Case Digest of Llamzares v.

COMELEC (Main Decision)

Vena V. Verga

Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700
J. Perez
FACTS:
Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime 1968. Parental care was
passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person who found the child. The relatives then
reported and registered the child as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then
named Mary Grace Militar. The child was subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan
Roces sometime in 1974. Necessary annotations were placed in the childs foundling certificate
but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poes new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents.
Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988, she was issued a Philippine
passport. In 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right after the wedding.
She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American
Citizen and she obtained a US Passport that same year.
In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support her fathers candidacy. It was
at this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter. She then returned to the US in July 2004
with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004 after learning of her fathers
deteriorating condition. The latter died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the
funeral arrangements.
Poe stated that she wanted to be with her grieving mother hence, she and her husband decided
to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared
for resettlement including notification of their childrens schools, coordination with property
movers and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog. According
to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the US.
Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the
US. She and her family stayed with her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a
condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February 14, 2006, Poe returned to the
US to dispose the other family belongings. She travelled back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe
and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they built their family
home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
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petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The Bureau of Immigration
acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then considered dual
citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before assuming her post,
she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Pasig
City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of
Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB Chairperson. According to Poe, she stopped using her
American passport from then on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the US
before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October 21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator stating that
she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13, 2013.
She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.
On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She
declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before election
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Several
petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least
10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born
considering that Poe is a foundling. It was argued that international law does not confer natural
born status and Filipino citizenship to foundlings hence, she is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as she is not a natural citizen to begin with.
Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen, she lost it when she became a US Citizen.
In addition, one of the petitioners, Francisco Tatad, theorized that:
1. Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis and hence persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural born Filipino citizens.
2. Using statutory construction, considering that foundlings were not expressly included in
the categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution, the framers are said to have the
intention to exclude them
3. International conventions are not self-executory hence, local legislations are necessary to
give effect to obligations assumed by the Philippines.
4. There is no standard practice that automatically confers natural born status to foundlings.

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Petitioner Valdez alleged that Poes repatriation under R.A 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural born citizen as those who repatriates only acquires Philippine citizenship and
not their original status as natural born citizens.
Poe countered these petitions by alleging that:
1. The grounds invoked by the petitioners were not proper grounds for a disqualification case
as enumerated under Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. What the petitioners filed focus on establishing her ineligibility, hence, they fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC.
3. The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration declaring her as natural born, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption reinforced her
position as a natural born citizen
4. As early as first quarter of 2005, she started to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines
and that she can reestablish her domicile of choice even before she renounced her
American citizenship.
5. The period of residency as stated in her COC for senator was a mistake in good faith.
COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen and that she
failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify POE
The procedure and the conclusions from which the Resolutions of the COMELEC emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether the COC should be denied due course on the exclusive
ground that she made in the certificate a false material representation. COMELEC should restrain
itself from going into the issue of qualifications of the candidate. It cannot, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of a candidate. Not one of the
enumerated powers of the COMELEC as stated in Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution grants the
commission the power to determine the qualifications of a candidate. Such powers are granted
to the Electoral Tribunal as stated in Article VI Section 17 and the Supreme Court under Article VII,
Section 4 of the Constitution.
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 of the COMELEC rules
do not allow, are not authorization and are not vestment of jurisdiction for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must first be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority vested with jurisdiction. Prior determination of qualification
may be by statute, by an executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
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Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy cannot be cancelled or denied due
course on ground of false representations regarding a candidates qualifications except if there
exists self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. In
this light the COMELEC cannot cancel Poes certificate of candidacy lacking prior determination of
her qualifications by a competent body.
2) Whether it can be concluded that Poes parents are Filipinos.
Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is
more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Hence, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondents should show that Poes parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos. In fact, there is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The
Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to
1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born
in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born
in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability
that Poes parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poes parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features
There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poes parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise
is to accept the absurd.
3) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would exclude them either. Because of silence
and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as
natural born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee,
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rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent legislation all expressly
refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance
of a foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship is without merit.
Hence, the argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a process in order to acquire or perfect
her Philippine citizenship, is untenable.
Having to perform an act means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this case,
the determination of foundling status was done by authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of
the process is to determine the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child and
lastly, the process is not analogous to naturalization proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles of international law
which include international customs form part of the laws of the land. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the country where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article 14 of the Hague Convention. Likewise,
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy,
although the Philippines has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a generally accepted principle of international
law.
Poes evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which
it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

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4) Whether Poes repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation which states
that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural born citizen before
he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing R.A. 9225, Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship may be reacquired even if it has been lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to acquire or perfect ones citizenship. In the case of Bengson, the
Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 constitution: natural
born and naturalized. There is no third category for repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot
reverse a judicial precedent. Hence, COMELECs decision is wrapped with grave abuse of
discretion.
5) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years
Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she returned for good
from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality 2. Intention to remain (animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus non-revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing
her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad,
email correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as
well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to
the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
COMELEC refused to consider the petitioners domicile has been timely changed as of May 24,
2005 and maintained that although there is physical presence and animus manendi, there is no
animus revertendi. Respondents contend that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be
counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired Philippine citizenship since
she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of previous cases ruled upon by the Supreme
Court.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein residence was counted only
from the acquisition of permanent residence were decided as such because there is sparse
evidence on establishment of residence. These cases cannot be applied in the present case. In the
case at bar, there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided
to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
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These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear
that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake in good faith. Such
a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering
the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration these overwhelming evidence, its decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus declared qualified to
be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.

Case Digest of Llamzares v. COMELEC (J. Carpio Dissenting Opinion)

Vena V. Verga

Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700
J. Carpio Dissenting Opinion
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS:
A presidential candidate who is deemed a natural born citizen by less than a majority and
deemed not a natural-born Filipino citizen by five Justices and with no opinion from three
Justices is now allowed to run for President of the Philippines. J. Carpio dissents.
He notes that the ruling of the majority will lead to absurd results by allowing a presidential
candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected. The majority wants to
resolve the citizenship status only after the election, and if the petitioner wins.
Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines
for the last ten years hence, she is not eligible to run as President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
ON COMELEC JURISDICTION:
Section 2(1), Article IX-C vests in the COMELEC the power, among others, to enforce and
administer all laws... relative to the conduct of the election. Screening initially the qualifications
of the candidates lies within this specific power. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the
COMELEC can initially disqualify those lacking any of the qualifications before the conduct of the
election.
The Supreme Court in the case of Timbol upheld the COMELECs power to disqualify a nuisance
candidate. It cannot be disputed that a person not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore,
ineligible, who files a certificate of candidacy for President, puts the election process in mockery.
Such person is therefore a nuisance candidate. Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the COMELEC is empowered, motu propio, to cancel a COC if it has been filed to put the election
process in mockery. The electorate is needlessly misled to cast their votes if an ineligible
candidate is allowed to run. COMELEC cannot be a party to such a mockery; otherwise, it will be
committing a grave abuse of discretion
ON CITIZENSHIP:
The 1935 Constitution, which is applicable in Poes case, allows only two methods of acquiring
Philippine citizenship:
1. By blood relation to the father or mother who must be a Filipino citizen
2. By naturalization according to law
The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the law of the blood to determine
citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological
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descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view is made evident by the suppression from the
Constitution of the jus soli principle.
Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed included in par. 3 and 4 of Article IV of the 1935
constitution (Par 3 - Those whose father are citizens of the Philippines and Par 4 - those whose
mother are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of majority, elects Philippine
citizenship).
Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers of the 1935 Constitution voted to categorically reject the
proposal to include foundlings as Citizens of the Philippines. The delegates actually voted to reject
Rafols amendment to consider children of unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. Three
delegates even voiced out their objections to this amendment and stated that the Congress should
instead provide an enabling law for foundlings to be considered as Filipino citizens.
Poe argues that the reason why the provision on foundlings was not included in the 1935
Constitution was because there is already a clear principle existing in domestic and international
law on foundlings. Carpio comments that there is no such domestic law as well as international
law existing during the proceedings of the 1935 Constitutional Convention explicitly governing
citizenship of foundlings and thus there could not have been any redundancy to speak of. The
Spanish Civil Code which has a provision on foundlings ceased to have any effect in our land upon
the cession by Spain of the Philippines to the US.
Likewise, only the 1930 Hague Convention relating to the Conflict of Nationality law, which
articulated the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, was in existence during the
deliberations of the 1935 constitution. This Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a
foundling at birth and there is no prevailing customary international law at the time, as there is
still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
While the framers of the 1935 Constitution discussed the matter of foundlings, they not only
rejected the proposal to include a provision relating to them (foundlings) but also clearly
manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino
fathers. The framers intended to exclude foundling from the definition of natural born Filipino
citizens by expressly rejecting Rafols proposal.
Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens
as only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to fathers who were Filipino
citizens nothing more nothing less. As a matter of course, those whose parents are neither
Filipino citizens or are both unknown, as the case of foundlings, cannot be considered natural born
Filipino citizens.

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FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:

It is a fundamental principle that every independent state has the right and prerogative to
determine who its citizens are. This principle is applied in the Philippines as early as 1912 in the
case of Roa. The 1930 Hague Convention explicitly recognizes this principle. Hence, it is the
municipal law, both constitutional and statutory, which determines and regulates the conditions
on acquiring citizenship.
There is no customary international law presuming a foundling as a citizen of the country where
the foundling is found. Poe anchors her claims on the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (CRS).
1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified by the Philippines only on August
21, 1990. This convention binds the Philippines only on the day of ratification. Since Poe
was born in 1968, her citizenship at birth cannot be affected in any way by the Convention.
Moreover, the CRC does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth much less a natural
citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine constitution, but merely the right
to acquire a nationality in accordance with a domestic law.
2. ICCPR the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976. The ICCPR does not obligate
states to automatically grant a nationality to children at birth. The covenant does not
guarantee a foundling a nationality at birth.
3. UDHR The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a nationality) is merely a declaration. It does not
obligate states to automatically confer nationality to a foundling.
4. 1930 Hague Convention the Philippines is not a signatory to this convention, hence,
Philippines is not bound by it. Poe claims that this convention is evidence of generally
accepted principles of international law. Note that Article 14 of this convention states that
foundlings shall have the nationality of the country OF birth. It does not say that a
foundling shall have the nationality AT birth. There is nothing in this article that guarantees
the nationality of a foundling at birth, much less natural born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine constitution. Moreover, Article 15 of the convention
acknowledges the fact that acquisition of nationality by reason of birth in a states territory
is not automatic. It actually states that municipal law determines the conditions governing
the acquisition of nationality.
5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness the Philippines is not a signatory to this
convention. The convention does not bind the Philippines. Likewise, Art. 2 of the CRS
which states that foundling found in the territory of a contracting state, shall in the
absence of proof to the contrary, to have been born within that territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that state binds only contracting states, of which, the
Philippines is not.

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In sum there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a contracting party, which
provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a natural born citizen of the country in
which the founding is found.
On the issue of customary international law, one of its elements (widespread and consistent
practice of states) was not duly proven by Poe. She failed to show that Article 2 of the CRS is an
established, widespread and consistent practice of a majority of sovereign states. On the other
hand, international law writers generally accept that the CRS does not constitute customary
international law precisely because of the small number of states that have ratified the
convention. Since the first element of customary international law is missing, the second element
(opinion juris) is lacking as well. There is no general international law, whether customary
international law or generally accepted principle of international law, obligating the Philippines, or
any state, to automatically confer citizenship to foundlings at birth.
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings;
1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found
(they have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth)
2. A founding is deemed born in the country where the foundling is found.
These two general principles have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.
Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter, a customary international law conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings could not be considered as natural born Filipino
citizens as such would conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution. In
case of conflict between customary international law and the Constitution, the constitution
prevails.
Moreover, there is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli and citizenship at
birth because of jus sanguisinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under the constitution
but the citizenship granted is not of a natural-born citizenship but that of naturalized citizenship.
Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguisinis, which required blood relation to a parent
are natural citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitution.
On Statistics
The statistics shown speak of foreign and Filipino births in the Philippines with known parents,
either Filipino or foreigner. It does not show the number of foundlings born in the Philippines.
This data also do not show the number of foundlings who were later determined to have Filipino
parentage. If there is 99% probability that a child born in the Philippines is a natural born citizen,
it does not automatically follow that there is 99% probability that a foundling born in the
Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The data on foundlings, if any, may show a different
statistical data. For the Solicitor General to assert that a foundling with a blond hair, blue eyes and
milky white Caucasian skin is a natural born citizen is the height of absurdity.
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Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is not determinative of natural born citizenship
The term natural born Filipino citizen does not appear in the domestic or inter-country adoption
act. In fact, while the term Filipino is mentioned, it is only in the title of these laws. The text of
the adoption laws do not contain the term Filipino. There is no specific provision in these
adoption laws requiring that adoptees must be Filipinos, much less natural born Filipinos. These
adoption laws do not distinguish between a Filipino child and an alien child found in the
Philippines. Hence they apply to both Filipino and alien child found in the Philippines over which
the government exercises jurisdiction. The case of Ellis and Duncan does not apply in the case at
bar because: 1) the case do not involve foundlings 2) the issues raised therein do not involve
citizenship.
On burden of proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his or her
Philippine citizenship. A person who claims to be qualified to run for the position of President,
because he or she, is a natural born citizen, has the burden of proving that he/she is indeed a
natural born citizen. Any doubt should be resolved against him/her. In this case, there is no
dispute that petitioner is a foundling with unknown biological parents. Hence, her certificate of
live birth does not show on its face that she is a natural born Filipino citizen. This shifted the
burden of evidence to the petitioner that she is eligible to run and she could have used evidence
such as DNA.
Summary: Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because:
1. No Philippine law automatically confers Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth
2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered natural born
citizens
3. There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural or
naturalized.
4. There is no treaty, customary international law or general principle of international law
granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
5. Assuming that there is a customary law presuming that foundling is a citizen of the country
where it is found, such presumption cannot prevail over the Philippine constitution which
adopts the jus sanguinis principle
6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural born Filipino citizen
7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his/her status as a foundling to acquire a
Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino
citizen because he/she has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy
for President can motu propio be cancelled by the COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC.
5