OCA vs. Judge Floro

*
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. March 31, 2006.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,

vs. JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., respondent.
*
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. March 31, 2006.
RE: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE

FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
*
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988. March 31, 2006.

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ.)
LUZ ARRIEGO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE FLORENTINO V.
FLORO, JR., respondent.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge should
not seek publicity for personal vainglorya parallel proscription
for lawyers is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that: a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel
proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services. This means that lawyers and
judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary
merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading
authority in legal and judicial ethics, (i)f lawyers are prohibited
from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or selflaudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services
(Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons
should judges be prohibited from seeking
_______________
EN BANC.
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Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or
actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.
Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408
(1993), the Supreme Court explained that the use of an ordinary
and simple professional card by lawyers is permittedby including
therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of
being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of
simplicity and modesty required of judges.In Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc., we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple
professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards
cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein
the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a
bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and
modesty required of judges.
Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of
Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon
2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.We find the act of
Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge
Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we
can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for
recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too
human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the
judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges
seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher
standard as they must act within the confines of the code they
swore to observe.
Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform
for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of
lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity
as a sign of insecurity.As to the charge that Judge Floro, through
his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2,

Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of
unnecessary public68
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for

announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers
and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign
of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of
justiceconfident, competent and true. And to discover that this is
not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has
to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether
final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is
set down in writing, signed and promulgated.As to the argument
of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on
recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in
the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that no judgment, or order whether final
or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set
down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the
Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his
duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for
the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No.
20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People v. Luisito
Beltran, People v. Emma Alvarez, et al., People v. Rowena
Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz. From his
explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can
surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or
negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors
in handling probation cases.We perceive three fundamental
errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered
the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of
the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to
oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without
first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the
release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge

Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced
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69

in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Judge Floros
insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in
writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure
to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is
to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.One of
the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law
fully and uphold it conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for
anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions.
To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassing judges to
take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments. This rule, however, admits of an exception as good
faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as
to be beyond permissible margins of error. Thus, even if a judge
acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.
Same; Same; Like Caesars wife a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicionhis language, both written and spoken, must
be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. This
means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense
justice should not only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest as well. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and
the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to
suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint
dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections
to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.

Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary. His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.
70
70

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to

suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with
the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.SEC. 12.
Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended,
if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from
an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made
pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule
116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees
that the suspension be made upon motion by the proper party.
Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the
suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own
assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the
Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the
accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper
defense.
Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or
give professional advice to client.Well ensconced is the rule that
judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that:
No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as member of the bar or give professional advice to client. Canon 5,
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand,
provides that: A judge shall not engage in the private practice of
law.
Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct
for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking.Be
that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of
that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of

unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming
conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for
appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his
oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts
is that Judge
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71

Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow
judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the
right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro,
to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even
assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies.Psychic phenomena, even
assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference
to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of
People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision,
Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal
witness by concluding that the testimony was a fairytale or a
fantastic story. He then went to state that psychic phenomena
was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed
the testimony of the witness.
Same; Same; The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, is
inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof.The Supreme Courts power to suspend
a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This power
consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courtsis hemmed in only by the
Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among
other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in
the administrative case against him or her.The rule now is that a
Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period
of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the
Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover,
the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a
final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or
her.
72
72

This is because[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and

employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated
upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above.
The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is
reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed,
the measure is intended to shield the public from any further
damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued
assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to
protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are
heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the
privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a
judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast
government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as
the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondent
F.V. Floro, Jr.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
lives.
1
Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran
The Cases
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the

Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro,
Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first
applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation
_______________
1
292 US 216, 229, 78 L. ed. 1219, 1227, 54 S. Ct. 684.

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VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
73

on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC
Clinic) revealed (e)vidence of ego disintegration and
developing psychotic process. Judge Floro later
voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when
he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation
exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal
deficits,
paranoid
ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and
1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a
judge.
Because of his impressive academic background,
however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners.
The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way
to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala
was conducted by the Office 2 of the Court Administrator
(OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty.
Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to
erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who
3
submitted his own report/memorandum to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999
recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge
Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed
under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation against him.
investigation against him.

4
In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc

adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the
com_______________
2
OCAs Annexes A to C.
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-15.
Id., pp. 87-89.

74
74

plaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission

of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit
team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing selflaudatory statements regarding qualifications and
for announcing in open court during court session
his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping
quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in
violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he
declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case
No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon
5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private
practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior
authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for
Release on Recognizance filed by the accused
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and
propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
the custodian of the accused;

(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy
to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of
the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the
ground that the accused is mahina ang pick-up;
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies
from that which he issued in open court in Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
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VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
75

(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial
Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings;
5
(m) For violation of Circular No. 13 dated 1 July 1987.

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was
referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez
(consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro
was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the
resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted by
the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution. In the same
breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
of the administrative charges against him. He was barely
eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified
Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
6
defenses while he filed his Answer/Compliance on 26
August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/
7
final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute. However,
on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness
on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness

8
in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.

Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a Petition
for Inhibition/Disqualification
against Justice Ramirez as
9
investigator which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an
Order dated 11 July
_______________
5
Guidelines in the Administration of Justice.
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 428-432.
TSN, 21 March 2000.

76
76

10
11
2000. Judge Floros motion for reconsideration suffered

12
the same fate. On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the
question of13 Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to
this Court. On 8 August 2000,
the Court ruled against the
14
inhibition of Justice Ramirez.
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been
ordered 15by the Court to comment on Judge Floros motion to
dismiss, recommended that the same should be denied. 16
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001.
The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a Partial
Report recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from
office by reason of insanity which renders him incapable
and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region,
17
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13
charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came
out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001,
Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against
those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20
July 1999 preventive suspension follows:
_______________
10
Id., p. 489.
11
Id., p. 491.
12
Id., p. 494.
13
Id., pp. 499-517.
13
Id., pp. 499-517.
14
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 218.
15
Resolution of the Court dated 5 April 2000. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 124 &
426.
16
Danilo Cuarto, TSN, 6 March 2001, pp. 48-57.
17

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VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
77

1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCAagainst Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial
18
Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJagainst Judge Benjamin
Aquino, Jr., 19Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Malabon City
_______________
18
To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 9 January 2006:
On 7 December 1999, Judge Floro filed a complaint against Atty.

Buenaventura. This is the same complaint, which was docketed as A.M. OCAIPI No. 00-876-RTC. Judge Floro alleged that during the audit, he informed
Atty. Buenaventura of the corrupt acts and practices of Judge Aquino and Clerk
of Court Dizon. According to Judge Floro, instead of reporting the matter, Atty.
Buenaventura conspired with Judge Aquino and Atty. Dizon and the three came
up with the misleading Judicial Audit Report later re-docketed as A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 which led to the filing of the 13 charges against him and his
suspension. He added that the three fabricated the charges to cover up the
anomalies.
On 2 March 2000, Atty. Buenaventura filed her Comment. In a resolution
dated 11 July 2000, this Court forwarded the records to Justice Ramirez for
inclusion in the investigation in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460.
19
To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 09 January
2006:
On 29 March 2000, Judge Floro filed a complaint dated 28 March 2000 against
Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr. He claimed that Judge Aquino: 1) failed to follow
the rules on litigated motions due to corruption and conspiracy with one Fermin
Ignacio Domingo alias Fermie Dizon, a fixer or fianzadora; 2) does not issue
orders for the reduction of bail but merely signs the upper portion of the motion
for reduction of bail; and 3) harassed one Gertrudes Mariano, a canteen
operator at the justice compound, for informing him of Judge Aquinos
connivance with the fianzadora. He added that Judge Aquino connived with
the municipal attorney to eject Mariano and Judge Aquino allowed a certain Ine
to peddle, cook and serve food in front of the court.
to peddle, cook and serve food in front of the court.
78
78

3. AC No. 5286against Court Administrator Alfredo
20
L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.
_______________
On 18 August 2000, Judge Aquino filed his Comment. In a resolution
dated 31 July 2000, this Court referred the case to Justice Ramirez for
investigation, report and recommendation in conjunction with A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 and OCA IPI No. 00-876-RTC.
20
2006:
On 21 June 2000, Judge Floro filed this complaint with the Office of the Bar
Confidant. He alleged that Court Administrator Benipayo, in conspiracy with
Judge Aquino, punished him due to vengeance and professional jealousy, with
Judge Aquino convincing Court Administrator Benipayo to recommend his
indefinite suspension based on 13 unsubstantiated charges. Judge Floro
contended that upon his assumption of office he came to know of the rampant
corruption in the Malabon, RTC, of the judicial employees thereat and of the
prosecutors. He had a bitter quarrel with Judge Aquino, Jr. due to the
unwarranted unloading of cases to his sala aside from other corrupt practices of
the latter. Likewise, he had a bitter quarrel with his own Clerk of Court due to
these corrupt practices. Thus, to protect himself, he requested for the audit of
his sala. The audit was conducted on March 2-3, 1999. Atty. Buenaventura, the
audit team leader, submitted her report on 12 March 1999 to respondent Court
Administrator
Benipayo.
Consequently,
Court
Administrator
Benipayo
submitted his report and recommendation for Judge Floros indefinite

preventive suspension to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, Judge Floro
assailed as unconstitutional, void and illegal Court Administrator Benipayos
report and recommendation to the Supreme Court for his indefinite preventive
suspension. Judge Floro thus prayed for the disbarment of respondents Court
Administrator Benipayo and Judge Aquino, Jr. and for the issuance of a
Permanent Injunction for similar cases of persecution in the future.
In a resolution dated 8 August 2000, this Court noted the complaint and
required Court Administrator Benipayo and Judge Aquino, Jr. to comment. On
18 September 2000, Judge
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79
4. AC No. CBD-00-740against Thelma C. Bahia, Court

Management Office, Atty. Mary
Jane DacarraBuenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of
the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda
21
G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon
_______________
Aquino, Jr. filed his Comment. In a resolution dated 24 Octo-ber 2000, this
Court noted the Comments of Court Administrator Benipayo and that of Judge
Aquino, Jr. and required Judge Floro to file a consolidated reply. On 21
November 2000 Judge Floro filed a Consolidated Reply.
21
To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 09 Janu-ary
2006:
On 21 June 2000, Judge Floro filed a disbarment case before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Bahia, Atty.
Buenaventura and Atty. Dizon. Judge Floro alleged that Attys. Bahia,
Buenaventura and Dizon conspired to punish him for vengeance, together with
the connivance of Judge Aquino, Jr. and Court Administrator Benipayo who
recommended his indefinite preventive suspension based on 13 fabricated and
unsubstantiated charges. Upon the conduct of the audit by Atty. Buenaventura
per his request to protect himself from the corruption practiced in the RTC
Malabon, Atty. Buenaventura and Atty. Bahia who approved the formers
report, with apparent collusion solely listened and relied on Atty. Dizon and
thus manipulated and fabricated the 13 charges against him which resulted to
his being punished without legal basis and against his constitutional right to
be heard before any disciplinary action is levied against him.
In an order dated 23 June 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline directed
the three respondents to submit their Answer to the complaint. On 12 July
2000, the respondents filed a motion praying that the case be referred to the
Supreme Court and to consolidate the same with the disbarment case filed by
Judge Floro against Court Administrator Benipayo and Judge Aquino, Jr. On
31 July 2000, Judge Floro opposed the motion. In an order dated 30 August
2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline referred the case to this Court for
consolidation with
80
80

5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278)against former
Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo
and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,
Consultant,
22
Office of the Court Administrator
_______________
_______________
the disbarment case against Justice Benipayo and Judge Aquino, Jr.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2001, this Court noted the order dated 30
August 2000 of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the letter of Judge Floro
praying for the consolidation of this case with A.C. No. 5286. In a resolution
dated 21 August 2001, this Court consolidated this case with A.M. No. RTJ-991460.
22
2006:
On 19 February 2002, Judge Floro filed before the Ombudsman a complaint
against former Court Administrator Benipayo and Justice Ramirez. The case
was docketed as CPL No. C-02-0278. He accused Justice Ramirez of violating
the rule on confidentiality in administrative proceeding for allegedly furnishing
former Court Administrator Benipayo, who had by then been appointed
Chairman of the Comelec, copies of the medical report regarding his mental
fitness and the Compliance dated 07 March 2001 of Justice Ramirez
recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro on the ground of insanity. Judge
Floro also accused former Court Administrator Benipayo of inducing Justice
Ramirez to falsify the Compliance dated 07 March 2001 as to indicate that
Judge Floro is not mentally fit to be a Judge.
On 5 March 2002, the Ombudsman referred the complaint to this Court. In a
resolution dated 24 February 2004, this case was consolidated with the other
cases involving Judge Floro. In a resolution dated 9 March 2004 this Court
ordered the instant complaint (CPL No. C-02-0278) be consolidated with A.M.
No. 03-8-03-0 and docketed as A.C. No. 6282. Both respondents were required
to comment on the consolidated complaints. Justice Benipayo filed his
Comment on 19 May 2004.
81
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
81

6. A.M. No.2303-8-03-0against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A.
Ramirez
7. A.C. No.24 6050against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A.
Ramirez
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved
that the cases he
25
filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. On 2614 February
2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.
_______________
23
In a Complaint dated 2 May 2003, Judge Floro assailed Justice Ramirezs

Report dated 7 March 2001 in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. This is identical to the
Report dated 7 March 2001 in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. This is identical to the
complaint in A.C. No. 050. Upon recommendation of the Court Administrator,
the Court, in a resolution of 9 September 2003, referred this administrative
complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant. In a Report and Recommendation
dated 23 January 2004, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the
complaint be treated as a separate administrative complaint and that
respondent be required to file his comment.
24
On 19 May 2003, Judge Floro filed a verified complaint dated 2 May 2003
before the Office of the Bar Confidant against Justice Ramirez. On 27 October
2003, Justice Ramirez filed his Comment while on 6 November 2003 Judge
Floro filed a Reply. On 12 November 2003, Justice Ramirez filed a Rejoinder
while Judge Floro filed a Sur-Rejoinder on 27 November 2003.
25
See temporary Rollo on the matter.
26
On 3 March 2006, Judge Floro likewise sought the dismissal of
A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ (Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. v. Judge
Benjamin Aquino, Jr). Judge Aquino, for his part, sought clarification as
to whether or not A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ had likewise been
dismissed. On 14 March 2006, we granted Judge Floros motion in view
of our earlier dismissal of A.M. OCA-IPI No. 00-876-RTC (Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. v. Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Atty. Esmeralda
Galang-Dizon and Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura) which
involved, among other things, the same alleged acts of Judge Aquino in
conniving with fixers in the
82
82

The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego

v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge h in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: (f)or using/taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement
even without the presence of the trial prosecutor. The
complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court
stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001.
On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence
which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5
which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5

September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while
Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16
October
2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this
27
case.
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a
resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special
Proceeding Case No. 315-MN In Re: Petition To Be
Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei,
Petitioner. The resolution disposed of the motions for
voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration
of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
_______________
reduction of bail and in allowing a certain Ine to establish a canteen
in front of the Court.
27
OCA Memorandum dated 9 January 2006, p. 9.

83
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
83

This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter
28
written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.
The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made
the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for
inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the
raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the
petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be
assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he
should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case.
It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case anew as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12,
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which
provides to wit:
8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified
application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a
provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive
Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable
damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall
be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the
special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a verified
application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and
only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is
not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the abovementioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even
mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is
his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to
_______________
28
Rollo (A.M. Mo. 99-7-273-RTC), p. 4.
84
84

hear a judge who speaks highly of a padrino (who helped him get
his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression
about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and
expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned.
A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of
Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the
ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which
this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not
29
administrative.
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on

(a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of
Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5
of the subject resolution that Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x
helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his
nomination x x x.
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the30Court en banc
adopted the recommendations of the OCA. Judge Floro,
31
through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999
31
through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999

which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11
January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence
which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000,
referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and
recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report
and recommendation in this case as well as in the second
case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated
14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as
the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court
whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988
and A.M.
_______________
29
Id., pp. 4-5.
30
Id., p. 19.
31
Id. (A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460), Vol. I, pp. 298-344 & Vol. III, pp. 159-
281.
85
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
85

No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have
the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the
two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its
willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution
based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise
informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006,
her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the
pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously
offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006,
Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice,
considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to
render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all
fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its
effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For
our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed
psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by
psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by

the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond
our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely
medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings
of
the
mental
health
professionals
who
interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade
through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the
irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge
Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the
evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next
issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro
acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or
mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question
hinges the applicability of equity.
86
86

As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges

(c and g, h and j, e and f) will be jointly discussed
as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA.
These charges involve common facts and to treat them
separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not
warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge
Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing
self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications
AND for announcing in open court during court
session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating
calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that
he is a bar exams topnotcher (87.55%) and with full
second honors
from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B.
32
and LL.B. The audit team likewise reported that: (b)efore
the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a
private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila
University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during
the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of
the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of

87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible,
particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John,
was made. The people in the courtroom were given the
opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter
read. No questions
were asked; hence the session
33
commenced.
_______________
32
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 6.
33
Id., p. 8.
87
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
87

Judge Floro
argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto
34
G. Martin, the use of professional cards containing the
name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not
improper and that the word title should be broad enough
to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors
duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other
lawyers do include in their calling cards their
former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees,
Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line?
Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being
circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends
or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common
sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other
professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open
court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his
branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who
suggested that during his initial court session, she would
briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of
his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively,
Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only
during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says
in no uncertain terms that a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel proscription,
this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. This
means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the
means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the

exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the
same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their
wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and
judicial ethics, (i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using
or permitting the use of any un_______________
34
RULES OF COURT, Vol. 6, pp. 122-123 (1981 ed.).

88
88

dignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their

qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should
judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not 35actors or actresses or
politicians, who thrive by publicity.
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory
details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct?
36
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that the use
of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is
permitted and that the card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot
be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein
the honors he received from his law school with a claim of
being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of
simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his
cards as these were just given by him
as tokens and/or only
37
to a few who requested the same. The investigation by
Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eyewitness from the OCA categorically
stated that Judge Floro
38
circulated these cards. Worse, Judge Floros very own
witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch,
testified
39
that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards.
_______________
35
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, E. L. Pineda, pp. 341-342 (1994
ed.).
36
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 408.
36
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 408.
37
TSN, 7 June 2000, p. 9.
38
See testimony of Branch Clerk of Court Esmeralda Galang-Dizon,
TSN, 25 April 2000, pp. 8-10.

39
Testimony of Ma. Enrina Talag-Pascual, TSN, 13 February 2001, p.
56.
89
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
89

As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being
more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before
its amendment, automatically classified violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to
gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may
amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge
or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming
conduct which is a light charge.
Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct
while gross connotes something out of all measure;
40
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.
For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained
of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate
41
the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge
Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt
motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a
persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the
judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against
judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are
held to a higher standard as they must act within the
confines of the code they swore to observe.
_______________
40
Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-
1511, 20 August 2004, 437 SCRA 81, 84, citing SPO2 Yap v. Judge
Inopiquez, Jr., 451 Phil. 182, 194; 403 SCRA 141, 151 (2003).
41
Francisco v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37, 16 March 2004, 425 SCRA
521, 525.
521, 525.
90
90

As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk

of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the
courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications
especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very
well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity.
Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice
confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is
not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities
that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers
approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements
went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple
misconduct only.
(b)
Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as

sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that inside Judge Floros

chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at
the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified
as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing
the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the
42
room.
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or
factual basis. The man the audit team saw sleeping on his
folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or alalay
whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods
and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian
reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that
the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left
when he saw the members thereof.
_______________
42
91
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
91
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
91

This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently
improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed
another person to use his folding bed for short periods of
time during office hours and while there is no one else in the
room. The situation would have been different if there had
been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds
43
and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova
wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service when he and his family used his chambers as
residential quarters, with the provincial government paying
for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge
to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes
fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this
case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to
the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably
uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge
allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written
orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules
of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the
Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor
and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the
absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with
the hearing of the following matters:
_______________
43
A.M. No. RTJ-91-657, 21 June 1993, 223 SCRA 489, 499-502.

92
92

(c-1) Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused, in

Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled People vs.
Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al., People vs. Rowena
Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al., People vs. Rowena
Camino, and People vs. John Richie Villaluz, respectively. In the
hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a
form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the
accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge
Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused
under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon
refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a
previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would
automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft
the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on
recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently granted.
As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as
Annexes 3 to 6), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay
kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa.
Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on
recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him
neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order.
Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the
parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes
dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and
20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes 3 to 5.
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN,
Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written
44
order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes 6 to 7.
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never

violated any rule of procedure with respect to the cases
mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
_______________
44

93
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
93

Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of
Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only final
orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at
bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of
Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for
release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although

captioned
as
MOTION
FOR
RELEASE
ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D.
968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due
course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the
same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of
the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all
courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos,
Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985almost 14
years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V.
Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to
interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his
being a responsible member of the community where the
accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the
form of direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness
stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is
required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of
probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced
previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous
cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court
hearings on application for release on recognizance,
respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included
the interview/hearing on the applications for release on
recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in
45
the chambers.
_______________
45
Answer/Compliance, Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 151-152.

94
94

The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability

for ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential
Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to
his remonstrations, the release of an accused on
recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the
46
custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation47Law,
and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares, it is
incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to
incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to

ascertain first that the applicant is not a disqualified
offender as (p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold
would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the
request for provisional liberty.
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem
that he completely did away with the requirement for an
investigation report by the probation officer. Under the
Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is
warranted only during the period for awaiting the
submission of the investi_______________
46
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1990 states:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders.The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended

to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day/or a
fine of not less that Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions
of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
47
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693, 436 Phil. 295, 318; 387 SCRA 485, 510
(2002).
95
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
95

gation report on the
application for probation and the
48
resolution
thereon. As we explained in Poso v. Judge
49
Mijares:
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order
to conduct case study prior to action on application for release on
recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim
character of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation
Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for
probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the
submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the
petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to
finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the
application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of
the accused even before the order to submit the case study
and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended
the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of the
prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis
supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the

release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing
as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic
_______________
48
P.D. No. 968, Section 7 as amended, provides:
SEC. 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report.The probation officer

shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than
sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation.
The court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after
receipt of said report.
Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the
petition, the defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed
in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the
defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the
defendant on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community who shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.
49
Supra note 47, pp. 317-318; p. 510.

96
96

50
notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals wherein we

held that no judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is
set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered
by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro
was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce
into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the
accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and
20442 entitled, People v. Luisito Beltran, People v. Emma
Alvarez, et al., People51v. Rowena Camino, and People v.
John Richie Villaluz. From his explanation that such
written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge
Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on
his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.

In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge
Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the
release on recognizance of the accused without the presence
of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro
ordered the release without first requiring the probation
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the
accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the
accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation,
was already a done deal even before the hearing on his
application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the
accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for
probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in
the observation of
_______________
50
G.R. No. 57343, 23 July 1990, 187 SCRA 672, 674.
51
As to Judge Floros Annex C-2, which purportedly disproves the
audit teams allegation that he did not reduce into writing his orders
made in open court, the same is immaterial as it refers to a totally
different case (Crim. Case No. 20774, People of the Philippines v. Joel
Solivar y Sta Ana); Rollo, Vol. I, p. 217.
97
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
97

the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had
been approving applications for release on recognizance
hastily and without observing the requirements of the law
for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts
leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants.
In herein case, however, we cannot countenance what
Judge Floro did as the unsolicited fervor to release the
accused significantly deprived the prosecution 52and the
private complainants of their right to due process.
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court
need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic
rules on
53
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to
54
understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.
54
understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
55
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not every

judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed56 in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanctions. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of
harassing judges to take the fantastic
and impossible oath of
57
rendering infallible judgments.
This rule, however,
admits of an exception as good faith in situations of fallible
discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple
and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be
beyond permissible margins of
_______________
52
Supra note 47, p. 318; p. 510.
53
Id., pp. 318-319; p. 511.
54
Id., p. 319; p. 511.
55
Id.
56
Id., p. 314; p. 507.
57
Id.
98
98

58
error. Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his

ignorance
is so gross, he should be held administratively
59
liable.
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he
declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the
members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always proaccused particularly concerning detention prisoners and
bonded accused who have to continually pay for the
premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that
what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need
for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40
detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases
could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty.
Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners
Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners

languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had
not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February
1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits
that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any
litigant or private complainant that he sided with the
accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other
hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro,
during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of
Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason
that he commiserated with them especially those under
detention as he,
_______________
58
Id., citing Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, 395 Phil. 353, 364; 341
SCRA 161, 171 (2000).

59
Gil v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 449 Phil. 677, 686; 401 SCRA 635, 643
(2003).
99
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
99

himself, had been accused by60his brother and sister-in-law of
so many unfounded offenses.
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is
more credible especially
since it is corroborated by
61
independent evidence, e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted
eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. This means that a judge whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and
62
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as well.
Like Caesars
wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
63
suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to
suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial
restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views
and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of
bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the
conduct 64
of a judge erodes public confidence in the
judiciary. His language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
65
misconstrued.
_______________
60
TSN, 25 April 2000, pp. 27-28.
61
See TSN, 07 August 2000, p. 17 and charge h.
62
Sps. Nazareno v. Judge Almario, 335 Phil. 1122, 1129; 268 SCRA
657, 664 (1997); Bunyi v. Hon. Caraos, 394 Phil. 211, 218; 339 SCRA 696,
701 (2000).
63
Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, Jr., 391 Phil. 835, 843; 337 SCRA 144,
150 (2000).
64
Cf. Cacatian v. Liwanag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1418, 10 December
2003, 417 SCRA 350, 357.

65
Fecundo v. Berjamen, G.R. No. 88105, 18 December 1989, 180
SCRA 235, 245, cited in Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, Jr., supra note 63,
p. 843; p. 149.
100
100

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is

objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And
by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty
of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put
in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust 66
in his
ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan:
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge
are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than
the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the
appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to
first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to
the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It
must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows
the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both
sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching
an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should
possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should
avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance.
with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral

ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of
the case, by persuading the private complainant and
the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor.
_______________
66
G.R. Nos. L-39516-17, 28 January 1975, 62 SCRA 124, 127. See also
State Prosecutors v. Judge Muro, 321 Phil. 474, 482; 251 SCRA 111,
117-118 (1995).
101
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
101

(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999
which varies from that which he issued in open court
in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385MN entitled: People vs. Nenita Salvador, Judge Floro, Jr., in the
absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private
complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor,
used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private
complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case
in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private
complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the
signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex 8).
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the
manifestations of the private complainant and the accused relative
to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same
order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement
until after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However,
per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order
was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order
given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already
settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The
settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability
of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further
of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further

reported that the private complainants signed the compromise
agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr.
The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes
(unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the
stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as
Annexes 8, 13, and 14. (Note: the stenographic notes were
signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in

Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M.
OCA-I.P.I.
102
102

67
No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint dated 9

August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro
forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused
therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the
parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the
accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining
witness, they requested respondent that they be given time
to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge
Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering,
ngayon na! ngayon na! Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly
made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the
accused against the complaining witness would likewise be
dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the
written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the
agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report
and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that
the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the
Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants
concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to
patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation.
Then, considering that the parties suggested that they
would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge
Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated
Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course
of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court
Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under
Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission
of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March
of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March

1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by
the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary
to Atty.
Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an
Order, courts have
_______________
67
Rollo in OCA I.P.I. 99-812-RTJ, pp. 10-23.

103
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
103

plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally
dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on 68
the matter finds expression in Echaus v.
Court of Appeals wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has
juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed
and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court
for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that
indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until
and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the
modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment
has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or
a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow
read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation
(i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the
parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it
indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or
revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or
even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or
judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory

order made in open courtostensibly a judicial approval of
a compromise agreementwhich was amended or revised
by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written
order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its
ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter
into a compromise agreement after the public
prosecutor
69
shall have submitted its comments thereto.
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of
Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling
and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an
amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty
amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty

(under paragraph j of the complaint).
_______________
68
Supra note 50, pp. 674-675 (citations omitted).
69

104
104

Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral

ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement
even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same
must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial
settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999,
thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She
cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not
reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on
the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached
under duress at the instance of Judge Floro. (i) For motu
proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is mahina
ang pick-up
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8
February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge
Floro motu proprio ordered the physical and mental
examination of the accused by any physician, over the
strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
on the ground that
70
the accused is mahina ang pick-up.
In refutation, Judge Floro argues
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the
demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO
lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted
to enter a plea of not guilty;
_______________
70
Id., pp. 6-7.
70
Id., pp. 6-7.

105
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
105

b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the
bench and he appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily
admitted that accused is nauutal, has difficulty of
reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often
changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to
guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation
by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the
Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons),
Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of
Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice),
manifested orally that the accused is mahina ang pick-up;
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing
the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is
well-settled that the court may order a physical or MENTAL
examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is
material to the issues involved. (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p.
71
107, Id.).
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for
Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension
of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan
72
Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. As
reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as
admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty.
Gallevo merely manifested that accused is mahina ang
pick-up.
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for
suspending the arraignment motu proprio and over the
strong objection of the trial prosecutor. It must be
remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in
February 1999 when the
_______________
71
Id., pp. 161-162.
72
TSN, 6 February 2001, pp. 4-6.

106
106
106

applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the

1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be

made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike
Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which decrees that 73the suspension be
made upon motion by the proper party. Thus, it was well
within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension
of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own
assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes
upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is
found that the accused, even
with the aid of counsel, cannot
74
make a75 proper defense. As we underscored in People v.
Alcalde :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that
an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or
imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be
found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with
the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court
to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper
place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
_______________
73
Cf. People v. Alcalde, 432 Phil. 366, 377; 382 SCRA 621, 631 (2002).
74
Id., citing United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil. 337, 345 (1917).
75
Supra note 73, pp. 378-380; pp. 631-633 (citations omitted).

107
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

107
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it
the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the
information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At
the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is
sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court
must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with
the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his

assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is
already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the
side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is
not an actionable wrong.
(e) Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in
Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial
Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in
the private practice of law
(f) Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without
prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report
states:
i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal
cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that
Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just
signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as
collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases,
Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for
leave of absence.
108
108

Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr.
has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and
filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and
even indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of

Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge
Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46M-98, entitled: In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner
versusJesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro. In this case Judge
Floro, Jr. filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of
Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission wherein
he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is
the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila.
Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos,
Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached
a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President
Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said
Motion is hereto attached as Annex 9.
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as
counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the
76
above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts.
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from

engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to
client. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
on the other hand, provides that: A judge shall not engage
in the private practice of law.
_______________
76
109
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
109

Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge
claiming
that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
77
cases.
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not
reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as
counsel in his personal cases after he had already been
appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading (Ex
Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With
Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission) jointly with his

counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he
filed against his brothers for the custody of their mild,
mentally-retarded brother. He explained, however, that he
prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he 78could
not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. He
likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him
alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the
same by
filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of
79
Merit. Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro
argued that he80 filed the subject pleading as petitioner and
not as counsel.
The proscription against the private practice of law by
judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also
aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their
judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their
own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in
the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by
81
a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.
_______________
77
Id., pp. 199-200; pp. 226-250.
78
Id., p. 237.
79
Id., p. 238.
80
TSN, 7 August 2000, p. 22.
81
Carual v. Judge Brusola, 375 Phil. 464, 477; 317 SCRA 54, 66
(1999).
110
110

Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that

what is envisioned by private practice is more than an
isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as
82
a lawyer. In herein case, save for the Motion for Entry of
Judgment, it does not appear from the records that Judge
Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe
to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and

does not in any wise constitute private practice of law.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be
guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty
of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73,
Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of
his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical
explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro
was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow
judge by emphasizing
that he himself is a judge and is thus
83
in the right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least,
put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its
claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of
his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As
Judge
_______________
82
Ziga v. Judge Arejola, 451 Phil. 449, 459; 403 SCRA 361, 370 (2003).
83
Cf. Perez v. Costales, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876, 23 February 2005, 452
SCRA 139, 145.

111
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
111

Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was
incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again
we have held that although administrative proceedings are
not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality
of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to
limitations
imposed by the fundamental requirement of due
84
process.
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court
and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings

In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to
observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With
the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a taperecorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the
transcript of the proceedings (Annex 15). The tape record of the
court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit
A.
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A
certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty.
Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the
hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding
Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court,
hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin,
_______________
84
Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, supra note 58, p. 370; pp. 176-177.
112
112

hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure;

pagdating dito eh . . . dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,
masyadong maraming . . . eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan . . .
but ginawa ko lang yon . . . Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi
ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin . . . except . . .
na hindi papayag . . . . kasi marami diyang . . .
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro,

Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case
involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice
system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the system.
Thus, he said:
Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto
bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera.
He continued:
Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi;
yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert
Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa
ako, ganun . . . ganun . . . Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan.
ako, ganun . . . ganun . . . Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan.

Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang
kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko
inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay
napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o
may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi
85
naka-record eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically

arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by
his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC
personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly
cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism
and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by
Judge Floro).
_______________
85

113
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
113

As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein
he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro
contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his
staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic
Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts
by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that
the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in
fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two
tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the
86
yellow notes and the official transcribed copy thereof.
This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by
the audit team as Annex 15 is but an unofficial copy and
does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a
court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without
concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court
proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the
unauthorized recording of a private
conversation is
87
inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents
thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word
against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified
under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize
the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving
these particular charges would therefore depend upon
these particular charges would therefore depend upon

which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
_______________
86
87
TSN, 25 April 2000, p. 16.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part

thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
114
114

Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01

Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of
us in branch 73 the alleged kabulukan ng hustisya.
Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use.
He said that since theory and the practice of law are
very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply
to different cases. Not only the justice system did he
criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . .
and I quote Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt
na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan.
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize
the very institution he is now serving? Where is his
respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How
can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself
did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter L which reads
for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings?
A
Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the

presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters
regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
on Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, Luka-luka,
talaga yang babaing yan and then he would call even
not during court session, but during office hours our
Court Interpreter malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the
sun. So, it did not surprise us one time when during a

pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No.
25-86-MN Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado, he uttered
offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted
by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the
tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for
consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro
discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff
present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case,
115
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
115

we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the
record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained
offensive languages against the justice system, against
a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named
Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In
fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the
possibility of the amicable settlement between the
parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a
Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or
not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the
same or attach the same in the record because it
contained offensive languages highly improper and
intemperate languages like for example, putang ina,
words like ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera,
88
etcetera.
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the
straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro
himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible
because subject utterances are consistent with Judge Floros
claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with
several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having
placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his
utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case
are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived
were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by
the persons who were either in charge of the cases against
him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently,
him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently,

although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what
he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he
sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of
his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show
that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of
Court and
_______________
88
TSN, 25 April 2000, pp. 21-27.

116
116

the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming

conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as reasonable
mind might accept
89
as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, there is
ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floros
part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1
July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses
matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03
provides that [a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in
the court. A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An
indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to
maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge
respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly,
others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with
honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to
detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is
supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any
detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice)
dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted
efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and
direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior,
appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he
appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he

is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that
he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and
sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has
unseen little friends are manifestations of his psychological
instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the
func_______________
89
Cf. Espaol v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, 11 November 2004, 442
SCRA 13, 37.
117
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
117

tions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject
Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to
90
ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary.
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an

offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the
guidelines in the administration of justice following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best
exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably
linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which
allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging
the functions of his office. This being the case, we will
consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself
to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that
he has unseen little friends in determining the
transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to
remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13
charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found
Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13
charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge asimple misconduct
2) Charges c and ggross ignorance of the law
3) Charge dunbecoming conduct
4) Charge eunbecoming conduct
5) Charges k and lunbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge.

Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious
charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three
but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of
_______________
90

118
118

P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00 depending on the

circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that
Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was
slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to
be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is
no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with
corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate
penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e.
P40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple
misconduct and
unbecoming conduct as aggravating
91
circumstances.
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of
RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge
the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds
the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-991460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro
embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an
appropriate mental or psychological examination and which
necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This
charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to
perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact
that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no
finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview
Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which
application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in
September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by
Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic
Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
_______________
91
On the other hand, if we were to give separate penalties for the
findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct, the result

would still be the same under the circumstances.
119
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
119

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during
the interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of
questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness.
He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila
graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar
examination. He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method
of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was
school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and
graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and selforganization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend
to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his
ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the
past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing Psychic vision every
morning and that the biggest secret of the universe are the unseen
things. He can predict future events because of power in psychic
phenomenon as when his bar results was to be released, he saw
lights in the sky no. 13-1, and he got the 13th place. He has been
practicing para-psychologyseeing plenty of dwendes around
him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be
irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego
disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview
92
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level).
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro

again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when
he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon.
Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D.
(Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and
evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he
takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite reluc-
_______________
92
Rollo, Vol. VIII, pp. 42-43.
120
120

tant to reveal information about his family background and would

rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However,
he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he
can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This
renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate
with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to
mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change
in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private
practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and
interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed
discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual distortions
were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild
mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive
efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background
and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as
suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his
role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary
role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present
not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the
responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed
93
to anxiety-provoking and stressladen situation.
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted

report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion
from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however,
resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological
capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the
Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro
to submit to appropriate psychological or mental
examination.
On 1 94February 2000, per recommendation of Justice
Ramirez,
the Court clarified that the appropriate
psychological or
_______________
93
Id., pp. 49-50.
94

121
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
121

mental examination being adverted to in the Resolution of
20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court
thereby directed Judge Floro to submit himself to the SC
Clinic for psychological
or mental examination, within ten
95
(10) days from notice. Judge Floro sought reconsideration
96
which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000.
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological
examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court
on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros
failure to 97do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought
reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a
conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric
examination
by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
98
institution.
This was denied by the Court on 14 November
99
2000.
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other
things, for the inhibition
or disqualification 101
of Supreme
100
Court Clinic doctors
and psychologist
with a
manifestation that he filed cases against them for
revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC), 102the Philippine Medical Association
(PMA) and the PAP for alleged gross incompetence and
dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep.
Act No.
103
2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics.
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the
approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that
Judge Floro be
_______________
95
Per the Courts Resolution dated 1 February 2000 (Id., p. 430).
96
Id., p. 449.
97
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 471-472.
98
Id., pp. 476-511.
99
Id., p. 554.
100
R. Mendoza and C. Vista.
101
Beatriz O. Cruz.
102
Judge Floro must be referring to the Psychological Association of
the Philippines.
103
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 283-320.
103
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 283-320.

122
122

sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with

the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions.
According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of
administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et
al., is an indication of the latters intention
to disregard and
104
disobey the legal orders of the Court. The Court en banc
agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro
was ordered to submit to psychological and mental
examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he
shall be ordered arrested and detained at the
jail of the
105
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x.
Judge Floro finally
complied with the directive on 13 and
106
15 December 2000. He likewise sought the services of a
private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out
with 107
his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January
2001. Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court
Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in
connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G.
Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that (o)ver all data strongly suggest a
delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is
basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to
analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status,
cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current
functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine
situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling
indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an
indica_______________
104
Id., pp. 321-322.
105
Id., pp. 323-325.
106
Report of Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist, Chief Judicial
Staff Officer of the SC Clinic.

107
123
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
123

tor of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective
assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual
distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such
that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena
and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a delusional
(false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found
108
to be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge.
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of

Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa
J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus
substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three [3]
psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2] psychiatrists, the
undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge
Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a
Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down,

Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
conducted by several mental health professionals which
were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were
in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon
City in 1998 brought about by him having failed the
examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report
dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A.
Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa GustiloVillasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation
(MPC), states in part:
_______________
108
Rollo, Vol. VIII, p. 216.

124
124

I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY
OF
INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE
SUMMARY
OF
CHARACTERISTICS
INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to

cope with everyday demands. He is able to handle both
concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details,
he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship
between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where
he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic) at concrete,
tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize
procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and
on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine
personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily
accept others ideas and contributions especially if these
oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is
expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his
emotions and does not let this get in the way of his
judgment and decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for
his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal
standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these
standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may
become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his
social stature and can be expected to comply with conventional
109
social demands.
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A.

Reyes opined on cross-examination that psychologically
speaking, Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on
his testimony here and on every available records of the
proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed
with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
_______________
109

125
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

125
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you

about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A Yes, Sir.
Q Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological
outlook of the patient?
A Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these]
proceedings and you were here when we were crossexamining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we
mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would
you consider his failure to tell you about his power of by
location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychol ogical outlook?
xxxx
A Yes, Sir.
Q Fatal [flaw]?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the
interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A He did not.
Q So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could
type letters?
A He did not.
xxxx
Q And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one
who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement
concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
xxxx
A Yes sir.
Q A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim
that he is capable of having trances in the course of his
private activities and even in the course of the
performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not
agree with that?
A I agree with you, Sir.
126
126

Q And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality

oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po
nakukuha naman na ako ay psychic, na ako ay
pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag
trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same
time. Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality
oriented?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit
as a Judge.
xxxx
Q I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
110
A Yes, Sir.
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior

Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center,
stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time
of the interview Judge Floro
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about
current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently
without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality
based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very
good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
111
disturbances.
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla,

M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed,
bespectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was
somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his
answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual
disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed.
There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or
defensive but there
_______________
110TSN, 6
111
March 2001, pp. 31-42.
127
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

127

were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and
appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is
intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical
functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of
Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and
112
appointment to the post he is seeking.
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge

Floros witness,113Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had
its limitations
and he might have missed
out certain
114
information left out by his patient.
The following
exchange is thus instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the
inter
view that he has little unseen, unheard friends known
as
duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to
you information about his claim to be the number five
psychic in the country?
xxxx
A No, Your Honor.
Q He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so
called, psychic phenomena?
A He did not.
xxxx
Q He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place
to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to
ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A Not during our interview.
xxxx
_______________
112Id.,
p. 363.
113TSN,
114Id.,
20 February 2002, p. 35.
p. 33.
128
128

A It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health

doctor you might have missed some information or it is
possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told
us everything.
Q And if your clients or patients did not tell you things
such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell
you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the
patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A The answer has something to do whether my evaluation
may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any
corroborative contradiction.
Q More so, if the presence of confirming events that
transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A The interview has its limitations.
Q Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during
the interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more
reason to have your evaluation altered?
A Yes.
Q Especially so if you will now know that after that
interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as
the number five psychic in the country [where] no one
has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q Would it be really more altered?
A I would say so.
xxxx
Q Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the
interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro
did not tell you during the interview, would your finding
of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you
that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation
of Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x?
A My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal
condition.
129
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
129

Q When you said abnormal something would have made
you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of
Judge Floro?
A Given the data.
Q We will give you the data or additional information.
Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on
recordJudge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he
is capable of typing a letter?
xxxx
A If there is data toward that effect prior to September
1998, probably drastically altered.115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented
the psychiatric evaluation of
116
Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D.,
dated 3 January 2001, the
relevant portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed.
Content of thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud
of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his
frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are
handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be
reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or
abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time,
place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making
capacity were adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on
December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic
achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a
gift of healing. He also talked about a covenant made during a
dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness
and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate
sufferings/pain from disease.
_______________
115TSN,
116
20 February 2001, pp. 25-43.
Psychiatrist connected with the Nio Jesus Clinic in Bulacan;
Rollo, Vol. VI, pp. 117-118.

130
130

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on

December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the following:
(1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3)
Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test
and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an
individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data,
showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is meticulous to details
and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is realityoriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in
his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard
to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was
found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is
not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded
nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in
making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is
culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr.

Maaba117 also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a
judge. The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and
Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is
wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed
with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim
to
be in two (2) places at one time.
Q And that something must be wrong?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with
a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in
this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is
another spirit, another person, another character
unseen
_______________
117TSN,
16 January 2001, p. 58.
131
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
131

who is with him at the same time or in tagalog sumapi
sa kanya.
xxxx
A The observation that Judge Floro had unseen
companion sumapi to me is unbelievable.
Q Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be
suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual
distortion, your Honor.
Q No, Delusion.
A Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A Both are on the same footing.
Q Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a
proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel
of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from
hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a
non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and
delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q Now, trance is something covered by the field of which
you are practicing with psychiatry.
A Yes.
Q Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he
was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually
considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound
syndrome and it could also be an indication . . . Basically
132
132

the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of

organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture
bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss
of concentration in a particular settings or situations so
that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would
[lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up
testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by
the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution,
so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting
as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge
Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and
he might not be able to rationalize or to control
expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of
a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A No, I have not encountered any.
Q And if you hear one and will be shown records of one
maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal
person.
A Maybe weird.
Q I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes
of the proceedings in these cases held on October 10,
2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the
question of Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness,
can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very
precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: Nakalakip
sila. I call it a trance, but I distinguished not
the trance that you see thenag-sa-Sto., Nino,
naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the
so called . . . Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi
awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind
projection. He is correct in a sense that those
nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind
projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a
change in the psychological aspect of the person.
But in my case I never was changed physically or
mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate
that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at
this very moment, Mr. witness, meron kayong
133
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
133

kalakip ngayon? Ngayong oras na ito? JUDGE
FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where
are they? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: They cannot be
seen but . . . ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?
To point to us where are they in this room?, Now
that you have read and seen this portion wherein Judge
Floro himself admitted that in the course of his
testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you
still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to
be a normal person?
A No.
Q No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these
proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of
stenographic notes later have claimed that he had,
always had and still had a socalled counter part, his
other side, other self, what can you say to that claim,
would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?
A No.
Q And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of
course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
118
A Yes.
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez,

reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba,
Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in
office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in
this case that President Estrada would not finish his term as
President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card
that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar
topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the
name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup
detat
_______________
118TSN, 16
January 2001, pp. 28-36.
134
134
134

attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic

powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is
improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other
judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say
that he is very successful over many other applicants for the
position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to
distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such selfserving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and
abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit
to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the
hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a
person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should
not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a
judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that
he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of
insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the
duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73,
respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED
119
from such office.
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot
remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental impairment
that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We
hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this
Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is insane
as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case
have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be

dismissed from the service due to insanity, he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a
general
_______________
119Rollo,
Vol. I, pp. 691-700.

135
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
135

laymans term, a catch-all word referring to various mental
disorders.
Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical
120
term as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of
the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998
and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and
symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding
to secure the
121
contentment and happiness of the people. An honorable,
competent and independent judiciary exists to administer
justice in order to promote the
stability of government, and
122
the well-being of the people. Carrying much of the weight
in this daunting task of administering justice are our front
liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in
whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and
institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in
their tasks if the judges presiding over them
are truly
123
honorable men, competent and independent.
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but
an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13
charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of
psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his
case indicate gross deficiency in competence and
independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes
in psychic visions, of foreseeing the future because of his
power in psychic phenomenon. He believes in duwendes
and of a covenant with his dwarf friends Luis, Armand and
Angel. He believes that he can write while on trance and
that he had been seen by several people to have been in two
places at the same time. He has likened himself to the
angel of death who
_______________
120See
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR), pp. 297-344 (Fourth Edition).

121Canon
1, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
122Preamble,
123
Code of Judicial Conduct.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, E.L. Pineda, p. 327 (1995 ed.).

136
136
136

can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he

perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He
took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching
only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that
Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot
on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge
Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his
break time. All these things validate the findings of the
Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon
beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief
system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro
acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no
place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law
and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in
resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to
psychic phenomena in the124decision he rendered in the case
of People v. Francisco, Jr. sticks out like a sore thumb. In
said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the
prosecutions principal witness by concluding125that the
testimony was a fairytale or a fantastic story. He then
went to state that psychic phenomena was destined to
cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the
testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge
Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL
witness (sole eyewitness of the incident)
NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of
inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor
points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several
indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception
of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief,
assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may
be admissi_______________
124Rollo,
125Id.,
Vol. I, pp. 49-61.
p. 7.
137
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
137
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
137

ble, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a
FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime
scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic
viewing. The following details, are proof of the
foregoing conclusion:
a) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and
Raul Ineria were sinalubong by Lando/accused on
June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley
Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the
nagpambuno between Raul and Ando, and that
HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO
LONGER THERE, but he still saw the
nagpambuno;
MORE
IMPORTANTLY,
he
SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P.
Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR
CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to
submit false testimony); for how could have he
witnessed the stabbing by accused when he
NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May
2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN
was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe
the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo
might have been SLEEPING during the testimony,
so that the word DAY should have been corrected to
another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY
TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the entire
NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no
reason that the seeming error DAY should be
corrected;
the
Courts
sole/remaining
conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC
NOTES
cooperated
by
PSYCHIC
PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in
having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY
INSCRIBED WITH THE126
WORDS FOLLOWING
DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, Id.); (Emphasis supplied)
127
In State Prosecutors v. Muro
we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An

independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific
disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit
limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include
_______________
126
Id., p. 56.
127
Supra note 66, pp. 482-483.
138
138

accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
128
procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial
129
necessity of order in the social life.
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity

and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be
desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he
has lapses in judgment and may have problems with decisionmaking. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
130
dispensing justice. x x x
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the

eight months that he served as RTC judge, indubitably
shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our
system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and
identified himself with large components of the judges role.
Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have
con_______________
128
Citing Yash Vyas, quoted in The Lawyers Review, Vol. VIII, 31 October
1994, No. 10.

129
Citing Justice B.N. Cardozo, quoted in The Lawyers Review, Id.
130
130
139
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
139

ducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one
who is said to have the judicial temperament. He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role demands. A
large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and
reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of
investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address,
and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most
unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a
thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in
131
part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge.
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more

than those expected of other public officials. Judges are seen
as guardians of the law and they must thus identify
themselves with the law
to an even greater degree than
132
legislators or executives.
As it has been said, [j]udges administer justice judicially,
i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and justice,
but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of
Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the
judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical
craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it
legislative 133
or not, which requires great ability and
objectivity.
We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in
speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient
objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline
and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are incontestable
and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are precisely
_______________
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
131
PUBLIC OPINION, David B. Truman, p. 484 (Ramdom House of Canada Ltd.,

1964).
132
Id.
133
The Art of Being a Judge by Leon R. Yankwich, HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES, edited by Glenn R. Winters, p. 4 (The American Judicature Society,

1975).
140
140
140

the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the

qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with . . .
judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment . . . must move within the limits of
accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the
134
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the

fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity
expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to
continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious
challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial
judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages
and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro
should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge.
However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this
case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative
to his application for judgeship. He went through the entire
gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the
JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to
having failed the psychological examinations given by the
SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded
by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric
evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from
the private sector and which were favorable to him.
Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than
honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge
Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental
and psy_______________
134
Id.
141
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
141

chological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had
been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes
that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other
requirements, persons of135proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence. It was only on 18 October 2000
when it promulgated JBC-009, the Rules of the Judicial
and Bar Council, that the JBC put down in writing
guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining
if one seeking such office meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses
qualities of mind
136
and heart expected of the Judiciary.
Rule 6 thereof
states:
SECTION 1. Good health.Good physical health and sound
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a
critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate
task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests.The applicant shall
submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the
Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or
psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very
well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist or
psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC
cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological
evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated
with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as
RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the
seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER,
JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the
penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven
years.
_______________
135CONSTITUTION,
136
Article VIII, Section 7.
WHEREAS clause, JBC-009.

142
142

Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to
promulgate rules concerning

pleading, practice and
137
procedure in all courts. The Constitution limits this power
through the admonition that such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify
138
substantive rights.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to
be followed in administrative cases against judges.
Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in
cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending
investigation. This is the state of things even after its
amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1
October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however,
is inherent in its power of administrative139supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
This power
consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courtsis hemmed
in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an
adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro
under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing
charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER
this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation,
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3)
SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper
office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.
_______________
137
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
138
Id.
139
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec 6.

143
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
143

Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro,
effective immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the
duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against
duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against

140
him.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge

Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of
the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the
Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the
investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as
amended, now states that (t)he investigating Justice or
Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90)
days from the date of its commencement 141
or within such
extension as the Supreme Court may grant and, (w)ithin
thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation,
the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the
Supreme Court a142report containing findings of fact and
recommendation.
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be
preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his
investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by
the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would
take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his
report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a
judge until such time that a final decision
is reached in the
143
administrative case against him or her. This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who
are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive
suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the
ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may
preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case
_______________
140
141
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 4, par. (b).
142
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 5.
143
Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of Judge Philbert I.
Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles City, A.M. No. 01-10-12-0, 29 March 2005.
144
144

especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity

in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield
the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be
caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It
is also intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the
privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a
judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast
government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as
the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
144
weapons against justice and oppression.
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive

suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual
investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer
period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the
most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself.
From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge
Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his
cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order
to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental
examination. Worse, what started out as single case against
him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated
into
145
one due to common questions of fact and law. All in all,
Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had
connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last
146
of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez.
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise
utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules on
_______________
144
Id.
145
Three are against Judge Floro while the seven are cases filed by
him.
146
These cases have since been dismissed per Resolution dated 14
February 2006 upon motion of Judge Floro himself.

145
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
145

preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We
have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde,
thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who
was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is
not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other

economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive
suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is
clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge
finds himself preventively suspended by the Court until further
orders.
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13
1/2 months, during which period he was not paid his salaries,
allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the
Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income.
He thus incurred several loans to provide for his familys basic
needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire
period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in
Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable
the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal
investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to
conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety
(90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence,
for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances
and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his
preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would
extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely
unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it
would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits
for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the
delay in the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon
being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive
suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes
without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It
must
146
146

be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed

the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place.
Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and
147
equitable grounds.
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that

Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at

the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court until
further orders or, as this case, for the duration of the
investigation. Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 1/2
months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire
excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy
of his brothers largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously,
these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we
held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days should
be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that,
as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension.
We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension
served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would
be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the
resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of
administrative cases against those he perceived connived to
oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the
investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More
importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent,
thus, using by anal_______________
147
Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of Judge
Philbert I. Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles City, supra note 143
(citations omitted).
147
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
147

ogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90
days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be
countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot
be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as
already discussed, contributed to the delay in the
investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde,
Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13
charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do
not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that

its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form,
the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
148
expressed by different courts.
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much

to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable
considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three years. This is because Judge
Floros separation from the service is not a penalty
as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is
imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity
due to a medically disabling condition of the mind
which renders him unfit, at least at present, to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable
under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give
him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it
would
_______________
148
Poso v. Judge Mijares, supra note 47, p. 324; pp. 515-516 (citations
omitted).
148
148

seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the
resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed
which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own
bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at
less than three years then the same would only be a
pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to
live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head
and with his hands bound as he could not practice his
profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case
against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro,
Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino
Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino

V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of
merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the
service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this
case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to
separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is
dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge h in A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge h is without
basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must
necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry
with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be
considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it
the
149
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
149

forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports,
considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental
impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to
disqualify him from re-entering government service for
positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The
reports contain statements/ findings in Judge Floros favor
that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they
deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros
assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with
minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets
as a result of self-discipline
149
and self-organization.
b. (I)mpressive academic achievements with no
drastic change in his personality and 150

level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice.
c. (C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness,
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena
. . . not detrimental to his role as a
151
lawyer.
d. Everyday situations can be comprehended and
dealt with in moderate proficiency . . . . His concern
for the details that make up a total field represents
152
his attempts at being systematic and cautious.
153
e. (E)quipped with analytical power.
_______________
149
See September 1995 Report of Dr. Cecilia Villegas, Dir. III, Chief,
SC Clinic; Rollo, Vol. VIII, p. 42.

150
See 25 June 1998 Report of Dr. Celeste Vista, Medical Officer IV
and psychiatrist of the Supreme Court Clinic; Id., p. 49.

151
Id., pp. 49-50.
152
See 2000 Report of Clinical Psychologist Francianina G. Sanchez,
Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Supreme Court Clinic; Id., p. 212.
153
Id.
150
150

Consequently,
while
Judge
Floro
may
be
dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive
nature of said position, he may still be successful in
other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well
be that Judge Floros current administrative and medical
problems are not totally of his making. He was duly
appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now,
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of
dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and
debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically
disabling condition.
Finally, 154
if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary
to genetics and/or adverse environmental factors (and,
unfortunately, such essential information is not available),
we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or
adverse environmentfactors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves
to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total

amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00)
PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his
functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him
SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him
unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective
immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
_______________
154
Judge Floro has admitted that he has a brother who is mildly
retarded.
151
VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006
151

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz
Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK
OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Judge Florentino V. Floro meted with P40,000.00 fine in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460; he is considered separated from
service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind
that tenders him unfit to discharge functions of his office;
but he is awarded back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years; and
complaints in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273RTC dismissed.
Notes.Judges are not only enjoined to regulate their

extrajudicial activities in order to minimize the risk of
conflict with their judicial duties but also prohibited them
from engaging in the private practice of law. (Doughlas vs.
Lopez, Jr., 325 SCRA 129 [2000])
It is not enough for judges to write their decision; it is
also important that they cause the immediate promulgation
thereof and make this fact known to all concerned. (Adriano
vs. Villanueva, 397 SCRA 627 [2003])
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the
part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination of the cause. (Madula vs. Santos, 410 SCRA
504 [2003])
o0o
152
152
Bellosillo vs. Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines
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*

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. March 31, 2006.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. March 31, 2006.

RE: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988. March 31, 2006.

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to

that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This is because[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court.

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the

292 US 216, 229, 78 L. ed. 1219, 1227, 54 S. Ct. 684.

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

investigation against him.

In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc

Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-15.

Id., pp. 87-89.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

plaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission

the custodian of the accused;

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

(m) For violation of Circular No. 13 dated 1 July 1987.

on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness

in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.

Guidelines in the Administration of Justice.

Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 114-141.

Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 428-432.

TSN, 21 March 2000.

Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 481-484.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2000. Judge Floros motion for reconsideration suffered

Id., pp. 499-517.

Id., pp. 499-517.

Rollo, Vol. II, p. 218.

Danilo Cuarto, TSN, 6 March 2001, pp. 48-57.

Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 691-700.

VOL. 486, MARCH 31, 2006

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr.

To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 9 January 2006:

On 7 December 1999, Judge Floro filed a complaint against Atty.

To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 09 January

to peddle, cook and serve food in front of the court.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated 09 January