Service Chiefs are free to render independent and objective advice, as members of the Joint Chiefs·of Staff, to the

President, the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and to me. Additionally, although not of equal importance, integration would appear to relegate the Service Chief to a position roughly equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, a reduction in status which will have a deleterious effect upon morale and leadership in the Armed Forces.

The provisions in the House version which would substitute the term "Command" for "full operational command" with all that it implies, impresses me as unnecessary. The JCS last month completed a comprehensive revision of JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces." The major focus of the revision was to clarify and broaden the authority of the combatant commanders (after consulting with those same commanders). This was accomplished by defining and implementing the concept of "full operational command" in a manner that gives the CINCs the authority they need to perform their missions. I am enclosing a copy of the letter I sent to you and Chairman [Les] Aspin, which contains more detail on the revision of JCS Pub 2. Members of the Joint Staff have briefed interested members of your staffs, including Jim Locher and Arch Barrett, in detail on the revision.

Concerning the Senate version, I must echo the views expressed by the President concerning the provision that would specify that the term of the Chairman shall expire not later than six months after the beginning of a new presidency. I oppose any provision which directly or indirectly might tend to politicize my office.

My last concern relates to reduction in headquarters personnel as it relates to combatant commands. I have difficulty understanding the logic of increasing the responsibilities and authority of the combatant commanders while mandating personnel reductions at their headquarters without an opportunity to assess the impact of the reorganization legislation. I realize that the reductions do not have to be effected until 1988, and I understand that the combatant commanders will have the authority to allocate the reductions within their commands, including their component commands, but I still believe that a reduction should not be mandated at this time. Perhaps the matter should be revisited by the Congress within a reasonable period of time after the reorganization legislation has been enacted and implemented and the personnel impacts evaluated.

Finally, I would like to once again echo the President by urging the Congress to exercise restraint by not legislating that which can be accomplished through executive action. I pledge my full cooperation and that of the Joint Staff, moreover, in conducting any study which might be mandated in lieu of legislation. I appreciate your consideration of these comments.

Excerpts from an Interview with David Hartman on "Good Morning America," ABC network television

October 11

Hartman: Looking at the military, we had that system, the Joint Chiefs, and the way it functioned for a lot of years. You say, wait a minute, this is a better system. What was so bad about the old system, and how is the new one going to, you hope, work better?

Crowe: I think this is one of the misleading things about all the rhetoric we've heard for the last year on reorganization. I don't believe the old system was broke so much. As a matter of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually handled thousands of issues and dealt with many crises very successfully.

On the other hand, circumstances and things have changed with time. Our technology is a great deal more complicated. We have a lot more issues now. We're thrust into more things with terrorism, Soviet surrogates, limited intensity conflict, and I don't believe anybody would say there wasn't a need to update the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The legislation that has been passed this week codifies some things that have already been done by the Defense Department and by the Pentagon, and it makes some modest changes which we will implement with enthusiasm, and I hope that will make it better to do our business.

Hartman: How does it increase your authority, as I just suggested? Does it give one person the ability or authority to make more decisions on behalf of everybody and cut down on the amount of bickering back and forth kind of thing, interservice rivalry and all of that?
Crowe: I think some of the things that have been claimed may be a little bit exaggerated. It makes me the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense but, of course, I will still have to consult with my Chiefs. I depend on them for their expertise. No single man knows all about the military. I will have more control and authority over the Joint Staff. These are modest steps that I think will facilitate our everyday business. It won't change the basic fundamental way we do our business dramatically, but it will change some.

Hartman: Earlier this morning, we were talking with Jody Powell and some other journalists about this whole supposed disinformation campaign, and Bernie Kalb resigned yesterday from the State Department, saying that now it appears that, you know, the government has lied to the press and, therefore, to the people of the country and so forth. You are on record, at least in the *Washington Post*, as saying you disagree with the idea of trying to psyche out Qaddafi. What's your view on this whole supposed disinformation campaign and what good or ill can come of it?
Crowe: Well, the events of the last week prove again Washington is a pretty tough town. That's one of the things I discovered when I returned to Washington. Every day I feel more and more close to Harry Truman, who said, "If you want a loyal friend in Washington, you better go buy a dog." But I can't comment on any advice that I gave either the National Security Council or the President, but I never, at any time, heard any intention discussed to deceive either the press or the American public. On the other hand, I have a certain amount of sympathy with raising the threshold of uncertainty in Mr. Qaddafi's mind. He's a terrorist. He's an enemy to the United States. He's tried very hard to do us harm, and he's going to continue to do so. And certainly, from my perspective as a military man, where I sit with my responsibilities, he's an enemy of our country.

Hartman: And will you continue to try to, as Secretary Shultz said yesterday, move the fleet around, move the planes around, and do lots of things.
Crowe: There are all kinds of things that you can do that are subject to more than one interpretation, and we leave it up to him to try and find the right interpretation. That's his problem. That's my problem when I'm dealing with enemies of the United States, or other military forces, or other events, and of course you can do that.

Hartman: The President is on his way to Iceland. The number one item on the agenda is arms agreements. How useful would some kind of arms agreements with the Soviet Union be, whether on nuclear arms or on conventional arms, where our military and our preparedness is concerned?
Crowe: It's not appropriate for me, on the brink of Iceland, to comment on the events there, specifically, but on the general subject of arms control, I think it is important to understand that the military is behind that. We feel if we can get equitable and verifiable agreements, it would be a great step forward for this country, and all of the services support that strongly. Events of the last few months suggest that we may be approaching promising times in at least some aspects of arms control, and I certainly hope so.

Hartman: You are quoted as suggesting that the President should not compromise on the Pershing missiles deployment in Europe. Why are those Pershings so important?
Crowe: I think on the specific mix, you have to know what kind of agreement we are talking about, the total numbers, and so on. But the ground launch cruise missiles and the Pershing missiles have different characteristics.

The Pershing is a ballistic missile. It is more accurate. It has considerable range. It is more difficult to defend against and to counter, and that kind of mix gives us a better military capability, more deterrent capability, and in turn, more leverage in arms control negotiations.

Hartman: The Labor Party in England is suggesting that if they come to power, they'd like to get all American nuclear missiles out of there, all nuclear capability out of Britain. How much would that damage NATO?
Crowe: It's difficult to predict, of course, with any specificity, but if the Labor Party carries out its platform as currently constructed, and is elected, it would have incalculable consequences for NATO and also, I would think, serious reverberations for the unity of NATO, throughout the alliance. It could be a watershed year if the Labor Party was to carry out those programs.

Hartman: To what extent do you agree with those who say that we are shouldering too great a share of the defense capability in Europe? And with so many men and women of our Armed Forces over there, ought we let them pay more of their own freight and pull some of our people out of there?

Crowe: As a military man, of course, an American military man, I would always like to see our friends and allies both in NATO and the Far East shoulder more of the military burden. I don't think that takes the responsibility from the United States. It's one of the problems of being a leader of the free world.

And as Americans, we have to make a decision. If you like to be the leader, and if you like to carry the responsibilities which we have historically carried now since 1945, there are certain things you have to do and should do. At the same time, I think our friends and allies could do more. We encourage them to do so, and we're constantly working on that problem.

Remarks at the World Peace Luncheon for Veterans on Armistice Day

Birmingham, Alabama | November 11

Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to be with you today and to participate in these ceremonies of remembering our Veterans. In appreciation for America's Armed Forces, it is especially meaningful to me that so many members of the Birmingham community—and indeed from all over the state—have joined in these events. Symbolically, our gathering commemorates a vital partnership that built this great nation and that has sustained it for two centuries: citizens who have used their freedom well and people in uniform dedicated to preserving that freedom and protecting those accomplishments. Today's proceedings send a strong signal to all Americans that this partnership is still alive and well in the great state of Alabama. This, of course, is no surprise to you or to me. The bond between US military forces and Alabama communities has been a close one for many years. But I refer today to something deeper: the long Alabama heritage of patriotism, decades of courage in peace and in combat. This state's citizen-soldiers have forged an admirable record that says a great deal about the fundamental strengths of this nation itself.

The Fourth Alabama Infantry Regiment fought brilliantly under General Lee's command in the Civil War. Little about that conflict can be recommended to our own time, but down in the foxholes of the Civil War the tenacity of Alabama soldiers in the hardest fighting of that awful war became legendary.

Three and a half decades later, two regiments of Alabama Volunteers responded instantly to President McKinley's call for help in the war against Spain. Alabama's General "Fighting Joe" Wheeler, who had led Confederate cavalry thirty-five years earlier, commanded the US Army's cavalry division at Santiago. In 1916, another generation of Alabamians—members of the Alabama National Guard—saw action in Arizona during the Mexican border disturbances, and in World War I, they fought gallantly in a brigade commanded by Douglas MacArthur. During World War II, the 167th Infantry Regiment—the organizational descendant of the Fourth Alabama—again rallied to the cause of national defense, this time with the 31st (Dixie) Division. It trained many Alabamians for combat throughout that global war, and later joined its old World War I commander, MacArthur, for his campaigns in the Pacific.

Since that time, the world, the nation, and this state have moved on, through decades of troubled peace. But the Nation has always been served well by patriots from this state who have brought their spirit and dedication to the military profession. More than twelve hundred names of your citizens are inscribed on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, in abiding and grateful remembrance of their sacrifice.

In these ceremonies we pay our respects to all those who have answered the nation's call to arms in times of greatest need and to those whose service today keeps America's defenses strong. All around us we can see, Birmingham, and what her fellow citizens have been able to achieve. Under the protection of this city, once just a railroad junction, Birmingham grew in less than a century into a major industrial and commercial metropolis. To the south, Mobile became a major ocean terminal, connected by open sea lanes to all the world's trading centers.

Great universities—like Alabama, Auburn, and Tuskegee Institute—emerged, attesting to what good minds can accomplish in a free society. The institutions and practices of a lively democracy are in evidence everywhere. And amidst all the growth and progress, Alabamians carefully honor and preserve their rich heritage—traditions of grace in tranquil times, of valor in war, and of joining together to surmount the challenges of a troubled age at home and abroad. The benefits of liberty have been convincingly displayed in the accomplishments of this vigorous community and this state. It is our challenge now to preserve these benefits and to stay on the course that has been so successful. To do so, we must nurture the civil-military relationship, which sustains the nation's defense.

I spend a lot of time in Washington trying to do exactly that: communicating the need for a strong America; telling people, especially in the Congress, about our military forces and about their contributions and requirements. And it is now clear to me that, if we are to have the strength we need, we must widen our citizens' understanding of the role of America's military forces in the Nation's life.

What we need is, in essence, what we are doing today: recognizing America's armed forces, deliberately celebrating their contributions, and appreciating the benefits all Americans derive from a strong national defense. It is imperative for our citizens to understand that America's Armed Forces do a great deal more than shield the nation from attack in major war. Military strength underwrites this country's dealings with the international community and provides the very cornerstone of our foreign policy. It permits untrammeled use of the sea lanes, productive communication and commerce with friends overseas, and confident approaches to arms control negotiations. It cements alliances which, in turn, enhance our own security. It restrains mischief-makers and promotes stability. It signals the seriousness of our commitment to our principles. In fact, our strength has been an indispensable pillar not only of American liberty but also the freedom and prosperity of millions of hopeful people—people all around the globe. During my time in NATO, I observed firsthand that our military contribution to that coalition literally anchors its unity and political structure, in addition to forming the centerpiece of its defense.

You would think our history would be helpful here. Four times in the last ninety years we have let our defenses sag and then were forced into combat dangerously unprepared. In

each instance, we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure, and instability. Americans seem to have painfully short memories. I heard a wag say that we remember the Alamo, we remember the *Maine*, we remember Pearl Harbor; when we win, we forget.

I know of no military leader in our nation who desires war. To keep peace is our fundamental mission, but we must remember that freedom is not free. It requires constant effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrifice—the sacrifice for which this republic is famous. Many great societies have stressed freedom but neglected their security and are now history. We need both freedom and security.

I am convinced that our current broad-based approach—diplomatic, economic, and military—is sending the right signal to potential adversaries abroad; a signal that the United States—the world's greatest nation—will continue to play a leading role in promoting stability and assisting its allies around the globe. At the same time, however, it is imperative to recognize that our military strength underwrites these policies and is an indispensable pillar of freedom and progress.

In my view, our deterrent policy has worked well. If it is to continue to do so, we must match the growing Soviet buildup with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history. If your military is to be successful, it needs good people and good hardware. But all the people, ships, aircraft, tanks, and guns provided by an increased defense budget won't be worth much unless our nation's military forces are strongly and staunchly supported by all Americans. The military is not an organization apart, but an integral segment of the society which it serves. It will only be as good as that society wants it to be.

Remarks at the 1986 National Convention of the Retired Officers' Association

San Antonio, Texas | November 19

Thank you very much, George.

You mentioned my Oklahoma background. It's not always easy being from Oklahoma. In fact, it takes a certain amount of courage to admit it this deep into Texas. Our rivalry is a longstanding one; as they say, the Oklahoma-Texas game is not a matter of life and death; it's much more important than that. My wife and I used to live in California, and I was harassed a great deal about my Okie origins. I finally developed a retort which I thought handled that sort of situation. I used to tell those Californians that I didn't understand why they complained about the Okie immigration, since it raised the intelligence level of both states.

Putting the Midwest aside for a moment, I've been in my present post nearly a year now, and I can attest to what many of you know implicitly from personal experience—that Washington can be a tough town on occasion. Every day I'm learning why Harry Truman said, "If you want a loyal friend in Washington, you'd better go buy a dog." That would

have been a lot funnier if he was kidding. So, to hedge our bets, my wife and I have two dogs. I'm not so sure that's sufficient.

I saw a character on television the other night that reminded me of myself on the program "Cheers," which I'm sure that many of you watch. Someone asked him how his day went, and he said, "It's a dog-eat-dog world out there, and I'm wearing Milk-Bone underwear." I often feel like that.

We had been out of Washington for about five years, when we came back last summer. I had forgotten some of the harsh realities. I rediscovered, for instance, that it's a fairly expensive place to live. I have a friend who said he received a letter from a lady saying that her son had obtained a job in Washington at $30,000 a year, and she wanted to know if he could lead a good Christian life on that. He wrote her back and said, "Madam, on $30,000 a year in Washington, he can't lead any other kind." So it's no wonder that you have decided to hold your convention in more civilized surroundings, particularly in a city with a history such as San Antonio has. I think you were wise.

The everyday problems in Washington aside, it's a distinct pleasure for me to be here today, among so many people who are devoted to keeping this nation strong and secure. It's gratifying, moreover, for an old submariner to be invited to deliver this address. My life is certainly a great deal different today than it used to be when I was a younger officer in the old and rather smelly diesel submarines of the "silent service." I didn't do much speaking in those days. In fact, there are a lot of things I didn't do in those days, and perhaps I can tell you a story that illustrates why.

It's a story that's very famous in the submarine force, about a diesel submarine that was in port for a few days. One night one of the sailors went ashore and had quite a bit to drink. He came back from his liberty leading a skunk on a leash, and he wanted to bring the skunk aboard. And the petty officer at the gangway watch said, "No, you can't bring the skunk on this submarine. It's just not possible." And this sailor thought about that and then he said, "Well, Jones up in the forward torpedo room has a dog. Why can't I bring this skunk aboard?" A big argument ensued; finally the duty officer showed up, but he had no more success than anyone else. Finally, he said to the sailor, "Well, have you thought about the smell?" and the sailor said, "Yes, I have, and he'll get used to it just like I did."

In a more serious vein, it is a great privilege to be able to appear at the national convention of this fine organization. For almost a half a century the Retired Officers Association has been a prominent voice speaking out on national defense issues, effectively leading informed discussion on these issues not only inside the Washington beltway but all over our country. The Association's efforts have markedly elevated the national debate about these issues and have helped to move our defense policies in directions that make the world a less dangerous place for America. Its work has benefitted not only the retired community but also all those who serve in active service in our Armed Forces. Every one of you can be justifiably proud of the contributions of this organization.

This afternoon I would like to take just a few moments to share with you some of my views on the state of our armed forces and the role which they fulfill in today's world. I have spent a great deal of time in the last few months talking to audiences over the

breadth of the Nation—including the Congress—about these subjects and about the necessity to keep our Armed Forces strong and healthy.

This education effort has proved to be a rather demanding task, but I believe firmly and sincerely in the importance of civil-military dialogue in our country. National defense is just too important to be left to the professionals alone. It's absolutely imperative for the American public to have the best possible information about our security posture and our defense needs. This is a burden that all of us who are devoted to a strong America can take up with great benefit to the Nation, and that includes the Retired Officers' Association with its impressive reservoir of defense expertise. In large part, our ability to fashion an effective defense posture will rest, just as it has in the past, on our success in this communications effort.

In that vein, I would like to share with you some of my personal perspectives and concerns as I now see things from where I sit in the Pentagon. I believe it is important to emphasize three particular areas where the level of understanding is often superficial in this country: the central role of the Armed Forces in American life, the spectrum of threats that we face, and the current state of our Armed Forces.

At a high level of generality, of course, everyone is familiar with some of the basics. America's national security goals have never been complicated or mysterious. They have, in fact, remained essentially unchanged since I entered the Naval Academy in the early 1940s. We want to:

- Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United States;
- Promote US and allied vital interests around the world; and
- Shape an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can survive and prosper.

Now, these are not just empty words. They genuinely describe what our military forces can do for us. Those forces have provided a great deal more than simply a shield against direct attack. That same power underwrites all of our political and commercial dealings with the international community, our use of the sea lanes, our communications with friends overseas, our approaches to arms control negotiations, and our credibility in dealing with mischief makers. It cements alliances which, in turn, enhance our own security. In fact, our strength has been an indispensable pillar not only of our own freedom and affluence but also the liberty and prosperity of our friends and allies around the globe. And that's a fact of international life today.

During my time in NATO, I observed firsthand that our military contribution to that coalition literally anchors the unity and political structure of NATO as well as furnishing the centerpiece of its defense. Above all, it has given us the longest period of uninterrupted peace that Western Europe has enjoyed in centuries.

When I served as USCINCPAC, a succession of Asian leaders emphasized to me the importance of a strong and vigorous America with forward-deployed forces. Behind the

bulwark of our power, they have been able to seek prosperity and political maturity in their own fashion and at their own pace. Asian leaders stressed that to me time and time again. I have visited recently in Central America and the Middle East. The leaders in both of those areas have made it graphically clear that they want a powerful America as a backdrop for their efforts to build free and functioning societies.

The bottom line is that our military strength provides us a host of benefits in terms of both national security and foreign policy every day of the year. Americans—and millions of hopeful people around the globe—are able to go about their peaceful pursuits and to move closer to fulfilling their aspirations because the strength of the US Armed Forces operates, largely invisibly, to contain our adversaries and to facilitate our economic and foreign policies.

I know this because I have witnessed it firsthand in every corner of this globe, and I have lived it. And so have many of you. You know it for the same reasons. But for the general citizenry, the role of those armed forces in their everyday lives tends quickly to be submerged in the press of day-to-day domestic business. Consequently, I believe that it is vital to remind Americans continually of these realities.

Of course, the nature of the peril we face complicates the challenge. Again, I am persuaded that there is a general lack of awareness of the diverse character of the threat, particularly the threat of today's world. Security challenges now wear many faces other than the specter of a conventional or a nuclear war with the USSR. American interests are threatened on a number of fronts; terrorism can occur anywhere on the globe, at any time, and that has become a greater threat than ever; the diverse activities of Soviet surrogates (for example, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Libya, South Yemen, North Korea); and proliferating local conflicts in the Third World: Angola, Beirut, Chad, Iran-Iraq, Cambodia, Afghanistan.

But the American public is not used to thinking of the world—much less the threat—in such terms. Henry Kissinger, a philosopher of some note, once observed that we tend to think of "peace" and "war" as two entirely separate and incompatible spheres of activity. In the everyday world, of course, reality is much more blurred than that. Admiral Jim Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, uses the term "violent peace" to make the point that today even a "peaceful" globe is marked by competition, conflict, and strife. Any newspaper testifies to the fact that he is right.

But our citizens have little incentive to follow these trends and themes. Most of all, the relative tranquility of their lives here at home numbs them to the significance of Soviet activities, which are designed to not only promote the spread of Moscow's values and institutions but also to undercut and limit the prospects of pluralism wherever the free world is vulnerable.

The Kremlin understands very well the fundamentally competitive nature of the international community and seeks deliberately to take advantage of it at every turn. The Soviets have never altered their original goal of overcoming the West, either through political or military means. And make no mistake, they will use their power brutally and directly when they believe the military calculus is in their favor—witness Afghanistan.

It has always fascinated me that, while many nations use force against their enemies, the Soviet Union doesn't hesitate to use it against its friends when it feels it's necessary, as members of the Warsaw Pact can testify.

Moscow's burgeoning military capability is well documented, and many of you are very familiar with it. Time does not permit me to belabor the statistics here. Suffice it to say that this growth is unprecedented—also unprovoked—and on sheer momentum alone the Soviet buildup will carry well into the 1990s, if not longer. Like it or not, it is an increasing threat, not a decreasing one. Every year it increases in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once observed that "when we build, the Soviet Union builds, and when we stop building, the Soviet Union builds." The 1980s have shown, not surprisingly, that when we resume building, the Soviet Union continues to build. Those realities pretty well speak for themselves.

The result is not only an impressive Soviet military apparatus but also an expanding proclivity for the Kremlin to project that power, to foster instability, to encourage surrogates, to promote terrorism, to support small but fierce regional conflicts, and to encourage anti-American regimes to challenge Washington in a variety of ways and places. It is imperative for Americans to recognize these developments and to confront them squarely. We ignore them at our peril.

Faced with these diverse and ever-present prospects of harm to American interests and people, the Pentagon must build forces that can cope with the full continuum of challenges.

We do the best we can with the resources that the Congress sees fit to provide. And I am convinced that the current state of our armed forces is sound by any commonsense measure, thanks primarily to substantial improvements which have been made in the last six to seven years.

With the encouragement of the Administration and the help of Congress, the depressing trends of the 1970s have been reversed, and we have seen our military capability improve in every category, in every dimension—personnel, readiness, modernization, sustainability, force structure. Personnel is a special high point; our young people are the best that I have seen in over forty years of service. And I might say, to digress for just a moment, that the most rewarding aspect, as many of you well know, of a career in the service is the opportunity to associate day in and day out with young American men and women. And despite some of the rhetoric in the press, I feel the future of the country is in good hands. I see evidence of their capability, their devotion, their courage every day.

This remarkable turnaround in our military fortunes has been accompanied by a resurgence of pride and morale at every level. I see it throughout the world in all of our services. The spirit is the best that I have experienced in my career.

But I likewise believe strongly and genuinely that we must carry to fruition the President's programs, which he laid out early in his administration. Though we have done well in restoring capabilities that had dangerously atrophied in the 1970s, and the progress thus far is encouraging, there is much yet to be done. Just to give you some hasty examples:

- Only one-third of our armor units have the newest M-1 tank;
- At this reading, only one-fourth of our battalions have the Bradley fighting vehicle;
- One-third of our Air Force has yet to receive F-16s and F-15s;
- Over half of our carriers do not yet field the F-18s; and
- Only one-third of our attack submarine force is made up of the latest units.

I could go on and on. But the bottom line is that we still have much to do in our modernization programs.

Aside from these measures of the incompleteness of our progress, consider all the pressures on us to do more and to do it better, in the realm of Special Operations Forces, in limited intensity conflict, and in counterterrorism and even drug enforcement, in which the military is becoming more involved every day. In a similar vein, we have new missions and new command responsibilities. Fifteen years ago, for instance, there was no Central Command; today, it is a major headquarters which does all the planning for possible United States involvements in South Asia. Fifteen years ago, there was no Indian Ocean Task Force; today we are deployed in that area 365 days a year.

These unfulfilled goals and new demands place a high premium on sustaining public support for defense. Unfortunately, our budget problems and deficit difficulties have spawned a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric in the media and elsewhere about our defense programs. I know you are familiar with this phenomenon. Some critics would make defense spending the scapegoat for mounting budget deficits. Others have attempted to disconnect decisions about America's military strength from the threat, from our society's rising prospects and prosperity, from the decades of peace that our allies have enjoyed, and from the improving prospects for meaningful arms control. That simply cannot be done. You cannot "de-link" our strength from those achievements; they are interrelated. Above all, we cannot allow these detractors to obfuscate the real issue—America's security in a trying and challenging era. Make no mistake about it, we are engaged in a contest that is a marathon, not a sprint. But the real question is not what kind of race it is, but whether we are going to stay the course.

My point is not that we must match the Soviet Union or anyone else, for that matter, weapon for weapon, gun for gun, or man for man. We all know—in fact we insist—that our humane and decent society must do many things in addition to building strength. We know, therefore, that in a major war or other engagement with the Soviets, we are going into battle outnumbered in both manpower and equipment.

Military leaders of my generation have accepted that for many years, and we move on to find ways to compensate—with quality weapons systems, excellent people, realistic training, broad and responsive logistics support, and the help of our free world friends and allies.

But that makes it a "sporty" course; a package that leaves little room for error, and no room for shaving funds in the areas that I have mentioned. The programs of the early 1980s have given us the right impetus. America is a safer place as a result, and the prospects for what many of our citizens understand as peace are higher. The job simply isn't finished, and the outcome of this year's budget agonies leaves us short of where we

need to be. Moreover, given the state of the public mind on these matters, I suspect that we will face a similar struggle next year, and perhaps even longer. We can live with one or two points on a descending curve, but several years of declining appropriations would return us to the doldrums of the 1970s, and that, given the threats we face, would in my opinion be disastrous.

You would think that our history would be helpful here. Four times in the last ninety years we have let our defenses sag and then were forced into combat dangerously unprepared. In each instance, we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure, and instability. Americans seem to have painfully short memories. I heard a wag say that we remember the Alamo; we remember the Maine; we remember Pearl Harbor. When we win, we forget.

This, of course, is why I put so much stress on communicating military views, concerns, and needs to the civilian community.

No military leader in our nation desires war. To keep the peace is the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces, and the primary measure of their success is their ability to deter conflict. But we must constantly remind our citizens that freedom is not free. It requires continuous effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrifice; the type of sacrifice for which this Republic is famous.

It is imperative for Americans to recognize that:

- Our military strength underwrites our foreign and economic policies and is an indispensable pillar of our liberty;
- The threat is real, diverse and part of the everyday world; and
- We have some ways to go in improving our armed forces before we can face the future with genuine confidence.

If our deterrent policy is to continue to work well, we must match the danger with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which seem to have characterized so much of our peacetime history.

If the US military is to be successful, it needs good people and good hardware. But above all, it needs the patience and continuing support of all our citizens. Our military is not a separate and distinct community. It is an integral element of the society it serves, and in the end, it will only be as good as that society wants it to be.

With that, I'd like to say again what a genuine pleasure it is for me to be here and talk to a group that has contributed so much to our national defense. Thank you very much.

Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Panel on Arms Reduction Proposals at Reykjavik
November 25

Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate the opportunity this hearing affords me to contribute to your review of the arms reduction proposals made at Reykjavik. I believe it would be helpful this morning if I sketched some of the background regarding JCS participation in this process before addressing specific queries.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been closely involved with the arms reduction process since its inception, and I believe have historically had an influential voice in shaping US proposals. In turn, the JCS have consistently supported this Administration's efforts to reach equitable, verifiable, and militarily sufficient agreements. This included initiatives to reduce Soviet INF missiles in Europe and worldwide, the 50 percent proposal first put forward in November 1985, and also the President's July 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. This last communication proposed negotiations which could hopefully lead to the ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, but mentioned no specific time frame.

Throughout the short ten-day workup to Iceland, the Joint Staff participated in the pre-summit preparations. I should stress that this process involved not merely NSC or NSPG meetings, but a variety of everyday informal staff contacts with other agencies and scheduled meetings with a number of interagency groups that are part of the NSC's supporting structure. Incidentally, the security consultative mechanisms in the government are richer and much more pervasive than I believe they are often given credit for in the media.

As far as process goes, I do not know of any of the regular pre-summit preparations in which the JCS did not participate in some fashion. Moreover, I had a representative, General [John] Moellering, who went with the team to Reykjavik and participated as an adviser.

As to Iceland itself, obviously the discussions concentrated more on arms control details and went much further with arms reduction proposals than had been anticipated in the preparations.

While no agreements were reached, it is important to note that an unusually wide range of issues were considered and unprecedented progress was made in narrowing the differences between the two sides on a number of thorny questions—some of which have frustrated negotiators for years. I suspect this was possible only because the two heads of government were present. In evaluating the outcome, I think it is fair to point out that the President has an obligation not only to be cautious in these matters but also to seize opportunities when they arise.

Given the turn of events at Reykjavik, the US side appropriately seized the opening to break new ground and move the arms reduction process forward. In the final analysis, it should be kept in mind no agreements were reached and, despite some public hand wringing and gnashing of teeth, our fundamental interests are still intact. At the same

time, I would suggest that the whole arms reduction dialogue has taken a significant and historic step forward as a result of Iceland.

The challenge now is to capitalize on these events in ways that do not jeopardize our security but also that do not return to the depressing stalemates which have characterized so much of our past history. I am confident that the President wants to do just that, and also that it can be done if we keep our heads and don't permit self-criticism to consume us. I genuinely hope that the Congress will be looking for constructive ways to work with the President in this process.

Remarks before Senator Barry Goldwater on his Retirement

The Pentagon | December 10

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to welcome you to these ceremonies, as we pay tribute to a man who has been one of this nation's most prominent citizens and leaders for more than three decades, Senator Barry Goldwater.

Every American owes this strong advocate for national defense a great debt of gratitude, and we in the Pentagon feel privileged to have this opportunity to show our appreciation today, as he prepares for what some have called "retirement."

Not long ago a report in the local media quoted Senator Goldwater to the effect that the new DOD reorganization law bearing his name is, in his words, "The only thing I ever did that was worth a damn." Now, I certainly don't want to quarrel with the Senator here, but I would like to take this opportunity to present a different viewpoint. Even aside from any judgments history may render concerning that legislation, I would argue that Barry Goldwater's legacy to his nation is much larger than that particular assessment admits.

Especially for those who have devoted their professional lives to the cause of national defense, two dimensions of his career in Washington have been notable. The first is the role he played in the resurrection of American spirit after our experience in Vietnam and the debates and doubts of the 1970s. Most of you remember those times well. In many quarters, the people in our Armed Services were ridiculed and even reviled; public cynicism about leadership and about the process of national governance was widespread; the country's international vision was clouded, and its defenses fell into disrepair.

Through all that turmoil and confusion, Barry Goldwater stood on high ground as a visible standard-bearer for values of patriotism and national service. He kept the faith of our founders, and with clear-eyed focus on national purposes and needs, he marked the place for his fellow Americans to return to after years of disillusionment, disappointment, and strategic wandering. The restoration of strength and stature this nation has achieved in the 1980s rests, ultimately, on that solid foundation. Indeed, it could not have been achieved—and cannot be maintained—without it.

Senator Goldwater's second large-scale contribution has to do with his continuing example of selfless, straight-shooting service to his country. First and always, his animating concern has been a concept of the national interest, not something smaller. His

career has provided an abiding lesson for all citizens, for all those who aspire to civic leadership, and especially for Americans who now wear the uniform of our armed forces in times that are better and safer because of his work.

A quarter century ago, just as he was rising to national prominence, Barry Goldwater did something that's now all the rage in Washington: he wrote a book. Its title featured a word—"conscience"—that doesn't appear much in the writings we've seen lately. Twenty years later, he wrote another book entitled "With No Apologies." It is an inspiring testament to Barry Goldwater, and to this country, that a man who came to Washington dedicated to abiding principles, and who never shrank from any battle, can now leave justifiably confident of his fidelity to those core values. So much for the cynics, carpers, and hangers-back. As we go forward in the effort to enhance this republic's defenses, I know we will continue to hear from Barry Goldwater. He will always prod us to do better. And just as important, we can be sure that he will keep the need for national strength in the forefront of a public mind that has tended—all too often in our history—to overlook that inescapable fact of international life.

I would submit that keeping America strong is doing the right thing, and I am confident that Barry Goldwater will always be in the vanguard of that effort. With that, and before we give the Senator himself a chance to make some typically modest denial of all these accolades, I am very pleased to turn over the microphone to a man who has led the massive turnaround of our military fortunes that Barry Goldwater helped make possible—as determined and effective a patriot and leader as the Senator himself, our Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger.



1. Ensign William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, upon graduation at the US Naval Academy. (June 1946)

2. Lieutenant(jg) Crowe serving as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander of the US Atlantic Fleet's Submarine Force. (1952)

3. Admiral Crowe's swearing in ceremony as the 11th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger attended by President Ronald Reagan and Mrs. Shirley Crowe. (October 1985)

4. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA; General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF; Admiral James D. Watkins, CNO; and General Paul X. Kelley, CMC. (1985)

5. Farewell ceremony for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger hosted by President Ronald Reagan and Admiral Crowe. (November 1987)

6. Welcome ceremony in honor of Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, USSR, hosted by Admiral Crowe at the Pentagon. (July 1988)

7. Admiral Crowe on the set of "Cheers" with Ted Danson (Sam Malone). (February 1989)

8. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., CMC; Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, CNO; General Larry D. Welch, CSAF; General Carl E. Vuono, CSA; and General Robert T. Herres, USAF, the first VCJCS. (1989)

1987
SELECTED WORKS

Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on FY 1988–1989 DOD Authorization
January 13

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and report on the overall condition of our military establishment. A considerable amount of water has passed under the legislative bridge since my testimony on the FY 1987 budget. In that budget the Congress chose to cut the President's Defense request dramatically and, for the second year in a row, to legislate negative growth in our appropriations. Throughout this process, I heard a great deal about the "fiscal" and "political" realities that dictated such action, but all too little about the "military" realities we face. This year, I believe it is imperative to go back to fundamentals—i.e., to review the strategic landscape and to consider the "military" realities carefully before deciding what resources will be committed to our defense over the next two years. In an attempt to aid this process, I will this morning address four subjects:

- Linkages between strategy, force structure, hardware, and people;
- The East-West balance, including capabilities of US and allied forces in comparison with our potential adversaries;
- The President's budget; and
- A brief look ahead.

Linkages between Strategy and the Military

To begin, the role of US military forces is shaped by national security policies which have remained essentially unchanged since the late 1940s:

- Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United States;
- Support US and allied vital interests abroad; and
- Encourage an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can prosper.

These policies genuinely describe what our strength, especially our military potential, can do for us in an often violent and turbulent world. The main point to keep in mind is that our military forces contribute to achieving these objectives every day, not just when the nation is under direct attack.

Defense Policies

Our military posture is further shaped by some basic themes which have evolved in the post-World War II era. We strive to:

- Deter wars rather than fight them. This strategy of deterrence aims to make war or the threat of war too risky for any hostile power or combination of powers to contemplate.
- Optimize our collective security arrangements and forward defense posture through combined defense planning with allies in Europe and Asia and through vigorous security assistance programs. At the heart of this policy is the principle that the capabilities of the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. In turn, our coalitions present potential adversaries with formidable political, psychological, and ideological challenges—as well as enhanced military power.
- Maintain robust central reserves supported by global mobility. Many of our treaty commitments are bolstered primarily by our power projection forces. Indeed, many strategists in and out of the Pentagon now recognize that real-world deterrence depends upon our inherent capability to "get there firstest with the mostest," deal effectively with the threat at hand, and withdraw just as quickly from the scene of action.
- Pursue a vigorous arms reduction policy which seeks equitable, effective, and verifiable arms agreements with potential adversaries. For more than fifteen years, we have been trying to engage the Soviets in an agreement which will sharply reduce offensive nuclear arms.

Military Strategy

Historically, the United States has attempted in peacetime to maintain sufficient capability to blunt initial attacks on our own interests and to form a nucleus around which we can expand for major hostilities. In practical terms, this means that we do not attempt to match potential adversaries weapon for weapon and man for man, but to develop quality forces and "edges" (marginal superiorities) that will deter our enemies by keeping their level of uncertainty high or allow Washington to manage crises in a manner that will prevent them from escalating or getting out of hand. In essence, we are betting that in a major war we can expand our peacetime forces and bring our total resources (technological, industrial, personnel, economic, political) to bear so that we will ultimately prevail. This is an appropriate policy for a democracy, but it also leaves little room day-to-day for miscalculation. More important, it means that, since we operate on the margin, seemingly small reductions in our peacetime capability may result in large increases in the risk. It is imperative that the Nation understand this fundamental relationship.

Over the course of time, we have followed a number of principles in determining how to build and deploy our forces. For instance, we attempt to:

- Plan in a total force context—i.e., active and reserve forces of the United States and its allies, host nation support in forward areas, various types of combat service support from civilian sectors, and allied military enhancements underwritten by our security assistance program;
- Exploit the deterrent value of nuclear forces while avoiding a nuclear war;
- Defend forces in-being against an initial attack at a time and place of the enemy's choosing;
- Emphasize our qualitative advantages—technical, personnel, and organizational—to defeat an adversary who will normally outnumber us on the field of battle;
- Expand our forces rapidly in the event of major crises, and especially in all-out war; and
- End any conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

Given our built-in pluralism and constrained resources, it is very difficult to bring all of these policies and principles together, even when you are not worried about static or sagging expenditures for Defense.

The East-West Balance

Cutting across the strategic landscape—and in many respects dominating it—is the East-West balance. In my view, a number of factors are imperative to consider: geography, economic defense potential, allied contributions, and military trends over time.

Geography

Geographically, the Soviet Union has a very large border and airspace to defend—much larger than ours—and a disadvantage in its limited access to the open oceans and non-European friends. For our part, the United States is much more dependent upon its use of international airways and oceans, not only in its daily commerce but also in cementing its far-flung alliances. Thus, geography tends to provide a mixed picture of inherent strengths and weaknesses.

Economics

On the other hand, economic defense potential clearly favors the United States and its allies as compared with the Warsaw Pact. Today, for example, our gross national product is nearly twice that of the Soviet Union. Similarly, NATO as a whole continues to outpace the Warsaw Pact by a factor of two-to-one.

Today, we also see the Soviet Union struggling to overcome weaknesses endemic to its system: the difficulties of running a "command" economy with no measure of profit and loss, depletion of their European mineral base, challenges of developing alternative resources in Siberia, lack of discipline among workers, management shortcomings

revealed in the Chernobyl disaster, and a host of problems keeping political and economic relations with Eastern Europe on an even keel.

Thus, by general measures of economic strength, the United States and its allies are considerably stronger than the Soviet Union and its allies. But how the money is spent also is a critical factor. Like Axis powers in the 1930s, the Kremlin continues to stress armaments at the expense of all other sectors of the economy.

Allied Contributions

With respect to allied contributions, Western Europe routinely accounts for about 30 percent of all military expenditures by NATO members and provides about 60 percent of the active military personnel, as well as 60 percent of the ground and air combat units. Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan also field the bulk of deterrent forces, numbering 600,000 and 250,000 military personnel, respectively. By comparison, we normally have about 130,000 military personnel stationed ashore and afloat in the Western Pacific.

On the other side of this coin, few of our allies have a nuclear deterrent of their own and, in the postwar years, many stressed ground and air capability rather than naval strength in their defense planning. Thus, in the overall scheme of things, it is necessary for the United States to place a high priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, global maritime superiority, and strategic mobility forces.

For its part, Eastern Europe normally accounts for about 15 percent of all military expenditures by the Warsaw Pact. The USSR shoulders the other 85 percent and, in turn, dominates the Pact's High Command, military strategy, force structure, and hardware. In this situation, it is relatively easy for the Soviets to achieve economies of scale in military production and standardization of equipment and tactics among Warsaw Pact forces. But they can never be certain that the forces or peoples of Eastern Europe will rally around a call from Moscow. I suspect that this one uncertainty weighs most heavily on the minds of the Russian leaders.

On balance, our allies shoulder a much greater defense burden in Europe and Asia than do allies of the USSR. Of course, we would prefer that many of them do even more, and we strongly encourage them at every opportunity. Nevertheless, their contributions are most significant and count heavily as a factor in our favor.

Trends in the Military Balance

Still, overall trends in the military balance give us little cause for optimism and strongly call for greater US effort. Our strategic nuclear deterrent is neither as secure nor as dominant as it once was. Particularly disturbing is the Soviet emphasis on strategic defense—the steady hardening of command and control facilities, a very robust defense against air-breathing threats, and an ABM system with potentially nationwide coverage. Concurrently, we see their large ICBM force becoming more hardened and mobile, their submarines more quiet, and their bombers more capable of intercontinental missions.

Soviet conventional capabilities on and around the Eurasian continent are much greater than they were two decades ago. In these forward areas, we have always been

considerably outnumbered by Soviet ground and air forces. Now we are also seeing our qualitative edge erode.

Soviet surrogates in Asia, Africa, and Central America are more heavily armed and troublesome than they once were. In turn, they are much more inclined to support terrorism, subversion, and greater forms of aggression against their neighbors and the West in general.

While the likelihood of a major Soviet assault on Western Europe is perhaps remote, the coercive threat of Soviet military power will loom over the Eurasian continent for many years to come. Moreover, the Soviet government has never departed from policies holding that its allies and surrogates in the Third World must remain strategically subservient to Moscow and that the rest of the world is an open field for destabilizing actions. Further, we see no slackening in tomorrow's military investments. By their own admission, such expenditures will continue on an upward slope—just as they have over the last four decades. All of this puts an enormous burden on the Soviet economy, but I see no sign that the system cannot sustain such an effort.

In my view, these and other indicators strongly suggest that we must prepare ourselves for a marathon, not a short-term sprint, in the military competition with the USSR. That thought must be a cornerstone of any successful US strategy.

Yet, this is one of the most difficult ideas to get across to the US Congress and the American people. Frankly, our history would argue that where military preparedness is concerned, we are notoriously short-sighted.

Net Assessment of Military Capabilities

Moving on, I recognize that this committee is interested in more than broad trends in the East-West balance. You want to know more specifically how the capability of US Armed Forces and those of our allies compare with those of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Strategic Forces

First, strategic forces. There is no question that in the static sense the Soviets have reached strategic parity or better. This is one of the major shifts in the balance between the two superpowers wrought in recent years. They have clear superiority in ICBMs and overall mega-tonnage. Hardened communications (C3) and passive defense measures give them a survivability US forces do not yet have. Likewise, the Soviets are further along in shifting to mobile missiles and are posturing themselves for a possible ABM breakout.

On the other hand, the US ballistic missile submarine force is less vulnerable than that of the Soviets and we have a more effective bomber force still capable of penetrating the USSR. Moreover, the President's strategic modernization program if fully implemented—MX, D-5, B-1, ATB, C3 initiatives, and small ICBM—will prepare us for the long haul, keep pace with Soviet improvements offensively, and correct our more glaring deficiencies.

Thus, all things considered, I am relatively confident that strategic forces and programs which are being proposed will deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States

and our allies. But I must reemphasize, for that judgment to continue to be solid, it is imperative to stay the course with our strategic modernization programs.

Maritime

The maritime picture is the second major shift in Soviet strategic policy. Throughout the immediate postwar period, the United States enjoyed undisputed mastery of the seas, but the Kremlin was not easily discouraged. By the late 1970s the Russian Navy had made tremendous inroads into our margin of superiority, and the trends were even more alarming. We have now reversed these curves—particularly in overall shipbuilding—but the Soviets are on the high seas to stay.

Our main concern is a "blue water" Russian fleet pushing its area of operations further and further from the homeland. By stretching our forces and tactics to the limit and working harder to understand Soviet naval thinking, we still hold a slim margin of superiority on the high seas. But whether that margin holds up will depend, in part, on our reacting quickly to indications and warnings and our willingness to match their forces and efforts. As an example, we must take full advantage of the superiority of our nuclear attack submarines and carry the battle to the Soviets in the forward areas. Without such pressure, we could expect to see a major breakout by Soviet naval units and formations on to the sea lines of communications.

While we still enjoy an advantage in seaborne air, amphibious forces, underway replenishment, and in support we receive from allied navies, a significant challenge on the high seas is growing out of Soviet success in:

- Deploying very advanced anti-ship missiles, which are constantly improving;
- Increasing their over-the-horizon targeting capability by exploiting space;
- Improving submarine propulsion (speed and quietness) and metallurgy (depth); and
- Steadily improving their ASW capabilities.

In essence, we cannot afford to relinquish naval superiority to the Soviets. To do so would jeopardize our coalitions, economic and trade dependencies (which are now necessary in war as well as peace), and capabilities to project our power overseas. Our ability to prevail at sea is a cornerstone of our overall strategy.

NATO/Warsaw Pact

Turning to the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance, major trends are generally adverse to NATO. I have already spoken to the implications of strategic parity. Moreover, we have essentially no deterrent to chemical warfare in NATO or elsewhere. This is a crucial weakness when confronting the USSR. Reinforcing this trend has been the extensive Soviet modernization, expansion, and reorganization of their theater forces.

Further, the Soviets are better able than NATO to conduct theater nuclear war in Europe. Today, they possess a pronounced superiority in numbers of intermediate nuclear forces, both long- and short-range. Similarly, our one-time lead in battlefield nuclear

systems has disappeared. In light of these developments, conventional forces assume an added significance. The Soviets have always had imposing ground forces, but the gap in numbers of modern weapons continues to widen. In ground equipment, they lead the United States, and also NATO, in virtually every category by ratios ranging from 1.5 to 1 to 6 to 1. Moreover, we have lost our lead in surface-to-air missiles and anti-armor capability. Similarly, NATO's qualitative edge in ground systems may have eroded somewhat. On the other hand, NATO ground forces on the Central Front have made progress in the use of combined arms and in the fielding of modern equipment. Similarly, the sustainability of US forces has improved markedly over the last few years. Unfortunately, the stocks of certain munitions among the allies have not improved appreciably and could be exhausted too quickly.

On the plus side, the NATO qualitative edge in tactical aviation, while somewhat diminished, has not disappeared. It is not clear, however, what this will mean against the numerical advantages of the Soviet air forces, offensive and defensive, which run in the neighborhood of 2.0 to 1. I have complete confidence that the quality of our pilots and weapon systems would permit us to exact high exchange ratios, but overcoming the impressive numbers of Russian medium-range bombers, fighter bombers, interceptors, and surface-to-air weapon systems will be a sporty course. The outcome is difficult to predict.

We will, of course, have the support of our naval forces in Europe and, as I mentioned earlier, the Soviets have yet to surpass our lead.

To put all of this into perspective, NATO capabilities are still deterring a war in Europe. Surely, the prospect of having to fight sixteen nations at once remains a sobering one for the Kremlin.

But if, for some reason, war breaks out, maintaining a successful forward defense will be a "near thing" under the best of assumptions. Barring a major change in the dynamics of the competition, NATO can no longer hope to offset Warsaw Pact numbers merely by improving the quality of its equipment or relying on the dedication of people defending their own territory. In the final analysis, the military balance in Europe is not encouraging and needs a great deal of tending—politically as well as militarily.

East Asia

Until the late 1960s, Moscow paid little attention to the defense of its eastern provinces and its strength in the Western Pacific. With the Peoples' Republic of China's (PRC) breakaway from the Soviet orbit and the burgeoning affluence of East Asia, the Kremlin began to buildup its forces in the region—not by drawing down in Western Europe, but by commissioning new units and increasing defense production to help them.

Overall, the balance on the Chinese border favors the Russians in every way except manpower, and as yet the Chinese have been unable to turn things around—preferring to put their current priorities elsewhere. The one exception is Chinese nuclear capability, which provides "minimal deterrence" of a sort. Nevertheless, China looms large in the Kremlin's calculations—witness the gradual buildup from twenty to fifty Soviet divisions on the Chinese border.

On the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has made a determined effort to outstrip the South's forces. Besides this general buildup, several recent initiatives are particularly worrisome—the relocation of a number of second echelon divisions close to the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and recent emphasis on improving special operations forces both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, as long as North Korea is not directly assisted by the Soviet Union, United States augmentation—especially our air power—should make the difference in deterring or, if necessary, defeating the North. The fact remains, however, that the Peninsula is an unstable focal point with a significant threat of major war lingering on the horizon. In the context of global hostilities, the East Asian area presents both opportunities and challenges to US planners. We have significant leverage against Soviet naval and air forces in the region, which both reduces the threat to our sea lines of communication and constrains the Kremlin's ability to accomplish its strategic goals in the Far East.

Further, our political relationships generally work in our favor. It is clear that PRC forces tie down substantial Soviet ground and air deployments in the region and that Peking puts considerable stock in its US tie. In a similar vein, Japan is a pillar of US strategy in the Pacific. Without Japanese cooperation, it would be difficult to bottle up the Russian fleet, augment South Korea, and find sufficient bases to support continuing operations against the Soviets. Likewise, the health of the US-Philippine relationship, politically and militarily, impacts heavily on the regional balance.

Obviously, the firmness of US alliances will rest to a great degree on our ability to successfully confront the Soviets in the region and, in the event of war, to keep open our sea lines of communication to the Western Pacific. While predicting what the Soviets will do is a hazardous business, I am inclined to believe that any US-Soviet confrontation in the Pacific will take its lead from events in Western Europe or elsewhere. This means that we would most likely be fighting a containing action as well as supporting our Pacific allies. While the prospects for achieving our objectives in Asia are encouraging, there is clearly a great deal to be done before we can confront the future with confidence.

Power Projection

Turning to power projection, the Soviets have long been able to project military power successfully adjacent to their borders. Basically, the Russians' continental location and large resource base give them an asymmetrical advantage vis-à-vis the United States when applying force in Western Europe and along their immediate periphery—witness events in Afghanistan.

In the last decade, the Kremlin has increased its ability to project forces, employing cargo aircraft, naval units, and nonmilitary shipping, although Washington continues to enjoy a distinct advantage where long-range lift is concerned. However, the Soviets have developed a style of power projection that avoids confrontation with US units—e.g., through the use of Cuban proxies, arms sales to clients, covert operations, and intervention in areas where US action is not anticipated. I am generally confident that in a direct confrontation, US forces would be able to defeat Soviet troops operating far from

the Soviet Union. In peacetime, however, we will continue to see the Soviets selectively intervene (projection of influence) in regional conflicts around the globe where they believe the calculus genuinely favors them.

Special Operations Forces

Because they so often operate behind the scenes, straight one-on-one comparisons of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Soviet "Spetsnaz" are difficult to derive and sensitive to portray in an open fashion. Nevertheless, several points are worth noting. Both sides depend upon such forces to complement conventional forces in general war planning. But the Soviet side tends to use its Spetsnaz more routinely in low-intensity conflict, as during the Czechoslovakia invasion of 1968 and in the current Afghanistan campaign. Their capability for covert and clandestine operations also fits into the Kremlin's policy of keeping pressure on the West through state-supported intimidation, terrorism, and subversion—and making sure that no surrogate ever gets out of the Soviet camp. In short, the Brezhnev Doctrine and Spetsnaz go hand in hand.

Against this background, there is no question that our SOF have become very good at the business of counterterrorism. In 1981, our capability was very limited; now, we probably have the best in the world. But this is a rather narrow field, and we are still groping to fit our SOF—and other forces—into an overarching strategy to meet the threat of low-intensity conflict. Further, progress should be possible with more focused organizational arrangements, including the new Special Operations Forces Command and increased emphasis on procuring the specialized equipment and training for these types of operations.

Overall, I believe we are building a credible and effective capability against state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other forms of indirect aggression against the West, but, a great deal of hard, constructive work still lies ahead in this area.

Net Assessment

In summary, it is clear that the investments made in the last eight years have materially improved the foregoing Net Assessment from the US standpoint. It is equally obvious that the picture is a dynamic one that the Soviets are working diligently to improve their position across the board, and that there are still a number of serious gaps in our own posture. On balance, we still need a number of years' growth before we can face the future with confidence. In particular, I cannot help but be alarmed by the signal which a continuing zero or negative growth defense budget would send to both our allies and potential opponents in Europe. Frankly, such a signal at this time is not justified by the threat, the political climate, or the military situation.

The President's Budget

Against this background, the President is starting anew with the 100th Congress by proposing 3 percent real growth in Defense spending against the FY 1987 baseline.

The Joint Chiefs believe that the budget for FY 1988-1989 supports the Nation's strategy and will reinstitute modest real fiscal growth so necessary to long-term health.

The Chiefs and CINCs participated in the formulation of the budget, and while it is by no means risk-free, they are satisfied that appropriate compromises and trade-offs have been struck at the resource level which has been set. The budget continues the modernization of the equipment for our forces, both nuclear and conventional; includes growth in naval force structure; addresses our more pressing sustainability shortages; provides an appropriate balance between readiness and modernization; preserves the kind of quality manpower which is the backbone of our forces; and, with an eye to our reliance on quality technology, continues to emphasize research and development accounts. Secretary Weinberger's statement has addressed each of these areas in detail. Consequently, I will only mention some of the more significant items.

Military Personnel

As I noted last year, our most precious asset is quality personnel—the cornerstone of our military establishment. This year, the President's budget continues support for adequate levels of compensation accompanied by a modest increase in military pay and additional funding for family housing. This action will sustain a personnel picture which overall remains healthy. Too often, we are inclined to count people as the intangible factor in the military balance, so I believe it is useful to cite one area where your support has paid extremely high dividends. We are the best in the world at operating and supporting complex weapon systems under night/all-weather conditions. I see this in all of the Services and count it as one of our strongest cards in managing crises and deterring our adversaries. It all flows from the talent, high morale, and competitive spirit of our officer and enlisted ranks.

Strategic Modernization

The Chiefs have consistently made strategic modernization their number one priority. Our triad of strategic nuclear forces is the umbrella under which all our deterrent forces operate and undergirds the security policies of our allies as well. In the face of unrelenting Soviet efforts to modernize their strategic weapons across the board, we have no choice but to refurbish all three legs of the triad. The MX, small ICBM, Trident, D-5, B-1B, ATB, and accompanying C-3 programs are designed to give us an updated deterrent which will see us into the next century.

In a similar vein, the Joint Chiefs support the President's Strategic Defense Initiative which will determine whether an alternative to sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation is feasible. It is both prudent and moral for the United States to explore means for ending the dominance of offensive ballistic missile weaponry.

Concurrently, the JCS strongly applaud efforts by the President to achieve progress in arms reduction negotiations. While I believe there are some encouraging signs, I do not see any immediate breakthrough in the offing or any reason to relax our strategic modernization initiatives. Negotiations are not a substitute for force modernization; rather, negotiations and our modernization efforts are mutually reinforcing.

Conventional Force Modernization

It should be obvious from the comparison of US-Soviet forces that we have some pressing needs in our conventional forces which must be corrected if we are to move into the 1990s with confidence. The number one priority is to maintain our qualitative edge on the field of battle, and the President's budget takes a positive step in this direction—in both procurement and R&D [research and development] funding. While we have made great progress over the last few years, it is also important to stress that we are only midstream in the conventional force modernization process. To cite some expected end FY 1987 figures:

- About 25 percent of the Army's active mechanized battalions and 40 percent of its tank battalions will be re-equipped with the Bradley fighting vehicle and M-l;
- From 50 percent to 65 percent of our tactical air wings will have received new fighter/bombers;
- Some five out of fifteen carrier battle groups will have AEGIS; and
- About 36 percent of our submarine force will be operating basic or improved versions of the 688 Class.

More progress will be made as equipment currently in the pipeline reaches our combat forces. But it should be clearly understood that we are stretching out and, in turn, delaying the modernization effort.

As explained in the OMB Budget Summary, this is a direct consequence of fiscal austerities and, in some cases, a deliberate decision to buy more modern munitions and fewer platforms. Only in FY 1989 does procurement in general resume an upward slope and that, of course, is contingent upon congressional approval of the President's two-year budget request. The bottom line is that many of our active and reserve units will remain behind the power curve in quality, particularly as reinforcements for NATO.

Chemical Warfare

Of special note are the requested funds for chemical weaponry. These programs are necessary to offset a serious disadvantage on the battlefield and to counter offensive and defensive asymmetries strongly favoring the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the American fighting man in the field, it is difficult to overemphasize this request.

Special Forces and Low Intensity Conflict

With respect to Special Operations Forces, this budget continues to place considerable emphasis on procuring equipment and weaponry. There is increasing recognition of the value of these specially tailored assets in today's world. In turn, there is a new determination to see that not only organizational but equipment deficiencies are corrected and that these forces are brought to an even higher state of readiness. The requested funds for SOF equipment will pay a high return in capabilities desired by both the President and the Congress.

Sustainability

The FY 1988–1989 budget proposes to continue the trend of the last few years in improving our sustainability, which includes war reserve stockpiles (munitions and spares), transportation capabilities, and industrial surge capacities. We worry about potential "war stoppers" or their impact on the theater nuclear threshold.

In the past four years, funding for ammunition has grown by over 25 percent; spare parts funding has doubled; and ammunition inventories of all Services have improved substantially. In Europe, for instance, ground ammunition tonnage is up 18 percent, and it has almost doubled in the Pacific. Munitions deficiencies which plagued us for years are improving steadily, but at the current rate of expenditures, it will be several years before we can near our goals and breathe easier.

We simply must stay the course if we want a genuinely sustainable force, as well as a modern and well-trained one. Otherwise, we will be spending a great deal for modern equipment with one hand and then reducing its effectiveness with the other.

Budget Overview

The peacetime strategy and Defense spending of the United States seek to maintain the cutting edge of our deterrent forces, active and reserve, while counting on our economic and mobilization potential to cope with any clear and present danger to the United States and its allies. Everything about this deterrent stance hinges upon the quality of our people, hardware, munitions, and logistic support.

Overall, this budget addresses adverse trends in the overall balance, stresses our qualitative advantages, reduces deterrent risks over time, and avoids the dramatic tradeoffs which would distort the force structure as we move into the 1990s. While by no means risk-free, the President's budget is a prudent approach to the problem of maintaining an effective and balanced deterrent across the full spectrum of potential hostilities. As the President's principal military advisor, I wholly support the defense budget for FY 1988 and FY 1989, and I urge the Congress to do likewise.

Looking Ahead

Looking ahead, this may well be a critical year in the national security debate. Recently mandated across-the-board cuts in funding and officer strength have slowed our progress in achieving force goals; stretched out force modernization; thinned out some of our combat units in hardware or people; left us with still inadequate stocks of modern munitions; and resulted in a growing backlog of equipment and facility maintenance.

Against this background, a considerable amount of reprogramming and fine tuning has managed to avoid either a hollow strategy or a hollow force—but the overall trends remain a matter of serious concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCS. We may be able to live with one or two years on a flat or descending appropriations curve, but we will eventually pay heavily for several years of zero or negative growth. At this point, it is difficult to forecast the specific impacts, but given the Soviets' steady progress and

the narrow margins inherent in our defense policies, small reductions in our capabilities could very well provoke a disproportionate change in the risk. Our experience has confirmed that time and again.

If confronted with no real increase in Defense spending over the next five years, for example, it is my judgment that our military risks will increase throughout this decade (possibly sharply) and into the 1990s. Primarily, this is a function of stretching things out, delaying improvements in a total force context, and living with sustainability problems we should be solving at a steady pace. Frankly, it's a pure function of the United States marching in place or making heavy tradeoffs, which will sacrifice some part of our structure, while the Soviets move forward in their customary fashion, correcting one military deficiency after another. That's precisely how we can lose our present ability to deter and our already slim edge on the field of battle.

In essence, I would like to see America settle down in the Defense debate—start looking at where we will be in the 1990s. What is most needed is a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run, rather than the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history. We have a great deal going for us in economic defense potential and in partnerships with other free nations of the world. But we must take the lead and set the pace in this long-term military competition with the USSR. If we fail to meet this challenge—and let the Soviet-controlled forces dominate the field—then we must be prepared to face the consequences of a world starkly different and less hospitable than the one we are living in today.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies at NORAD and US Space Command

Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado | February 6

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, and men and women of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Space Command:

It is indeed a privilege to participate in this ceremony, which marks a shift of leadership at the helm of these first-line commands and honors both the departing and arriving commanders.

It is a great pleasure also to visit the State of Colorado once again. Military people traditionally believe that any duty outside Washington is good duty and that, by the same token, any trip outside the Washington Beltway is a good trip. I certainly don't disagree with that folk wisdom. Put simply, I welcome these brief escapes from the Washington swirl. But this visit today—and this event—have special significance and meaning, for several reasons.

It is gratifying, first of all, to be back in the heartland and to be part of a gathering that includes so many prominent Coloradans—and I say this in all sincerity, despite my deep roots elsewhere in the Big Eight (and my fondness for the Oklahoma football team).

In a sense, the large civilian presence here today at this traditional military rite celebrates the partnership that built this great nation and each of its states: citizens who have used their freedom well, and people in uniform dedicated to preserving that freedom and protecting those accomplishments. In these ceremonies, we renew—and pay tribute to—a great civil-military tie which has always been strong in the Centennial State, ever since the days of the frontier forts and which remains obviously vibrant in this community today. The US Space Command's seal symbolizes what we are about. The eagle holds the olive branch and the arrows, symbolizing the joining of the fruits of peace and the military strength that keeps the preconditions for peace firmly in place.

It is equally gratifying for me today to be able to recognize the fine work of the men and women of NORAD and the US Space Command—and to tell them how much we in the remote netherworld of Washington value, and depend on, your work. The message I bring is simple and direct: the people of North America are free, and their prospects are good, in large part because you have raised a shield of vigilance and strength over our country which defies those who would do us harm.

For decades, NORAD has been a central element of our military structure which has deterred war, frustrated our most determined adversaries, and permitted Canadians and Americans to go about their civilian pursuits so successfully. This bi-national bond between Washington and Ottawa is one of the West's greatest postwar strategic success stories. Similarly, the US Space Command has applied vision, imagination, and extraordinary talent to find ways to move our defenses forward into the twenty-first century.

Together, you have faced the most awesome responsibilities of the modern age, working to prevent war and providing a powerful incentive for our enemies to return to negotiating tables where peaceful solutions can be developed and hopefully reductions in armaments can be pursued. You have helped not only to make the world safer but a better place to live. There is no nobler cause and I salute you for these achievements. It is a great personal pleasure for me to have a chance today to recognize and applaud your efforts. You deserve the best and you have certainly been blessed with the finest of leaders.

As you say goodbye to General [Robert T.] Herres, we in Washington prepare to welcome him to his new responsibilities as the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my co-pilot. He will find those responsibilities large and still evolving, but he will be more than up to the task. We in Washington count ourselves fortunate to have an officer of his talent and dedication inaugurating this important post. As a personal aside, I would add that anyone who once qualified as an astronaut can cope with being launched into the unknown, even in Washington. Also, because I have some experience in the matter, I can say with confidence that a man who marries a girl named Shirley has a great reservoir of strength to call on when events close in—and they do close in at times. Shirley Crowe and I have indeed been looking forward to the return of the Herres family to Washington.

Excerpts from Remarks at the Princeton University Interfaith Council Breakfast

Princeton, New Jersey | April 27

The subject of this morning's discussion, "What Matters to Me and Why," is a truly daunting one. When you get to be my age, you've tended for a long time to take these things for granted. And in the press of everyday business, you don't often get the opportunity to reflect on such subjects.

As I prepared these remarks and struggled with the problem of compressing large ideas into a few words, I thought about my own time as a student at the Naval Academy and the course of my career since then. One episode in particular stood out—really the only memory I have of my graduation day at Annapolis. It is a piece of advice offered to my class by our commencement speaker, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. He told us to conduct ourselves—no matter what we did or where fortune called—so that we would always be welcome to return to our hometowns. It's difficult for me to believe it has been almost forty-one years since I heard him say that. In that time I have followed the flag literally to all corners of the earth. Those years have been filled with challenges for our nation, too many and too familiar for any recounting here. They have been my preoccupation, and in the end they have brought me wholly unanticipated responsibilities. Now I am the last one of my Annapolis class still wearing the uniform.

What are those values that were so powerful for me and that have made that episode live on in my memory? Three words summarize them—God, Honor, and Patriotism. I would suspect that those words are the same ones that have animated many of you, and your families, in your own hometowns.

I'd be the first to admit that it is all too easy for them to be obscured by the exigencies of life in this age. The momentum of change is impressive, if not bewildering, and in many respects the environment surrounding us—and its challenges—are unparalleled in history. There are more people on this globe than at any time in the past. An unprecedented proportion of them are literate and educated. More than ever, people are expressing their aspirations and influencing governments. The scientific and technological revolution impacts every aspect of our lives. Advancements in communications and transportation alone have shrunk the world incredibly. Scientists claim we are doubling our acquisition of knowledge every five years. Assuming they are correct, in less than seven decades we should know a million times more about our universe than we do today. If you had a personal library consisting of a whole wall lined with built-in bookshelves, a million-fold increase in your library would require a continuous wall of bookshelves extending from coast to coast across the breadth of the United States.

I believe the average American, in seeking the answer to such a question, does not rely on complicated arguments, nor does he cite the unique tenets of any particular religious faith. Instinctively, he returns to, most likely, the basic teachings he has learned as a child, to mention a few: God, country, moderation in all things, freedom with responsibility, self-respect for all, and emphasis on human dignity and the worth of the individual.

These are the benchmarks which undergirded the early years of our great democratic experiment. Do they have application today? My answer is emphatic: Of course! They are relevant every day and every way in the actions of moral men and women dedicated to living fruitful lives within our nation, in the government, in every profession, in all endeavors, and in every home and workplace.

I stand before you as one of those. My profession is one in which the values I have mentioned are held high as standards of personal behavior and as the characteristics of the free society I am sworn to defend. A few years ago, there was a great debate about the moral problems of war in the nuclear age. It raised important questions about how we can remain civilized in an age in which technology has given us not only unparalleled creative capacities but also unprecedented powers of destruction. But these are not new questions. In every age, men have been challenged to remain faithful to abiding norms while making difficult choices about what to do. This is our challenge, as well, and I am confident we can steer the right course. We cannot wish away the unpleasant aspects of the world; we have to do our best to grapple with what exists, and somehow to make it better.

Channeling our creative abilities and using our strength for purposes that advance humane guiding principles is the ultimate test for those who govern. We cannot and should not detach the business of governing, or of defending the society, from those principles. They are the standard against which we—and all Americans—should measure our behavior. This would not be possible without the emphasis that we have historically put on the individual, his dignity, his welfare, and his freedom. Certainly, neither we nor our system are perfect; clearly, there is a great deal more to do and we still face more than enough problems. Yet, the point is that our idealism has been a dynamic force in the life of our nation—constantly spurring us to greater heights—and it remains so today. Even Watergate, a most sordid chapter in our political history, demonstrated our resiliency, patience, and cohesion as a nation. Only a people which had great faith in their institutions and collective morality could have digested Watergate without more trauma, without tanks or soldiers in the streets, or without tearing their society apart. In my view, Watergate was a moral trial rather than a political one, and our fundamental values stood the test well.

The Vietnam schism provides similar encouragement. No matter what side of the argument you took or how distressed you were by those events, in the long run our obedience to Democratic principles, our inherent regard for pluralism and the humanity of our values allowed the country ultimately to overcome this traumatic division.

If there is a threat to us, I believe it is not our ethics but the hypocrisy which we often practice. When the younger generation shows its dissatisfaction about events, it seems to me to spring from a sense of discrepancy between what we believe and what we do. That is where the greatest need for improvement lies.

Let me very quickly turn from the national to a personal level and cite a graphic example of a man who was not a hypocrite—a military man who found strength in our traditional values and in his professional ethic when he was put to great peril and trial—Vice Admiral James Stockdale, a POW in Vietnam for seven and a half years and

a Medal of Honor winner. He had this to say about his experience. (Forgive me if I quote liberally—but I could not do his testimony justice in my own words):

> In prison, we Americans had many mainstays. Mine reduced to a strong three-legged stool of God, country, and honor. Patriotism formed the honor leg of that stool. By honor, I mean a mixture of pride and conscience. That is, pride of one's country and in one's self, and a well-developed conscience based on this nation's history and its citizens' obligation to uphold the promise and commitment of our Founding Fathers.
>
> Alone, sick and suffering, with the agony of having the thin veneer of civilization brutally removed from our lives—faith, love, and hope were taken away from the strongest men as the screws of this extortion environment were tightened, day by day. The North Vietnamese hacked away at our honor, too, but there they hit the bedrock of resistance and resolve. We prisoners saw the bottom of the barrel, and our honor, our patriotism, helped save us from going over the edge into barbarism. I've seen brave men broken to the point that honor was the only building block left—but it was there. Patriotism sustained, encouraged, and gave hope.
>
> The immense strength of our history elevated our conscience and helped maintain our hope and unity.

This is the stuff of the real world and a concrete example of an American in extremis falling back on central and timeless concepts: God, honor, and patriotism. Jim Stockdale prevailed over his captors; they never conquered his spirit or the inner man. In essence, his victory was a spiritual one. What a testament to our idealism, our code, our belief in country—what a testament to our central hometown values.…

Public Lecture—"America and Her Military" at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey | April 28

It's a pleasure for me to be here tonight. Shirley and I are about midway in my McLean Fellowship Program and we have genuinely enjoyed the opportunity to revisit familiar places and see some old friends. We have fond memories of this town and campus. To say the least, we hold a deep affection for Princeton. I might add that for me, this has been a refreshing respite from the rigors of the Pentagon. I've been in this job for a year and a half now and have relearned the lesson that Washington can be a very tough town indeed—as the newspapers may have suggested to you over the past few months. I have to deal with Congress a lot, and that can be trying, especially at budget time. So, it's very satisfying to take refuge in more civilized surroundings, if only briefly.

But such burdens aside, I have looked forward to sharing with you some of my thoughts about the once and future challenges of defending our country. I have always believed

that it is vital for the military to engage in a continuous dialogue with the public. National security is too important these days to leave to the professionals alone. America's ability to fashion a viable and effective defense rests in large part on our citizens' understanding of the challenges we face and our ability to deal with them. Put simply, both the civilian and the military communities must communicate with each other and work very hard at it.

It is essential to maintain the mutual understanding that can support a genuine civil-military partnership for defense. We already have historically had such a partnership, though we don't often think of it in those terms. It was, after all, a civil-military team that built this country and won our freedom. That combination has defended the Nation successfully for two centuries, and I see it operating at several levels today: within the National Security Council arena, in the Department of Defense, with civilian and military personnel cooperating to fashion our military structure throughout our nation's history, civilian communities adjacent to defense facilities, and last but not least, in the country at large, where many people work diligently to inform themselves and to participate responsibly in the recurring national debate over what emphasis should be assigned to defense.

But those relationships notwithstanding, in times that are generally prosperous and which appear to be peaceful, the average Americans—and Congressmen for that matter—are often ambivalent about defense expenditures and especially about the role military men play in national decisionmaking. Our history is instructive here.

In the first book of Daniel Boorstin's trilogy *The Americans*, he details our colonial forefathers' military affairs. The early settlers had come here, of course, from countries where professional forces had been tools of autocrats and were literally a separate caste used by rulers for their own purposes, or more frequently, their whims. Quite naturally, the colonists brought with them deep resentments of professional military, but once settled in the new world, the colonists, in addition to all the rather challenging hardships, often had to deal with hostile natives.

On a frontier and on the battlefield, the imperatives were clear. As a result, everyone valued and became accomplished in the business of personal and collective security as much as they were in the business of shopkeepers or as farmers. It was a matter of survival. From this lifestyle, a strong militia tradition arose: self-armed citizen-soldiers ready to drop their personal pursuits at a moment's notice and rally to the defense of home, hearth, and community. This custom gave rise to the belief that the colonies were always prepared for peril, in a sort of effortless way, as a by-product of the colonial lifestyle.

But, as Boorstin notes, in practice the militia tradition was firmly bounded by local allegiances: people were reluctant to participate in extended expeditions defending distant communities. As life settled into more peaceful patterns, training in units grew perfunctory at best. George Washington quickly discovered in the War of Independence that militia troops—the Minutemen—though fierce defenders of hometowns, were notoriously unreliable when committed elsewhere. To fight the highly disciplined British units, a national force of regulars was needed, but it was hard to lure men away from their localities for extended duty. Short enlistments and lagging re-enlistments constantly imperiled campaign plans and strategic designs. In Princeton, we today are properly proud of the

famous battle fought here. What is not as well known is that George Washington, after his earlier victory at Trenton, had literally to beg soldiers due for discharge in a few days to stay with him. About half did stay and followed him here; but half went home, too. And though the situation improved somewhat in the later stages of the war, it was never good. People—and towns—saw to their own defenses first.

After the Revolution, streams of Americans poured westward. Life for them was in some respects like it had been for the first colonists. There were great risks and uncertainties about the simplest things and, of course, security of homes and settlements was a major concern. They also depended on a strong tradition of self-help for defenses, but gradually a small professional army began to share the mission of protecting them.

It's hard for us sometimes to imagine what their lives were like as they pushed across the Piedmont and Appalachian Plateau and out across the plains and prairie. Homes were scattered, isolated, and vulnerable. Indian and bandit raids could come at any time.

Naturally, these people valued the protective presence of the Regulars, and were the strongest advocates—more vocal than many in the military—for full-time professional units. But back east, where life became more secure and more and more preoccupied with industry, commerce, and the gentle arts, skepticism about the military establishment grew, as did criticism about the ways it was used and, of course, the monies it required. The Civil War aside, which was treated more as a one-time spasm, the need for permanent forces seemed more and more remote as the frontier threat receded. There were wars and upheavals on other continents, to be sure, but our connections with them were attenuated. Our country was not at risk, and the strength of the British Navy kept the sea channels open for commerce.

The contributions of a military establishment became less apparent and were downgraded except on those infrequent occasions when an unruly world intruded and demanded that the United States defend its own burgeoning interests and activities and help others defend their own against blatant aggression. But each time, after a burst of energy, we demobilized—demilitarized, some would say—when the threats were quelled. It was the American way.

Some attribute this pattern primarily to the original colonial fear of the "man on horseback" or basic aversion to a "standing military" that might usurp power. My father, an attorney with a fascination for history, shared these fears and used to lecture me at length about the place of the professional soldier in a democracy. On one hand, he admired valor and was proud of being a World War I veteran. On the other hand, he never overcame his skepticism of the "brass."

An equally important factor throughout our history has been the sense of threat. After all, it is the language of our own Constitution (in the Second Amendment) that says a well-regulated militia is "necessary to the security of a free state." That is truly a foundation principle for us as a nation. But the rub usually comes in recognizing and acknowledging the threat in a timely fashion. Americans seem to have painfully short memories. Four times in the last ninety years we let our defenses sag and then were forced into major hostilities where we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure,

and instability. I heard a wag say that we remember the Alamo, we remember the *Maine*, we remember Pearl Harbor. When we win, we forget them.

After World War II, the United States found itself the leader of the Free World with global concerns. Following another precipitate demobilization, the United States discovered that it could not return to its comfortable pre-war mode. It rapidly became clear that Moscow had no intention of continuing its wartime alliance with the West. A shattered Europe was looking to Washington for sustenance and protection. In the Pacific, MacArthur was charged with transforming Japan into a democracy, and nationalists throughout Southeast Asia and the subcontinent were agitating for independence. In the background lurked the nuclear weapon, which only the United States possessed.

But the world was moving fast. In 1949, the Soviets exploded a nuclear device. With the attack on South Korea, American troops found themselves again fighting abroad. Out of this trauma came NATO, the Marshall Plan, and an overall military buildup, including the landmark decision to keep forces indefinitely forward-deployed in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific. In a few years, these moves were bolstered by a network of security treaties with other allies. Americans were discovering that international leadership involved a great deal more than diplomatic conferences. This was a marked break with our past. For the first time we were to support large forces in peacetime. The 1950s determined our fundamental commitments and strategic posture until the present day.

These developments, of course, meant that even though we were at peace, the military was heavily involved in national policymaking and that Defense procurement would become influential in the economy. In turn, Service leaders would assume a higher profile than in the past. Predictably, our historical ambivalence about things military reasserted itself. The country did finance increased military outlays and elected a professional officer as President in 1952. Interestingly, before leaving office even he saw fit to caution Americans about the military-industrial complex. Academics, exercised about the newfound influence of the Defense Department, churned out a host of studies and analytical pieces on the "military mind" and "men on white horses"—as I discovered when I was in graduate school at Princeton.

The late Bernard Brodie, in his 1973 book *War and Politics*, outlined the perspective I'm talking about. Brodie decried what he termed the "primitive" and "parochial" outlook of those who rise to high military positions. They were, he felt, too confident in the efficacy of force and too uninformed about other instruments of policy. Military leaders, he contended, because of their professional upbringing, are simply not likely to be well-equipped to advise the President sensibly about "the goals and ends of peace and of war."

That's pretty tough criticism—especially to someone like me who is, in fact, charged to give the President just such advice. And it's not an isolated attitude by any means. The Vietnam schism reinforced these views in many peoples' minds and certainly caused career officers at all ranks to rethink what they were about. While I believe that Brodie would be pleased if he could see some of the changes that have taken place in the attitudes and sophistication of your senior military leadership, his views are still held by many and still represent formidable barriers to mutual understanding. Consequently, it is imperative for today's senior officers to work at bridging this gap and, in turn, to constantly reexamine their own perspectives.

The post-Vietnam reaction was to cut back defense spending markedly. But neither Democrats nor Republicans were able to reduce our international commitments successfully, although they tried on occasion. The imperatives of our global responsibilities and the expectations of our allies were just too strong. By the late 1970s, we confronted a situation where we were deployed worldwide, but with hollow forces. In typical American style, a backlash set in, and the last six to seven years have witnessed increased defense expenditure and marked improvements across the board in our military posture.

Despite the ups and downs in security expenditures, the strategic environment, as usual, refused to stand still. That's my prime preoccupation. Our interests remain global. In fact, I think Americans today take that simple assertion for granted—often without realizing what it implies. While we were distracted by Vietnam and its subsequent trauma, Moscow in its plodding but consistent fashion continued to invest heavily in raw power. I won't belabor the statistics documenting their military apparatus; suffice it to say, this continuous investment has produced impressive forces—in fact, forces of unprecedented strength in the peacetime world.

Moreover, they have steadily improved qualitatively as well as quantitatively. No matter what assumptions you might make about the Kremlin's intentions, make no mistake: they possess formidable military power of global reach. While I believe we are seeing some encouraging signs in Moscow, we have not as yet detected any tangible abatement in Soviet military programs—either testing or building.

It is also a fact of life today that security challenges now wear many faces other than the specter of a nuclear or conventional war with the USSR—such as terrorism that can occur anywhere on the globe at any time; the manifold activities of Soviet surrogates who seek to promote instability wherever they can; and proliferating local conflicts in the Third World.

The challenge—and the guts of my job—is to see that we are prepared to deal with this continuously shifting strategic climate. In a very real sense, our past success makes the task more difficult. Our deterrent policy has worked—certainly as far as major war and Western Europe is concerned—and, in turn, has freed our citizens and resources for peaceful pursuits. That they can be so absorbed is, of course, in itself a measure of our armed forces' success in keeping the preconditions for peace and progress in place. But it is also true that the relative tranquility of Americans' lives tends to numb them to the harsh and distant realities of the international community. They aren't used to thinking of the world as a place marked by conflict, competition, and strife, and they lose sight of the role of military strength in protecting and facilitating their daily lives.

Henry Kissinger—a philosopher and statesman of some note—once observed that Americans tend to think of "peace" and "war" as two entirely separate and incompatible spheres of activity. Everyday affairs are, of course, much more blurred than that. Admiral Jim Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, used the term "violent peace" to describe today's atmosphere. Any newspaper testifies to the fact that he is right. But for many Americans, it's hard to connect these reports to our own defenses.

Yet another complication is the very character of the public discussion of defense issues—especially at budget time, when the great arguments tend to get cast in terms of dollars and not—no pun intended—strategic sense, and when there is a distressing tendency to proceed without considering fully all the values and interests at stake. This tendency has become pronounced with the growth of genuine concerns about budget deficits.

I spend considerable time on Capitol Hill, and I hear a great deal of talk there about the primacy of so-called fiscal and political realities. No one ever really defines what those realities are, but many clearly feel the debate about allocation of national resources ought to take its bearings from them. I certainly agree that the discussion has to consider the full array of challenges confronting the country, but I would argue that it should also include military realities: i.e., far-flung American activities and interests, the needs of friends, trends in security threats, and the state of our own forces. But as sensible as that position may seem, it is sometimes very hard to get it across to congressional interlocutors.

All this, I hasten to add, doesn't lead to an argument that we must match the Soviet Union, or anyone else, weapon for weapon, gun for gun, or man for man. Military people know—in fact, we insist—that our humane and decent society must do many things in addition to building its military strength. We know, also, that in a major war or other engagement with the Soviets, we are going to go into battle at sea, on the land, or in the air outnumbered in both manpower and equipment. Senior leaders of my generation have learned that this is a fact of life, and we move on to find ways to compensate with quality weapons systems, excellent people, realistic training, broad and responsive logistic support, and the help of our free world friends and allies. But that makes it a "sporty" course; a package that leaves little margin for error and no room for retreat from the challenges in any of those compensatory areas.

In my view, because of the renovation of our defenses undertaken in the 1980s, America is safer than we were ten years ago, the possibilities for meaningful arms reductions are greater, and the prospects for what many citizens understand as peace are higher. But in today's world it is unfortunately true that the business of security is never done. Similarly, leadership of the free world is a tough and protracted job. Like it or not, we're engaged in a contest that's a marathon, not a sprint, and if you'll forgive me for mixing in a naval metaphor, this is no time to rest on our oars. The bottom line is that complacency is hardly justified by the threat, the political climate, or the military situation. This is a time when the country needs, as never before, to be conscious of the bonds and mutual requirements that hold together its civil-military team and to look with clear eyes at all dimensions of the world it faces.

I promised a word about the future. Obviously, I believe that for some time we will be required to invest in keeping our defenses strong. At the same time, there is no question that the current practice of politicizing defense issues, even small ones, is wasteful in a variety of ways. Of all the serious studies addressed to Defense reorganization, every one that I am familiar with recommends dramatic changes in the way Congress addresses security issues and the need for bipartisanship on defense. Yet when Congress passes reorganization legislation, these suggestions are ignored. It's much easier to rearrange the Secretary of Defense's office or command lines than it is to alter political attitudes and habits.

The fact remains that the real challenge is to forge some type of consensus on defense policy and to set aside the political pettiness which marks so much of the annual security debate.

There's no question that we could defend this country better with less money if we had a consistent and consensual policy that stretched over a number of years. If, instead of the wildly fluctuating curves of military spending over the last twenty-six years, we had maintained zero growth for this period, we would have had several billion more dollars available to defend the country and certainly would have been able to buy more for the monies expended. Perhaps this may be an impossible goal, although given some of our past national accomplishments, I have trouble accepting such a conclusion. In any event, the benefits would be so considerable that I believe we should bend every effort to go in that direction.

No military leader in our nation desires war. To keep the peace is the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces, and the primary measure of their success is the ability to deter conflict. But we must constantly remind our citizens that freedom is not free. It requires continuous effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrifice—the type of sacrifice for which this republic is famous. If our deterrent policy is to continue to work well, we must match the threats with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history.

If the US military is to be successful, it needs good people and good hardware. But above all, it needs the patient and continuing support of all our citizens. Our military is not a separate and distinct community. It is an integral element of the society it serves, and in the end, it will only be as good as the American people want it to be.

Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee on Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

May 1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:

I greatly appreciate your invitation to appear this morning in order to review implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act and, in particular, Title IV provisions pertaining to Joint Officer Management.

The Joint Staff

Seven months have passed since enactment of the Defense Reorganization Act. During that time, we have:

- Welcomed a new Vice Chairman who is clearly and effectively performing duties intended by Congress and approved by the Secretary of Defense;

- Firmly placed the Joint Staff under the Chairman's authority, direction, and control; and
- Fully complied with those provisions of the Act which allow me to select the "most highly qualified" officers for duty on the Joint Staff, choose a representative on Service promotion boards, and assess the results of such boards.

General Herres and I are very much involved in this process. In fact, it is the type of challenge which has required our personal participation in the staffing as well as the decisionmaking. Overall, we are satisfied that the Joint Staff has good people and that even better people are being nominated by the Services as incumbents move on to other assignments. With respect to promotion rates and selection for command, equity and fairness are qualities we will have to evaluate over the long haul and, if warranted, on a case-by-case basis. We have already placed into practice the monitoring process.

Joint Personnel Management

Turning to the area of Joint Personnel Management, the 99th Congress recognized that it was breaking new ground with a limited amount of data and information concerning how Title IV would actually work. Wisely, the door was left open for a review of the situation—the main reason we are here today.

First, I know that you are interested in what we are doing to implement Title IV as it now stands. Following initial guidance by the Congress, DOD has implemented the Act and is proceeding to formalize it with comprehensive policy directives. One directive, which will be issued shortly, deals with such issues as: (1) assignment of graduates from the Armed Forces Staff College and National Defense University; (2) expected joint duty tour lengths; (3) guidance to promotion boards pertaining to the consideration of officers who are serving in or have served in joint duty assignments; and (4) completion of the CAPSTONE course by flag and general officer selectees.

Additionally, we have looked at the detailed provisions of Title IV and in the process have:

- Identified some 8,000 to 9,000 joint duty assignments within the Department of Defense, about one-tenth of which will be in the Joint Staff;
- Considered the congressional mandate that approximately one-half of these assignments will be filled with a joint specialist or nominee, including 1,000 critical billets requiring this specialty;
- Examined the long-term impact of other requirements mandated by Congress such as those related to joint duty tour lengths and professional qualification of joint specialists; and
- Assessed how the Act would affect the military profession as a whole.

Our analysis and future projections suggest that the community of officers with joint duty experience could be strengthened somewhat by modifying slightly some provisions of Title IV. Rather than dwell on the entire package, I will focus on areas of primary concern.

Joint Duty Tours

Our first priority request would shorten joint duty tour lengths from 3½ to 3 years at the grade of 0-6 or below and 3 years to 2 years for flag and general officers. I strongly support this proposal for two reasons:

- It still provides stability in joint duty assignments while allowing somewhat greater flexibility in the management of officer personnel. In particular, I would like officers in the joint community to "return to the field" as often as practical and sharpen their technical or warfighting skills within or alongside the combatant forces. I feel very strongly about this side of their qualifications and believe this is an essential part of an effective joint officer.
- By shortening joint tours somewhat, this initiative also allows more officers to gain such experience as they progress through the ranks. I believe that this opportunity will benefit the Department of Defense as a whole, as intended by framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In a similar vein, I would strongly recommend that you allow us to count less than two-year tours of joint duty for cumulative credit. For example, this would include officers: (1) assigned to relatively short joint tours in remote or unaccompanied locations; (2) forced to shorten their tour length for reasons of hardship or circumstances beyond their control; or (3) reassigned within a normal tour from one joint billet to another, e.g., from the Joint Staff to one of the Defense Agencies or headquarters staff of a Unified Commander or a transfer within the Joint Staff.

Qualification of Joint Specialty Officers

Turning to the qualification of Joint Specialty Officers, we agree that, in the main, the requirement should be joint professional military education followed by a successful tour of joint duty in that order. We are proceeding to work with the Armed Forces Staff College and the National Defense University to meet this requirement over the long term. As you know, I have convened a study panel, headed by General Dougherty, reviewing the joint educational system and also looking at the "jointness" of Service schools and colleges.

We are requesting, however, two changes in this area of Title IV:

- One change would allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the sequence of a joint tour and professional military education. This will permit us to capitalize on officers who have successfully completed a joint duty tour by making their "hands on" experience available to the faculty and other students attending the Armed Forces Staff College or National Defense University. This "waiver authority" also will allow us somewhat more flexibility and selectivity when filling at least 1,000 billets requiring the specialty. While I anticipate that this exception would only be used sparingly, I believe it would permit us to bring into the Joint Specialty some quality officers that we may otherwise miss.

- More important, I would strongly recommend permitting an alternate qualification path for the joint specialty in addition to the currently prescribed route of PME plus one tour of joint duty. We are proposing that successful completion of two joint tours of duty or, if you prefer, a specific time frame such as five or six years could be prescribed, which would allow officers to be considered. This proposal recognizes that the career management of our middle grade officers already is stressed by multiple requirements: refresher training in special combat skills, operational tours of duty, postgraduate education, various types of command and staff assignments, and technical expertise demanded by both headquarters and joint staffs. In the broad sweep, it is not uncommon to find an officer with two joint tours who is eminently qualified to fill a critical joint billet. I speak with considerable experience on this subject, not only in terms of my own career pattern but also in observing officers who have worked for and with me in the joint arena. In passing, I should note that these officers would still have to be declared qualified by a review board before receiving the joint specialty designation.

Tracking Promotion Rates

Turning to promotion rates, the law as it now stands mandates equitable promotion rates for officers currently serving or having served on the Joint Staff or those with a Joint Specialty in comparison with officers currently serving on the headquarters staff of their parent Service. We do not propose to change the "currently serving" aspect of Title IV.

We are concerned about the way prior service is counted and tracked under Title IV. Essentially, we are recommending that the expectations of Title IV be slightly modified so as not to influence an officer's promotion prospects beyond his next in-zone consideration for promotion. For example, an Air Force major who was serving on the Joint Staff as of 1 October 1986 and subsequently received orders as a major to the Tactical Air Command would be monitored through his consideration for promotion to lieutenant colonel in the primary zone. He would not beyond that point be credited for promotion purposes with previously served joint duty unless he reported for another tour of joint duty, which would re-energize the process.

I support this proposal for two reasons:

- First, it will not saddle promotion boards with the prospect of unduly having to consider early career performance in order to meet promotion rates mandated by Congress. The Chiefs and I strongly believe that performance "in grade" is the primary indicator of potential for promotion boards to consider, not where the officer was or what he did ten years before the board convened.
- Second, our proposal will encourage repeat joint tours.

Joint Matters in the Headquarters Staffs

The last of our proposals would allow some joint duty positions within the headquarters staffs—essentially officers whose primary duty is to work with and assist the Joint Staff in preparing papers for the Chiefs and I to address. The vast majority of these papers require a detailed understanding and integration of Service capabilities. The Joint Staff

cannot do that without substantial, constructive, and forthcoming input from the Services. Moreover, even with a strong Joint Staff, we will need people within the Service staffs who know how to work within the joint system and carry the joint perspective back to their own staffs. That's a very important part of the overall process.

Thus, we are proposing that the Chairman be allowed to certify a maximum of 250 billets in the four Armed Forces headquarters as joint duty assignments. That's less than 5 percent of the 5,170 active duty officers Congress has allowed for the headquarters staff, including those of the Service Secretaries.

Officers with Critical Combat Operations Skills

Even with these requests, we have not solved a number of career management problems surrounding officers with critical combat operations skills. Our Navy nuclear officers, who spend virtually their entire careers at sea or in training, are an excellent example. Granted, the Secretary of Defense can waive prior joint duty as a requisite for promotion to flag rank. I am not convinced, however, that this is entirely fair or encouraging to nuclear submariners or other officers who, for one reason or another, are forced to concentrate on combat operations skills. It tends to place them in double jeopardy—either they won't be selected or won't obtain the waiver required for promotion to flag/general rank. Thus, I strongly recommend that you query each of the Service Chiefs on his particular problems and ask if other officers should testify on the subject of critical combat operations skills.

Closing Remarks

To sum it up, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a solid piece of legislation. Even though we are only seven months into its implementation, we are moving forward not only with the spirit of reform but also with a host of measures required to put the Act into practice. Many of these measures, of course, go beyond those dealing with Joint Personnel Management, including actions by the Joint Staff to support me with net assessments, weave the Defense agencies into our readiness calculations, and better integrate the operational plans of our combatant commanders.

By nature, however, Joint Personnel Management has a very high people content. Thus, we have spent a great deal of time examining this side of the Defense Reorganization Act. In general, we want to nourish and broaden the community of officers with joint experience, achieve as much flexibility as possible in meeting Department of Defense requirements for officers with joint duty qualifications, establish a challenging and rewarding career pattern for Joint Specialists, and at the same time ensure that fairness remains a hallmark of the military promotion system in general. Frankly, it's a challenging mandate, even for those of us who work inside of and are familiar with the personnel management systems of the four Services.

I believe, however, that we have struck the right balance with the proposed alterations submitted by OSD—a balance which is designed to strengthen the Goldwater-Nichols Act in principle and practice. In turn, I strongly urge the Subcommittee to consider and accept these recommendations.

Excerpts from Remarks to the Armed Services YMCA Luncheon Honoring the Senior Enlisted Advisors from Each Service
Headquarters, YMCA, Washington, DC | May 11

It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to be here today. I want to say at the outset that it is particularly gratifying to be a part of the ceremonies today, which are honoring our Senior Enlisted Advisors and, by extension, all of those who are following through the ranks and their example.

These people are the strong backbone of all our Services, the Coast Guard included. Leaders that have risen to the top by making things happen where it counts—on the ground, on and under the seas, in the skies, all over the globe every day. They are masters of the many technical skills, but far beyond that, it is their job, first and foremost, to lead, to provide cohesion and direction for our people, and to find that special combination of man and task needed in all units for smooth and productive operations.

Of course, in the real world, they are caught right in the middle in the leadership business. Everyone turns to them—and I do mean everyone—up and down the chain of command. There's not a senior officer in any one of our Services who does not owe a debt, and probably a very, very large debt, in his career to a noncommissioned officer or a chief petty officer who, sometime earlier, broke him in as a young pup, who shared his wisdom, counseled him to be patient, told him when he was doing it wrong, encouraged him to hang tough when the world was pressing him, and served as a leadership model for the young officer to follow. That certainly describes my own case. And their influence works downward in the ranks to the same effect.

I refer to my own experience in the Navy. For years, I have been intrigued by the relationship between a good chief petty officer and his men—a real combination of technical skill, browbeating, sympathizing, counseling, and rewarding. He manages to weld them together in a team, both professionally and personally, and I've seen it time and time again. They will kid him, they will hate him, they will revere him, they will produce for him, they will swear at him, but above all, they obey him when the time comes—and the time may come when he asks them to die for him. Men don't fight for ideals as much as they do for their comrades and their leaders. And good NCO's and Petty Officers understand that and build on it. And in the end, the business of defense literally depends on them. To steal a phrase from that great philosopher Reggie Jackson, "They're the straw that stirs the drink."

I might add that it is typical of the Armed Services YMCA to focus on the contributions of these key people today. What a debt we owe to your organization! The Armed Services YMCA provides support and help to thousands of young military people who are serving their country in unfamiliar new environments, and I think it was so well-illustrated by the short film we saw. It operates more than fifty units of service throughout its twenty-five branches. It is affiliated with six YMCA associations. The

network reaches throughout the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, the Republic of Panama, and the United Kingdom.

The YMCA continues to provide some of the same types of services that began during the Civil War 126 years ago. But it has now extended its reach to the total military family, married and single, and their needs. The YMCA also is an important link between the military and civilian communities, to the young military families assigned to cities and states, and helping military commands enhance the quality of life for these special citizens. There's a widespread recognition, at all levels, that healthy families contribute substantially to mission readiness and retention and that wholesome lifestyles benefit not only the individuals of the armed services but the entire defense establishment as well.

The Armed Services YMCA is the civilian arm that helps promote this kind of lifestyle that helps enhance our defense establishment in such a meaningful way. I know of no better example of the civilian-military bond and the fact that our society does appreciate what Service people do.

I spend a lot of time, in my time in Washington and around the country, working to keep that civil-military connection healthy in all its dimensions. It requires mutual understanding and communications at many levels, and that's a tall order. But I believe strongly in the merits of a lively civil-military dialogue. Americans need to have the best possible information about our security posture and our Service needs, especially in a time when there is great debate about the share of national resources that should be devoted to defense. This is, by the way, a burden we can all take up with great benefit, and that includes many people in this audience. Not all citizens are as conscious of the need for a strong military as you are. And don't forget that, in large part, our ability to fashion an effective defense posture will rest, just as it always has, on our success in communicating with our public, our success in communicating our needs, our perspectives, our concerns, and information about the threat.

I don't think we have those difficult of problems in the defense dialogue, but it is true that it has been too easy for some Americans, preoccupied with their interests at home, to overlook the more troubling facts of international life. Among those, of course, is Moscow's massive military buildup, the Kremlin's proclivity to use raw power when the calculus favors it—as in Afghanistan, and in Russian support for the efforts of kindred regimes to spread any antidemocratic revolutions and to oppose the free world wherever it is vulnerable. Of course, the Third World strife and dissidence racks our newspapers today.

In part, the American tendency to ignore those realities and to overlook the contributions of our Armed Forces in keeping mischief makers at a distance stems from a habit of thought that sharply distinguishes between peace and war. In times that look peaceful to many citizens, it is hard for them to feel any military or immediate threat justifying military strength. But the reality of the matter is this: Americans can absorb themselves so completely and productively in their civilian pursuits precisely because of the strength that undergirds all of our foreign policies and keeps the free conditions for peace and progress firmly in place. Many in this room are intimately familiar with those

contributions, and have had the privilege of leading the fine people who man our distant battlements, who patrol freedom's frontiers, and who work long days to hold themselves at the ready, in ports, bases, and ships around the world.

In fact, as I look back over a forty-year career, I can say without hesitation that the greatest reward of a Service career—a professional Service career—has been the opportunity to associate day in and day out with young American men and women in our Armed Forces. I have watched them in stress and in boredom, in peace and war, and in good times and in bad. I've seen them unfailingly give 110 percent to every test, often far from home and without the amenities that other professions might have brought them. There is no nobler calling and there are no finer people. They are in my thoughts daily as I make the rounds explaining what they do and what they need.

Here are just a few of the images from my own experience that press forward in my mind, and I apologize because they are personal and perhaps not as broad as you would prefer. I vividly remember Chief Gunner's Mate Wood. I was an Ensign on my first ship, a destroyer-minesweeper. For reasons that I never quite fathomed, I was assigned as Gunnery Officer. I had never even seen a five-inch gun fire. The Chief said: "Don't worry Boss. Just walk around like you know what's going on and I'll make sure that everything works right." He was true to his word. He was the first of a long line of people who steered me, and others like me, past the treacherous shoals of inexperience or uncertainty.

There was my Naval Academy classmate who had a Wingman shot down behind enemy lines in Korea. He landed his plane in an adjacent field and attempted to save his friend. When he pulled him from the cockpit, the Wingman was already dead. Lieutenant Tom Hudner received the Congressional Medal of Honor.

There was the time I was serving on a submarine that had lost propulsion and unwittingly descended below test depth. A calm and cool First Class Electrician by the name of Martinez from Brownsville, Texas—that's when this Oklahoman began to like Texans—on his own initiative, hastily completed a jury-rig to get power back. His skill saved the ship.

Once, in Vietnam, I was a passenger in a helicopter which suffered a major casualty. The young pilot of twenty-three, Lieutenant Spence Roberts—I can still see his face—managed to keep control against great odds, in order to auto-rotate the chopper into a rice paddy just as if he was going to the bank.

I will never forget watching four sailors and two Marines rush into burning huts in Vietnam in order to save eight small children. They spent the next three hours fighting to keep them alive until medical help arrived.

A few years ago, I had the privilege of attending a British Mess Night. The Colonel of the Regiment presided over the affair, and after the dinner he was showing us around the Mess and some of the war trophies that they had acquired over the years. There was a flag that was obviously of American origin and he said, "This was a flag that we took at the Battle of Breed's Hill, which you know as Bunker Hill." He said, "As you can see, we've still got the flag." Whereupon a young Marine captain that was in our party, without hesitation said, "Colonel, we've still got the hill."

I watched a young Navy wife face the press three days after she had lost her husband at sea. She announced that she would be proud to have her six-month-old son choose the Navy as a career. And I have a vivid recollection of watching on TV as Captain and future Senator Jerry Denton, after eight years of prison in North Vietnam, exited from a plane from the Philippines and announced to the world that he was proud to make such a sacrifice if it would help his country. He ended by declaring, "God bless America."

Now, those are memories! Today, as I make my rounds, I think of young soldiers crouching in the freezing night air along the DMZ in Korea, and also patrolling on the West German border for an attack that we hope will never come. I think of the sailors of the Seventh Fleet criss-crossing an area totalling fifty million square miles from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day. I think of young Marines guarding our embassies around the world at a time when the threat of terrorism is omnipresent and the highest it has ever been. Regardless of what current news stories may suggest, the security of these solitary outposts could not be in more capable hands.

I think of those F-111 crews and pilots who, a year ago, flying at the speed of sound in darkness only a few hundred feet above the surface, attacked Libyan targets with selfless courage through intense anti-aircraft fire. They demonstrated graphically that this nation will resist terrorism and not sit back passively while an outlaw government attacks and slaughters innocent Americans around the world.

I think, too, of the American men and women of the Coast Guard, whose vigilance at sea and in the skies protects our borders and keeps the daily lives of Americans safer. Unseen by most of our citizens that shield against adversity and close-to-home danger plays a key part in this nation's day to day security.

Now, these stories are typical of the people who have felt the Nation's deepest agonies and have helped us achieve and secure its triumphs. They are the ones to whom every leader, military or civilian, and every American citizen owes a deep debt of gratitude.

Here in Washington, we're great fans of the Redskins, and I confess a personal fondness for the Oklahoma Sooners—that' a football team, you know. But I would submit that the really number one team in the country, in this nation, is the one represented by the honorees at this dais today—the true guardians of freedom and tranquility. Ceremonies such as this and organizations such as the Armed Forces YMCA provide great, great comfort to us in many ways, and in times that can be especially trying.

I speak on behalf of all the Armed Services when I say to you that we are truly grateful for your support. You can rest assured that we will carry back to our comrades the message that the civil-military partnership this nation depends on so critically is alive and well, even inside the Washington beltway.

Remarks at the Activation of US Special Operations Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida | June 1

It is a great day, I assure you, for me to join with Deputy Secretary Taft in this ceremony, to activate the newest addition to our family of Unified and Specified Commands, the US Special Operations Command.

As we do so today, we in the military mark occasions such as this with a great deal of justifiable pride. But that feeling runs especially strong today, for the Command we inaugurate embraces people widely recognized as the most accomplished our Armed Services have to offer and forces whose capabilities are key to this nation's ability to navigate through an uncertain future. In a larger sense, however, the activation of this command represents a great deal more than the aggregation of talented people and forces. It provides another signal to friends and potential adversaries of America's intent to stand tall against the full spectrum of military challenges we face. And it demonstrates our resolve to guard and defend the peace and progress in a world that is not universally hospitable to those purposes.

As a former Commander in Chief of US forces in the Pacific, I can attest to the importance of such capabilities to leaders who will have to fight the battle if war should ever come. And I can also testify to their value, in times of ostensible peace, as a key element of the nation's deterrent posture and a vital instrument of US policy and presence in endangered or vulnerable regions of the world. It has become increasingly clear that these specially tailored forces deserve increased attention and effort.

I do not have to tell the majority of those assembled here that the military challenges this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diversity. Over the last thirty years, every one of my predecessors has expressed concern about the evolving Soviet worldwide threat and the state of the overall military balance. Today, this phenomenon has an especially troubling dimension: the Kremlin's increasing tendency to act through surrogates. Moscow continues to be successful in having its clients act against Western governments and peoples and in using them to exploit localized tensions and strife in key regions around the world. The result is a burgeoning terrorist threat, spreading and fierce regional conflicts, and an increasing willingness of small anti-American regimes to challenge us and our friends.

Admiral Jim Watkins, the former CNO, characterized the world we face as "violent peace." Any newspaper, on any day of the year, attests to the accuracy of that observation. In that environment, the demands placed on our military forces have continued to grow, especially in the realm of ambiguous, twilight challenges short of general war.

As we move toward the close of this century and the opening of a new one, there will be no slackening of that trend. For those of us in the Armed Forces, this means all our capabilities must be ready to respond to the President's call, and to our people's needs.

We will look to our new Special Forces Command for employment in the full range of operational contingencies. The result will be a critical augmentation of the military strength that supports this country's foreign and national security policies. Though this headquarters may be located within the United States, in a real sense it will always be

a front-line command, one whose efforts will enable Washington to go forward with the confidence befitting the leader of the free world. America's far-flung interests, and the aspirations of millions of hopeful people around the world, will be safer because of the capabilities developed and honed under the aegis of General Lindsay and his successors

I have known and worked with General Lindsay for some time: in fact, I was the culprit who presided at his last promotion. For nearly thirty-five years, he has been an exemplary soldier: a devoted infantryman who has led our readiest and most capable fighting units from platoon to Corps. He excelled in the most demanding staff positions, and most recently headed the Readiness Command with great distinction. In war and peace, he has always stayed close to the heart of our military: the troops. The soldiers, sailors, and airmen assigned to this new organization could have no finer commander. It is with great confidence and pride that I participate in these public ceremonies formally charging him with his responsibilities as the first Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command.

Building this command will require a great team effort and the dedication and perseverance of a host of talented people here and in subordinate elements around the world. It won't be easy: our critics will be vigilant, and our citizens' expectations are justifiably high. The great and honored traditions of the units composing the Special Operations Command will provide solid foundation and sustenance for the effort—so will the support of leaders in Washington. But also needed—indispensably—will be leadership on the ground—leadership that provides the vision and energy to oversee and direct integrated coordinated activities and to make the whole truly Joint and larger than its parts. We are fortunate indeed to be able to entrust this endeavor at its beginning to a man of Jim Lindsay's caliber.

In that spirit, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I congratulate General Lindsay on his assumption of these key duties and extend our very best wishes to him, to his family, and to the entire Special Operations Command, as you move forward in the months and years ahead.

Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Persian Gulf
June 5

Editor's Note: On May 17, 1987, the USS *Stark* deployed in the Persian Gulf and was engaged by two Exocet missiles fired from an Iraqi Mirage fighter with the loss of 37 crewmen, 2 of whom were lost at sea. These losses brought into focus the Administration's decision to accept the Kuwait request to "re-flag" Kuwaiti commercial shipping and to provide protection in the Gulf.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome your interest in recent events in the Persian Gulf and, in turn, this opportunity to discuss our future actions in this crucial region.

US Interests

One prefatory comment is in order: the strategic, economic, and political interests which intersect in the Gulf not only make it an area of great importance but also pose very complex policy problems for all involved parties. In dealing with this part of the world, there are no simple or perfect answers. This is particularly true of the United States. As a superpower and the leader of the Free World, we must reconcile our past policies with our wider global responsibilities. Against this backdrop, I defy anyone to construct a simple policy for the region or one which will put us on the right side of every issue under all circumstances.

I believe that there is some consensus as to our fundamental goals in the Persian Gulf:

- We have a vital stake in seeing that the region's supply of oil to the Free World remains unimpeded.
- In turn, we have major political interests in the non-belligerent Gulf states, both in their own right and because of their influence within the Gulf and beyond. Washington's relationship with this group of nations affects the economic health of the entire Free World.
- In a similar vein, we have a vested stake in peace and stability in this volatile region, as we do in other troubled areas. Clearly, we have not succeeded in preventing hostilities, but we must persevere with our efforts to prevent the Iran-Iraq War from spreading and hopefully to bring that conflict to an early close.
- Throughout, the strategic importance of the region and the foregoing interests compel us to attempt to deny the Soviet Union either direct control or increased influence over the Gulf and its littoral.

US Historical Involvement

As you are aware, the great powers have been colliding with each other in the Gulf region for centuries. So, today's difficulties are not unprecedented. Our military involvement began when the Middle East Force was established in 1949 to demonstrate American interest. With the British departure in 1972, the Middle East Force, as the only remaining Western military presence, took on a new significance. I won't dwell on the details. You are familiar with the increasing role oil has played in our lives and the traumatic supply disruptions of 1973-1974 and 1978-1980 caused by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. To say the least, all of America suddenly became aware of the importance of the Persian Gulf. Today, there are uncountable numbers of American commercial concerns operating in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. We estimate there are some 34,000 American residents and dependents living in the region. Militarily, we have assisted all of these countries to one degree or another in building defense establishments. For instance, at this moment there are 500 American airmen in Riyadh and Dhahran assisting the Saudi Arabian government to create an AWACs capability. All told, we have over 2,000 Service personnel detailed to Gulf countries.

The 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan merely reinforced an American sense that the Persian Gulf was too important to be ignored. In response to these events—and with encouragement from our friends—the US government decided to deploy a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean at frequent intervals. We are still there. With the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran, the Middle East Force was expanded. We have some eight ships assigned to that force today. While we have no formal treaty commitment with any nation in the area, we clearly have established long-term important relationships with a number of countries that have worked to the benefit of all concerned. Moreover, I am convinced that our military presence over the long term and recently during the Iran-Iraq War has had a moderating influence, worked for stability in the region, and helped limit the spread of conflict.

The road, of course, has not always been smooth. For example, events in Lebanon and Syria, Congressional actions on proposed US arms sales, and recent developments regarding Iran have given some of our friends cause to doubt our consistency. Many in the region take exception to our close ties with Israel. Nevertheless, anyone who has lived in the area, as I have stated, is constantly impressed by how many Arab friends we have and how resilient our ties with the Arab world are. That is not to say that we don't have to nourish those relationships—we do. It is to say that we have a lot going for us if we are willing to stand by our friends.

Given the recent media attention devoted to the Gulf, I believe a quick word about the maritime environment is appropriate. Since 1984, both belligerents—Iran and Iraq—have mounted random or selective attacks on shipping at sea. But we must keep this picture in perspective. Right now, on any given day there are around 400 ocean-going ships in the Gulf. Of some 26,000 voyages that have been made in that small sea since 1984, less than 1 percent have been involved in attacks and no large merchantmen have been sunk—damage and lost lives, yes, but not sunk. Similarly, there are always underway a mix of warships: from littoral navies, British frigates, French men-of-war, and Soviet navy escorts, in addition to our own. It is also important to note that for some months now Middle East Force has been escorting US flag ships sailing in the western Gulf—this traffic runs four to ten ships per month. With the exception of the USS *Stark*, none of the non-belligerent naval units has been hit. Commercial air traffic, with some slight route changes, has continued to all the littoral countries.

The Gulf today is an uncertain place and can be dangerous, but it is not a war zone in the accepted use of the words. Air and sea traffic continues apace. There is even some seaborne intercourse between Iran and the UAE and Oman; drilling rigs are operating normally and Iranian oil exports are running at the rate of about 2.2 million barrels per day. Commercial insurance rates, after a sharp initial increase, have receded and today, while higher than normal, are in no sense prohibitive. The Gulf is not a no man's land; in fact, it is still a thriving and bustling commercial crossroad.

USS *Stark* Tragedy

The recent attack on the USS *Stark* graphically illustrated that the Gulf can, on occasion, be threatening. Most important, the *Stark* tragedy has raised American sensitivities as to our involvement in the Middle East and prompted many to call for a reexamination of our presence—in some cases to suggest a withdrawal of our ships. I am persuaded, however, that the Iraqi pilot did not realize he was threatening an American ship—in other words, that it was an accident. In my view, the ship had the weapons systems and sensors to put up a credible defense, but why they were not brought into play is a proper subject for a formal investigation. As you know, such an investigation is now in train.

As to the larger questions, I believe it is important to keep in mind the everyday environment in the Gulf and not to be stampeded by overly dramatic accounts. The *Stark* incident has brought home in a painful way that we must remain constantly alert, and we are now working out with Baghdad some procedures to avoid a recurrence of an accidental attack. The Iranians have the same capabilities they did a month ago, and the inhibiting pressures on their policies and resources remain. Since the *Stark* attack, we have not as yet seen any change in Iranian conduct at sea—in fact, they appear to be even more cautious than previously. While this situation could change quickly, I would suggest that we base our judgments and actions on tangible evidence rather than conjecture.

As to the suggestion that the United States should withdraw from the Gulf, I not only believe that it would be a grave mistake to do so, but that first we should answer the question of what would happen should we leave. How would our retreat affect the course of the Iran-Iraq struggle? There is a high probability that our absence would lead to Iran realizing its goal of regional dominance. While that conclusion may be debatable, there is little doubt in my mind that a US departure would thrust our Arab relations into deep, and perhaps irreparable, disarray.

Future

Looking ahead, the Administration, after reviewing the history and political imperatives in the region, has made a decision to respond positively to the Kuwaiti request to reflag its tankers and to accept responsibility for escorting those ships through the Gulf. The JCS believe that we can carry out this mission. Of course, there are no absolute guarantees that such an operation will be casualty free or that Iran will not escalate the sea war, which will present us with further difficult choices. On the other hand, we have the capability to keep the oil line to Kuwait open, to assure our Arab friends of our commitment, and to keep the risks low.

I am sure you are interested in some of our detailed views on the threat and our ability to carry out this mission, as well as how we would deal with Iranian counter actions. However, Mr. Chairman, I believe these are more properly subjects for a closed hearing. That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies, US SOUTHCOM

Quarry Heights, Panama | June 6

It is a privilege to participate in this ceremony and to bear witness to the transition at the helm of this first-rate command and in honoring both the departing and arriving Commanders. I admit at the outset, of course, that I eagerly take any opportunity I can to travel outside the Washington beltway. There is folk wisdom that it is a dog eat dog world there, and I wear Milk Bone Dog biscuit underwear.

But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure to be here to preside today. It is gratifying, first of all, to speak directly to the men and women of USSOUTHCOM and to bring to them personally the message that leaders in our nation's capital greatly appreciate their daily contributions to peace and development in this hemisphere.

I have served many years out on the battlements around the globe. I know all too well that, for people in the field, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you, however, that your efforts here, serving the best interests of the United States and its friends, are universally admired as indispensable to the peace and the growth of democracy and the economies in this key region.

I spend a good deal of time back home talking about the role of America's Armed Forces in the world we face. Simply put, it is that our military strength operates every day to shield the accomplishments and aspirations of our citizens—and those of millions of hopeful people around the globe. From every point all over the world, the Nation's forces work unceasingly day and night to assure the Free World's vitality and safety.

The service of the people in this command, alongside the forces of neighboring countries, is a fine example of what I'm talking about. It is a very special challenge: not really war in the way our citizens understand it, and not really peace, either. Nonetheless, this is an engagement that the leaders of the Free World must take up vigorously and the family of nations in this hemisphere join us to assure democracy now for our next generation or pay a higher price in the future.

Some years ago, it was fashionable for critics to say that the United States employed its forces in a way that placed us on the wrong side of history. But in this region that assertion has been proved false, and it is clear that the wave of the future here is democracy, the cause you serve, not despotic alternatives.

You and our friends in the region have much to be proud of. The job isn't finished, of course. Moreover, given the nature of the challenge, we are engaged in a contest that is a marathon, not a sprint. But you have set a strong pace and have shown that persistent hard work can bring success.

Here, as elsewhere, there is no substitute for enlightened leadership. And the second reason why this ceremony is such a pleasurable event is that, as we say goodbye to a leader of Jack Galvin's caliber, we welcome another commander of equal talent—Fred Woerner—who will step up to take his place.

In the three decades prior to his taking charge of USSOUTHCOM, General Jack

Galvin's career was marked by distinction in an array of jobs: Infantry command at all levels from platoon to Corps, combat leadership in Vietnam, and key positions in other headquarters around the globe. He also became an articulate writer about the history of his profession. In the book entitled *The Minutemen*, he examined the military institutions of colonial America, the people and forces that first defended our freedom and won our independence. His work at USSOUTHCOM has advanced that grand tradition appreciably against challenges our forefathers could not have anticipated. I am sure that the Minutemen of Massachusetts would be as proud as we. On behalf of the President and the Secretary of Defense, I am very pleased to congratulate him on his achievements and to wish him well in the future assignment as CINCEUCOM. Also, I personally thank his lovely wife. She has been his partner serving alongside with a warm heart, enthusiasm, prowess and good humor.

You leave big shoes for General Fred Woerner to fill. But I can think of no one better suited to the task. General Woerner, you take these responsibilities with our fondest wishes. From the parade grounds and soccer fields of West Point, to the battlegrounds of Vietnam, to the treacherous terrain of the Pentagon, this Infantryman has succeeded at everything he tried. Along the way, he accumulated impressive credentials in this region: study at the Uruguayan General Staff College, civic action duty in Guatemala, and command of the 193rd Infantry Brigade at Fort Clayton, Panama. He is an accomplished warrior who also knows the challenges of troubled peace. The men and women of the US Southern Command are getting a very fine and multidimensional leader.

Alongside this outstanding commander will be his wife, Gennie. The Woerner team has enjoyed great success over the years. As an old (but not too old) field commander myself, I truly envy the opportunity that lies ahead of you. I urge you especially to take the time to smell the roses far from the Washington flagpole.

When we depart these proceedings today, there are three reasons why we ought to feel good about our nation and about its prospects. The first is that the change of command we are witnessing demonstrates not change of direction or resolve, but reaffirmation and rededication. It displays, for all to see, the continuity of talented leadership that has become, thankfully, characteristic in America's Armed Forces.

The second reason for optimism and confidence is the evident strength and cohesion of this command, and ultimately the capabilities and commitment of its people.

And a third is the progress friendly nations have made behind the shield of strength you have helped to raise.

As these are reasons for justifiable pride, they are also signals to friends and enemies alike that America's position as defender of the Free World's hopes remains strong and determined. In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I wish General Galvin, General Woerner, their families, and all the people of this fine Command fair winds and following seas in the days ahead.

Remarks at the Navy Memorial Foundation Dinner

Washington, DC | June 23

I have to tell you at the outset that I'm not used to being treated so well by a Senator—or, for that matter, by a Chief Petty Officer. This is an intimidating experience for me. When I was invited, they didn't tell me the full details of the program tonight. I've been in the Navy forty-five years, and I'm sort of embarrassed I've never been in a movie. I was even turned down for the television program *Real People*. They said I didn't qualify.

That doesn't mean that I haven't been in some dramatic productions. I'm doing that every day. Today, I just had a discussion with the Senate. Senator [John] Warner and I attended together, and I felt as I came off the Hill like the man I saw in the television program *Cheers* the other night. Someone said, "How's it going, Norm?" He said, "It's a dog-eat-dog world out there, and I'm wearing Milk Bone underwear." I'm beginning to appreciate every day the reason for Harry Truman's observation—if you want a loyal friend in Washington, you'd better go buy a dog.

I really do have something serious to say here. I think the cause that really draws us all together, which was highlighted by the film that you just saw, has infused this event with a spirit, a unique spirit, a spirit that's a little different than the one I experience in Congress occasionally. It's a transcendent feeling of solidarity, and I'm sure that you would agree with me, it is pure and simple—the spirit that pervades us tonight—a deep affection and appreciation for the Naval service. That's what we're all about here.

I believe the Navy men and women have a great deal to be proud of and, in turn, that our country should share this pride. In essence, for two centuries American sailors have labored, served, fought, and died so that others might have a better life and freedom and peace; and in the process, they have created the world's most respected Navy.

Certainly, tonight's tribute, and this Memorial, coming literally from the heart of America, will serve to remind future generations of the magnificent history and traditions forged in both peace and war by the US Navy—Traditions of achievement, of gallantry, of service, of sacrifice and above all, of victory. Using the past, I would suggest that this Memorial will prod the future to excel and further tighten the bond between our Navy and our citizenry. It is something special indeed.

As I look over the Memorial's design, my eye has been drawn unfailingly to the figure of the "Lone Sailor." In more than forty years of service, I have acquired a host of memories—some good, some bad—of missions, grand events, ships, duty stations, and exotic sights. But the dominant image in my mind is always of shipmates and friends sharing the joys, the rigors and the perils of a lifetime in the Service. And I believe that the "Lone Sailor" represents all of my comrades over the years.

If you will forgive me for just a moment, I'm going to tick off some of my nostalgic memories, since I have a captive audience. I will always remember Chief Gunners Mate Wood. I think all of us have a Chief Petty Officer in our past that we worship and have fine memories of. I was an Ensign, and as a result of some things I didn't understand, I'd been made the Gunnery Officer of a destroyer. I'd never even seen a 5-inch gun fire.

The Chief said, “Don’t worry, Boss. Just walk around like you know what you’re doing, and I’ll take care of the rest.” He was true to his word.

I remember serving on a submarine that lost propulsion and was descending out of control below test depth. A calm and cool First Class Electrician by the name of Martinez from Brownsville, Texas, on his own initiative, hastily completed a jury-rig to restore power. His skill saved the ship.

I remember many Navy wives whose husbands were deployed from eight to nine month stretches—sometimes back to back. I saw them manage families without complaint, support the Navy vigorously, and welcome their husbands home with a smile.

I remember having the mid-watch on a submarine one night when I asked the lookout, “What would you do if a man fell overboard?” And he said, “I’d holler, ‘Man overboard, starboard side.’” I said, “What would you do if an officer fell overboard?” There was a long silence, and he said, “Which one?” That would have been funny if he had been kidding.

I remember being a passenger in a helo in Vietnam that suffered a major casualty. The young pilot of twenty-one managed to keep control under great odds and auto-rotate into a rice paddy just as if he was going to the bank. His name was Spence Robbins.

I remember watching a submarine wife, who had just lost her husband at sea, face the press. She told them that—this was two days after he was lost—she would be proud to have her newborn son serve in the Navy.

I remember four sailors and two Marines who rushed into a collection of burning huts in Vietnam in order to save eight children; they spent the next three hours fighting to keep those small children alive until medical help arrived.

I remember right after we were married, my wife saw the magazine *All Hands* on the coffee table. She asked me what it was and I said, “Well, it’s a Navy magazine. It tells you about affairs and events in the Navy.” She thought a moment and said, “*All Hand*s, that’s a good name for a sailors’ magazine.” You have to think about that a little.

I have a particularly vivid memory of watching television as Captain Jerry Denton, who was a Naval Academy classmate of mine and later a senator, exited an airplane in the Philippines after eight years in prison in North Vietnam. He announced to the world that he was proud to make such a sacrifice if it would help his country. He ended by declaring, “God bless America.”

I don’t know how the Navy attracts such people, but it does, and our world is better because of it. It’s those kinds of men and women who make the Navy an exciting, stimulating, worthwhile career and way of life. As I speak tonight, Navy men and women are carrying on the proud traditions that we cherish all over the globe: living out the drama depicted just a few moments ago in these films, making new memories for a rising generation of sailors.

In Asia, the Seventh Fleet patrols an endless stretch of water, totaling fifty million square miles, from the Bering Sea to the Straits of Malacca and to the Indian Ocean. The Atlantic Fleet similarly guards an area from the Arctic ice cap to the Cape of Good Hope. As they stand watch, three fierce wars are raging over the horizon, and the Soviet Fleet is always nearby.

In the Mediterranean, on the vital southern flank of Europe and never very far from the turbulence and terrorism of the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet displays American commitment and strength for all to see. And last year it graphically demonstrated to Muammar Gaddafi that the American government would not stand by while its citizens and innocent people were murdered around the world.

Buttressing these efforts are submarines on patrol, land-based air prowling ahead of the fleet, dozens of ships making independent transits, holding training, conducting search and rescue or drug interdiction—all the tasks that fall to the professional sailor at sea. And there are as well the vital activities ashore concerning logistics and training, without which no operations could take place.

These are the images represented in the “Lone Sailor”—that captivating symbol of the heart of the Naval Service and the Navy way of life. For him, and all who wear his uniform, I congratulate those who have brought this magnificent project so close to fruition, and I thank you for remembering how it is in the Navy, how it was in the Navy, and how it always will be.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony at Headquarters, US European Command

Stuttgart, Germany | June 24

It is a privilege for me to represent Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this ceremony transferring the helm of European Command and honoring the departing and arriving commanders.

I admit at the outset, of course, that I enjoy all my trips away from Washington. Our nation’s capital can be a really tough town at times. So I always welcome the opportunity to travel to more civilized surroundings.

However, this occasion is truly a special one. For today we have the opportunity, on the one hand, to honor General Bernard Rogers, America’s senior soldier, one of the free world’s most accomplished leaders, and a man who has significantly advanced American and allied security interests in his time as SACEUR and commander of US Forces in Europe.

On the other hand, we mark the beginning of General Jack Galvin’s tenure in this critical post, as he returns to Europe from another theater in which he has commanded with great distinction and grappled with some of the most difficult and thorny challenges that face free societies today.

It is also gratifying for me to be able to speak directly to the men and women of the European Command and to tell them how much their leaders in Washington—and the citizens of our country—value their work. I know from my own experiences that this is true but also that sometimes people like yourselves, out where the real work is done, can feel a bit neglected, while Washington seems absorbed in all sorts of other concerns, and while our fellow citizens lose themselves fully in the activities that your efforts protect.

Let me assure you, however, that your contributions are warmly admired and regarded as indispensable to the keeping of the peace. In my travels around the United States, I find our citizens more supportive of the military than I can remember in years, thanks in large part to the prominence of your fine example and that of your Commanding General. For myself I might add, your faithful service has been a never-ending source of inspiration and strength as I have gone about my duties as Chairman. I draw upon those wellsprings of spiritual sustenance literally every day.

Another source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that here, at the center of the Free World's defense posture, we have had the finest of leaders in General Bernie Rogers. I don't propose to recite all of General Rogers' accomplishments; you know them well. Suffice it to say that under his leadership NATO's military structure has been made stronger, collective defense needs and interests have never lacked a forceful and persuasive advocate, and our troops deployed here are more ready for their missions in this great coalition for peace than they ever have been. Secretary Weinberger and three JCS Chairmen have all benefitted immensely from General Rogers' straightforward advice and sage counsel.

Speaking for Secretary Weinberger as well as for myself, I am pleased to congratulate him on his many achievements, a lifetime of service, and to thank him for a job well done—wishing him and his wife every blessing from our nation, as befits a soldier's family.

The Rogers team will be hard to replace. But if anyone can do it, Jack and Tinny Galvin can. This command is losing a multidimensional leader in General Rogers, yet it is certainly gaining another in General Galvin. (In fact, if you look at things from a certain angle, you'd almost think General Galvin's middle name had to be Rogers. But then, his middle name *is* Rogers.) His skills as a commander were tempered in combat and later proven on the far-flung battlements of a troubled peace. He has seen all faces of the threat that we face as a nation. He has had key staff posts shaping the Army's future and also helping to lead the Joint and combined defense effort here in Europe. A noted student and scholar of the American military, he has also worked side-by-side with the forces of other nations to preserve the peace against determined aggressors.

We are indeed fortunate to have gifted leadership like his in the European Command. It is a great responsibility but Jack Galvin's shoulders are broad. And there is no doubt that the other half of the Galvin partnership will help immeasurably to carry the load—while retaining that famous good humor that has become her distinctive trademark.

When we depart these proceedings today, there are three reasons why we ought to feel good about our nation and about its prospects.

- The first is that the change of command we are witnessing demonstrates no change of direction or resolve, but reaffirmation and rededication. The cause which has joined our effort so successfully with that of European friends energizes us now as it did decades ago.
- The second reason for optimism and confidence is the evident strength of the traditions from which these two men have emerged. This ceremony displays for all to see the continuity in talented leadership that has become, thankfully, characteristic in America's Armed Forces.
- And the third is the self-evident strength and cohesion of this command, and the capabilities and commitment of its people.

As these are reasons for justifiable pride, they are also signals to friends and enemies alike that America's position as leader of the free world's defenses remains strong and determined.

In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, I wish General Rogers, General Galvin, their families, and all the people of this fine Command fair winds and following seas in the days ahead.

Remarks at the Activation of US Forces Command

Fort McPherson, Georgia | June 29

It is a genuine privilege to participate in this ceremony welcoming Forces Command to our family of Unified and Specified Commands.

I admit at the outset, of course, that I eagerly take any opportunity I can to travel outside the Washington beltway. An old Navy saying has it that any duty outside Washington is good duty, and I take it that no one here would disagree.

With that folk wisdom, I must put my personal burdens aside, because it is a special pleasure to be here today, and for several reasons. It is gratifying, first of all, to visit a community having such venerable and strong ties between civilians and the military. The presence here of prominent citizens from the area attests to the vitality of that important bond today. I have often remarked that this nation's military strength depends ultimately on broad roots of support among the public. We in the Armed Forces can only be as good as our citizens want us to be.

As we inaugurate this important new Forces Command, it is comforting indeed for me, immersed as I am in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once again that the civil-military tie that has built and protected this nation for two centuries and more is still alive and well-tended in Atlanta.

The second reason why this visit is a welcome event for me is the opportunity to speak directly to the men and women of this command, and to bring to them personally the message that leaders in our nation's capital greatly appreciate their daily contributions.

I have served many years out on the battlements around the globe. I know all too well that, for people in the field, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you, however, that your efforts here have been universally admired, and your designation as a new Specified Command reflects the trust and confidence the Nation's leaders have in the people who have made this organization go. I know the history that you and your predecessors have forged will prove genuinely sustaining in the days ahead.

I do not have to tell those assembled here that the military challenges this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diversity. Over the last thirty years, every one of my predecessors has expressed concern about the evolving Soviet worldwide threat and the state of the overall military balance. Admiral Jim Watkins, the former CNO, used to say we live in a time of "violent peace." Any newspaper, on any day of the year, attests to the accuracy of that observation. In that environment, the demands placed on our military forces have continued to grow, especially in the realm of joint operations. As we move toward the close of this century and the opening of a new one, that trend is certainly going to gain momentum, and the new roles assumed by this command will only grow in importance.

To set the effort off on the right foot, we are indeed fortunate to be able to call on a commander of General Joe Palastra's caliber. He has led Infantrymen in combat with great distinction and has commanded our readiest forces in peacetime. His broad-gauged capacities have been proven in an array of key positions in Washington (even in the State Department) and in field headquarters—and particularly in the joint arena. No one could be better qualified to take on this new challenge than General Joe Palastra.

It is with great pride that I participate in these ceremonies formally charging him with his responsibilities as the first Commander in Chief of Forces Command. In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and my comrades in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I extend our very best wishes to him, his family, and all the men and women of this command as you move forward in your new and important roles.

Statement on his Nomination for an additional two-year term before the Senate Armed Services Committee
September 29

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am honored that President Reagan has asked me to serve a second term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The responsibilities of this office are very demanding for any incumbent. Over the last two years, however, I have been privileged to serve in a superb military establishment. I am constantly impressed by the dedication, skill, and enthusiasm of the men and women serving in our Armed Forces. They remind me that great nations produce, first and foremost, great people.

As principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, I am blessed with a very able Vice Chairman, a good organization, a talented staff, and first-rate support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For this, I am grateful not only to framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act but also to the many civilian and military leaders who helped to facilitate and ease the implementation process. At this juncture, I also must report that the strategic direction of the US Armed Forces

continues to be a very challenging process for all concerned. Essentially, we are trying to develop a more forward-looking and fully integrated military strategy, maintain the deterrent capabilities of our Combatant Commands, realign our forces as required by potential breakthroughs on the arms control front, and work within a Defense budget which refuses to settle down at any level of spending.

Seldom has it been more difficult to plan ahead. In this fluid situation, I have no blinding insights on how to reduce risks to our national security at less cost to the US taxpayer except to continue to increase efficiency and productivity. However, I do renew a pledge made two years ago—that I will work closely and candidly with this committee and with civilian and military leadership of the Executive Branch in securing the defense of our nation.

As always, I value your advice and counsel.

Remarks at the Dedication of the US Navy Memorial
Washington, DC | October 13

Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy, a veteran of war and a Naval hero, spoke to the Brigade of Midshipmen at Annapolis and said: "… any man who may be asked in this century what he did to make his life worthwhile … can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction: 'I served in the United States Navy.'"

Those words admirably express the spirit that pervades this ceremony today: a pure, simple, and abiding affection for the Naval service. Not only in this century but in the two hundred-year history of our country, American sailors have labored, served, fought, and died so that others might have a better life in freedom and peace. In the process, they have created the world's most respected Navy.

Navy men and women indeed have a lot to be proud of, and in turn the country should share this pride. This memorial will remind our fellow citizens and future generations of the magnificent tradition forged by their naval service—a heritage of achievement, gallantry, sacrifice, and above all, victory.

As I have looked over the memorial's design, my eye has been drawn unfailingly to the figure of the Lone Sailor. In my career of more than forty years, I have acquired a host of memories—some good, some bad; memories of missions, grand events, ships, duty stations, and exotic sights. But the dominant image in my mind after all this time is that of shipmates and friends sharing the joys, the rigors, and the perils of a lifetime in the Service. The Lone Sailor, for me, shall always symbolize my comrades. They will be in my thoughts as the statue is unveiled. At this very moment, Navy men and women all over the globe are carrying on the proud traditions of the past and adding a history of their own. In Asia, the Seventh Fleet patrols an endless stretch of water, fifty million square miles from the Bering Sea through the Straits of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. The Atlantic Fleet similarly guards an area from the Arctic Ice Cap to the Cape of Good Hope. In the Mediterranean, on the vital southern flank of Europe and never very far from the turbulence and terrorism of the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet displays American strength

and commitment for all to see. And in the Persian Gulf, American sailors—shoulder to shoulder with people from all the other Services—are at work every day to protect the interests of peace and freedom. Alongside these efforts are the submarines on patrol, the land-based aircraft going ahead of the fleet, dozens of ships making independent transits, carrying on training, conducting search and rescue or drug interdiction—all the tasks that fall to the sailor at sea.

And there are, as well, the vital activities ashore concerning logistics support, recruiting, and training, without which no operations could take place. These are the images represented in the Lone Sailor, that captivating symbol of the heart of the naval Service and the Navy way of life. For him and all who wear his uniform, I congratulate those who have brought this magnificent project to fruition, and I thank you for remembering how it was, and is, and always will be, in the Navy.

Remarks to the Royal College of Defence Studies
London, England | October 27

Thank you for that kind introduction. It is a privilege for me to be with you today. I must admit at the outset, of course, that after having spent two years in my present post, any respite from the rigors of Washington is most welcome. There is an old saying in the American military that any duty outside Washington is good duty, and I can't say I disagree with it. I now work in the Pentagon, that famous building with five sides—on every issue. And I have to deal with Congress frequently; it is not always a pleasant experience. The other day someone asked me: if pro is the opposite of con, does that mean progress is the opposite of Congress? I didn't answer that question. Like our former President Harry Truman, I was raised on the great American prairie. I am more and more persuaded of the wisdom of one of his more celebrated observations: that in Washington, if you want a good and loyal friend, you'd better go buy a dog.

For all those reasons, I am happy for the opportunity to escape, if only briefly, and to collect my thoughts in these more civilized surroundings. As you know, I am here visiting the British forces, but I have a long and personal relationship with this country dating back to the time when I was a graduate student doing research in London. In the course of those months, I accumulated a great many stories about British life and, particularly, her Armed Services. One of my favorites comes from a speech given by Lord Mountbatten. It has to do with service rivalry and is particularly appropriate given my current "joint" responsibilities in the United States:

> The British Isles are made up of four peoples: The Welsh who "pray" on their knees and their neighbors; the Scottish who keep the peace and anything else they can get their hands on; the Irish who don't know what they're for but are willing to fight for it; and the British who are all self-made men thereby relieving God Almighty of a tremendous responsibility.

In a more serious vein, let me say how much I admire the Royal College of Defence Studies and envy the time you are spending here. It's hard to overstate the value of this experience, to you personally and to your nation. The security challenges that democracies face these days are diverse and complex, with interrelated political, economic, social, international, scientific, and military dimensions. More and more, leaders who make or shape national policy need to understand the nature of these relationships and the requirement for a broadly integrated approach to strategy.

I mentioned my graduate research earlier—my project was a study of British naval policy in the period between 1946 and 1963. In the course of my inquiry, I was particularly struck by the way in which the British Navy had accommodated to evolving postwar realities, and in turn, the manner in which her leadership adjusted to the new imperatives. It was not easy for military professionals to modify and expand their forms of reference in order to operate in a variegated world—in fact, it was often painful—but a successful adjustment was ultimately accomplished.

An important feature of this transformation was the quality of the relationship between civilian officials—the civil service, the political leadership—and the professional Navy. That partnership was clearly a cornerstone of British naval policy in an era of great change. A similar reformation has taken place in our own Services. It is exactly the purpose of the Royal College to study the developments and to prepare you for future change. I can think of no better way to contribute to the cause of national defense in our time. In a very real sense, the larger payoff will be long-term: in years to come, the associations and widened outlook you have gained here will generate countless dividends in the important and multifaceted role this nation plays on the world scene.

I say all this knowing, of course, that the academic adventure has its own frustrations. I must warn you to view your professor with a certain amount of skepticism. When I was growing up, my teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks about; that was designed, of course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But I later discovered it was somewhat misleading. If it had been true, by the time I was eighteen, I would have become a girl. But I survived that disillusionment, just as I am sure you will surmount any you might encounter in the coming years, however unruly the "real world" might prove to be.

I understand that my appearance here coincides with the beginning of the allied defense phase of your course. I thought it might be interesting for you if I took a few minutes to outline, first, some large themes concerning the security challenge as Washington sees it around the globe, and then some principles dictating our responses—including one of the firmest pillars of our strategic approach, coalition deterrence and defense. My observations will, of necessity, be generalized, and I will have to leave some important subjects and many details to our question period. I know there is a wealth of curiosity—and expertise—in this audience, and I look forward to addressing your questions.

The International Security Environment

Let me start by surveying how military planners in Washington generally see the emerging international security environment. As I noted earlier, that environment has many aspects that need to be understood as a whole. But here are the military features I think are particularly important. From my perspective, such a survey has to begin with the nature of Soviet military power. You are familiar with the statistics documenting the size and continuing expansion of the Soviet military apparatus. But beyond those figures and the inevitable static comparisons, how do military planners in the Pentagon look at the dynamics of this burgeoning phenomenon?

In the broad sweep, first of all, the Soviet threat is different than any the United States or other free nations have previously faced. Granted, pre-war Germany was a formidable power in Europe and Japan in Asia, but the two never successfully integrated their efforts on a worldwide basis—witness Japan's unilateral attack on Pearl Harbor and Berlin's unhappiness because Tokyo would not engage the Soviets in Asia. In contrast, the Soviet Union is a military power of global reach and can, moreover, coordinate military forces and economic and political structures to an impressive degree. Any US strategy must confront that reality.

A second point has to do with our attitudes about how the Soviets might put that strength to use. Free societies are naturally suspicious of totalitarian regimes, of course, and particularly wary of their military power. History is an important teacher here, and I think the evidence clearly shows that the Kremlin has used its military muscle brutally and directly when the calculus has seemed to be in their favor. Further, with that raw power as a backdrop, the Soviets have again and again displayed a proclivity to intimidate peaceable states, to foster instability, to exploit surrogates, to promote terrorism, to support small but fierce regional conflicts, and to encourage anti-Western regimes in a variety of ways and places. If nothing else, they are patient and persevering in this regard.

That is the record they themselves have fashioned. But in democratic societies there is always a good deal of debate, much of it useful, about how the Soviets will behave in the future. And we can't overlook Mr. Gorbachev's Glasnost policies and his reformist stances on internal social and economic matters. In time, they could conceivably bring about some moderation in the harsher—and historic—Soviet approaches to world affairs. But what is not likely to change in Moscow is the Party's control over the Soviet Union's immense war-making potential—the economy, the industrial base, civil air transport, merchant marine, labor supply, and so on. This central direction in peacetime greatly facilitates mobilization and transition to a war footing.

In turn, ever since the Revolution, the Soviets have had a fascination with numbers. As Lenin once remarked: "Quantity has a quality all of its own." They have never departed much from this principle in building industrial centers, setting goals for military production lines, or fielding nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. They always err on the side of building too many rather than too few, forcing us constantly—until they change, if they ever do—to look for ways to offset their numerical superiorities with better concepts, doctrines, training, technologies, leadership, and personnel. Though it is clear that the Kremlin's emphasis on military strength at the expense of every other sector of the economy has carried with it enormous burdens, I see no sign at this juncture that their system will forego nor cannot sustain such an effort. As former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was fond of saying: "When we build, they build. When we stop, they continue to build."

On the other side of the coin, we know that the Kremlin worries about its own vulnerabilities: a very long border and a vast airspace to defend, natural choke points constraining their access to the open oceans, an inefficient industrial plant, and the questionable steadfastness of their East European allies. Some of these disadvantages can be exploited by the United States and free world planners, if we are thoughtful, and it would be foolish not to do so. In fact, these Soviet weaknesses can help redress our own numerical deficiencies. Still, there is no avoiding the reality that their huge defense buildup has altered the East/West balance markedly in the strategic deterrent, in conventional forces across the board, and in capabilities for what is popularly known as low intensity conflict.

The likelihood of a major Soviet assault on Western Europe is perhaps remote, thanks in large part to the continued success of the collective deterrent represented in NATO. But the coercive danger of Soviet military power will loom over the Eurasian continent for many years to come and still represents our highest priority threat. At the same time, the Soviet government has never departed from the philosophy that its allies and surrogates in the so-called Third World must march in step with Moscow and that the rest of the globe is an open field for destabilizing actions. And the success of our deterrent policies—and NATO, in particular—has created new challenges, forcing Moscow to look for opportunities on the periphery of traditional areas of interest and to explore new ways to use its power besides overt aggression.

Overall, then, the fundamental lesson that Pentagon planners take from this is that the strategic competition we are engaged in is one for the long haul—a marathon, not a sprint. In my view, that thought has to be the centerpiece of the American and, indeed, the free world outlook, but I would be the first to admit that it is a difficult idea to get across to peace-minded democratic peoples.

Complicating the future threat picture as seen from Washington is a whole host of challenges that do not raise the prospect of global war or direct conflict with the Soviets, but that nevertheless will continue to jeopardize important interests worldwide: terrorism, regional instabilities, localized conflicts, and a range of low-level confrontations that blur the distinction between peace and war. These, too, are going to place new and evolving demands not only on the military forces of the United States but on those of all nations whose interests and activities span the globe. Indeed, they already have: in Central America, in the Middle East, in Africa, in South and Southeast Asia, and of course in the Persian Gulf right now.

These kinds of problems are especially taxing for military planners and operators. National objectives are limited: worst case scenarios will most likely entail only partial mobilization, and such operations unavoidably have a high political content. The enduring

challenge in such cases is to develop strategies and tactics that resolve all the conflicting interests yet still enable the military commander to bring force to bear under advantageous conditions. This is, in effect, the underside of strategy—the side that many Americans are not comfortable with. It's unfamiliar territory in many ways, and often the stakes just don't seem to justify the effort. Further, it certainly demands a new breed of warrior, at least in the American system, and not everyone is comfortable with that. But it's these efforts that give the best prospect for avoiding truly large and costly wars, and I think it's clear the future will give us little respite in this regard.

The US Response

The military strategy Washington has developed attempts to take bearings from those realities, and within it the role of US military forces is shaped by national security policies which have remained essentially unchanged since the 1940s. We have sought, in short, to:

- Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United States;
- Support US and allied vital interests abroad, and
- Encourage an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can prosper.

Additionally, since World War II our military posture has been characterized by several enduring principles:

- We seek to deter wars rather than to fight them.
- We hope to make free world defense capabilities greater than the sum of its parts, through collective security arrangements, forward defenses, and security assistance programs.
- We keep strong central reserves capable of global mobility, recognizing that real-world deterrence requires a credible ability on our part to respond to a distant threat, deal with it, and withdraw just as quickly.
- And, in tandem with the effort to maintain a posture of strength, we seek equitable, effective, and verifiable arms reduction agreements with potential adversaries.

Within that general framework of goals and principles, the Pentagon derives its military strategy and generates requirements for armed forces. Given the built-in pluralism of the American system and our constrained resources, it can be very difficult to bring all these policies and principles together. But such is the stuff of our business in Washington.

The Role and Impact of Alliances

Now let me expand on the role and impact of alliances in our approach, since that subject is particularly relevant to your curriculum. If there is one strategic lesson that stands out from all the others in the postwar world, it is that the United States can no longer go it

alone. For much of America's history, we tried hard—and successfully—to stay clear of military alliances outside of true crises. But the circumstances undergirding that aloofness have long vanished. Order requires political and military cooperation among nations that share our traditions and aspirations. The rather elaborate structure of Free World security alliances created since the 1940s responds to that imperative. The Pentagon sees the NATO coalition as the centerpiece of that structure, both militarily and politically. We know that the successful defense of Western Europe is vital to the security of the United States, and we have worked for decades to link our strength credibly and effectively to that of our allies.

Changing conditions—notably developments in the threat and in our own capabilities—have complicated that effort at times. But I would argue we have done reasonably well in maintaining healthy security linkages. By itself, NATO's longevity says a great deal about strategic success. Sometimes we lose sight of our achievements in all the talk of issues and burdens and challenges. A host of crises have come and gone over the decades: Berlin (repeatedly), Suez, France's withdrawal from the integrated command, and controversial INF deployments.

The bottom line remains: Not only does the United States depend on a coalition strategy, and on the NATO alliance as its central pillar, but we count that policy as a great success despite its complications and frustrations. There are, of course, special challenges and constraints associated with multilateral defense arrangements. Any participant in them necessarily sacrifices some freedom of action. Otherwise, they are not meeting the obligation they have undertaken. They require constant political tending and often costly transfusions in the form of new initiatives. NATO is famous for this: in just the last decade or so, Washington has seen several such thrusts. Also, participation in defense coalitions frequently requires compromises that can confuse the military equation. No doubt many of you know from experience that planning, operating, and fighting with foreign forces can present a host of burdensome problems. Frankly, from the US perspective, it has never been easy to fit some of our forces into the common NATO denominator, particularly when we want them to have global utility under a variety of conditions.

These types of problems are constant, thorny, and often result in considerable investment. At the same time, it is indisputable that the character of our alliances is currently under considerable pressure. The postwar recovery and affluence of America's partners has changed the balance of influence within coalitions, increasing our allies' voice and diminishing the US role. Clearly, today our partners need and expect more give and take among friends—in short, consultation. Conversely, our allies do not want America to realign or reduce its participation nor for Washington to insist that a louder voice must be accompanied by increased investments. Perhaps most frustrating, some allies expect responses to crises outside the traditional area to be shouldered by Washington alone. This suggests a reluctance to come to grips with reality, and it seems to me that all parties have had trouble adjusting to the new circumstances.

Nevertheless, Washington remains convinced that, on balance, our great emphasis on security coalitions is well worth the time, resources, and effort we spend on them. And in the end, we believe cooperation among NATO subscribers is the key to a safer world.

The Future

Having outlined the attitudes governing our strategic stances, let me say just a few words about the future.

At home in America, we are going to face the continually challenging task of getting adequate support for defense in the resource allocation process. When I spoke last year at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), I observed that we had encountered a much different mood in the Congress than was the case a few years ago. That is still the situation. In the early 1980s, rising Appropriations enabled us to undertake an impressive modernization program that has gone some distance in revitalizing our armed forces—in personnel, readiness, sustainability, force structure, and every parameter. Today, the American military is sound by any commonsense measure, and enhancements that have already been placed in the pipeline will continue to upgrade our capabilities over the next several years, even if we must live with flattened or decreasing appropriations. But several years of declining funds would throw us back to the 1970s.

Clearly, we have our work cut out for us to maintain the fiscal support the Pentagon needs for the more distant future. Recent stock market developments will lend greater emphasis to this point. In last year's remarks, I also noted that it is very difficult, especially when you travel west of our Allegheny and Appalachian mountains, to persuade our citizens of the need to continue their sacrifices on behalf of peoples who live much closer to the Soviet Union and still have a long way to go to build adequate defenses for themselves. Make no mistake: a strong current of isolationism is still pressing below the surface in the Midwestern United States.

In NATO, and also in other key alliances, we have worked hard to encourage defense enhancement efforts similar to our own and to promote cooperation that gets the most defense out of our combined resources. The anticipated INF agreement will give those efforts even greater urgency. There has been progress, but the response has been uneven, and I don't think there is any dispute that there is a great deal more to be done before the West can face the future with genuine confidence. But barring untoward developments in overall alliance relations, for example, a complete breakdown in consensus, I do not believe the American electorate will fundamentally alter the course it has held for the last four decades. The United States will remain strong and will grow stronger in an up and down fashion. And the American commitment should remain a cornerstone of the West's military power. Most of our people still believe in an instinctive way what the wars in the first half of this century proved: that aggression can't be contained if America stays home.

Clearly, arguments about scaling back commitments will be a prominent feature of the strategic landscape in the United States, and watchful critics are going to prod us to do better. But let me stress again that NATO nations themselves—and their approaches to alliance defense—will have a lot to do with whether those arguments gather momentum or remain in the background.

Undoubtedly, the ongoing arms control efforts will impact alliance—unity or division, as the case may be. Even with the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] agreement behind us, I foresee protracted dialogue including START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks], DSLT [Defence Science and Technology Laboratory], CW [Chemical Warfare], the conventional balance and, ultimately, SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces]. Every free world nation will have a stake in these negotiations, and they will undoubtedly influence future NATO strategy and force orientation. It will be imperative to strive continually for some kind of consensus as we march forward. But it will not be easy, and the possibilities for fracturing alliance unity will be there.

We have already seen how difficult it is to fashion a unified party in the INF negotiations—the least challenging. I am not optimistic that we can digest such an ambitious menu and keep the alliance healthy, but we must try. I can assure you that the current and foreseeable American Administration are determined to seek meaningful arms reductions—especially nuclear. You may find that comforting or discomforting, depending on your ideological view.

Let me say just a few final words about American global commitments and their implications for Washington's allies. The United States is heavily committed worldwide, and as I suggested earlier, there is little prospect that those demands will subside. Frankly, many strategists contend that our greatest challenges in the next decade will be in the so-called Third World, and unquestionably, the center of gravity of our international trade is gradually shifting westward into the Pacific, dictating continued and increasing US military involvement in the East Asian region.

Washington, of course, believes that promoting stability in these areas serves our allies' interests as well as our own. Admittedly that policy may be difficult to implement and often impossible without risks, e.g., the Persian Gulf. We have thought for some time that NATO in particular, but not only NATO, must develop the capacity to look outward, but many allies have been slow in coming to that conclusion and reluctant to support actions external to Western Europe. I think there's no question that the future will require us to find ways, together, to adapt our coalition to the reality of diverse challenges at what some regard the geographic margins of their interests. In my RUSI remarks last year, I argued that accommodating to this fact of life and developing a realistic policy for supporting out-of-area efforts will be one of NATO's greatest challenges in the next decade. I've seen nothing since then to change my mind.

A second point has to do with the internal division of labor in our partnerships. We have had a sort of informal contract about these matters for decades. Like all contracts, these understandings have to be honored if the larger security arrangements are to succeed, but they are hardly immutable. Indeed, it would be foolish to treat them as such, given the shifting conditions surrounding them.

The general outlines of the bargain are reasonably clear. Few of our allies have a nuclear deterrent of their own, and in the postwar years many stressed local ground, air, and naval capabilities rather than long-range power projection in their defense planning. Thus, in the overall scheme of coalition defense, the United States must place a high priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, global maritime superiority, and strategically mobile ground and air forces. In turn, a fair division of labor requires manpower con-

tributions and heavy ground forces from allies, plus contribution of specialized functions. Managing this apportionment of burdens into an evolving future will take all our determination, energy, foresight, creativity—and statesmanship. But those qualities are precisely what have brought us to this point, and there's no reason to think they won't move us forward in the future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me just recap a few points. The military threat Washington and like-minded capitals face is diverse and growing. By and large, the strategy we have deployed has coped with it remarkably well. You can measure our successes in many ways. Perhaps one of the most important recognizes not only significant events but some non-events as well, notably—no nuclear holocaust involving the superpowers or anyone else and no great war sweeping across Europe and Asia. In Washington, we think these say a great deal about the efficacy of peace through strength as a winning policy for the American people and the world at large.

But there are, as always, serious challenges looming in the future. Meeting them will require continued collaboration and also adaptation. We all want the benefits produced by coalition strategy. That desire, surely, will remain constant. But the mechanisms we have adopted will as surely require modification as we move ahead. It remains to be seen whether we can meet that challenge.

My own view of history argues that we should go forward with confidence in our capability and flexibility. I remain essentially an optimist, I guess. Considering how long I have been in this game that makes me an incurable optimist.

It will take hard work, but in this regard I find it comforting to recall what that great American philosopher Paul Harvey says that in times like these, it is important to remember that there have always been times like these.

I thank you for the opportunity to visit the Royal College of Defence Studies, and now I will be pleased to take your questions for the remainder of our time together.

Remarks at the Dedication of the Crowe Global Hat Display

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | November 10

Thank you for that fine introduction. As many of you know, Shirley and I are always pleased to come home to Oklahoma. The warm welcome we receive here never fails to make us look forward to the next chance to return. Tonight is no exception. In effect, I suppose you could say: "We'd 'Sooner' be here than anywhere else".

I am not a Sooner born, but I am a Sooner bred. I've always been proud that my grandfather was one of those hardy souls who made "the Run" on April 22, 1889, and my mother was born in Oklahoma Territory. In turn, their legacy to me was a deep pride in and affection for this wonderful prairie state.

And in growing up here, I acquired very early another prominent Oklahoma trait: a

lively spirit of national patriotism and sense of appreciation for the country's military. When I left Oklahoma University to go to the Naval Academy to prepare for a lifetime of service to the country, it seemed a completely natural thing to do. Since then, in all my years of following the flag around the globe, my Oklahoma heritage and patriotic spirit have been truly sustaining.

This dedication gives me special pleasure and not just because it clears off some shelves in my house. For one thing, each of these hats carries with it some distinctive memory for the Crowes, and all together they represent a lot of years and also the kindness of many friends in places all around the globe. Indeed, the whole collection symbolizes graphically the fun, good fellowship, and far-flung challenges of a life in the Service—all the psychic rewards of the career that Shirley and I have shared. We're gratified to be able to display them for others to enjoy as we have.

I admit I let them go with mixed feelings, however. In part, that's because of nostalgic attachment. But also it's because I wonder if future browsers will react to the exhibit like the Duke of Wellington once did to the scene in Parliament, after 19th century reforms opened the legislature to a more diverse group of legislators outside the nobility. In amazement, he said simply: "I never saw so many shocking bad hats in my life."

I don't know what Wellington would think of these hats, but I'm sure it's a good thing he never had to see our national legislature—the world's greatest deliberative body. Of course, Wellington was probably wrong to judge people so quickly by their headgear. John Barrymore is supposed to have said that "The only reason why a man should pay the least attention to a hat is that it is something one tips to a lady." I certainly hope the exhibit proves more interesting for my fellow Oklahomans and other visitors than that, although I must say, I understand the basic point very well.

There is something else to be said about this exhibit, too, and our celebration of Veterans Day tomorrow makes these observations particularly appropriate. If you think about it, the collection's diversity—and its global scope—says a great deal about the worldwide interests of this country and also about the role of America's Armed Forces in protecting and advancing them. Moreover, the ones that were given to me as small tokens of friendship and remembrance speak volumes about the value that many societies place on their relationships with the American military and on the presence or proximity—and the steadfastness—of America's military power. They reflect firm bonds, not just between individuals but also between governments and societies. And those bonds were built and are solidified every day by the work of America's people in uniform.

All around the globe, American military men and women fortify the battlements of a troubled peace by efforts which are invisible to most of their countrymen but which are absolutely necessary to safeguard the Free World's achievements and aspirations.

Our soldiers stand watch along the DMZ in Korea in the freezing cold of winter and in the heat of summer. In the wider Pacific, sailors of the Seventh Fleet patrol an area totaling fifty million square miles from the Bering Sea to the Straits of Malacca and on to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day. Young Marines guard our embassies everywhere, at a time when the threat of terrorist attack is the highest it has ever been,

and omnipresent. Air Force crews stand ready at a moment's notice to strike back at all aggressors, just as those F-111 crews did last year, when they flashed 3,000 miles through the night to strike against a Libyan terrorist infrastructure that had claimed, time and again, innocent and unsuspecting American lives.

They and their predecessors have done this for generations, often serving far from home and without the amenities other professions might have brought them. In times of war and crisis their contributions have been celebrated, or at least widely appreciated. In more tranquil times, however, the tendency is to overlook what their quiet strength means for the daily lives of all Americans in an uncertain world. In its own way, this exhibit of hats, some of the modest trappings of one Serviceman's career, recognizes all this. I hope visitors who see it in years to come will think of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines whose efforts over the decades have brought us the peace we enjoy, and will also be reminded of those who carry on that long and proud tradition of national service today.

For people who give their lives to a military career, and for their families, home literally is "wherever you hang your hat." But all of us have another home, too. The one memorialized in the old adage that places you forever where your heart is. Though Shirley and I have never been able to come back to Oklahoma for more than a few days at a time, we have always thought of it as home. There just isn't a more fitting place for us to hang all these hats, to sort of make things official about where our heart lies no matter where we go. And we are profoundly grateful to John Kirkpatrick and others for making it possible to do that.

Thank you all very much, for your kindness and support.

Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
November 16

Good evening.

Welcome to all, as we honor the Weinbergers. I can think of no more appropriate place to express our appreciation than in these hallowed halls. All around us are reminders of our country's military history and of men who played significant roles in that past. Tonight we express our thanks to a man who has added another distinguished chapter of achievement to these annals. Everyone in this room has had an opportunity to watch Cap Weinberger deal with the trials and tribulations of Washington.

It can be a tough town known for shifting political winds and for people who act like weather vanes. But Cap hardly fits that stereotype. He is a forceful advocate with firm ideas and a fetish for consistency. Some people say he's stubborn, but I just think he went to Harvard. They say you can always tell a Harvard man, but you can't tell him much. It's an old joke but so are most of us here.

I would have had the Secretary say grace tonight, but I was afraid he would have started with a list of non-negotiable demands. Like all Harvard men, he's a great seeker of

truth. With Congress, his motto has always been: Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you mad. Unfortunately, I'm usually sitting beside him when they get mad.

Despite his tenacity, the one personal trait that impresses all who work with and for him is his courtesy and gentle humor. Somebody said: "To be born a gentleman is an accident; to die one is an achievement." He has stayed on the road to that accomplishment. Will Rogers observed that: "It's great to be great, but even greater to be human." Cap Weinberger's a direct example. He disproves that old adage that being a gentleman is a handicap in an argument or in positions of heavy responsibility.

Clearly, he'll be both missed and remembered with affection by all of us. But these are only personal observations. His record of professional achievement truly marks him as exceptional. There may not be a more widely experienced figure in American public life. He soldiered in World War II as an Infantryman, a survivor of a tour with MacArthur. Won distinction on the fast track in peace: from Harvard, where he was a conservative even as a student, to a prestigious law practice to a senior executive of Bechtel. Also, he found time to dabble as a media and journalism star. He hosted a TV show and wrote a column on California government which may explain the reason he is always treated so kindly by the Press today. In California, he was a prominent activist in State government and Republican politics as legislator, finance chief, and Party official. This experience was followed by many years of Federal service at HEW, OMB, FTC, and, of course, in DOD. The only place he hasn't served is the Supreme Court. He may be called yet to that body if he can pass the marijuana test.

Everyone in this room remembers well the state of our defenses eight years ago: aging equipment, sagging morale, "hollow" forces, all while the Soviets built steadily and the threat diversified. Likewise, we know where we stand today: improved in every parameter, with more in the pipeline. The job isn't finished. It never is. It will still take hard work. But clearly, Cap Weinberger's legacy to us reaches far into the future, in the form of better operating capabilities, renewed spirit, increased teamwork among ourselves, and greater partnership with the public at large.

Mr. Secretary, I speak for many in saying thank you: For citizens who are safer and whose prospects are better as a result of your personal efforts. For my colleagues in the JCS, our Unified and Specified Commanders and Agency Chiefs, but most of all I speak for young soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen all over the world, the people who man the battlements of freedom every day. They are now better equipped, trained, more appreciated than ever before. Your legacy will live a long time in their hearts.

For myself: I bid farewell to an admired superior, a valued colleague, and a treasured friend.

Walter Lippman once said: "The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men the conviction and the will to carry on." By that definition you are a striking success. Not only are we indebted to you for reviving American strength but you leave behind a military leadership totally determined to carry on in your footsteps.

We wanted to give you a memento that would recall your days in the Pentagon, that would remind you of the esteem in which your colleagues hold you, and at the

same time, that would be useful. Since you have devoted so much of your energy and talent to standing up for the military, we settled on a stand-up desk. We can never compensate you for the blood, sweat, and tears you have shed in our behalf, but we hope it will serve at least as a symbol of our gratitude to you for standing up for us so consistently and effectively.

1988
SELECTED WORKS

Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the INF Treaty
January 25

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to participate in your second set of hearings devoted to our national security strategy. Certainly, this year's focus on NATO defense and the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty is most timely.

My testimony is organized in four parts. First, I will present an overview of our experience with the alliance. Next, NATO's military objectives and strategy will be reviewed. My statement then turns to the INF Treaty, including an assessment of its impact on NATO defense and the rationale for strong endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, I will address the question of preparing the United States and its coalition partners for the future.

NATO Overview

To begin, allied security interests are set forth with remarkable clarity in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and in a 1974 review of these interests by the North Atlantic Council. Basically, the allies seek to:

- Safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their people;
- Promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area;
- Unite their efforts for collective defense; and
- Preserve peace and stability in the world at large.

Over the years, however, NATO has often found itself in disagreement over how to marshal the resources necessary to support these policies. In the 1974 declaration, for example, the allies held that armed forces should be maintained and improved in efficiency. Yet, they also stressed the importance of reducing the burden of arms expenditures on their people. This ambivalence about resources has continued to the present day.

The alliance has changed dramatically since the end of World War II. Initially, an enormously powerful United States moved swiftly to support a devastated and frightened Western Europe, providing economic aid under the Marshall Plan, favorable access to the US market, integration of forces under the NATO umbrella, extended aid under the Mutual Security Act, and so on.

The remarkable success of this effort can be seen in the situation today: two nearly equal pillars in the alliance, one European and another American. These pillars have

much in common: each with over 200 million talented and energetic people, exceptional prowess at the high frontiers of technology and manufacturing, heavy dependence upon international trade to provide the necessary raw materials, and lines of commerce stretching to every corner of the world.

In other ways, the European pillar is much different than the American one: a bloody history of continental wars, more directly exposed to Soviet military power, little defense in depth against a conventional assault by the Warsaw Pact, and not much potential to trade space for time on the field of battle. Moreover, it is far more difficult for the thirteen nations of Western Europe to coordinate defense policies than it is for a nation of fifty united states. Still, geopolitical factors do not relegate NATO Europe to a position of permanent inferiority versus the Warsaw Pact or enormous dependence upon armed forces of the United States. To the contrary, Western Europe has a long history of producing great military leaders, highly professional troops, and first-rate military hardware. Moreover, within the European Economic Community, the European Space Agency, the Western European Union, and the Eurogroup, I find convincing evidence that where there is a will, our NATO allies can be remarkably effective in the business of integrating policies and resources. Insofar as the American pillar is concerned, economic support for the industrial allies no longer is necessary or desirable. Yet, our political and military participation in NATO still makes a crucial difference.

Certainly, the US strategic nuclear umbrella is vital to NATO, especially for allies possessing no nuclear arsenals of their own. In my experience, they want us to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, shield them from nuclear blackmail and coercion, and engage the Soviets in a dialogue aimed toward a mutual and verifiable reduction in nuclear arms. In recent years, the "grass roots" sentiments favoring nuclear arms cutbacks as opposed to limitations have grown in Western Europe as well as the United States. Part and parcel of European expectations is the linkage between continental-based conventional forces, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems. In general, this requires a credible, visible mix of both short- and long-range systems suitable for holding at risk massed forces and militarily significant targets in the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, and thus providing the deterrence that has kept the West free of war for almost four decades.

Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving trans-Atlantic couplings. Our military presence in Europe of more than 300,000 troops is a central part of this process. Among other things, this commitment tells both the Europeans and the Soviets that American troops would be among the first to fight. Equally significant is our maritime strength in the Atlantic, especially capabilities to contain or counter a major break-out of air and naval units of the Soviet Northern Fleet. This forward deployment also makes surprise attack against NATO far less likely.

Additionally, global economic activities and partnerships have led members of the North Atlantic Alliance to acquire a considerable stake in international peace and security. In a practical sense, this means that on occasion the Western nations must deal with the world's troublemakers, attempt to keep small crises small, and shore up trembling military balances which could turn to their disadvantage.

I would argue that the US role in shoring up international peace and security contributes heavily to NATO's well-being and that members willing to put their forces on the line in the common interest must receive more credit in the realm of strategic burden sharing. From a military perspective, US mobility units (air and naval) and light ground forces which can project power are not only a significant element of our contribution to the Alliance but perform a service which no other member can match.

Military Objectives and Strategy

NATO's general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the outset:

- Deter a Warsaw Pact assault;
- Defend forward if attacked; and
- Restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

The strategy for achieving these objectives has, however, undergone some dramatic shifts since 1949. In the early days, NATO drifted structurally to a heavy dependence on the United States and especially on the doctrine of massive retaliation. Washington possessed a nuclear monopoly, global delivery systems, and an affluence that permitted an across-the-board investment in weaponry. All of this formed a ready-made counter to Soviet superiority in manpower and conventional weaponry at minimum cost to the allies.

Ultimately, time and circumstances eroded the underpinnings of this strategy. The Soviet Union first acquired atomic technologies and then, during America's preoccupation with Vietnam, proceeded to build up its nuclear arsenals not only to "parity" but in certain areas to "superiority." The passage of years led both superpowers into ballistic missile weaponry, cancelling out the US advantage in air-breathing delivery systems. Suddenly, nuclear deterrence wasn't as compelling in warding off limited attacks as it had been in the 1950s.

Flexible Response

NATO revised its basic strategy in January 1968 with adoption of MC 14/3, which was designed to provide a more credible replacement for the deterrent threat of "massive retaliation" and to wean the Alliance away from an overdependence on nuclear retaliation that weakened the commitment to conventional defense. The new doctrine was known as "flexible response."

The general principles of MC 14/3 are well understood in the public domain. No one proposed to fold the US nuclear umbrella, but much more emphasis was placed on direct defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminate use of theater nuclear weapons before contemplating a general nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Alliance policy did not prescribe the mix of conventional, theater nuclear, or strategic nuclear forces required for deterrence and defense. It did describe the conditions necessary to ensure an initial defense of NATO: regular consultations, adequate conventional and dual-capable

forces, a high state of readiness, full use of available warning time to augment forward deployed forces, and sufficient logistics support and sustainability. In turn, it stressed that these factors will influence the time NATO can resist a Pact attack without resort to nuclear weapons.

Clearly, such a strategy, to be successful, depends on constant and adequate investments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. Otherwise, it becomes a high risk policy—as its predecessor was—because of its excessive reliance on nuclear ordnance should deterrence fail.

The Balance

As is always the case in military matters, the evolving balance can be influenced by either side. For its part, the Kremlin continued its policy of steady improvements and expansion at all levels and over time confronted NATO with not only strategic parity but a degenerating balance in theater nuclear forces, an increasingly negative conventional balance, and adverse trends in many of the major weapon categories.

The Joint Chiefs have for a number of years been disturbed about the military balance. Their major concerns have been in the area of conventional weapons, where NATO's defense capability needs great improvement. Although the United States has since 1981 been effectively modernizing and upgrading its conventional forces in Europe, Soviet spending and NATO's sometimes flagging performance have prevented a satisfactory resolution of the problem.

Of special concern to the JCS is the low level of sustainability items and munitions supporting NATO formations. This trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation. This state of affairs hardly accords with a strategy designed to allow selectivity and discrimination in the process of "flexible response." A number of others have expressed similar views as to whether NATO is relying too much on nuclear weapons and not doing enough in the conventional arena, e.g., General Rogers (former SACEUR) and Ambassador Abshire (former US Ambassador to NATO). To date, the NATO nations have not seen fit to increase their spending levels sufficiently to reverse these curves.

Arms Control

Effective arms control agreements could, of course, relieve these problems. For some fourteen years, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) has attempted to redress the conventional imbalance, but has had no success even in reaching agreement on the baseline from which future reductions should be measured. It is important to note that these talks focused on personnel rather than weapon systems.

Concurrently, the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreements imposed some constraints on strategic weapons (i.e., rough parity maintained at high weapon inventories) but did not address other critical areas of the Soviet military buildup. To prove the point, the Soviets proceeded to deploy intermediate range missiles capable of striking every nation on and around the Eurasian continent. Shortly, the United States found

countries in both Europe and Asia deeply concerned that the SALT process had not captured the SS-20s. By the late 1970s, many of our allies were urging Washington to proceed directly from SALT II to a treaty limiting intermediate range missiles. That, of course, was an integral part of the "dual track" decision reached by NATO in December 1979. These decisions ultimately resulted in INF negotiations, a "global solution," and the treaty we address today.

The INF Treaty

This brings me to the treaty itself. First, a few general observations are in order.

Each party to the INF agreement (US and USSR) has agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate and shorter range missiles and related support structures and equipment. That includes ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the parties are specified by type in the treaty text, i.e., Pershing II, Pershing IA, BGM 109G (cruise missile), SS-20, SS-5, SS-4, SSC-X-4, SS-12, and SS-23.

Overall, nothing about this accord makes Europe "safe" for another conventional war. Nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet, this agreement does:

- Reverse a forty-year buildup during which Europe has become the most militarized region in the world; and
- Eliminate completely several classes of very destructive nuclear weapons systems which offer neither East nor West much in the way of warning time.

Tactical Perspective

Obviously, Moscow would not have signed a treaty conferring enormous military advantages on the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, there are substantial benefits for the United States and NATO.

The Soviets agree to give up missiles capable of carrying over 1600 deployed warheads as opposed to about 400 for the United States, This asymmetrical reduction is significant from both a military and political perspective; it is a very valuable precedent for future arms reductions negotiations. There is, of course, a great deal more to this agreement than asymmetrical numbers. Equally important is the military impact on both sides. In this connection, SACEUR surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with ground-launched missiles, in particular, aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself. There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershings because of their rapid deep-strike capability and that was an influential element in moving them toward a double-zero approach.

On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters. In Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to:

- Hit with theater ballistic missiles Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy, and a large part of Turkey; or
- Strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS)

sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe.

Incidentally, we have always been extremely concerned about the Soviet's ability to cover our shallow support area in Europe. To threaten these targets in the future, the Soviets will have to use their dual-capable aircraft or their strategic weapons.

Today, most of those aircraft are concentrated on a few main operating bases. They are not dispersed over the countryside like land-mobile missiles and consequently are vulnerable to counteraction.

Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France while eliminating the intermediate and shorter range missile threat to these systems. As many of you know, this was a sticky issue on the Soviet side, but the United States steadfastly refused to consider British and French systems. We had no license to do so.

Additionally, we have long been worried about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter range delivery systems (SS-12s and SS-23s) will fall out of the Soviet order of battle as a result of this treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-23 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and air fields.

Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this treaty. With the SS-20s, the Soviets have a capability to hold at risk nearly 500 targets in the Asia-Pacific theater. The SS-20 can range virtually all of mainland Asia plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and a portion of Alaska. The Soviets also have nearly 300 shorter range missiles (SS-12s and SS-23s) in the Far East. Our Asian allies are deeply concerned about this threat and greatly relieved that this treaty will eliminate it. This Soviet concession was extremely difficult to negotiate and represents one of the more significant strengths of the agreement.

Verification

With respect to verification of compliance, this agreement relies on two basic methods. National Technical Means (NTM) will be the principal method of monitoring total elimination of intermediate and shorter range missile systems, related support facilities, and the means of producing such weapons. In this regard, the parties have agreed not to interfere with each other's NTMs and to take specific steps to enhance the other side's ability to monitor by NTM. Another important means of verification is established by the unprecedented right of on-site inspections (OSI), set forth in the Inspection Protocol. Such rights include:

- Baseline inspections to help verify the initial exchange of data;
- Close-out inspections to verify that treaty-prohibited activities actually have ceased at missile support facilities;
- Elimination inspections to observe the destruction of missiles and launchers;
- Short-notice inspections of a specific number each year for the first thirteen years that the treaty is in force; and

- Portal monitoring of the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk, where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled.

A Special Verification Commission will be used to resolve questions related to compliance and agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty's provisions. Routine or special communications between the parties will be routed through Reduction Centers.

Later this week, Secretary Carlucci and I will be testifying on these provisions before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Suffice it to say, the total web of all intelligence sources, including our national technical means and on-site inspection procedures, provides high confidence that the United States government can detect breaches of treaty provisions by the Soviet Union before such violations become militarily significant.

Thus, the JCS have unanimously concluded that, on balance, this treaty is militarily sufficient and also adequately verifiable. In turn, they believe that this accord is in the best interests of the United States and its allies and strongly recommend its ratification by the US Senate.

Further Implications for NATO

At the same time, it is important to understand what the INF Treaty does not do.

As to arms control, it is only a first step, if we are to redress the dangerous imbalance between East and West. While the role of arms control could be potentially significant in reducing the risk of war, we must understand that this process is a two-edged sword: it presents both challenges and opportunities.

The Soviets view arms control as an instrument for competitively achieving political and military objectives vis-à-vis the Free World. They clearly would like to divide NATO and to undermine its military capabilities. Restraining the SDI, eliminating NATO's theater nuclear response (an essential element of Alliance deterrent strategy), limiting America's ability to exploit its technological advantages in conventional weapon systems—all of these are high on the Kremlin's priority list. If these goals could be achieved without redressing the conventional balance, the Soviets would have gained the unchallenged superiority they desire.

On the other hand, if the West can keep its arms reduction policy consistent with the NATO strategy of flexible response, we can maintain the security we seek at reasonable levels of investment—not to mention reducing the risk of nuclear devastation. To succeed in this endeavor, we must exploit key areas where we enjoy potential long-term technological advantages…. Under these conditions, arms control could become an instrument for furthering NATO's long-term objectives.

The treaty has no impact on NATO's fundamental strategy. While the Pershings and GLCMs will be eliminated by the agreement, the United States retains a full spectrum of capabilities to execute selectively NATO's strategy of "flexible response": short-range missiles, nuclear-capable artillery, dual-capable aircraft, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and strategic nuclear systems. As indicated earlier, both the theater and strategic nuclear

systems of Great Britain and France remain outside the scope of this agreement. It does not erase all of the imbalances which plague the Alliance today—especially the short-range nuclear, conventional, and chemical warfare imbalances. Without further efforts by NATO, the adverse conventional balance will continue to force excessive dependency on nuclear use should deterrence fail. In this regard, the United States did make certain that the INF Treaty would leave the door open for NATO to exploit fully emergent technologies in the modernization of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

Preparing for the Future

Looking ahead, it is imperative for the Alliance to take stock of its military posture and to reassess the way it is preparing for the long haul. As noted earlier, the strategic environment in both NATO and countries outside the treaty area has changed a great deal since 1949 and is continuing to do so. What sort of future can we anticipate?

The West

On NATO's part, we can expect flat or declining national defense budgets, shrinking demographic trends that create manpower constraints (especially in the Federal Republic of Germany), and increased emphasis on further arms reduction negotiations. In a similar vein, all members of the Alliance face more pressure to merge efforts with significant Free World players outside NATO (Japan, Brazil, Australia, and others) and the necessity to deal with Third-World crises and problems.

In the near term, NATO clearly needs to do more to keep up with the Soviet building programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures. As noted above, this widening gap has been of concern to members of NATO for some time. Thus, 1983 became the year of nuclear force modernization and 1984 the year of conventional force improvements.

Nonetheless, a number of factors on both sides of the Atlantic have been working against NATO's military posture: the public diplomacy of Gorbachev, diminished concern about a Pact attack on the West, euphoria on the arms control front, a tangled web of economic uncertainties, chronic Federal budget deficits, and the allure of distant as opposed to current military technologies.

The Warsaw Pact

As for the Warsaw Pact, we must recognize that they likewise face serious challenges and do not necessarily look at themselves as we do. NATO's investments in conventional defense may look erratic to us, but they have made a deep impression on Soviet leadership. While Moscow's conventional capabilities remain formidable, there are significant elements of pessimism in Soviet circles about their ability to defeat NATO rapidly and at low risk. If our deterrent policy is to remain healthy, we must continue to nourish this air of uncertainty.

Moreover, there is growing apprehension in the Soviet military that rapid changes in technology are placing them at a disadvantage, particularly in the field of automatic

data processing—an area crucial to the effective use of emergent technologies. This concern is, of course, linked to the overall Gorbachev effort to foster general economic reform and to place his nation in a more competitive position. I genuinely believe he has come to the conclusion that his nation cannot remain a first-rate power with a second-rate economy. The Kremlin has also demonstrated a rising concern about NATO maritime strength along their periphery; we see this attitude manifested in recent Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity, under the guise of "military detente" in northern European waters. The Soviets realize that Western maritime strength is a principal barrier for the global strategic objectives which are essential to their preferred strategy.

As in the West, the Soviets are heavily involved in the Far East, South Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, the Kremlin continues to face major uncertainties concerning the reliability of Eastern European allies which would, in turn, constrain military operations against the West.

With these changes, the Soviet threat has become more subtle and multifaceted. Clearly, the Kremlin prefers muscle flexing, intimidation of smaller states, and the employment of surrogates to obtain its political ends. But as Afghanistan demonstrates, Soviet leaders are still not above the use of direct force when they believe their interests are served by it.

The key point here is to emphasize that in addressing the Alliance's future, we must factor in Soviet concerns, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities. In short, they have serious problems too, which NATO can and should exploit.

Progress in NATO Councils

Clearly, there is unease in the Alliance about the future, and a great deal of thought has been given to the subject in Brussels. The Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee are working hard to prepare NATO for the future. The Conceptual Military Framework of 1986 reflects a solid effort by civilian and military professionals to examine the potential of emergent technologies and to produce a more forward-looking and fully integrated concept for NATO defense, especially one that is tied more specifically to budgets and resources.

In 1987, the Ministers gave this effort additional impetus by reaffirming endorsement of the Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) program, which laid out nine critical deficiencies to be translated into force goals and corrected by the member nations. As others have noted, the CDI does have drawbacks: no plan of action or milestones to correct the cited deficiencies and no sense of priorities for what has turned out to be a very resource constrained environment.

Still, the CDI reflects a common awareness that technology is NATO's strongest card. Exploited collectively by the Alliance, recently developed and evolving technologies can substantially—even dramatically—improve capabilities to blunt an initial assault by the Warsaw Pact and attack follow-on forces. Equally important, such steps reinforce the uncertainty already present in the Kremlin.

In turn, I find some very impressive work by the Conference of National Armaments Directors to pursue these technologies as a common research and development effort and to broaden the base of procurement. Noteworthy projects encouraged by the Nunn-Warner Amendment and already in train include:

- Improved antiarmor and antitank weapons, e.g., the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Advanced Precision Guided Missiles, and Infrared MAVERICK;
- Area and local air defense systems, such as combined purchases of AWACs, an interoperable IFF [Identification, Friend or Foe] system, and a family of surface-to-air missiles (PATRIOT, ROLAND, and RAPIER);
- The Anti-Tactical Missile System now being pursued by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; and
- The NATO frigate replacement program (NFR-90).

Overall, programs of this type are strongly supportive of NATO's need to enhance its force posture. The traditional and lingering question remains, however: whether NATO Europe is collectively prepared to move from common R&D to the more expensive business of acquiring and deploying weapon systems required by the common defense. In essence, this is a critical moment in the Alliance. Never has there been greater need for bold and creative leadership within NATO councils.

US Contributions

As a leader of the Alliance, the United States likewise must address the crucial issues confronting NATO, and there is no better time than now as we implement the INF Treaty.

As I pointed out earlier, the Joint Chiefs have been dissatisfied with the NATO force balance for several years. Admittedly, we have made considerable improvement in our posture since the late 1970s, and we know that these steps have reinforced uncertainties in the minds of Kremlin planners. But the Soviets continue to run fast and to match our efforts. While the Chiefs endorse the INF Treaty, you should not conclude that they will be satisfied after the treaty is implemented—it speaks only to a slice of their concerns. In their view, allied sustainability and conventional imbalances especially undermine NATO's security. The Chiefs believe that these deficiencies must be corrected if deterrence is to remain credible as we move into the 1990s.

What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future that will strengthen all of NATO that lays out a course for our representatives to pursue in Alliance councils, that guides US investment strategy, and that receives the strong support of the Congress. Throughout, the US defense effort and strategy for NATO must, of course, be part and parcel of our worldwide strategy. That is a tall order, but I assume, Mr. Chairman, that you intended for these hearings to contribute to that goal. Today, we are working hard to bring together such a concept in the Pentagon. Obviously, we want to build upon productive work that has already been completed in NATO: the Conceptual Military Framework, Conventional Defense Improvements, and Common Research and Development programs. These efforts represent an excellent bridge to the future.

Our approach to NATO's conventional defense, of course, is conditioned by some sobering military realities. We will never engage the Soviets with the same number of tanks or aircraft or people. This conclusion is reinforced by current fiscal realities. Nor can we be as confident as we once were that our forces will prevail on the field of battle simply by exacting high exchange ratios in one-on-one engagements, i.e., tanks versus tanks. All of these factors drive us to think about how to use our enduring strengths to exploit endemic weaknesses of the Soviet Union and to concentrate on high leverage weapons systems. That is the central thrust of recent work by the Pentagon on "Long-Term Competitive Strategies," a policy designed to get the most out of our acquisition process.

Secretary Carlucci's report to Congress on support for NATO strategy in the 1990s clearly notes that "Competitive Strategies" is not a substitute for NATO Conventional Defense Improvements. The allies must move forward to correct critical deficiencies in infrastructure, munitions, C3, sustainability, and a host of other areas. We should press our NATO friends to see the CDI through to completion. Still, the two efforts have one thing in common: both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial attack and counter follow-on forces of the Pact.

The initial cases we have studied apply "Competitive Strategies" to the acquisition of systems related to the NATO Central Front. They address Soviet concepts for overrunning NATO—the initial air offensive, the rapid penetration of NATO forward defenses, and the central coordination of forces massed for the seizure of large chunks of NATO territory. These concepts are the heart of current Soviet military strategy in the contingency of a large-scale conventional attack in central Europe. They also point to endemic or structural weaknesses on the Soviet side. We can infinitely complicate their problem by concentrating on countereforts in those specific areas of weakness. The study then considers how new technologies can be used to exploit these weaknesses effectively and disrupt or shatter the Soviet timetable of attack.

Overall, the proposed solution relies heavily on conventional stand-off missiles and supporting battlefield and rear area surveillance capabilities (great similarity to FOFA [follow-on forces attack]). Many of the missiles can be found in present cooperative research and development programs of NATO. A number of the surveillance systems are well along in the US research and development program, e.g., intelligence-gathering cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles. Obviously, all of these must be designed in range to comply with the INF Treaty.

Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs are insistent on continuing the nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by the treaty:

- A Tactical Missile system (follow-on to LANCE), Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles; plus
- Air-to-surface missile (TASM) to enhance the effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft and provide greater survivability.

Again, you will find that these systems build upon common R&D efforts, examples of which were cited earlier in my statement. Depending upon warhead selection, these systems can be used as theater nuclear forces or to strengthen conventional forces, or both. In this connection, the Chiefs will be proposing a relaxation of legislative restrictions on the number of Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles.

Likewise, the Joint Chiefs are examining the disposition of our current forces which will survive the treaty to see if they make sense in the new circumstances.

Overall, the Department of Defense is trying to get as much deterrence and defense as possible for NATO out of technologies embedded in the coalition's ongoing R&D effort—essentially mature technologies which can be fielded over the next few years. Everyone must understand, however, that given a fragile balance, military risks are related more directly than ever to time in the acquisition process: time to make the political decisions, examine trade-offs within no growth budgets, muster the financing, let the production contracts, and field the necessary systems. We cannot afford business as usual.

Beyond these efforts, designed to improve our capabilities in the near future, we must look further ahead and we must place our NATO-related efforts into the context of worldwide threats and alliances and US global interests. We need a longer-term view because weapon systems we are now developing will have to serve our strategy at least into the first decade of the twenty-first century. As you know, a Federal Advisory Committee, the independent bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, recently has completed its report addressing these broader long-term issues. I note that the Commission strongly endorses our coalition strategy and US nuclear guarantees for the common defense, while stressing that reliance upon theater nuclear forces must be both discriminate and selective.

Moving Ahead with Confidence

To put all of this into perspective, we should be candid about the leadership challenges confronting the United States in NATO Councils. Certainly, we cannot leverage our allies into doing more by threats of pulling out of Europe—that would be thoroughly counterproductive. At the same time, we are not positioned to take up the slack when and where the European allies decide to shed commitments or trim back on conventional force improvement programs. In some fashion, we must get the idea across that the benefits of collective security go hand-in-hand with the burdens of a common defense. In my view, that is not too much to ask on either side of the Atlantic.

Next, I believe that we deserve credit in NATO councils for dramatically improving our conventional force capabilities and readiness over the last eight years. We continue to do so with a defense budget amounting to about 6 percent of Gross National Product. Over the next few years, of course, we will be spending less than previously planned for national defense in a combined effort with other agencies to reduce the Federal budget deficit. But I would argue very strenuously in NATO Councils that a healthy US economy is vital to the Alliance as a whole.

Further, I am convinced that American leadership remains crucial to allied solidarity and resolve, particularly in dealings with the Soviet Union. In this regard, the allies have presented us with a very full platter: further the process of detente, engage the Soviets in asymmetrical arms reductions, exploit cultural and economic openings to the USSR, and do all of this without eroding public support for a strong deterrent and credible defense. If firm in our dealings with the Soviet Union—and with our allies in the field of burden sharing—I believe the United States can meet this challenge. If we ever vacillate or seem unsure of ourselves, experience tells me that the allies also will waiver.

Finally, I believe that it is extremely important for the United States and its NATO allies to prepare for the mid-1990s and beyond. If this time is allowed to slip away, the Alliance could end up with neither a credible deterrent nor a viable defense. Conversely, if this time is used wisely and productively, I am confident that we can achieve the four objectives stressed in the President's Report on National Security Strategy: narrow the gap in conventional capabilities, enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and reduce the risks of Soviet miscalculation.

Remarks at the Opening of the National Prayer Breakfast

Washington Hilton, Washington, DC | February 4

The National Prayer Breakfast began in 1953 as a gathering of leaders—President Eisenhower and members of Congress—each of whom had, over the course of a lifetime of service, found strength in a relationship with God. Together they desired to make a conspicuous renewal of their dedication to abiding principles that unify mankind.

Now, this institution and all it represents has an honored place in the life of this nation. Today, there is a corridor dedicated to Dwight Eisenhower's memory in the Pentagon, just outside the office of the Secretary of Defense. Not surprisingly, a theme that emerges unmistakably from the exhibit is his enduring faith. In the course of my duties, I walk past those displays nearly every day.

Overlooking the Eisenhower gallery from a nearby stairway is a painting that resonates deeply with that theme of faith. The scene is a chapel: an Air Force flier kneels at the altar with his young family. Their heads are bowed in devotion, hands folded in prayer. The inscription below the portrait is a passage from Isaiah (6:8) in which the voice of the Lord asks who, in a world full of iniquity, can be sent to advance His cause. "Whom shall I send," He asks, "and who will go for us?"

The scriptural response, engraved there and in the hearts of all who serve the Lord in their lives, is simple and eloquent: "Here am I; send me." It is a military scene, and an American one, but its message is broader. For it depicts mankind's best and constant hope to align earthly endeavors with a higher design. It points to principles which are the ultimate source of guidance and strength for all peoples. And nowhere is the true purpose of public service—and of leadership in general—better portrayed. In all walks of life, in all cultures, across all the boundaries that divide our temporal pursuits, the

words—"who shall go for us"—have challenged every generation as it grappled with the afflictions of an imperfect world.

Unfailingly, men and women of good will have responded. Selflessly, they have gone: to quiet tumult and conflict, to right all manner of wrongs, to battle against disease and ignorance and poverty. They have gone despite privation and heartbreak and discouragement, conquering mortal fears and uncertainty. They have gone with confidence that those purposes are virtuous, trusting their fate to God.

In that recurrent drama there is one great imperative—unspoken but real—passed down through the ages to those who lead. Send me, it says, in the interests of justice and humanity. Send me, in the service of all men's search for peace and brotherhood. Send me, in the hope that my work, my example, and if necessary, my sacrifice, will bring us closer to God's intent. "I am here. I will go. Send me."

This morning, it is fitting that we who share the responsibilities of leadership in America and other countries should pray, together, for the wisdom and vision to see how God's design can be realized in this world, and how we can lead our people toward that exalted end. Please join me in prayer:

Heavenly Father, we have come together this morning to reaffirm our dedication to your teachings. We still strive to give your commandments life in our time. We still yearn for that peaceful concert of peoples, that order of justice and liberty in which all men can pursue their rightful aspirations in tranquility. We still seek that transcendent unity in which all can share in the world's bounty. We know these things are the heart's desire, and the birthright, of every individual on earth. Grant us the wisdom to see the way to these ends through clouds of division and discord. Make us strong against worldly weaknesses, and vigilant to find and redress our own shortcomings.

Help us to see your image in others, and to understand their ways of serving and searching for your path. Let all understand that to serve You is to hasten the day when nations without exception shall lay aside rivalries and feuds, and embrace one another as brothers.

This we ask, on behalf of all your children, and in your name, Amen.

Excerpts of an Interview with Mike Wallace on "60 Minutes," CBS network television

Washington, DC | March

Q: Chairman of the JCS, the senior military advisor: You are the senior military advisor, top military man in the United States, but if you command no troops, if you control no budgets, then all you can do is offer advice. Well, at Reykjavik Summit—your opposite number, Marshal Akhormeyev—there was some big dealing going on and the top military man in the United States was not there. How come?
A: Well, I think a deliberate decision was made many years ago that the arms control dialogue or process would be handled by the civilian side of the government. It's a

decision I happen to agree with, and it has been traditionally and historically done that way. We—being the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also myself as the senior advisor, since I've been in this post—we have been in on all the preparations for every meeting, summit or otherwise that concerned arms control negotiations. Now, that was true of Reykjavík as well. Everything that was done to prepare to go to Reykjavík, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted and I represented them at the meetings, etc., etc., where these matters were discussed.

Q: Even when some of these things were happening overnight—when the President was with Gorbachev?
A: Now that doesn't matter. I have a representative on the scene, and there were some decisions taken at Reykjavík that were not discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. You have to appreciate, of course, that the Commander in Chief not only has an obligation to do things in a thoughtful way, but I would hope that on major decisions with a high military content that he would consult with the Chiefs. We feel that our people have a lot of expertise and a lot to offer. But the Commander in Chief also has an obligation to take advantage of opportunities when they arise, and I think the President saw that at Reykjavík—at least in his mind as an opportunity—and he grasped it. I don't have a lot of quarrel with that.

Q: You have said that you were never informed while the Iran-Contra affair was going on. Why not? Why was Bill Crowe "out-of-the-loop," so to speak?
A: Now I've testified, of course, that I openly did learn—several months into the affair—that something was going on, but no, I was not at the outset informed.

Q: Shouldn't you have been?
A: I wished that I had been. I think that it matters—particularly that it had a military content, and that in this instance, they were talking about the transfer of arms, and of course, that is a military question to a certain extent. I personally would like to be informed and would like to have the opportunity to make a considered judgment as to whether that's a wise idea or not on transferring arms.

Q: Why would they want to hold it so close? Why shouldn't the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff know about that? Why shouldn't the Joint Chiefs know it and advise?
A: I would like to be informed, of course. Obviously, they felt it was a high risk proposition and that widening the circle would jeopardize the operation, because of the political stakes. Now, incidentally, the command authority in this country has that privilege—they can reduce the distribution of something when the stakes are high, if they make a calculated decision to do so. You know, I've lived a long time by the premise that I want to know what concerns me and not the things that I don't have business knowing or I don't want to know. Now, whether this is one of those matters or not—that's a matter for judgment, and obviously, the judgment was made that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be brought into it.

Q: Is Oliver North a national hero, Admiral Crowe? The President has said so; the Vice President has said so.
A: Well, you've qualified that statement now of the last word you've read, of the word "hero." I think Oliver North is a very attractive man—I don't know him very well, but from what I've seen, he's a very attractive young man, and I know he has many, many sympathizers in this country. But you put the appellation "hero" on the end there, I would quickly define a hero as somebody that has done exceptionally well, and has performed some service or some task a great deal better than the average. He's done a good service for his boss, for his organization, and managed responsibilities in a very exemplary manner, and has kept his boss informed—made sure that his boss was informed of what's going on. I don't think I would use the word "hero."

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I think the American people have a rather high regard for the integrity of military officers in general. It's interesting to note—I'm not going to make a self-serving statement here, Mike—but the last two years the Gallup Poll has found that the United States military is the most admired organization in the United States as opposed to other institutions.

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I believe that we are required as military men—not only not to lie and to be honest in the performance of our duty but also, frankly, we have to have higher standards than most professions. In managing military operations, it's absolutely imperative that you know what's going on in the scene even if it doesn't reflect glory or if it doesn't reflect that everything was done right, etc. The Commander must know: he must have an honest appraisal of what's going on. There are countless examples throughout history, particularly in autocracies, where the Commanders didn't report accurately and disaster followed. We stress that from the very first day that we bring people into our educational institutions. We insist on that—we're not flawless. I mean, it doesn't always work, but we do insist on it and we work very hard at it.

Q: The performance of your fellow admiral, John Poindexter: want to give us an estimate on it?
A: Well, I think he was in a very tight position, and I've had an opportunity to see those pressures since I've been in my present responsibilities. He was pushed and pulled in many directions—heavy responsibilities—lots of pressure, tough job to reconcile vested interests that are not necessarily compatible, and he chose a certain way to react to it. I don't agree with everything that he did.

Q: Should a military officer be the President's national security advisor?
A: I'm on the record as opposing that.

Q: Why?

A: Because I feel that it puts him in a very difficult position, with his loyalties to the military and also then throwing him into the political cauldron. The national security advisor is in the political caldron and he is forced, rightfully so, into putting the President's interests right there first. And I always thought that that was part of the problem with John Poindexter. On the other hand, the President should have the right to choose or select whomever he wants.

Q: Can you see the circumstances, Admiral Crowe, in which you would resign rather than carry out an order?
A: Of course. I think any military officer—throughout your career—at least if you dabble in history, which I do, and I can see orders coming down, then an officer would have to make the choice.

* * * * *

Now, that choice was often posed that if you resign, you sacrifice your life, so I'm not proposing that in Germany it was an easy choice. Don't misunderstand me, I think that the kind of choice that would face an American officer more likely, and bring up the situation you are referring to, is whether he felt very strongly that a certain course should be taken—either an operational course or more money or perhaps an administration comes in and cuts the Services dramatically to the point where the officer felt that he must oppose, publicly, that course of action. Then I think the resignation is in order. But as long as he's in the system and he is working for the National Command Authority and for the President, I don't think he has the right to oppose it publicly in a vigorous way. But he does have a right to leave his post, and then he has the same freedom of any American citizen to carry his case to the public.

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Comments with Lesley Stahl on "Face the Nation," CBS network television
April 24

Welcome to "Face the Nation":

I'm Lesley Stahl. An Iranian gunboat fired a disabling rocket at a Saudi oil tanker in the Persian Gulf this morning, only hours after President Reagan warned Iran that continued attacks on neutral parties like Saudi Arabia would be costly. Iran's new provocation came despite its already costly defeat on Monday by US forces. Joining us this morning is Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral, let me first ask you about the expanded rules that apparently now cover neutral ships, neutral oil tankers like the Saudi Arabian tanker that was hit this morning. Do the new rules require now that the United States retaliates for that attack?
Crowe: Well, Lesley, you've seen some commentary in the press, which you've just referred to. Obviously, after an incident like last Monday's, we will be reviewing the guidelines that

we have for our commanding officers. We do not discuss rules of engagement, but we are obviously trying to keep them appropriate and timely. We have not made any decisions yet on the new rules, but there is a consultation process going on right now.

Stahl: Can you tell us if this line of attack on neutral merchant shipping in any way inspires our government to take an action against Iran for what they did this morning? We heard the President yesterday warn Iran over radio that if they continue their attacks, it would be very costly to them.
Crowe: Odd; but he made it clear that we are now returning to normal operations in the Gulf; we consider our response on Monday a restrained response for the indiscriminate mining; and we do not contemplate any more violence unless Iran continues what we would say is an indiscriminate and threatening action.

Stahl: What was that they did this morning?
Crowe: Well, of course, they have been doing that for quite some time. But these rules are under review right now.

Stahl: Well, do you see it as their thumbing their noses at us? I mean, we destroyed half their navy fleet, and instead of hunkering down and running home, they come back and attack another ship, right away.
Crowe: I think your report is apt. Of course, it has something to do with that. On the other hand, their warships, except those Boghammers, are in port. We have not heard a peep out of the Iranians since the attack.

Stahl: So those speed boats you take as something different.
Crowe: The level of violence is much less. And, as you saw in the report from the tanker, they did not feel that they had been heavily damaged. And we will certainly keep those events in the calculations of this review.

Stahl: All right, there is a story on the front page of today's New York Times saying that the Pentagon and the Administration are contemplating sending Coast Guard vessels in to help the patrols for what now everybody is assuming are expanded rules. In fact, the report says that the Pentagon notified—I think you may have been one of them—notified Congress that you were expanding these rules of engagement. Is it possible that you will send Coast Guard vessels in to help the mission?
Crowe: You are trying to connect the two, and I'm not so sure it's an appropriate connection. We have attempted, ever since the outset, to be open-handed: in other words, "What are they doing? What are we doing? What is an appropriate force mix to be in the Gulf?" And, yes, we are considering those kinds of things. The Coast Guard has a patrol boat that is particularly appropriate for those types of operations. And we are looking at the wisdom of it—the parameters, the cost—and we could very well make such a decision. But the decision has not been made yet.

Stahl: What are you going to say when Congressmen come to you and say "What about our war against drugs?" How can you take the Coast Guard vessels—and the Coast Guard budget has already been cut, and our budget to fight drugs has already been cut—how can you take the Coast Guard——
Crowe: But these are ships that are not being employed in that effort.

Stahl: So it will in no way affect——
Crowe: We do not believe so. And if it did, I think that would severely complicate the calculus.

Stahl: Well, what about the resources that are taboo? I've read that you are not in favor of the expanded rules because of the enormous expense, which I understand is something like a million dollars a day to run the ships we already have in the Persian Gulf.
Crowe: Expense, of course, would be a factor, but we are looking at a number of things, and we believe we can do it inside our present force and cost estimates— if we choose to do it. But I stress—you insist on implying that these decisions have been made, and they have not.

Stahl: Let me ask you to tell us what's in your own mind about these tit-for-tat retaliatory measures or policy, if you are not concerned that it increases the likelihood of more direct confrontations with Iran in the Gulf, and where you think that's going to lead us.
Crowe: I'm always concerned. Please don't imply that I'm not concerned. I follow our operations and I worry about our operations. On the other hand, I think the response which we mounted this week was measured, was appropriate—and I don't know of an operation where so much effort was put in to keeping the loss of life small and trying to control and constrain it. We warned the platforms, we warned every ship that was engaged—and as you mentioned earlier in your lead-in, the decision by Secretary Carlucci on the Sabalan. This was a very interesting operation from that standpoint, and of course, it reflects the values of our own country, that we have now tremendous efforts to make this just exactly what the President said—a measured response.

Stahl: Are you worried, though, that Iran wants to draw us into more confrontations? Is there evidence that that is in fact what they are trying to do?
Crowe: I'm not on expert on what's in the Iranian mind. We spend a great deal of time speculating on it—and I suspect there's some factionalism in Iran; in other words, there is not a consensus. And we never know, for example, whether the Revolutionary Guards are receiving their orders from Tehran or from somewhere else. They would like to see us out of the Gulf; they would like to push us out, and they will press to the limit. But I don't believe—particularly after last Monday—they want an expanded conflict in the Gulf.

Stahl: Well, let me explain why I ask you that question. That is because I've heard a theory, which is they are trying to goad us into confrontation so they can kill a lot of American

soldiers, the idea being that we will run—we will turn tail and run. And they look at what happened in Lebanon after 243 Marines were killed, and that's their goal. They want to hit a ship, hit two ships, and sort of make us turn around and get out of the Gulf.
Crowe: Well, I've heard a variety of theories. I would think that theory might have been discredited this week. We demonstrated rather graphically that we can take care of ourselves at sea.

Stahl: Let me ask you about the Silkworms. Have you gotten any more definitive word on what those missiles were that went after the *Jack Williams*?
Crowe: We are trying to reconstruct those events, and there was some confusion in reporting. We do not have any evidence at this point that can lead us to confirm the use of Silkworms.

Stahl: Do you have evidence that they weren't Silkworms?
Crowe: We have some confusing signals that we are trying to sort out, but we have never been able to identify those electronic signals with Silkworms.

Stahl: Why did the ship's crew think that it was? Was there some kind of radar signal?
Crowe: There was a missile in the air. And I think in the heat of combat and confusion, people label things very quickly. And of course, the Silkworm was the most intense threat they could face, so it's sort of wise to say it's a Silkworm and attempt to deal with it.

Stahl: What else could it have been if it wasn't a Silkworm. It must have looked like—is there a Russian made———
Crowe: They have acquired some other missiles that may be at sea or may not. We don't know yet.

Stahl: But now tell us about our policy on the Silkworm missile: it is identified as a Silkworm. Are we in some way bound to knock out the Silkworms that are on the land, that are stationed there?
Crowe: You are asking me a hypothetical question, and I don't want to deal with what we are going to do in the future. Obviously, it would be a very serious escalation of events in the Gulf.

Stahl: Can we go back for a minute and explain exactly what our policy is right now in terms of protecting ships? What we will respond to, what we won't respond to, what the mission is?
Crowe: Well, as I said earlier, we don't talk about specifics of the rules of engagement. I should say in regard to rules of engagement, however, so there's no mistaking in anybody's mind, that the guidelines that we give our commanding officers, no matter what the circumstances, allow them the latitude to protect themselves, and to do it effectively and adequately.

Stahl: But, what's the mission, what's the policy, what are the American people supposed to understand from what we are doing there?
Crowe: Of course, what we are doing is using military force to support our foreign policy, and that is to increase our influence with those nations in the Gulf that are Western-oriented, oil-bearing countries. You know, 60 percent of the world's oil reserves are in that area, and the future of the Free World depends in large part not only on the access to those reserves, but also our influence in that part of the world.

Stahl: Let me ask you one final question—I'm referring to the process in deciding to retaliate: was the fact that the Kuwaiti hijacking was under way, did that have any role in the decision to retaliate?
Crowe: Not particularly. I would like to say one thing before we conclude, if I can.

Stahl: Please, you may.
Crowe: I was extremely impressed with the professionalism of the response this Monday and of our people in the Gulf. It was exactly correct. And our weapons, which are often criticized for their sophistication, worked well, extremely well. We were very satisfied with what we are often maligned on: our command set-up. It was short, flexible, and responsive. And I think it proved that we do have the right command set-up in that part of the world.
That's my commercial, Lesley.

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News Briefing at the Pentagon on the Iranian Airbus Tragedy
July 3

Editor's Note: On Sunday morning of 3 July, Aegis Cruiser USS *Vincennes* passed the Straits en route to Bahrain to support the USS *Montgomery*. It then found its helicopter under fire and turned in support of its aircraft. Both ships were authorized to return fire against multiple "Boghammer" Iranian attack boats. The USS *Vincennes* engaged and destroyed what was thought to have been an attacking Iranian F-14 but was in fact a civilian Iranian Airbus. The following press conference ensued.
Good afternoon.

After receiving further data and evaluating information available from the Persian Gulf, we believe that the cruiser USS *Vincennes*, while actively engaged with threatening Iranian surface units and protecting itself from what was concluded to be a hostile aircraft, shot down an Iranian airliner over the Strait of Hormuz. The US government deeply regrets this incident. A full investigation will be conducted, but it is our judgment that, based on the information currently available, the local commanders had sufficient reasons to believe their units were in jeopardy and they fired in self-defense.

The sequence of events commenced when a *Vincennes*' helicopter was fired upon by

Iranian surface units at 10:10 AM local Gulf time (2:10 AM EDT), approximately forty minutes before the air action. Subsequently, the *Vincennes* identified the Iranian firing units and closed to engage. The Iranian gunboats turned toward *Vincennes* at high speed and were engaged at 10:42 AM, with gunfire from the cruiser and the frigate *Elmer Montgomery*.

While so involved, the *Vincennes* detected an aircraft over Iran at about 10:47 AM, again local time. This aircraft headed toward the *Vincennes* and commenced closing at high speed. The *Vincennes* immediately began assessing this new threat. The suspect aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor. More important, the aircraft headed directly for *Vincennes* on a constant bearing at high speed—approximately 450 knots.

A warning was sent on both military and civilian distress frequencies beginning at 10:49 AM. This procedure was repeated several times, but the aircraft neither answered nor changed its course. There were electronic indications on *Vincennes* that led it to believe that the aircraft was an F-14 (there have been a number of F-14 flights in the area over the last few days). Given the threatening flight profile and the decreasing range, the aircraft was declared "hostile" at 10:51 AM local. At 10:54 AM, when the aircraft was about nine miles away, *Vincennes* fired two standard surface-to-air missiles, at least one of which hit at an approximate range of six miles. Due to limited visibility, the aircraft was not visually sighted until the missile impacted.

In understanding this incident, it is important to appreciate the total context in which our ships operate. The US government emphasized from the outset that committing military units to the Persian Gulf mission would involve risks and uncertainties. This conclusion has been reinforced by several incidents, e.g., the *Bridgeton* mining, the *Stark* tragedy, and the *Samuel B. Roberts* mining. A decision was made early in the commitment to give our commanders sufficient latitude to protect their people and equipment when hostile intent was manifested. They do not have to be shot at before responding. Throughout our involvement in the Persian Gulf, the Iranian government has repeatedly threatened and fired upon US forces.

In September 1987, as a result of the attack on the USS *Stark* and other incidents, the US issued a Notice to Airman (NOTAM) which advised all aircraft in the Persian Gulf region that US Navy ships were taking additional precautions and of the need to identify themselves and to state their intentions. Additionally, they were advised that failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions, or to warnings, and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft at risk by US defensive measures.

As to the recent environment, we have alerted our forces of indications that Iranian units might attempt to carry out attacks against our forces over the July 4th holiday period.

We are still in the process of reconciling and collating all the data. An official investigation of the incident will be conducted by Rear Admiral William N. Fogarty, USN, of the US Central Command.

Excerpts from News Conference Welcoming Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR

The Pentagon | July 11

It's a genuine pleasure for me to welcome Marshal Akhromeyev to the United States. It is the first visit of my counterpart, or rather a first counterpart visit to this country by a Chief of the Soviet General Staff, since World War II. In that sense, I believe it is an historic occasion. It comes from a dialogue between our two nations that has been expanding in many dimensions, and I think it is appropriate that we also look for ways to amplify or to increase the communications links between our two militaries. This, of course, carries with it the prospect not only of better understanding between our Services, but ultimately and hopefully of contributing to the process of reducing tensions between our two nations.

Marshal Akhromeyev and I come from vastly different backgrounds and systems, but as military men we share many common experiences. We both know the rewards of a life of service dedicated to our country, the frustrations of a nomadic military life, as well as an appreciation of the horrors and devastation of war, as Marshal Akhromeyev saw firsthand from his experience in World War II.

I hope that at the end of this week's visit the Marshal and his party will have a better idea of the strength, honesty, and cultural diversity of our nation, as well as appreciating the extraordinary capabilities of our Armed Forces. No American military leader wants war, and I suspect that is true equally on the Soviet side. This visit is, in my view, another important step in the mutual endeavors of our two countries to insure that the terrible prospects of conflict are lessened.

Again Marshal Akhromeyev, welcome to America

Joint Statement with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev

Washington, DC | July 11

The US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Soviet Chief of General Staff in their discussions indicated their intent to pursue policies and actions which will assist the Armed Forces of the US and the USSR in the avoidance of engagement in dangerous military activity in the vicinity of each other and in the immediate termination of such activity, should it arise. To this end, the sides will also ensure the appropriate training and preparation of their respective armed forces.

Additionally, they indicated that they intend to establish a US-Soviet military-to-military working group, to operate under guidance which they shall provide, to explore the issue of dangerous military activity in greater detail and make recommendations.

Among other things, the working group will review the two sides' respective capabilities to communicate expeditiously with elements of the military forces of the other country for the purpose of preventing dangerous military activity from occurring or continuing between

elements of those military forces. In addition, the working group will consider whether there are types of dangerous military activity which could arise that are not subject to specific existing arrangements, which should be made the subject of appropriate arrangements.

The two senior military representatives also indicated that there is no intention on their part to replace or derogate from existing agreements such as the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas or the 1947 Huebner Malinin Agreement on military liaison missions. Their intent is simply to improve their professional relationship so that members of the military forces of the US and USSR are less at risk when operating within the vicinity of each other.

News Conference with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR

The Pentagon | July 11

Good morning. When Marshal Akhromeyev began his visit to America last week, I said that my goal was to have him meet the people of this country and especially the young men and women who serve in uniform. I believe there was no better way for him to understand the great strength of this country than to meet its ordinary citizens.

We have now reached the last day in the Marshal's stay in the United States, and we have reached agreement on several issues which will be of substantive help in increasing our military-to-military contacts in the future and hopefully in reducing the possibility of dangerous incidents between our Armed Forces. At the end of this session, we will be releasing the text of a joint statement and the exchange of letters between us on military contacts.

However, the most significant aspect of Marshal Akhromeyev's visit has not been the military equipment he has seen, as impressive as that is; rather, it is the opportunity that he has had in the last day to take the measure of the people who operate that equipment, young men and women who love their country and their way of life. I would hope that this would be his enduring impression of his visit with us.

Marshal, if you would like to make a few comments.

Marshal Akhromeyev: Ladies and gentlemen of the mass media, our visit, the visit of the Soviet military delegation, is drawing to a close. When we first met a few days ago, I told you that we had three tasks before our visit. It is my judgment that, thanks to Admiral Crowe, who so earnestly prepared the visit, we successfully completed the visit and we have carried out all those three tasks.

As Admiral Crowe correctly mentioned here, we made effective the plan of military-to-military contacts between the Soviet Armed Forces and the US Armed Forces for the years of 1988 to 1990.

We also agreed on a joint statement on formation of a joint Soviet–American working group which would address the questions of reducing the risk of dangerous military

activities when the forces are operating in the vicinity of each other. As the Admiral said, these documents are going to be released shortly.

Then I should tell you that we spent dozens of hours with the Admiral discussing a variety of issues. Those were not just conversations of military topics. The Admiral actually took his time in order to educate me in many ways. He was telling me about how the American nation developed. He also told me how the American mind became as it is, and I have never read anything like that in any books. Well, naturally, we took some time in order to discuss the military issues.

We did not engage in negotiating the outstanding military issues here because we have not received the respective instructions from our political leaders—from the General Secretary and from the President of the United States. But we have made a very thorough analysis of our concerns addressed to each other.

Let me assure you, those discussions were extremely candid and open, and I'm sure they are going to bring some profits for both of us in the future.

The second task before us was to get acquainted with the American Armed Services. We familiarized ourselves with military equipment and naturally with the Servicemen of the US Services.

We received complete freedom of interviewing anybody in the American Armed Services. We received the opportunity to put up any questions. And I have recently met with the President of the United States, and I told him that the human rights in this regard have never been violated because, I have received the answers to all of my questions. And we came to understand that the Americans are supportive of the promises pursued by the President of the United States and the General Secretary.

The third task before us was to get acquainted with the American people, to get acquainted with the cross section of the American society. Thanks to the gracious offer from the Admiral, we managed to complete this program of ours as well. We met with hundreds of Americans. We interviewed them. We answered their questions. What we felt was that the civilian Americans also support the work of the US administration and of the Soviet government, headed by our political leaders in developing the relationship between our two nations. We have come to know a lot of new things about the American society and about the ordinary Americans. I think it is going to be useful for our professional duties as well. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you.

Crowe: Let me just say, I think it was a fine trip. Marshal Akhromeyev was a very fine guest. Today, we'll be bidding him adieu, and I wish him very well.

Marshal Akhromeyev: Well, in closing, I would like to say that in Admiral Crowe, I saw an admirable host who did his best in order to make this visit a success.

Press Conference Statement on the *Vincennes* and Iranian Flight 655

The Pentagon | August 19

Secretary Carlucci has just informed you of the action he has taken on the *Vincennes* investigation. I forwarded my advice yesterday to him and will go over briefly some of the major points of my review. Admiral Fogarty's investigation was conducted with complete independence from any preconceived notions of culpability or non-culpability. The investigation, after four weeks of work, submitted its findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations to the Commander in Chief, US Central Command.

The main recommendation of the investigation was that no disciplinary action should be taken against any US naval personnel associated with this incident. I concurred and so recommended to the Secretary. Let me briefly touch on the highlights of my review.

An examination of the events on 3 July leads quickly to the conclusion that Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy, and the investigation so found. By any measure, it was unconscionable to ignore the repeated warnings of the United States and to permit an airliner to take off from a joint military/civilian airfield and fly directly into the midst of the ongoing surface action in the Strait of Hormuz, which the Iranians themselves had initiated.

These tragic events of 3 July did not occur in a vacuum. They happened in an area where thirty-seven American sailors on board the USS *Stark* had been killed by an air attack in May 1987 and where our military has been tested by fire time and again over the last year. The actions of Captain Rogers and the *Vincennes* crew must be judged in that context.

The investigation paints in vivid terms the history of our commitment, Iranian threats, intelligence reports, and the commanding officer's fundamental responsibility to protect his ship and people. It also describes in detail the stress which surrounded events on the *Vincennes* in July. During the critical seven minutes that Flight 655 was airborne, Captain Rogers and his CIC team were conducting a surface action, tracking a multitude of contacts, coordinating US units, and trying to sort out friend from foe with spotty information. He had a genuine dilemma. In the midst of all this, the threatening air contact was closing at five to six miles a minute, and he felt if it continued to present a danger, he should fire before it got much closer than ten miles.

The villains of the piece were six significant problems, which plagued the captain and which he could not control or discount:

- *Vincennes* was engaged in an intense surface action with Iranian gunboats.
- The "unidentified, assumed hostile" contact had taken off from an airfield used by military aircraft.
- The flight was heading directly at Vincennes and its range was relentlessly closing.
- The unknown aircraft radiated no definitive radar emissions, so even the Vincennes warnings went unacknowledged and unanswered.
- The compression of time gave him an extremely short decision window—less than five minutes.

It was only prudent for Captain Rogers to assume that the contact was related to his engagement with the Iranian boats—until proven otherwise. The proof never came. Given the time available, the commanding officer could hardly meet his obligation to protect his ship and crew and also clear up all of the possible ambiguities. It is not unusual in combat to have to deal with uncertainties and conflicting information.

Although it might not seem fair, commanding officers do not have the luxury of reconciling all such questions before committing themselves. They have to go with the weight of evidence and their best judgment. These are the realities of combat. And the commanding officer, if he is to be effective, must be given the latitude to deal with them.

Admiral Fogarty's investigation also revealed that mistakes were made on board *Vincennes* that day. That, in itself, is not surprising to anyone who understands the stress of hostile action in a life-or-death situation. No military combat operation is flawless—even when there is a successful outcome. The more important question in this case is whether those mistakes were critical to the tragic result.

Our early Washington briefings of the accident were based on information received from the ship shortly after the action, some of which was found by the investigation to be incorrect. Let me comment on the significant items.

Admiral Fogarty's probing revealed that the IFF emission from Flight 655 was Mode III, which a commercial aircraft normally uses. The *Vincennes* also detected a contradictory Mode II military squawk and mistakenly concluded that it came from Flight 655. That detection did lead the CIC team to declare the contact an F-14. Much has been made of that error. However, this decision must be understood in the total context. It was not a crucial element in Captain Rogers' ultimate decision to fire. Military aircraft on attack runs can disguise their identity using civilian IFF signals or, on occasion, no IFF signal at all, e.g., significantly, Iranian F-4s operating against US units on 18 April were squawking only Mode III. Under standard procedures, even had the F-14 designation not been made, the plane would have remained designated an "unidentified, assumed hostile," and would have been treated as a potential threat by the captain and crew.

Questions have been raised about the ship's initial report that the aircraft was outside of the air corridor. This report was wrong. Whether or not an aircraft is in a commercial air corridor is a peripheral point to a commanding officer engaged in hostile action, particularly when the corridor covers the area of engagement. The Persian Gulf is blanketed by commercial air corridors; they cover over 50 percent of the Gulf.

Captain Rogers testified that, in his experience, commercial airliners tried hard to stay on the centerline of the corridor. He did not focus on the fact that the corridor is twenty miles wide, but rather that the contact was three to four miles off the median. The CO interpreted that as unusual. Perhaps the most puzzling mistake was the ultimate call of Flight 655 as descending instead of climbing. The investigation concluded that the range and altitude information passed to the commanding officer was correct until the Airbus reached a range of approximately fifteen miles. Captain Rogers had already

received permission to fire from his immediate superior. One of the radar operators reported at eleven miles that the aircraft was no longer climbing and the altitude was decreasing—a report that was not supported by a review of the AEGIS tapes.

Two other reports of descending altitude may have been made at ten and nine miles. The last report was apparently announced after the decision to fire had been made. In fact, the investigation concluded that the time between the initial report of decreasing altitude and the decision to fire was in the neighborhood of twenty to thirty seconds. It is impossible to say with assurance how those two inputs bore on the commanding officer's final decision. But it is important to keep in mind that the CO had this information for only twenty-thirty seconds and that during this interval he was involved in preparing to fire. The investigation made the point clearly that this was only one consideration among many in the CO's mind.

Singly, these errors or mistakes were not crucial to the fateful decision. Even cumulatively, they do not appear to change the picture in a decisive way. The commanding officer never received the clear evidence that he felt he needed to establish that the Iranian aircraft had not come to participate in the ongoing surface action. Our past experience in the Gulf, the intelligence available to the ship, and the rules of engagement all supported such a judgment.

I believe that, given the operating environment, Captain Rogers acted reasonably and did what his nation expected of him in the defense of his ship and crew. In all good conscience, I concur with Admiral Fogarty's finding that there was no culpable conduct displayed onboard the *Vincennes*.

This regrettable accident—and it was an accident—was a by-product of the Iran-Iraq War and saddened all Americans, most of all the crew of the *Vincennes*.

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Special Subcommittee on War Powers on the War Powers Resolution
September 23

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before you this morning in response to your interest in reevaluating the efficacy of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

I must begin by characterizing my views as those of a professional military man, and not those of a constitutional scholar or lawyer. I would like to offer the benefit of my own experiences and observations, particularly from the perspective I have gained over the last three years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the outset, I want to state for the record that I agree with Secretary Carlucci's statement and have consciously attempted to avoid a duplication of his comments.

I strongly share the desire for consultation between the Executive branch and Congress on important issues and policies, especially decisions to commit our Armed Forces.

As a result of my own experience in Vietnam, I initially supported the War Powers Resolution because I believed it would not only facilitate consultation but assist in building support for our fighting men whenever they were committed in dangerous situations.

Consequently, I have followed the use of the War Powers Resolution with great interest, and my present responsibilities have brought me directly in touch with the overall process. Unfortunately, this experience has led me to revise my original views. I now believe that the War Powers Resolution has not functioned as originally envisioned and has definitely had some unanticipated adverse impacts. On balance, I would strongly recommend that the Congress search for other ways to achieve these high purposes.

I do believe that consultation has two healthy effects. First, it is my impression that the Congress has been kept better informed than in the past. Moreover, I suspect it has made those on the Executive side think more deliberately about planned actions. This does not mean, however, that consultation has been a total success.

There is no definition, either formally or practically speaking, of consultation, and it means different things to different people. In turn, it is used for a variety of purposes, some of which have little to do with the substance of the issues.

I noticed that General Scowcroft emphasized this deficiency and elaborated on the unresolved questions in his testimony. I would certainly associate myself with his comments in this regard. The bottom line is that it is not clear as to what a President is expected to do or as to what the character (particularly limits) of Congressional involvement should be.

Similarly, it is graphically clear that the Resolution's reporting scheme and the attendant debate has not produced the desired consensus. The Congress speaks with a relatively uniform voice in favor of Congressional-Executive Branch partnership with respect to the commitment of our Armed Forces. However, when the debate was focused on the Persian Gulf, there was a loud chorus of criticism or praise of the Executive's policy but little effort to come to a final agreed decision as to whether or not the policy should be pursued. To be blunt, too many members of Congress were content to debate about the War Powers process and were happy to avoid being held accountable for approval or disapproval of the policy. I do not see this as helpful to the decisionmakers or the country.

In fact, it may be counterproductive. I think this is best illustrated by the effect such a contest has on two groups outside the United States: our allies and our adversaries. There is no question in my mind that the War Powers Resolution, and in particular its automatic withdrawal provision and the heated debates conducted in its name, have had a deleterious effect on our relationships with our friends. It has inevitably created a context for their doubts about our ability to maintain a consistent and continuous course of action with regard to matters concerning their and our vital interests. This debate tends to have a subtle, but nonetheless real, effect.

We tend to see the robust give and take of our political system as one of our greatest strengths, and it is. But when such debates center on specific foreign policy initiatives, and when the presence and/or the utilization of our Armed Forces is a central focus of such debate, then the "automatic withdrawal provision" of the War Powers Resolution

forms a backdrop, which makes it very difficult for our friends to interpret such debates as anything other than a lack of resolve.

That brings us to the effects of the War Powers Resolution upon those who are not our friends. Whether or not there is a War Powers Resolution, there will be extended political comment and discussion in our country regarding any commitment of US troops. Nevertheless, the confrontational format of the War Powers Resolution insures a partisan political debate on every aspect of the crisis and a time window for action which encourages our opponents to use the US political process for their own ends. In other words, the War Powers reports, or lack thereof, and debate become part of the adversary's tactical calculus and may give him a lever for influencing US political will. For example, the existence of a War Powers Resolution, with the attendant debate, may encourage those who wish us ill to test whether we will confront them. By this, I mean the political dialogue may provide an additional reason to perceive us, however wrongly, as a nation that is tentative or groping. This can be crucial at the outset of a crisis, when the prospect of decisive action could deter a further spread of hostilities.

Once US forces have been committed, the War Powers debates may push our opponents to make a maximum effort at the outset with the objective of either eliciting a congressionally mandated withdrawal or preventing the formation of public and legislative support for the commitment beyond the running of the sixty-day limit on such involvement.

On the other hand, the War Powers debate might have an opposite but equally damaging effect. Our enemies could perceive a great advantage to themselves in delaying any decisive engagement on the battlefield while US domestic debate was allowed to fester, and again, the running of the sixty-day limit brings us closer to a domestic political crisis. It is important to realize, however, that the reporting provisions of the resolution may also impact our own military tactical dispositions and initiatives. While I don't believe this affects the major decisions to commit, once our forces are deployed, there are often supporting military steps that could be taken to improve our position. If these actions could be interpreted as putting people at risk, the potential necessity to notify Congress formally inevitably becomes part of our operational decision-making. If the deployment has been politicized, then provoking further congressional controversy may tend to outweigh military judgment.

This outcome, of course, may be what some desire, but I don't believe that discouraging moves that could improve the US military position (and perhaps save American lives) was part of the original rationale for the War Powers Resolution. Certainly, from my perspective, this is an unfortunate by-product.

I am confident that there are ways to ensure that the Congress is adequately informed without all of the accompanying baggage which the War Powers Resolution carries. I would strongly recommend that you focus your efforts on working with the Executive Branch to ensure a flow of information to the Congress on military deployments of major policy significance. I would expect that, once the information issue is separated from the withdrawal provisions of the War Powers Resolution, a more meaningful and focused debate on the policy issue can ensue, if such is necessary, without unduly jeopardizing the operations themselves.

Excerpts from Remarks at a Reception held for the World Board of Governors of the USO [United Services Organization]
Washington, DC | September 28

Thank you very much. It's a genuine pleasure and privilege to be able to speak to this group for a few minutes this evening, to say—on behalf not only of myself as Chairman but also all our men and women in uniform and their families—how much we appreciate the work of the USO and the support of all the people who have stood with that fine organization. I'm particularly grateful for the opportunity to express my thanks to you all as devoted supporters and leaders of the USO.

* * * * *

I know it will be hard for you to believe, but I'm old enough to remember the year 1941 well, and to recall the galvanizing impact of World War II on all Americans. Since that time, not only through wars but through all the vicissitudes and distractions and frustrations of a troubled peace, the USO has been a prominent—and indispensable—feature of military life in America, providing much-needed support and spiritual sustenance for generations of servicemen and women who have followed the Stars and Stripes to far-flung corners of the globe.

Since coming to Washington, I've talked a great deal to many audiences about the great American civil-military partnership—the bond between citizens at home who use their freedom so well in a vast range of productive pursuits, and their colleagues in uniform who devote—and sometimes sacrifice—their lives to secure the fruits of those activities. In its many programs that display the appreciation of Americans for their Armed Forces and the concern of people at home for military families in posts, camps, and stations around the world, the USO literally makes that bond come to life. The USO has made a special place for itself in the hearts of everyone who wears the uniform: a touch of home, when home is only a memory; a meaningful gesture of friendship and thanks, reaching out to us when friends seem hard to come by and it is all too easy for us to feel forgotten; a deep reservoir of understanding and help when our people, especially our young people, must deal with new and unfamiliar challenges.

The United States has a great deal to be proud of in its Armed Forces, by every measure—in our heritage of courage and victory on the battlefield; in the key present-day missions we take on; in our fine equipment, logistics, training, and so forth. But in my view, the real jewel in our crown is the talent and spirit of the young American men and women who have chosen to serve in the Armed Forces, foregoing many of the amenities that other professions might have brought them. They are the ultimate source of this nation's strength.

Each of you can be very proud of your role on that team, and on behalf of the Joint Chiefs and all the men and women of America's Armed Forces, I thank you and wish you well in the days and months ahead.

Remarks on Receiving the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Washington, DC | November 14

I am truly gratified to be here tonight, and to have been selected to receive your distinguished service award, for several reasons.

I have long admired the work of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA)—an organization that takes the need for a strong national defense as its charter purpose, and which works hard to stay informed on defense issues and to advance public understanding about them.

I know that some of you are fly-in participants this year, and others may have taken part last year when I spoke to you. That sort of interest and engagement is exactly what we need in our democracy, and says a great deal about JINSA and its members. To keep our defenses strong, I've always believed that it is vital for us to nourish a genuine civil-military partnership in this nation. America's armed forces can only be as good as our citizens want them to be, and we need to devote constant effort to sustaining a public meeting of the minds about US interests in the world, about threats to our interests, and about what we need to do to cope with those dangers.

So while I may have been chosen as your award recipient this year, I'd like to turn the tables at the start and thank you for your hard work in improving public dialogue on these important subjects. It's a true national service that you are engaged with every day, and I applaud your efforts.

There's another dimension of these proceedings that I find particularly gratifying—that is, for you to recognize a man in uniform. This has important meaning for me, because I am proud to stand here tonight as the representative of all the men and women who serve in our country's Armed Forces. They are the ones who man the distant battlements, who patrol freedom's frontiers, and who stand ready at a moment's notice to defend our security. They are the ones who have answered the call again and again, in remote places and frequently forbidding circumstances, to help friends who rely on America's strength in a troubled world.

I think about them every day as I go about my business here in Washington, explaining what they do and what they need. This distinguished service award you give to me sends an important signal of affirmation, on a very personal level, to them, and I might add to those at home and abroad who benefit daily from their service. Rest assured that I will carry back with me your clear message of encouragement and support. Our fine people richly deserve to hear it.

Finally, I am truly proud to receive an award commemorating Senator "Scoop" Jackson's legacy to America. That legacy has, of course, greatly enriched our tradition of public service generally. Many would echo the columnist George Will's observation that the Senator was the finest public servant he had ever known. But more specifically, Scoop

Jackson's example left us a way of thinking about the world, and about imperatives for the United States, that was grounded in mainstream American principles—essentially in the fundamental outlook not only of Everette, Washington, but of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and indeed of Main Street America.

He was a believer in human rights and the institutions of democracy who knew that those precious values must be defended as well as proclaimed. For him, the lessons of history and the events of his own lifetime reinforced common sense on that point. He knew, moreover, that since the world could be a threatening place for struggling democracies, America, as the strongest free nation, had a special interest, indeed a duty, to encourage and protect their achievements and prospects.

And he believed that American strength and steadfastness, in concert with the efforts of friends and allies, was the key to a peaceful future for the Free World. It was a profoundly internationalist outlook, yet it was also quintessentially American. No wonder those who understand it can claim that politics really does—or should—stop at our own borders. And in my view, much depends on our ability to stay the course with that perspective.

Israel, of course, had a special place in the Senator's outlook. It rested on a variety of grounds, including what Scoop Jackson saw personally at the end of World War II. But in Israel he also saw a society that hewed to democratic traditions despite all the attendant domestic frustrations and in the face of considerable external dangers. He saw a people whose fundamental values resonated with America's. And he saw an alliance grounded not only on such affinities, but on the hopes of all peoples for peace.

The Senator worked tirelessly for that Middle East peace, as Washington does now. He could be passionate in his speeches about the opportunities created by the Camp David Agreement. And that sentiment still animates us. Four times in the last eight months, Secretary of State Shultz has travelled to the Middle East, visible testimony to the intensity of US efforts to find a way to realize the full promise of Camp David.

But in all its dimensions, the Scoop Jackson legacy has indeed been formative for those who lead in Washington, and I am proud to be associated with it in these proceedings tonight. His example has set a high standard for us, and you can be sure that my uniformed colleagues and I will do our best to live up to it as we go forward.

Letter to the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Washington, DC | November 21

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As the next administration develops its approach to arms reduction negotiations, it is important in my view to look at our organizational structure.

I am persuaded that there are a number of reasons why greater military involvement in the process would help us advance our negotiating objectives.

As we get deeper into START and commence serious conventional arms talks, technical military questions will assume a larger role and require even more military analysis, expertise, and judgment.

We should look for ways to facilitate those inputs into the policy levels. Similarly, when the point comes for the Chiefs to advise on ratification, it is important that they have confidence in the negotiating process that brought us to that point. Lastly, my discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev led me to believe that the Soviets would regard more visible military participation as a significant indication of US seriousness. If we can engineer such participation without upsetting the principle of "civilian control," I believe it would strengthen our overall credibility with both the Congress and the Soviet Union.

The following are suggestions concerning how we might increase the military role. It is not clear at this juncture if the Bush administration intends to appoint a principal advisor to the Secretary of State (and the President) on arms control matters—in the same fashion that Paul Nitze served. If that is the intent, I would recommend that a senior retired military officer be selected to act as his deputy and associate. We, of course, would have to attract an officer of sufficient stature and with suitable abilities. (I am well aware that not all military officers acquire the necessary experience or talents for this type of work.) I am thinking of men of the prominence, caliber, and experience of former CNO, Admiral Jim Watkins; former Deputy CINCEURs in Europe, Air Force Generals Willie Y. Smith and Dick Lawson; or possibly our current SAC commander and former PM [Politico Military] Director, Air Force Genera1 Jack Chain. I have not consulted any of these officers and cannot speak to their availability, but use their names illustratively. I would place the highest priority on such an appointment and am confident we could find a suitable candidate.

In a similar vein, I would suggest that a qualified military officer (retired or active) should be considered to head the START (and Defense in Space) negotiations, or in the alternative, to act as deputy to the head of delegation (as we have occasionally had in the past). Frankly, this practice would seem to recommend itself for all our arms control delegations who are negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the Service Chiefs need to identify more closely with the negotiators and hence to play a more prominent role in the process. To achieve this, the Chairman and Vice Chairman could be included in summits and perhaps also in ministerial-level delegations. If this suggestion was adopted, it would be important to accord our senior military representatives status and access equivalent to that of Akhromeyev or his successor as Chief of the General Staff.

It also would be useful if individual Chiefs periodically visited Geneva and spent a week or so there while arms control negotiations were in session.

Their presence would demonstrate high-level military interest in the negotiations, and more important, add to their grasp of the complex political-military issues that negotiators face. I can, of course, easily arrange this if the administration is agreeable.

If you concur that these suggestions are worth exploring, I would be most happy to elaborate further on them with you and Jim Baker, or whomever you suggest.

Remarks at the Dedication of the USS *Oklahoma* Exhibit

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | December 7

I am deeply honored, as an Oklahoman and as an American, to participate in these ceremonies dedicating the USS *Oklahoma* exhibit. And as a man whose generation can remember the events of December 7, 1941, well, these proceedings have very special meaning, indeed.

For one thing, it's gratifying to experience, once again, the strong patriotism—and genuine respect for the Armed Forces—that is so characteristic of the citizens of this great state. That sentiment has always been an important source of spiritual strength for Oklahomans who serve their country in uniform. This exhibit will stand as a prominent example of that pride in America and that admiration for the achievements of her defenders. But beyond that, I am truly proud to help commemorate an event that says so much not only about the US Armed Forces and their sacrifices forty-seven years ago, but also about America and about her potential for the future. For a few minutes this morning, I'd like to elaborate on those points briefly.

As I flew here from Washington, I tried to envision what Pearl Harbor—that beautiful locale, which I remember fondly from later, peacetime years—looked like as Japanese attackers descended on it nearly half a century ago.

All accounts indicate it was a glorious morning—the sun was warm, the clouds were high, and there was just a slight breeze. Ninety-six ships of our Pacific Fleet were inside the harbor or patrolling outside the entrance.

On the *Arizona*, coxswain James Forbis had a working party on the fantail, rigging the ship for church services. Fleet Chaplain William A. Maguire commented to his assistant that this was a day for the tourists. Men on duty seemed to agree. On ship after ship they were eating breakfast, getting ready to go ashore to attend church services. Others were looking forward to a day of swimming at Waikiki, while some planned to go to stores downtown—there were only fifteen shopping days left to Christmas.

The calm and serenity of that quiet Sabbath was shattered at 0755 as some 360 Japanese carrier-based bombers, dive bombers, and fighters in a two-wave attack struck targets throughout the island of Oahu. They hit a number of bases, but the enemy's main objective was the Pacific Fleet, especially the eight battleships moored along "battleship row," next to Ford Island in the center of the harbor.

They were like sitting ducks, and the sky literally rained havoc on them. Before five minutes had passed, a direct hit exploded the *Arizona*'s forward powder magazine. Hundreds of men were cut down in a single flash, and ultimately *Arizona* went down with more than 1100 men trapped in her hull.

Several hundred yards to the south, five torpedoes struck the *Oklahoma*'s port side. Heavy bombs and torpedoes ripped the battleship *West Virginia*, which settled to the bottom, her superstructure awash in the oil-shrouded water. When a large fire raged out of control, she was abandoned, as was the *California*.

On the *New Orleans*, Chaplain Howell Forgy did his best to encourage men who were laboring below decks without lights, passing ammunition from magazines to the guns. In the process, he coined a phrase that was to be memorialized in song and become famous as a World War II battle cry, "Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition."

The *Nevada*, shaken by explosions, attempted to clear the harbor. The *Pennsylvania*, *Maryland*, and *Tennessee* were also hit and fought to stave off the destruction, which engulfed their sister ships. On the other side of Ford Island, the target ship *Utah*, blazing from several bomb hits, slipped beneath the surface and disappeared. All told, eighteen ships were either sunk or damaged and most of the Oahu-based Army and Navy aircraft were destroyed or badly crippled.

Tales of heroism and tragedy on that day are legend, in all Services. At Hickam Field, airmen had to shoot off the locks to their aircraft and load bombs by hand while being strafed. One soldier set up a machine gun in a parked bomber and kept firing until flames engulfed the plane.

Second Lieutenants George Welch and Ken Taylor jumped in a car and rushed to Haleiwa auxiliary field, where they managed to get their P-40s into the air. Ranging all over the skies, and landing at least three different times for ammunition, together they bagged seven of the eleven planes shot down that day by Army pilots, and in turn they received the Distinguished Service Cross. At Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, Marines dragged damaged but unburned planes off the runway and mounted machine guns on them to fire at attacking aircraft; others crouched close to the ground and answered enemy raiders with what they had at hand—their rifles.

But Pearl Harbor was at the heart of the holocaust that day. And as enemy planes swarmed like hornets above the columns of dense smoke rising from battered and exploding ships, the men of the *Oklahoma* wrote their own stories of indomitable bravery into our annals. The *Oklahoma* was moored outboard of and starboard side to the *Maryland*, bow pointed toward the harbor entrance, an ideal target for the attacking planes, which dashed in low over the submarine base, dropped their deadly torpedoes, and darted away. When the attack alarm was sounded, Lieutenant Commander William M. Hobby, the second-ranking officer on board the *Oklahoma*, immediately ran topside to be greeted by "a din of gunfire and explosions from all directions," and he felt the ship shudder deeply as the first torpedo hit. Immediately, the wounded warship began listing to port. A second torpedo hit, and then three more in quick succession tore open what was left of her port side.

Streams of men poured topside through the hatches, gathering on the starboard side as the ship leaned farther to the left. As the listing continued, so did the explosions and fuel oil spewed out onto the water and splashed in streams over everything and everyone topside. Finally, the *Oklahoma* rolled over on her side. In the words of one onlooker on Ford Island, it happened "slowly and stately, as if she were tired and wanted to rest." She kept rolling until she was bottom-up, only eight minutes after the first torpedo hit. Hundreds of men had made it up from below and had worked their way along the side and the bottom as the ship keeled over.

Many swam through the oil slick to the *Maryland*, or to the Ford Island landing, or to boats that were shuttling back and forth picking up survivors. There were many cases of men aiding others to swim, and in some cases actually towing their stunned or injured comrades through the waters.

Later Commander Hobby remarked on their calm—and on how they all seemed to be thinking of how to get back into the fight rather than of seeking safety. *Oklahoma* officers and men who got aboard the *Maryland* ran to help that ship's antiaircraft battery. Others, on the dock, asked where they could go to join the battle, and some clambered aboard a tanker that needed more men to help in getting under way. Still others manned rescue boats in the burning harbor. A Marine sergeant named Hailey volunteered for a mission in a small unarmed plane to locate the Japanese fleet. Up he went, rifle in hand, still wearing only the oil-soaked underwear he wore from the *Oklahoma*.

Looking back from our perspective decades later, it's hard to think of a more stirring illustration of the valor and reflexive comradeship of America's Service people in the face of truly desperate combat circumstances. But the drama didn't end when the attackers had left. The ship's executive officer Commander Jesse Kenworthy, Commander Hobby, and others went back out to the *Oklahoma*'s hull and tried to locate and save survivors trapped inside. Ultimately, thirty-two men were recovered alive, and their stories are truly inspiring. Trapped in the dark, immersed in water and oil, many of them were unaware that the ship had heeled over and were uncertain of their location inside her. Some were trapped in groups and had to watch their friends die as they took turns in searching unsuccessfully for a way out. The air grew fouler, and the water rose higher, with the passage of the hours. In one case, a man found a way out—a submerged porthole—but he was himself too large to get through it and was left behind as smaller men escaped. More than four hundred others would perish in similar manner, entombed in that overturned hull. Rescue crews worked feverishly outside, listening for sounds from the lower compartments, poring over blueprints, tapping and waiting for responses, and following directions of the few who managed to escape. Thirty-six hours after the attack, the last survivor was brought out from the wrecked battleship.

Thirteen Navy men earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for their actions on December 7, 1941. Sixty Navy Crosses, sixty-five Silver Stars, and four Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded for gallantry. But every sailor, soldier, Marine, airman, and civilian who answered the call to duty on that day was a hero.

Today—and all days hence at this exhibit—we will honor these heroic deeds and thousands more like them. In a larger sense, however, the more than 2200 Americans who gave their lives on December 7, 1941, serve as a reminder for future generations that freedom is not free, but demands recurring payments of courage, dedication, and service.

So as we pause to relive the acts of heroism and honor the courage and sacrifices of the crew of the USS *Oklahoma*, it's also important that we remember this date in its broader context. For Pearl Harbor marked an important turning point in world history. In a symbolic sense, as the fleet at Pearl Harbor staggered and caught its balance in the months following the attack, American power rose from the depths of ambivalence and

isolationism. All doubts were thrust aside, and for better or worse the United States was thrust into the role of a great power. There was no turning back.

The defeat of 7 December riveted our country together as no other event could. Pearl Harbor became a rallying point for our people. No longer would we sit on the sidelines as tyranny engulfed Europe and Asia. As Admiral Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese Fleet, feared, the attack on Pearl Harbor awakened a sleeping giant. America became one country—enraged, unified, and determined.

Only those of us who lived through that period can truly understand the meaning of these words and how unforgettable it was to see our great nation totally engaged in the pursuit of one common aim. It's unfortunate that we cannot better convey to our children what that means and how awesome America's strength is when it is genuinely energized.

The commitment of the American people was vividly illustrated in factories across the country. The magnitude of our war effort was truly staggering. By June 1944, we were producing 100,000 aircraft a year. We tripled our ship production in twelve months. Between Pearl Harbor and final victory, American industry turned out 87,000 tanks, 315,000 artillery pieces, and almost three million trucks. In all, the United States produced 50 percent of the total allied armaments used against Germany and Italy and 86 percent of those employed in the Pacific theater. The term "Arsenal of Democracy" was not an idle boast.

At Pearl Harbor, the effort was equally remarkable. The *West Virginia*, *California*, and *Nevada* were refloated and sent to shipyards on the mainland. All three were ultimately repaired and saw action in the Pacific. The *Maryland*, *Tennessee*, and *Pennsylvania* were returned to service by early 1942. The quick action and dedication of salvage crews and repair teams allowed most of the ships damaged during the attack to rapidly rejoin the fleet and take part in the war.

These outstanding efforts on the home front complemented our uniformed men and women, who carried the memory of Pearl Harbor into battle with them throughout the world. Over sixteen million Americans rallied to the colors. They fought in every clime, every ocean, and every corner of the globe. On land, on sea, and in the air, from Midway to the gates of Berlin, our servicemen proved that America could and would fight with valor and unswerving determination when its fundamental ideals and institutions were at stake.

What started here in Pearl Harbor as a tragedy produced a crusade that culminated four years later in victory. The three totalitarian regimes which threatened freedom throughout the world had been decisively defeated. Moreover, the planet would never be the same again. Many of the shackles of the past had been thrown off.

By the end of the war, a new international order had arisen. The United States stood as the undisputed leader of the Free World. The nationalism that in postwar years created over one hundred new nations; the philosophical movements of the 1950s and 1960s formed to fight racism; the surge forward in communications and technology, which brought the whole world closer together; the march into space; the tremendous strides in modern medicine—all of these great forces were spawned in the dark days of World War II and nourished by returning warriors as they hammered their swords into plowshares. Pearl Harbor was, indeed, a watershed in American and world history.

Walter Lord closes his book *Day of Infamy* with a moving chapter describing the people and sights around Oahu as December 7 drew to a close. Rumors of every description were rampant. Uncertainty, shock, fear, and anger were common. As evening colors sounded, all work stopped. Men and women snapped to attention and saluted—the simple ceremony taking place as always, despite the day's disaster.

For Ensign Ed Jacoby, trudging to the bog after losing the fight against *West Virginia*'s fires, that ritual reminded him that his country lived on—that it had survived blows in the past and could do so again. Nurse Valera Vaubel joined others at the naval hospital in a spontaneous cheer. At least this sundown she was still free. It says something about America that the thoughts of the survivors would at the end of that horrible day dwell on their country and their freedom. They were right, of course. Our nation, its principles, and its values do have a life of their own.

Today is a time to salute those who gave their all at Pearl Harbor—they are martyrs in their own right. Let us never forget that their sacrifices were made in the name of our way of life. More important, let us never forget they, as free men, "voluntarily" made sacrifices to preserve their way of life. That memory is especially appropriate today when we are often posed with a tradeoff between the quality of our life and our security. A way of life that espouses the dignity of the individual, that opposes aggression and oppression, that believes, no matter what the obstacles, men and women should never willingly relinquish their freedom. This is the heart of Pearl Harbor's legacy to us. In turn, this magnificent legacy challenges succeeding generations to pick up the torch and to insure that the flame of liberty never dies.

This morning, our young people from the Naval ROTC unit at Norman read out the names of those who died on the USS *Oklahoma*. May their generation and those which follow always cherish that memory and honor all that this exhibit commemorates. And may the ringing of the bells across this state, which we have just completed, always resound in the hearts of Oklahomans with the great, enduring lesson of December 7, 1941.

Remarks at the National Defense University
Washington, DC | December 14

Thank you. I'm not so sure how comforting it is to have a Chairman with all those dead-end jobs behind him. I'm afraid you'll break whether you like it or not. I couldn't help thinking as I was walking down the corridor to come in to the auditorium, as you see the artifacts that have been gathered by previous college classes in their travels, that I was always a little surprised that when Neil Armstrong descended on the moon, there wasn't a plaque there that said "The National War College."

Anyway, that's the only spot I knew of in the entire solar system that doesn't have one. I am genuinely pleased to be here today; I try to come annually. I think it's a little more nostalgic today because, according to some transition stories in the local papers, I ought to be grateful that I'm still in Washington at all. That is courtesy of George Wilson.

This tour can be an amazing place at times like this. It's really feverish about who's going to do what, where, and when. I am not heavily involved in that process, but like many of you I suspect, you follow the newspaper reports closely. My everyday problems go on, however, just as usual, whether it's the transition period, or even whether it is Christmas or not.

As you are aware, I work in the Pentagon, and that's a building with five sides—one for every issue. And we see most of those sides in the Joint Chiefs. As Chairman, I sit unfortunately in the middle of controversy a great deal of the time. For example, right now the Air Force wants me to move toward strategic systems. The Army wants me to move toward forward deployments. The Navy wants me to move out of town. It would be a lot funnier if I was joking.

I apologize for the state of my health. It is bad. I just came back from a trip yesterday. My wife says that growing old takes courage.

Someone asked me not too long ago how in the world I came to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I said, "I don't know, it just happened. I don't blame anyone."

I think the Christmas season in Washington is both a time of joy and of trauma. The joy comes from the congressional recess, and the trauma, of course, comes from the necessity to do Christmas shopping and other exciting circumstances. Just the other day, I had a saleslady try to interest me in a teenage doll that has something to do with my family. It was a teenage doll; you wind it up and it resents.

I don't mean to scare those who may be headed for jobs in Washington. I suspect many of you have already suffered that ordeal. I just suspect that perhaps you don't realize how lucky you are to spend a year in refuge, in a place that is devoted and dedicated to ideas and learning. I hasten to add that I know the War College environment has its own frustrations. On visits like this, I am often reminded, of course, of my own academic experiences. At the very least, I advise a certain amount of cynicism where your professors are concerned. I learned early in my academic career that teachers are not always direct, and maybe you must be careful of what they say. In my early days, several of my teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks about. This was designed, of course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts, but I later discovered that it was somewhat misleading. If it had been true, then by the time I was eighteen I would have been a girl. I hope that doesn't offend anyone.

Such disillusionments aside, I truly envy the opportunity that you have this year to widen your horizons, to study your profession, and to exchange ideas with your peers from all of the other Services, and other government agencies as well. Further, you are attending an institution that was in the forefront of the jointness movement, something that is sort of close to me. It was in the forefront of that movement even before there was one. I can assure you, that trend is only going to grow in importance over the coming years.

Obviously, you arrived here experienced in the affairs of your individual Services, and surely also with the esprit that the Service training gives you, gives all of us. These are extremely important, and there's no way that they won't be important for, in the end, they are mainstream skills and attitudes that will also play a central part in warfighting.

Our deterrent strategy requires that we be able to plan, operate, and lead in a truly integrated, cross-Service fashion. Further, budget constraints, which clearly loom on the horizon, force us to make demands for efficient use of our resources, and in my book, that translates into jointness. I encourage all of you to get all of the benefit that you can concerning the joint perspective from your studies. The Nation as a whole and the Services individually will be the winners if you do.

Since the prevailing mood has been so caught up with the end of one administration and the arrival of another, what I'd like to do today is to survey some geostrategic landscape that I see emerging, and some of the resulting challenges that we will confront, or at least in my view, that will confront the incoming administration. And you as NDU graduates will also face those problems.

Let me just say in a prefatory fashion that my remarks will be, of necessity, highly compressed, but I would be happy to expand on them in the question and answer period. I know there's a wealth of curiosity out there. At least there was when I came; maybe I've killed it already. But I'm looking forward to both hearing from you and addressing your queries.

First, let me say a few words about what the strategic landscape looks like from where I sit as Chairman. There are a number of general trends in world affairs that have developed over the last decade, which are molding the international community. I suspect that many of you have had the opportunity to examine them in your studies here and elsewhere.

They include the ever–increasing economic interdependency among nations, the growing dispersion of economic power, the globalization of commercial networks and capital markets, our own deficit problems, the looming debts of the developing countries, and the fact that we are literally standing on the threshold of nothing less than another industrial revolution, which will produce a host of new technologies, materials, processes, and products.

No one can say for sure how these developments will eventually turn out or what this globe will look like as they unfold, but they have already had a profound impact on the international community as well as on the calculations of political leaders. In turn, they have greatly complicated the calculus of defense, thrusting military personnel into a large spectrum of disciplines and communities, both in and out of the government.

In my view, this trend puts a high premium on the ability of our Services to attract and to retain competent personnel who can deal with the sophistication of the modern world. I foresee no change in these trends or in this reality. It also will greatly test rising leaders like you to prepare themselves for responsibilities at the top, which are not easily compartmented according to warfighting specialties or according to Service experiences or even according to our status as military professionals.

President Kennedy once admonished the Joint Chiefs that he wanted them to be much more than military experts when they rendered advice to him on national security affairs. That guidance is even more relevant today and certainly will apply as you rise in the Service ranks. Apart from those broad trends and their indications for your generation,

I can give the picture as seen from my post a little more shape and a brief overview of the world's geographical regions.

Turning to Asia first, I think we find an upbeat story ongoing in that key part of the globe. I would be hard-pressed to find another region in which our long-term policies—economic, political, and security—have been so successful. Here communism is an economic and social model clearly on the wane. The Soviets have fallen miserably in penetrating the Asian marketplace. Democracy has steadily spread, though not evenly, and the recent economic progress, as I am confident you are aware, is in many respects mindboggling.

From the military perspective, furthermore, I would argue that the postwar Asian history has been most satisfying, Vietnam notwithstanding. Washington has worked closely with our friends over the years to provide the security shield that has protected their advancements and aspirations, and it has permitted them to develop in their own fashion and at their own pace.

When I was Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Asian leaders continually emphasized this theme to me and pronounced that US forces should remain forward deployed in the western Pacific. But there is no question that the region now presents us a new set of economic and foreign policy challenges. Indeed, in many ways, Americans are now confronted with the consequences of their success: energetic economic competitors and lively democratic societies that are flexing their muscles and redefining their relationships with the United States. Those dynamics are going to need statesmanlike tending in the coming years, and we are already engaged in those issues.

Likewise, the military realities will still require attention. The reach of Soviet Pacific naval and air power has expanded annually, as does the order of battle at Cam Ranh Bay, and retaining access to bases in the area, I suspect, will be an issue for some time to come. But nevertheless, by and large, from the macro view, from the military perspective, our Asian problems do seem to be manageable. Certainly the progress and stability of East Asia are powerful testimonies to the wisdom of a forward deployed strategy.

In Europe, however, I would suggest or argue that the story of success has similar themes, yet our long-term strategic picture is less clear. America's economic center of gravity may be shifting toward the Pacific, and I argued that it was when I was the Commander–in-Chief Pacific, but our primary foreign policy focus will remain in Western Europe for the foreseeable future, primarily because that is where the most demanding threat and strategic environment still looms. The flux that we have witnessed in recent years promises to continue, and in my view, will complicate matters far beyond what we, Washington and our allies, are accustomed to handling. And let me tell you why.

The free nations of Europe have continued to integrate their markets and have come together on many economic and social issues, all of which may be setting the stage for a strongly European flavor within NATO. Certainly that will be a desirable outcome. Unfortunately, the day is still some time off. In Moscow, meanwhile, General Secretary Gorbachev, who has consumed much of our headlines, is pursuing internal reforms; making overtures to the West, including trade and financial initiatives; and modifying

somewhat the Kremlin's traditional foreign policies. Perhaps I shouldn't have said "somewhat"—fundamentally modifying the Kremlin's traditional foreign policies, totally: engineering the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan; joining with President Reagan in a serious arms reduction effort, namely, INF; and now publicly committing to troop reductions and to force restructuring in both Europe and Asia.

The world is rightly curious as to what is inspiring these rather remarkable developments. My own view is that Gorbachev and his supporters, incidentally including some of his military leaders, have come to the conclusion that the USSR cannot be a first-rate power as long as it is plagued with a third-rate economy and an ossified bureaucracy. He understands that Moscow's global interests in the long run require a better support base, and at least some of the effort they devote to maintaining large oppressively clustered armed forces and to sustaining difficult external adventures could be put to better use internally.

To achieve these goals, he needs time, a stable international climate, and foreign capital. His recent troves will contribute to all three. It is not so clear, however, that the General Secretary can sell the necessary exchanges and sacrifices associated with domestic restructuring to his countrymen.

In Eastern Europe, similarly, the communist economic marvel is spartan. People have grown restive under party rule, and powerfully, there is increasing receptiveness to systemic change. For some time I have believed that these nations have been unreliable allies for Moscow, and if the Kremlin's military presence really does decline in Eastern Europe over the next few years, their desire for autonomy will more than likely become more pronounced.

Many in the West will find this comforting, and it may well be. But it may well signal an era of great uncertainty and instability, which in our business can be rather unsettling. It isn't yet clear where all these developments are taking us. Out amidst all the stirring there is one persistent reality that can't be denied: the Soviet military strength that looms over the continent is still most formidable, still defensive in character, still backed by a vigorous modernization commitment, and even if the promised reductions and restructuring materialize, the Kremlin retains a large advantage on the conventional scales.

There has been a lot of discussion, including Marshal Akhromeyev and myself—the Marshal just retired this week, and I noticed this morning in the newspaper an article as to his relief—a lot of discussion about modifications of the Soviet military leading to a defensive posture. Some of the changes Gorbachev outlined in his UN speech to address these concerns, notably the intention to withdraw forces that are positioned to facilitate quick cross-border thrusts against NATO—armored forces, and bridging capabilities and so forth. If he keeps his promise, it will be a most welcome development and will modify the military calculus fundamentally in Western Europe.

In the meantime, my counsel has been that the best attitude for professional strategists in the West is to be watchful and wary, waiting for the deeds that the General Secretary has said will follow his words. The full impact that we are looking for—force structure, doctrine, and so on—clearly will take time to manifest itself, and Marshal Akhromeyev made that point most emphatically to me. After all, we are talking about

changes to central features of an organizational structure, the most organized structure the world has ever known. In other words, I don't think we should be readying ourselves quite yet to put out another version of Soviet Military Power. On the other hand, I would counsel that we must be patient, and I do mean patient, as well as healthily suspicious. But in the face of these developments, the challenge—and it will be a very, very imposing one—will be to preserve our own strength, to keep our allies unified, and to stay forward abroad until the Soviets can demonstrate in a concrete fashion that they are pursuing these new defensive themes seriously and for the long haul.

Here I am frankly talking about political tasks rather than military ones. That advice or prescription for the future will be easier to say than to do. Unfortunately, Gorbachev is complicating the problem with very astute and disguised appeals to European public sentiment. His initiatives are reinforcing the always-present tendency of many Europeans to discount the threat and to lay down the need for military strength. In security issues, NATO leaders today are sharply divided on the danger, the cost, the need for a foreign presence, environmental concerns, training inconveniences, and so on. This tendency is, frankly, the real heart of our problem, and it spells trouble for the alliance as we proceed with a very large agenda, which includes, among other things, dangers that we will adjust the ways that we share military responsibilities and burdens.

Overcoming these challenges and managing the coalition consensus, or obtaining coalition consensus, will require statesmanship and imagination of a very high order. I hope we are up to it. Clearly, from my tone, I am not as optimistic as perhaps I should be. I hope it's the water.

For some time now, strategists in the United States, in government and in academia, have known that it is in the Third World that perhaps the most likely and direct threats to US interests will arise. Of course, we are seeing that today in our military deployments. Global interdependence plus persistent proliferation of high tech weapons have modified these dangers. A sample listing illustrates the point.

Tensions and age-old hatreds in the Middle East persist, with the prospect of war and episodes of violence as part of everyday life in the region. The Near East cauldron—Pakistan, India and Afghanistan—continues to seethe. Access to overseas oil will clearly preoccupy the world nations well into the next century; witness our current operations in the Persian Gulf. In Latin America, which I returned from last night, we confront an insidious drug trade, self-styled "liberation" movements with built-in anti-US flavor and Soviet, Cuban, or Nicaraguan backing. The threat of terrorism and low-intensity conflict continues to expand around the globe. These few examples make the point that the likely military gauntlet that we will have to pick up in the coming decade will be regional instabilities which threaten our foreign and economic policies, as well as the survival of many of our friends and allies.

We have been steadily enhancing our capability in the counterterrorism area and our ability to mount special US operations, but these are only first steps as we learn to deal with this mushrooming threat. It will require different development, training, tactics, and approaches than traditional warfare. For these kinds of scenarios, furthermore,

America's response depends on a great deal more than just what the Department of Defense can contribute.

Also important are a range of factors concerning public and congressional attitudes, and I'm talking about public education, capabilities of other US policy tools (diplomatic, economic, and so on) and the attitudes of the nations whose interests may be endangered by these low-level threats.

Frankly, there are some very complicated security problems that will continue to arise behind the grand eternal shield that we have erected toward the Kremlin. But to develop and integrate a balanced approach to these issues will be a major test for the new administration, particularly as fiscal pressures grow.

In addition to these international developments, defense planners in the next decade are also going to face some burdensome responsibilities at home. The first has to do with the fact that the military dimensions of daily international affairs tend to be reserved for citizens of the democracies who are enjoying a relatively affluent and placid life. That certainly characterizes our own. And in our republic, that tendency can be sometimes quite pronounced for defense-related considerations to compete successfully with other compelling priorities on the Nation's agenda. In war, we remember the Alamo, the *Maine*, Pearl Harbor; in good times, we forget. As a matter of fact, because of forgetting we have paid an extremely rich price four times within the last hundred years. We forget the strategic accord and the political goals which unify us, and we lose sight of the real dangers of international life and the need for strength to keep them at a distance.

During my tenure in the Chairmanship, I've been wrestling with the effects of some of these peaks-and-valleys cycles. In the early years of the Reagan administration, we saw, and you and I experienced, a marked revival of military capabilities that had been neglected in the 1970s. But now our resources have been constricted by negative real growth in budgets for four successive years, and I am constantly told by congressmen that realities, quote unquote, whatever those are, and they never amplify, will dictate decreasing Defense appropriations for the foreseeable future. Not many of them, however, have much to say to me or to our citizens about overseas threats, international conditions, the status of our forces, or what I would call, in general, the military realities, particularly those that do not conform to their views of the political climate.

This inability to consider strategic questions in a reasonable and consistent manner is both inefficient and dangerous. I am afraid that the bottom line is that you are condemned to working in an inefficient economic environment where economic conditions will continue to expand and contract arbitrarily.

This practice makes steering a straight strategic course extremely difficult. Military leaders are constantly criticizing it, but with very little success. The important point is that you should continue to prepare yourselves to function in a pluralistic and contentious policymaking system that is pushed and pulled by many vested interests outside of yours and mine, the military. It will be frustrating, and I am sure that many of you have already sampled that frustration, but the Nation needs you to continue to engage these windmills and not to withdraw from the fray. There was a line on the new TV sitcom

"Roseanne," which I only watched once—not because I didn't like it, but because I don't get the opportunity—that in a sense speaks to life in the Pentagon. Roseanne's husband told her about friends of theirs who were getting a divorce. She said she wished that that couple could find a way to stay with it, down in the marital trenches, slugging it out on the battlefield, like all the rest of us who believe in "true love."

Now life in the military, or for the military in a democracy, isn't much like a honeymoon, but if you stay in the trenches and slug it out good-heartedly, you *can* win a few, and on occasion, life can be very rewarding. Most important, the stakes are high, and the struggle you are engaged in has to do ultimately with the survival of the republic. And while I am on that subject, let me say something a little more general about serving and leading in this perplexing and often frustrating job. A few days ago, a friend explained to me the difference between a politician and a statesman. A politician makes the possible necessary, and a statesman makes the necessary possible.

Now, this simple witticism is designed to amuse, but it points to what I consider the most urgent problems in government today. While there is no dearth of sound ideas, in this country and in this city and in the military and in the Pentagon, there is definitely a scarcity of leaders who can recognize a truly worthwhile proposal, flesh it out after someone had the idea, drive it through our complex bureaucracy, overcome its naysayers, and ultimately develop sufficient public and congressional support to make it a reality.

Now, that's a tough job. That exercise takes a special brand of leader beyond what we are familiar with in the military's operational environment. It takes intellectual and communication skills as well as a broad knowledge of the mechanical side of our government, and also a special kind of courage and perseverance. These traits are not always so important when we serve in field commands, where people strain in the utmost to work together and to respond to the commander's direction. You will find neither one of those tendencies in Washington.

I believe our professional experience and schooling often slights this aspect of government service. We are often seeking for the good idea instead of teaching and trying to get across how you turn the good idea into a practical, actual, everyday policy. Many of our people are never exposed to this problem until they at least reach the war colleges or come face-to-face with the prospect of a Washington assignment. Yet translating thought into action in a modern republic will take up a good deal of your time in the future.

If I could give you some home-cooked advice, I would strongly recommend that when you join organizations engaged in that sort of endeavor that you identify the front runners in the organization—those people, not necessarily the front runners, but those who you see in the organization who can make the necessary possible in a bureaucratic environment. Study their experience, make their techniques your own, absorb their knowledge and their wisdom. You and the country will profit from that effort.

In a similar vein, another set of domestic problems for Defense issues will arise—and it will not be for the Pentagon to make itself, but to be sure that it continues as a credible

player in our bureaucracy. Simply put, it is imperative that we retain the trust of the President, the Congress, and the public, and we must continue to make strenuous efforts to improve our efficiency and management.

Now, like everything else, I believe that Pentagon management is not as bad as the critics say it is, but I also believe it is not as good as some of the defenders say it is. Nevertheless, we are going to require strong leadership and fully committed followership to implement a wide variety of reforms, which are probably long overdue. Some of these will be legislated, some will be self-generated. But the target is, the bottom line is, we've got to improve our way of doing business.

Now, I know you are familiar with many of these initiatives, probably more than I am. In the military realm, we see a number of them go toward the rubric of jointness, but there is also a range of improvements under way on the civilian management side. Some are further along than others, but there's no question that in all cases our performance will be closely scrutinized by civilian leaders and by a public which is increasingly concerned that we make the best use of the resources they provide us. This challenge, too, will be a major feature of the policy landscape in your professional lifetime. I urge you to give it your fullest attention.

Let me close my remarks with this brief note, lest you think I have painted a picture of nothing but indeterminate challenges abroad and frustrations at home. It is well to keep in mind what that famous Midwestern philosopher Paul Harvey said on the subject, "In times like this, it helps to recall that there have always been times like these."

The challenges I have described are part of my everyday business, and before too long, probably a lot sooner than you think, they'll be a part of yours. We should not underestimate the problems, but on the other hand, our history suggests that we can manage them successfully if we exercise persistence, imagination, and professionalism. I am optimistic in this regard. With my Washington travels, I guess that makes me an incurable optimist. It will take great determination, energy, and above all, consensus-building talents and the help of the Congress and the public. With persistence, I think we can keep Western civilization glued together.

You will be served well in that task by the year you are spending here at the National Defense University. I would also suggest that you would be served well if you can make a career-long commitment for the study of your profession, the study of our government, and above all, the study of successful practitioners within our government. You will also be enhanced by the associations you are developing here with colleagues who will arise alongside you to senior leadership posts. I truly envy your challenge and opportunity. I thank you for inviting me and allowing me to share these reflections with you.

1989
SELECTED WORKS

News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci on the Downing of Libyan Planes in the Gulf of Sidra

The Pentagon | January 4

Secretary Carlucci: Good morning.

The Chairman and I are here to present the facts of the Libyan incident as we understand them at this point—and let me emphasize that. These are preliminary reports. Preliminary reports are never 100 percent accurate. There are always changes in detail. But in the interest of getting to the American public and the world in general the information that we have, we're going to present a statement based on that information. But I urge you to take into account the fact that preliminary reports sometimes do change.

This morning at about 5:00 AM Eastern Standard Time, or 12:00 AM local time in the Mediterranean, two Libyan MIG-23 aircraft were shot down in self-defense by American F-14s with air-to-air missiles. Two parachutes were sighted, and a Libyan search and rescue helicopter was later detected headed for the area.

The US Navy aircraft were operating from the aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy*, which was off the southwest tip of Crete and about 127 miles north of Tobruk, Libya. At the time of the incident, both the ship and its aircraft were conducting training operations in international waters. The two F-14s were providing combat air patrol approximately fifty miles south of the *Kennedy*, which is some seventy miles north of the northeast Libyan coast. The MIG aircraft were detected shortly after they left Al Bumbah airfield at about 4:50 AM EST and were tracked as they closed on the two F-14 aircraft.

The F-14 pilots maneuvered to avoid the closing aircraft. They changed speed, altitude, and direction. The Libyan aircraft continued to close in a hostile manner. At about fourteen miles, the US section leader decided his aircraft was in jeopardy and they could wait no longer. One MIG-23 was shot down with a Sparrow missile. The second MIG was shot down by a Sidewinder missile at six miles.

These Sixth Fleet ships and aircraft were operating in international waters and international airspace at the time of the incident and posed no threat to Libya. These routine operations are of the same type that have been conducted in the same area many times in the past. The Sixth Fleet operations had no connection whatsoever with Libya's newly constructed chemical facility. These operations were conducted over 600 miles northeast of the plant, had nothing to do whatsoever with that plant. We now consider this matter closed.

Admiral Crowe and I are now prepared to take your questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what were the indications of hostile intent? You've mentioned the fact that the Libyan planes continued to close. What else, if anything, was there that told the pilot the Libyans had hostile intent?
A: Bear in mind what I said earlier, that these are preliminary reports. The pilots are being flown to Naples for a detailed debrief, so we will not know the actual maneuvers that took place until we've had the detailed debrief from the pilots. Based on our current information, and I emphasize that point, the pilots descended in altitude from approximately 15,000 feet to 4,000 feet and they took some five different evasive actions. Each time the Libyan aircraft sought to put their nose on our aircraft. They also accelerated. So the hostile intent seems to be fairly clear.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what were the rules of engagement that were in place?
A.: Normal peacetime rules of engagement. There has been no change in the rules of engagement.

Q: There were no communications required then between the F-14s and the *Kennedy*? They didn't have to go back to the *Kennedy* and ask for weapons release authority or anything like that?
A: The lead pilot has the authority to make his judgment on his own.

Q: Did the lead pilot fire both missiles, Mr. Secretary? Did he fire both the Sparrow and Sidewinder?
A: I think both aircraft fired. I think the lead pilot was the one that hit.
Crowe: It's clear both aircraft fired. One was hit with a Sidewinder; one was hit with a Sparrow. We think they both came from the lead aircraft, but both aircraft did fire missiles.

Q: A total of four missiles?
Carlucci: Yes.

Q: Libya has been bloodied in the past by confronting US planes and ships. Why would they do this?
A: You will have to ask them, not us.

Q: They said they expected the US to attack Libya because of this chemical weapons plant.
A: All I can do is emphasize that these were routine carrier maneuvers. Our carrier battle group has been in the Mediterranean steadily. We've had them there for years. It was on a normal training mission. It is en route to port. It will continue en route to port. This has nothing whatsoever to do with all the speculation, and if I may say excessive speculation, that has existed with regard to chemicals.

Q: We in no way provoked them or drew them into this?
A: Absolutely not.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how long had the carrier actually been in the general vicinity, within a 100 or 120 miles of Libya?
A: It had been steaming eastward in the Mediterranean. I don't know how long it had been in that vicinity. Bill?
Crowe: Since the Christmas vacation.

Q: Had it been conducting flight operations on a continuing basis during that time?
Crowe: A few hours each day.
Carlucci: Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, have the activities of the Libyans been normal? Have they been checking out US aircraft a little more than routine lately?
A: We had not noticed any abnormal activities until this incident.

Q: Mr. Secretary, does that Libyan chemical plant pose any eminent threat to the region? And what, if any, threats to US interests?
A: The State Department has indicated that we are greatly concerned with that chemical facility, and I don't think it would be appropriate to go beyond that statement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned excessive speculation when you're talking about this Libyan chemical plant. What has been excessive? What is your concern about that?
A: I've seen all kinds of details and speculation come out in the press. I know you all have your sources and you all think your sources are infallible, but quite frankly, they are not. I've seen a number of details come out in the press that are not accurate. I've seen a number of reports of what the Pentagon is thinking—thinking that has never been brought to my attention. So in my judgment, the speculation has been excessive. But let me emphasize, we do not comment on military contingency plans.

Q: That was triggered by President Reagan's own statements that he was considering a military option.
A: I don't think that's what the President said, if you go back and look at his actual statement. But in any event, the reports I'm referring to are reports you all have been putting out from the Pentagon.

Q: Were the planes capable of making an attack on the so-called chemical weapons plant?
A: If we're going to make an attack on the chemical plant, you would not position your carrier some 600 miles away. I think that's self-evident.
Crowe: Nor use F-14 aircraft.

Q: Mr. Secretary, were there any indications when the MIGs were going to fire?
A: I've indicated that by their maneuvers they were clearly acting in a hostile fashion.

Q: Did they lock on with their radar?
A: Once again, let me emphasize the point. We have some preliminary information that radars were turned on. We do not know the nature of the radars. Until we debrief the pilots, it is really not appropriate to get into that kind of detail.

Q: Mr. Secretary, other than the MIGs that were shot down, were there any other Libyan forces in the area that you are aware of?
A: Not that we're aware of.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you describe any plane-to-plane conversations between the Americans and the Libyans or perhaps any other——
A: That's the level of detail that we shouldn't get into until we've had the debriefing of the pilots.

Q: We understand they were warned. Can you tell us how they were warned?
A: I'm not aware of any warnings.

Q: In the previous week, or ten days, had there been any reports from the area of suspicious or threatening behavior by the Libyans of any kind?
A: No, not to my knowledge.

Q: We had reconnaissance planes up over the past week or ten days around the carrier, and they were never challenged or threatened in any way by the Libyans until this morning?
A: There have been the normal challenges. This activity took place in what is called a "flight information region," where you do have these kinds of challenges to identify aircraft. This has no legal standing. It's a regulation, but these kinds of challenges are normal. We do it ourselves. But that has nothing to do with carrier training operations.

Q: What you're saying is, if the Libyans had behaved the way they behaved this morning a week or two weeks or three weeks ago, we would have shot them down then, too?
A: Any time an aircraft demonstrates clear hostile intent, and on the basis of our preliminary information this is certainly the case here, our aircraft are entitled under the rules of engagement to defend themselves.

Q: What happened after this incident? Was there any scrambling of Libyan jets? Any Libyan activity that followed this incident?
A: Other than the SAR operation, search and rescue operation, I have no indications of any other Libyan activity.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you clarify. Earlier you said you considered the case closed. Does that mean we're back to business as usual; there's no further military action under way? You just go back to where you were?
A: That is correct. We will continue with our training operations, and the carrier will continue its course into port.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Navy is saying the planes were warned in English to break off. Are you saying there was no such warning, or you're saying——
A: I know of no warning. Once again, we will debrief the pilots, but at this point, we know of no warnings.

Q: You said the *Kennedy* had arrived in the area around Christmas time and had begun operations at that point, is that correct?
Crowe: It arrived in the area. It had been in port over the holidays and then left port to go to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Q: When was the last time, prior to that, that it had conducted training operations in this region?
Crowe: I don't know about the *Kennedy*, but we were in this specific area in October.

Remarks in Farewell for President Reagan

The Pentagon | January 17

Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, it is truly an honor for the men and women of America's Armed Forces to be able to pay tribute to you this morning. As you stand at the threshold of new and different challenges—and we all know that life in California can present some really different challenges—we are proud to mount this public demonstration of our respect for your leadership and to thank you for the legacy of strength you are leaving to our next Commander in Chief. We celebrate those contributions not in their own right but for what they have meant, and will mean, to the United States and indeed to millions of hopeful people around the globe.

Mr. President, the men and women of America's Armed Forces are proud of their role in the defense of the American way of life. We know that you set the conditions for their readiness and that you let the American example of liberty and free enterprise flourish.

Yet, that defender's role can be a thankless one at times that seem tranquil to a peace-minded public. Many in this audience have served through more than one of those depressing periods, when our ability to live up to our citizens' expectations and needs eroded badly. Such was the case in the years before you became Commander in Chief. But if the Nation can stay on the course you charted and led, it will not be so again. All that this society stands for will be safer as a result, and I can't think of a better measure

of a man's accomplishment than that. But there is one other thought we'd like to leave you with.

Mr. President, eight years ago, your first Inaugural address urged our citizens to believe in themselves and to work hard together to make America perform as only this country can.

You quoted from the diary of a soldier, Marvin Treptow, who had been killed in action during World War I. In it he said: "America must win the war. Therefore, I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone." You observed that not all Americans will be called upon to make the sacrifices of soldiering. But in their own lives, they could well take a lesson from the spirit of selfless commitment and hope that had animated Marvin Treptow. The colors and the riflemen and women gathered to honor you this morning, Mr. President, are part of that tradition.

Please know that, with you as our Commander in Chief, we have been genuinely sustained by your appreciation of our sacrifices and our service and the spirit of which you spoke in your past eight years; and, we look to the future of this country with confidence.

As for your future, Mr. President, you will leave Washington with our greatest respect and affection. We wish you and Mrs. Reagan Godspeed and, if my non-Navy colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff will pardon the nautical idiom, on their behalf, I wish you fair winds and following seas in all your future endeavors.

Remarks at a Luncheon for Medal of Honor Recipients

Washington, DC | January 19

I'm pleased to be able to host this luncheon today and to talk with this group of genuine American heroes. Of course, I have to admit at the outset that I'm always grateful for even brief respite from my workaday travails in this town.

It's been especially interesting lately—transition frenzies about who's going to occupy what jobs have been a major preoccupation for many people. Frankly, I haven't been heavily involved, but it has made life even more interesting than it usually is. And as a rule, life around here can be pretty testing.

Furthermore, as Chairman I'm embroiled in controversy every day. The Air Force wants me to move toward strategic systems; the Army wants me to move toward forward deployments; the Navy wants me to move out of town. Someone asked me the other day how in the world I got to be Chairman, and I said: "I don't know, it just happened; I don't blame anyone."

In any event, it's a real pleasure to be able to spend time in more tranquil surroundings, and also to meet with people whose contributions to the nation's interests have been literally enduring and not dependent on Washington's unique and often fleeting fascinations.

I might add that your presence here during Inaugural activities is a fitting reminder that the institutions of democracy being renewed in these days have had to be defended

again and again, and that Americans have been called upon not only in battle but also throughout a troubled peace, to lay their lives on the line to secure our way of life. Moreover, each of you symbolizes a bedrock commitment to comrades and country that every public servant, in uniform and out, can take bearings from. The kind of courage you displayed in war is still, in its own way, contagious, and helps to sustain us in our own daily activities. And I can attest from my own experience about how your influence works to great effect out in the country at large.

A few years ago I had the honor of dedicating a memorial to one of your brethren, a World War II Marine PFC from Oklahoma named Albert Schwab, who had been killed in the Easter Sunday assault on Okinawa in 1945. Schwab was a flamethrower operator whose company became pinned down in a valley by a Japanese machine-gun nest on a high ridge to their front. Under a murderous hail of bullets, he scaled the cliff and attacked and eliminated the gun with his flamethrower, only to be taken under fire by a second machine gun. Though he hadn't had time to replenish his supply of fuel, PFC Schwab advanced again and single-handedly wiped out the second enemy position—but not before a final burst had wounded him fatally.

They gave Albert Schwab's Medal of Honor to his toddler son on Memorial Day 1946, back in Tulsa, Oklahoma, his hometown. Almost four decades later, as I officiated at his memorial's dedication in Oklahoma City, the state capital, it was touching to see how his memory had been cherished—down through the years—by grateful Oklahomans from all walks of life, and how his story will always remind future generations in the heart of America's heartland that freedom isn't free.

Each of you has left a legacy of similar reach, and it's an important message indeed in our republic. Tomorrow will mark the departure from office of a President who made that message a prominent feature of his tenure. And I thought I'd share with you some brief reflections about what that has meant to the profession you have shaped so lastingly.

You may recall that in his first Inaugural address, the President urged Americans to believe in themselves and to work hard together to make this country perform as only it can. Significantly, he found the right spirit expressed in the diary of a World War I soldier who had been killed in action, quoting an entry which read: "America must win the war. Therefore, I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone."

In effect, right at the start of his presidency, Ronald Reagan held up the military's tradition of service and sacrifice as the model for our citizens. And as he prepares to leave, I can report to you that that proud heritage has been enlivened under his leadership.

You are no doubt familiar with the Defense revitalization President Reagan has led, and of the achievements of his policies that sought peace through strength. With justifiable pride, he highlighted those contributions in his farewell speech to the Nation last week.

But make no mistake, for the men and women of the Armed Forces, maybe his most important accomplishment was in the spiritual realm, in his highly visible appreciation for our daily labors in posts, bases, camps, and stations around the globe. He made activist patriotism fashionable again. And he made our citizens see the profession of

arms as attractive and honorable once more. As he put it in his farewell remarks to us, the luster has been returned to the reputation of America's fighting forces.

The results can be seen in our recruiting statistics; in the high quality people we have been able to draw to, and retain in, the Services; and in the spirit that pervades the entire establishment. We truly owe Ronald Reagan a great debt for his encouragement, for his recognition of our place in the Nation's life, and for the attention he has given to our problems.

What was particularly striking was that all this truly came from his heart, and it showed through again and again. I remember vividly a ceremony I attended in 1984 when I was CINCPAC. President Reagan was the major attraction. He was departing Hawaii en route to his historic visit to China, and he took time to speak to our honor guard and to many military dependents who had come to see him and pay him homage.

But instead, he turned the tables on us. As he neared the end of his prepared remarks, he set his text aside and added these comments: "You know, many years ago, in one of the four wars in my lifetime, an admiral stood on the bridge of a carrier watching the planes take off out into the darkness bent on a night combat mission, and then found himself asking, with no one there to answer, just himself to hear his own voice, 'Where do we find such men?'" A decade or so ago, after spending an evening with the first returning POWs from Vietnam, Nancy and I found ourselves, as the evening ended and having heard the stories of horror and brutality from men who had been confined as prisoners of war longer than any other fighting men in America's history, found ourselves asking the same question—"Where do we find such men?" After posing that question, the President answered it quickly. He said, "We find them where we always find them when we need them. We found them where we found you—on the main streets and farms of America."

You can imagine how uplifting it was for us to hear that praise from the Commander in Chief; to be identified with authentic, even legendary, American military heroes. And it is just that sort of support that the President constantly gave us.

You can see the effects every day, especially among our young people. The United States has a great deal to be proud of in its Armed Forces, by every measure—in the heritage of courage which you exemplify, in our tradition of victory in battle, in the key everyday missions we take on, in our fine equipment, logistics, training, and so forth. But in my view, the real jewel in our crown is the talent and esprit of the young American men and women who have chosen to serve in the Armed Forces, foregoing many of the amenities that other professions might have brought them. They are the ultimate source of this nation's strength.

I have seen them in peace and war, in times of stress and boredom, in good times and in bad. Unfailingly, they give 110 percent to meet every challenge. And as a result, I have no qualms about this country's defenses. They're in good hands.

Our people out on the battlements are on my mind daily as I go about my business in this town—the young soldier crouching in the darkness of night along the DMZ in Korea; the sailors of the Seventh Fleet crisscrossing an area totaling fifty million square miles, from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day; young Marines guarding our embassies around the globe at a time when the threat of terrorism is omnipresent; Air Force crews ready at a moment's notice to respond to the President's call anywhere in the world; men and women of the Coast Guard, vigilant at sea and in the skies to shield us against close-to-home dangers. I often think, too, of the young Navy wife I saw face the press three days after she had lost her husband at sea. She announced she would be proud to have her six-month-old son choose the Navy as a career.

In recognizing the contributions and tending to the needs of these people, our Commander in Chief has rendered signal service to this nation's security interests. And those who come forward to wear the uniform in the future will benefit greatly from that legacy. They'll share in the renewed professional pride, and they will be able to look to the future of this country with great confidence and hope.

As we bid the President goodbye, I don't know of a better measure of a man's achievement than that yardstick. And that's the thought that will be uppermost in my mind, as we watch another Commander in Chief take the helm tomorrow.

In conclusion, let me just say that, as you are well aware, no military leader in this nation desires war. Those who have seen combat, as you have, know that keeping the peace must be our fundamental mission, and that the primary measure of our success is the ability to deter conflict.

But as a nation, we must remember that freedom requires constant effort and vigilance and, at times, sacrifice—the kind of sacrifice for which our republic is famous. Many great societies have stressed freedom but neglected their security and are now history.

We need both freedom and security. That's what you stand for; that's the idea that animates every man and woman in America's Armed Forces; that's the message that President Ronald Reagan has communicated so well to our citizens for the past eight years. And in my view, that theme will mark out a lasting place in this country's history for him. I can assure you that all our servicemen and women have been proud to help write his chapter in the drama, and we feel well prepared to contribute to the next one. In fact, as you did, we relish the opportunity.

Thank you for letting me share these thoughts with you today, and I wish you well in all your future endeavors.

Guest Appearance on "Cheers," NBC network television
February

Sam. Hey, guys, you are never going to guess who I brought back with me. *Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., in full dress uniform, enters.*
Woody. Sam, how'd you do it? The doorman at the Ritz-Carlton! *Cliff jumps off his stool and snaps to attention.*
Cliff. Oh my Lord! That's Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, himself!

Woody. Wait a minute. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff! The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a doorman at the Ritz-Carlton? Boy, no wonder they charge you so much over there.
Sam. No, Woody. This really is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was at the dinner. Turns out he's a big baseball fan and knew of me.
Admiral Crowe. Yep. No one could give up a towering home run like Sam Malone.
Sam. Thanks.
Admiral Crowe. I wish we had missiles that flew that high.
Cliff, *in awe*. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.—Promoted to Admiral, 1974; Commander, US Pacific Command, 1983; 1985, appointed eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; wife—Shirley.
Admiral Crowe. I'm impressed, young man. How do you know so much about me?
Cliff. Simple, sir. I'm an American. (*He holds out his hand.*) Clifford Clavin, US Postal Service. (*Cliff shakes hands with the Admiral.*)
Admiral Crowe. Nice to meet you, Mr. Clavin. Were you ever in the Navy?
Cliff. I wanted to be, sir. But that darn asthma of mine kept kicking up, so I joined the Post Office. I figured, if I couldn't serve, I should at least deliver draft notices to those who could.
Rebecca. Admiral, I'm Rebecca Howe, manager of Cheers. It's truly an honor to have you in our bar. Is there anything I can do for you? Anything at all?
Admiral Crowe. Go out with this Malone fellow.
Rebecca. Couldn't you ask me to do something more enjoyable ... like say a commando mission in Libya?
Admiral Crowe, *to Sam*. I tried.
Carla. Hey, Admiral, I'm Carla Tortelli LeBec. Listen, could you do me a favor? If you're ever on the USS *Lexington*, could you find out why nobody has ever called, or dropped a card, or sent a note?
Frasier. My, my, who's this?
Norm, *matter-of-factly*. Oh, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Frasier. Uh-huh. I'm Dr. Frasier Crane. Here's my number. I've treated Napoleon, Teddy Roosevelt, and I think I can help you.
Crowe. No, no, I really am the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Fraiser, *humoring him with a salute*. Aye, aye, Admiral.
Norm. Sir, I was a proud member of the United States Coast Guard.
Crowe. Where were you stationed?
Norm. On a beach towel in Fort Lauderdale, which, you may recall, stayed under our flag the entire time I was guarding it.
Crowe. Nice work.
Cliff. Sir, I hope you're not falling for any of that "Glasnost" balloon juice. A Ruskie is a Ruskie, and you can't trust the lot of 'em.
Crowe. Well, we all have to live together. The US military is more interested in peace than war.

Cliff. You really believe that? I don't know if I can sleep well at night, knowing you have that kind of attitude.
The man who said Sinatra enters from the hallway and spots the Admiral. Crowe!
Crowe. I don't believe it. Captain Rosen! My very first commanding officer.
Sam: He was your commanding officer?
Scene dissolves. …
Interior of bar a little later. The Admiral is at the bar, surrounded by our regulars.
Cliff. Now here's what separates my new submarine concept from everyone else's—mine has wheels on it.
Crowe. Why would a submarine need wheels?
Cliff. Detection is everything, isn't it? Where are they going to be looking for submarines?
The good Admiral has heard enough of this.
Crowe. Well, it's getting late, and I've got to get back to Washington.
Everyone ad libs. Nice to meet you, Good Luck, Thanks for coming, etc.
Crowe. Nice to meet you, Sam, and thanks again for the autographed ball.
Sam. Hey, if the President wants one, he knows where he can find one.
Cliff. Sir, about those plans I have drawn up for the new assault vehicle—where can I send them to you?
Crowe. Just send them to the Pentagon.
Cliff. I'm a little worried. If they're just sent to the Pentagon, they could get lost.
Crowe. Right. Send them to Washington. *The Admiral exits.*

Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on US Military Posture
March 14

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on America's military posture in connection with your hearings on the first Defense Budget of President [George H. W.] Bush.

As you know, the President has modified Defense fiscal guidance previously issued by President Reagan and initiated an interagency review of our national defense strategy. In turn, the Department of Defense is reworking programs to square with the new fiscal guidance. Until this work is finished and approved by the President, I will not be prepared to address in detail the Defense budget for FY 1990-1991.

I will proceed to discuss continuities, changes, and uncertainties in the global security environment, all of which will have a considerable impact on the strategic review. Additionally, I will go over the strategic and structural factors which led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to strongly recommend that spending for Defense resume modest real growth by FY 1991.

Military Strategy and Posture

To begin, our national military strategy is designed to safeguard and promote enduring national interests:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation;
- A healthy and growing economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors; and
- A vigorous alliance relationship to bolster forward defense of the United States and collectively maintain peace with freedom in the world at large.

These interests also describe our success as a nation: a representative government freely elected by the American people; a land bountiful in human and natural resources; a strong and diverse industrial base; a vast market for consumer goods; and the world's largest gross national product. No other country in the world has a better economic and competitive environment for pursuing individual and national endeavors.

Basic Objectives

In early 1988, President Reagan submitted to Congress a report on national security strategy, and within this report, you will find two fundamental objectives:

- Maintain security of our nation and our allies by deterring aggression, repelling or defeating any attack should deterrence fail, and ending the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies; and
- Respond to the challenges of a global economy by heeding economic factors that affect our national security, tending to foreign sources of supply in critical areas, and limiting the vulnerability of our supply lines.

These objectives remind us that America cannot choose between military security and economic security. To underscore this point, our economy is irreversibly intertwined with a global network of communications, finance, petroleum, metallurgy, and merchant shipping—not to mention imports of industrial materials and machinery. To maintain a healthy and growing economy, we must use our military establishment to nurture a secure and supportive international environment.

Today, the United States is engaged in a complex array of international relationships and negotiations designed to promote a more stable world community and enduring peace, to reduce the level and lethality of world armaments, and to resolve festering regional conflicts. In some areas, we are making progress, but sound and durable agreements inevitably will require protracted and occasionally frustrating negotiations. This challenge undoubtedly will tax our initiative, resolve, and wits. I would argue as well that to maximize the prospects of success the President should be able to deal from strength.

Military Posture

Meanwhile, our global military posture is designed to keep the peace, prevent small crises from becoming big ones, and deter major hostilities. In practice, we strive to maintain a healthy strategic and theater nuclear capability, field forces of high quality to offset numerically superior adversaries, exploit total force planning with our allies, and limit war reserve material to the time required by industrial mobilization. To effectively manage risks, this posture must be supported by a durable consensus on expenditures for Defense.

Customarily, we do not keep all of our forces ready for combat on an everyday basis. Depending on the situation at hand, we plan to activate our Reserves and, if confronted with a major crisis, draw upon the full resources of our nation. Even with full mobilization, we are not positioned to defend Western Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific Far East simultaneously against a major assault by the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead, we plan to deal with the various theaters sequentially, depending upon circumstances and priorities at the time. These limitations obviously call for close collaboration with our European and Asian allies.

Soviet Military Power

Cutting across the strategic landscape is a more complex and challenging array of continuities, changes, and uncertainties associated with the evolution of Soviet military power.

Legacies of the Past

Legacies of the past include a Soviet military posture designed to defeat every possible coalition apt to oppose the Communist state—plus strong military attachment to the principle that a good defense of the homeland will always require a strong offense terminating in a crushing defeat of the enemy. With this kind of thinking, it is not at all surprising that the Soviet Union has built the largest military establishment in the world.

Enduring elements of Soviet military power are well-known: robust capabilities in space, strategic and theater nuclear forces with intercontinental range, conventional ground and air forces capable of power projection across the entire Eurasian continent, naval forces poised for the denial of Western sea lanes, and heavily armed surrogates near many of the world's oil fields and maritime choke points. Any US military strategy must confront these realities.

The Soviet Union also towers above all other nations in the production of military equipment. Quantity is not the only worrisome part of this picture. For the last two decades, the USSR has been steadily closing the gap (relative to the West) in military technologies. For example, the Soviet Union is on a qualitative par with the United States in such deployed systems as surface-to-air missiles, antitank guided missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, short-range naval cruise missiles, communications, and electronic countermeasures. They hold an edge in antisatellite systems, artillery, chemical weapons, and mines.

Underlying Pillars

On the other hand, the underlying political, social, and economic pillars of Soviet military power are not in good shape. Part of the problem lies in 20 million members of the Communist Party trying to govern the everyday lives of 280 million people and not doing a very good job of it. Lack of political cohesion also can be seen among ethnic minorities occupying territory and clinging to cultures predating the Communist revolution by 1,000 or more years. Many of the nationalities are not emotionally attached to or inspired by the "Socialist Fatherland."

Today, Soviet leadership is beginning to understand that the nation's future depends largely on the productivity, initiative, and satisfaction of 130 million workers—not just Party functionaries. In turn, state planners must improve the quality of consumer goods and services available to the Soviet people as a whole.

Compounding these problems is the Kremlin's central budget deficit, concealed from public view for many years. Investment increases are required in the energy sector to sustain economic growth, in food production to keep pace with population, in the machine tool industries to exploit new manufacturing processes, and in a wide range of government services, including pensions, housing, and medical care. On top of these demands, the Kremlin is confronted with previously unprogrammed costs associated with disaster relief for the people of Chernobyl and Armenia. Yet, state revenues have sagged in the face of falling world oil prices (a major export).

Given these resource problems (more of which seem to surface every day), I was not surprised by unilateral force reductions announced by General Secretary Gorbachev last December. I was impressed by the size of these reductions (500,000 troops) and the time frame (two years) within which he intends to accomplish them. I suspect he must now let the internal wounds heal before going further, but I do anticipate more initiatives.

Meanwhile, the Soviet military faces challenges of a related but different order. Today, Minister of Defense Yazov and an increasing number of other leaders seem genuinely concerned about sagging patriotic support for the "Socialist Fatherland," recruits not prepared for the moral and physical rigors of compulsory military service, officers lacking "fatherly concern" for the troops, poor operational and technical discipline within the ranks, too much damage to combat equipment in the field, and lack of candor in readiness reporting.

Overall, the Soviet military establishment is having a tough time insulating itself from political, social, and economic problems cutting across the nation as a whole. By admitting that these problems exist, however, the Kremlin has taken the first step down a long and, I suspect, difficult road of shifting from quantity to quality in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. How this will affect their net military capabilities remains to be seen.

Net Assessment

Moving on to my annual net assessment, some preliminary words are in order about force reductions announced by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

At the moment, the USSR and its allies are focusing on ground forces. If carried out, these reductions will affect the balance of land power in Europe and Asia. Opposite NATO's Central Front, Warsaw Pact reductions also represent a good down payment on Gorbachev's pledge to move toward a less offensive posture. We must, of course, verify and satisfy ourselves that these reductions actually occur in the time frame and on the scale promised by the Kremlin.

It's also important to note that much of the global military picture remains untouched by these Soviet reductions—for example, activities in space, strategic nuclear forces, strategic mobility, and support for states who sponsor terrorist acts. It is not clear yet whether maritime units will be included. Further, military balances in the Third World will be affected more by Soviet arms transfers than by reductions they plan in the Far East, Southwest Asia, or the regions opposite NATO.

Overall, I am less inclined than usual to predict the future military balance. However, the latest net assessment does provide a relatively complete picture of where we and our allies stand today in comparison with the Soviet Union and its allies. While covering this ground, I will mention demands placed upon our combatant forces as well as their preparedness to deal with these demands.

Maritime Defense

As a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States is pledged to defend the Atlantic and Mediterranean as a whole. This commitment is most challenging in the Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Soviets contemplate a campaign of sea denial. We are confronted with similar problems in the Pacific, where Soviet naval power overlaps lines of communication to the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Today, we would fare well in this contest: a product of our nuclear attack submarines, carrier battle groups, maritime patrol aircraft, surface action groups, and replenishment units—plus support provided by our allies in the form of choke point control, mine clearance, land-based tactical aircraft, and especially naval escorts. All of this presumes high readiness and sufficient warning time to reach assigned operating positions before the outbreak of hostilities.

What happens in the Atlantic and Pacific remains very sensitive to our ASW posture. While making substantial investments in nuclear propulsion, quieting, and stand-off weaponry, the Soviets have not cut back sharply on their force of attack submarines—still over 300 in number. To confine this threat to home waters and to establish the needed control over vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) will require an all-out effort by the bulk of our Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Throughout, we must achieve high exchange ratios in the design and operation of our nuclear attack submarines. We also are counting heavily on our maritime patrol aircraft, Active and Reserve, to monitor approaches to the mid-ocean SLOCs and to the United States itself.

On balance, the mobility and capability of our naval forces represent one of our greatest advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its surrogates. They will be useful in containing the Kremlin to a land campaign and in confronting the Soviets with a wide and unpredictable number of threat axes. Similarly, they buttress our ability to communicate with our allies and to project our own air and ground power in either major or limited hostilities or peacetime crises (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This is a flexibility the Soviets do not enjoy to the same degree.

Strategic Mobility

The United States maintains strategic mobility forces to underwrite overseas treaty commitments and, at times, to keep small crises from getting out of hand in the Third World. For rapid deployment of troops, we depend largely on airlift. For tactical mobility on the ground (helicopters and vehicles), we rely on a mix of pre-positioned equipment, wide-bodied air transports, and sealift. Most of the follow-on ammunition and fuel will go by sea. Overall, we are well postured for contingencies short of a major war.

Soviet reliance upon strategic mobility forces is driven, in part, by the vast size of the country, marginal road and rail lines linking Russia to the Far East, and reliance upon regular military forces to deal with internal security problems. Both sealift and airlift support a steady stream of Soviet arms transfers to clients in the Third World. As seen in the Afghanistan campaign, Soviet air transports also can be used to project significant military power to adjacent countries.

Given a crisis involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union would have an initial advantage in reaching Western Europe due to short distances and a developed road and rail system. The Kremlin also has an advantage in merchant shipping which can be commandeered easily for military purposes. In contrast, we would have a tough time mustering the ships necessary to reinforce Western Europe in accordance with our goals—a consequence of insufficient capacity as well as ownership, flags, and ship crews shifting away from NATO to semi-industrial and nonaligned nations of the world.

Once hostilities commenced, the Soviet merchant fleet would find itself confined to home waters, bottled up in neutral ports, or otherwise out of action. In contrast, their strategic airlift provides a robust wartime capability to swing forces between the European and Asian theaters—all within Soviet airspace. This capability will improve substantially with the new AN-225 air transport, which can lift some 500,000 pounds of cargo—or twice that of our C-5B.

One other aspect of our mobility deserves comment. If fiscal realities were to require force reductions both at home and overseas, our mobility assets would become even more crucial. We would expect any scaled down forces to be able to deploy quickly and effectively throughout the globe, but this could only be achieved with adequate modernized lift.

Space

Over time, the United States and the Soviet Union have acquired a hefty reliance upon the space environment for communications and intelligence in peace, crisis, and war.

By most measures—infrastructure, launch boosters and payload, numbers of space vehicles and sensors, and activities and time in space—the Soviet Union has a pronounced lead over the United States. In technical sophistication, miniaturization, and satellite reliability (or the time before normal decay in orbit), the United States still enjoys a comfortable lead. Thus, we do not have to launch as many satellites to keep the same number in orbit during peacetime.

In crisis or conflict, our chief concern is with Soviet antisatellite systems, which place some of our communications and intelligence at risk. This is a main element of the military balance where we find ourselves lacking a deterrent. Yet, the credibility of our strategic deterrent and the effectiveness of our general purpose forces increasingly depend upon a secure position in space.

Overall, America does not need to match the Soviet Union by increasing its space launches four-fold or its time in space three-fold. The United States, however, does require significantly improved space launch capabilities. Moreover, we cannot tolerate a marked Soviet advantage in capabilities to destroy or disable satellites. Thus, I fully support a larger and less constrained investment in antisatellite systems by the US government.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

With respect to the strategic nuclear balance, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have neglected investments in strategic warning systems, and both have a reliable and credible capability to detect preparations for an all-out nuclear strike, although our warning system is more sophisticated.

Each side does approach strategic nuclear parity in a different way. For its part, the Soviet Union has more balance in strategic offensive and defensive systems. Their triad of land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and bombers is complemented by substantial investments in leadership survival, strategic air defense, antisatellite devices, and the world's only ABM system. In the Krasnoyarsk radar, they have gone beyond limits of the ABM Treaty.

Additionally, Soviet strategic offensive forces are more dispersed and hardened than those of the United States. In the case of ICBMs, they have exploited government control of vast lands within the Soviet Union and placed most of their missiles in very hardened silos or on mobile launchers. When it comes to military targets, our computer-supported analyses always show that Soviet ICBMs give the Kremlin a relative advantage in "damage expectancy." This lead means little, however, in the overall nuclear calculus.

For its part, the United States must maintain general nuclear parity with the Soviet Union by means of strategic modernization programs set in motion over the last decade: more firepower in the Trident class submarine, improved accuracy and hard target kill capability in the submarine-launched D-5 missile and the land-based Peacekeeper missile, and the long range and high accuracy of air-launched cruise missiles.

These strategic modernization programs are "vital" as the Soviets continue to improve their active and passive defenses, especially, as we move into a START regime. Beyond these weapon systems, our most pressing current problem is to resolve the mobile missile issue. Put bluntly, a healthy strategic deterrent is the cornerstone of our overall defense posture and compensates to a real extent for some of the shortcomings in our theater nuclear and conventional forces. It serves a similar function for many of our allies.

Further, research on the Strategic Defense Initiative serves warning that the United States will not allow the Soviet Union to monopolize the field of antiballistic missile systems and shows considerable promise for an ultimately nonnuclear defense posture.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Starting in the mid-1960s, NATO became increasingly dependent upon theater nuclear forces to compensate for conventional shortcomings and provide options short of a strategic nuclear exchange. The USSR responded in kind and eventually outnumbered the United States in intermediate and shorter-range missiles. The INF Treaty will eliminate these types.

Major asymmetries continue in short-range nuclear missiles, favoring the USSR. Additionally, NATO's practice of relying upon dual-capable tactical aircraft raises worrisome questions about the survivability and attrition of these assets at the outset of a conventional war. In part, we can hedge this risk by relying more on rear area bases or seaborne platforms (TLAM), but SACEUR genuinely needs a modern nuclear battlefield system as seen in a follow-on to Lance. I also believe very strongly that NATO and the Pact have a shared responsibility to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe.

Conventional Forces

Today, America's conventional strength around the world is relatively adequate to deal with a wide spectrum of peacetime crises and limited contingencies. The most stressful and worrisome challenge, however, would be a full-fledged conflict with the Soviet Union and, in turn, the task of defending NATO Europe alongside our allies.

NATO/Warsaw Pact

As a founder and member of NATO, America is committed to the forward defense of Western Europe and, if necessary, the restoration of allied territory. Only forces of the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, threaten the territorial integrity of NATO Europe.

Over the years, no region in the world has been subjected to more military assessments than the Central Front of Europe. Results are fairly consistent—the deterrent stance of NATO forces has worked for forty years. Deterrence is, of course, a complicated and uncertain calculus with a high political and psychological content. In Europe, I believe it is fundamentally a product of allied political cohesion (who wants to declare war on sixteen nations), America's global strength, the Free World's predominant economic position, internal problems in the Soviet Union, and the cutting edge of NATO forces positioned on the Central Front.

If deterrence fails and the initial defense falters, allied forces will face an unsatisfactory outcome: possible loss of considerable territory or, in the alternative, the prospect of resorting to theater nuclear weapons. In turn, we want to make conventional defenses as strong as possible to lessen the need to use nuclear weapons.

Countless studies and programs have addressed measures to enhance the conventional defense of NATO and reduce the prospects of a nuclear spasm. But today NATO is still not able to mount a genuinely effective conventional defense against a determined Soviet campaign. In the final analysis, only adequate conventional forces can offer an assurance against both aggression and the prospect of nuclear war—i.e., large numbers of well-trained forces, weapon systems capable of yielding high exchange ratios, tactical expertise in combining arms, adequate inventories of modern munitions, and sufficient combat logistics support.

At the moment, NATO defense planners are looking at high leverage technologies and a host of other measures to more effectively blunt the initial attack. Obviously, this is the first order of business for an alliance long preoccupied with deterrence. When it comes to defense, however, NATO's Central Region does not have the number of troops and weapons nor the inventories of preferred and common munitions necessary to prevail in a high intensity conflict of several months or more with the Warsaw Pact.

Of great concern is the possibility that NATO may not make the investments necessary to correct this situation. Perhaps unilateral Soviet reductions or conventional arms negotiations will redress the balance, but it is much too early to rely on such judgments. In fact, experience would argue that the best way to bring the Kremlin's leaders to the table is to enhance our own strength. The most frustrating aspect of this picture is that the United States cannot solve this problem alone. Without allied cooperation and willingness to spend more, a successful conventional defense of Western Europe will be extremely difficult to mount.

Put simply, the most glaring weakness in our global posture is our inability to adequately defend Western Europe conventionally. This shortcoming does not necessarily mean that Europe is in immediate jeopardy or that our deterrent policy will be ineffective. As mentioned earlier, deterrence has a number of elements besides sheer military strength. It does mean that we should look closely at our overall policies and insure that we are realizing the highest return on our investment in terms of deterrence. This is especially important today as we confront the prospect of little or no growth in defense appropriations.

Having stressed NATO in order to note our most pressing military challenge, the following comments address other regions of special US interest.

East Asia and the Pacific

In the Pacific, forward defense of the United States (Alaska, Hawaii, and the Marianas) is bolstered by our alliance with Japan. In turn, we are committed by treaty to the territorial integrity of Japan and by another agreement to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. To maintain a favorable balance of power in the region, we must protect lines

of communication to China as well as Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Today, I judge the posture of US and allied forces in the Pacific sufficient to deter the Soviets from a major attack in that theater and, if deterrence fails, prevent them from achieving their military objectives. The Republic of Korea is similarly equipped to deal effectively with any threat from the North that does not involve either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

Two words of caution are in order: First, the Soviet Union has been increasing the reach and firepower of its air and naval forces in the Pacific and supporting a general upgrade of tactical air forces by North Korea and Vietnam. Second, we are confronted with political pressures on bases in the Philippines. In short, we must sustain our air and naval strength in the Western Pacific and, at the same time, remain flexible on base options. This is not an easy situation to manage.

Southwest Asia

In Southwest Asia, US security interests are tied closely to energy objectives—namely, access to oil at reasonable prices. The Persian Gulf has more reserves than any other region in the world, and no producer can lift petroleum out of the ground at less cost than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Should the Soviet Union ever decide to co-opt the Gulf oil fields, their divisions and tactical air forces could overwhelm the regular troops of Iran, but they always have to worry about what happens next. Our gaming suggests, for example, that the Central Command (CENTCOM) can contest a Soviet military foothold in Iran and probably maintain some access to the Persian Gulf. When stiff resistance by the Iranians, multilateral responses by the West, and support by the Gulf Cooperation Council are added to the picture, the Soviets would be confronted with even more serious problems than they encountered in Afghanistan.

Again, the Kremlin cannot overlook the fundamental global strength of the United States. Even if successful in Iran or the Gulf, their progress would be limited to the water's edge, and America's ability to project power would severely hamper Soviet use of captured oil facilities.

Latin and Central America

Turning to Central America, the situation is in a state of change. The five Central American countries recently have concluded an accord designed to bring democracy to Nicaragua and disband the Nicaraguan Resistance or "Contras." We are assessing the impact on the region and on our overall objectives. Up to now, Nicaragua has worked against peace with freedom in the region, virtually ignoring terms of the Arias Peace Plan. The burden of proof is still with the Sandinistas. Above all, they must respect human rights within their own country and stop interfering with their democratic neighbors.

Meanwhile, the United States is faced with a crisis in Panama and sagging confidence in leadership of the Panamanian Defense Force. A resolution will be painful and probably protracted as Panama sorts out its political and economic problems.

Concurrently, we are confronted with the illicit trafficking and production of narcotics in Latin America, posing a threat not only to the integrity and stability of governments to our south but also to the social fabric of the United States itself.

Against this background, I much prefer to see a bipartisan agenda for the region and an enhanced security assistance program keyed to the everyday threat of low-intensity conflict within the region. Over the next several years, however, America will have to rely primarily on its own forces to protect US lives and property, improve air and sea surveillance of the Caribbean, fend off coercive moves by Cuba and Nicaragua, bolster US commitments under the Rio Treaty, promote regional stability generally, and support the drug interdiction program. We are competent to do this, but it will take persistence, time, and some reordering of our priorities.

International Terrorism

Cutting across the international scene is a persistent threat of state-supported terrorism as seen in assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings. While the Kremlin professes to have no interest in this form of coercion, some of its allies and surrogates remain deeply involved in the training, covert passage, and arming of terrorist groups.

In response to this threat, an ounce of prevention by civil authorities is worth much more than a pound of military cure. But it's very tough to provide a point defense of every public meeting place or conveyance. Thus, when and where it is possible to do so, we depend heavily upon our Special Operations Forces. In this regard, I can vouch for their professional expertise, but I cannot promise success in every instance. In fact, some acts of terrorism are so disastrous and conclusive that there is not much anyone can do to help after the fact.

Given these realities, I believe we must make terrorism more costly for the nations who support it. Our Special Operations Forces have a role in this process. In practice, we also depend upon our conventional military forces to send a strong message to states known to have a role in specific acts of terrorism, Libya being a noteworthy example. Sometimes the international community has accused us of being heavy-handed, but this must be weighed against no deterrent whatsoever to this form of aggression—normally conducted against innocent civilians.

Preparing for the Future

At this point, many members of this Committee may be wondering how the US government cut $300 billion from the five-year defense plan contemplated in Fiscal Year 1985 and still managed to end the decade with a position of considerable military strength.

Three factors account for this transition: First, President Reagan placed a high priority on the strategic modernization program, alliance commitments, and the everyday excellence of our combatant forces. Second, the military Services postponed conventional force goals planned in the early 1980s, slowed down modernization programs, and cut back on the buildup of war reserve material. Third, our combatant forces continued to

receive new fighting vehicles, combat aircraft, and naval warships funded during the FY 1979-1985 defense buildup.

In essence, you may like many aspects of the foregoing assessment of current capabilities, but you must understand that this assessment is largely the product of Defense investments made during the early 1980s. What happens in the 1990s is a function of spending for defense today. Consider, for example, the implications of 2 percent versus zero or less real growth in spending for Defense over the next five years.

Two Percent Real Growth

With 2 percent real growth, as proposed by President Reagan, we could continue on course with our strategic modernization program, maintain a balanced conventional force, nourish research and development programs, and protect a combatant force of high quality.

We would not be able to replace major items of combat equipment on a one-for-one basis. This means, in effect, that the United States will be moving toward a smaller conventional force throughout the next decade. Granted, newer generations of combatant equipment may be more effective than the last, but we would not have the numbers of today.

Substantial trade-offs will be required in the aviation sector. The Army would have to reduce its helicopter fleet from 8,500 to 6,500 platforms; the Air Force would go from 37 to 35 tactical fighter wings; the Marine Corps would be cutting back on AV-8B and MV-22 (Osprey) procurement; and the Navy would rely on Reserves to man 2 of its 15 carrier air wings.

With respect to naval combatants, we would have to defer achievement of an amphibious lift capability for one Marine Expeditionary Force plus a brigade until the late 1990s. The Fleets would remain short of AAW destroyers throughout the next decade, and we would go below 100 nuclear attack submarines while moving ahead with the new SSN-21.

Further, we will be right at the margin when it comes to protecting a force of high quality: military compensation barely keeping pace with inflation (not comparability with the private sector), more deferral of depot maintenance, a growing shortfall of base facility maintenance, and depletion of war reserve material in the interest of peacetime training and exercises. Obviously, these practices could not continue as an open-ended proposition. These and other implications of 2 percent real growth can be found in the last annual report of Secretary Carlucci.

No Real Growth or Less

No real growth or less would pose even more serious and risky choices between competing priorities within the Defense budget. For example, if we place a high priority on strategic modernization, advancing military technologies, and the everyday quality of our combat forces, we will have in turn to cut back sharply on conventional force structure or current modernization programs. In either case, overall conventional military strength would go downhill.

All of this would occur at a time when we are trying to become less, not more, reliant upon nuclear weapons to deter on the Central Front of Europe and other forward areas.

Further, we would not be able to stand fast while negotiating a reduction of conventional forces in Europe—unless, of course, we are prepared to accept a marked and adverse shift in the Pacific balance of power.

Alternatively, we could try to nourish a supportive global security environment, hold the line on current commitments, and protect conventional force structure. In this case, we would have to postpone strategic modernization programs, cut back on research and development, and allow further depletion of our war reserve materiel.

Slashes of this type would translate into an aging triad of strategic offensive forces and lower investments in the SDI—not a good combination in terms of deterrence or our leverage in START. Moreover, we would not be investing as much as we should be in conventional military technologies and our Defense industrial base. Yet, we know that America's prowess in high technologies is the best hedge we have against uncertainties surrounding the evolution of Soviet military power.

Simply put, we cannot get more defense for less money. In fact, we are at a point where even small cuts in Defense outlays will translate into disproportionate reductions in current or future military capabilities.

Amended Defense Budget for FY 1990–1991

Against this background, President Bush has issued new fiscal guidance to the Department of Defense calling for no real growth in FY 1990, followed by 1 percent real growth in FY 1991-1992 and 2 percent in FY 1993. About $16.2 billion will have to be cut from the FY 1990-1991 budget submitted by President Reagan and over $60 billion from the five-year plan as a whole.

As you are aware, President Bush places a high priority on strategic modernization. Similarly, he agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders that we must nourish the everyday excellence of our military establishment. Thus, managing the initial decrement of $16.2 billion will require deeper trade-offs between conventional force structure and modernization.

Pending the strategic review ordered by President Bush, some argue that we should protect conventional force structure and take the cuts in procurement accounts. The resultant impact, however, will be less upfront funding and fewer benefits from multiyear procurement. More important, we will be confronted with further slippage in critical aircraft and missile modernization programs, as well as additional backlogs in depot maintenance, etc.

If we concentrate the cuts on force structure, the question is where and how to do it. Some believe that we should stand fast in the forward areas and focus on our CONUS-based forces. Others argue the opposite case. In any event, saving money requires us to eliminate altogether some Active units.

These simple examples illustrate the complexity and difficulty of the choices. Complicating the picture are the uncertainties in the international picture. Are we confident that Gorbachev will succeed, that he will survive, that START is a done deal, that regional instabilities will not persist, that the drug problem is in hand, that third

country terrorism is on the wane? I submit that it is premature to reach any of these findings. On the other hand, just as our "peace through strength" policy is beginning to bear fruit, there are those who would jump to these conclusions in order to save money.

A much more thoughtful way to do business would approach the problem carefully and scale down as our confidence increases. Most important, if we are forced to take substantial force cuts, the Congress would be well advised to dovetail these with progress in the arms reductions talks. It is with these kind of thoughts in mind that President Bush has ordered a broad-based strategic review to examine our approach to the whole panoply of problems. This review is being conducted to make recommendations not only to the Executive Branch but also to the Legislative arm.

It is clear at this point that with decreasing funds we cannot be strong everywhere, and we cannot continue to do what we do today effectively. This reality portends change perhaps in force structure or modernization or both. Certainly, to drop below the recommended budget for several years will require significant rollbacks and would mark a decreased departure from present security policy. Such a decision should not be taken lightly. Consequently, to get the most for our investment both in economic and strategic terms, we will be well advised to move gradually and to coordinate these moves with the international climate—i.e., Soviet moves, arms control progress, and allied relationships. To ignore these factors and to slash Defense appropriations precipitately would be ill-advised at best and disastrous at worst.

Conclusions in Sum

America will enter the 1990s spending little more than 5 percent of its Gross National Product on Defense. This is a very modest investment considering the size of this product, the worldwide spread of commitments, the global foundations of our economy, the importance of a stable and secure international environment, diverse and recurring threats to the national interests, lingering concern about the evolution of Soviet military power, and a strong American interest in promoting freedom and democracy in the world at large. Every day, our nation benefits from a military establishment respected by friends and adversaries alike.

Over the last four years, the United States has worked out a relatively reasonable balance between our various global responsibilities. In the process, however, our forces are tightly stretched and the level of our capabilities involves more risk than the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer. Specifically:

- All of our Active and Reserve forces will not be ready on an everyday basis to defend NATO, Southwest Asia, or the Pacific Far East against a major threat from the Soviet Union;
- In the unlikely event that deterrence fails and we engage the Soviet Union worldwide, we will have to sequentially reinforce and defend the various theaters; and
- On NATO's Central Front, we may be forced to trade space for time or to consider resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Neither option is very palatable.

Concurrently, the United States is challenged to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, a secure position in space, a supportive maritime environment, and strategically mobile ground and air forces.

While the time seems right to develop a more stable and sustainable relationship with the USSR, the United States and its allies must remain wary of Soviet military power. Even after unilateral force reductions announced by Gorbachev, the USSR will have an active military establishment in the neighborhood of 4.6 million personnel. Granted, the Soviets seem anxious to follow the INF Treaty with a START agreement and conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals, but little has occurred that we can rely on. Further, it remains to be seen whether the Soviet process of substituting quality for quantity in Armed Forces structure will translate into reduced military capabilities. This is a critical transition we will have to watch and measure throughout the 1990s.

Today, the Department of Defense is challenged to provide more forward looking, fully integrated, and fiscally constrained advice to the President and the Congress. Yet, civilian and military leaders in the Pentagon will never be able to deliver the goods without a durable consensus on spending for Defense.

At this point, we cannot get more defense with less money. With the fiscal guidance of President Bush, we can move into the next decade with much of the military strength we have today. Granted, we may have to ease toward a smaller conventional force, but this will occur in a gradual fashion—not as a precipitous decline apt to undermine our alliance relationships, reduce our leverage in international negotiations, and cause massive turbulence in our military establishment.

At any level of spending for Defense, we must protect a force of high quality—the backbone of our military strategy, our strongest card in crisis management, and the best hedge against uncertainties surrounding the evolution of Soviet military power. Quality requires more than the exploitation of advancing technologies; we must as well nourish the everyday excellence of our combatant forces and people.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, I have tried to arm you with my best estimate of what various spending levels will do to our military posture. You may decide that you want to spend less than President Bush has proposed, but I would urge you first to consider the entire picture.

Remarks at the Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island | March 30

I'm genuinely pleased to be here at Newport today. Of course, I admit that any trip outside Washington is a good trip.

We may be living in the era of jointness, and I know Admiral [Ronald J.] Kurth has emphasized that in your curriculum here, but the Pentagon is still the building with five sides, on every issue. As Chairman, I sit right in the middle of all those controversies, every day. The Air Force wants me to move toward strategic systems. The Army wants me

to move toward forward deployments. The Navy wants me to move out of town. Not long ago somebody asked me how in the world I got to be Chairman. I said, "I don't know, it just happened; I don't blame anyone."

I suspect that some of you don't realize how lucky you are to spend a year in a real sanctuary for ideas and learning. I hasten to add that I know the war college environment has its own frustrations. On visits like this, I'm always reminded of my own academic experiences. At the very least, I advise a certain amount of skepticism where professors are concerned. I learned early in my academic career that you have to be careful of what teachers say.

When I was growing up, my teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks about. That was designed, of course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But I later discovered it was somewhat misleading. If it had been true, then by the time I was eighteen, I would have become a girl.

Such disillusionments—and frivolity—aside, I appreciate the invitation to talk with you today. I truly envy the opportunity you have in this year to widen your horizons, to study your profession, and to exchange ideas with Navy colleagues and peers from other Services. That experience, and the many friendships you acquire here, will enrich your lives in countless ways, wherever you go.

You arrived at Newport tested and proven as operators and leaders in your war-fighting specialties. And no doubt each of you has been infused with the strong esprit that service training and experience give us. That technical excellence and fundamental bonding have always been—and will always be—central attributes of fine military forces and successful operations. Today we also need military officers who can plan, operate, and lead in a truly integrated, cross-Service fashion.

The nature of modern warfare, the demands of our deterrent strategy, and the budget constraints that loom on the horizon force us to make the most efficient use of our resources. I would suggest that translates into a strong jointness imperative. It doesn't mean we're going to give up Service loyalty or all the positive things that our early training brings us. But it does ask our leaders to develop a better balance, to equip themselves to function in a multi-service environment, to appreciate the merits—and problems—of other services, and to bring an open mind to joint responsibilities.

I encourage you to get all the benefit you can concerning the joint perspective from the remainder of your studies here, as well as from your colleagues in other Services. The rewards for you as individuals and as military professionals will be substantial, but ultimately the Nation will be the real winner.

The second clear need that your War College experience meets is to go beyond war-fighting and to broaden your knowledge of national security affairs. Believe me, preserving the peace in today's rapidly changing world is a challenge of the first order. I suspect that you have had the opportunity in your classes and discussions to reflect on a number of trends and pressures that have been remolding the international community in recent years.

They include the ever-increasing interdependency among nations, the growing dispersion of economic power, the globalization of commercial networks and capital markets,

our own deficit problems, the looming debts of the developing countries, and the fact that we are standing on the threshold of nothing less than another industrial revolution. No one can say for sure how these developments will eventually sort out or what our globe will ultimately look like as they unfold, but they have already had a profound impact on the calculations of political leaders. In turn, they have greatly complicated the defense calculus, thrusting military people into a wide spectrum of disciplines and communities, both in and out of government.

This trend puts a high premium on men and women who can comprehend and deal with the sophistication of the modern world. I foresee no change in this reality. Your generation must prepare to assume responsibilities which are not easily compartmented according to war-fighting specialties, or according to service experiences, or even according to our status as military professionals.

My message—and appeal—is that you should strive to develop such a broad-gauged view of your profession as you rise in rank. It should govern your personal preparations and influence your thinking about future assignments. Even more important, let it inform the way you counsel and develop your people.

President Kennedy once admonished the Joint Chiefs that he wanted them to be much more than military experts when they rendered advice to him on national security affairs. That guidance is even more relevant today. I urge you to give it your best shot as you move ahead. With those remarks as background, what I'd like to do for the next few minutes is to survey some major features of the geostrategic landscape that I see emerging, and some of the resulting challenges ahead for Washington in the 1990s.

Of necessity, my observations will be highly compressed, but I would be happy to expand on them in the question period. I know there's a wealth of curiosity out there—at least I'm sure there was when I started a few minutes ago. I'm looking forward to both hearing and addressing your queries.

Turning to Asia first, we find an upbeat story unfolding in that key part of the globe. I would be hard-pressed to find another region in which our long-term policies—economic, political, and security—have been so successful. Here Communism is a discredited model clearly on the wane. The Soviets have failed miserably in their attempts to penetrate the Asian marketplace. Democracy has steadily spread, though unevenly, and the region's economic progress has in some respects been mind-boggling.

From the military perspective, furthermore, I would argue that the postwar Asian story is a relatively satisfying one, the Vietnam War notwithstanding. Washington has worked closely with our friends to provide a security shield that has permitted them to develop in their own fashion and at their own pace, without external interference or intimidation. And they know our help has been crucial. When I was CINCPAC, Asian leaders continually emphasized this point to me and urged that US forces remain forward-deployed in the Western Pacific. But there is no question that the region presents us a new set of economic and foreign policy challenges. Indeed, in many ways Americans are now confronted by the consequences of success: energetic economic competitors and lively democratic societies that are flexing their muscles and redefining their relations

with the United States. Those dynamics are going to need statesmanlike tending in the coming years. Our dealings with Japan on the FSX illustrate these complexities well. [The FSX was envisioned as a successor to the F-1 support fighter aircraft; it was never built].

Likewise, the region's military realities will still require attention. The reach of Soviet Pacific naval and air power has expanded annually, as does their order of battle at Cam Ranh Bay. While the long-term outlook for balance on the Korean peninsula remains favorable, the North's current force modernization, historic hostility, and continuing unpredictability highlight the importance of close cooperation between Seoul and Washington. Moreover, throughout the region, retaining access to bases will be an issue for some time to come—even in the Philippines.

From a "macro" perspective, however, the security dimensions in Asia seem to be manageable—within the context of a forward-deployed American strategy. And I think the past successes of that policy provide strong incentive to maintain it in a region whose importance to the United States is growing steadily.

In Europe, however, I would contend that while the story of success has similar themes, the long-term politico-military picture is less clear.

Washington's primary strategic focus will likely remain on Western Europe for the foreseeable future, because that is where the most demanding threat still looms. Yet the flux that we have witnessed in that region in recent years promises to continue, and in my view will complicate matters far beyond what we are accustomed to handling. Let me tell you why. The free nations of Europe have continued to integrate their markets and have come together on many economic and social issues, all of which may be setting the stage for a stronger European pillar within NATO. Certainly that will be a desirable outcome, but that day is still some time off.

In Moscow, meanwhile, General Secretary Gorbachev is pursuing internal reforms, making highly publicized and often favorably received overtures to the West (including trade and financial initiatives), and fundamentally modifying the Kremlin's earlier foreign policies—notably in engineering the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, joining with President Reagan in a serious arms reduction effort, and publicly committing to troop reductions and to force restructuring in both Europe and Asia. Gorbachev has also announced cuts in military production and the redirection of defense plants to civilian output.

Make no mistake, these are significant steps, and they move in directions we've been encouraging for years. In the military realm, if carried out, they will impact on the balance of land power in Europe and Asia, virtually eliminate the surprise attack option for Soviet ground forces, and more generally provide a down payment on a shift to a less-offensive posture.

The world is rightfully curious as to what is inspiring these remarkable developments. My own view is that Gorbachev and his supporters—including some of his military leaders—have come to the conclusion that the USSR can't be a first-rate power as long as it is plagued with a third-rate economy and an ossified bureaucracy.

He understands that Moscow's global interests in the long run require a better support base, and that at least some of the effort they devote to maintaining large Armed

Forces and to sustaining external adventures would be put to better use internally. To achieve these goals, he needs time, a stable international climate, and foreign capital. His recent moves make gains on all three fronts, but it is not so clear that he can sell the necessary changes and sacrifices associated with domestic restructuring to his countrymen.

In Eastern Europe, similarly, the communist economic model has sputtered, people have grown restive under one-party rule, and probably there is increasing receptiveness to systemic change. For some time, I have believed that these nations have been unreliable allies for Moscow, and if the Russian military presence really does decline in Eastern Europe, their independent tendencies could become more pronounced. Many in the West are finding this comforting, but it may also signal an era of great uncertainly and instability, which in our business can be rather unsettling.

It isn't yet clear where these developments are taking us. But amidst all the stirring, there is one persistent reality: the Soviet military strength that looms over the continent is still most formidable and is, moreover, largely untouched by Mr. Gorbachev's promises. Even if his declared reductions materialize, the Soviets would still have some 4.5 million men under arms, vastly superior numbers in nearly every category of ground weapons systems, plus a massive strategic arsenal, impressive naval power, and a burgeoning space capability. Those facts will remain for strategists of the 1990s to confront.

In the meantime, my counsel has been that the best attitude for the West is to be watchful and wary, while awaiting the deeds that the General Secretary has said will follow his words.

The full impact that we are looking for clearly will take time to manifest: after all, we're talking about changes to central features of an organizational culture that may be the most rigidly structured the world has ever known. In other words, I don't think we should be readying ourselves quite yet to publish the next edition of *Soviet Military Power* on a 3-by-5 card. But in the face of these developments, the challenge—and certainly it will be an imposing one—will be to preserve our strength, to keep our alliances united, and to stay forward-deployed abroad until the Soviets can demonstrate that they are pursuing their new "defensive" philosophy seriously and for the long haul. Here I am, frankly, talking about political tasks rather than military ones, and my capsule prescription will be a lot easier to say than to do.

Unfortunately, Mr. Gorbachev is complicating the problem with very astute appeals to public sentiment, reinforcing the always-present tendency of many Europeans to discount the threat and to play down the need for military strength. On security issues, NATO electorates increasingly debate the danger, the costs, the need for a foreign presence, environmental concerns, training inconveniences, etc. Speaking candidly, this tendency is the real heart of our problem. It spells trouble as we attempt to keep the Alliance healthy for the future.

For some time now, strategists in the United States—in government and out—have known that it is in the Third World that the most likely and direct threats to US interests will arise. A sample listing illustrates the point. Tensions and age-old hatreds in the Middle East persist, with the prospect of war and episodes of violence part of everyday

life in the region. The Near East cauldron of Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan continues to seethe.

Access to overseas oil will preoccupy Free World nations well into the next century; witness our operations in the Persian Gulf. In Latin America, we confront an insidious drug trade, self-styled "liberation" movements with a built-in anti-US flavor and Soviet, Cuban, or Nicaraguan backing. The threat of terrorism and low-intensity conflict continues to expand around the globe. These few examples make the point. The most likely military challenge in the coming decade will be regional instabilities which threaten our foreign and economic policies as well as some of our friends.

We have been steadily enhancing our capability in counterterrorism and special operations, but these are only first steps as we learn to deal with this mushrooming threat. It will require different approaches, equipment, and tactics than traditional warfare.

For these kinds of scenarios, America's response depends on a great deal more than just what the Department of Defense can contribute. Also important are a range of factors—for instance, public and congressional attitudes, the capabilities of other US policy tools (diplomatic, economic, etc.)—and the staunchness of nations whose interests may be endangered by these low-level threats.

Developing an integrated and balanced approach to these threats will be a major challenge for the bureaucracy, particularly as fiscal pressures grow—witness Panama and our drug problems. In addition to these international developments, defense planners in the next decade will continue to face a troublesome climate at home.

The first has to do with the fact that the military dimensions of daily affairs tend to be obscured for citizens of democracies who are enjoying a relatively affluent and placid life. In our republic, that tendency is sometimes quite pronounced. It is often difficult for defense-related considerations to compete successfully with other priorities on the Nation's agenda. In war, we remember the Alamo, the *Maine*, Pearl Harbor; in good times, we forget—we lose sight of the real dangers of international life and the need for strength to keep them at bay.

During my tenure in the Chairmanship, I have been wrestling with the effects of one of those peaks-and-valleys cycles. In the early years of the Reagan Administration, we saw, and you and I experienced, a marked revival of military capabilities that had been neglected in the 1970s. But now our resources have been constricted by negative real growth in budgets for four successive years, and in spite of what the administration now plans for Defense (level with inflation this year and slow growth later), I am constantly told by congressmen that "political realities" will dictate decreasing Defense appropriations for the foreseeable future. Not many of them, however, have had much to say—to me or to our citizens—about overseas threats, international conditions, the status of our forces, or what I would call the "military realities." Unfortunately, it is hard to accommodate both views, and political imperatives will most often prevail.

This is an inefficient and often dangerous way to approach security issues. But I'm afraid that you are condemned to working in an environment where appropriations will continue to expand and contract arbitrarily. This practice makes steering a straight

strategic course rather difficult. Our DOD leaders have constantly criticized it—but with little success. This, again, emphasizes the need for you to prepare to serve in a policy-making system that is pushed and pulled by many vested interests outside the military. It will be frustrating, but the Nation needs you to continue to engage these windmills and not to withdraw from the contest.

A few days ago, a friend explained to me the difference between a politician and a statesman. A politician makes the possible necessary; a statesman makes the necessary possible. That's a simple witticism designed to amuse, but it points to what I consider the most urgent problem in government today. While there is no dearth of sound ideas in this country, and in Washington, there is definitely a scarcity of leaders who can recognize a truly worthwhile proposal, flesh it out, drive it through our complex bureaucracy, overcome its nay-sayers, and ultimately develop sufficient public and congressional support to make it a reality.

Now, that's a tough job. It takes a special brand of leadership. It takes intellectual and communication skills, a broad knowledge of the mechanical side of our government, and also a special kind of courage and perseverance.

I believe our professional experience and schooling slights this aspect of government service. We are often seeking the perfect answer instead of teaching how you turn the good idea into practical, actual, everyday policy. Yet translating thought into action in a modern republic will take up a good deal of your time in the future.

If I could give you some home-cooked advice, I would strongly recommend that you identify the people in your organization who can make the necessary possible in a bureaucratic environment. Study their experience, make their techniques your own, and absorb their knowledge and their wisdom. Both you and the country will profit from the effort.

In a similar vein, another set of problems for Defense leaders will arise from the need for the Pentagon itself to remain a credible player in our government. Simply put, it is imperative that we retain the trust of the President, the Congress, and the American public, and we must continue to make strenuous efforts to improve our efficiency and management.

Like everything else, Pentagon management is not as bad as the critics say it is, nor is it as good as some of its defenders say it is. Nevertheless, we are going to need strong leadership to implement a wide range of reforms which are long overdue.

You are familiar with many of these initiatives on the military and civilian sides of DOD. Some are farther along than others, but there's no question that in all cases our performance will be closely scrutinized by politicians and the public alike. This challenge, too, will be a major feature of the landscape in your professional lifetimes.

Let me close my remarks with this brief note: lest you think I've painted a picture of nothing but indeterminate challenges abroad and frustrations at home, it's well to keep in mind what an old philosopher, Paul Harvey, said on the subject: "In times like these, it's helpful to recall that there have always been times like these."

The problems I've described are part of my everyday business, and before too long (probably a lot sooner than you think), they will be part of yours. We should not underestimate the problems, but on the other hand, our history suggests that we can manage

them if we exercise persistence, imagination, and professionalism. I am optimistic in this regard. With my Washington travails, I guess that makes me an incurable optimist.

On your watch, it will take great determination, energy, and consensus-building talents—and the help of Congress and the public—but it can be done. You will be served well in that task by the time you are spending here at Newport.

I would also suggest that you make a career-long commitment to studying your profession, your government, our history, and above all, successful practitioners within the government.

Remarks to Welcome Mr. Dick Cheney to Duties as Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon | May 8

It is a pleasure for me, on behalf of my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all forces, to preside at this ceremony officially welcoming Mr. Dick Cheney to his duties as Secretary of Defense, and we are proud also to extend warm greetings to his wife, Lynne, herself a widely respected leader in Washington. Together, this couple constitutes an impressive partnership, and we in the Department of Defense are privileged indeed to begin an association with them.

Though we are rendering this first welcome salute to the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney has, of course, been on the job with us for some weeks and has already had to endure an extended welcome of quite a different sort—the low-budget variety, so to speak of. And as he himself has admitted, it has been a learning process, even at times an emotional roller coaster, with some confusing ups and downs—especially on his Pentagon elevator.

Somebody said that for years Mr. Cheney strode the corridors of the White House and Congress with distinction and aplomb, but he quickly discovered that it's easy to lose your way in the Pentagon. He knows his way around, now. In fact, since taking office he has adeptly handled an array of formidable and pressing national security problems:

- Maintaining cohesion among strong-minded allies;
- Dealing from strength with long-time adversaries; and
- Participating in dialogue with observers of various contending persuasions.

And all that's just in twenty-four hours!

Incidentally, I should make it clear that if my remarks about Mr. Cheney seem somewhat understated to you, I'm operating under some mild constraints today. Despite his impressive beginning as Secretary, he said I shouldn't try to predict how he'll do in the long term. Something about hazarding guesses being hazardous business.

Mr. Cheney comes to DOD at a particularly interesting and significant time. As America's Armed Forces formally mark the opening of Cheney's tour at the Defense Department, they can be proud of what they have accomplished in securing this country's global interests and promoting international stability. Yet it is also true that when

our civilians look out on the world, they see an international scene that seems to be in considerable flux.

For a decade and more, after all, the pace of change has been genuinely mind-boggling: with an ever-growing dispersion of economic power; emergence of the Soviets flexing their muscles on the world stage; for the first time, burgeoning technologies that propel us into a future that literally has no road map, and not only is there no map for what lies ahead but as Americans look out on the global stage, they see continuing political turmoil, terrorism, and regional conflict; and they know that potentially hostile military forces loom over whole continents and threaten vital lines of communication. At the same time, they see their nation involved in a more complex spectrum of international relationships and negotiations, with more riding on them than ever before.

Additionally, while they watch democracy and free enterprise take root among developing nations and thrive everywhere, they also witness the agonies and frustrations inevitably attending that phenomenon. Among our long-time adversaries, they see stirrings that suggest signs of hope, including military changes—moves have come belatedly and slowly, amidst the defensive shifts. They also see political shifts but only on the margins of a huge military establishment. Many of our citizens scan that horizon of emerging opportunity coupled with perplexing uncertainty and of promise coupled with the legacy of a troubled past and two major lessons emerge.

The first is that the favorable prospects we may find in our potential adversaries have not developed fortuitously or naturally. They are in large part the consequences of successful policies the United States has pursued, in conjunction with many allies and friends, for more than forty years. This can be cause for great satisfaction and confidence.

But the second lesson argues against complacency. It has taken a great deal of American effort, sacrifice, engagement, and leadership to get us to this point. In particular: it has taken sustained, determined effort in the security arena to deter aggression; the internal craftsmanship to forge a bulwark of our countries; and the projection of strength behind which countries can seek economic and political maturity in their own fashion and at their own pace; and the creation of a world order in which free institutions can flourish.

Indeed, it is a plain fact of international life that America's Armed Forces, strong and forward-deployed, have been an indispensable pillar, not only of our freedom and affluence but also of the liberty and prosperity of many hopeful peoples around the globe. That international strength has been the umbrella under which all our cards have been played. That same power, arrayed against evolving threats, will have much to do with how the future unfolds: Our leadership knows in the years ahead we will need clear-sighted vision to sustain the posture to explore opportunities for great geostrategic security, while also attaining the defenses that bring those opportunities within reach, and to master change, while also keeping a weather eye.

It is indeed fortunate that a leader of Dick Cheney's caliber will be at the Pentagon's helm during this time. He brings wide experience and special central qualities to the job. He has been a long-time student of and participant in war-gaming, rising to the top levels

in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. He has seen the multiple burdens of the Commander in Chief up close, as a key advisor to two Presidents. In Congress, he rose quickly to leadership posts and won the enduring confidence of colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Moreover, this former congressman from Wyoming remains closely attuned to the heart of America as he grapples with the most demanding issues of international security and strategy.

On the governmental process, I can attest personally to his keen mind, his capacity for hard work, his fair-mindedness, and his thoughtful approach to addressing the long-term national interest.

All these assets will stand you in good stead, Mr. Secretary, and they augur well for our future. But I would add just a few more entries to this general catalogue of the resources available to you—and to the President—as you move forward. You can:

- Depend on the skill and commitment of the men and women in America's Armed Forces, and on their faithful service on the battlements every day.
- Be sure that they are led by talented commanders well-prepared for their missions. You can look to the concerted efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the soundest military advice we can muster.
- Be certain that no potential adversary can lightly contemplate any direct challenge to the aggregate strength we represent.

Unquestionably, we are a formidable team. And speaking for all our people in uniform, I can say that we are gratified to have the opportunity to serve with you as we address the challenges that lie ahead.

Remarks at a DOD News Briefing for the Admiral's Upcoming Trip to the Soviet Union
June 6

Good morning.

A number of journalists inquired about my trip to the Soviet Union, and since time did not permit me to meet individually with them to discuss the forthcoming visit, I thought it might be helpful if I, just for a few moments, spoke to you collectively.

I will be leaving Thursday evening and arrive in the Soviet Union on the 12th. This is in a very real sense an extension, or a return visit, to the call that Marshal Akhromeyev made last summer. It is an extension of the military-to-military contacts program which he and I agreed to. We both concurred, in our discussions last summer, that since the courage of our political leaders was bringing our countries closer together, and they were seriously engaging the issues that divide us, that it was incumbent upon our two militaries to look seriously for ways to contribute to this process. That is the main purpose of my return visit to the Soviet Union.

I will, of course, attempt to establish a relationship with General Moiseyev, who is my host. I hope to see first-hand, close-hand, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. I will be visiting installations in every Service. Likewise, I anticipate the opportunity to talk to many Soviet citizens, as Marshal Ahkromeyev did in our country last year. I will have discussions in Moscow which will address, I believe, the mutual concerns of our two militaries, and we will be, in an informal fashion, looking for ways to advance on those problems. With that, I'll be happy to submit myself to your questions.

Remarks on the Signing of the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
Moscow | June 12

The signing of this agreement culminates nine months of hard work by the joint working group Marshal Akhromeyev and I established last year to examine ways of lessening the risk to our Armed Forces that may arise when they operate in proximity to one another, and of preventing tensions that may be created by certain military activities. In the entire history of our countries' relationship, this was the first direct military-to-military consideration of these matters at the top level of uniformed leadership. From that standpoint alone we, should mark this ceremony as a significant event. And of course, because such a development was unthinkable only a few years ago, it signifies as well how far the courage of our political leaders has brought us toward developing a more sustainable, larger relationship between our countries.

Setting aside history and the broader context, however, the agreement is important on its own terms. I congratulate General [George Lee] Butler and General [Anatoly] Bolyatko, and all the others who contributed to the effort, for promising a document from which their comrades-in-arms will benefit for years to come. From all of them, on both sides, you have earned a hearty, "Well done."

On a very personal level, I might add, this event is a most satisfying one for me. Near the end of a career that has brought me unexpected opportunities to serve the interests of peace, I have been proud now to participate in developing these procedures intended to diminish tensions and dangers associated with military activities. After all, the fundamental mission of our Armed Forces is to prevent war. This agreement rests on that very proposition. That we have found such common ground and outlined practical ways of cooperating augurs well for the future of our professional relationship.

General Moiseyev and I have already had the opportunity to discuss these and other important issues, and I look forward to further discussions as my program here in the Soviet Union proceeds.

DOD Press Release Regarding the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement

An executive agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the prevention of dangerous military activities was signed at 8:45 AM (EDT) today in Moscow. The agreement represents the first direct military-to-military consideration of these matters at the top level of uniformed military leadership. The signatories on behalf of the US and Soviet governments are Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman, JCS, and General Mikhail Moiseyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff.

The signing ceremony culminates a nine-month process of discussions and negotiations by a joint working group set up by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff. The working group has been coordinated on the US side by Major General George L. Butler and on the Soviet side by General Major Anatoly Bolyatko. The American team brought to the negotiating table a group of experts from William J. Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, the various military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department, who, along with their Soviet counterparts, explored issues and concerns of each side concerning military activities, which have the potential for creating tensions between our two countries. The agreement commits both nations to seek to prevent four kinds of dangerous military activity. Dangerous military activities, for the purposes of this agreement, are certain activities of one party's Armed Forces when such Armed Forces are operating in proximity to Armed Forces of the other party during peacetime. Specifically, the unintentional or "force maneuver" (emergency) entry into the national territory of the other side; the hazardous use of laser devices; the disruption of military operations in a mutually agreed upon "special caution area" (an area of high tension such as the Persian Gulf, where both sides have forces in close proximity); and interference with the command and control networks of either side.

The agreement also contains stated procedures for establishing communications necessary to prevent dangerous military activities, to resolve incidents peacefully, and to exchange and discuss information regarding such activity or incidents as may arise. Finally, the agreement contains a provision to set up a Joint Military Commission, which will meet periodically to explore and evaluate issues relating to dangerous military activities. The executive agreement is of indefinite duration.

Remarks on "The US-Soviet Military-to-Military Relationship" at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy

June 13

It is a high honor for me to visit your country at the invitation of General Moiseyev and especially to speak to the staff and students of the renowned Voroshilov General Staff Academy. The program has already been filled with memorable events and warm Russian hospitality. But no military man could fail to be impressed—indeed, profoundly moved—

upon entering this academy's beautiful marble hall and seeing the names inscribed here: many graduates of this academy have risen to positions of national leadership, and all followed in the footsteps of a long and distinguished line of professionals dedicated to serving their nation.

That sense of heritage, that proud history, clearly is well-tended by those who will lead the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union tomorrow. In the American Armed Forces, we too find strength and sustenance in our traditions of serving our republic and its people.

We are, of course, brought together today by more tangible and immediate events. The very fact that I am here attests to the drama and promise of recent developments in our larger bilateral relationship.

Depending on the international climate, we have known each other at arms-length—as in the years of hostility and suspicion that others dubbed the Cold War, and with arms linked—as in that historic moment in 1945 on the Elbe River, when tired American and Soviet troops met and celebrated their mutual cause and triumph.

In my professional lifetime, we have been allies in a grueling war, then wary adversaries in a troubled peace, and now we are challenged to collaborate with national leaders advocating new courses to promote peace and mutual security. You and I are literally members of a transitional generation—re-examining the way our two societies have thought about and dealt with one another for many years.

Today I would like to devote my prepared remarks to observations about the military relationship between our two great nations—about its past, about the realities of the present, and about the promise of the future. In our question and answer session I will be happy to address those subjects—or any others you would like to pursue—in greater detail.

Our military-to-military relationship was born in a time of trial, when the United States extended lend-lease assistance to the Soviet Union during World War II, your Great Patriotic War. During that association, many US and Soviet Servicemen grew to know one another well, and some of the Americans even joined in Soviet military operations. For instance, our sailors and merchant seamen struggled with yours to maintain the supply lines to Murmansk and Archangel; some rest there today as testimony to that joint undertaking. Our pilots worked together to ferry bombers between allied-controlled Western Europe and airfields in the USSR. There were other joint supply operations between Alaska and Siberia, and military cooperation in the Balkans, as well. And of course, there was that joyous linkup at the Elbe.

The memory of that cooperation, limited as it may now seem to have been, and the respect American Servicemen came to have for their Soviet counterparts have endured through the passing years and through the vicissitudes of international life.

The time of friendly, face-to-face collaboration was short-lived, of course, and replaced by the postwar era of confrontation in a divided Europe and elsewhere. But I think it is noteworthy that even in those times people in uniform on both sides played important and constructive roles in a host of tension-reducing activities in:

- Establishing military liaison missions in divided Germany, for instance, and initiating dialogues between US and Soviet commanders. Contacts which persist to this day;
- Making arrangements for routing traffic in the Berlin air corridor;
- Negotiating and subsequently implementing the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement;
- Arms reduction talks and risk reduction measures;
- The SALT, START, and conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna;
- The 1975 Helsinki Agreement and the 1986 Stockholm accord;
- The Standing Consultative Commission; and
- The vital INF verification mechanisms in both countries.

Overall, this brief historical overview argues that, despite the unevenness of developments in the past, there is a great deal for us to build on in the present. Moreover, it tells us that there have always been eminently good reasons for military officers to be involved in the international endeavors to promote peace and stability.

Certainly, there has never been a time when it was more important than today for our Armed Forces to appreciate their role in larger events. Without dwelling on the historical pressures that shattered the wartime bond between our two governments, the fact is that the military strength of both sides is part and parcel of the circumstances that divide us. The imposing nuclear arsenals, advanced space technology, extensive conventional forces, and the global military reach of the Warsaw Pact and NATO cast long shadows. Each side believes its strength to be necessary for its own security. Similarly, each perceives the other's power to be a serious threat which cannot be ignored.

Likewise, the increasing sophistication and reach of our weapons steadily reduces the room for error and raises the level of uneasiness all across the globe. More important, a steady stream of political, environmental, social, and economic problems are crying for attention, and solutions are hindered by the drain large forces place on our pocketbooks.

Make no mistake: the challenges presented by our history are immense as we attempt to satisfy the current social and economic pressures without jeopardizing our safety. But that should not discourage or deter us. The political leaders of our two great nations clearly are determined to confront this challenge squarely. Due to the political courage of Chairman Gorbachev and President Reagan and now President Bush, America and the USSR are engaging seriously the great issues which divide us. In turn, it is incumbent upon the Armed Forces of our two nations to look for ways to contribute positively to this effort. It was in that spirit that I invited Marshal Akhromeyev to the United States last year to visit our Armed Forces and to meet our citizens.

On that path-breaking journey, he held long and detailed discussions with American military leaders. He went to sea on a newly commissioned aircraft carrier, visited a nuclear missile silo, witnessed a field exercise, and then toured a bomber base. He had the opportunity—indeed, he seized many opportunities—to interact with a broad spectrum of young Service men and women. That trip was unprecedented, in both the itinerary and the discussions, which were full, frank, and directed to fundamental issues. He

and I had long conversations about our respective homelands and instructive exchanges laying out our individual security perspectives.

We reached several general conclusions. First and foremost, it is imperative for our two militaries to search for ways to contribute to the larger process of reducing tension between our two governments and promoting stability. As Marshal Akhromeyev said last year, "You can't accomplish the paramount task of today, the prevention of war, without the military. This is why leaders are active as never before in the process that should lead to the prevention of war…."

We agreed that one of the prominent roadblocks to improved relations was the "mistrust" between Moscow and Washington that had developed in the postwar era. Genuine progress requires that we promote mutual understanding and find ways to attenuate resentment and suspicion. It is essential for each side to have as clear an understanding of the other as possible—free of stereotypes and reflexive suspicions.

With that goal in mind, we were able to agree on a program for further military contacts. This framework provided for two paths: a Joint Working Group on "dangerous military activities," and a two-year schedule that includes reciprocal visits by military leaders, historians, warships, medical workers, and sportsmen.

I think it is important to note that the Joint Working Group is the first direct military-to-military exploration of these matters coordinated at the top level of command. The group has recommended a number of actions and procedures that will put the members of our Armed Forces at less risk when operating near each other in peacetime. Their work resulted in the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities that General Moiseyev and I signed yesterday.

The two-year program of exchanges has also proceeded apace. I am very pleased with its success, and I hope that when we review it together in 1990 we can continue to expand the areas of exchange and cooperation.

In a similar vein, I believe the Marshal and I came to the conclusion that arms reduction initiatives are fundamental to improving our relationship. Such efforts to succeed will require the wholehearted support of our two Armed Forces. There are many technical questions to be sorted out which can only be answered by those with arms expertise. Moreover, it is imperative that negotiated draw-downs be made in a fashion that offers each party a suitable balance and a dependable level of security throughout. Here again, sound judgments by our military leaders will be essential.

To facilitate progress, we agreed on the necessity for a frank exchange of views and a better understanding of each other's doctrine and goals. We recognized that there are limitations on such contacts. All nations naturally have unique perspectives—due in part to different histories, locations, and strategic circumstances.

Secretary Carlucci touched on this subject last year, and I think it is useful for me to reinforce the point. The Soviet Union is an enormous country with huge reserves of natural and human resources. Military professionals in the USSR, charged to defend far-flung borders encompassing a vast expanse of land, naturally emphasize territorial integrity.

The United States, by contrast, is a nation whose welfare has always depended heavily on international intercourse. In Washington, planners think primarily in terms of assured access to the sea lanes that are our lifeline, and also of the safety of our allies, friends, and trading partners abroad.

In turn, each country's forces and capabilities will be shaped by those realities. Understanding these limitations will help us to accommodate differences in view.

Lastly, the Marshal and I readily acknowledged that the tasks ahead are daunting ones. It will take a great deal of time, patience, persistence, and thoughtfulness before all the obstacles can be overcome. But the stakes are immense and justify extraordinary effort. We must not flag or become discouraged—there simply isn't any responsible alternative in our age.

Personally, I am optimistic as to the ultimate outcome and as to the positive role our respective Armed Forces can play in this drama in the coming years. Turning to the future of our relationship, both Moscow and Washington will need to ponder carefully how to move our military-to-military dealings forward. Appropriate areas for discussion and exchange must be carefully defined in alignment with security interests and in light of real world developments.

There is no gainsaying, of course, that there are important questions yet to be answered and differences to manage. Last August, in his speech at this academy, then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci outlined some of the trends and uncertainties we see in Washington. He focused particularly on the evolution of your military doctrine toward a more defensive posture. I had similar discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev, and—as you might imagine—this subject remains of great interest not only to Americans but to many others around the globe. Acknowledging this interest, your leaders have counseled patience and urged that we continue to watch for proof of that shift.

We have, indeed, been very attentive, and some changes have been visible. From our standpoint, however, we occasionally see contradictory indicators which we hope time will sort out satisfactorily. In that regard, the force reductions and restructuring announced by Chairman Gorbachev at the United Nations last December provided an additional glimpse of what the formula "reasonable sufficiency" might mean. If the basic programs are carried to fruition, they will represent an important step in addressing some of our long-standing concerns about the preponderance—the sheer weight—of your forces, and especially their posturing for the offensive, including surprise attack.

You must understand as well the way we look at the unilateral proposals of your government. As we see it, these draw-downs will affect only the margins of Soviet military power. Granted, they focus on units that fight the theater war, but even after the anticipated reductions, you will still possess the world's largest active military establishment, as well as a larger inventory of military hardware than all of NATO combined in many categories of equipment.

Speaking candidly, it is rather difficult for Americans—and those in many other countries—to see how such a massive array of power is mandated by the legitimate needs of defense.

It is fundamental for you to understand as well our professional concern regarding current asymmetries in the arms balance. Take for example the European case. Beyond what anyone may believe about the intentions of your leaders or the character of your strategy, the simple arithmetic that describes your capabilities leads inescapably to the conclusion that if NATO is serious about defending Europe—and let me assure you that we are—then the alliance cannot prematurely sacrifice key weapons systems, notably our air power and theater nuclear capability.

Similarly, your vast preponderance in numbers tells us that we must have strong maritime capabilities to keep open the sea lanes in order to reinforce and sustain potential battlefields. There just is no other responsible position for us to assume. I am persuaded that if you sat in my chair or in NATO councils you would be influenced by the same imperatives.

In other words, absent the addressing of those asymmetries which have always troubled us, it is unreasonable to expect Washington—and me as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to jeopardize our ability to reach Western Europe and to meet our NATO commitments. In this regard, I consider the recent Soviet CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe treaty] offer as most encouraging, since the principle of parity is explicitly accepted. Details, of course, remain to be sorted out, but when combined with President Bush's recent intervention, we are seeing prospects for genuinely modifying the European military landscape and encouraging stability.

The same approach, of course, governs our reading of what is required in the realm of strategic weaponry, which underwrites our entire deterrent posture. Please bear in mind that I am expressing an American point of view. I fully appreciate that you have legitimate concerns to resolve about our intentions and capabilities, that these issues must be hammered out in dialogue, that we need to know more about each other, and that both sides will have to exercise imagination and statesmanship before we can reach common ground.

Make no mistake: your American counterparts welcome the announced shifts in Soviet military thinking and structure. We will watch closely as these changes unfold, and we genuinely want the momentum to continue. On this visit, I hope to learn a great deal about your new perspectives on defense. Certainly, a continuing program of contacts can help to clarify uncertainties on both sides. For my part, a fundamental objective would be to convey to the Soviet government and people the basic goals of America's defensive strategy, and above all to emphasize that our purpose is to resist aggression, never to initiate it.

As we confront these issues, it is wise that we develop a more comprehensive understanding of each other's systems. To be candid at this point, Americans have a limited understanding of how your military and political authorities interact in determining Soviet policies. We watch with great interest, but from a distance, the process of political reform under way in the Soviet Union today. I have no wish to intrude in your internal discussions. Indeed, my countrymen since 1776 have firmly believed that every society has the right to choose the form of government it thinks best. So let me instead simply

describe a system I know much more about—the American one—and how one officer sees the military's relation to the political system.

The central feature of all policymaking in the US government is its pluralism—i.e., a large number of voices have a say in every major decision. This is especially true in the security area, where civilian involvement is extensive. Most striking is the public debate which accompanies every significant issue. National security officials, accountable to the Congress and the American citizenry, must publicly explain their programs. In turn, the press, academics, and think-tank experts all have and freely state a broad spectrum of views on military operations, strategy, investment and budget questions, as well as military personnel matters. Predictably, these opinions run the gamut of wisdom and can occasionally prove most taxing for the professional who bears the responsibility for translating policy into weapons and units. Unquestionably, this system puts great demands on our top commanders who must function in this inquisitive environment.

On the other hand, the freedom to intervene is built into our souls and despite its frustrations usually brings wider and deeper deliberation into the process. One advantage of this public deliberation is that there is an opportunity for the political process to balance military and non-military objectives against each other—as has occurred, for example, when environmental complaints are raised against basing plans for military activities.

Complicating the equation, the US Constitution gives our Congress several crucial powers—e.g., responsibility to advise and consent on treaties, to raise and support armies and navies, to mobilize reserves, and to declare war. This means that key defense decisions are made not only by a process that is complex and searching but by one that is formal and open. Congressional budget authority, for example, permits constant and widely publicized inquiries, investigations, and studies into our business.

From the Service viewpoint, legislative activities sometimes become too intrusive and too detailed and may unduly limit our ability to manage efficiently. On the other hand, legislative inquiry and scrutiny assist in making our policies understandable and in developing a political consensus within the Congress and the citizenry. This process, however, requires a public and comprehensive Defense budget—one which acknowledges the real costs of defense and articulates the benefits—for all to see and often to criticize. For instance, I personally have to explain and defend our budget submissions before congressional committees every year—sometimes it seems like every week. In this regard, I believe that this openness pays off. For a strong power, secrecy is counterproductive because it breeds suspicion in others and requires them to seek a wider margin of safety.

In sum, satisfying Congress produces its own set of frustrations, but on balance the benefits are great: more comprehensible, legitimate, carefully thought-out policies reflecting the purposes of the American people, serving their needs by means that conform to fundamental precepts they support, and integrating their defense with the whole panoply of societal requirements.

Completing the civil-military relationship in the US system, our President is by definition the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This constitutional device reflects

our founders' desire to insure "civilian control" of military operations and at the same time to empower a single authority who can act with decisiveness and energy.

It is not, however, a wholly independent power. Inevitably, the President and Congress dispute the limits of each other's jurisdiction, especially in foreign affairs. From the outside, this may appear confusing at times. But the crucial fact is that both the President and the Congress are elected by the people. In the American system, civilian control means democratic control of the military. The President has the power to act quickly when circumstances require it, but the people can second-guess his judgments and call him to account.

Democratic control of the military, despite some inconveniences, is the most important principle of the American system. From the military's own point of view, it enhances the prospects that our policies enjoy public support and legitimacy. Equally important, our soldiers—all of whom are volunteers—are linked to the roots of power—our citizenry.

Because elections ensure that our civilian authorities enjoy the consent of the governed, civilian control of the military is not a matter of one bureaucracy asserting its priority over another. As James Madison wrote, "the people are the priority, original fountain of all legitimate authority." Democratic leaders make tough choices, sometimes leading public opinion, sometimes adjusting to it; but the fact that their authority comes from the people's explicit choice is their most valuable asset.

That consent, in the end, "begets the public spirit" necessary for a military to function in a democracy and signals to friends abroad that our military policies will reflect the electorate's desires. Clearly, this is the cornerstone of our system. Again, it puts a premium on the ability of our political and military leaders to balance all these competing considerations while simultaneously fashioning effective and efficient Armed Services. Believe me, it is a tough balancing act.

This is only a brief description, which I would be happy to elaborate upon in the question period. I hope it gives you some feel for the politico-military interface between our Armed Forces and the citizenry and of the complexities of my own duties. It also explains in part our approach to important issues in our bilateral relationship with your government, such as arms control issues. It is a perplexing structure, which is perhaps more awkward and time consuming than many would prefer. But in today's modern world, with such high stakes riding on the way strength is employed, we believe its merits outweigh its demerits.

No leader in the United States, military or civilian, desires war. We have always believed what both President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev stated: that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. To keep the peace is the fundamental mission of our Armed Forces, and the primary measure of our success is the ability to deter conflict, nuclear or nonnuclear.

Speaking as an officer whose forty-seven years of service spans the entire postwar era, and who has served at the highest levels in European and Asian commands as well as in Washington, I have never seen or heard of any US planning to initiate aggressive war against the Soviet Union. It is that fundamental truth which I hope our contacts

can reinforce in your minds, with a confidence grounded in first-hand exposure to our leaders and our people.

If the political relationship between Moscow and Washington continues to improve, I see vast potential for more extensive military contacts than those of the past. They would be governed by a mutual intent to ensure crisis stability, and confidence in each other's desire to avoid conflict. Through open and fundamental discussion about the nature of military strategy, the sharing of information on such issues as budgets and procurement schedules, the expanded exchanges of our personnel, the further development of regimes for verification of arms reductions, and the evolution of confidence- and security-building measures, we will be able to help our governments construct a more sustainable relationship overall and enhance the prospects for avoiding conflict. We hopefully can become collaborators in the interests of international peace and stability and the welfare of our two peoples. Marshal Akhromeyev, General Moiseyev, and I have taken the first steps in that project. It will be up to you, and American officers like you, to take the next steps into the future.

Let me conclude with one final, more or less, personal note. In preparing for this address, I looked at a book of famous photos taken by your combat photographers between 1941 and 1945. One scene in particular caught my attention. The picture was taken in the late Fall of 1941 as the photographer journeyed throughout the hinterlands to chronicle the course of the war, hoping to find a way to express its enormous consequences and its stakes. In this scene, he found what he sought, and it is no wonder that the grainy black-and-white photo that resulted, and others like it, helped literally to galvanize your people and to stir your forces to meet the great sacrifices that were still ahead.

He found his subjects not among your embattled troops, not amidst gallant cavalry or tenacious infantry, not in the ranks of the battle-scarred wounded. He found it in a mother and her children, raggedly wrapped against a driving wind, shuffling through frozen fields away from the invading enemy and on to some safer place. I suppose many of you have seen the photograph. The mother cradles a bundle—an infant, perhaps—and clasps tightly the outstretched hand of a young girl. A boy walks beside her, leaning in, following her lead. Their fingers are swollen with cold, their faces etched in fatigue and anxiety. It was a message about inseparability, about the determined strength that carried families through the ravages of war. I have no doubt that the image of that family spoke directly to the hearts of every one of this nation's defenders, animating and sustaining them in that time of trial.

Your American colleagues understand that message. We know its importance to you, and that it will always inspire you. But we want you to know that we, too, share in its sentiment. It is what, in the end, has inspired us to devote our own lives to the defense of our Republic. I believe that in that motivation there is much that can draw us together.

I am proud to be the first Chairman to speak at this much-respected academy. I would like to thank General Moiseyev for the opportunity, and I know I speak for my government and the men and women of my Armed Forces when I say that the leaders of your generation, on both sides, must seize future moments like this—for all our children and all the heirs of that strong and universal family in the old photograph from your Great Patriotic War.

Joint News Conference with General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, as translated from Russian

Moscow | June 21

Good morning. I have just concluded a ten-day visit to your country. I am here, of course, at the invitation of General Moiseyev. I had the pleasure last summer of hosting Marshal Akhromeyev in the United States, and I am, in a very real sense, returning that visit. I have had the opportunity to visit your Armed Forces and to speak to the men and women of your military.

We visited the rocket forces and your air force; I had a wonderful day at sea with the Northern Fleet, where I was aboard the *Kirov* cruiser, as well as went through one of your nuclear submarines, *Belorussia*, and then did some touring. We have had the opportunity to be in five of your hero cities. We later witnessed army field exercises in Minsk and Volgograd, and then went through central Asia, both Tashkent and Samarkand. And yesterday we completed our touring with a day in Sochi.

It has been a genuine learning experience for me, and a full and most interesting schedule. I have discovered—of course, I knew intellectually, but had to discover again emotionally—that the Soviet people and the American people are a great deal alike. Their main interest in life is their family, their home, their children; they want their children to be better off in the future and to have a secure and happy life. They love their country. They live in a vast land, which they appreciate. All of these are attributes and values that Americans cherish and admire.

I repeat, the Soviet people impress me as being a great deal like Americans. The men and women of your Armed Forces, similarly, are a great deal like the men and women who serve in my own military. They are competent, skilled, well-trained in the fundamentals of their art. They are durable, determined, and very patriotic. They have a good sense of humor. They are personable. And I see all of these things at home when I visit my own military.

I will return to the United States with great admiration for the Soviet Armed Forces. All-in-all, it has been a full week, and I want to thank General Moiseyev for inviting me and for the hospitality which he and the Soviet people have extended to my party. We leave both knowing more about each other, and certainly better off than when we came, and we leave very, very happy with our visit. With that, I will be happy to address any questions you might have.

Moiseyev: Ladies and gentlemen, comrades. We have just come here with Admiral Crowe from a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

There Admiral Crowe shared his experience regarding the visit to the Soviet Union; what he saw during his program, what he saw in the various branches of our Armed Forces.

He saw our hero cities: Murmansk, Leningrad—well, of course, Moscow, Minsk, Volgograd. He saw not only our military activities but he also met our Servicemen and

women. He learned of their needs and their opinions. Admiral Crowe's visit to the Soviet Union is nearing its end. In this connection, I would like to say a few words about some of my opinions.

During this visit, a lot of intensive work has been done as regards the development of political dialogue between the leadership of our countries. You know that, following the instructions of our governments, we have signed a very important document, an agreement to prevent dangerous military activities. This paper, in our view, corresponds to the spirit of the time and lays down new norms in the relations between the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States and, above all, is aimed at preventing dangerous military activities. In this regard, the agreement can help considerably in improving Soviet–American relations and bettering the international situation on the whole.

Well, what was learned during the visit? I must say that while we do not know each other, opinions can be very contradictory about each other and about the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. But as we came to know each other better, as we tried to understand each other, we have found better contacts in many fields—and not only in the military field. We have a plan of contacts between the Armed Forces for 1989-1990. We, with Admiral Crowe during his visit, discussed proposals and made constructive suggestions in order to build our relations on a long-term basis. We believe that this will give a promising prospect to our relations.

We also discussed other issues, including military doctrines, specific features of building the military forces, the issues of arms. Of course, we discussed the Vienna talks and the status of affairs there. Well, naturally, we did not reach mutual understanding on all the issues, but on many major issues we have an understanding and common language.

I would like to note a constructive and well-wishing atmosphere during our meetings and during the entire visit. I have already said that the American delegation had an opportunity to learn more about our Armed Forces. We visited a missile facility and a modern fleet facility. Admiral Crowe has visited a nuclear submarine, the cruiser *Kirov*. He also learned about the everyday life of the Servicemen, talked to the sailors.

And in one of his visits, he said that today we better understand each other. He also had an opportunity to visit Leningrad, to see the sites of Leningrad, including the Petrodvorets Palace in Belarus. He saw tactical trials, including the arsenal of various arms on each of the sides. And we wanted to show that we comply with our defensive doctrine, which corresponds to the spirit of the time and to the spirit of our defensive doctrine.

If we sum up the results of the visit of the American military delegation headed by Admiral Crowe, I must say that this visit gives us a very good impression, and we would like to hope that this visit would serve the development of trust, which we so badly need and we which we lack so far; that it would improve relations in the military field; that it would contribute to greater understanding between our military ministries; that it would make military activities of our Armed Forces more predictable; and that it would help in searching points of contact on other military issues.

This conclusion, as regards the visit, I link with the condition of Soviet–American relations, which have been developing positively of late, which corresponds to the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples as well as to the interests of European peoples and the interests of the entire world. Thank you.

Speech at a Dinner Hosted by the Veterans of Foreign Wars
Las Vegas, Nevada | August 21

And also at the American Legion National Convention
Baltimore, Maryland | September 7

A lot has happened during the last few years. It has been an exhilarating and an educational experience for me. From the start, it was heightened by the fact that my nomination as Chairman was so unexpected—most of all, unexpected by me. I told Colin Powell, my appointed successor, that I enjoyed one advantage he doesn't have, and that is, when I came into the post, nobody had ever heard of me. Someone asked me how in the world I got to be the Chairman. I said, "I don't know, it just happened. But I don't blame anybody."

I am extremely pleased to be addressing you today. I grew up in a veteran's household. I feel a great attachment for your organization. My father was a Second Class Radio Operator on the battleship *Pennsylvania* in World War I. He was extremely proud of his war service.

In 1920, he moved to a small town in Kentucky to practice law in partnership with his uncle. After a few years, he ran for county attorney against a man who had lived all his life in the community and who campaigned on a motto of "Vote for the Home Man." My father countered with his own slogan: "My opponent is the Home Man—Home Before the War, Home During the War, and Home After the War." I'm sorry to say, he lost the election but he got the veteran vote, and he loved to tell that story until the day he died. My generation, of course, owes a large debt to the American Legion and the VFW.

In my view, the 1944 GI Bill of Rights is the most important piece of legislation produced by our Congress in this century. It bridged the huge gap between peace and war and put our country on a firm and stable course for the crucial postwar era. It was an act initiated, sponsored, and sold by the American Legion. This, of course, is only one of the many notable achievements of your superb organization, whose civic-mindedness and activist patriotism has ranged from veterans' hospitals to scholarships to baseball teams, and most recently, to your highly visible efforts to protect the symbol of our nation, the flag.

Furthermore, I can assure you that the Active military is extremely beholden to you for your enthusiastic and staunch commitment to a strong defense. Your everyday efforts have greatly enriched the dialogue between the military and civilian communities and the continuing debate about what emphasis Defense should receive. On behalf of all our men and women in uniform, I extend truly heartfelt thanks.

As you might imagine, my impending retirement from active service has been much on my mind lately. As I have contemplated that transition, I have spent some time thinking not only about my own length of Service, but about the role of the military in our nation's life and the picture from where the Chairman sits.

If you will pardon me, I want to depart from my prepared remarks for just two sentences. The one thing I will miss the most, as I leave the Service, is the opportunity to work and serve every day with young American men and women. It is the greatest reward of a professional career in the military, and let me tell you, no matter what you might read to the contrary, my experience tells me that the future of our country is in very good hands.

Putting that aside, I thought I might share with you some of the thoughts today that have crossed my mind concerning the large return we have gotten over the years on our Defense investment and concerning Defense imperatives for the future. As I look back over forty-seven years of service, the clearest example of our productive military policy is the US contribution to NATO, by every measure the most successful coalition in history.

Above all, this investment has brought us the longest uninterrupted period of peace in European history. Our Armed Forces in Western Europe have likewise played a crucial role in buttressing the political unity of the Atlantic Alliance, in cementing Washington's leadership role in the Free World, and in signaling to friends and foes alike that the United States is willing and able to invest our manpower and treasure in support of our ideals.

A similar phenomenon has transpired in the Far East, although in a somewhat different context. For many years our forward-deployed forces in the Western Pacific, in Japan, and on the Korean peninsula have provided a security shield for our Asian allies and friends.

Our strength has deterred outside intimidation and allowed the free market countries of the region to advance in their own fashion, at their own pace. The result has been unprecedented affluence and the steady spread of democracy and political stability.

When I was Commander in Chief, Pacific, this theme was repeated to me time and again by leaders in the area, who emphasized that their progress would have been impossible without American forward-deployed forces in Asia. In the last few years, we have seen additional examples, on a smaller scale, of how the military can be used to further US ends. Grenada, Libya, Honduras, El Salvador, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East today demonstrate that our Armed Forces can often contribute in a measured and constructive fashion to achieving our foreign policy goals. Incidentally, these examples also suggest that we are becoming more adept in meshing national, diplomatic, and security efforts.

In a similar vein, our Services have turned their attention to a number of new missions, which have recently climbed onto the national agenda—counterterrorism, limited intensity conflict, and drug interdiction.

Every day, we are becoming better postured to give the President a wider choice of tools in dealing with these threats to our society and the American way of life, and this was graphically demonstrated this week in the President's remarks where he addressed the drug problem.

Perhaps the recent events in Soviet Russia are the most persuasive argument for our policy of peace through strength. For several decades, we were threatened, vilified, and bullied by an aggressive Kremlin that continuously proclaimed the coming demise of capitalism and proceeded to build the world's most formidable military establishment. Today, we are seeing hopeful signs of a basic reappraisal in Moscow and the first turns toward a less offensive stance.

While this reversal has been brought about by a range of factors, including the near collapse of the communist economic system, I am convinced in my heart that a major contribution was the West's determination not to succumb to intimidation and to erect its own defenses. I would be the first to admit that this policy has been expensive and, at times, painful for our people, for our government, and for our allies. But the payoff is well worth the sacrifice. Our world is still free and prospering. Millions of people around the globe are turning to Washington and to the West for hope, and today pluralism, not communism, is the wave of the future.

In the face of such evidence, no one can convince me that our security investment has been misplaced. Yet after a few years of increasing defense appropriations in the early 1980s, we are seeing the historical pendulum swing once again. Since 1985, the Congress has steadily cut our funds—some 12 percent, actually—and I am told that this is just the beginning. I hear talk of massive cuts for the next five years. I cannot help but be severely disturbed by such a prospect. My concern has been reinforced by the current budget struggles on the Hill, in which not only the total amount of our request is in jeopardy but the details of our programs are being selectively rearranged to meet the political interests of special strategic notions of a few legislators.

In the Pentagon, we agonize to produce a budget request often in accord with instructions from the Congress, that balances competing priorities to best accomplish our national objectives. When our work goes to the Hill, it may very well be treated as a legislative grab-bag. All too often, the final result is more pork than a coherent strategic package. Four times in the last century we have entered major wars unprepared because we failed to fund Defense properly in peacetime. In each instance, we paid a terrible price in blood and treasure—a price, incidentally that could have been avoided with more forethought and wisdom. I heard a wag once say, "In war, we remember the Alamo, the *Maine* and Pearl Harbor; in peace, we forget." Will we never learn?

It is curious that just as our policies are beginning to bear real fruit in Moscow, we commence whittling away at them with a vengeance. I am not opposed to Defense drawdowns if the threat and international conditions justify it, but I do not see a national or congressional debate in depth about the threat, about foreign policy, or about the future of regional instabilities. I see no meaningful strategic discussion of events in Central and Latin America, Afghanistan, China, Cambodia, southwest Africa, Syria, Lebanon, or Iran, all of which are currently racked by problems that could escalate and ultimately involve us militarily.

To the contrary, when I testify on the Hill, I am told that I don't appreciate the political realities. No one defines those for me. Instead of the emotionalism that such talk often stems from, I would prefer to see some clear-eyed analysis of the truly hard questions

that must be answered if this country is to remain secure and to continue leading a free world. Do we want to reduce our commitments? Do we want to change our overall strategy? Do we want to replace the triad with a dyad—and so on?

I would argue vigorously that it is preferable to decide where we are going and why before we arbitrarily and irreversibly slash the Defense budget, thus precipitating the wholesale disassembly of the very security structure which has guaranteed the peace for the past forty years plus. That doesn't strike me as too much to ask.

That brings me to my second subject, our relationship with the Soviet Union. I am told that recent events in the USSR are what led many to conclude that the requirement for strong defenses is disappearing. In my view, we need to look carefully and also thoughtfully at this proposition. Certainly, in my time as Chairman, nothing has been more remarkable than the emergence of General Secretary Gorbachev with his dramatic policy changes in Moscow.

When I took my present post, I had no idea that the political climate in the US–Soviet relationship would ultimately permit my Russian counterparts and me to open up a direct dialogue or to inaugurate a systematic program of contacts between our Armed Forces. Nor did I expect to watch Marshal Akhromeyev testify before the House Armed Services Committee. Imagine: a Soviet Marshal addressing the Congress of the United States. Who could have dreamed such a thing forty-seven years ago when I entered the military, or for that matter, four years ago, when I became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I told the Marshal that I thought that it was appropriate that he suffer some of the things I suffer and go up to the Hill, that he share the misery with me. I told him that if Moses had gone up to Capitol Hill instead of Mount Sinai, the tablets he brought back would have been aspirin instead of the ones we read about in the Bible.

Yet all those unexpected events have occurred in just the last two years, and the momentum is continuing. To say the least, these have been interesting times, as we have tried to understand what Gorbachev's intentions and prospects are, and what his efforts might mean for the future, especially in the military realm. Indeed, for the full span of my professional lifetime, the global reach of Soviet military power has been the main concern of defense planners in the United States and among Washington's allies in Europe and Asia, and with good reason.

I don't need to rehash that history here. Suffice it to say today that the basic characteristics of that power are still impressive by any yardstick. The Kremlin has the largest military establishment in the world—the formidable legacy of a strategy designed to defeat every possible opposing coalition and of a long-time cultural belief in numerical military superiority in both peace and war. On the other hand, it has been clear for some time that the underlying political, economic, and social pillars of Soviet society are not in good shape—they are close to bankruptcy—and that the Kremlin's postwar security policies have imposed enormous burdens on the Russian people and severely limited their future prospects.

Gorbachev has outlined those woes in detail himself, in his writings and public utterances. In turn, he has launched *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and democratization, in the hope of

reshaping his country for entering the twenty-first century. In addition to those domestic difficulties, a number of international trends have moved unfavorably for the USSR. Probably foremost is the evident success of the free enterprise system throughout the developed world. In essence, events have refuted the Kremlin's catechism, which confidently predicted capitalism's imminent demise. NATO responded to Moscow's huge military buildup not with weakness or indifference but with determination and a marked resurgence of strength across the board in its Armed Forces. Equally important, US alliances have proved remarkably resilient and adaptable to changing conditions, in stark contrast to Moscow's associates, who neither carry the load that America's allies do nor are as reliable. We are seeing that in our newspapers every day.

Looking out on that array of problems, Gorbachev and his supporters still hold that defense must be the first priority of the state, but they now claim to be reshaping the Kremlin's military posture to one of reasonable sufficiency. And we saw the first manifestations of that decision in the force reductions and restructuring plans he announced last summer.

And it is true, if in fact these and other announced moves are carried out, they will be significant, especially in reducing the possibility of a surprise attack on Western Europe. Additionally, over the last few years, Gorbachev has joined with Washington in serious arms reduction talks, and we have made some real progress. All this, of course, is as encouraging as it was unexpected. But certain fundamental realities counsel caution in interpreting these trends.

First is the fact that, even if reduced as announced, the Kremlin's military establishment will still number more than four million men, and Moscow will retain the world's largest single-country inventory of military hardware. As I told the Soviets repeatedly during my trip there in June, it is very hard for outside observers to understand how that massive apparatus can be justified by legitimate defense needs. Moreover, other critical elements of Soviet military power remain untouched by the reductions announced thus far, and that includes military activities in space, strategic offensive and defensive forces, air defense units, naval combatants, and mobility assets.

A further cautionary note springs from the immensity and risks of the tasks the Soviets have undertaken. It appears that Gorbachev and his supporters are sincerely committed to some fundamental reforms, but wanting and accomplishing change are two different things. I believe the Soviets originally underestimated the difficulties associated with *perestroika* and the time and effort it will take to implement such a policy.

For such an ambitious enterprise, it is impossible to lay out a detailed road map at the outset. In a real sense, they are sailing in uncharted waters. There is an awful lot of playing it by ear, proceeding one day at a time. Their rigid and inflexible economy is providing difficulty for the military as well. Absorbing large numbers of released military personnel into the civilian sector turns out to be a very significant problem, and converting defense industry to the production of consumer goods is not only difficult today but it will become even more so in the future.

In this situation, to observe that they are doing fine today doesn't tell you much about tomorrow. Much the same can be said for *glasnost*. Thus far, the leadership has just put

its toe in the water in encouraging openness. If real pluralism is ultimately achieved in the USSR, it will involve a massive shift in attitudes throughout the society, requiring every group to exercise extraordinary tolerance of others. At this juncture, it is simply not clear how this will play out, if at all, or how quickly it will transpire.

Moreover, the ethnic problems that plague the Kremlin are especially thorny and could threaten the entire enterprise. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact countries are severely testing Mr. Gorbachev, as events at this moment in Hungary and Poland demonstrate. All of this does not make me feel especially comfortable. I am persuaded that we are not yet in a new era, but that we are entering a period of uneasy transition, which includes both encouraging and worrisome signals. Put simply, there are too many uncertainties still on the horizon to draw definite conclusions, and my assessment is that we may be in this unsettled state for a long time.

My deepest concern is that our own impatience might tempt us to move prematurely with broad leaps of hope and faith before we have tangible evidence of where the Kremlin is going and what its timetable will be. It's curious to me that many Americans profess to know where the Soviet Union is headed when the Soviets themselves don't know where they are going. Moreover, it would be a great deal more rational to move gradually and deliberately, taking reasonable steps as the horizon becomes clearer, not before. This applies particularly to our own defense policies. In my view, to draw down our strength prematurely and precipitously would be extreme folly.

Finally, a brief word on keeping these events in perspective. As I prepare to leave the Chairmanship and to retire from Active Service, I am convinced that events of the last several years have appreciably advanced mutual understanding and confidence between the US and Soviet military establishments. The climate for frank discussion of differences and constructive work on real-world issues has markedly improved with every meeting. If we are skillful and patient—and I stress "patient"—the remarkable changes we are witnessing today may, at some point in the future, offer real promise for a safer and more stable world. But such a climate is not here yet. There is a lot of hard work and trauma ahead before we can achieve such an outcome. Moreover, it is imperative to understand that the international community will always have differences to manage. Further, many of the problems in the Soviet Union, and for that matter around the world, present and future, cannot be solved simply by developments in the superpower relationship alone.

As far as the US-Soviet relationship is concerned, our systems—no matter what happens in Moscow—will remain fundamentally competitive for the foreseeable future. Even if all the trends we think we can discern in Moscow play out in our favor, the business of protecting the interests of Americans in an uncertain world will not be done. We will still need strong Armed Forces to undergird our international relations and to buttress friends and allies around the globe.

George Shultz said, "Our military strength is the umbrella underneath which all our diplomatic cards are played." Certainly the character, the size, and the shape of our Armed Forces may well change, and they may become smaller. But the enduring imperatives of international affairs will always demand that we retain an adequate level of power.

We are seeing that fact of life assert itself today, and it will continue to plague us for a long time to come. Maintaining an appropriate and adequate defense posture will not be easy. It will take patience, determination, and a clear-sighted policy mix that exploits all opportunities for peace without sacrificing the strength that brings the opportunities within reach. But fundamentally I am an optimist about our ability to walk that line, and I guess in Washington that makes me an incurable optimist. Paul Harvey says, "In times like these, we must always remember, there have always been times like these." I am convinced, however, that my optimism is not unfounded. With the proven leadership of an outstanding President, who you are going to hear in just a few minutes, one who understands the need for strength and who has experienced war himself—a genuine American hero—we can and will prevail.

I can testify from personal experience that he is served by a first-rate national security team, in Secretary Cheney, Secretary Baker, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. They work closely as a team—something that doesn't always happen in our government—and they are confronting the problems head-on. Moreover, my successor, General Colin Powell, will be a superb complement to that team. He is a charismatic and imaginative leader who brings a wealth of experience both in and out of Washington to the post. He is an eminently exceptional and excellent choice.

I want to mention again that I am well aware of the significant role that the American Legion plays in defense affairs. Our nation profits from your patriotism, from the experience and knowledge represented in your ranks, and on behalf of the Armed Forces, I salute you. I thank you for your consistent support of our efforts, and I urge you, which I know you will, nevertheless, I urge you to remain engaged in the national security debate.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Transportation Command

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois | September 22

It is a genuine privilege to participate in this ceremony passing the baton of command of the United States Transportation Command from General [Duane] Cassidy to General [Hansford] Johnson.

For me, it is a particular honor, for, as some of you may recall, I was here just two years ago at the creation of this command. I guess this occasion is proof of what my wife says has happened over the past four years—I've been Chairman so long that I'm starting to repeat myself. I'm starting to see what she means.

Although my mission today is mainly to officiate at this formal transition, I am pleased to have the opportunity also to recognize the many contributions of General Cassidy and his wife Rosalie as they stand on the threshold of retirement from thirty-five years of active service.

The subject of retirement has been much on my own mind of late, as Shirley and I prepare to make that transition at the end of this month. I believe there are some hard,

cold realities out there, and it may be a traumatic experience. An episode that occurred the other day brought this home to me dramatically. I had to take our car in for repairs, and when I got the bill I was startled to see that the mechanic charged me $200 an hour for his time. “Two hundred dollars,” I screamed, “I’m the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I don’t make $200 an hour.” The guy looked up and said: “Neither did I when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.” (I always wondered what happened to David Jones.)

But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure to be here today, for several reasons. Today marks my third visit to this beautiful part of the country since I became Chairman. It is always gratifying to return to a community that’s well known for its strong ties between civilians and the military. The presence here today of so many prominent citizens from the area attests to the vitality of that bond. The support you provided to the Air Force and to MAC [Military Airlift Command] in the past has obviously continued with the Transportation Command. I have often remarked that this nation’s military strength depends ultimately on broad roots of support within the American public.

We in the Armed Forces can only be as good as our citizens want us to be. It is comforting indeed for me, immersed as I am in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once again that the civil-military tie that has served as the bedrock for this nation for over two centuries is still alive and well in America’s heartland.

Coming here is always a nostalgic journey of sorts for me. Just over a century ago—on the 22nd of April 1889—my grandfather and his father passed through the Gateway to the West to make the Homestead Run into Oklahoma. As I was growing up in Oklahoma City, I inevitably turned to St. Louis as my own personal gateway to the world beyond. I saw my first burlesque show there, and that certainly was a world beyond Oklahoma City. And I followed with pride the careers of fellow Sooners, like the Dean brothers and Pepper Martin as they played ball with the Cardinals.

But more pertinent to today’s events, the second reason why this visit is a welcome occasion for me is the opportunity to speak directly to the men and women of this command and to bring to you personally the message that leaders in our nation’s capital greatly appreciate your daily contributions.

I have served many years out on the frontiers of freedom around the globe. I know all too well that for people in the field, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. I know that in the past two years, as you have labored in the trenches to establish this unified command, you have received more than your fair share of attention and scrutiny. Let me assure you, however, that your efforts here have been universally recognized and admired.

I do not have to tell the majority of those assembled here that the military challenges this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diversity every day. This is especially true today, as we enter into an era of uneasy transition, which includes both encouraging and worrisome components. Put simply, there are both promises and challenges on the horizon. The role of this strategically critical command will undoubtedly grow in proportion to these promises and challenges.

For myself, I might add, the dedicated service of all of you associated with USTRANSCOM, serving America’s interests on a daily basis around the globe, has been a never-ending source of inspiration and strength as I have gone about my duties as Chairman. Another source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that the nation’s defense establishment has been led by commanders of the caliber of General Duane Cassidy.

When Duane Cassidy was taking his basic aviation cadet training in Texas in the early 1950s, he was probably told that there was really only one standard against which all pilots were judged. A good pilot, he was informed, is one whose log book has the same number of landings as take-offs. He must have taken that advice seriously, for his career of three-and-one-half decades has been marked by an equilibrium of strong take-offs and successful landings.

In fact, his career reads like a history of the United States Air Force. He has flown B-25s as a navigator, including participation in the hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific, and he has piloted B-47s for the Strategic Air Command. He has amassed well over 9,000 flying hours, and commanded missiles, bombers, and airlift units.

It was after his tour in Vietnam that General Cassidy first got into the airlift business. Duane, did it ever cross your mind back then in the early 1970s when you were flying the MAC Commander around, that you would someday return to that command yourself? It may not have been to you, but it was obvious to some, even then, that you were a “marked” man. The almost fifteen years which General Cassidy has spent in the Military Airlift Command have spanned the spectrum of the Command’s mission, as well as spanning the globe in executing that mission.

A renowned bomber and airlift pilot, he has forged a distinguished record in command at all levels and has also held key staff posts—all of which made him the obvious choice to become the first Commander in Chief of TRANSCOM. Two years ago, as General Cassidy was assuming this command, I warned him that he would be faced with the Herculean task of assembling a truly joint transportation system.

The confidence of our nation’s leaders in entrusting this task to General Cassidy was not misplaced. His record of achievement here speaks for itself. The award which is to be bestowed upon this command during today’s ceremonies is in no small part a reflection of the personal and professional example from the CINC himself. Alongside this impressive commander every step of the way has been his lovely wife, Rosalie. They have made a great team and both will be sorely missed—missed by the Armed Forces and by the community as well.

The uncertain future facing us means that there is much yet to be done by this Command. As we move forward into that unknown, the United States is fortunate to be able to turn the reins of command of TRANSCOM over to General Hansford T. Johnson. General Johnson is a bona fide war hero and an outstanding leader. His career has been marked by doing in practice what others have only dreamed about in theory. He has risen with distinction through command and staff assignments throughout the world. His unflagging dedication and incisive intelligence are renowned throughout the defense community. I know this special brand of leadership first hand, for until yesterday, General Johnson was

the Director of my staff, the Joint Staff. I can say without reservation, he is the right man for this critically important job. H. T. and Linda Ann, I think you'll find this a refreshing change from the intrigues of Washington. Certainly you'll find the traffic different than on the beltway. I envy you both.

When we depart these ceremonies today, there are good reasons to feel optimistic about this nation and its future prospects. First, we can share in a deep sense of pride that our military establishment has produced leaders of the caliber of Duane Cassidy and H. T. Johnson—accomplished in command and operations, at home in the world of theory as well as practice. These are men who can stand on the bridge between those two worlds and pull them together.

The second reason for encouragement is the health and vibrancy of this command, and its outstanding prospects as one of the vanguards of our Armed Forces, one of our key strategic assets. The third cause for confidence is an outgrowth of the first two: the growing vitality of the civil-military tie throughout our nation. This is the lifeblood of our military profession, the driving force that sustains and animates all of us who wear the uniform.

As these are reasons for confidence and encouragement, they are also signals to friends and adversaries alike that America's defenses—and position as leader of the free world—will always remain in capable hands.

In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and all of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, I extend very best wishes to Duane and Rosalie Cassidy as they take up the new challenges of retirement, and I welcome H. T. and Linda Ann to their new responsibilities in the US Transportation Command. May you have fair winds and following seas.

Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Forces Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia | September 27

It is a genuine privilege for me to participate in this ceremony passing the baton of command of the United States Forces Command from General [Colin] Powell to General [Ed] Burba.

As some of you may recall, I've been here once or twice before—first in July of 1987 when FORSCOM became a Specified Command, and more recently in April of this year when General Powell assumed command. This occasion, in a sense, is proof of what my wife says has happened over the past four years: I've been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so long that I'm starting to repeat myself. I'm starting to see what she means.

It is a genuine pleasure to participate here today. I eagerly seize every opportunity I can to travel outside the Washington Beltway. General Powell will assume my duties as Chairman in a few short days and know the burdens first hand that I have left behind for the moment in the Pentagon. But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure to be here today, for several reasons.

First is the opportunity to visit Atlanta. It is always gratifying to return to a community that's well known for its strong ties between civilians and the military. The presence

here today of so many prominent citizens from the Atlanta area attests to the vitality of that bond. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all who wear the uniform, I want to convey our deep appreciation for your continued support.

I have often remarked that this nation's military strength depends ultimately on broad roots of support within the American public. We in the Armed Forces can only be as good as our citizens want us to be. It is comforting indeed for me, immersed as I am in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once again that the civil-military tie that has served as the bedrock for this nation for over two centuries is still alive and well here among the Georgia peaches.

Nothing illustrates the reality and vitality of that civil-military bond better than FORSCOM itself. The US Forces Command, as represented on this field before us, consists of over one million Active, National Guard, and Reserve troops. These are the finest young men and women America has to offer—like their forefathers, proud to be citizen-soldiers. They represent a highly professional Total Force, composed of people from all walks of life, deterring war by their very presence, but willing to defend our nation if called upon to do so. We in the Nation's capital greatly appreciate your daily contributions.

I have served for many years around the globe. I know all too well that for people in the field, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you that your achievements are universally recognized and admired. Your professional and rapid response to fast breaking events has been consistently superb—for example, in Panama, in Honduras, in the fight against drugs, and most recently in St. Croix—whenever and wherever crises have occurred which require troops from our strategic reserve, FORSCOM has been there.

I have to tell you assembled here that the military challenges that this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diversity every day. This is especially true as we enter into an era of uneasy transition, which includes the Soviet Union and its relations with Washington. This transition has both encouraging and worrisome components. Put simply, there are both promises and challenges on the horizon. The role of this strategically critical command will undoubtedly rise in proportion to those promises and challenges.

For myself, I might add that the performance and power of this Command has been a never-ending source of inspiration and strength to me as I have gone about my duties as Chairman. Another source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that the nation's defense establishment has been led by commanders of the caliber of General Colin Powell.

In Colin Powell, we have the living incarnation of that old World War I recruiting poster which challenged: "Don't read history, make it!" He is first and foremost a soldier, a natural leader grounded in the techniques of war-fighting and peacekeeping. He's been tested and proven in the crucible of combat. He's a leader in the finest traditions of the US military. His career has been marked by doing in practice what others have only dreamed about in theory. I think General Powell would agree that in his heart he always has been a field soldier. And he has the muddy boots to prove it, for he has commanded from the Infantry platoon level up to a forward-deployed Corps and now this Specified Command.

Despite his affection for "mud soldiers," Colin Powell has equally impressive staff credentials. He has served as a key advisor to this nation's top civilian leaders and has won widespread respect in Washington and in allied capitals around the world.

I won't dwell on his many accomplishments here at Forces Command. He wouldn't want me to, and in any event, this audience knows them well. Suffice it to say that General Powell has left a marked imprint on this country's deterrent posture as commander of this Command. When he was assuming his command, I told him that he would be faced with the task of consolidating a combat ready, joint strategic reserve for the Armed Forces. I had every confidence in him, and my confidence in him was obviously not misplaced.

As he mastered this task, at every step of the way has been his lovely wife. I have heard it said that behind every successful man stands a surprised mother-in-law. Colin and his wife are a great team, and one that we are all extremely proud of—and I am sure that FORSCOM and Atlanta will miss you as you move to take on the responsibilities and challenges as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But the loss is the Nation's gain. No one is more qualified as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than Colin Powell—no one.

The uncertain future facing us means that there is much yet to be done by this command. As we move forward into that unknown, the United States is fortunate to be able to turn the reins of command of FORSCOM over to General Ed Burba. Ed Burba has an impressive record of soldiering. He has led Infantrymen in combat with great distinction and is coming to FORSCOM from command of the Combined Field Army in Korea, where he led American and South Korean soldiers on one of the Free World's most exposed bastions. General Burba's wide-ranging capacities have been proven in an array of key positions in Washington and throughout the Continental United States, Germany, and Korea. And he's had a wide variety of assignments in the joint arena as well.

I can't overlook perhaps his most important qualification for this job. Like myself, he hails from Oklahoma, and that makes him an obvious choice for this important position.

When we depart these ceremonies today, there are good reasons to feel optimistic about this nation and its future prospects. First, we can share in a deep sense of pride that our military establishment has produced leaders of the caliber of Colin Powell and Ed Burba: accomplished in command and operations, at home in the world of theory as well as practice. These are men who can stand on the bridge between those two worlds and pull them together.

The second reason for encouragement is the health and vibrancy of this command, and its outstanding prospects as one of the vanguards of our Armed Forces, one of our key strategic assets.

I would suggest that the third cause for confidence is an outgrowth of the first two: the growing vitality of the civil-military tie throughout our nation. This is the lifeblood of our military profession, the driving force that sustains and animates all of us who wear the uniform.

Just as these are reasons for confidence and encouragement, they are also signals: signals to friends and adversaries alike that America's defenses—and position as leader of the Free World—will always remain in capable hands.

In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and all of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, I extend very best wishes to Colin and Alma Powell as they take up the new challenges in Washington, and I welcome Ed and Trish to their new responsibilities in the Forces Command. In nautical parlance, may you always enjoy fair winds and following seas.

Remarks upon his Retirement and Departure as Chairman

US Naval Academy | Annapolis, Maryland | September 29

Mr. President, your remarks were most kind and generous. I heard a wag say once that the difference between a eulogy and a testimonial is that in the case of a testimonial there is one person in the audience that believes it. I won't mention who that person is.

I knew it was time to retire last 4th of July. My wife and I were visiting Boston to ride the *Constitution* for its annual turnaround. It was a lovely day and it was a great festivity. In the course of the proceedings, a Bostonian said to Shirley, "What a wonderful ship the *Constitution* is," and what a great attachment he had for it. He said, "You know, it's an old relic but it's still commissioned." And Shirley said, "Are you talking about the ship or my husband?" I got the hint.

I, of course, chose the Naval Academy as the site of my retirement because this is where the trouble started, right here on this parade ground when I attempted to learn the Manual of Arms as a plebe. I didn't have too much trouble until they put bayonets on those rifles. I didn't kill anyone, but I came awfully close.

My father was an enlisted man in the Navy in World War I, and very proud of his service. As a young boy growing up in Oklahoma, I had a picture of his ship, the USS *Pennsylvania*, in my room. As a result of my own inclinations and his urgings and encouragement, I determined very early to seek entry to Annapolis; I think about the time I was ten years old.

Now, many of my Oklahoma friends didn't take me too seriously. I'm happy to report, however, that today they take those ambitions a little more seriously than they did. I should mention, of course, that there are many, many of my Oklahoma friends in the audience this morning, and I deeply appreciate their presence.

I was not the world's best Midshipman, but despite that hardship I didn't lose my fascination or my love for the Navy. I learned some really practical things here at the Naval Academy; for example, to pray for rain on parade days. And I also learned that if that didn't work, how to doze in ranks, as I suspect some people are doing on the field this morning. Perhaps the most helpful skill I acquired was the ability to change uniforms quickly. As a matter of fact, I've used that talent all my life, even this morning.

My affection for the Naval Academy has grown steadily over the years.

Admiral Hill, I thank you for the blood, sweat, and tears that you have put into mounting this ceremony. And I respectfully recommend that you delete all the demerits awarded to Midshipmen today.

I must mention that there are many, many of my classmates here today. We all belong to the class of 1947. It was a three-year class, and we actually graduated in 1946. I have spent my entire life explaining that confusing phenomenon. The class of 1947 served this country in one of its most interesting periods. Those years included a great deal of conflict and crisis. They spanned Korea and Vietnam and all gradations of troubled peace. Two were POWs in North Vietnam for over seven years. Two [of my classmates] are Medal of Honor winners. Thirty-four attained general or flag rank. An impressive number are CEOs or heads of their own companies. One headed the CIA. One served as the President of the Republic.

Now I am the last of 826 on active duty. I have always been extremely proud to have been a member of such an exceptional and close-knit class. And I would like to ask my classmates to please stand, please.

Mr. President, I leave the Service with good feelings about our nation and its Armed Forces. America stands for the right things: freedom, democracy, human dignity, and individual fulfillment. Through good times and bad times, those values have served us well. The prospects for the future spread of democracy are bright, and hopeful people, millions of hopeful people, still look to the United States of America for inspiration and help.

In traveling about our country, I have also observed that the Republic has its feet on the ground. And we have a President that has his feet on the ground and that has the American spirit. We combine optimism with common sense like no other country, and we, above all, are a patriotic people.

In fact, one of the joys of serving as your senior military leader was to see American families encourage their children to serve their time in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines, and Coast Guard. I am encouraged as well by a grassroots consensus that there is no real substitute for peace through strength and that we must maintain a military establishment second to none in quality.

So long as we stay close to these principles, Mr. President, we need not fear a world in transition or the uncertainties that sometimes cloud the horizon. As you mentioned, sir, our military establishment is the finest I've seen. Nowhere—and I repeat, nowhere—have I found more individual initiative and more pride in a job well done. American mothers and fathers, sometimes grandparents or aunts and uncles, deserve a great deal of credit for this happy state of affairs. But the lion's share goes to our superb, young, enlisted people.

Mr. President, I couldn't bring all the enlisted people here today, but I asked the Unified Commanders to bring representatives from their commands and all our Services from the enlisted ranks to be symbolic of their presence. They are here today in the first section outside of the tent area, and I'm going to ask them to stand as well, and I want you to recognize them. Put simply, we have the best military training establishment on the globe, and we reap our huge security benefits from this establishment every day of the year.

Today, the shape and help of our Alliance is a topic of lively debate and occasional grumbling. NATO is facing a mid-life crisis. Military burdens are not shared as well as they should be. Some of our overseas base rights appear to be softening, and so on.

But I would argue that these problems are minor in comparison with those afflicting the USSR and the [Warsaw] Pact. All of the pull is toward the West, not the East. The enemies of freedom have been more thwarted than successful. Their situation and their star are in decline.

Much of this, of course, can be traced to our basic values. But I am also struck by the fact that we have proved that Lenin and Stalin were wrong, totally wrong, when claiming that the Western democracies could not be trusted to keep the peace. Even a new generation of Soviet leaders seems to be coming around to a different view of the West. Put simply, we have created—I repeat, created—not fallen into a world more hospitable to our national interests, to our way of life, and to freedom and peace.

I truly believe and would argue vigorously, that our military strength has, over the years, played an integral role in effecting that result. Now the task is to hold onto the gains and to consolidate them for the next decade, and I have every confidence that we will do exactly that.

Over the last four years, I've had a unique opportunity to observe the military contribution to our national life and to have a voice in security policy. In this endeavor, I've been associated with an outstanding multi-service staff, which has risen to every occasion. In the process, I have developed a deep admiration for the Joint Staff action officer, for his energy, his determination, his professional skill, and above all, his ability to put the joint approach above Service parochialism. In the process, they hear a lot about the fog of war, but they've also learned that the fog of peacetime is rather mind-boggling as well. There is no way I can amply extend my thanks. I do extend my heartfelt thanks. That's inadequate.

But as a symbol of my high regard, Shirley and I have endowed an annual award for the outstanding Joint Staff action officer. And to inaugurate that tradition, I would like now to confer this year's award on Major Andrew Dichter of the US Air Force, who is a member of the operations shop on the Joint Staff. If he would come forward, please, I would like to make that award. Would you please read the citation?

Narrator: In recognition of his sustained outstanding achievements, contributions to the accomplishment of the missions of the Armed Forces, and support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major Andrew S. Dichter has been selected as the Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Joint Staff Action Officer of the Year for 1989.

During the past two years, Major Dichter has been the Joint Staff facilitator in the development and execution of this nation's most highly sensitive conventional joint military contingency operations. Major Dichter played a key role in the navigation in international waters and airspace against Libyan attack, in developing contingency options for hostage crisis situations in Lebanon, and perhaps most significantly in the United States operations to protect nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf, known as "Operation Earnest Will."

Major Dichter's demonstrated expertise and initiative in these operations led to his selection to play a leading part in developing the initial concept of operations for the

United States military's role in the Nation's anti-drug campaign. Again he excelled, providing imaginative, insightful advice on how the military could best accomplish this critical new mission.

Throughout his tour on the Joint Staff, Major Dichter has displayed the highest standards of professional conduct, personal integrity, and individual initiative. His performance in meeting the most sensitive and demanding challenges has been outstanding and reflects great credit upon himself, the Joint Staff, and the United States Air Force.

Admiral Crowe resuming: Congratulations. If you hadn't noticed, that gave me great pleasure.

Mr. President, I am deeply indebted to you personally for the opportunity to serve your Administration and to have a role in protecting the interests of our great country. It has been a wonderful adventure for me in every sense of the word. Americans are blessed to have a Commander in Chief with your breadth of understanding and exceptional political skill, and I have witnessed personally that it is tempered by optimism, humaneness, and a great sense of humor, all basic American traits and qualities. I speak for all the military when I say we're especially grateful for the personal support you give us and your appreciation for our mission.

Your national security team is superb and dedicated to keeping this nation safe. I have served under three great Secretaries of Defense. And I want to extend my personal thanks to each—Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Dick Cheney. It was a real learning experience to watch Secretary Weinberger maneuver through the complexities of Washington. Frank Carlucci and I threaded the rocks and shoals of the Persian Gulf. He was a super navigator. It has been an extreme pleasure to work with and to watch Dick Cheney pick up the reins and skillfully set a new course for the Pentagon. You're well served, Mr. President, by this man from Wyoming. I will always treasure the months I worked under him.

General Colin Powell will strengthen your team. No one is better qualified to assume the Chairmanship. He is extremely familiar with the highways and by-ways of Washington, and I leave knowing that the military is in extremely good hands. That's one of the reasons that I feel so good this morning.

Now the tough part. This leaves one other task. Here goes. Thirty-six years ago, when I was courting Shirley in an effort to convince her that it was a good idea to marry me, I was prone on occasion to exaggerate. I used to tell her that she was the most wonderful and beautiful woman in the world, and after thirty-five years of marriage, I've discovered it wasn't an exaggeration.

What modest accomplishments I have achieved are joint ones—we've done it together. Frankly, I discovered I couldn't do anything worthwhile without her. So she has been there through the whole march. Whenever I was knocked out of the ring, she picked me up, dusted me off, assured me that I was winning—although it wasn't so obvious to me—and sent me back into the fray.

She has given me a fantastic family, and that family literally revolves around her.

She has taught all of us to love, to care, and to hang in there, and you can't do much better than that. In the process, she has taught our children to stand up, stand with, and stand behind Dad, and they do. They are here today, as usual, cheering. I suspect they're also laughing, because she taught them to laugh, and I wouldn't be surprised if they are scratching as well.

I don't always understand Shirley, but she has made my life interesting, fulfilling, and fun. Shirley, you are the air underneath my wings. Without it, I would have crashed.

I depart happy in spirit. I've never been prouder to be in the US military than I am today. I wish my fellow Chiefs the best of everything. They have been a joy to work with—Bob Herres, Carl Vuono, and Admiral Trost, Larry Welch, Al Gray, and on occasion, Paul Yost. It's been exciting, stimulating, and even at times fun. I wish you the very best.

When I came into the Chairmanship, few people had ever heard of me. All the press could find to talk about was that I had a hat collection, that I told corny jokes, and that I was a sloppy dresser. I am happy to report that that has changed. I have given away the hat collection. But otherwise, I leave the same, still rumpled and prone to tell stories. Those two traits prove to be particularly stubborn ones—even publicity couldn't change them.

I wish my many friends today the very best and many thanks for your friendship.

God bless America.