Trusts

Invisible Snares

by Alfred Adask

As background for the following articles in this issue on “construc-

tive trusts,” note that I’ve explored the idea that government uses
trusts to bypass the Constitution for about five years. I’m not going to
try to republish all of insights and opinions I’ve previously presented on
this subject. If I did, I’d have to fill up this whole issue of Suspicions
without adding anything new. However, I will provide a brief summary of
my earlier “Trust Fever” series of articles:

T he essence of all trusts is divided title to property. To illustrate,

let’s suppose a man owns perfect title (also known as “lawful,”
“complete,” or “full” title) to a home and decides to create a trust to
shelter that home. He first grants or donates the “perfect” title to his
home into the trust. The home thus becomes trust property (also known
as the trust “corpus”).
The grantor then divides his “perfect” title to the home into its two
sub-components: legal title and equitable title. Each “sub-title” contains
a different set of rights. Legal title includes the rights of actual control
and disposal of trust property. Equitable title includes the right of pos-
session and use of trust property.
The difference between legal and equitable titles is similar to the differ-
ence in rights between a landlord and a tenant. The landlord owns the
house and has legal right of control and disposal (sale) of the house. The
tenant has the equitable right to live in, use, and “possess” the house.
Although the tenant lives in the house, he has no legal right to tear down
walls, or sell the property.
When an individual has “perfect” title to his house, he has both the
legal right of ownership and the equitable right of use. He has the right to
both control (own) and live in (use) his house. However, when he creates

50 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 a trust, he appoints one or more trustees to hold the legal title to his
home, and he appoints one or more beneficiaries to actually live on the
property. The trustees effectively manage the home; the beneficiaries get
to live in the home.
It’s a hard and fast rule that the trustees can’t enjoy the benefits of
the trust property, nor can beneficiaries exercise any real control (owner-
ship) over trust property. Whenever a single individual holds both the
legal title and equitable title to a trust property, the “sub-titles” are once
again unified into a single “perfect” title, the trust is said to be “executed”
and ceases to exist.

T rusts offer a number of advantages. First, trusts can provide for

beneficiaries who are too incompetent to provide for themselves.
For example, a wealthy father can create a trust that includes money or
property that’s to be used exclusively for the benefit of his minor children.
As beneficiaries, his children will get to use the father’s property (a house,
perhaps) or receive the profits from a business or investment—but they
don’t own legal title to the house or business and thus can’t foolishly sell
that property. The right of sale and actual control of the trust property is
left to the trustees. The advantage of this system is that if the father dies
when the children are young and foolish, he needn’t worry about his kids
selling the house for $1,000 to buy a new electric guitar or some drugs.
A second, and perhaps more important advantage of trusts, is that
they provide limited legal liability for trust property and/or trust members.
For example, suppose the kids who are beneficiaries of the mansion
left by their wealthy father, get drunk, and cause an automobile accident in
which several people are killed or injured. The survivors and heirs of the
victims may see the kids’ multi-million-dollar home and sue to gain owner-
ship of that property. But if the mansion is held in trust, their lawsuit will
be unsuccessful. As beneficiaries, the kids get to use the mansion, but
they don’t own it. As a result, you can no more sue the beneficiaries for
the property they use, than you can sue the owner of an apartment com-
plex when one of his tenants causes an automobile accident on the street.
Shielded by a network of trusts, it’s entirely possible to live like a king
and never have personal assets of more that $500 to your name. Sure,
people can still sue you. They can even win massive judgments against
you. But insofar as you lack legal title to property, you “own” nothing, and
therefore there’s nothing that can be taken from you. As a result, you can
be virtually litigation proof. Essentially, no one will waste money paying
lawyers to sue a beneficiary who has no more personal assets than a home-
less bum.
A few years ago, a former governor of a south-western state retired
from public office into a life of wealth and leisure. He promoted and per-
sonally guaranteed an investment scheme which failed. Based on his per-
sonal guarantee and presumed personal wealth, he was ultimately sued
by his investors for the millions of dollars they’d lost. On receipt of the
suit, the former governor’s lawyers replied that everything their client had
was in trust, his personal net worth was trivial, and they would therefore
not even bother to defend against the investors’ suit.

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51
 Even though the former governor lived like a king in a mansion, his
assets were all held in trust, he was a legal pauper and therefore beyond
the reach of lawsuit. If the investors wanted to waste even more of their
money paying their lawyers to sue the former governor, they were free to
do so, but they’d never collect a dime. Result? The former governor stayed
in his mansion and the investors’ suit was dropped. You can’t squeeze
blood out of a turnip—or a legitimate trust.
A third advantage is that trusts can be extremely secretive. The man
e w ary who places his mansion in trust for the benefit of his children has no obliga-
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52 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 ultimately flows from a title to that property. Even if you don’t personally
hold a title to that house or apartment, you are ultimately renting from
someone who does.
But it’s not only true that your rights to property flow from your title to
a property; it’s true that the kind of rights your receive depend on the kind
of title you hold. Virtually everyone assumes that there is only one kind of
title: the “perfect” or “complete” title that a grantor must possess to
create a trust.
That assumption is wrong. Remember how the essential feature of a
trust is division of perfect title into it’s two “sub-titles”—legal and equi-
table? With legal title, trustees receive one bundle of rights (ownership,
control, disposal). With equitable title, beneficiaries receive a different
bundle of rights (possession and use). These bundles are mutually exclu-
sive. By definition, being a trustee means you can have no equitable rights
in trust property. Likewise, beneficiaries, by definition, have no legal rights
to trust property.
This distinction between “kinds” of title becomes particularly impor-
tant when a beneficiary goes to court as a plaintiff. Although the plaintiff-
beneficiary may suppose his case will be heard in a court of law, he’ll be
wrong. The only purpose for a court of law is to determine legal rights. It
follows that if you don’t have legal title to the subject matter of a lawsuit,
you can’t have legal rights to that subject matter, and therefore, you have
no standing at law. Unless you have legal title to the subject matter of a
case, there is nothing for a court of law to decide.
As a result, beneficiaries can’t invoke a court of law (which only de-
cides legal rights) when they litigate. Instead, beneficiaries but must al-
ways invoke a court of equity wherein the judge rules strictly according to
his own alleged “conscience”. In equity, the judge is unbound by law and
the litigants are virtually helpless to resist almost any decision the judge
wishes to impose. If the judge doesn’t like the color of your eyes, your
political bias or your religious beliefs, he can rule against you. Beneficia-
ries have virtually no rights or recourse to defend themselves against judi-
cial bias or even overt oppression. Beneficiaries are always at the mercy
of the court.
Thus, from government’s point of view, degrading a Citizen to the status
of beneficiary essentially empowers government to treat the beneficiary as a
subject. As subjects, we are obligated to accept without question or constitu-
tional defense virtually any regulation the government wishes to impose.
In other instances, government also tricks us into accepting the role
of “trustee” relative to governmental or private trusts. If we unwittingly
accept that status of trustee, government can impose a virtually unlim-
ited list of “fiduciary duties” (like paying income tax) upon us. In the
capacity of trustee, we must accept whatever burdens and obligations
are placed upon us by the trust indenture (rules of the trust)—even if
those duties are seemingly unconstitutional.
Although you can’t be both trustee and beneficiary of the same trust,
you can simultaneously be a trustee of one trust and a beneficiary of
another. As a result, government will sometimes treat us as beneficiaries;
sometimes as trustees. In either case, our claim on unalienable Rights is

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

53
 compromised or implicitly denied. This denial is particularly frustrating,
mysterious, and seemingly inexplicable because not one man in 10,000
could even imagine that the government might surreptitiously impose these
trust relationships and legal personalities on us without our express knowl-
edge. But through these unexpected trust relationships, the government
and courts can “secretly” bypass the Constitution and deprive us of our
unalienable Rights based on the presumption that we “understood” and
voluntarily agreed to surrender those Rights when we became beneficiaries.
At first, the idea that government could use trusts to bypass the Con-
stitution and deprive us of rights or subject us to unexpected duties sounds
absurd. But trusts have several major attributes that make this kind of
covert oppression possible.

First, anyone—including government—can create a trust without

expressly using the words “trust,” “trustee,” “grant,” “grantor,”
“benefit,” “beneficiary” or any other
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I doubt that one person in one hundred can even understand what I
just wrote. Worse, I doubt that one person in 10,000 can recognize a
“trust relationship” whenever he happens to participate in one.
For example, suppose you borrow my pen. Insofar as I expect you to
return my pen, we have just entered into an unstated trust relationship
wherein I am the beneficiary (the one who trusts you will return my pen)
and you are the trustee (the one who temporarily controls the pen). Even
though neither of us used the words “trust,” “benefit” etc.—even though
you did not expressly agree to return my pen, I am trusting that you will
return my pen, you are trusted with control of my pen, and therefore, we
have a “simple” (unexpressed) trust relationship.
Creating trust relationships can be just that simple. As a result, it’s
easy for government to entangle folks in trust relationships (and thereby
compromise whatever rights they might normally expect to have) without
folks having any idea of what’s happening.
Further, few people realize that whenever the word “Application” is
used by an governmental agency, it typically means “Application for Ben-
efits”. For example, when you fill out an “Application” for a drivers license,
Social Security Card, or bank account, you are probably applying for a
“benefit” to be provided by a governmental trust. You can’t normally re-
ceive a “benefit” without being a “beneficiary”—and “beneficiaries” have
no legal rights. Thus, by voluntarily filling out an “application” you may
unwittingly forfeit your claim to any legal rights or standing at law relative
to the trust property.

54 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 I f you’d like to see an express trust agreement, read a software
license from Microsoft or any other major software provider. The
“license” identifies you as the “End-user”. Anytime you see the word “use”
or “user” beware of the possible presence of a trust relationship. In the
case of software, Microsoft makes it clear that you don’t own the software
product—you merely get to use it on one computer. But at all times real
ownership of the product remains with Microsoft; they own legal title to
the software. Your “license” merely gives you an equitable title (or inter-
est) to use their software.
If you don’t like your limited rights as a beneficiary, your only option is
to return the software (trust property). Otherwise, by continuing to “use”
the software (accepting the benefit) you have virtually no legal rights against
Microsoft. If the software crashes
your computer, destroys the data
base that runs yours business, or
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can bind you to a trust relationship,
a trust relationship and resulting diminished status can be impressed on
your life. When you filled out the “application,” you probably thought you’d
receive some free “benefits”. Silly you. What you didn’t know (and they
had no obligation to disclose) was that you’d pay for that beneficial “pot-
tage” with the surrender of your unalienable Rights. If you should ever
lodge a complaint against the trust or trustees, the courts will silently
presume that: 1) you recognized the trust relationship when you “applied”
to become a beneficiary, and 2) you knowingly and voluntarily surrendered
your unalienable and legal rights when you applied to become beneficiary.
Based on those silent presumptions, you will lose your case. Insofar
as the average person can’t even imagine that they could be seduced into
surrendering their unalienable Rights by filling out a mere “Application,”
they will never raise an effective defense in court against the imposition of
duties (or loss of rights) under an unseen governmental trust.
Do you see the potential power? Even though trusts are virtually
invisible to 98% of Americans; even though we have no training in trusts
during our grade school, high school or college education—we are expected
to “see” trust relationships whenever we encounter them. If we fail to see
those trust relationships, we will still be bound by their invisible chains.
But if you can’t “see” those invisible chains, how can you complain
about them to the court? If you don’t expressly complain about those
chains, the court will leave them in place (around your neck). Thus, through
trusts, you can be effectively enslaved without even knowing how that
enslavement occurred.

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

55
 S econd, unlike contractual relationships, there’s no requirement
for “full disclosure” when you create a trust and designate some-
one to be a beneficiary. The best illustration of this attribute is the fact
that I can create a trust and designate my six-year old daughter as benefi-
ciary. There is no requirement that I “fully disclose” the terms of the trust
to my beneficiary.
Why? Because, as a beneficiary, she is presumed incompetent and
unable to understand the operation of a trust. Similar presumptions allow
government to impose trusts on adult “beneficiaries” who are also deemed
“incompetent” to understand the relevant trust privileges and duties. There
is no more need to fully disclose trust rules and regulations to adult benefi-
ciaries than there is to fully disclose trust rules and regulations to chil-
dren.
Similarly, government can create a trust and designate you as a ben-
eficiary of that trust without expressly informing you of that fact. As a
result, whenever you relate to property of that governmental trust, you
will have no legal rights and will be treated as a mere beneficiary in a court
of equity.
Insofar as we are presumed to have accepted appointment as trust-
ees, we can also be bound by rules which have never been expressly
explained to us and even by arbitrary rules that, ordinarily, would be ex-
ceed the constitutional limits of government’s delegated powers. For ex-
ample, under the Constitution, government has no authority to penalize a
man who has not damaged another person’s body or property. However,
if that person enters into a trust relationship with government, govern-
ment can absolutely regulate and even punish that man’s acts whenever
they violate arbitrary trust rules—even if no other person or person’s prop-
erty has been damaged.
In sum, trusts can be created and imposed without express words,
without full (or any) disclosure, and without our express knowledge (in
secret). As a result, trusts can be used as invisible snares to trap all of
us into relationships and roles which compromise our rights as Citizens,
reduce us to the status of subjects, and impose unwanted duties. And
insofar as we are totally unaware of trusts and their strange powers, they
are virtually invisible to us, and thus virtually impossible for the vast ma-
jority of Americans to resist or escape.

56 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 Constructive trusts

At Arm’s Length

by Alfred Adask

Is there a device able to ward off unseen and unwanted trusts? A

magic amulet to wear around our necks to keep us safe from the “boogy-
trust”?
Probably not. If there is a way to effectively ward off disabling trusts,
it will probably depend on having sufficient personal knowledge of trusts
to recognize, avoid or at least expressly protest each relationship with a
governmental trust as they’re encountered.
Even so, there is a term defined in several editions of Black’s Law
Dictionary which seems to ward off constructive trusts much like garlic
wards off vampires: “at arm’s length”. The term is defined in Black’s 1st
Edition (1891) and 4th Edition (1968) as:

“Beyond the reach of personal influence or control. Parties

are said to deal ‘at arm’s length’ when each stands upon the strict
letter of his rights, and conducts the business in a formal manner,
without trusting to the other’s fairness or integrity, and without be-
ing subject to the other’s control or overmastering influence.”
[Emph. add.]

The classic definition of “beneficiary” is “one who trusts”. Therefore, if

one acts only “at arm’s length,” he would seem to do so “without trusting”
and, thus, couldn’t be a beneficiary.1
Black’s 7th Edition (1999) does not define the term “at arm’s length”.
Instead, it defines “arm’s-length” as an adjective that means:

“Of or relating to dealings between two parties who are not

related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly
equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship
<an arm’s-length transaction does not create fiduciary duties be-
tween the parties>. [Emph. add.]

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57
 The concepts of “confidential relationship” and “fiduciary duties” are
normally essential to trust relationships. Because these concepts are de-
nied by the definitions of “at arm’s length” (Black’s 1st and 4th), and
“arm’s-length” (Black’s 7th), both terms seem to implicitly deny the exist-
ence trust relationships.2
Black’s 7th defines “fiduciary relationships” as:

A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for

the benefit of the other on matters within the scope of the rela-
tionship. Fiduciary relationships—such as trustee-beneficiary,
guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client—require the
highest duty of care. Fiduciary relationships usu. arise in one of
four situations: (1) when one person places trust in the faithful
integrity of another, who as a result gains superiority or influence
over the first, (2) when one person assumes control and responsi-
bility over another, (3) when one person has a duty to act for or
give advice to another on matters falling within the scope of the
relationship, or (4) when there is a specific relationship that has
traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary duties, as with
a lawyer and client or a stockbroker and a customer.—Also term
fiduciary relation; confidential relationship. [emph. add.]

There’s a lot to be derived from that definition, but I want to explore

just two elements:
First, “fiduciary relationships” are not confined to the beneficiary-
trustee relationships of trusts. Instead, fiduciary relationships also in-
clude guardian-ward, agent-principal, attorney-client and possibly other
unnamed relationships. (Could these un-named fiducial relationship include
husband-wife, parent-child, em-
ployer-employee, business-cus-
Outlaws Legal Service tomer, doctor-patient and teacher-
student?)
All Rights Preserved This multitude fiduciary relation-
ships seem governed by principles
All Wrongs Revenged largely indistinguishable from those
governing trusts. I strongly suspect
Unconventional Law that most of these relationships—
although they carry alternative des-
ignations—may be varieties of
www.outlawslegal.com trusts.
Second, Black’s definition of “fi-
duciary relationships” uses the words “relation” and “relationship” eight
times. That emphasis on “relationships” may seem unremarkable, but as
you’ll read in the article “Legal Personality” (this issue), “relationships”
may be far more important than most of us have so far imagined.
For example, I’m beginning to wonder if our invisible, external “rela-
tionships” may have a legal existence of their own that’s separate and
apart from our individual existence. We know that the names “Alfred Adask”

58 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 and “ALFRED N. ADASK” signify two different legal entities. “Alfred” is a
natural man and creation of God; “ALFRED” is an artificial entity presum-
ably created by government. But what kind of artificial entity is “ALFRED”?
Is it a trust? A corporation? Both
answers have been advanced; so
far, neither has proven satisfactory.
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This notion is more complex than the diagram suggests, but as you’ll
read in a later article (“Legal Personalities”), the idea might not be as half-
baked as it first seems. If “ALFRED” is a legal personality that exists only
in the “space” between two persons having a “fiduciary relationship,” it
would imply that “ALFRED” can’t “exist” if the fiduciary relationship be-
tween “Alfred” and “Wendy” were denied. In other words, if Alfred and
Wendy entered into their mutual transactions “at arms length,” there’d be
no “relationship” between them, and ALFRED might not exist. Given that
virtually all of our lawsuits are denominated in ALFRED’s name, the non-
existence of that entity might cause the courts some inconvenience.

I ’m even starting to wonder if a “relationship” might not be the pri-

mary subject-matter of most lawsuits in equity.
Is it possible that the plaintiff isn’t the subject matter, the defendant
isn’t the subject matter; what one or the other party did or didn’t do isn’t
really the subject matter. Is it possible that, at bottom, the real subject
matter of most suits in equity is a presumed “trust relationship” between
the plaintiff and the defendant?

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

59
 This may be an important avenue of investigation since “subject mat-
ter jurisdiction” is so critical to court jurisdiction that it can be challenged
at any time—even long after a case has been decided. So, if a court’s
“subject matter jurisdiction” were based on an unstated but presumed
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the courts to achieve jurisdiction over unsuspecting defendants. Given
that the resulting “constructive trusts” are legal fictions, they are virtually
invisible to both unsuspecting litigants. But if you learned to “see” con-
structive trusts, the court’s system of “invisible snares” (trust relation-
ships) might be more easily challenged and denied. And if there’s no trust
relationship between a plaintiff and defendant, what basis remains for a
court’s jurisdiction in equity?

S o how can we use “at arm’s length” or “arm’s-length” to shield

our-selves from the obligations imposed by constructive trusts?
I’m not sure.
Perhaps we could post public notices in a newspaper declaring that,
unless we expressly declare otherwise, in order to preserve all of our
unalienable Rights, all of our transactions will be conducted strictly “at
arm’s length”. Alternatively, we might add an “at arm’s length” disclaimer
over each of our signatures or as codicils to all of our contracts to notify all
others that we won’t enter into an implied or presumed trust relation-
ships.
If we can devise an effective strategy to conduct all of our transac-

60 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 tions at “arm’s length,” we may be able to blunt or even eliminate the
jurisdiction of courts of equity. And if they can’t get at us in equity, that
may leave only courts of law—and I don’t think the courts want to deal
with our divorces, traffic fines and tax squabbles at law.
Why? Because courts of law determine just one thing: legal rights.
Legal rights flow from legal title, and in our brave new democracy, we have
virtually no legal titles, no legal rights, and thus no standing at law. As a
result, without an underlying presumed trust relationship, most lawsuits
might tend to “disappear”.

1 (If “at arm’s length” serves notice that you won’t act in the capacity
of a “subject,” it also seems to provide another shield against non-
constitutional governmental authority.)

2 However, the two definitions may differ in this regard: “at arm’s
length” seems to deny one’s status as a beneficiary (one who trusts), but
“arm’s-length” seems to deny one’s status as a trustee (one who is trusted
with “fiduciary duties”). I’m not convinced this distinction is real or
important. However, the possibility remains that we might need to
choose between the terms, depending on whether we wanted to refute
our status as a beneficiary or a as trustee in any presumed trust relation-
ship.

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Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

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 Constructive trusts

Plaintiff-beneficiaries
vs. Defendant-trustees?

by Alfred Adask

Every two weeks, I host a legal reform meetings here in Dallas. At a

recent meeting, I was exploring the meaning of “at arm’s length” when
all the sudden I began to realize something new about the way our
courts work. If that realization is (roughly) correct, it could be impor-
tant; perhaps even exciting.
What follows is, for the most part, a reply I sent by email to one of
the people at the meeting, Terry Farmer. He’d expressed his apprecia-
tion for learning about “at arm’s length,” but I countered that I was more
excited about the new “insight” we’d stumbled onto at the meeting.

Dear Terry,
The “at arms length” concept seems important, but it was small stuff
compared to the insight gained during the meeting on the operation of the
courts. What we did last night—by beginning to see how the plaintiff may
be assumed be the beneficiary of a assumed trust relationship with his de-
fendant—and how that assumption inevitably opens the door for the judge
to construe a constructive trust—may be a big step forward in under-
standing the “system”. If that insight wasn’t particularly clear to people
attending our meeting, it was a revelation for me.
If that insight is correct, I can now imagine that “adhesion contracts”
and “quasi-contracts” etc., aren’t “contracts” at all (there’s usually no
lawful consideration). Instead, those terms were merely used to mask the
fundamental assumption on which the courts act—that those documents
or other conduct by the parties are evidence that a trust relationship had
been created between the parties. Based on that assumed trust relation-

62 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 ship, the unsuspecting plaintiff is assumed to act in the legal personality of
a beneficiary and the unwitting defendant is assumed to appear in the ca-
pacity of a trustee. Although the court assumes the plaintiff and defen-
dant know they’re involved in a trust relationship, that assumption is never
expressed to either litigant. As a result, without the knowledge, under-
standing or intention of either party, the courts will assumptively (se-
cretly) resolve their issue as if it were an alleged violation of trust law—
even though no such trust relationship did, in fact, exist.
This hypothesis doesn’t explain everything that happens in court. For
example, criminal cases are probably not based on trust relationships
(but penal cases may be).
Nevertheless, in civil cases between “private” parties, I’m increas-
ingly confident that, in most instances, the court silently makes a series of
assumptions:
1) The first “great assumption” is that the plaintiff and defendant had
previously entered into a “implied” (not express) trust relationship;
2) Based on the assumed trust relationship, the court assumes it has
jurisdiction in equity;
3) The plaintiff appears in the court of equity as the assumed “benefi-
ciary” of the implied trust relationship and unwittingly implies that the
defendant holds the position of “trustee”;
4) The court of equity assumes in personam jurisdiction over the de-
fendant based on the defendant’s assumed status as trustee in the im-
plied trust relationship; and,
5) The plaintiff-beneficiary is assumed to be complaining that the de-
fendant-trustee has somehow breached his fiduciary obligations as trustee
in their implied trust relationship.
Note that every one of these assumptions is false.

I n essence, I’m wondering if our civil courts of equity operate

primarily through the imposition of constructive trusts upon unwitting
litigants. I.e., without either litigant’s knowledge, the courts assume both
litigants have previously entered into “implied” (unexpressed) trust rela-
tionships. What’s the basis of this assumed trust relationship? Perhaps
a debt in credit or an implied promise of performance.1
Based on the assumption that the parties had voluntarily entered into
a trust relationship, the court construes the plaintiff’s complaint to allege
that: 1) the defendant-trustee promised to perform (or refrain from per-
forming) some act, provide some service, or pay some money on behalf of
the plaintiff-beneficiary; 2) the plaintiff-beneficiary “trusted,” relied on and
“expected”2 the defendant-trustee to perform as promised; but 3) the
defendant-trustee violated his fiduciary duties by failing to perform as he
had originally (and implicitly) “promised” and/or received a benefit which
(under trust law) can only be conferred on a beneficiary. (Trustees receiv-
ing trust benefits are condemned for having received “unjust enrichment”.)
The court then issues a court order which may serve as an express
trust indenture to clarify the interests and duties of both parties to the
former “implied” (unexpressed) trust relationship. The plaintiff-beneficiary’s
trusting “expectations” are either confirmed, modified or denied; the

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

63
 trustee’s alleged fiduciary obligations are likewise clarified and specified.
The court’s “order” will compel the defendant to perform whatever fidu-
ciary obligations the court finds were “intended” by the parties when they
first entered into their “implied” trust relationship. Any “unjust enrich-
ment” received by the trustee-defendant will be ordered to be “disgorged”
and returned to the beneficiary-plaintiff or perhaps some other third-party
beneficiary.
Admittedly, this seems to be a pretty “far out” hypothesis. It is so
foreign to almost everyone’s understanding of our civil court system, that
it’s almost certainly mistaken. Even if I’m roughly correct, I’ve undoubt-
edly made some serious oversights or errors.
But even if it’s just roughly correct, it’s a blockbuster.

A s a defendant, how can you stop a case against you based on an

implied “trust relationship”? If my “constructive trust” theory is
roughly correct, I can imagine several possible strategies.

First, you might argue that the court’s “great assumption”—that there
was a trust relationship between you (the alleged defendant/trustee) and
the plaintiff-beneficiary)—was false.

T he The Nature of Money E.g., you might argue that the rela-
tionship was always conducted “at
re
Natu f by Alfred Adask
arms length” and therefore no trust
o Economist John Maynard Keynes warned
was created. Alternatively, you
might argue that a payment in real
ey
Mon
that, “not one man in a million” truly money (gold or silver coin) was in-
understands the nature of money or the
cluded in the transaction—or that
hidden, economic forces money can
invoke. For example, the kind of money the alleged debt was paid in full, the
we use (tender, legal tender, or full legal trust had therefore been “ex-
tender) determines our rights, our ecuted” and no trust relationship
standing at law (or equity), and whether remained for the judge to “con-
we and our children are bound for strue”.
ask freedom or bondage. If there’s no trust relationship,
ed Ad
by Alfr The Nature of Money illuminates the there’s probably no basis for hear-
mysteries and virtual sorcery of money, the
ing the case in equity. The plaintiff
unimagined power of bankers, and why—for over 4,000 years—the key
to enslaving others has been the use of debt-based currency. You can’t (by acting as a “beneficiary” at-
be free if you don’t understand the nature of money. tempts to invoke the court in eq-
uity rather than at law) has implic-
263 pages PDF format sent to your e-mail address 14.95 itly conceded that he has no legal
Order from the “Bookstore” at www.suspicions.info rights relative to the controversy
or www.antishyster.com—place a MC, Visa or AmEx order at with the plaintiff. If he had legal
972-418-8993—or send a check to Suspicions News Magazine, rights, he should’ve proceeded at
POB 540786 Dallas, Texas 75354-0786 The United States of America law .
So if the plaintiff has no legal
right relative to the controversy with the plaintiff, he can’t invoke a court of
law. And if there’s no trust relationship for the plaintiff to base a claim in
equity, how can the plaintiff sue?

Second, you might concede that a trust relationship did, in fact, exist

64 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 between you (the alleged defendant-trustee) and the plaintiff, but it was a
intended to be a different trust relationship (possibly biblical) from the secular
trust relationship the court attempted to construe. If the judge miscon-
strued your original but unexpressed intentions, he would’ve “construed”
the wrong trust, therefore his resultant court order (express trust inden-
ture) might be a nullity.
For example, suppose you’re tangled up in a divorce or custody battle
and your spouse appears in court as the beneficiary/plaintiff and you are
the assumed defendant/trustee. The judge will want to rule “in the best
interests” of the child according to a secular trust relationship based on
Birth Certificates, Social Security Accounts, and your Marriage License.
But what would happen if you defended yourself claiming that the only
trust you were aware of or knowingly entered was a “trust in God” wherein
the terms of the marriage, divorce, child custody, and support would be
spelled in your “trust indenture”—the Bible? Thus, despite the secular
“hooks” of Marriage License, Birth Certificate and social Security Accounts,
you might be able to mount a strong defense based on your 1st Amend-
ment Right of Freedom of Religion.
Of course, you’d probably have to refute, revoke or otherwise com-
promise the legal impact of the various secular “hooks”. For example,
when the court prepared to decide the case “in the best interests” of your
alleged child “MARYANN B. DOE” (an artificial entity) you might argue that
you’re a natural man and not parent to any alleged “child” who was, in fact,
an artificial entity. Instead, you might claim that your only daughter is the
flesh-and-blood offspring named “Maryann Doe” (a gift from God), and there-
fore your only “trust relationship” with that child is expressly described in
the faith (trust indenture) called the “Bible”.

Third, you might argue that although a trust relationship did in fact
exist between you and the plaintiff, the plaintiff-beneficiary was in breach
of that trust relationship and therefore lacked the “clean hands” required
to invoke a court of equity.
A classic illustration of the “clean hands” doctrine is seen in the story
of Jesus telling a crowd bent on stoning a sinful woman to death that “He
who is without sin, cast the first stone.” Since everyone in the crowd was
also guilty of sin, they lacked the “clean hands” required to act against
their fellow sinner.
Today, the “clean hands” doctrine simply says that a plaintiff may not
ask for equity if he hasn’t given equity. In other words, you can’t invoke a
court of equity to force your neighbor to return the lawn mower he bor-
rowed, if you are equally guilty of first refusing to return the neighbor’s
power saw which you borrowed.
So far as I know, the issue of “clean hands” is irrelevant at law. If you
invoke a court of law (not equity) and produce your legal title to the lawn
mower, the court of law will compel your neighbor to return your lawn mower
even if you are simultaneously guilty of refusing to return the neighbor’s
power saw, VCR and family car. If the neighbor wants his property back,
he can produce legal title to the missing property and invoke a court of
law, or (lacking legal title) he can invoke the court in equity—that’s his

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

65
 choice and his problem. But if you have legal title to the lawn mower, a
court of law will force the neighbor to return it—no if’s, and’s or but’s.
I’m intrigued by the application of the “clean hands” doctrince in mod-
ern family law (which appears to be litigated exclusively in equity). I.e.,
the plaintiff who initiates a divorce is arguably at fault for attempting to
destroy what was supposed to be a til-death-do-us-part relationship. By
filing for divorce, the plaintiff intentionally breaks his oath to God, violates
the marriage covenant, ignores his spouse’s “expectations,” and dam-
ages the other spouse, their children, and even society. These violations
would seem to be prima facie evidence that the plaintiff lacks the requisite
“clean hands” to initiate a divorce in equity. Therefore, the plaintiff should
ordinarily be forced to accept the painful and humiliating duty to, instead,
file for divorce at law—where it will be necessary to prove that other spouse
is the “bad guy” in no uncertain terms.
But what if the plaintiff is the “bad guy”? What if the plaintiff’s real
reason for divorce is not “irreconcilable differences” but rather that he
wants to run off to Florida with his secretary? Conventional divorce law
(not equity) would not allow the errant plaintiff to divorce his innocent
spouse unless the spouse agreed to “give him” a divorce. Plaintiffs might
have to “pay through the nose” to get that “agreement”. Moreover, it
might be almost impossible to secure a divorce agreement at law from a
spouse who 1) was innocent of any wrong-doing (adultery); and 2) wanted
to maintain the marriage no matter how unpleasant that marriage might be.
Historically, virtually all divorces were probably conducted only at law
where the plaintiff had to prove the defendant-spouse had violated the
marriage covenant—usually, by committing adultery. Adultery was not
only hard to prove, it was messy and destructive of personal lives and
reputations.
Today, I doubt that any divorces are conducted at law. Instead, mod-
ern divorces appear to be conducted in equity—even though the plaintiff
lacks the “clean hands” required to invoke equity jurisdiction.
How can I explain the apparent contradiction?
No-fault divorce.
Under this “new-and-improved” legal formula, your guilt as a plaintiff
and your spouse’s innocence as a defendant are irrelevant. It doesn’t
matter whether your spouse is a sinner or a saint. If you’re tired of the
marriage, you can bail out. Anyone who’s hot to run off to Florida with a
new boyfriend, girlfriend, whatever, is free to trot.
It occurs to me that the requirement for “clean hands” to invoke a
court of equity might explain why family law underwent “no-fault” divorce
revolution in the 1950s and 1960s. Prior to “no fault,” your personal
unhappiness with your spouse was insufficient reason to sanctify a divorce.
If you wanted a divorce you had to prove at law that your spouse had
seriously violated the marriage covenant. To prove your spouse had vio-
lated the marriage covenant, you’d have to produce evidence in a public
forum that was incredibly damning for your spouse and inevitably humiliat-
ing for yourself and even your children. (Do you really want to publicize all
the juicy details that surround your spouse’s sixteen affairs with members
of both sexes since you were married four years ago? Prob’ly not.) There-

66 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 fore, divorce lawyers justified “no fault” divorce as a means to avoid the
often shocking public revelations and brutal confrontations that had previ-
ously characterized divorce in courts of law.
However, I suspect real reason behind the “no fault” assumption may
have been to nullify the issue of “clean hands”. Despite divorce lawyers’
claims to the contrary, I suspect the “no fault” assumption was not in-
tended to spare plaintiffs the cost and unpleasantness of proving “fault”
on the part of their defendant-trustee spouses. Instead, the “no fault”
assumption may have applied equally (even primarily) to the plaintiff-ben-
eficiary and thereby allowed the plaintiff to proceed (invoke the court of
equity) on the assumption that the plaintiff (not the defendant) had “no
fault” and therefore had “clean hands” required to initiate the divorce in
equity.
In other words, the “no fault” assumption doesn’t ignore the defendant’s
marital transgressions, it ignores the plaintiff’s. (After all, it’s the plaintiff
who violates the til-death-do-we-part trust relationship by filing for a di-
vorce.) So, if the plaintiff is assumed to be “no fault,” she can initiate a
divorce in equity (where proof is
largely irrelevant), violate her vow
to God, damage her spouse, chil-
dren and society and—thanks to
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thanks to the “no fault” assumption,
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and constructive trusts, issues of
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Tracks include power-driven
Fourth, even if a implied trust Illuminati, and the the haunting
relationship between plaintiff and Rather Die Than Be Your Slave.
defendant is admitted, it might be
terminated without judicial action.
Insofar as the two parties could
create the trust relationship with-
out the government’s knowledge or
official sanction, it follows that the
parties could also terminate that To order, visit
trust relationship without govern-
ment intervention. As a defendant,
www.pokerface.com
you might officially and publicly re-
sign as trustee before the case is
heard. We see possible evidence of that strategy in public notices which
read something to the effect that “I, John Doe, am no longer responsible
for the debts of Jane Doe.” That public disclaimer would seem to termi-
nate any express or assumed trust relationship that had previously ex-
isted between Mr. Doe (assumed trustee) and his former wife (beneficiary).

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

67
 Fifth—less likely, but remotely possible—suppose the original “im-
plied” (unexpressed) trust relationship between the plaintiff and defen-
dant is successfully construed into a constructive trust and results in a
court-order (express trust indenture). The defendant-trustee might still
be able to simply decline (or resign from) his “appointment” as an “official”
trustee who is obligated to administer the constructive trust.
After all, according to the 13th Amendment, “Neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction.” Serving as a trustee appears to be a form of
unpaid “servitude” to the beneficiaries or the trust, or both. It therefore
seems unreasonable and unconstitutional to force a man to serve as a
trustee against his will. If you volunteer to be a trustee, fine. But “no
involuntary servitude” should mean that if you refuse to volunteer, you
can’t be forced to serve as trustee.
I’m only guessing, but I suspect the court assumes that each defen-
dant “volunteered” to be a trustee when he allegedly entered into the
implied trust relationship with the plaintiff-beneficiary. If so, technically,
the court isn’t “forcing” the defendant to serve as a trustee. Instead, the
court is merely 1) clarifying the fiduciary obligations (issuing a court or-
der) that defendant implicitly accepted when he “voluntarily” entered into
trust relationship with the plaintiff; and 2) forcing the defedant to perform
those agreed obligations.
Of course, given that you never knowingly entered into a trust rela-
tionship or knowingly agreed to serve as a trustee, the court’s “great
assumption” is a complete fiction and sham. As a defendant, you’re being
treated like a trustee without ever being expressly informed of the nature
of your assumed status.
Assuming this process is actually employed by our courts, it is dia-
bolically clever. After all, what defendant would think to complain about
“involuntary servitude” as a trustee, if he don’t even know he was as-
sumed to be a trustee in a trust that, in fact, doesn’t even exist . . . ?
If this deception really takes place, then the trick would be to “un-
volunteer” from your position as trustee. This “un-volunteering” might be
achieved by placing the plaintiff (as well as the court) on some sort of
official notice that 1) you never intended or agreed to enter into an trust
relationship; 2) you never voluntarily agreed to serve as a trustee for the
plaintiff-beneficiary; or 3) even if you did, you now officially resign from that
role as trustee. If that notice were provided by affidavit or publication in
local newspapers, I wonder how the court would subsequently “construe”
you into the role of trustee. I won’t say the court can’t entrap defendants
almost permanently in the role of trustee, but to do so publicly and ex-
pressly would inevitably “let the cat out of the bag” and therefore prob-
ably be avoided by most judges.

I f this “constructive trust” hypothesis is valid, the operation of our

entire system of civil law would be threatened by public understand-
ing that our courts routinely function through the imposition of trust rela-
tionships which are assumed, but do not, in fact, exist. After all, if valid,
this hypothesis is largely based on the fact that the public doesn’t have a

68 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 clue and is blind to the presence or danger of “invisible” trust relation-
ships. But—if the public began to recognize this “trick”—the whole sys-
tem of civil procedure might have to be revised.
Why? Because the system depends on public ignorance. If my hy-
pothesis is correct, the system can’t work on defendants who are bright
enough to understand trusts and trust relationships. Such people will
reject the court’s “great assumption” that an implied trust relationship
exists between the plaintiff and defendant. Without that assumption, court
of equity may not have jurisdiction to proceed.

P ossible applications this notion are springing up so fast in my

mind, that I’ve either made a very important perceptual break-
through or finally slipped far ‘round the bend. Although there’s a lot more
to be discovered, refined and understood, I believe the understanding
that plaintiffs may routinely appear in the role of beneficiary and defen-
dants appear in the role of trustee may be a major insight.
For example, suppose I’m correct and modern family law is primarily
based on the assumption that the parties—rather than being married in
the classic, spiritual sense—had merely entered into a godless, secular
trust relationship based on a ritual that merely masqueraded as a true
marriage (contract) in the traditional church. Suppose the children born
under this trust relationship were (under the doctrine of parens patriae)
assumed to be the property of the state, and the putative “parents” oc-
cupied positions of mere trustees (servants; baby-sitters) relative to “their”
children. Then, in the aftermath of the divorce, the court might rule “in the
best interests of” the children-beneficiaries, that one spouse-trustees (typi-
cally, Mom) had custody and the other spouse-trustee (typically, Dad)
would be “fired” from seeing his children but nevertheless remain respon-
sible for paying child support.
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This analysis implies that there
are two trust relationships in such FALSE ARREST ¨ FALSE IMPRISONMENT ¨ MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
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divorces. First, the plaintiff (usu-
ally Mom) appears as a beneficiary IF YOU HAVE A LEGITIMATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST A GOV-
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beneficiaries and both parents are
assumed to appear as trustees (relative to the kids). Now, the court
adjusts the duties of the two parent-trustees—typically by giving custody
to the Mom-trustee and the duty of paying bills to the Dad-trustee.
But what would happen if the Dad-trustee were able to revoke, re-
nounce or decline his “appointment” as trustee for the children? What if
Dad would only agree to be a “father” of his own natural children (as de-
fined and empowered by the Bible) but refused to act as a trustee to
oversee the welfare of children which the government claims to “own” un-

Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.antishyster.com

69
 der the doctrine of “parens patriae”? Dad’s refusal could be based on
both 1st Amendment freedom of religion and the 13th Amendment’s pro-
hibition against “involuntary servitude”. Could the court compel him to
involuntarily accept the duties of a secular trustee in violation of his reli-
gious faith? Could the court compel a non-trustee to pay child support for
a child which the state claims to “own” under the doctrine of “parens
patriae”? If the state owns the kids, if the state is the presumptive “fa-
ther,” then let the state support them.
What if the alleged Dad-trustee were able to challenge the court’s
“great assumption” that a secular trust had been created by the marriage
ceremony and that, instead, his marriage was a true, spiritual marriage
under God rather than mere state-licensed cohabitation? And what if the
alleged Dad-trustee were therefore able to prove that his relationship to
his former wife and/or flesh-and-blood children was not based on the secu-
lar trust that the court “construed” when it imposed child support? If the
court “construed” the wrong trust, the resulting court order (express trust
indenture) might have to be void.4

F inally, if my hypothesis seems too incredible to be believed, read

the definition of “fiduciary” in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.). That
definition includes the following description of one of modern applications
of that term to constructive trusts:

“Fiduciary is a vague term, and it has been pressed into ser-

vice for a number of ends . . . . My view is that the term ‘fiduciary’

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70 Suspicions News Magazine Volume 12 No. 1 www.suspicions.info

 is so vague that plaintiffs have been able to claim that fiduciary
obligations have been breached when in fact the particular defen-
dant was not a fiduciary stricto sensu but simply had withheld prop-
erty from the plaintiff in an unconscionable manner.” D.W.M Wa-
ters, The Constructive Trust 4 (1964)

Here, we see strong evidence that at least some lawsuits have been
interpreted by courts of equity as being based on the existence of fidu-
ciary relationships between the plaintiff and defendant which—“stricto
senso”—did not ever exist. Jurisdiction over the defendant was knowingly
achieved by means of a assumed “fiction”—a lie.
This false assumption seem to attach without the knowledge of either
the plaintiff (beneficiary) or defendant (trustee). Child-like, the litigants
proceed as if they were in a court of law wherein they had some legal
rights or constitutional defenses. Neither side understands that the court
is actually deciding their case in equity based on assumptions and prin-
ciples which are completely “invisible” to both litigants.
It’s undeniable that courts of equity achieve jurisdiction over some
plaintiffs and defendants through the application of assumed “fiduciary/
trust relationships” and resultant “constructive trusts”. This procedure is
demonstrated and confirmed in Snepp vs. United States (444 U.S. 507) . In
that 1980 case, the U.S. government (actually the C.I.A.) expressly claimed
to be a “beneficiary” of a constructive trust with a former C.I.A. employee
(Snepp). Under this assumed constructive trust, the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed that the C.I.A. could compel the former agent (defendant) to “dis-
gorge” money he’d earned selling a book about the C.I.A..
The Snepp case is particularly interesting because the C.I.A. admitted
that its former employee Snepp had signed a contract when he entered the
C.I.A. in 1968 that he wouldn’t write a book about the C.I.A. without the
C.I.A.’s approval, and signed another contract to the same effect when he
left the C.I.A. in 1976. Despite the existence of two apparently valid
contracts, the C.I.A. instead chose to sue Snepp based on the assumption
that Snepp and the C.I.A. had also entered into a “implied” (unexpressed)
trust relationship in which the C.I.A. occupied the role of beneficiary and
Snepp was assumed to be trustee. As beneficiary, the C.I.A. claimed it
was entitled to the profits of that trust relationship (the money Snepp had
earned from selling his book about the C.I.A.) because Snepp (the as-
sumed trustee) violated trust law by retaining the book profits (unjust
enrichment) that rightfully belonged to the beneficiary.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the C.I.A. and held:

“A former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, who

had agreed not to divulge classified information without authoriza-
tion and not to publish any information relating to the Agency with-
out prepublication clearance, breached a fiduciary obligation when
he published a book about certain Agency activities without sub-
mitting his manuscript for prepublication review. The proceeds of
his breach are impressed with a constructive trust for the benefit of
the Government.”

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71
 The Snepp vs. U.S. case proves that (at least on some occasions) the
courts have imposed the fiction of constructive trusts to compel perfor-
mance by defendants.
However, the Snepp case does not answer one critical question: How
often do the courts employ the “great assumption” of fiduciary relation-
ships to gain jurisdiction over defendants? Almost never? Occasionally?
Frequently? Or almost always?
I don’t know. But I’m finding increasing support for the conclusion that
most, perhaps all, of our civil lawsuits are based on assumed “trust rela-
tionships” and “promises” rather than actual, isolated acts or individual
rights.
If so, courts of equity are gaining jurisdiction over defendants—not
according to what an individual defendant did or didn’t do, per se—but
according to what the plaintiff “expected” the defendant to do. These
“great expectations” are based on the defendant’s unexpressed and, ar-
guably, unintended “promises”.
I suspect that the claims of plaintiff-beneficiaries are being interpreted
as without legal foundation (beneficiaries have no legal rights) but still nec-
essary to resolve—somewhat like the wailing of a spoiled child crying that
his playmate did something “unfair”. In a sense, the “parent-judge” sim-
ply acts to pacify the little brat-plaintiff by making the defendant give him
the ball or the bicycle or whatever toy the “kiddies” are arguing about.
When the defendant says “But, judge, that’s my ball!”—the judge, like any
other over-stressed parent, essentially shrieks “Just do it!”
But the entire process could only work if both litigants (especially the
defendant) are assumed to be without unalienable Rights. We already
know (or at least speculate) that the plaintiff is assumed to be a benefi-
ciary and is thus without legal rights. But that plaintiff-beneficiary’s “ex-
pectations” could only be enforced against the defendant if the defendant
were also assumed to appear in a legal personality based on a trust rela-
tionship which leaves him without meaningful rights—rather than as a “man”
who is “created equal and endowed by [his] Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights” which he sought to preserve by acting “at arm’s length” in all
his dealings with the plaintiff. The show could not go on, unless the defen-
dant were assumed to appear in a capacity that affords him no claim of
unalienable Rights against the plaintiff’s mere “expectations”.

H ow could that trust relationship be challenged? One way might

be to put the plaintiff (alleged beneficiary) on the stand and ask
him to testify about your “relationship” prior to the lawsuit. Given that the
unwitting plaintiff won’t understand his complaint is being construed as
evidence of a preexisting trust relationship, it shouldn’t be too hard to get
the plaintiff to testify that he doesn’t know what a trust is and never in-
tended to enter into one—especially if, by doing so, the plaintiff implicitly
forfeited many of his unalienable Rights. If both plaintiff and defendant
testified on the record that a trust relationship was not intended and there-
fore did not exist, the court may be unable to sustain its assumptions and
resultant constructive trust. No trust, no equity jurisdiction, no case?

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 Most importantly, I’m beginning to wonder if the assumed trust rela-
tionship provides the “subject matter” which gives the court “subject mat-
ter” jurisdiction in a particular case. It’s my understanding that subject
matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time—even long after a case
has been decided. If so, it seems remotely possible that a civil defendant
might retroactively nullify some court verdicts (trust indentures) by ex-
pressly denying the existence of the “great assumption” (a “implied” trust
relationship between the litigants) which provided the assumed subject
matter on which the court assumed jurisdiction and ultimately decided the
case.
The implications are large.

A gain, this conjecture seems pretty far-fetched. It can’t be as simple

as I imply. Although I’m convinced that trust relationships are a
principle means by which government extends unconstitutional powers
over us, I don’t believe it will be necessarily easy to deny or evade those
trust relationships. My theory (assuming it’s correct) is relatively simple.
But the application—the actual implementation through procedures the
courts of “this state” will recognize—may be fairly subtle.
Even so, the journey (or rabbit trail) of a thousand miles begins . . . .

1 Given that all legal tender is an I.O.U.—a promise to pay, rather than
an actual payment, it’s possible that any transaction involving Federal
Reserve Notes is automatically construed as a “trust relationship”.)

2 I’ve seen several cases where the courts talk about the litigant’s
“expectation of rights” rather than “rights”. By definition, beneficiaries
have no meaningful rights. Is the term “expectation” primarily applied to
persons who occupy status of beneficiary? If so, whenever a court talks
about your “expectations,” it may be signalling that it regards you as the
rightless beneficiary of a trust relationship.

3 She (the plaintiff-beneficiary) can probably even stick her husband

with her legal fees. Why? Perhaps because she appeared as a benefi-
ciary, and the duty of paying trust obligations (including the debts of the
beneficiary) falls on the defendant-trustee (usually the husband).

4I’m betting that one way or another, our duties to pay income tax,
have drivers licenses, and obey a host of laws and regulations that any
fool can see are unconstitutional are based on assumed trust relation-
ships between ourselves and the government. I’m further willing to bet
that those trust relationships must be “voluntary” (remember the “volun-
tary” income tax?). So if we learn how to “un-volunteer” as trustees (or
even beneficiaries) from these various trusts, we may be able to extract
ourselves from the equity jurisdiction of today’s civil courts. Once that’s
done, the only way government could easily attack us would be at law—for
criminal offenses wherein we intentionally damaged another person’s body
or property. Generally speaking, I believe gov-co is so reluctant (perhaps
incompetent) to prosecute people at law, that cases which can’t be
prosectued in equity may be routinely dropped.

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73
 Constructive trusts

Penal Offenses
by Alfred Adask

Although I’ve studied the legal system for years, I still don’t under-
stand the terms “criminal” and “penal”. The words seem similar, but not
synonymous. Their meanings are thus confused.
However, I suspect a key distinction between “penal” and “criminal”
can be inferred from the definition of “Criminaliter” in Bouviers Law Dictio-
nary (1856):

CRIMINALITER. Criminally; opposed to civiliter, civilly.

2. When a person commits a wrong to the injury of another, he
is answerable for it civiliter, whatever may have been his intent;
but, unless his intent has been unlawful, he is not answerable
criminaliter. [Emph. add.]

Note that it’s possible for a person to “commit a wrong to the injury of
another” by 1) accident or 2) intent. If the wrong is unintentional, we have
a civil offense. When the wrong is intentional, we have a crime.
For example, suppose a child darts out into a street and is hit and
killed by a passing car. If it can be shown that the driver hit the child by
accident, there may be a civil offense (which may be settled with insur-
ance). But if it can be shown that the motorist could have stopped or
swerved to avoid hitting the child, but instead chose to strike the child
intentionally, we have a crime. In both examples we have the same driver,
same car, same dead child. The only difference between a civil offense and
a crime is the absence or presence of the driver’s wrongful intent. Thus,
the “crime” is not the act of killing the child, it’s the intent to do so.
Given that the essence of any crime is the perpetrator’s “intent,” it
follows that only a natural, moral person (one who knows the difference
between right and wrong) is capable of committing a crime. Why? Be-
cause amoral entities (children, the insane, and artificial entities) can’t tell
the difference between right and wrong and are therefore incapable of form-
ing the requisite “intent” necessary to knowingly choose to commit a crime.
When these amoral entities “accidentally” or inadvertently commit a
wrong, they are subject to penalty—but not as criminals. Instead, they
are “penalized” in order to (hopefully) discipline them and perhaps “de-
ter”—inspire fear rather than impart moral knowledge—to other amoral
entities from committing similar offenses.

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 For example, when a child takes something that belongs to someone
else, we don’t indict the child for theft—we give him a smack on the butt to
teach him his first lesson in property rights. Similarly, when the account-
ing firm Arthur Anderson is found to have assisted its client Enron in shred-
ding truckloads of financial documents, the Arthur Anderson corporation
is penalized with a $500 million fine. However, the corporation is not pros-
ecuted criminally since corporations (although clearly capable of doing
wrong) are artificial entities incapable of forming the necessary intent to do
wrong. (Of course, officers of the errant corporation might be charged
criminally, but I suspect the corporation itself can only be “penalized”.)

Penal
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.) defines “penal” in part as:

“Of, relating to, or being a penalty or punishment, esp. for a crime.”

Note that while “penal” may apply “especially” to a crime, it need not
apply “exclusively” to a crime. That is, “penal” can be applied to offences
that are statutory and civil but not necessarily criminal. Thus, a penal
statute might impose the penalty of $10,000 fine, or punitive damages as
a “civil” penalty in addition to the criminal penalty of spending several
years in prison.

Black’s 7th continues to define “penal”:

“The general rule is that penal statutes are to be construed strictly.”

Note that a “general rule” implies specific exceptions. Thus, govern-

ment has power to deviate from that “general rule”. Also, in modern le-
galese, the word “construed” often implies the presence of a “construc-
tive trust”. Thus, “penal” sanctions may be a primary artefact of con-
structive trusts.
Black’s 7th continues with a “simple” 64-word sentence:

“By the word ‘penal’ in this connection is meant not only such
statutes as in terms impose a fine, or corporal punishment, or forfei-
ture as a consequence of violating laws, but also all acts which
impose by way of punishment, damages beyond compensation for
the benefit of the injured party, or which impose special burden, or
take away or impair any privilege or right.” [Emph. add.]

First, whatever “privilege or right” they’re “taking away” can’t be the

“unalienable Rights” that are given by God and thus beyond the lawful
capacity of any man or judge-god to arbitrarily remove.
However, no one—certainly not a beneficiary—can claim “unalienable
Rights” within the context of a trust other than that of God’s true church
(which is a spiritual faith rather than a secular trust). Thus, a court of equity
could have authority to “take away” the “equitable rights” of beneficiaries
and even “legal rights” of trustees. This power of penal authorities to take

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75
 away “rights” implies that the litigants are not appearing in the capacity of
independent “men” but may be appearing in the capacity of parties to a
trust.
Second, whenever I see an unusually long and hard to read sentence
in a legal document, I assume the author is trying to conceal rather than
communicate. So I tend to read the long sentences very closely. As a
result, I can find a host of implications in that single, 64-word sentence.
For example, Black’s definition of “penal” declares:

By the word ‘penal’ in this connection is meant not only such

statutes as in terms impose a fine, or corporal punishment, or forfei-
ture as a consequence of violating laws, but also all acts which
impose by way of punishment, damages beyond compensation for
the benefit of the injured party,

Thus, “penal” not only applies to punishments required by “statutes”

but also to “all acts” which impose a punishment beyond “the benefit of
the injured party”.
OK—who is the “injured party” in a court case? The plaintiff.
Since “statutes” imposing penalties are passed by the legislative
branch of government, what else might fit under the general heading “all
acts” that impose a punishment on errant defendant-trustees beyond the
“benefit” of the plaintiff-beneficiary?
How ‘bout the discretionary “acts” of a court committed without di-
rect requirement of law? And where can courts act without regard to law?
In equity. In fact, judges in courts of equity are specifically absolved from
the duty to obey the “law” (statutes) but are instead empowered to de-
cide cases based strictly on their alleged personal conscience.
Thus, a “person” can be penalized not only according to law (stat-
utes), but also according to “all acts” in the administration of trust rela-
tionships under the unbridled discretion of judges sitting in equity. Such
“penal” applications seem to expose all persons to the arbitrary authority
of the state courts of equity—i.e., rule by man, not law.
And what is a principle subject-matter jurisdiction for courts of eq-
uity? Trusts.
The implication that “penal” offenses may routinely apply to trust-based
relationships is supported by Black’s reference to “benefit” in the defini-
tion of “penal”. The term “benefit” generally signals the presence of a
“beneficiary” and, thus, the presence of a trust. This is consistent with
the observation that in constructive trusts, the plaintiff (whether he knows
it or not) appears in the capacity of a beneficiary who implicitly claims to
have been wronged by the defendant. The defendant (whether he knows it
or not) appears in the capacity of a trustee who is alleged guilty of violating
his fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff-beneficiary.
Again, none of this may sound particularly remarkable or relevant.
Big deal—trustees may be subject to “penal” laws. But who cares? Virtu-
ally no American ever signs up to be a trustee in a trust, right?
Yes—and No.
Look at the definition of “constructive trust” in Black’s 7th:

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 A trust imposed by a court on equitable grounds against one
who has obtained property by wrongdoing, thereby preventing
the wrongful holder from being unjustly enriched. Such a trust cre-
ates no fiduciary relationship. Also termed implied trust; involun-
tary trust; trust de son tort; trust ex delicto; trust ex maleficio; remedial
trust; trust in invitum. Cf. resulting trust. [Underline added.]

Since the terms “constructive trust” and “involuntary trust” are syn-
onymous, then defendants might challenge the constitutionality of such
constructive/involuntary trusts (and their resulting duties and liabilities)
as a violation of the 13th Amendment’s prohibition against “involuntary
servitude”.1
Black’s continues:

“A constructive trust is the formula through which the con-

science of equity finds expression. When property has been ac-
quired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity con-
verts him into trustee.” Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122
N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.)

Exactly. The defendant may be unknowingly “converted” into a “trustee”.

Black’s continues:

“It is sometimes said that when there are sufficient grounds

for imposing a constructive trust, the court ‘constructs a trust.’
The expression is, of course, absurd. The word ‘constructive’ is
derived from the verb ‘construe,’ not from the verb ‘construct.’ . . .
The court construes the circumstances in the sense that it ex-
plains or interprets them; it does not construct them.” 5 Austin W.
Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts Sect. 462.4 (4th ed.
1987). [emph. add.]

Here, Black’s makes clear that the court “construes” but does not
“construct” a trust. Thus, the court “interprets” the interests and duties
of the parties to a trust-relationship which is assumed to exist between
the parties before they enter the court. However, the court does not cre-
ate (“construct”) a brand new trust after the case has been initiated.
The assumption that the court “construes” an existing trust—rather
than “constructs” (creates) a brand new trust—absolves the court from
the duty of expressly informing the litigants of their “new” trust relation-
ships. Since the trust being “construed” is assumed to have been created
by the plaintiff and defendant, they are assumed to know about that trust
and need no further information on it’s creation or their respective roles.
Instead, since the litigants are assumed to know about the existence of
their trust relationship and their respective roles, the court’s only pur-
pose is to expressly clarify (construe) the duties and interests that are
assumed to attach to the assumed trust-relationship.

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77
 Given that the court “construes” rather than “constructs” (creates)
the trust relationship, the whole case (and perhaps even the court of equity’s
jurisdiction) seems to turn on the assumption that a pre-existing trust rela-
tionship did, in fact, exist. If that assumption can be expressly challenged
and shown to be false, there’d be nothing for the court of equity to “con-
strue” and the plaintiff’s case would be at least compromised and possi-
bly defeated. In other words, if the defendant denied the existence of a
trust relationship between himself and the plaintiff, the case might lack
subject matter to invoke a court of equity.

Black’s concludes the definition of “penal” with:

“The word penal connotes some form of punishment imposed

on an individual by the authority of the state. Where the primary
purpose of a statute is expressly enforceable by fine, imprison-
ment, or similar punishment the statute is always construed as
penal.” [Emph. add.]

The phrase “authority of the state” might be stretched to imply that

the penal authority did not ultimately trace to God. Technically, “crimes”
are committed against God’s law (thou shalt not murder, steal, lie, etc.).
Thus, “crimes” are ultimately enforced under God’s authority.
But when an offender is penalized by the authority of the state, it
seems possible that he’s been found guilty of an offence against the state,
rather than God. For example, God declared that “Thou shalt not steal,”
and thus made all theft a crime against the laws of God. However, The
Bible is silent on God’s opinion of driving without a drivers license. There-
fore, insofar as driving without a license (or without insurance, current
registration or fastened seatbelts) can’t be traced to God’s law, then those
offenses are against man’s law (the state) and might be “penal” rather
than criminal.
Also, note the use of the word “construed” in the last sentence of
Black’s definition (“Where the primary purpose of a statute is expressly
enforceable by fine, imprisonment, or similar punishment the statute is
always construed as penal.”). This isn’t proof, but it again implies that
modern “penal” sanctions may be applied through constructive trusts. This,
in turn, tends to support the hypothesis that we may routinely (but unwit-
tingly) appear in court as parties to assumed trust relationships that do
not, in fact, exist.
If so, defendants might gain a great deal might by successfully deny-
ing the existence of those assumed trust relationships.

1 Also, insofar as “resulting trust” is not listed as synonymous with

“constructive trust,” it might be advantageous for a defendant to con-
cede that a trust relationship exists, but declare that it’s a “resulting”
trust rather than a “constructive” trust. I haven’t looked into the issue,
but perhaps the defendant-trustees liabilities are lessened under that
“kind” of trust relationship.

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