Prosecutor's Response Re: Anthony Christian

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 1 of 71 PageID #: 5478
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- against -
11 CR 425 (S-6) (ENV)
ANTHONY CHRISTIAN, et al.

Defendants.
X
THE GOVERNMENTS MEMORANDUM OF LAW

IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS
MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL OR A NEW TRIAL
LORETTA E. LYNCH
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Allon Lifshitz
Richard M. Tucker
Kevin Trowel
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(Of Counsel)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................................. 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 2
I. THE CHARGED CRIMES AND RACKERTEERING ACTS WERE PROVEN ............ 2
A. General Legal Standard ................................................................................................. 2
B. Application .................................................................................................................... 2
1. Racketeering and Racketeering Conspiracy (Counts One and Two) ...................... 3
a. Legal Standard................................................................................................... 3
b. Application: Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian ..................................... 5
i. Enterprise Membership ................................................................................ 5
ii. Enterprise Continuity ................................................................................. 12
c. Application: Jason Quinn ................................................................................ 15
i. The Overwhelming Evidence Of Quinns Guilt ........................................ 15
Distribution of Narcotics ................................................................................. 15
The 260 Wars and Possession of Firearms .................................................. 20
ii. Quinns Guilt as to Racketeering (Count One) and Racketeering
Conspiracy (Count Two)............................................................................ 22
2. Narcotics Conspiracy (Racketeering Act One and Count Three) ......................... 27
3. Murder Conspiracy The 260 Wars (Racketeering Act Two) ............................. 28
4. The Conspiracy to Murder Corey Brooker (Racketeering Act Three) and the
Murder of Jerome Estella in Aid of Racketeering (Racketeering Act Four and
Count Four) ........................................................................................................... 28
a. Legal Standard................................................................................................. 29
b. Application ....................................................................................................... 29
5. The Conspiracy to Murder William Jones (Racketeering Act Five and
Count Five) ............................................................................................................ 32
a. Legal Standard................................................................................................. 32
b. Application ....................................................................................................... 33
6. Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Other Crimes (Count Six) ................... 37
II. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT MAKE ANY IMPROPER ARGUMENTS ............... 37
A. Legal Standard............................................................................................................. 38
B. Application .................................................................................................................. 39
1. The Governments Rebuttal Was Proper ............................................................... 39
a. General Legal Standard .................................................................................. 39
b. The Government Properly Characterized Defense Arguments About
Cooperating Witnesses .................................................................................... 40
i. Legal Standard ........................................................................................... 40
ii. Application ................................................................................................. 41
c. The Government Properly Rebutted Arguments About Felix Grant ............... 45
d. The Government Did Not Improperly Vouch For Its Cooperating
Witnesses.......................................................................................................... 47
i. Legal Standard ........................................................................................... 48
ii. Application ................................................................................................. 50
2. Quinn is Not Entitled to a Kastigar Hearing ......................................................... 57
a. Applicable Law ................................................................................................ 57
b. Application ....................................................................................................... 59
3. The Government Properly Introduced Evidence of Quinns 1997 Arrest............. 62
4. The Government Did Not Distort Felix Grants Testimony .............................. 64
5. The Governments Argument About the Waiver Provisions of Quinns Proffer
Agreement Provides No Basis to Vacate the Verdict............................................ 65
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 68
ii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The defendants Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and Jason Quinn were
convicted, following a jury trial, of all counts charged in the Sixth Superseding Indictment.
They have moved for judgments of acquittal as to certain counts and racketeering acts,
arguing that the government failed to prove particular elements of those counts and acts, or,
alternatively, for new trials, arguing that the government made improper arguments at trial.
(See Docket Entry Nos. 401 (JQ Br.), 402 (AC Br.), 405 (HC Br.) and 414 (JQ Supp.
Br.).) For the reasons set forth below, the defendants motions should be denied in their
entirety. 1
Because the Court is familiar with the record and evidence in this case, the
facts set forth in this memorandum are not meant to be an exhaustive recapitulation of the
evidence presented by the government in this lengthy trial. Rather, in this memorandum, the
government has endeavored to highlight only the evidence relevant to the defendants posttrial motions. Citations to the trial transcript refer to Tr.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE CHARGED CRIMES AND RACKERTEERING ACTS WERE PROVEN

A.
General Legal Standard

Rule 29(a) provides that [a]fter the government closes its evidence or after
the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendants motion must enter a judgment of
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. A
judgment of acquittal may be granted only if no rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d
Cir. 2005). Put differently, a Rule 29 motion must be denied if, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Temple, 447
F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2006).
The Second Circuit has instructed that [c]ourts must be careful to avoid
usurping the role of the jury when confronted with a motion for acquittal. United States v.
Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003). In particular, a court must avoid substituting its
own determination of the weight of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence. Id. Rather, it is the task of the jury, not the court, to
choose among competing inferences that can be drawn in favor of the government. Temple,
447 F.3d at 136-37; see also United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2006)
(same).
B.
Application
The defendants have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence introduced to
prove certain counts and racketeering acts. However, the record demonstrates that those
2
counts and racketeering acts were supported by sufficient evidence, and there is no basis for
acquittals as to any of them.
1.
Racketeering and Racketeering Conspiracy (Counts One and Two)
Anthony Christian argues that the government fail[ed] to establish the

continued existence and operation of the [charged racketeerinfg] enterprise. (AC Br. at 4.)
More specifically, he argues that (1) [w]ith the exception of the defendants Anthony and
Harvey Christian, no other person was involved or associated with the enterprise for longer
than 2 years, and (2) no proof was offered of the existence of the enterprise between 20002001 and 2010. (Id. at 2.) Jason Quinn argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, and also moves for
judgments of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29. (JQ Br. at 3). Harvey Christian joins in these
motions. (HC Br. at 1.) These motions are based on false factual and legal premises, and
should be rejected.
a.
Legal Standard
A charge of racketeering requires, inter alia, proof of participation in the

affairs of an enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and a charge of racketeering conspiracy
requires, inter alia, proof of an agreement to participate in the affairs of an enterprise, 18
U.S.C. 1962(d). The racketeering statute defines an enterprise as any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). The
Supreme Court has explained that proving an enterprise does not require proof of any
particular formal organization:
[A]n association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit

that functions with a common purpose. Such a group need not
have a hierarchical structure or a chain of command; decisions
may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of
methodsby majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc.
Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different
members may perform different roles at different times. The
group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established
rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or
initiation ceremonies. While the group must function as a
continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a
course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise
whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by
periods of quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups
whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for
example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion
through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may
fall squarely within the statutes reach.
Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009).
Significantly, the Second Circuit, district courts in the Circuit and other courts
have repeatedly held that [a]n individuals associated in fact enterprise, 18 U.S.C.
1961(4), may continue to exist even though it undergoes changes in membership. United
States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 49 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d
46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005) (This
element may be established even if some individuals left [the charged enterprise] and were
replaced by new members at a later date.); United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 156061 (2d Cir. 1991) (enterprise element satisfied because the evidence clearly established that,
regardless of internal disputes and membership changes, the [enterprises] power structure
endured and its members functioned as a unit up until the time that [one of its leaders]
cooperation with the government was revealed); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
223 (3d Cir. 1983) (This [continuity requirement] does not mean that individuals cannot
4
leave the group or that new members cannot join at a later time.); Jones v. United States, 12
CV 601 (EBB), 2014 WL 6871198, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2014) (Moreover, even if, as
Jones alleges, there was no evidence showing that Powell and Harris had any involvement in
the criminal activities of the enterprise from 1990 to 1994, the law is clear that the
government does not need to prove an enterprise was comprised of a fixed membership
throughout its existence.); United States v. Mayes, 11 CR 385 (ARR), 2014 WL 3530862,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014) ([A]n enterprise can function as a continuing unit even if
the membership changes during the period charged.).
In addition, and consistent with the Supreme Courts decision in Boyle, the
Second Circuit has held explicitly held that [a] period of quiescence in an enterprises
course of conduct does not exempt the enterprise from RICO prosecution. United States v.
Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 ([N]othing in
RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by
periods of quiescence.).
b.
Application: Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian
Anthony Christians argument about the enterprises membership and

continuity both fail.
i.
Enterprise Membership
The argument about membership fails because the government offered

extensive proof that the enterprise was a continuing unit that functioned with a common
purpose. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948. In particular, every cooperating witness who testified
explained that, during the period of his involvement in or awareness of the enterprise,
Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian were its leaders, its purpose was to sell drugs in the
5
Park Hill neighborhood of Staten Island, and its methods included engaging in violence to
maintain and obtain control of drug turf:
James Bestman testified that in 1991, he sold drugs at 160 Park Hill with
Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and their brother James Christian, all of
whom also sold drugs at 55 Bowen. (Tr. at 104-05, 108, 113-14.) Bestman
met Quinn in the early 1990s and would see him around 55 Bowen with
Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian. (Id. at 99-100.) Bestman pooled his
money with the Christian brothers to buy drugs together from supplier Leon
Lewis. (Id. at 106.) Significantly, Bestman testified that even back in 1991
Harvey Christian was a natural leader who would recruit people to work for
us, i.e., to sell crack for the enterprise. (Id. at 112-13.) Bestman identified a
man known as Bigga, whose true name he believed to be Sheron Crabs, as
someone who sold crack with the Christian brothers from the early 1990s
onward, including at 225 Park Hill and 240 Park Hill. (Id. at 101-03.) The
enterprise members worked together at 160 Park Hill, a freelance building,
where Bestman would generally use his speed to reach customers before rival
drug dealers, while, at the same time, Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian
physically blocked the rival dealers. (Id. at 114-15.) In 1992 or 1993, after
Brian Humphreys and another drug dealer forced the enterprise out of 160
Park Hill, Bestman and the Christian brothers moved their operation to 225
Park Hill and 240 Park Hill. (Id. at 122-27.) The enterprise quickly came to
control 240 Park Hill, meaning that the only people who could sell crack
there were enterprise workers. (Id. at 127-28.) This arrangement lasted for
five or six months, beginning at the end of 1993, and involved the members
buying drugs and guns together. (Id. at 128-32.) The arrangement at 240
Park Hill ended in 1994, after Bestman shot and killed Erron Lewis, also
known as 2 Cent, while protecting the enterprises turf from Lewiss friend
Echoes, who had sold fake drugs at 240 Park Hill. (Id. at 134-40.) Bestman
was in jail for that crime from 1994 to 1997 before being acquitted at trial.
(Id. at 139-40.) He recalled that before he went to jail, the enterprise was
involved in an ongoing dispute with a rival drug trafficking organization based
in 260 Park Hill one building over from 240 Park Hill which was run by
leaders Keith Darling, also known as LK, and Marcus Peake, also known as
Herb. (Id. at 140-41.) After 1997, Bestman did not live in Staten Island
because he feared retribution from Erron Lewiss brothers, but he visited from
time to time, saw the Christian brothers at 55 Bowen, knew that they had
joined the Bloods gang by 1997, and believed they left it in approximately
2000. (Id. at 141-43.)
Brian Humphreys, also known as Trev, testified that he met Anthony

Christian, Harvey Christian and James Christian whom he knew as AK
in 1992. (Tr. at 402-03.) In 1992 and 1993, he saw them selling crack at 55
Bowen, 225 Park Hill and 240 Park Hill, and he understood that they
6
controlled 55 Bowen and 225 Park Hill. (Id. at 404-05.) Humphreys worked
as an enforcer for LK and Herb, as well as their partner Michael Prince,
also known as Black, but stopped working for that crew in 1992 in order to
remain neutral in their dispute with the Christian brothers. (Id. at 415.)
Humphreys subsequently sold drugs outside New York and spent time in jail,
but returned to Park Hill in or around 1998. (Id. at 418-20.) At that time,
Humphreys brother Paul Ford, also known as Uncles, explained that the
Christian brothers were in control of the drug trade and that Ford had become
their drug supplier because Leon Lewis was incarcerated, and Humphreys
observed that the Christian brothers were the bosses of the Bloods gang in the
area. (Id. at 420-22.) After another arrest, Humphreys returned to Park Hill in
1999 and began working for the Christian brothers as an enforcer. (Id. at 42225.) They controlled drug sales at 55 Bowen, 225 Park Hill and nearby Targee
Street. (Id. at 425-27.) Humphreys committed a series of robberies and
extortions for the Christian brothers in 1999, often with other enterprise
members, generally aimed at eliminating rival drug dealers who infringed on
the enterprises turf. (Id. at 427-32.) As discussed in greater detail below, in
1999, Humphreys, at the direction of Anthony Christian and Ford, agreed to
murder a rival drug dealer known as Shank Bank. (Id. at 437-40.) In the
course of attempting to carry out that murder, Humphreys with Anthony
Christians approval, and using a gun provided to him by Anthony Christian
shot and killed an associate of Shank Bank known as Boo Boo, and was
then arrested on the fifth floor of 55 Bowen, immediately outside the Christian
brothers apartment, where he had gone to report the murder and to return
the murder weapon to Anthony Christian. (Id. at 442-60.)
Paul Ford, also known as Uncles, testified that he met Anthony Christian,
Harvey Christian, James Christian and Jason Quinn in 1987 or 1988, when he
(Ford) sold crack at 55 Bowen. (Tr. at 823-24.) In the late 1980s and early
1990s, Ford observed the Christian brothers and Bigga selling crack at 55
Bowen. (Id. at 825.) By 1991, the Christian brothers were being supplied
with crack by Leon Lewis. (Id. at 830-31.) In 1993, Ford observed Anthony
Christian and Harvey Christian selling crack at 55 Bowen, where they had
several workers working for them. (Id. at 835.) He also saw Bestman selling
crack with them at 55 Bowen, 185 Park Hill, 225 Park Hill and 240 Park Hill,
and he saw Rob Fields, whom he knew as Rob or Boy Boy, and Vernon
Fields, whom he knew as Vern, spend time with the Christian brothers at 55
Bowen. (Id. at 835-36, 854-55.) In 1994 and 1995, the Christian brothers
enterprise which included Jason Quinn, another dealer known as Waco,
and others whom Ford did not know by name was involved in an ongoing
dispute with the rival group operated by Darling, Peake and Prince. (Id. at
837-40.) During the dispute, Ford once observed Anthony Christian and
Harvey Christian running from 260 Park Hill toward 55 Bowen, while Harvey
Christian held an AK-47 and shots were fired from 260 Park Hill. (Id. at 841.)
Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian later told Ford that they had been
7
fired on from the roof of 260 Park Hill and that they had returned fire. (Id. at
844.) In 1995, Ford proposed to Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian,
Waco and another dealer known as AO that Ford supply them with crack
to sell at various buildings they controlled, and to split the resulting profits.
(Id. at 846-47.) The group agreed, and the plan was put into action, with
Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian selling their share of the crack at 55
Bowen. (Id. at 848.) This arrangement lasted approximately six months. (Id.
at 849-50.) By 1998 and 1999, the Christian brothers had become more
powerful in Park Hill because they had joined the Bloods and were highranking in that organization, and because their supplier, Leon Lewis, was no
longer in Park Hill. (Id. at 853, 855.) Ford recalled that his half-brother, Brian
Humphreys, began working for the Christian brothers in or around 2000. (Id.
at 852-53.) In or around 1999, Anthony Christian proposed murdering Shank
Bank, who had robbed another drug dealer, and Ford, in the presence of
Humphreys, gave his approval. (Id. at 855-57.) After Boo Boo was
murdered, Anthony Christian told Ford that Humphreys had committed the
murder. (Id. at 858-59.) In 2010 and 2011, Ford supplied crack to Anthony
Christian and Harvey Christian, who bought the crack together with Quinn,
Boy Boy and Vern, and who at that time employed Jamie Booker, also
known as Momo, Rob Jones, known to Ford as Rob, and a driver known
as Dia. (Id. 867-75.) In early 2011, Anthony Christian and Harvey
Christian told Ford they were having a problem with Buddha at 55 Bowen.
(Id. at 861-64.) Ford later observed Anthony Britt, whom he knew as N-O,
shooting at Buddha from the front 55 Bowen toward the back of 225 Park
Hill, an incident discussed in greater detail below. (Id. at 864-65.)
Lamar Goodwine, also known as Stopper and Pop, testified that he had
sold drugs in Park Hill and elsewhere. (Tr. at 1062.) He began selling for
Keith Darling, who was his cousin, and Marcus Peake in 1991 or 1992. (Id. at
1063-65.) Goodwine then sold drugs outside of New York, but began
spending a lot of time in Staten Island on August 3, 1994, and on that day he
observed a dispute between Darling and Leon Lewis outside 260 Park Hill,
based on one of Darlings workers having robbed one of Lewiss workers, and
realized there was about to be a war. (Id. at 1070-73, 1105-06.) Goodwine
knew Lewis to be associated with the Christian brothers, and knew that
Darling controlled 260 Park Hill. (Id. at 1104, 1107-09.) At that time,
Michael Prince controlled 280, Lewis controlled 180 Park Hill and the
Christian brothers controlled 55 Bowen. (Id. at 1110-12.) In the fall of 1994,
the Christian brothers worked with Rob Fields, Vern Fields, James Christian
and Jason Quinn, and were attempting to sell at 225 Park Hill. (Id. at 111415.) Goodwine witnessed a confrontation that Darling had with Anthony
Christian and Harvey Christian shortly after one of Darlings workers Keith
Jackson, also known as Meat had been shot. (Id. at 1115-17.)
Subsequently, Harvey Christian shot at Darling and Goodwine as they drove
past 55 Bowen, they retaliated by shooting up in front of 55, and these two
8
rival crews engaged in a full-blown war. (Id. at 1118-19.) Goodwine

recalled that the war lasted two or three months, and there were several
shooting in some weeks. (Id. at 1119-20.) The incidents were many and
violent. In one, Harvey Christian, who was with Anthony Christian and
another brother named Archie, shot at Goodwine near 225 Park Hill, and
Goodwine got in a car and shot back; the next day, Harvey Christian, carrying
a gun, attempted to open the door of a cab Goodwine had entered. (Id. at
1121-23.) In another, the Christian brothers enterprise including Anthony
Christian, Harvey Christian, Quinn, another brother known as Fred or Flip
and another individual stood on the roof of 225 Park Hill and exchanged
gunfire with Darling and others, who stood on the roof of 260 Park Hill. (Id.
at 1123-24.) In yet another incident, members of the charged enterprise shot at
the front of 260 Park Hill. (Id. at 1124.) After Goodwine assaulted Archie,
the enterprise retaliated, with Harvey, Nitty and an enterprise member named
Billy tr[ying] to shoot up 260 again. (Id. at 1124-26.) On one occasion,
Anthony Christian, who was with Fred, shot at Goodwine, who was in 260
Park Hill with others. (Id. at 1126-27.) Goodwine also observed enterprise
members shooting from cabs and test-firing guns on the roof of 55 Bowen.
(Id. at 1127-29.) In all, Goodwine recalled being shot at on at least ten
occasions during the war including numerous times by Anthony Christian
and Harvey Christian, and one or two times by Quinn and shooting back
about the same number of times. (Id. at 1129-30.) Darling and Peake still
controlled 260 Park Hill at the end of the war, but by 1998, when Goodwine
completed a term of incarceration, the Christian brothers controlled 260 Park
Hill and were also still selling drugs at 55 Bowen, and their enterprise
appeared to be engaged in a lucrative drug trade at those locations. (Id. at
1133-34.) In 2007, after Goodwine completed another term of incarceration,
the Christian brothers were still selling at 55 Bowen, and they had workers,
including one Goodwine knew as Rob. (Id. at 1136-37.) In 2010, after
Goodwine completed yet another term of incarceration, he observed that the
Christian brothers were still selling crack at 55 Bowen, along with Rob,
Quinn, Booker, and a man known to Goodwine as Africa. (Id. at 1140-41.)
On one occasion, Goodwine observed Buddha, with whom Goodwine had
engaged in separate disputes, firing a gun toward 55 Bowen and 225 Park Hill.
(Id. at 1142-44.)
William Cothren, also known as Elmo and Specialist, testified that he

lived in Park Hill early in his life and then again in 2011. (Tr. at 1332-33.) He
met Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian that year, though he had been
aware of them earlier through his cousin, a member of the Bloods who died in
1997. (Id. at 1336-38.) Soon after meeting the Christian brothers, Cothren
began selling crack for Harvey Christian in 55 Bowen. (Id. at 1342-43.)
Nobody could sell drugs there without permission from the Christian brothers.
(Id. at 1361.) He identified Rob as another worker for Harvey Christian.
(Id. at 1345-48.) When Cothren worked for Harvey Christian, he lived in the
9
Christian brothers apartment in 55 Bowen, along with Rob and Momo.

(Id. at 1350-52.) Momo also assisted in Harvey Christians drug dealing.
(Id. at 1355.) Rob Fields, also known as Boy Boy, also sold crack at 55
Bowen at this time. (Id. at 1356.) In addition to dealing crack with Harvey
Christian, Cothren broke up and bagged up marijuana with Anthony
Christian and Momo. (Id. at 1359.) Cothren observed that Harvey Christian
had a driver. (Id. at 1361-62.) When Rob stopped coming to 55 Bowen,
Harvey Christian became upset and instructed Cothren to find him. (Id. at
1363-64.) Subsequently, Cothren moved out of the Christian brothers
apartment, but continued to hold crack for Harvey Christian and marijuana for
Anthony Cristian. (Id. at 1367-71.) He also held a gun for Harvey Christian
and Antony Christian, which was delivered to Cothren by Momo, and which
both Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian later directed him to deliver.
(Id. at 1371-74.)
Amos Boone, also known as Peanut, testified that he began selling crack on
Staten Island in 1986 or 1987, and was a member of the Bloods from 1993 to
2012. (Tr. at 1442-43.) He met Anthony Christian in jail in 1997 or 1998 and
met Harvey Christian later, in or around 2000. (Id. at 1444-45.) He was
introduced to Anthony Christian by a fellow Bloods member, and knew
Anthony Christian to be a member of that gang. (Id. at 1445-46.) When he
met Anthony Christian, Anthony Christian said he sold drugs at 55 Bowen,
was in a dispute with Darling over the control of buildings in Park Hill, and
had been involved in a shootout at 260 Park Hill. (Id. at 1448-49.) Boone first
spoke to Harvey Christian by phone in 2000, while Boone was still
incarcerated. They spoke over the phone as a result of Boones brother also
a Bloods member having met the Christian brothers; Boone and Harvey
Christian planned to meet at 55 Bowen when Boone was released. (Id. at
1450-51, 1454-56.) When Boone was released later in 2000, he found that
everybody in every neighborhood [in Staten Island] was Blood. (Id. at
1457.) After Boone had difficulty selling drugs in another neighborhood, he
drove to Park Hill and got Harvey Christians phone number from a crack user
who Goodwine knew, and Boone and Harvey Christian met at 55 Bowen. (Id.
at 1459-66.) Harvey Christian told Boone that Darling had been arrested
federally, and as a result, Park Hill was wide open. (Id. at 1467-68.) Boone
observed that the Christian brothers drug business was successful, and Harvey
Christian told him he had been involved in a gun battle at 260 Park Hill and
had issues with Shank Bank. (Id. at 1468-70.) Subsequently, around 2001,
Boone saw Anthony Christian selling crack on Targee Street. (Id. at 1472-75.)
In the fall of 2009, Boone saw Harvey Christian, N-O and Boy Boy in
front of 55 Bowen. (Id. at 1500-01.) He then heard N-O, who was across
the street by 225 Park Hill, ask, Wheres that at?, to which Harvey Christian
responded, Its right on the tire. (Id. at 1501-02.) N-O then retrieved a
handgun from the front tire of a car and Harvey Christian told him to let that
10
thing off; Boone drove away and did not see what happened next. (Id. at
1502-03.)
Anthony Britt, also known as N-O, testified that he sold crack beginning at
age seventeen in Staten Island and elsewhere. (Tr. at 1633-34.) He joined the
Bloods in February 1996, when he was incarcerated in Rikers Island. (Id. at
1634, 1643.) Significantly, after he was released in 2003, he saw Anthony
Christian and Harvey Christian selling drugs at 55 Bowen, which Britt visited
because his father worked there as a security guard. (Id. at 1652-54.) In the
middle of 2009, Britt brought Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and
another man into the Valentine set of the Bloods; he knew that the Christian
brothers had previously been members of another Bloods set, which Harvey
Christian said they left because of other members perceived cooperation with
law enforcement. (Id. at 1647-50, 1657-59.) Harvey Christian had asked Britt
to bring him into the Valentine set, and Harvey Christian subsequently brought
another man into it. (Id. at 1650-51.) After the Christian brothers were
inducted into the set, they joined Britt in blooding out another member,
which involved break[ing] his blood, and, during that incident, Harvey
Christian and Britt both cut someone in the face with a razor blade. (Id. at
1660-62.) Britt explained that by joining the Bloods, Harvey Christian gained
access to lower prices from drug suppliers. (Id. at 1664-65.) Britt saw the
Christian brothers selling drugs at 55 Bowen in or around 2009 and 2010,
including with their workers Rob and Momo, and although Britt was a
high-ranking Blood, he had no control over the Christian brothers drug
business. (Id. at 1665-66, 1675-76.) Indeed, Harvey Christian refused to even
allow Britt to sell drugs at 55 Bowen. (Id. at 1676-77.) In the summer of
2010, Britt had a dispute with an individual known as Buddha and, as
described in greater detail below, the dispute evolved into an enterprise
dispute. (Id. at 1677-89, 1701.) In late 2010 and into 2011, Britt observed that
the enterprises crack and marijuana business at 55 Bowen was thriving, and it
included Rob, Momo and Boy Boy. (Id. at 1689-91.) On one occasion,
Britt encountered enterprise worker Rob, who spoke disparagingly of
Harvey Christian, and Britt at Harvey Christians direction delivered
Rob to Harvey Christian. (Id. at 1691-94.)
Felix Grant, also known as Pookie, testified that he sold crack to Harvey
Christian, and crack and powder cocaine to Quinn. (Tr. at 2025-26.) He met
Harvey Christian through Robert Fields, also known as Boy Boy, in 2011.
(Id. at 2040-41.) Fields introduced Harvey Christian as his brother, which
Grant understood to be a figure of speech indicating they were close. (Id. at
2041-42.) On that first occasion, Harvey Christian and Fields bought crack
from Grant, and Grant subsequently sold crack to Harvey Christian about ten
to fifteen times. (Id. at 2043.) During this period, Harvey Christian called
Grant directly, approximately once per week, to arrange these transactions.
(Id. at 2043.) Sometimes, enterprise workers Rob and Momo picked up
11
the drugs. (Id. at 2044-45.) Harvey Christian introduced Grant to Quinn,

saying he needed drugs for his man, i.e., Quinn. (Id. at 2046-47.) Quinn
would then contact Grant directly to purchase drugs from him, which
happened about once a week for three or four months. (Id. at 2047-48.)
This evidence goes far beyond the basic requirements of Boyle, and though
not required by Boyle proved that the charged enterprise had a rather formal structure with
defined roles for particular members, such as the enforcer Humphreys, the workers Jones and
Booker, and the suppliers Ford and Grant. Most importantly, this testimony established that
the enterprise was always controlled by Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian, that it
always existed to sell drugs in Park Hill, and that its methods always included using violence
to obtain and maintain drug turf. Therefore, the enterprise was proven by sufficient
evidence, and Anthony Christians argument about the enterprises changing membership
should be rejected.
ii.
Enterprise Continuity
Anthony Christians argument about the purported quiescence of the enterprise

between 2000 and 2010 also fails. As an initial matter and significantly the cooperator
testimony in fact refers to enterprise activity during the period between 2000 and 2010. In
particular, in 2003, Britt saw Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian selling drugs at 55
Bowen. (Tr. at 1652-54.) In 2007, Goodwine saw the Christian brothers still selling at 55
Bowen with workers, including the one Goodwine knew as Rob. (Id. at 1136-37.) In the
middle of 2009, Britt brought Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and another man into the
Valentine set of the Bloods, which allowed Harvey Christian to gained access to lower prices
from drug suppliers. (Id. at 1647-50, 1657-59, 1664-65.) Furthermore, as essentially
conceded by Anthony Christian, the record was not limited to testimony by cooperators who
12
personally dealt with the defendants, but also included testimony by eyewitnesses and law
enforcement officers about incidents that prove the existence of the enterprise throughout the
2000s:
Awie Kollie testified that in July 2004, he attempted to buy a bag of marijuana
from Anthony Christian in 55 Bowen. (Tr. at 1276-77.) Anthony Christian
provided the drugs, and Kollie said he would pay him later. (Id. at 1278.)
Anthony Christian collared Kollie, and Kollie began to choke Anthony
Christian. (Id. at 1278.) Someone screamed to get Harvey Christian and
James Christian, and soon thereafter Kollie was on the ground, being assaulted
by the three Christian brothers, and he got stabbed in the back of his neck,
resulting in 50-60 stitches. (Id. at 1279.) This incident demonstrates that in
2004, the enterprise continued to sell drugs in 55 Bowen, that it still included
Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and James Christian, and that enterprise
members were will to commit acts of violence to resolve disputes and protect
their drug business.
New York City Police Department (NYPD) Sergeant Thomas Spitzfaden

testified that on January 18, 2005, he and a partner entered 55 Bowen to search
for criminal activity. (Tr. at 1949.) Prior to that date, he had seen Anthony
Christian, Harvey Christian and James Christian in front of, inside, and around
the corner from 55 Bowen, and, in general, the three Christian brothers had
taunted the police and asked, What are you doing here in our building? (Id.
at 1952.) On January 18, 2005, Sgt. Spitzfaden and his partner saw three
young men loitering in the lobby of 55 Bowen, placed two of them in
handcuffs, and were about to cuff the third when Anthony Christian and
Harvey Christian appeared in the lobby and a security guard walked out of it.
(Id. at 1953.) Harvey Christian told the officers, Youre not arresting them,
and instructed the uncuffed man to run, which he did. (Id. at 1953-54.) Sgt.
Spitzfaden wanted to give chase, but Harvey Christian physically blocked him,
and Anthony Christian grabbed him. (Id. at 1954.) As the officers left with
the two men they had cuffed, the Christian brothers taunted them, saying,
Bring your boys back, come back. You think you can get us, come back.
Were going to get you. Get out of our building. (Id.) By the time the
officers placed the two trespassers in a police cars, a crowd of fifteen to twenty
people had gathered and joined in the taunts. (Id.) That evening, Sgt.
Spitzfaden returned with another officer and a supervisor in order to arrest
Harvey and Anthony Christian for obstruction of government administration.
(Id. at 1955.) They found Harvey Christian and tried to arrest him, but he
physically resisted and screamed, as if to get people out of their apartments.
(Id. at 1956.) Sgt. Spitzfaden pepper-sprayed Harvey Christian, which
appeared to have little effect, and Harvey Christian ran down a staircase. (Id.)
The officer gave chase, and Harvey Christian reached back, grabbed the
13
supervisor, pulled him down the stairs and slammed him into a wall, requiring
hospitalization. (Id. at 1956-57, 1959.) The officer attended to the supervisor,
so Harvey Christian was able to get away again. (Id. at 1957-59.) This
incident proves that in 2005 in the middle of the purported period of
quiescence the Christian brothers still controlled 55 Bowen and believed
they were so powerful that not even the New York City Police Department
could enforce the law in the buildings lobby.
NYPD Detective Anthony Bellantone testified that on March 20, 2009, he

went to 55 Bowen in response to a call stating that guns were in the hallway
ceiling hatch. (Tr. at 1309-10.) Det. Bellantone and his partner recovered a 9
millimeter firearm and a .45 caliber firearm, as well as drugs, from that
location. (Id. at 1310-11.) This testimony proves that in early 2009, the
enterprise continued to operate, continued to use 55 Bowen as its stronghold,
and contained to sell drugs and to possess weapons in furtherance of its drug
business.
As noted above, the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have explicitly held
that occasional periods of quiescence do not allow defendants who are otherwise guilty of
racketeering offenses to obtain acquittals. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948; Burden, 600 F.3d at 216.
In addition, as just demonstrated and perhaps more importantly the record contains ample
evidence of continued operation between 2000 and 2010, and absolutely no evidence of any
period of quiescence at all. The law does not require the government to prove the daily
activities of an enterprise in order to prove a twenty-year racketeering count, and if it did
then few, if any, such prosecutions would succeed. In this case, the evidence indicates that
the enterprise operated in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Taken in the context of all of
the cooperating witness testimony about the enterprise about the Christian brothers
leadership of it, the extensive drug sales, the total control of 55 Bowen, the frequent use of
firearms it is difficult to imagine a reasonable juror concluding that any of the specific
incidents proven at trial were unconnected to the enterprise, let alone that they all were.
Reasonable juror were certainly entitled to conclude based on this evidence that the
14
enterprise operated continuously from 1991 to 2011, as alleged, including between 2000 and
2010, without any legally relevant periods of quiescence.
For all of these reasons, the government respectfully submits that the evidence
of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy was sufficient to support the verdicts.
c.
Application: Jason Quinn

i.
The Overwhelming Evidence Of Quinns Guilt
At trial, the government presented overwhelming evidence establishing

Quinns participation in the charged racketeering enterprise, his membership in the charged
narcotics distribution conspiracies, his possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute,
and the use of firearms, including machineguns, in furtherance of these crimes. This
evidence, summarized and highlighted in part below, included testimony from numerous
cooperating witnesses, recorded calls from judicially authorized wiretaps, text messages
forensically captured from a coconspirators cellular phone, and seized crack cocaine,
firearms and ammunition.
Distribution of Narcotics
As the government proved at trial and argued in its summations, Quinn was an
active member of the charged racketeering enterprise and narcotics conspiracies. In
furtherance of those activities, Quinn shared drug suppliers with Anthony Christian and
Harvey Christian, discussed strategies for drug pricing and packaging, discussed problems
with certain drug suppliers, and discussed methods for avoiding detection by law
enforcement officials. Cooperating witness Paul Ford testified that he first recalled seeing
Jason Quinn around 55 Bowen with Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian in the early
1990s as the Christian brothers were beginning to develop a reputation as the leading drug
15
dealers in Park Hill. (Tr. at 824, 830, 997-99 (Jason Quinn was always in the building at 55
[Bowen] hanging out with the Christian brothers.).) Ford further testified that in 2010 and
2011, Anthony and Harvey Christian, Robert Fields, also known as Boy Boy, and Quinn
would pool their monies together, and they would let me know exactly what amounts they
want, what amounts Boy Boy and his brother wanted, and what amounts Jason Quinn
wanted. (Id. at 868.)
Cooperating witness Felix Grant likewise testified that he sold crack cocaine
and powder cocaine to Jason Quinn. (Tr. at 2048-49.) Grant explained that he first came to
sell narcotics to Quinn only after Harvey Christian introduced Quinn to Grant. Grant
testified:
Q: How did you come to meet Jason Quinn?
A: I met him through Harvey.
Q: Please tell us what happened.
A: Harvey called me up one day and says he needs drugs and he
says its for somebody, for his man or something.
Q: He said it was for his man?
A: Yeah, I believe so.
Q: What happened next?
A: I end up bringing the drugs. I dealt with Harvey on the first
time, I believe, and I guess they exchanged drugs. Harvey gave
him my number. He calls me up one day after that and hes
like, this is Harveys man, and I started dealing with him from
then.
16
(Id. at 2046-47.) Grant further testified that he agreed to sell narcotics to Quinn [b]ecause
he [Quinn] was dealing with Harvey, and that Grant subsequently sold crack and powder
cocaine to Quinn at least once per week for three-to-four months. (Id. at 2048.)
In addition to this testimony from cooperating witnesses, the government
introduced recorded telephone calls between Quinn and Harvey Christian, and between
Quinn and Grant, in which they discussed the distribution of narcotics. For example, during
two lengthy intercepted calls on April 4, 2011, Quinn and Harvey Christian discussed in
detail the merits of packaging large, or chunky 50s, referring to $50 baggies of crack
cocaine. In these calls, it was apparent that Quinn had possessed distribution quantities of
crack cocaine on or about that same date. For example, during one of those calls, the
following exchange took place:
QUINN: So Im like Ill make you all wanna get the 50. That
back and forth shit is what brings niggas more exposure to go to
jail. So if they use Im just saying, if you got them used to big
itll be maybe not if you just show them put it with the big
split the chunky 50s. But the motherfuckers is used to coming
for dubs, they might not really be going for that shit. See, my
shit was my dubs I came I started in the dubs with small
already. So it aint really changed that much, they just a little
bit bigger than before, but the 50s is mad chunky. The 50s is
like three almost three almost more than three 20s now,
about three 20s. Its like the same thing they was gonna get it I
was giving a little play. But its a gimmick so this shit go. But
if your shit is already mad big
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Oh.
QUINN: but you could do it. I mean, the shit went before
when he made a note off a 10, even though you got complaints.
I think the complaints is from when he was selling 50s. Them
50s was looking fucked up. A 20s a 20, yeah, but the bag is
mad big and its mad space. Them shits is how your 20s was
looking before. You cant thats what Im saying. You cant
sell a nigga something for 50 that you was giving them for 20.
17
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Yeah.

QUINN: Thats how that shit was looking.
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: I wanna sell the shit I got now.
(GX 800(a)-4.)
During a call on April 16, 2011, Quinn complained to Harvey Christian about
the low quality of a quantity of narcotics that Quinn had recently obtained from Grant:
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Hello?
QUINN: Yo, what up?
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Whats going on?
QUINN: Yo, yo yo your man gonna make me hurt him, dawg.
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Who?
QUINN: Yeah, its the dude we was talking about. I dont
wanna say his name right now, but the dude, the dude you was
talking about going to get, yo, son, yesterday I was gonna tell
you to, like, not, chill, dont get the nigga, cause, you know, we
need him. Dawg, I had, I got some yesterday. Got mad
complaints, right?
QUINN: So he bought, he Im like, yo, homie [U/I], you got
to swap this shit. Hes like, no doubt, I know I got you. He
swaps it today, right?
QUINN: The shit is sodaed up, so Im like Im looking -- I
aint really look too close to it. Boom boom, I could barely cut
it. So I go hit my bottom bitch, you know what Im saying, that
keeps it 100. Then I hit another bitch. The bitch I hit, she calls
me back popping shit, yo, how the fuck you did this to me? Im
like, yo, hold the fuck up, man.
18
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: So [U/I]?

QUINN: Yo, he aint picking up. Hes gonna have my cake
tomorrow, son.
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Oh, yo, yo, yo. I owe him some bread.
So Im gonna call [U/I]. Im taking that stuff he gave me back.
QUINN: Yo, yo, look, its like this, you dont have my cake.
He aint picking up his phone right now. Hes gonna have my
cake tomorrow, man.
(GX 800(a)-16.)
The government also introduced recorded calls between Quinn and Grant
wherein they discussed narcotics transactions. During a call on May 11, 2011, Quinn agreed
to purchases quantities of powder and crack cocaine from Grant. (GX 801(a)-1.) Later, on
May 31, 2011, Quinn and Grant spoke and Grant advised that he was awaiting a delivery of
narcotics. In response, Quinn told Grant that he needed some soft, too, referring to powder
cocaine, and promised to call Grant back. (GX 801(a)(2).) Later that day, Grant was
arrested. Four days after that, Quinn and Harvey Christian discussed Grants (also known as
Pook) arrest and Quinn asked Harvey Christian to supply him with seven grams of crack:
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Yo.
QUINN: Yo. Yeah, you got your work?
QUINN: Yo, let me, let me hold seven, man.
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: I dont got none right now, man.
QUINN: Nobody do?
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Nah.
QUINN: I dont know what the fuck Im gonna do.
19
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: I dont know how Pook got jammed

up like that, man.
QUINN: Its fucking crazy and lazy. Yeah, being lazy.
HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Silly ass nigga.
QUINN: And real lazy.
(GX 800(a)-50.)
When Quinn was arrested on June 8, 2011, agents from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) found crack cocaine packaged for resale in his residence, other
packaging paraphernalia and cash. (GX 600, 601, 602, 606.) In addition, after he was
released on bail, Quinn continued to distribute narcotics, as the government proved through
text messages between Quinn and fellow narcotics distributor Sam Gill, in which they
discussed the sale of narcotics on April 5, 2012. (GX 900(a).)
The 260 Wars and Possession of Firearms
The government also introduced compelling evidence of Quinns participation
in the charged conspiracy to murder members of the rival drug crew operating out of the
apartment building at 260 Park Hill, and his use of firearms, including machineguns, in
furtherance of that murder conspiracy, as well the charged racketeering enterprise and
narcotics conspiracies more broadly. In addition to the testimony of Paul Ford discussed
above, cooperating witness Lamar Goodwine testified that he personally observed Quinn
fighting alongside Anthony and Harvey Christian during the so-called 260 Wars.
Goodwine testified:
A: . . . We was on 260 and they came Harvey, Nitty and Q
[referring to Quinn] and the other brother Flip or Fred came
walking in 225 and took the elevator upstairs to the roof.
20
Q: You could see them enter the building from where you were
on the roof of 260?
A: Yes. They walked inside the building and a minute or two
later they appeared up on the roof. We exchanged gun fire from
across roof to roof.
Q: Who did you say was present on the roof of 225?
A: Harvey, Nitty, Q, their brother Fred and somebody else I
couldnt really identify.
Q: Who had weapons on the roof of 225?
A: Harvey, Nitty, Fred and Q and another person.
Q: What kind of weapons, if you could tell?
A: Well, they was mostly handguns, but Nitty had I believe it
was an AK, I believe.
Q: And what could you see?
A: I see it wasnt all the way dark yet but it was starting to
turn dark so it still had a little bit of light outside. You could see
the flashes. We hear the bullets whizzing over our heads and all
that.
(Tr. at 1123-24.) Goodwine went on to testify that Anthony Christians AK-47 had fired
fully automatically. (Id. 1125-26. 2)
The government further proved at trial that Quinn continued to use and carry
firearms in furtherance of his drug dealing and enterprise membership through the date of his
2
The government introduced ample other evidence that the Christian brothers
and other enterprise members regularly used and carried automatic weapons in furtherance of
their violent crimes, including testimony from Ford, Brian Humphreys and Amos Boone.
Further, the government introduced evidence of the massive gunfight proceeding the murder
of John Kennedy, also known as Jihad in May 1995, including photographs of bulletriddled buildings, dozens of shell casings from the street and roof of 260 Park Hill, and
panicked 911 calls from area residents describing automatic gunfire.
21
arrest in this case. Indeed, agents seized a Hi-Point Model C9 semiautomatic pistol and
loaded magazine from Quinns residence on the day FBI agents took him into custody. (GX
605.)
ii.
Quinns Guilt as to Racketeering (Count One) and

Racketeering Conspiracy (Count Two)
Quinn first argues that to prove that he conducted or participated in the

conduct of the affairs the enterprise, the government was required to prove that Quinn
directed operations of the charged enterprise. Quinn goes onto claim that the government
failed to establish that he was a leader of the enterprise, and thus his conviction on Count
One must be overturned. (JQ Br. at 3-5.)
As a threshold matter, Quinn is simply incorrect that the government was
required to prove that he directed, operated or managed the charged enterprise. As the
Court instructed the jury:
The fifth and final element the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt is that the defendant you are considering
conducted or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the
enterprise through the pattern of racketeering activity. This
means that the defendant must have played some part in the
operation or management of the enterprise. The government is
not required to prove that a defendant was a member of the
management of the enterprise, had a formal position in the
enterprise, or had primary responsibility for the enterprises
affairs or shared in the profit of the enterprise. Rather, an
enterprise is operated not just by management but also by
lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are under the
direction of management or carry out its orders. In other words,
all that participate in the conduct of the enterprise, whether they
are generals or foot soldier[s], are responsible for the affairs of
the enterprise.
(Tr. 2682-83 (emphasis added).) Notably, this instruction was later re-read to the jury in
response to jury question. (Id. at 2778-79.) Quinn never objected to this instruction, no
22
doubt because it is based on well-established law. Indeed, the Second Circuit has made clear
that liability under 1962(c) is not limited to upper management . . . An enterprise is
operated not just by upper management but also by lower-rung participants in the enterprise
who are under the direction of upper management. Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680,
683 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993)).
Nevertheless, here the government established that Quinn, as a longtime and
trusted criminal associate of Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian, was among the upper
echelon of the charged criminal enterprise. Indeed, the government argued in its rebuttal
summation:
Nobodys saying that Jason Quinn was Harvey Christian or
Anthony Christians worker. Thats not what the evidence
shows you. What it does show you . . . is that Harvey Christian
and Jason Quinn are speaking regularly about strategies for
packaging drugs, strategies for pricing drugs, talking about how
theyre not in competition, worrying about the drug economy,
talking about the quality of drugs, talking about whether a
particular supplier is giving them good drugs, talking about
what they want to do because a particular supplier has given
them bad drugs. Remember that call with Jason Quinn, he says,
Im going to have to hurt that guy, dog. Theyre talking about
things that partners talk about. This isnt boss and employee
only, ladies and gentlemen. Anthony Christian, Harvey
Christian, and Jason Quinn worked together. They shared
information. They talked about how to cut cocaine, to cook
crack cocaine more effectively. They talked about law
enforcement and their concerns. Remember Jason Quinns
recording where he talks about how he doesnt like making sales
out of his building because hes worried that the police will see,
neighbors will see when people are coming and going. Thats
what makes this an enterprise. Its what makes it a narcotic
conspiracy because these guys are working together, theyre
sharing notes.
(Tr. at 2587-88.)
23
Put simply, the government was not required to prove that Quinn directed
the enterprise only that he was a thoroughly indoctrinated participant in the charged
enterprises criminal activities. See Napoli, 45 F.3d at 683 (quoting United States v. Wong,
40 F.3d 1347, 1373 (2d Cir. 1994)). Not only was Quinn thoroughly indoctrinated in the
enterprises criminal activities, he was part of the enterprises upper echelon, serving as a
longtime partner and advisor for Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian. Quinns
argument therefore fails.
Quinn next argues that the three racketeering acts of which he was convicted
(Racketeering Acts One, Two and Six) were not vertically related, because the government
did not establish that he was enabled to commit those offenses solely because of his position
in the charged enterprise. (JQ Br. at 6.)
As Quinn correctly notes, and as the Court properly instructed the jury, the
government was required to prove that Quinn participated in the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Second Circuit has explained:
[T]he pattern of racketeering activity is a series of criminal
acts as defined by the statute. Such conduct forms a pattern
under RICO when it embraces criminal acts that have the same
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events. At least two
predicate acts are required to prove a pattern, and the acts must
be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity. The requirements of relatedness and continuity protect
defendants from RICO charges based on isolated or sporadic
criminal acts. . . .
Horizontal relatedness requires that the racketeering predicate
acts be related to each other. However, that relationship need
not be direct; an indirect relationship created by the relationship
of each act to the enterprise will suffice. Vertical relatedness
means that the acts are related to the enterprise. It requires that
24
the defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely because

of his position in the enterprise or his involvement in or control
over the enterprises affairs, or because the offense related to the
activities of the enterprise. Although the government must
provide sufficient evidence of each kind of relatedness, both the
vertical and horizontal relationships are generally satisfied by
linking each predicate act to the enterprise. This is because
predicate crimes will share common goals and common victims
and will draw their participants from the same pool of associates
(those who are members and associates of the enterprise).
Burden, 600 F.3d at 216 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Court explained this element of racketeering to the jury in the following
manner:
To constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, the racketeering
acts must also be related, that is, they must have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and not be merely isolated events. To establish
that two racketeering acts are related to the enterprise, the
government must prove one or more of the following: (1) that a
defendants position in the enterprise facilitated his commission
of those illegal acts; (2) that the acts were in some way related
to the acts of the enterprise, or (3) that a defendant was able to
commit the acts by virtue of his position or involvement in the
affairs of the enterprise. The racketeering acts must also either
have extended over a substantial period of time or have posed a
threat of continued criminal activity. A threat of continued
unlawful activity may be established when evidence shows the
racketeering acts were part of a long-term association that
existed for criminal purposes or when the racketeering acts are
shown to be the regular way of conducting the affairs of the
enterprise. In determining whether the government has proven
the threat of continued, unlawful activity, you are not limited to
consideration of the specific racketeering acts charged against a
defendant. Rather, in addition to considering such acts you may
also consider the nature of the enterprise, and other unlawful
activities of the enterprise and its members viewed in their
entirety, including both charged and uncharged unlawful
25
activities. A pattern may be established by proof that a

defendant operated as part of a long-term association.
(Tr. at 2681-82.)
The evidence at trial amply established both the requisite vertical and
horizontal relatedness of the predicates of which Quinn was convicted. Indeed, the
government established that Quinn was a longtime associate of Anthony Christian and
Harvey Christian, as far back as the early 1990s, when Paul Ford testified that he regularly
saw them together as the Christian brothers ascended to become the most powerful drug
dealers in Park Hill. (Id. at 824 (Jason Quinn was always in the building at 55 [Bowen]
hanging out with the Christian brothers.).) As Lamar Goodwine testified, Quinn fought
alongside the Christian brothers during the 260 Wars, discharging firearms at members of a
rival drug crew from a building rooftop during that conflict. (Id. at 1123-24.) It was only
because of this longtime criminal association that the Christian brothers trusted Quinn
sufficiently to share sources of drug supply, to pool money for drug purchases, and to discuss
strategies for distributing narcotics and avoiding detection by law enforcement officials.
Stated simply, Quinn was permitted to be part of the Christian brothers narcotics conspiracy
only because he had proved himself as a reliable criminal associate through his longtime
association and support in acts of violence, like during the 260 Wars. Thus, there was ample
evidence of vertical and horizontal relatedness to support the jurys conclusion that the
government proved that Quinn participated in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Quinn also makes a perfunctory argument that the government totally failed
to adduce evidence that Quinn reached a meeting of the minds to commit racketeering as
charged in the Indictment. (JQ Br. at 10.) He offers no legal or evidentiary support for this
26
argument. The Court properly instructed the jury as to the elements that the government was
required to prove as to Count Two, and the jury returned a conviction. There is no reason to
disturb the jurys finding.
2.
Narcotics Conspiracy (Racketeering Act One and Count Three)
Quinn challenges the sufficiency of the governments evidence with respect to

his membership in the narcotics conspiracy with Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian
(Racketeering Act One, Count Three). Because he sets forth no reason for the Court to
substitute its own factual findings for that of the jury, these arguments fail. In particular, as
set forth above in greater detail, the government proved Quinns guilt through the testimony
of cooperating witnesses, telephone recordings captured pursuant to judicially authorized
wiretaps, and drug seizures. Further, during two lengthy discussions with Harvey Christian
on April 4, 2011, Quinn discussed pricing strategies and recent drug transactions that fully
supported a jury inference that he possessed narcotics with the intent to distribute on or about
that date. 3 There was ample evidence to support the jurys decision to convict Quinn as to
the narcotics conspiracy.
Curiously, Quinn argues that FBI Agent Wayne Jacobs grand jury testimony
regarding Quinns possession of narcotics on or about April 4, 2011 would somehow be
relevant to the question of whether the trial jurys convictions on Racketeering Act Six and
Count Seven were supported by sufficient evidence. (JQ Br. at 8-9.) Of course, that is
incorrect as a matter of law. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986)
([T]he petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to
believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jurys verdict, then, any error in
the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.).
27
3.
Murder Conspiracy The 260 Wars (Racketeering Act Two)
Quinn also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving his membership
in the conspiracy to murder members of a rival drug crew during the 260 Wars (Racketeering
Act Two). (JQ Br. at 6-8.) However, with respect to Racketeering Act Two, the government
introduced testimony from numerous witnesses, including cooperating witnesses and law
enforcement officials, regarding the 260 Wars. The government also introduced evidence of
Quinns close association with the Christian brothers during that conflict. In addition, Lamar
Goodwine testified about having witnessed Quinn discharging firearms with Anthony
Christian and Harvey Christian from a rooftop. This evidence was compelling proof of
Quinns membership in the conspiracy to murder members of the rival drug crew at 260 Park
Hill. 4
4.
The Conspiracy to Murder Corey Brooker (Racketeering Act Three)

and the Murder of Jerome Estella in Aid of Racketeering (Racketeering
Act Four and Count Four)
Anthony Christian argues that the Court should overturn the jurys verdict as
to the conspiracy to murder Corey Brooker, also known as Shank Bank, and the murder of
In his December 10, 2014 submission styled as a Response To Arguments

Made In Defendant Anthony Christians Memorandum Of Law, Quinn once again cites to
evidence presented to the grand jury in support of his Rule 29 motion. Specifically, Quinn
claims that before the grand jury the government does not appear to have corroborated the
account of Lamar Goodwine. (JQ Supp. Br. at 2.) Quinn further states that Agent Jacobs
testimony in the grand jury differed as to Quinns role in the 260 Wars. (Id. at 2.) Clearly,
the grand jury found Agent Jacobs testimony, including his summary of information
provided by Goodwine, sufficient to return an indictment charging Quinn with participating
in the 260 Wars. In any case, once again, the governments evidence presented to the grand
jury has no bearing on the sufficiency of its evidence at trial. Indeed, the government is
certainly under no obligation to present all of its evidence to the grand jury. As such, it
would be of no moment if the government did not present to the grand jury all of the
evidence corroborating Goodwine that it highlighted during trial summations.
28
Jerome Estella, also known as Boo Boo, because the testimony of Brian Humphreys and
Paul Ford was incredible as a matter of law. (AC Br. at 5-6.) This argument lacks merit and
should be rejected.
a.
Legal Standard
In addition to the general principles that apply to Rule 29 motions, which are
set forth above, it is well established that a district court deciding such a motion may not
assess witness credibility, resolve inconsistent testimony against the verdict, or otherwise
weigh the significance of the evidence. United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.
2000); United States v. Cunningham, 723 F.2d 217, 232 (2d Cir. 1983) (trial judge may not
set aside [a] guilty verdict simply because he would have reached a different result if he had
been the fact-finder). The court may grant the motion only if the evidence pointing to guilt
is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Otherwise, it must let the jury decide the matter. United States v. Taylor,
464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1972). These strict rules are necessary to avoid judicial
usurpation of the jury function. United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984);
see also United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003) (courts must be careful
to avoid usurping the role of the jury in deciding Rule 29 motions).
b.
Application
In light of these principles, it would be nearly impossible for the defendants to

prevail on the basis of their assessment of witness credibility. Indeed, even in the cases cited
by the defense, the court found that it would be improper to find the witnesses incredible. In
United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit noted that
29
[w]hile theoretically the testimony of a witness might be so incredible that no reasonable

juror could believe him, but it then decline[d] the invitation to second-guess the jurys
verdict and find that the witness at issue could not have been believed, id. at 388. Similarly,
in Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth Circuit stated that there
comes a point when [a] witness qualifications are so shoddy that a verdict of acquittal
should have been directed, but then concluded that [b]earing in mind the limited role of an
appellate court in a criminal appeal, we do not think that point was reached here, id. at 795.
In addition, the government notes that, contrary to the defenses arguments,
the testimony of Humphreys and Ford was not merely sufficient in some technical sense, but
in fact was credible in light of the totality of the evidence offered during trial. First, with
respect to the conspiracy to murder Brooker, Humphreys and Fords testimony was
generally consistently as to events they both witnessed. In particular, as noted above, they
both testified that Anthony Christian wanted Brooker murdered, that Ford agreed it should be
done, and that Humphreys was assigned to do it. Given that this plan was agreed to fifteen
years prior to trial, this general consistency about events and participants is a strong sign of
credibility. To be sure, Humphreys and Ford recalled certain details differently
Humphreys believed Ford joined Anthony Christian in ordering the murder, whereas Ford
recalls that he approved it after Anthony Christian proposed it, and they also differed in the
precise location, number of meetings and attendees of the meetings to plan the Brooker
murder but this merely indicates that neither the witnesses nor the government made any
effort to fabricate testimony or to make different witnesses testimony match.
With respect to the Estella murder, Humphreys and Ford provided some of the
same information, but the differences in their testimony are easily explained by the fact that
30
Humphreys actually murdered Estella, whereas Ford only learned about the murder after it
occurred. As the government argued in closing, to the extent the testimony differed, it made
sense to credit Humphreys as to details of which he had first-hand knowledge. In addition,
Humphreys testimony was corroborated by objective facts. In particular, evidence outside
his testimony confirmed that he was arrested on the fifth floor of 55 Bowen where he
claimed he went after the murder to meet with Anthony Christian and to return the murder
weapon to him, which is highly probative of Anthony Christians role in the murder and
that Harvey Christian called the Christian brothers apartment from jail minutes after the
murder, consistent with Humphreys recollection. (GX 204 (phone records), 205 (phone
records), 1004 (stipulation regarding Humphreys arrest).) This sort of corroboration, based
on evidence that Humphreys could not have created or known about, is powerful, and the
government submits that in light of this corroboration, a reasonable juror was legally entitled
to credit Humphreys testimony implicating Anthony Christian.
As for Fords testimony about Estella, the government submits that it was
highly credible precisely because it did not overtly implicate Anthony Christian. As noted
above, Ford testified that Anthony Christian told him that Humphreys had murdered Estella,
but Ford did not say or even suggest that Anthony Christian admitted to having authorized
the murder. If Ford had wanted to falsify his testimony whether to render it consistent with
Humphreys or to inculpate Anthony Christian it would have been easy for him to testify
that Anthony Christian, in addition to reporting to him that Humphreys murdered Estella, had
also admitted his role. Indeed, if Ford wanted to falsify his testimony in order help the
government, he could have also said that Anthony Christian told him that Harvey Christian
had also authorized the murder in advance. Because Harvey Christian was incarcerated at
31
the time, and communicated with Anthony Christian by phone, it is certainly possible that
this occurred, and testimony to that effect would not have been logically inconsistent with
Humphreys testimony. That Ford did not inculpate the Christian brothers in the Estella
murder strongly indicates that his testimony is generally trustworthy.
In light of the applicable legal standards and the evidence and circumstances
described above, the government respectfully submits that the evidence was sufficient to
prove the conspiracy to murder Brooker and the murder of Estella.
5.
The Conspiracy to Murder William Jones (Racketeering Act Five and

Count Five)
Anthony Christian selectively quotes from the transcript to argue that the
conspiracy to murder William Buddha Jones was not undertaken in furtherance of the
enterprise. Anthony Christian fails to cite any case law in support of his argument and he
omits portions of the transcript that prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the dispute
threatened the enterprise and that the conspiracy to murder Buddha was undertaken to
protect enterprise members and their turf. Anthony Christians argument has no basis in law
or fact and should be rejected.
a.
Legal Standard
To obtain a conviction on a substantive RICO count, the government must

prove both that an enterprise exists and that the conduct in furtherance of the enterprise
comprises a pattern. Burden, 600 F.3d at 216. Conduct forms a pattern sufficient to support
a RICO conviction when it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Id. (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell
32
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989)). At least two predicate acts are required to prove a
pattern, and the acts must be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity. Id. (quoting United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Relatedness for RICO purposes encompasses both horizontal and
vertical relatedness. Horizontal relatedness requires that the racketeering predicate acts
be related to each other. Burden, 600 F.3d at 216. As the Second Circuit has explained, an
indirect relationship created by the relationship of each act to the enterprise will suffice to
demonstrate horizontal relatedness. Id.; see also United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 541
(2d Cir.1998) (A predicate act is related to a different predicate act if each predicate act is
related to the enterprise.). Vertical relatedness means that the acts are related to the
enterprise. Burden, 600 F.3d at 216. Vertical relatedness requires that the defendant was
enabled to commit the offense solely because of his position in the enterprise or his
involvement in or control over the enterprises affairs, or because the offense related to the
activities of the enterprise. Id. Although the government must provide sufficient evidence
of each kind of relatedness, both the vertical and horizontal relationships are generally
satisfied by linking each predicate act to the enterprise. This is because predicate crimes will
share common goals . . . and common victims . . . and will draw their participants from the
same pool of associates (those who are members and associates of the enterprise). Id.
(quoting United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 376 (2d Cir. 2006)).
b.
Application
The testimony of cooperating witness Anthony Britt makes clear that, although
the dispute originated as a personal one between Britt and Buddha, it quickly escalated to
involve the enterprise. As background, and as noted in part above, the testimony introduced
33
at trial established that Britt, a high ranking member of the Valentines Blood set and an
enterprise member, brought Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian into the Bloods gang in
approximately 2009. (Tr. at 1647, 1659-65.) Britt testified that, after Anthony Christian and
Harvey Christian became members of the set, Britt helped Harvey Christian obtain better
wholesale prices on crack cocaine from another member of the same Bloods set, and that
enterprise members Britt, Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and Robert Fields together
engaged in acts of violence in furtherance of their Bloods membership. (Id. at 1659-65.)
Britt called on Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian for protection because all three were
members of the same Bloods set. (Id. at 1798.)
As Britt explained, the dispute with Buddha started late one night between
Britt and Buddha on Targee Street in Park Hill. (Tr. at 1677.) Anthony Christian was
present during the initial confrontation between Britt and Buddha and Christian initially tried
to quell the argument between the two. (Id. at 1678.) Buddha was armed at the time and
he pulled a gun on Britt. (Id.) Britt testified that he had brought a weapon with him to Park
Hill that night, but he had given it to Harvey Christian at 55 Bowen Street to store in the
building during Britts visit. (Id.)
After the initial confrontation between Britt and Buddha, Britt returned to 55
Bowen where he met up with Anthony Christian. (Tr. at 1879.) Anthony Christian retrieved
Britts weapon from the laundry room in 55 Bowen and returned it to Britt. (Id. at 1679.)
Britt stayed at the Christian Brothers apartment in 55 Bowen that night, and the brothers
permitted Britt to bring his gun into the apartment. (Id. at 1679-80.)
The next morning, Britt chased after Buddha and fired several shots at him,
but did not hit him. (Tr. at 1681.) Britt then abandoned the gun in the laundry room in 225
34
Park Hill and hid in an apartment in that same building. (Id. at 1682.) Shortly after the
shooting, Harvey Christian called Britt and told Britt to come downstairs. (Id.) Britt met
Harvey Christian downstairs at 225 Park Hill and Britt and Harvey Christian together
unsuccessfully tried to retrieve Britts gun from the locked laundry room. (Id. at 1682-83.)
As Harvey Christian and Britt were trying to retrieve Britts gun, Buddha
entered 225 Park Hill and began firing at both men. (Tr. at 1683.) Britt and Harvey
Christian ran towards 260 Park Hill, and neither was hit. (Id. at 1684, 1685.) Moments later,
Anthony Christian called Harvey Christian on the phone and Harvey Christian explained that
Buddha had been shooting at him and Britt. (Id. at 1684.) Anthony Christian came to meet
Harvey Christian and Britt and the three returned to 55 Bowen together. (Id.) Britt left Park
Hill later that night. (Id. at 1685.)
The next morning, Harvey Christian called Britt and reported that Buddha was
standing outside of 55 Bowen shooting at the building. (Tr. at 1685, 1778.) Harvey
Christian told Britt he wanted to kill Buddha and he asked Britt for help. (Id. at 1799.)
During the call, Harvey Christian also asked Britt for a weapon and Britt came to Park Hill to
bring Harvey Christian a 9mm pistol to use to retaliate against Buddha. (Id. at 1686.) After
Britt arrived in Park Hill, he, Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and another man drove
around Park Hill looking for Buddha with the intent to kill him if they found him. (Id. at
1687, 1727-28.) Harvey Christian was armed with a 9mm pistol and Britt was armed with a
.380 handgun. (Id. at 1686.) Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian tied t-shirts over their
faces to disguise themselves as the four men drove around the neighborhood looking to kill
Buddha. (Id. at 1687-88.) As Britt explained, when Buddha began shooting at 55 Bowen,
Harvey [Christian] decided it was too much what Buddha was doing, and it was [Harvey
35
Christians] decision to get in the car and go there [looking for Buddha to kill him]. (Id. at
1779.) Britt explained that Harvey [Christian] said hes tired of Buddha, and thats how
[Anthony Christian, Harvey Christian and Britt] went and got a car to look for Buddha to
kill him. (Id.)
In light of these facts, there can be no serious dispute that the conspiracy to
murder Buddha was related to the charged enterprise. The evidence at trial proved that,
during the charged period, the enterprise had many members who performed distinct roles.
The organization had members who made hand-to-hand drug sales like Robert Jones,
William Cothren and Jamie Booker, also known as Momo and it had members who
provided muscle and protected the enterprise and its members from external threats like
Quinn and Robert Fields, and cooperating witness and former enterprise member Anthony
Britt.
It is true, but irrelevant, that the dispute with Buddha originated as a personal
one for Britt. Britt was not in Park Hill when Buddha began shooting at 55 Bowen, the
enterprises home base and the location of its drug dealing business. At that moment, as
Buddha threatened the safety of the enterprises members and its ability to sell drugs at its
home base, Harvey Christian called in Britt to provide additional muscle and firepower to
protect the enterprise and its members. Harvey Christian called on the enterprises muscle
just as he and Anthony Christian had during the 260 Wars and just as Britt had when Britt
needed protection. The conspiracy to kill Buddha was part of the enterprises broader goal of
using violence to protect the enterprises home base and members from external threats and
to protect the business it ran from 55 Bowen. The conspiracy to murder Buddha was clearly
related to the enterprise, and Anthony Christians argument to the contrary should be
36
rejected. See Burden, 600 F.3d at 218-19 ([T]he charged acts of violence were related to
the enterprise because they were conducted to protect the [enterprises] members and garner
them respect in the drug community.).
6.
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Other Crimes (Count Six)
Quinn challenges his conviction on Count Six, charging him with using and
possessing firearms, and aiding and abetting the use of firearms, including machineguns, in
furtherance of the charged racketeering enterprise, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 924(c). (JQ Br. at 10.) Specifically, Quinn argues that there was no basis for
the jury to conclude that Quinn possessed the requisite advance knowledge that a machine
gun would be deployed and Quinn played no critical role in [the] use of any machine gun
or carried any necessary ammunition. (Id. at 10-11.)
However, not only did the evidence at trial support an inference that Quinn
had advanced knowledge regarding the Christian brothers use of machineguns, but also
Quinn was present for the use of a machinegun. As set forth in greater detail above, Lamar
Goodwine testified that he personally witnessed Quinn firing from a building rooftop
alongside Anthony Christian, who had an AK-47 machinegun. (Tr. 1123-26.) Accordingly,
there is ample evidence to support the jurys inference that Quinn aided and abetted Anthony
Christians use of a machinegun in furtherance of the racketeering enterprise. His conviction
on Count Six should stand.
II.
THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT MAKE ANY IMPROPER ARGUMENTS

The defendants motions for new trial, premised on various assertions that the
government made improper arguments, should be rejected.
37
A.
Legal Standard
Rule 33(a) provides that [u]pon the defendants motion, the court may vacate
any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. The Second Circuit
has held that [g]enerally, a motion for a new trial should not be granted unless the trial
court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is
a miscarriage of justice. Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1998)). The trial court has broad
discretion . . . to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage
of justice. United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992)). Though the Court is entitled to
weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses,
Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413 (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th
Cir.1980)), the Court must strike a balance between weighing the evidence and credibility
of witnesses and not wholly usurping the role of the jury, Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133.
A trial courts discretion to grant a new trial under Rule 33 must be exercised
sparingly, and only with great caution and in the most extraordinary circumstances.
United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992). The defendant bears the
burden of proving that he is entitled to a new trial under Rule 33, United States v.
McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009), and the crucial question for the court is
whether it would be a manifest injustice to let the guilty verdict stand. Sanchez, 969 F.2d
at 1414. A manifest injustice occurs where a trial court cannot be satisfied that
competent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence supports the jurys finding of guilt beyond
38
a reasonable doubt, and where a real concern exists that an innocent person may have
been convicted. Id.
B.
Application
1.
The Governments Rebuttal Was Proper
Anthony Christian argues that the government advanced several improper

arguments in its rebuttal summation. The rebuttal, however, was perfectly proper, and none
of the arguments to the contrary has merit.
a.
General Legal Standard
Although there are certain limited situations in which a prosecutors comments

in a jury address may be improper, [i]t is a rare case in which improper comments in a
prosecutors summation are so prejudicial that a new trial is required. United States v.
Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that:
Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would
not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction
obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Instead, . . . the
remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to
determine whether the prosecutors behavior amounted to
prejudicial error.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
When a defendant argues that a prosecutor has made improper arguments,
courts in the Second Circuit apply a three-factor test, which considers (1) the severity of any
misconduct, (2) the measures taken to cure the misstatements, and (3) their likely effect on
the outcome. United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir. 1981). The first factor turns on whether the
misconduct was intentional and whether the misstatements were pervasive or were minor
39
aberrations in a prolonged trial. Id. at 1181; see also Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 95; United States
v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (most of the cases in which we have reversed
convictions as a result of prosecutorial misconduct have involved repeated improper
statements). As to the second factor, a district courts curative instructions or sustaining of
a defense objection lessens any prejudice. United States v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
644-45 (1974) (curative instructions); United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 734 (2d Cir.
1994) (reprimand of the prosecutor). Finally, the third factor considers the likelihood of
conviction absent the misconduct. Compare, e.g., Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 96 (reversible error
where misstatements went to only contested issue at trial), to Modica, 663 F.2d at 1182
(improper remarks were harmless where governments case was overwhelming).
b.
The Government Properly Characterized Defense Arguments

About Cooperating Witnesses
Anthony Christian argues at great length that the government, in its rebuttal,
characterized defense counsels summation as sleazy. (AC Br. at 7-8.) This argument is
factually untrue nobody from the government called any defense attorney sleazy, nor was
such a strategy ever even contemplated and also fails as a matter of law.
i.
Legal Standard
As a general matter, in responding to the arguments of defense counsel, the

government should of course avoid characterizing the defense theory in a manner that
impugns the integrity of defense counsel or that is otherwise inflammatory, such as by
describing the defense as a sham or as an insult to the jurys intelligence. United States v.
Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 61 (2d Cir. 1983). However, the Second Circuit has found no error in
descriptions of defense arguments as a fairy tale, United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 544
40
(2d Cir. 1995), as desperate and struggling, United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 51 (2d
Cir. 1981), in limited, non-inflammatory characterizations of defense testimony as lies,
United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1989), or in arguments that the
jury should not be fooled by the tactics of defense counsel, United States v. Marrale, 695
F.2d 658, 667 (2d Cir. 1982).
ii.
Application
As an initial matter, the government did not in any way do what defense
counsel says it did. It is important to note that Anthony Christian does not even suggest that
the government used the word sleazy or any similar word, but, instead, bases his argument
on the governments reference in rebuttal to a classic defense tactic, a phrase the
government used to refer to defense arguments about certain cooperating witnesses criminal
histories and prior lies. (AC Br. at 7-8.) Defense counsel repeatedly alleges that this
argument by the government had the effect of suggesting to the jury that what defense
counsel had done was sleazy or otherwise improper. (Id.) However, because the Court
observed the rebuttal, the government respectfully asks for a finding that (1) no such
statement was made, and (2) the rebuttal did not suggest this to the jury. Indeed, the
government respectfully notes that after the jury sat through this lengthy trial, and observed
the outstanding and professional work of defense counsel, any attempt by the government to
characterize defense counsel as sleazy could only have backfired and undermined the
governments own credibility.
Moreover, by referring to the defenses tactics regarding cooperating
witnesses, the government was using a proper, neutral term in the course of directly
responding to defense arguments. In Marrale, the Second Circuit specifically held that such
41
an argument is proper, approving of the prosecutors admonition to the jury not to be

fooled by the tactics of Alphonses attorney. 695 F.2d at 667. While it is not clear from
the opinion whether the word tactic was used by the prosecution in Marrale the opinion
focused on the use of the word fooled, which, if anything, seems more troubling the fact
that that Circuit itself used the word tactic in this context, and the fact that it approved of
the governments statement that the jury should not be fooled by a defense tactic,
demonstrates that tactic is a proper word to use in describing a defense argument, and is
certainly not inflammatory in any legally relevant sense. As the Second Circuit explained in
Marrale, there is a world of difference between the neutral, responsive language used by the
government in this case and the sort of words that have, from time to time, been criticized by
the Circuit:
Nor do we believe the prosecutors admonition to the jury not to
be fooled by the tactics of Alphonses attorney falls into the
category of impermissible conduct. Statements designed to
appeal to the jurys emotions or to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury. Thus, we have condemned remarks such
as you have to be born yesterday to believe appellants
defense, and the defense is an insult to your intelligence;
defendants testimony is so riddled with lies it insults the
intelligence of 14 intelligent people sitting on the jury; and
Dont let [the defendant] walk out of this room laughing at
you.
The remarks made by the prosecutor at the present trial pale
beside the examples just given.
Marrale, 695 F.2d at 667 (citations and some quotation marks omitted, brackets in original).
Finally, even accepting the defenses interpretive leaps, the defenses
argument fails each part of the applicable three-part test. With respect to the first part the
severity of any misconduct, Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 95 even if there was somehow any
42
misconduct (which there was not), it was unintentional and an aberration[] in a prolonged
trial. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181. With respect to the second part the measures taken to
cure the misstatements, Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 95, the Court will recall that, after the
governments rebuttal, defense counsel raised several objections and the Court then
addressed the jury as follows:
I wanted to make one observation. Weve heard very lengthy
closing arguments and rebuttal arguments by some very talented
lawyers. I want to remind you of something I said at the very
beginning of the case; and that is, whatever the lawyers say is
not evidence. The only thing the lawyers are here to do in the
closing arguments are to present arguments about what they
believe the evidence is.
Arguments by lawyers about what the other lawyer argued, are
even to the extent possible, even less significant and are
diversionary.
Nonetheless, to the extent that any of the arguments or
arguments about the arguments create any concerns for you as
to what the evidence is in this case, as you will hear from the
instructions you are about to be given, you have the right to
review the evidence, whether its a transcript, whether it is a
videotape, whether it is an audiotape, whether it is a picture, or a
map. All of it will be made available to you during your
deliberations; simply, requested by a note.
(Tr. at 2610-11 (emphasis added).) Significantly, this instruction was made immediately
after the government rebuttal concluded. The Court could not have made a more clear and
timely statement to address any possible issue defense counsel may have had with the
governments characterization of its arguments. Finally, with respect to the third part of the
test the[] likely effect on the outcome, Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 95, again it favors rejecting
the defenses argument. In particular, the third factor considers the likelihood of conviction
absent the purported misconduct. Compare Forlorma, 94 F.3d at 96 (reversible error where
43
misstatements went to only contested issue at trial) to Modica, 663 F.2d at 1182 (improper
remarks were harmless where governments case was overwhelming). In this case, where
the evidence included not one but eight cooperating witnesses, countless law enforcement
officers, six 911 calls, expert witnesses in forensic pathology and firearms analysis, search
warrant evidence, crime scene evidence, telephone records and, perhaps most significantly,
wiretap evidence that, on its own, could have supported convictions as to racketeering,
racketeering conspiracy and a 924(c) charge and which served, in effect, to corroborate the
general picture painted by every single cooperator it is inconceivable that a government
reference to a defense tactic had any effect on the outcome.
In support of his argument, Anthony Christian cites United States v. Friedman,
909 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990). That case, however, is inapposite, because it involved a
government rebuttal in which the very role of defense counsel was disparaged. In particular,
the government, in rebuttal, stated the following:
And some people would have you pull down the wool over your
eyes and forget all that, because while some people, ladies and
gentlemen, go out and investigate drug dealers and prosecute
drug dealers and try to see them brought to justice, there are
others who defend them, try to get them off, perhaps even for
high fees.
Id. at 708. On appeal, the government conceded this statement was improper, and the Circuit
ordered a new trial. Id. at 706, 709-10. The statement in Friedman has no bearing on any
statement in this case, despite the defense efforts to turn the word tactic into the word
sleazy, and the result reached in Friedman is not warranted here.
44
c.
The Government Properly Rebutted Arguments About Felix

Grant
Anthony Christian next objects to the governments rebuttal of his arguments

about Felix Grant. In particular, Anthony Christian argues that the government improperly
stated that Felix Grant testified that he needed to tell the truth, rather than that he needed to
say what the government needed. (AC Br. at 8-9.) This argument fails because it was the
defense, not the government, that misrepresented Grants testimony.
In his summation, defense counsel said the following about Grant, in the
course of making a more general argument about the governments cooperating witnesses:
Now, just yesterday Felix Grant took the stand and it was
interesting. I think it was yesterday, maybe the day before
yesterday, whatever. And the Government got to that portion of
the examination and asked: Well, what does the agreement
mean to you? Well, I have to tell the Government what they
need and then I'll get my testimony, just matter-of-factly. Just
think about that, the phraseology: Im obligated to tell the
Government what they need. And then he proceeded: Oh, I
have to tell the truth. The first words out of his mouth were:
I have to tell the Government what they need. Thats what
hes thinking. You saw the window into his mind.
(Tr. at 2412.) In rebuttal, the government then said the following:
Mr. Gold told you yesterday that when I asked Felix Grant what
he was required to do under his cooperation agreement, Mr.
Gold told you that Mr. Grant responded that he was obligated to
tell the Government what they need, Just tell the Government
what they need and I will get my letter. Look at the transcripts,
ladies and gentlemen. This is page 2079, direct examination of
Felix Grant.
Question: Did you plead guilty pursuant to an
agreement?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: What kind of agreement?
45
Answer: If I cooperate with the government, the government

will write me a letter, if everything went according to. I told the
truth and helped the government out, I will receive a letter at the
end.
Mr. Gold told you yesterday that Mr. Grant made it seem that
truth-telling was an afterthought and really what he had to do
was give the Government what it needed, but thats not what the
transcript said.
(Id. at 2570.)
Again, the defenses argument fails each part of the applicable three-part test.
With respect to the first part the severity of any misconduct there simply was no
misconduct. Defense counsel emphasized one answer by Grant, and the government invited
the jury to consider another answer when determining what Grant said. The government
never denied that Grant had given both answers, but rather argued that, read together, it was
clear that Grant understood and had intended to convey to the jury that his obligation was
to tell the truth. Defense counsel takes particular issue with the government statement that
thats not what the transcript said (AC Br. at 9), but in light of the full statements quoted
above, it is clear that what the government argued the transcript did not say is that Grant
viewed the truth as an afterthought, not that it did not contain the literal answer cited by
defense counsel. This is a perfectly appropriate argument and is well within the bounds
established by the case law. United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 807 (2d Cir.
1990) (the government is free to make arguments which may be reasonably inferred from
the evidence presented). Moreover, by citing to the relevant transcript page, the
government was clearly inviting the jury, if it had any concerns about Grant, to read the
46
testimony and decide for itself. 5 As for the second factor the measures taken to cure the
misstatements the instruction quoted above, given by the Court immediately after the
governments rebuttal, effectively advised the jury that the lawyers arguments were not
evidence and that the lawyers arguments about each others arguments were even farther
removed from evidence. Finally, with respect to the third part of the test the[] likely
effect on the outcome it is exceedingly unlikely that any aspect of the outcome of this case
hinged on whether Grant believed he needed to tell the truth or say what the government
wanted him to say. The Court will recall that Grants testimony was essentially limited to his
sale of drugs to enterprise members in 2010 and 2011, and wiretap recordings of the
defendants and Grant clearly proved that he in fact sold drugs to them in that period.
d.
The Government Did Not Improperly Vouch For Its

Cooperating Witnesses
Finally, Anthony Christian argues that the government improperly told the
jury that it should believe the cooperators because (1) they did not know what the other
evidence in the case was and (2) the government believed them. (AC Br. at 10-11.) These
arguments rely on excerpts of the governments rebuttal summation taken out of context and,
Indeed, the government repeatedly made clear that the primary point of this
portion of its rebuttal summation regarding defense counsels misstatements of the record
was to encourage the jurors to review the trial transcripts for themselves. (See Tr. at 256970 (And ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that Mr. Gold and Mr. Chabrowe have not
been careful with the facts in this case. Im going to give you some examples, but I
encourage you, again, to look at the transcripts. If something doesnt seem right to you, look
at what was actually said.); Id. at 2571 (Ladies and gentlemen, I represent the Government.
Im a lawyer. What I say to you isnt evidence in this case. My job is to try to highlight the
evidence thats important, that will help you make the decision, but you should look at the
transcripts if you have any questions. Thats the point Im trying to make.).) The jury
clearly saw fit to do so, requesting the transcripts for nearly all the cooperating witnesses
during its deliberations.
47
when considered in the full context of the trial and other summations, they do not constitute
improper vouching under Second Circuit case law. In fact, in the portions of the rebuttal that
defense counsel has carefully selected to support this argument, the government does not
once state that it personally believes any cooperator told the truth. Accordingly, these
arguments must fail and the motion to vacate the jurys verdict on this ground should be
denied.
i.
Legal Standard
As a general matter, prosecutors should not personally vouch for the

credibility of witnesses or the truth of the governments evidence. United States v. Miller,
116 F.3d 641, 683 (2d Cir. 1997). In particular, the Second Circuit has criticized rhetorical
statements punctuated with excessive use of the personal pronoun I, and has held that [i]t
is obligatory for prosecutors to find careful ways of inviting jurors to consider drawing
argued inferences and conclusions and yet to avoid giving the impression that they are
conveying their personal views to the jurors. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294,
1328 (2d Cir. 1987)
However, the Second Circuit has drawn a bright line between, on the one
hand, a prosecutors improper statement that he personally knows that testimony was
truthful, see, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1981), and, on the
other hand, perfectly proper factual arguments prefaced by language such as, I submit, see,
e.g., United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 681 (2d Cir. 2004) (approving statements in
which prosecutor submitted certain credibility conclusions to the jury); United States v.
Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1998) (approving statement I submit to you that [the
governments witnesses] are reliable, you can trust their testimony. You can count on them.
48
And theres some reasons why I say that to you.); United States v. Clark, 613 F.2d 391, 405
(2d Cir. 1979) (And I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that [the governments] evidence
is credible. It is believable. It is supported by the known facts in the case.). The use of
such phrases is especially proper after the defense impugns the integrity of the governments
case by attacking the credibility of a cooperating witness.
United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d
157, 173 (2d Cir. 1996).

In addition, a prosecutors arguments about factual issues are generally found
proper when they are coupled with a discussion of the supporting evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) (prosecutor did not vouch for witnesses by
referring to their testimony as the absolute truth where arguments relied upon evidence
supporting the contention); Miller, 116 F.3d at 683 (prosecutors assertion that defendants
were guilty on all counts was not improper when it came after extensive discussion of the
evidence and exhortation to decide case based on the evidence); Eltayib, 88 F.3d at 173 (use
of I submit was proper when arguments either relied on evidence that corroborated the
governments witness or asked jurors to draw reasonable inferences).
Finally, the government is permitted greater latitude in responding to defense
arguments that impugn the integrity of the governments case. When defense counsel makes
such arguments, the prosecutor is entitled to respond with rebutting language suitable to the
occasion. United States v. La Sorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973) ; see also United
States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1994) (prosecutors arguable vouching for witness
was not improper in light of defense summation that accused government of fabricating
testimony); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (any improper
conduct on the part of the government was in response to [defendants] attack on the
49
governments case). In United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1979),
the Court approved a prosecutors argument that if the jury believed that the government's
case was a deliberate attempt by someone to deceive you, to lie to you, to connive you, to
swindle you, then it should acquit the defendants. In United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d
127, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2011), the Court of Appeals found that the prosecutors rebuttal
comment that the government . . . is not on trial was a permissible response to the
defenses improper selective prosecution arguments and that a reference to agents putting
their lives on the line was a fair response to a defense attack on the agents credibility and
competency. In United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2005), the Court of
Appeals ruled that, in light of defense counsels persistent attacks on the credibility of
cooperating witnesses, the government had not improperly vouched for the witnesses by
arguing that they had no motive to lie and thereby jeopardize the benefits they had earned by
testifying in other cases.
ii.
Application
In this case, the governments rebuttal arguments were proper responses to

numerous aggressive defense arguments about the cooperating witnesses credibility,
criminal history and mental health, as well as the governments decisions to even call them
as witness. Counsel to Anthony Christian argued that:
Doesnt matter what Brian Humphreys says. If you cant
believe Brian Humphreys, you cant believe what he tells you,
certainly not beyond a reasonable doubt. And ladies and
gentlemen, if he told you this morning it was raining out and
youre looking out the window and its raining out, youd still
think to yourself, Is it really raining? I better double check
because if Humphreys is telling me its raining, it probably
isnt. Brian Humphreys is a liar. Paul Ford is a liar. And
ladies and gentlemen, a liar lies, thats what he does. If hes
50
cornered, hell just say what pops into his head to try and get
him out of whatever difficulty he might think himself to be in,
and then later on cant remember what he said because it was
never the truth to begin with. And so time after time you saw on
the witness stand on direct hes fine, he sails through, knows
whats going to be asked, has a ready answer for everything, but
when it comes time for cross what happens? He phumphers.
He cant remember. How many times I dont remember. I
dont remember. Id read to him trial transcript testimony from
his previous two times that he testified I dont remember.
Why? Cause he makes it up as he goes along. Its hard to
remember when youre doing something like that.
(Tr. at 2399-2400.) Counsel to Anthony Christian also argued that two cooperating
witnesses Bestman and Ford pled guilty to murders they never committed, simply to
satisfy the government. (Id. at 2401-02, 2407-10.) He appealed to the jurors visceral fears
about Humphreys seeking a motion for a reduction in his sentence. (Id. at 2404 (Brian
Humphreys may hit the streets. Lock up your windows, folks. Close your doors. Dont let
the kids out because Brian Humphreys may be back in town.).) He called the cooperators
lowlifes who dont think like normal people. (Id. at 2410.) He described a crime
committed by Boone the details of which the Court had specifically precluded from
evidence as so repulsive and so egregious, so outrageous that Boone was afraid that if
he told the truth about it to . . . he would not get his cooperation agreement, leading to a
government objection and a Court admonition of defense counsel. (Id. at 2414-15.) In the
course of arguing about Humphreys, counsel to Anthony Christian even disparaged the
government: Its mind boggling, frankly, you know, this person [i.e., Humphreys] was
given a plea agreement, a cooperation agreement with that history. They [i.e., the
prosecutors] didnt act in bad faith, as I said earlier. They exercised bad judgment. This is
not who you give a cooperation agreement to because this is not someone you can trust or
51
come before a jury like you in a serious case like this and tell the truth. You dont do that.
(Id. at 2424-25.) Later, he asked of Humphreys, Will a plea agreement, a promise to tell the
truth, constrain this maniac to whom murder is ordinary? The laws of God and man dont
apply to this person. (Id. at 2428.) Soon after, he argued, I guess with Brian Humphreys
its a little bit easier to know when hes lying. Just look to see if his lips are moving. . . .
With Paul Ford maybe we can come up with a different formula. Maybe if he hesitates for
less than 15 seconds before answering me, hes telling the truth. But when its for a minute
or more, then hes lying. (Id. at 2435.) Referring to Humphreys mental health issues,
counsel to Anthony Christian stated, [W]e all have this little voice in our head that tells you
stop. Its the little voice in your head that keeps you from crossing that line into an area
where you really shouldnt go. Brian Humphreys hears a different voice. I dont know what
it tells him, but it doesnt tell him to tell the truth. And it certainly never stopped him from
committing horrific crimes. (Id. at 2448.) And, finally, he said that Fords testimony
consisted of reading from Humphreys script. (Id. at 2461.)
Not to be outdone, counsel to Harvey Christian argued to the jury that the
Government is asking you to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt based upon all of these
lying cooperators[.] (Id. at 2519.) He described Britt as so arrogant and so angry (id. at
2531), and later as very combative (id. at 2558), and even told the jury that Britt answered
one of counsels questions with that face, which was disgusting, because to him this is all a
game. (id. at 2562). He described Humphreys by stating, This is a guy, ladies and
gentlemen, who literally, as far as I could tell, has no conscience, has absolutely no concept
of right and wrong, no concept of morality whatsoever, and also reminded the jury of the
voices in his head. (Id. at 2536-37.) Like counsel to Anthony Christian, he took steps to
52
conflate his arguments about Humphreys with disparaging comments about the government,
and at the same time injecting his own personal opinion into the summation:
What struck me in listening to [Humphreys] is at what point
would the government say, you know what, I dont care, I dont
believe you, I am not going to put you on the stand as a
representative of the United States government and ask a jury to
find someone else guilty based upon you because you are
offensive, you are a liar, youre disgusting and you have no
conscience? How much more would it have to be? Because
what I saw was someone who literally had no morality
whatsoever, no concept of right or wrong. Doesnt even know
what it means. So at what point would it get to be too much?
(Id. at 2538-39.) He stated of Humphreys with absolutely no good-faith basis Im sure
hes killed many more people than those he admitted to killing, leading to a government
objection and leading the Court to admonish defense counsel to stick to the record. (Id. at
2541.) He again offered his own opinion to the jury when he said of Ford that he was so
good I think at avoiding the truth. (Id. at 2546.) He said that Humphreys told a million
lies, Ford told a million lies. (Id. at 2562.)
Under the law, it is these defense arguments arguments attacking the
cooperating witnesses credibility, mocking Humphreys mental health issues, providing
personal opinions about who is telling the truth, criticizing the government for entering
cooperation agreements that form the background against which the governments rebuttal
must be considered. Carr, 424 F.3d at 228-29 (in light of defense counsels persistent
attacks on the credibility of cooperating witnesses, the government had not improperly
vouched for the witnesses by arguing that they had no motive to lie and thereby jeopardize
the benefits they had earned by testifying in other cases); Myerson, 18 F.3d at 163 (2d Cir.
1994) (any improper conduct on the part of the government was in response to [defendants]
53
attack on the governments case); Rivera, 22 F.3d at 438 (2d Cir. 1994) (prosecutors
arguable vouching for witness was not improper in light of defense summation that accused
government of fabricating testimony); La Sorsa, 480 F.2d at 526 (2d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor
entitled to respond with rebutting language suitable to the occasion).
In this context, the government respectfully submits that the statements that
the defense has characterized as vouching are not improper. With respect to Anthony
Christians first argument, the government properly argued that the incentives created by the
witnesses cooperation agreements provided a basis for the jury to believe their testimony.
In rebuttal, the government explained that
Paul Ford, like all the cooperating witnesses, dont dare accuse
these defendants of things that they didnt do because it's too
risky, because as all the cooperators told you, they dont know
what the other proof is, and if they get caught in a lie, theyre
going to have a lot to answer for. Theyre going to have their
agreements torn up.
Mr. Gold and Mr. Chabrowe said the Government is not
sticking to its word on the whole cooperation agreements being
torn up point. He says we talk a big game about tearing up
cooperation agreements, but we really dont stick to it. Ladies
and gentlemen, ask Brian Humphreys if thats true. We tore up
his cooperation agreement. He had to plead guilty to a new
crime and he got an additional five years on top of the 20 that he
received for his violent crimes. Ask William Cothren if thats
true, ladies and gentlemen. He testified that because of his
marijuana use while he was on bail his cooperation agreement is
in jeopardy. He could face a five-year mandatory minimum. In
any case, remember a judge decides the sentence here. The
letter isnt some magic ticket. The letter, as all the cooperators
explained, includes the good and the bad, and ultimately a judge
decides.
(Tr. at 3583-84.) Far from bolstering and vouching for the witnesses as a collective group
(AC Br. at 10), this rebuttal point was, in the context of defense counsels many aggressive
54
attacks on the witnesses credibility, an appropriate reminder to the jury that the witnesses
cooperation agreements provided a strong incentive for them to tell the truth and that failure
to do so could result in serious consequences. Several witnesses, including Brian
Humphreys, testified that they did not know who else the government intended to call at trial,
see, e.g., Tr. at 754 (testimony of Brian Humphreys), 1269 (testimony of Lamar Goodwine),
1800 (testimony of Anthony Britt), but that fact is largely irrelevant given that the argument
concerned the truth-telling incentives created by the cooperation agreements and the
consequences the witnesses would face if they fabricated stories about the defendants.
The government also properly responded to defense counsels arguments when
it stated in rebuttal that it called the cooperating witnesses to testify because we believed
that their testimony was important, it was probative, it provided you with a more full sense of
who these defendants are, what they were about, and what they did. (AC Br. at 10; Tr. at
2577.) That the government believed these things was self-evident to anyone who attended
the trial certainly the government would not call witnesses it believed were not probative
and stating these beliefs does not constitute vouching under any case.
Moreover, when the government stated that when a cooperator told it
something, agents and prosecutors went back and said what can we do to corroborate what
weve been told? How can we establish that what were hearing is actually true? (AC Br. at
10-11; Tr. at 2577), it was merely responding to the implication by defense counsel, made
repeatedly, that the government had either been duped by its witnesses or knowingly
presented their false testimony. Indeed, as defense counsel concedes, [t]he rebuttal then
proceeded to argue how the witnesses were corroborated in various ways (AC Br. at 11),
precisely the sort of context that turns purported vouching into a permissible rebuttal
55
argument. In its proper context, the governments rebuttal was carefully tailored to fit
squarely within the permissible range of arguments described by the Second Circuit in Perez,
144 F.3d at 210 (I submit to you that [the governments witnesses] are reliable, you can
trust their testimony. You can count on them. And theres some reasons why I say that to
you.), Clark, 613 F.2d at 405 (And I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that [the
governments] evidence is credible. It is believable. It is supported by the known facts in
the case.) and Williams, 690 F.3d at 76 (prosecutor did not vouch for witnesses by referring
to their testimony as the absolute truth where arguments relied upon evidence supporting
the contention).
Finally, to the extent that anything the government said in rebuttal could be
characterized as vouching, the government respectfully submits that, again, the defenses
argument fails each part of the applicable three-part test. With respect to the first part the
severity of any misconduct assuming there was any, it was certainly not severe in light of
the defenses comments in summation and the fact that the government rebuttal actually cited
the evidence in the record rather than simply asserting government opinion. With respect to
the second factor the measures taken to cure the misstatements the Courts instructions
that followed the governments rebuttal effectively advised the jury that the lawyers
arguments were not evidence. Finally, with respect to the third part of the test the[] likely
effect on the outcome again it is exceedingly unlikely, in a case involving eight
cooperating witnesses and numerous other witnesses and types of evidence that any aspect of
the outcome hinged on whether the jury thought the government lawyers personally believed
the cooperating witnesses.
56
For all of these reasons, the Court should reject the Anthony Christians
arguments about the governments rebuttal.
2.
Quinn is Not Entitled to a Kastigar Hearing
Defendant Quinn argues that the Court should grant him a new trial under
Rule 33 as a result of government misconduct because the government relied on Quinns
pre-trial proffer statements to charge him with Racketeering Acts Two and Six and Counts
Six and Seven, and, he asserts, he is therefore entitled to a Kastigar hearing. (JQ Br. at 1113.) Quinn is not entitled to a hearing pursuant to Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972), because he was not compelled to speak to the government in June 2011 he
proffered with the government twice voluntarily and in the presence of counsel and he was
not granted derivative use immunity for his statements. Kastigar is inapposite to this set of
circumstances and Quinn does not cite a single case in any district in which a court has
conducted a Kastigar hearing under such circumstances. Accordingly, Quinns motion for a
hearing should be denied and his Rule 33 motion on this ground should be denied.
a.
Applicable Law
Title 18, United States Code, Section 6002 provides use and derivative use
immunity for testimony given by witnesses who are compelled to testify. See generally
United States v. Blau, 159 F.3d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing immunity and Kastigar
generally). Section 6002 provides that:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before or ancillary to . . . [, inter alia,] a court or
grand jury of the United States . . . and the person presiding over
the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued
under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but
57
no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or

any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. 6002 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, [t]his total
prohibition on use in [ 6002] provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring the use of
compelled testimony as an investigatory lead, and also barring the use of any evidence
obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (internal footnote omitted).
In Kastigar, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 6002 against a
Fifth Amendment challenge. The Court explained that [t]he power of government to
compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is
firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence but is limited by the Fifth
Amendments privilege against self-incrimination. Id. 443-44. The Court held that the
immunity from use and derivative use [provided by 6002] is coextensive with the scope of
the [Fifth Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to
compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. Id. at 453.
The Court also explained that, where testimony is compelled under a grant of
use and derivative use immunity, the person granted such immunity is not dependent for the
preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.
Id. at 460. Rather, once a defendant demonstrates that (1) he has testified under a grant of
use and derivative use immunity (2) to matters related to the challenged federal prosecution,
the burden then shifts to the government to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Id.
58
b.
Application
Kastigar and its progeny are inapposite to the facts of Quinns case. First,
unlike in Kastigar, Quinn statements to the government were not compelled. Rather, Quinn
voluntarily proffered with the government on June 15 and 29, 2011. He therefore cannot rely
on the Fifth Amendment privilege that was the basis of the defendants claim in Kastigar.
See, e.g., United Satates v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2012). ([T]he [Fifth
Amendment] privilege must be invoked: an individual must claim the privilege to be
protected by it. An individual who makes self-incriminating statements without claiming the
privilege is deemed not to have been compelled but to have spoken voluntarily.); United
States v. Jackson, 545 F. Appx 435, 446 (6th Cir. 2011) (When a defendant voluntarily
provides information to the government, however, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated,
and the government may negotiate a lesser degree of immunity.); United States v. Smith,
452 F.3d 323, 337 (4th Cir. 2006) (Here, however, the defendant has provided information
voluntarily by agreement rather than by compulsion. In these situations, there is no Fifth
Amendment interest at stake, and the government is not obligated to provide use or
derivative use immunity, much less both.); United States v. Baljit, 207 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that voluntary proffers with the government constituted waiver of
Fifth Amendment privilege).
Moreover, again unlike in Kastigar, the scope of the immunity granted to
Quinn for his proffer statements is not governed by the Fifth Amendment or 6002. As the
Court is aware, Quinn, with advice of counsel, entered into proffer agreements with the
government that set forth the ways the government may use Quinns proffer statements. It is
well settled that a proffer agreement is a contract that must be interpreted to give effect to
59
the intent of the parties. United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); see
also, e.g., United States v. Harper, 643 F.3d 135, 140 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (Ordinary
principles of contract interpretation apply when interpreting the scope of negotiated
immunity.).
And, finally, unlike the immunity at issue in Kastigar, the proffer agreements
between Quinn and the government do not provide Quinn with derivative use immunity.
Both agreements provide that the Office may use any statements made by [Quinn] . . . to
obtain leads to other evidence, which evidence may be used by the Office in any stage of a
criminal prosecution (including but not limited to detention hearing, trial or sentencing), civil
or administrative proceeding. (6/15/2011 Proffer Agreement 3; 6/29/2011 Proffer
Agreement 3.) This provision in the proffer agreement is fatal for Quinns argument
because, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, Kastigar hearings occur only because the
immunity privilege implicated therein itself precludes derivative use. United States v.
Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
It is well-settled that a defendant is not entitled to a Kastigar hearing where, as
here, a defendant has received use immunity but not derivative use immunity. In United
States v. Short, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants assertion that the governments
grant of use immunity entitled him to a Kastigar hearing. See 387 F. Appx 308, 314 & n.3
(4th Cir. 2010). The Court first expressed doubt that, as here, the use-immunity agreement
at issue in this case is subject to the full Kastigar protections . . . because [the defendant]
voluntarily cooperated with the government. Id. 314 n.3. It went on to explain that to the
extent that a full Kastigar hearing is ever appropriate in non-compulsion cases, it was not
required in this case because, at most, the government provided [the defendant] with use
60
immunity, not derivative use immunity, and there is no evidence in the record showing that
the government directly used the immunized testimony. Id.; see also United States v.
Mendizabal, 214 F. Appx 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2006) (A defendant granted only pocket
immunity [as opposed to statutory immunity under 6002], however, lacks grounds for
insisting on a Kastigar hearing, and normal contract law and remedies govern any alleged
breach by prosecutors.); United States v. Breeden, 149 F. Appx 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2005)
(As the Government was permitted to use the statements derivatively and the Government
did not violate the proffer agreement or any evidentiary privileges, no Kastigar hearing was
required because it was not necessary to determine if the Government could use the
statements derivatively.); United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 226 (1st Cir. 1995)
(rejecting claim for Kastigar hearing as unnecessary where the only offer was an offer
against direct use of the testimony and not any derivative use); United States v. Garcia,
1994 WL 46308, at *20 (9th Cir. 1994) (The agreements between [the defendant] and the
Government specifically permit the Government to make derivative use of any statements
made by [the defendant], obviating the need to hold a subsequent Kastigar hearing.);
Pittenger v. United States, 10 CV 4038, 2011 WL 2671255, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 30, 2011)
([A] Kastigar hearing is appropriate when [a defendant] has been granted both use
immunity and derivative-use immunity. (emphasis added)); United States v. Curry, 05 CR
10, 2005 WL 2100651, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 14, 2005) (A court is not required to hold a
Kastigar hearing when the grant of immunity is not formal, statutory immunity.); United
States v. Smallwood, 311 F.Supp.2d 535, 544 (E.D. Va. 2004) (Accordingly, because [the
defendant] did not receive derivative use immunity under the terms of the 1996 plea
agreement, he is not entitled to a Kastigar hearing in this case.); United States v. Fernandez,
61
00 CR 420, 2000 WL 1409738, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2000) (denying request for
Kastigar hearing where defendant signed proffer agreement permitting derivative use).
The case law and Quinns proffer agreements make clear that a Kastigar
hearing is inappropriate and unnecessary. Accordingly, Quinns request for such a hearing
should be denied. The Court should also reject his baseless motion to dismiss Racketeering
Acts Two and Six and Counts Six and Seven on this same basis. 6
3.
The Government Properly Introduced Evidence of Quinns 1997 Arrest
Quinn also argues that the government improperly introduced evidence of

Quinns 1997 arrest for possession of 11 bags of a white rocky substance that tested positive
for the presence of cocaine. (JQ Br. at 14-15.) The Court should reject Quinns attempt to
relitigate the Courts September 23, 2014 ruling permitting the government to introduce
evidence of Quinns 1997 arrest and deny his Rule 33 motion to extent it is based on that
evidence. (JQ Br. at 14.) In these arguments, [Quinn] seeks to use Rule 33 as a vehicle to
relitigate evidentiary rulings with which he disagrees. However, [Quinn] offers no authority
to suggest that these allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings would support his request for a
new trial. United States v. Smith, 08 CR 390, 2009 WL 4249120, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25,
2009). As in Smith, Quinn cannot show prejudice, and cannot prevail on his Rule 33
motion. Id.; see also United States v. Barret, 10 CR 809, 2012 WL 3229291, at *28-*29
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (same).
Contrary to Quinns assertion, it is demonstrably untrue that Lamar Goodwine

did not identify Quinn during Goodwines testimony. (JQ Br. at 12.) To the contrary,
Goodwine identified Quinn in Government Exhibit 3A, a booking photograph of Quinn from
the 1990s, when Quinn had dreadlocks. (See Tr. at 1115-16). Goodwine explained that he
knew the person shown in Government Exhibit 3A as Q. (Id. at 1116.)
62
The admissibility of evidence of Quinns 1997 arrest was extensively briefed

in the months prior to trial and argued at length before the Court on September 23, 2014.
(See, e.g., Docket Entry. Nos. 278 (government motion in limine seeking to introduce
evidence of Quinns 1997 arrest), 282 (Quinns memorandum in opposition to motion in
limine), 331 (Quinns supplemental memorandum in opposition to motion in limine); see
also Tr. dated Sept. 23, 2014 at 65-72 (oral argument on governments motion in limine).
The Court determined that Quinns 1997 arrest was direct evidence of the charged
conspiracy and permitted the government to introduce evidence of the arrest at trial. (Tr.
dated Sept. 23, 2014 at 69.) The government abided by the Courts ruling and there is no
basis to vacate the jurys verdict on this ground.
Quinns attempt to relitigate the Courts ruling regarding the substance of
Sergeant David Villarreals testimony about Quinns 1997 arrest should also be rejected. (JQ
Br. at 15.) Sgt. Villarreal testified that he was trained to identified crack cocaine and that 2/3
of his approximately 800 arrests were for crack cocaine or other controlled substances. (Tr.
at 1027.) Sgt. Villarreal testified that, based on his experience and training, he identified the
material he seized from Quinn in 1997 as crack cocaine. (Id.) NYPD Chemist Nagwa
Hanna testified that the substance seized from Quinn tested positive for cocaine. (Id. at
1048.) She explained that she did not test the material seized from Quinn for the presence of
crack cocaine because the test was not requested at the time. (Id. at 1049-50.) She
nevertheless noted that crack cocaine would also test positive for the presence of cocaine.
(Id.) In summation, the government fairly characterized the evidence admitted from Quinns
1997 arrest:
63
You know that Jason Quinn was selling crack back in the 1990s
because he was arrested by retired sergeant David Villar[r]eal.
Jason Quinn was arrested for driving without a valid license,
and when the officer[] searched him, he found eleven bags of
crack cocaine in his underwear.
You heard from Sergeant Villar[r]eal that he had seized crack
hundreds of times in his career and he knew what it looked like.
You also heard that it tested positive for cocaine at the lab and
that crack cocaine will test positive for both cocaine base and
cocaine.
(Tr. at 2303.)
In sum, the evidence about Quinns 1997 arrest provides no basis to vacate the
jurys verdict. Quinns Rule 33 motion on this ground should be denied.
4.
The Government Did Not Distort Felix Grants Testimony
Quinn argues that that the government distorted the testimony of Felix Grant
on direct examination. (JQ Br. at 15.) Ths argument should be rejected. Quinn failed to
raise any issue about Grants testimony during trial (Tr. at 2024-56, 2074-2118 7) and he now
fails to cite to any portion of the transcript in support of his argument. Indeed, Quinn fails
even to explain in his brief how the government distorted Grants testimony during direct
examination. Rather, Quinns argument appears to be based entirely on the unsupported
assertion that Quinn was a drug dealer operating on his own an assertion belied by the
physical, testimonial and wiretap evidence introduced by the government at trial.
Quinns
conclusory assertion provides no basis to vacate the jurys verdict and his Rule 33 motion on
this ground should be denied.
Quinns counsel objected only once during the governments direct

examination of Grant, to purported hearsay, and the objection was overruled by the Court.
(Tr. at 2082.)
64
5.
The Governments Argument About the Waiver Provisions of Quinns

Proffer Agreement Provides No Basis to Vacate the Verdict
Quinn also asserts that the government improperly argued that Quinns crossexamination of Paul Ford triggered the waiver provision in Quinns proffer agreements. (JQ
Br. at 16-21.) However, the Courts rulings on this issue provide no basis to vacate the jurys
verdict under Rule 33, and Quinns attempt to relitigate this issue should also be rejected.
Quinn fails to acknowledge that he was in no way prejudiced by the Courts
rulings because he ultimately prevailed on the issue he is now attempting to relitigate after
the Court received briefing from both parties on the waiver issue, the Court denied the
governments request to introduce any of Quinns proffer statements before the jury. (Tr. at
1427.) Indeed, none of Quinns statements were introduced at any time during the trial. The
argument and ruling described in Quinns Rule 33 motion occurred after Quinns lawyer had
completed his cross-examination of Paul Ford, and no part of the argument or the Courts
ruling occurred in the presence of the jury. Accordingly, there was no prejudice to Quinn
and there is no basis to vacate the jurys verdict on this ground.
To the extent Quinn argues that the Courts rulings prevented his counsel from
effectively cross-examining subsequent government witnesses, that argument is equally
unsupported and should be rejected. First, throughout the pendency of this case, Quinns
counsel has aggressively litigated issues related to Quinns proffer agreements before Your
Honor and the Second Circuit. On October 9, 2014, the morning that Quinns trial began,
Quinns counsel filed a sealed letter with the Court concerning his understanding of the
waiver provisions in Quinns proffer agreements and the parties and the Court discussed the
issue at length. (Tr. at 15-21.) During trial, Quinns counsel continued to vigorously litigate
65
the terms of proffer agreements and to oppose the admissibility of Quinns proffer
statements. In light of this record, it is frivolous for Quinns counsel to now assert that he
was somehow cowed by the Courts patient, polite and careful resolution of these issues
during trial in a way that prevented him from adequately confronting adverse witnesses.
The Courts care in dealing with this issue is apparent from its offer to preview
proposed lines of cross-examination to assist Quinns counsel in his attempt to avoid
triggering the waiver provisions in Quinns proffer agreements. In Quinns October 9, 2014
sealed letter to the Court, Quinns counsel indicated that he would to the extent possible, . . .
alert the Court and counsel of any possible cross-examination questions that might trigger
the waiver provisions by accus[ing] a government witness of fabrication, or otherwise range
beyond a simple challenge to the witnesss ability to perceive an event. (10/09/2014 Def.
Ltr. at 3.) Prior to opening statements, the Court explained to Quinns counsel that the Court
would be available to consult on such issues: Im also liberal on side bars. . . . So if you
think you need a side bar before you begin a line of inquiry, you say, your Honor, I need a
side bar, and well all go over and well all hear what you have to say. (Tr. at 21.) The
record makes abundantly clear that the Court did not prevent Quinns counsel from
confronting adverse witnesses. Rather, the Court was willing to assist counsel with this
issue. Counsel failed to avail himself of the Courts assistance, which demonstrates the
frivolity of his current argument. 8
Nor should the jury verdict be disturbed because of the Courts ruling that the
government was not required to object to cross-examination questions that might trigger the
waiver provisions of Quinns proffer agreement. (JQ Br. at 16.) Quinn has not cited a case
in any district in which the government was required to lodge such objections and there is no
basis in law or in the terms of the proffer agreements to support his argument. Put simply,
66
The Courts rulings following Quinns counsels cross examination of Paul

Ford therefore provide no basis to vacate the jurys verdict under Rule 33, and Quinns
motion on this ground should be denied.
there is nothing objectionable about a line of questioning that triggers the waiver provisions
of Quinns proffer agreement. Such questions do not breach the proffer agreement; rather,
they trigger a conditional provision of the agreement if x, then y that the parties
negotiated and entered into voluntarily. Contrary to Quinns assertion, Federal Rule of
Evidence 103 does not require an objection under such circumstances because there is no
claim of error that the government is seeking to preserve. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)
(Preserving a Claim of Error). The Courts ruling on this issue was correct, and there is no
basis to disturb the jurys verdict on this ground.
67
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants motions for acquittals or new
trials should be denied in their entirety.
Dated:
Brooklyn, New York

January 12, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
LORETTA E. LYNCH
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
By:
68
/s/
Allon Lifshitz
Richard M. Tucker
Kevin Trowel
Assistant United States Attorneys
(718) 254-6164/6204/6351

Prosecutor's Response Re: Anthony Christian

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Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 1 of 71 PageID #: 5478

11 CR 425 (S-6) (ENV)

ANTHONY CHRISTIAN, et al.

THE GOVERNMENTS MEMORANDUM OF LAW

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Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 3 of 71 PageID #: 5480

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 4 of 71 PageID #: 5481

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 5 of 71 PageID #: 5482

THE CHARGED CRIMES AND RACKERTEERING ACTS WERE PROVEN

General Legal Standard

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 6 of 71 PageID #: 5483

Racketeering and Racketeering Conspiracy (Counts One and Two)

Anthony Christian argues that the government fail[ed] to establish the

A charge of racketeering requires, inter alia, proof of participation in the

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 7 of 71 PageID #: 5484

[A]n association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit

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Application: Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian

Anthony Christians argument about the enterprises membership and

The argument about membership fails because the government offered

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Brian Humphreys, also known as Trev, testified that he met Anthony

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rival crews engaged in a full-blown war. (Id. at 1118-19.) Goodwine

William Cothren, also known as Elmo and Specialist, testified that he

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 13 of 71 PageID #: 5490

Christian brothers apartment in 55 Bowen, along with Rob and Momo.

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the drugs. (Id. at 2044-45.) Harvey Christian introduced Grant to Quinn,

Anthony Christians argument about the purported quiescence of the enterprise

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New York City Police Department (NYPD) Sergeant Thomas Spitzfaden

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NYPD Detective Anthony Bellantone testified that on March 20, 2009, he

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 18 of 71 PageID #: 5495

Application: Jason Quinn

The Overwhelming Evidence Of Quinns Guilt

At trial, the government presented overwhelming evidence establishing

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HARVEY CHRISTIAN: Yeah.

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HARVEY CHRISTIAN: So [U/I]?

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 23 of 71 PageID #: 5500

HARVEY CHRISTIAN: I dont know how Pook got jammed

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Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 25 of 71 PageID #: 5502

Quinns Guilt as to Racketeering (Count One) and

Quinn first argues that to prove that he conducted or participated in the

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 26 of 71 PageID #: 5503

Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 419 Filed 01/12/15 Page 27 of 71 PageID #: 5504

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the defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely because

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activities. A pattern may be established by proof that a