-~.

BY:

MtAr\

TIME

Republic of the Philippines

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Intramuros, Manila
SECOND DIVISION

ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,
Petitioner,

SPA NO. 15-001 (DC)

-versus-

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD

SONORA POE LLAMANZARES,
Respondent.
X ------------------------------------------------ X

NOTICE
1. ATTY. ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
Petitioner
8th Floor, Pacific Star Building
Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. corner Makati Avenue
Makati City
2. ATTY. GEORGE ERWIN M. GARCIA
G.E. GARCIA LAW OFFICE
Ground Floor, LAIKO Building
372 Cabildo St., Intramuros, Manila
GREETINGS:
Attached is a copy of the RESOLUTION of the Commission
(Second Division) in the above-entitled case promulgated 01 December
2015.
Manila, December 01, 2015.
FOR THE DIVISION:

J~CUARESMA-LILAGAN

ABIGAIL
1
Acting Clerk of the Commission tJt/17/l'lr

'

Republic of the Philippines

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Intramuros, Manila
SECOND DIVISION

ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Petitioner,
Present:
Parrei'i.o, A.A., Commissioner
Lim, A.D., Commissioner
Abas, S.M., Commissioner

-versusMARY
GRACE
NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE LLAMANZARES,

Respondent.
X----------------------------------------------X

Promulgated: _ _ __

RESOLUTION
Based on the Constitution, law, and jurisprudence, and viewing
it solely from the legal perspective, shorn of emotional and other
extraneous considerations, We are led to no other result than to
GRANT the petition and find that respondent Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe Llamanzares committed material misrepresentation when
she declared in her Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the upcoming National and Local
Elections on May 9, 2016, that:
"7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP
TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09,2016:
10 - No. of Years

11 - No. of Months

8. I AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN." 1.

'
See Exhibit "B" (Respondenrs Certificate of Candidacy for President, 2016 NLE),
RECORDS.

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Page2 o34
Second Division Resolution

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

NATURE OF CASE

This is a petition brought under Section 78 2 of the Omnibus

Election Code3 and Section 1, Rule 234 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,s as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 95236 filed by
petitioner Estrella C. Elamparo ("Petitioner") seeking to deny due
course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President
of the Republic of the Philippines filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares ("Respondent") for the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections.

FACTS

Culled from the uncontroverted submissions in the pleadings

as well as admissions of the parties during the hearing conducted in
this case are the following relevant facts:
1.
Respondent was born on September 3, 1968 in Jaro, Iloilo,
of unknown biological parents, hence, a foundling?

2.
After having been born, respondent was abandoned in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, and was found by a certain Edgardo
Militar.8
2.1 On September 6,1968, a certain Emiliano Militar reported
to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City the fact that~

"Sec. 78. -Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election."
3
Balas Pambansa Bilang 881, 3 December 1985.

"Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. - A petition to deny due

course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party,
organization, or coalition or political parties on the exclusive ground that any material
representation contained therein as required by law is false."
15 February 1993.
s

IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT TO RULES 23, 24, AND 25 OF THE

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PURPOSES OF THE 13 MAY 2013 NATIONAL,
LOCAL AND ARMM ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS, 25 September 2012.
7
See Exhibit "C" (Foundling Certificate); See also Annex "1" of Verified Answer dated
November 6, 2015 (Certificate of Live Birth), RECORDS.
s
Par. 5, Petition; Par. 1.1, Respondent's Verified Answer; See also Exhibit "C", RECORDS.

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SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page3 o34
Second Division Resolution

respondent had been found; a Certificate of Live Birth was issued for
the said child, named: Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 9
3.
On May 13, 1974, when respondent was 5 years old, the
Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal granted the petition for adoption
of respondent by movie stars Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces)
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. or "FPJ"). The
court ordered a change in respondent's name from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 10
4.
On December 13, 1986, soon after turning 18 years old,
respondent applied for and was granted by the Honorable
Commission a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.n
5.
On April4, 1988, respondent applied for and was issued a
Philippine passport by the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
ManilaP
6. Respondent initially pursued college studies in Manila. In
1988, however, she transferred to Boston College in Massachusetts,
U.S.A, and graduated from said school in 1991 with a degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies.t3
7.
On July 27, 1991, respondent got married to Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares in San Juan City, Metro Manila.
Respondent's husband is a citizen of both the Philippines and the
U.S.A When they got married, her husband was already based in
the U.S.A.t4
8.
On July 29, 1991, respondent left for the U.S.A to live with
her husband and raise their children there.ts
9.
On October 18, 2001, respondent was naturalized as a
citizen of the U.S.A.,t6 after taking an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A,
which stated: .

...

Exhibit 11 C', supra.

1o

Annex "2", Respondenrs Verified Answer; RECORDS.

Annex "3", Respondenrs Verified Answer; RECORDS.

Annex "4", Respondenr s Verified Answer; RECORDS.
At p. 4, par. 9, Petition; RECORDS.
Ibid., p. 4, par. 10.
Ibid., p. 4, par. 11.
Ibid., p. 4, par. 12.

12
t3
t4

IS
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SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page4 of34
Second Division Resolution

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce

and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or
dtizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on
behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform
noncombatant seroice in the Armed Forces of the United States when
required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under
civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me
God.

10. On July 7, 2006, respondent took her Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary
public in Manila,17 to wit:
I, Mary Grace Poe Uamanzares, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines, and I will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto,
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of eva8ion.

11. On July 10, 2006, respondent filed with the Bureau of

Immigration a sworn petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its implementing rules and
regulations. Respondent also filed petitions for derivative citizenship
on behalf of her three (3) minor children.IS
12. On July 18, 2006, then Immigration Commissioner Alipio
Fernandez, Jr. issued an order granting respondent's petition for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, pertinently stating:
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of
the instant petition indicate that the petitioner was a former citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter,
became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American
passport; was issued an ACR and ICR and has taken her oath of,

...

Ibid., p. 4, par. 13; See also Exhibit "G" (Petition for Reacquisition andfor Retention of
Philippine Citizenship); RECORDS.
ts.
Ibid., p. 4, par. 13; See also respondent's Oath of Allegiance (Annex "19" of Verified
Answer); RECORDS.

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SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page5of34
Second Division Resolution

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so

is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.19

13. On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued

Identification Certificates ("ICs") for respondent and her three
children. 20
14. On August 31, 2006, respondent applied to be registered
as a voter at Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.21
15. Per the respondent's travel log from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID),22 it appears that respondent
used her US passport on July 26, 2006, September 11, 2006,
November 1, 2006, July 20, 2007, July 23, 2007, October 31, 2007,
October 5, 2008, April20, 2009, May 21, 2009, July 31, 2009, August 3,
2009, November 15, 2009 and December 27, 2009.
16.
On October 13, 2009, respondent secured from the DFA
her new Philippine passport with No. XX4731999 (valid until October
12, 2014).23
17. On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Aquino III
appointed respondent as chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).24
18. On October 20, 2010, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship25 before a notary public in
Pasig City, Metro Manila, to wit:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal
age, and presently residing at No. 1"07 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this
affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United .

...

See Bureau of Immigration Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 dated July 18, 2006 copy of
which was attached as Annex "D" and Annex "22" of the petition and verified answer,
respectively; RECORDS.
20
Annexes "23", 11 23-A", 11 23-B", and 11 23-C" of Verified Answer; RECORDS.
21
Annex "24" of Verified Answer; RECORDS.
22
Exhibit "I"; RECORDS. Respondent, however, denied having used her US passport on
July 26, 2006 and September 11, 2006.
23
Annexes "5" and "25" of Verified Answer; RECORDS.
24
P. 5, par. 18, Petition; See also Annex "26" of Verified Answer (respondent appointment
letter as MrCRB head); RECORDS.
23
Exhibit "K" (Affidavit of Renunciation of US citizenship before a Philippine Notary
Public notarized on October 20, 2010); See also par. 1.38 of Verified Answer; RECORDS.

19

SPA No.15-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page6of34
Second Division Resolution

States nationality/ American citizenship, together with all Rights

and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto
pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and
of my own free will, free of any duress or undue influence.

19. On October 21,2010, respondent submitted to the Bureau

of Immigration the notarized Affidavit of Renunciation26. She then
took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB before President Aquino
on the same date (October 21, 2010).
20. On July 12, 2011, respondent executed before the Vice
Consul at the US Embassy in Manila an Oath/ Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.27
21. On December 9, 2011, the USA Vice Consul issued to
respondent a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States,
wherein it was stated that Respondent "expatriated herself" on
October 21, 2010, the same date shown in respondent's former US
passport. 28
22. On
October 2, 2012, respondent filed with the
Commission her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator of the
Philippines, and wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013".29
23. On May 16, 2013, respondent was proclaimed as Senator
of the Philippines after topping the 2013 senatorial elections.30
24. On December 19, 2013, respondent was issued a
Philippine diplomatic passport.31
25. On March 18 2014, respondent was issued a regular
Philippine passport.32...;

,.
"

Annexes "28" and "28-A" of Verified Answer; RECORDS.

P. 6, par. 21 of Petition; See also Annex "30" of Verified Answer; RECORDS.

P. 6, par. 22 of Petition; See also Annex "31" of Verified Answer (Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States); RECORDS.
29
Annex "32" of Verified Answer; See alsop. 6, par. 23 of Petition; RECORDS.
'"
P. 6, par. 24 of Petition; See alsop. 14, par. 1.43 of Verified Answer; RECORDS.
"
Annex "33" of Verified Answer; See alsop. 7, par. 25 of Petition; RECORDS.
32
Annex "34" of Verified Answer; See alsoP. 7, par. 26 of Petition; RECORDS.

211

Page 7of34
Second Division Resolution

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

26. On September 16, 2015, respondent announced her

candidacy in the 2016 presidential elections.33
27. On October 15, 2015, respondent filed
Commission her COC for President of the Philippines.34

with the

28. On October 16,2015, petitioner filed with the Commission

the instant Petition.
29. On November 10, 2015, respondent filed her Verified
Answer (With Special and Affirmative Defenses). On even date, a
hearing was held on the petition and both parties argued their
respective positions exhaustively.
30. The respective memorandum of the parties as required by
the Commission (Second Division) was simultaneously submitted on
November 23, 2015.
31. On November 23, 2015, the petition was deemed submitted
for resolution based on the undisputed submissions in the pleadings
as well as admissions made in the course of the November 10, 2015
hearing, as further amplified and ventilated in the respective
memorandum.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS

Petitioner contended, thusly:

I.

The Commission has jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Certificate of Candidacy of the respondent must be denied

due course/ cancelled on the ground that she committed a
material misrepresentation in stating that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

33
34

A.

Respondent, being a foundling, cannot be considered a

natural-born Filipino citizen under the Constitution;

B.

International law does not confer natural-born status and

Filipino citizenship upon respondent; .

P. 7, par. 30 of Petition; RECORDS.

See Exhibit "B".

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SPA No.15..()01 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

III.

PageS o34
Second Division Resolution

C.

Respondent, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, is

not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

D.

Assuming arguendo that she was a natural-born Filipino

citizen, she lost that status when she became a citizen of
the United States of America.

The Certificate of Candidacy of then respondent must be

denied due course/cancelled on the ground that she committed
a material misrepresentation regarding her residency in the
Philippines.
A

Respondent's period of residency in the Philippines for a

period of 6 years and 6 months as of May 2013 as
declared under oath in her COC for Senator in the 2013
elections is an admission against interest and conclusive
upon her;

B.

By the principle of estoppel and the Filipino people relying

on what she stated in her Certificate of Candidacy during
the 2013 senatorial elections, respondent cannot deny but
is bound by her admission that she had resided in the
Philippines for only 6 years and 6 months as of May 2013;

C.

Assuming arguendo that respondent is qualified to file a

petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225, her filing of the petition in July 2006 is the
earliest starting point from which one may reckon her
residency in the Philippines.

D.

Assuming arguendo that respondent is qualified to file a

petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225, she failed to re-establish her domicile in the
Philippines.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

On the other hand, respondent countered, thusly:

I.

..

The Petition fails to state a cause of action against respondent.

Page9 o34

SPA No.15.001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

II.

III.

Second Division Resolution

The petition does not contain allegations which, if

hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement
in respondent's subject COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; and

B.

The petition does not allege that respondent's

representation in her COC regarding her natural-born
Filipino citizenship and her period of residency in the
Philippines (assuming these representations are false)
were done willfully or deliberately in order to "mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render
(her) ineligible."

The Commission lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

The DOJ, and not this Commission, has primary

jurisdiction to revoke the B.l.'s July 18, 2006 Order which:
(a) found Respondent presumptively a former naturalborn Filipino; and (b) approved her petition for
reacquisition of natural-born Filipino citizenship. Insofar
as the petition assails the B.I.'s Order, the same is a
prohibited collateral attack on respondent's natural-born
Filipino citizenship;

B.

The petition is essentially a petition for quo warranto

because it seeks to establish the ineligibility of the
respondent for the Presidency of the Philippines.
The petition is, therefore, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
and it may be filed only if respondent is proclaimed
President of the Philippines in the May 2016
elections.

Respondent did not make any material misrepresentation in

her Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of President in the
May 9, 2016 elections.
A

Respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

1. Even though foundlings are not expressly
mentioned in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, it was nevertheless the intent of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution to include them
as citizens of the Philippines under paragraphs.;.

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

PagelOo34
Second Division Resolution

(3) and/or (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935

Constitution;
2. Under

applicable treaties and "generally

accepted principles of international law," a child
born in the Philippines in 1968 of unknown
parents, is a natural-born Filipino citizen;

3. Respondent

re-acquired her natural-born

Philippine citizenship under the provisions of
R.A. 9225;

4. Respondent executed a sworn renunciation of

her U.S.A. citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC as President in the 9 May 2016 Elections.
This sworn renunciation is in full force and effect
and has not been withdrawn or recanted.
B.

On May 9, 2016, Respondent will have been a resident of

the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months.
1. It is well-settled that in order to re-establish one's
domicile of choice in the Philippines, only the
following requisites must concur: (a) residence or
bodily presence in the Philippines; (b) an
intention to remain in the country (animus
manendi); and (c) an intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus non revertendi), which
respondent all satisfied no later than May 24,
2005;
2. Respondent could legally re-establish her
domicile of choice in the Philippines even before
she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship on July 7, 2006;
3. Respondent committed an honest mistake, on a
difficult question of law, when she stated in her
COC for Senator in the May 13, 2013 elections
that her "period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013" is "6" years and "6"
months. Respondent had the legal duty to correct
this honest error, and could not be bound (by .

...

Pagell o34

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Second Division Resolution

estoppel) to repeat it, when she filed her COC for

President in the May 9, 2016 elections.
C.

Considering that the Petition not only fails to state,

but lacks a cause of action, and is also beyond the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission, it is
relegated to nothing but an action to usurp the
sovereign right of the Filipino people to answer a
purely political question - should respondent serve
as the next president of the Republic of the
Philippines?

MAIN ISSUE AND SUB-ISSUES

The main issue to be resolved is:
Does respondent's COC, filed for the purpose of running for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections, contain a false material
representation?
The answer to the foregoing question hinges on the resolution
of the following sub-issues:
(l)Are the sworn representations by Respondent in her COC
that (a) she is a natural born Filipino citizen and (b) has a
period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before
May 9, 2016 of 10 years and 11 months material?
(2) Are the above-mentioned representations, assuming they are
material, false?
(3)Assuming the said material representations are false, are they
deliberate attempts to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render respondent ineligible for the office
that she seeks to be elected to (President of the Philippines)?

RULING OF THE COMMISSION

-.

The Petition is GRANTED. .

SPA No.15-001 (DC)

E/amparo v. L/amanzares

Page12of34
Second Division Resolution

Respondent's COC, filed for the purpose of running for

President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections, contains material representations
which are false. Hence, it should be denied due course and cancelled.
FALSE MATERIAL REPRESENTATION
It bears stressing that this petition is filed under Section 78 of

the Omnibus Election Code and Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.35
Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy. - A verified Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for
any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or
a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition
of political parties on the exclusive ground that any
material representation contained therein as required
by law is false. xxx 36
Similarly, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled when
there is a false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy:37
Sec. 78. -Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation cnntained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.38~

35
36

37

38

See Paragraph 1 of the Petition; Records.,..;..

Emphasis supplied.
Efren Racel Ara Tea v. Commission on Elections and Estela D. Antipolo, G.R. No. 195229,
9 October 2012.
Emphasis supplied.

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SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Uamanzares

Page13of34
Second Division Resolution

Section 74 of the same Code details the contents of the

certificate of candidacy:39
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing
it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true
to the best of his knowledge. xxx xxx xxx40
Respondent is running for President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Item 11 of her COC for President states:
I AM ELIGIBLE FOR 1HE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED TO.

As defined by the Supreme Court in Dominador G. ]alosjos, Jr. v.

Commission on Elections and Agapito]. Cardino,41 a candidate is eligible
if he has a right to run for the public office. Relative to this, the
Supreme Court in Efren Racel Aratea v. Commission on Elections and
Estela D. Antipolo42 emphasized that
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course
to or cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to...:
39
40

41
42

Id.
Underscoring supplied.
G.R. No. 193237, 9 October 2012.
Supra, see Note 25.

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SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page14o34
Second Division Resolution

the qualifications required of the public office he/ she is

running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in
the COC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate.
Applying here the ruling in Aratea, there is a need to examine
Section 78 of the Code in relation to the constitutional provision on
the qualification or eligibility for the position of President.
Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution declares:
Section 2. No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.43
Petitioner claims that respondent committed material
misrepresentation in stating in her COC that she is a natural born
Filipino citizen44 and that she a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years as of May 15, 2015 (day before the election).45
In the case of Victorino Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections and
Ermelita Cacao Salcedo,46 the Supreme Court listed down the elements
of material misrepresentation, thus:
As stated in the law, in order to justify the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section
78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned
therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.~

43

44

.
45

Emphasis supplied.
See p. 10 of the Petition; RECORDS.
See p. 53 of the Petition; RECORDS.
G.R. No. 135886, 16 August 1999.

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XXX

XXX

XXX

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false

representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
In other words, it must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
public office.
Considering the ruling in Salcedo II, the elements of material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Code, then, are the
following:
(1) The representation pertains to a material fact;
(2) The material representation is false; and
(3) The false material representation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
THE FIRST ELEMENT - MATERIALITY
To reiterate, Respondent claims that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
and 11 months up to the day before 9 May 2016.47
To comply with the 1t element, these two representations by
the Respondent must pertain to a material fact. In Salcedo II, the
Supreme Court clarified that:
Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a material representation, the Court has
interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying
Section 78 of the Code.
In Abella vs. Larrazabal, supra, a petition was filed
with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of
private respondent Larrazabal for alleged false statements
in her certificate of candidacy regarding residence. The
Court held that the challenge made against private
respondent's claimed residence was properly classified .

41

See Footnote No.1.

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as a proceeding under Section 78, despite the fact that it

was filed only on the very day of the election.
Meanwhile, in Labo vs. Commission on Elections, the
disqualification proceeding filed by respondent pursuant
to Section 78 of the Code sought to cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed by Petitioner Ramon Labo, who ran for
mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections,
based on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
XXX

XXX

XXX

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material

misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the
Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy
are grave - to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, fro1p serving, or to prosecute him for violation of
the election! laws. It could not have been the intention of
the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office
upon just any innocuous mistake.4B

In Nardo M. Velasco v. Commission on Elections and Mozart P.

Panlaqui, 49 the Supreme Court pronounced that:
The false representation that these provisiOns
mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to
a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who
falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a
candidates qualification for elective office, such as his
or her citizenship and residence. so_.

48
49

so

Emphasis supplied.
G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008.
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Similarly, in Luis R. Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections and

Miguel R. Villafuerte,51 the Supreme Court held that
Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny
due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material
misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification
for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for local elective office as
provided in the Local Government Code.52
To repeat, respondent claims that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11
months up to the day before 9 May 2016. As shown above, these

representations refer to a material fact, as the term is defined in our

settled jurisprudence.
Therefore, the 1st element exists. The representations by
Respondent as to her citizenship and period of residence in the
country pertain to facts that are material in character.

THE SECOND ELEMENT - FALSITY

RESPONDENT'S PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE

PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 9, 2016 WOULD
NOT BE AT LEAST 10 YEARS.

In Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik

"Bobby" T. Alingan, the Supreme Court declared:

The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence

qualification is to exclude ~ stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the con itions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.53
The Constitution requires that a candidate for President of the
Philippines should be a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding the election. Section 2, Article VII of the
Constitution declares:~
52

G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014.

Emphasis supplied.

53

G.R. No. 181097, 25 June 2008.

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Section 2. No person may be elected President

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.54
For purposes of the May 9, 2016 presidential elections,
respondent is required a residency in the country of as early as May
2006. She is not compliant with this basic requirement.

RESPONDENT'S COC FOR SENATOR

Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial
Elections. In her COC for Senator, she answered "6 years and 6
months" in the space provided for the candidate's period of residence
in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration, respondent
admitted under oath that she has been a resident of the country only
since November 2006.
Undeniably, this falls short by 6 months of the required May
2006 commencement of residence in the Philippines in order for
respondent to qualify as a candidate for President of the Philippines
in the May 9, 2016 elections. If we reckon her period of residency
from November 2006, as she herself declared, she will be a resident of
the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a period of 9 years and 6
months.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by
respondent is an admission against her interest.
Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory
application) expressly states:
Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him..;.

Emphasis supplied.

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The rationale for the rule was explained by the Supreme

Court in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio
Deloy:ss
Being an admission against interest, the documents
are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based
on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself UNLESS SUCH DECLARATION WAS
TRUE. Thus, it is fair to presume that the deelaration
corresponds to the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. 56
Respondent's representation in her COC for Senator that she
has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6
months by May 2013 is an admission that is binding on her. After all,
she should not have declared it under oath if such declaration was not

true.
Respondent's convenient defense that she committed an honest
mistake on a difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC
for Senator that her period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013 was 6 years and 6 months, is at best self-serving. It cannot
overturn the weight given to the admission against interest
voluntarily made by respondent.
Assuming arguendo that as now belatedly claimed the same was
due to an honest mistake, no evidence has been shown that there was
an attempt to rectify the so-called honest mistake. The attempt to
correct it in her present COC filed only on October 15, 2015 cannot
serve to outweigh the probative weight that has to be accorded to the
admission against interest in her 2013 COC for Senator.
Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013
COC for Senator, under oath .at that, that she has been a resident' of
the Philippines since November 2006 still stands in the record of !!his
Commission as an official document, which may be given in evidence
against her, and the probative weight and binding effect of whicm is
'
neither obliterated by the passing of time nor by the belated atterllpt
to correct it in her present COC for President of the Philippines.
Respondent cannot now declare an earlier period of residence.
Respondent is already estopped from doing so. If allowed! to
repudiate at this late stage her prior sworn declaration, We wiU be..;,
ss
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G.R. No. 192893, 5 June 2013.

Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, G.R. No. 159284, 27 January 2009; emphasis supplied.

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opening the floodgates for candidates to commit material

misrepresentations in their COCs and escape responsibility for the
same through the mere expedient of conveniently changing their
story in a subsequent COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate
to run for President when the COC for Senator earlier submitted to
the Commission contains a material fact or data barring her from
running for the position she now seeks to be elected to. Surely, to rule
otherwise will be to tolerate a cavalier attitude to the requirement of
putting in the correct data in a COC. In fact, the COC filer, in that
same COC, certifies under oath that the data given are indeed "true
and correct".

R.A. 9225
As will be discussed in the later portion of this Resolution,
respondent is not a natural~born citizen. Hence, she is not covered by
R.A. No. 9225,57 which provides for the reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by natural-born citizens. At this juncture, however, we
temporarily put this consideration aside to resolve the respondent's
arguments regarding her period of residency in the country.
Petitioner correctly posits58 that the earliest starting point from
which We should reckon the respondent's residency is July 18, 2006
when respondent was granted reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under R.A. 9225.
In Teodulo M. Coquilla v. Commission on Elections and Neil M.
Alvarez,59 the Supreme Court pronounced:
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of
origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting
in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to
reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws
may have allowed him to stay as visitor or as a resident
alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a
requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen ...;.

57

ss
59

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,29 August 2003.

Seep. 66 of Petitioner's Memorandum.
G.R. No. 151914,31 July 2002.

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Therefore, following Coquilla, respondent lost her domicile of

origin when she became a U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001.
Again, in accord with Coquilla, from October 18, 2001 until
July 18, 2006 when she was granted reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225, respondent was an alien without any
right to reside in the Philippines save as our immivation laws may
have allowed her to stay as visitor or as a resident alien.
The Supreme Court reiterated the pronouncement in Coquilla
by declaring in Manuel B. Japzon v. Commission on Elections and JaimeS.
Ty that: 60
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In
Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an
individual to acquire American citizenship, he must
establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself
admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen,
then he must have necessarily abandoned the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines as his domicile of origin; and transferred to
the USA, as his domicile of choice.
Recently, the Supreme Court declared in Rogelio Batin Caballero
v. Commission on Elections and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 61 that:
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born
and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that
he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, we ruled that
naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds
true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in
Canada is required for the acguisition of Canadian
citizenship.
Hence, petitioner had effectively
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His
frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation.;
60
61

G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009.

G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.

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from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of

such abandonment.
In short, from the time respondent became a naturalized U.S.
citizen on October 18, 2001 until her re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship on July 18, 2006, her domicile of choice was the United
States of America.

The earliest starting point therefore from which We may reckon

her period of residence in the Philippines is July 2006, which is 2
years and 10 months before 9 May 2016, still short of the 10-year
residency requirement for the Office of President of the Philippines.
Clearly, Respondent's period of residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 9, 2016 will not be at least 10 years.
In light of the above discussion, the unavoidable conclusion is
that respondent's claim in her subject COC that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years up to the day before
May 9, 2016 is false.

RESPONDENT IS NOT A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN

Respondent's representation in her subject COC that she is a

natural- born Filipino citizen is false; Respondent, being a foundling,
is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
That respondent is a foundling is shown by her Birth
Certificate62, stipulated upon by both sides, openly admitted in her
Verified Answer63, and reiterated in open hearing by her counsel.64
I. THE CONSTITUTION

Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution defines a naturalborn Filipino citizen as follows:

.,
..

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are

citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to .

...

Exhibit "C" .
The opening salvo in the Verlfled Answer reads as follows: "1.1 Respondent does not know

who her biological parents are".

64

See TSN November 10, 2015.

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perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine

citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution- the Constitution
in effect when Respondent was born in 1968- states:
Article IV. - Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The enumeration is clear and exclusive.
Applying the
definition of natural-born citizens in the 1987 Constitution to the
enumeration of Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution which is
the Constitution applicable to the respondent, the only logical
deduction is that she would be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen only if her father was a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that
respondent is admitted a foundling negates, at least at this time, any
possible finding that respondent was born of a Filipino father.
Significantly, those listed in Section 1 (4) of the 1935
Constitution - those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenshipdespite the obvious blood relation to a Filipino mother, are not
considered as natural-born because they still need to elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Such election is the
operative fact that would confer Filipino citizenship, hence, said
person is not natural-born not being a Filipino citizen at birth.
It would indeed be an absurd situation to consider a foundling

with no known bloodline to a Filipino parent as a natural-born.:.

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Filipino citizen and deny such status to a child with a known

bloodline to a Filipino mother.
Notwithstanding her clear knowledge that her biological
parents are unknown, respondent avowed in her subject COC that
she is a natural-hom Filipino citizen qualified to run for President of
the Philippines.
Respondent knew or ought to have known that she is not a
natural-hom Filipino citizen. The representation in her subject COC
for President that she is a natural-hom Filipino citizen is obviously
false.
As a sitting Senator, and well educated at that, respondent
knew or can be reasonably expected to know, that our 1935,1973, and
1987 Constitutions have consistently adhered to the "jus sanguinis" or
"citizenship by bloodline" principle wherein natural-hom Filipino
citizenship is solely and exclusively determined by a bloodline to a
Filipino father (1935 Constitution) and by bloodline to a Filipino
father or mother (1973 and 1987 Constitution).
Nowhere in any of the three Constitutions of the Philippines is
there a direct or indirect inclusion of a foundling as a natural-hom
Filipino citizen, or a Filipino at birth.

the respondent.
Since all Co titutions enumerate who are Filipino citizens, and
a foundling is not the enumerations, there is then no constitutional
or legal basis to consider a foundling as a natural-hom Filipino
citizen.

Ia

In Mario Salinias v. Commission on Elections, et al.,65 the Supreme

Court held:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed
in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ~

65

G.R. No. 146943,4 October 2002.

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The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated

in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the
principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressium facit cessare taciturn. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not. by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters. (Emphasis
supplied)
XXX

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its

variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They
are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings
of the human mind. They are predicated upon one's own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.66 (Emphasis
supplied)
We do not agree that a departure from the clear meaning of the
Constitution is warranted. As correctly pointed by petitioner in her
memorandum, only when the meaning of the words is unclear or
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction
and interpretation. The provisions of the Constitution are clear. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be
no departure.
In Republic v. Carlita Lacap,67 the Supreme Court noted that:
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
Respondent harped on the alleged intent of the framers of the
1935 Constitution to consider a foundling as a natural-born Filipino
citizen. ..;
..
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, (1990), pp. 160-161, citing the cases of
Canlas vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139 (1958);
People vs. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245 (1978); People vs.Lantin,
30 SCRA 81 (1%9); Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 (1976);
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, % SCRA 448 {1980); Lerum vs. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652
(1950); Velasco vs. Bias, 115 SCRA 540 (1982).
67
G.R. No. 158253, 2 March 2007.

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In par. 4.43 of her memorandum, 6s respondent attached the

transcript of deliberations supposedly indicating that delegates
inserted the concept of "foundlings" in Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. Respondent pointed out that Delegate Rafols wanted to
include in the enumeration of Philippine citizens the following subsection:69
"The natural children of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother not recognized by the father."
Respondent likewise claimed:70
Delegate Rafols explained that the phrase "natural
children" was meant to include "natural children of
unknown parentage." Delegate Montinola objected to the
amendment, citing Spanish Law which applies a
"presumption" that "a child of unknown parentage is the
son of a Spaniard." He then suggested that this apply to
the Philippines. In other words, Delegate Montinola
suggested that a foundling be presumed born of Filipinos.
As discussed, Delegate Roxas essentially agreed with
Delegate Montinola when the former expressed the view
that "(b)y international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation." This was the final statement on the matter
of "foundlings," and this explains why foundlings were
not mentioned in Article IV of the 1935 Constitution."
A clear case of clutching at straws.
What is not within the plain language of the Constitution is
simply not there!
A closer look at the records of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention will ferret out the truth that while Delegate Rafols
intended to include "natural children of unknown parentage" in the
enumeration of who are citizens of the Philippines, his proposed
amendment was eventually put to a vote by the Convention and was
eventually struck down by his fellow delegates. Respondent does not
dispute this fact. In short, the framers, by voting to reject the.:
68

70

Records, p. 96.
See Item 4.44.2 of Respondent's Memorandum.
See Item 4.44.3 of Respondent's Memorandum.

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suggestion made by Delegate Rafols, evinced their collective decision

to exclude foundlings from the enumeration of who are Filipino
citizens. In a word, both the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as
well as the intent of its framers, support the position that the 1935
Constitution adopted the principle of jus sanguinis.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

As argument of last resort, respondent invoked

international law~~. She asserted:

11

customary

Under applicable treaties and 'generally accepted

principles of international law,' a child born in the
Philippines in 1968 of unknown parents, is a naturalborn Filipino.71
Even if we were to take this declaration at face value, and
concede it to be true, it would not result in a finding that the
respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply cannot be the
case for the very simple reason that such customary law" will be in
contravention of the Constitution.
11

It is a hornbook doctrine that any law, be it statutory law or

customary international law" or any other specie of the latter kind,
is void if it is contrary to the Constitution, the highest and the
fundamental law of the land.

II

Respondent invoked: (a) the 1930 Hague Convention on

Certain Questions 'Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, (b)
the 1961 Conventi<iln on the Reduction of Statelessness, (c) the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (d) the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (e) the 1989 UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child.

First. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions

Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the
nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be.;.
71

See Item B.1.2 of Respondent's Memorandum; Records, p. 106..

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determined by the rules applicable in cases where the

parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed
to have been born on the territoey of the State in which
it was found.
Article 15
Where the nationality of a State is not acquired
automatically by reason of birth on its territory, a child
born on the territory of that State of parents having no
nationality, or of unknown nationality, may obtain the
nationality of the said State. The law of that State shall
determine the conditions governing the acquisition of
its nationality in such cases. 72
The Philippines not being a signatory to this convention is not
bound by it. Assuming arguendo that the terms of this convention
apply, it does not support respondent's claim that a child born in the
Philippines in 1968 of unknown parents is a natural-born Filipino.
The 1930 Hague Convention does not categorically state that a
foundling found is a national, much less a natural-born citizen, of the
State where said child is found. The phrase "shall have the nationality
of the country of birth" implies a future legal act or process to acquire
precisely that "nationality".
Still and all, such provision as interpreted by respondent,
cannot override the constitutional provision requiring blood relation
to a Filipino parent in order for an individual to be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

Second. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

reads:
Article1
1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a
person born in its territoey who would otherwise be
stateless. Such nationality shall be granted:
(a) at birth, by operation of law, or.;

72

Emphasis supplied.

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(b) Upon an application being lodged with the

appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person
concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national
law. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this
article, no such application may be rejected.
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within that territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State. 73
It should be emphasized that the Philippines is not a signatory
to this convention. Hence, its terms do not bind the Philippines. Both
Articles 1 and 2 refer to a "Contracting State." Since the Philippines is
not a Contracting State to this convention, all its terms do not apply
at all to the Philippines. And even assuming that its terms may apply
in our jurisdiction, the same terms do not categorically state that a
foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipinq citizen.
What is more, even if its terms so state that a foundling found in the
Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen, this hypothetical
declaration will never prevail over the Constitution which requires
blood relation to a Filipino parent in order for an individual to be
considered a natural-born Filipino.
Third. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides:
Article 15

1. Everyone has a right to nationalit;y.74

Additionally, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights states:
Article 24
XXX

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.7s

Lastly, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
declares:

73

Jd.

74

Id.

75

Jd.

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SPA No.IS-001 (DC)

Second Division Resolution

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Article7
1.
The child shall be registered immediately after birth
and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.76
The Philippines ratified the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, all of
which declare that the child has the right to acquire a nationality. This
right granted by these three conventions cannot be overstretched like
a rubber band. For these conventions do not in any way declare that a

foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

To illustrate our point: Even if the wordings of these
conventions are deemed to have declared that a foundling found in the
Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen, these international
conventions cannot supplant or override the Constitution which
requires a bloodline to a Filipino parent to confer the status of being a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Consequently, it stands to reason that respondent's claim in her
subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen is false.
Respondent's representations as to her citizenship and period
of residency in the Philippines are both on a material matter and both
false.
THE THIRD ELEMENT- DELIBERATE ATTEMPT
TO MISLEAD, MISINFORM OR HIDE A FACT
The Supreme Court in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections77
ruled that:
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under section 78 must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In
other words, it must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
public office.~
76

77

Id.
Supra, see Note No. 34.

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SPA No.15001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Uamanzares

Second Division Resolution

This third element is just as important as the preceding two

elements.
WAS THERE A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT
TO MISLEAD, MISINFORM OR HIDE A FACT?
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCY:
We answer the question in the affirmative.
In her COC for President, respondent pertinently stated:
7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:

10- No.ofYears

11 - No. of Months78

Respondent deliberately attempted to mislead or misinform the

electorate or hide a fact from them when she supplied the answer,
"10 years and 11 months", to the question in Item No. 7 of her COC.
As earlier discussed, this was material but false.
On top of tl).at, in so declaring a residency of "10 years 11
months" in her present COC, she deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact from the electorate for the reason that such
declaration was false based on her own COC for Senator in 2013. Her
statement in her present COC for President that she has been a
resident of the country since November 2006 can be given only one
interpretation, which is that it was intended to create the impression
on the part of the unsuspecting electorate that she is compliant with
the residency requirement, hence, eligible to run when actually she is
not.

Based on respondent's own 2013 COC which remains an

official document to this day, respondent shall have been a resident
of the Philippines for only 9 years and 6 months up to the day before
May9,2016.
In short, the declaration of "10 years and 11 months" in her
present COC for President was intended to hide the fact earlier stated
under oath in her 2013 COC for Senator that she had actually resided ..:
18

Id., see Note No.1; boldness supplied.

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SPANo.15-oOl. (DC)
Elmnparo v. Ua11U1nzares

Page32of34
Second Division Resolution

in the Philippines only since November 2006. In her present COC

for President, she made it appear that she has been a Philippine
resident since May 2006 so as to meet the residency requirement of 10
years for said high office.
All told, respondent's deliberate action of contradicting the
sworn data earlier given in her 2013 COC betrays an indubitable
attempt to mislead or misinform the electorate and hide from them
the fact that she is actually not compliant with the requirement
prescribed in the Constitution that a candidate for President of the
Philippines should have been a resident of the Philippines for at least
10 years immediately preceding the election.

ON THE ISSUE OF BEING A

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN.

We answer the question in the negative.

The evidence is not conclusive that respondent deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the electorate
when she declared in her subject COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
On the issue of citizenship, there
misrepresentation committed by the respondent.

is

no

'

material

First, We agree with the respondent's submission that the

citizenship issue involving foundlings is a question of first
impression in that, to our best knowledge, there is no jurisprudence
on the issue.

Second, unless the said issue has been definitely resolved by the
Supreme Court, the respondent's assertion that as a foundling she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen, while false, may be presumed to have
been made in utmost good faith.
This Commission may perhaps be permitted to take judicial
notice of the fact that respondent is publicly known as an adopted
child of two prominent Filipinos, the actors Susan Roces and
Fernando Poe, Jr. While it may be true that being a foundling her
biological parents are unknown, we can indulge in the assumption
that having grown up in the Poe household, like in most Filipino:.

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

Page33 o34
Second Division Resolution

families, she was treated, reared and cared for not so much as an
adopted but as a legitimate child, with the Poe spouses giving her all
their love and support. Unavoidably, such atmosphere could not but
engender in respondent a well-founded belief that she is a true
Filipino.
Under such circumstances, she could not be faulted for
believing, albeit wrongly, that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Hence, We are not prepared to rule that on the citizenship issue she
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a material fact
from the electorate.
In the consolidated cases of Desiderio vs. Comelec, Velez vs. Poe,
and Fornier vs. Poe79, the Supreme Court held:
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty
of
having
made
a
material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not
only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
Petitioner, in the case at bar, failed to prove that respondent, in
declaring in her subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, did so not only falsely but deliberately and willfully as well.

A FINAL WORD
An aspirant for the highest position in the land must strictly
adhere to the provisions of the highest law of the land - the
Constitution. ..;.

"
2004.

G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004; G.R. No. 162634, March 3, 2004; and G.R. No. 161824, March 3,

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Second Division Resolution

SPA No.lS-001 (DC)

Elamparo v. Llamanzares

We would have wanted to declare the respondent eligible to

seek the highest position in the land within the gift of our people.
After all, she is not only popular; she is, potentially, a good leader.
However, it is our bounden duty to resolve this case by
applying the Constitution, law, jurisprudence, and none other.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the

instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.:.
SO ORDERED.

~a

ARPARRENO
Presiding Commissioner

Commissioner

~~AS

Commissioner

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution

were reached in consultation ~mong the members of the Commission
(Second Division) before th~was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Commission. ~

Nf~

...

Presiding Commissioner .