G.R. No.

170351 March 30, 2011 LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION - ALU - TUCP, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY - ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. FACTS: PNOC is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in, among others of energy resources like geothermal energy. Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, duly registered with the DOLE. PNOC hired employees for its Leyte Geothermal Power Project whereby, their employment was only good up to the completion or termination of the project and would automatically expire upon the completion of such project. Majority of the employees hired had become members of petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner demands for recognition of it as the collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, PNOC did not heed such demands. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to be completed, PNOC proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees who are members of the petitioner. The petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against PNOC on the ground of purported commission by the latter of ULP for "refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination." On the same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike. PNOC filed a complaint for, among others, Strike Illegality with NLRC which ruled in its favour and whose decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: WON the officers and members of petitioner Union are project employees of respondent. HELD: The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the particular employees engagement. In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members of petitioner Union were specifically hired as project employees for respondents Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon the completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, the officers and the members of petitioner Union could be validly terminated. Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the [end of the] season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal. G.R. No. 185556 March 28, 2011 SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-INDAPL), Respondent. FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision, which affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that petitioner violated certain provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Petitioner Supreme Steel Pipe Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel pipes for domestic and foreign markets. Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Supreme Independent Union is the certified bargaining agent of petit ioners rank-and-file employees. Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations. Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent, eight were decided in its favor; two (denial of paternity leave benefit and discrimination of union members) were decided in favor of petitioner; while the issue on visitors free access to company premises was deemed settled during the mandatory conference. The CA declared, in favour of respondents, that the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the employees who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice. It pointed out that there was no ambiguity or doubt as to who were covered by the wage order. Petitioner, therefore, may not invoke error or mistake in extending the COLA to all employees and such act can only be construed as "as a voluntary act on the part of the employer." The CA opined that, considering the foregoing, the ruling in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC clearly did not apply as there was no doubtful or difficult question involved in the present case. ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding that the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII10 from the employees who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice? HELD: No. No diminution of benefits would result if the wage orders are not implemented across the board, as no such company practice has been established. Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time; (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or

application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer. To recall, the CA arrived at its ruling by relying on the fact that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the wage order as to the employees covered by it. From this, the CA concluded that petitioner actually made no error or mistake, but acted voluntarily, in granting the COLA to all its employees. It therefore took exception to the Globe Mackay case which, according to it, applies only when there is a doubtful or difficult question involved. The implementation of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 across the board, which only lasted for less than a year, cannot be considered as having been practiced "over a long period of time." While it is true that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years in order for a practice to be considered as a voluntary act of the employer, under existing jurisprudence on this matter, an act carried out within less than a year would certainly not qualify as such. Hence, the withdrawal of the COLA Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the salaries of non-minimum wage earners did not amount to a "diminution of benefits" under the law. Absent any proof of specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of the practice, we cannot give credence to respondents claim. The isolated act of implementing a wage order across the board can hardly be considered a company practice,71 more so when such implementation was erroneously made.

G.R. No. 169717 March 16, 2011 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union President,Petitioner, vs. CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION, Respondent. FACTS: On February 19, 1999, Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region. On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss4 on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees

within petitioner union.5 The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company. As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. ISSUES: I WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee*s+ of petitioner *unions+ membership is *a+ ground for the cancellation of petitioner *unions+ legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election. II WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by its mother federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner *unions+ legal personality as a labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for certification election. HELD: I It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases. But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees was removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit, thus: II As readily seen, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. As to the charter certificate, the abovequoted rule indicates that it should be executed under oath. Petitioner union concedes and the records confirm that its charter certificate was not executed under oath. However, in San

Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products PlantsSan Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFUFFW),22 which was decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9, Series of 1997, we ruled In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Laguesma, 331 Phil. 356 (1996), the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. Id. While this ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments , we believe that the same doctrine obtains in this case. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the local/chapters officers x x x certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of. In accordance with this ruling, petitioner unions charter certif icate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate,24 (2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office,25 and (3) its constitution and by-laws the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records. G.R. No. 177467 March 9, 2011

PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, Petitioners, vs. GERALDINE VELASCO, Respondent. FACTS: Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003. While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice". Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" and for her return of items (cars, etc.) related to her employment. Velasco replied through a letter defending herself re: accusations against her. Thereafter, Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation.

Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, 17 July 2003, PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. On 25 July 2003, Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice," together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally, on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velascos dismissal valid. HELD: No. In PFIZERs view, it should no longer be required to pay wages considering that (1) it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter; (2) it was allegedly ready to reinstate respondent as of July 1, 2005 but it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to report for work; (3) it would purportedly be tantamount to allowing respondent to choose "payroll reinstatement" when by law it was the employer which had the right to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement; (4) respondent should be deemed to have "resigned" and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation pay; and (5) this Court should not mechanically apply Roquero but rather should follow the doctrine in Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission which was supposedly "more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice." We do not agree. At the outset, we note that PFIZERs previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00 (representing her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision, until May 5, 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiters Writ of Execution dated May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor. Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted PFIZERs unreasonable delay in complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. A perusal of the records, including PFIZERs own submissions, confirmed that it only required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005, as shown by its Letter dated June 27, 2005, which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed down in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated December 5, 2003.

PFIZER makes much of respondents non-compliance with its return- to-work directive by downplaying the reasons forwarded by respondent as less than sufficient to justify her purported refusal to be reinstated. To reiterate, under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll." It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed.