RFID Systems and Security and Privacy Implications: Sanjay E. Sarma Stephen A. Weis Daniel W. Engels
RFID Systems and Security and Privacy Implications: Sanjay E. Sarma Stephen A. Weis Daniel W. Engels
Sanjay E. Sarma
Stephen A. Weis
Daniel W. Engels
Auto-ID Center
• International industry-sponsored
research center
• MIT, Cambridge University, and
University of Adelaide
• Design, develop, and deploy large-scale
field trials including RFID projects
Overview
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
• EPC System
• Security Benefits and Threats
• Future
Uses of Automatic-ID Systems
• Access control and security
• Tracking of products in Supply Chain
• Id of products at Point of Sale
• Cost of tag
• Cost of reader
• Ability to tolerate tags with enter and
leave during interrogation period
• Desire to count tags exactly as opposed
to sampling
• Range at which tags can be read
Regulations Effect
• US regulations on 13.56 MHz
bandwidth offer significantly less
bandwidth, so Aloha is more common
• 915 MHz bandwidth allows higher
bandwidth, so deterministic algorithms
are generally used
13.56 MHz Advantages
• Frequency band available worldwide as
an ISM frequency
• Up to 1 meter reading distance in
proximity / vicinity read
• Robust reader-to-tag communication
• Excellent immunity to environmental
noise and electrical interference
13.56 MHz Benefits
• Well-defined transponder interrogation
zones
• Minimal shielding effects from adjacent
objects and the human body
• Damping effects of water relatively
small, field penetrates dense materials
915 MHz Benefits
• Long range (from a few to several
meters, depending on regulatory
jurisdiction)
• High data rates
• Fast anti-collision and tags per second
read rate capabilities
The EPC System
• System that enables all objects to be
connected to the Internet by adding an
RFID tag to the object
• EPC
• ONS
• SAVANT
• Transponders
The EPC
• Electronic Product Code
• ID scheme designed to enable unique id
of all physical objects
• Only data stored on tag, since
information about object is stored on
network
• EPC acts like a pointer
The ONS
• Object Name Service
• Directory service that maps EPS to IP
• Based entirely on DNS
• At the IP address, data is stored in XML
and can be accessed via HTTP and
SOAP
The ONS
• Reduces power and memory
requirements on tag
• Transfer data communication to
backend network, saving wireless
bandwidth
• Makes system more robust
• Reduces size of microchip on tag
Savant
• System based on hierarchical control
and data management
• Provides automated control functionality
• Manages large volumes of data
• Acts as a gateway for the reader
network to the next higher level
Savant
• Transfers computationally intensive
functionality from tag to powered
system
• Any single point of failure has only local
effect
• Enables entire system to be scalable
since reader sub-systems are added
seamlessly
RFID Transponder
• Most numerous parts of system
• Most cost-sensitive part
• Protocols designed for 13.56 MHz and
915 MHz frequencies
• Implement a password-protected Self
Destruct command
RFID Security Benefits and
Threats
• Airline passenger and baggage tracking
made practical and less intrusive
• Authentication systems already in use
(key-less car entry)
• Non-contact and non-line-of-sight
• Promiscuity of tags
Previous Work
• Contact-less and constrained
computational resource similar to smart
cards
• Analysis of smart card security
concerns similar to RFID
• RFID especially susceptible to fault
induction and power analysis attacks
Security Goals
• Tags cannot compromise privacy of
holders
• Information should not be leaked to
unauthorized readers
• Should not be possible to build long-
term tracking associations
• Holders should be able to detect and
disable tags they carry
Security Goals
• Publicly available tag output should be
randomized
• Private tag contents should be
protected by access control and
encryption
• Spoofing tags or readers should be
difficult
Low-cost RFID Issues
• Inexpensive read-only tags are
promiscuous and allow automated
monitoring – privacy concern
• Neither tags nor readers are
authenticated – security concern
• Full implementation of privacy and
security is costly – cost concern
Possible solutions
• Erase unique serial numbers at point of
sale – tracking still possible by
associating “constellations” of tags
• Public key cryptography – too
expensive
• Shared key – if one tag is compromised,
entire batch is effected
Approach to RFID Protection
• Use one-way hash function on tag –
“meta-ID”
• When reader knows meta-ID, tag is
‘unlocked’ and readable
• After reader is finished, tag is locked
• Tag has self-destruct mechanism to use
if under attack
Future Research
• Development of low cost crypto
primitives – hash functions, random
number generators, etc.
• Low cost hardware implementation w/o
computational loss
• Adaptation of symmetric encryption and
public key algorithms from active tags
into passive tags
Future Research
• Developing protocols that make tags
resilient to power interruption and fault
induction.
• Power loss graceful recovery of tags
• Research on smart cards and other
embedded systems