Our Framework
Our Framework
Our Framework
AUGUST 2011
We cant solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them. Albert Einstein OUR FRAMEWORK
A framework is simply a method for processing information. In any endeavor, having a framework is important as it increases the likelihood of making better decisions. In financial markets, where information is not only constant, but also fast-moving, frameworks are vital. The framework we address below is instrumental to our current thinking, as well as in the construction of our secular themes. It serves as a guidepost for synthesizing incoming data, prioritizing our research agenda and anticipating policy responses. Importantly, it can often lead to views and positioning that are different from consensus. And because positioning directly affects performance, we believe its helpful for investors to fully understand our view. As discussed on many previous occasions, we believe the developed Western world is undergoing a process of deleveraging. In early 2008, at the onset of the crisis, this view was only considered to be a hypothesismeaning there was no verifiable evidence to support it. However, as we analyze the data over the past three years, we believe, at this juncture, the deleveraging theme is virtually irrefutable. Consider the following, all of which are key factors in distinguishing between normal cycles and deleveraging scenarios: The recovery since July 2009the declared end of the recessionhas been the weakest since 1921. In the first half of 2011, the US economy has grown at an annualized rate of 0.8%.1 By contrast, between World War II and 1990, postrecession recoveries averaged 6.8% annualized growth Bank credit has failed to expand and households continue to reduce debt Since the beginning of 2008, inflation-adjusted consumption has averaged just 0.5%, the slowest rate of growth in the postwar period All of this is of course despite a truly unprecedented fiscal and monetary response. Clearly something is awry. expansion, particularly in the household sector. However, in order to properly develop this theme, its helpful to quickly review the nature of credit, specifically focusing on why it is so important to officials, and secondly, why has it failed to increase. Over the past few decades credit has been used as a convenient expedient to economic growth, serving as a catalyst to household demand. Therefore, understanding credit cycles is critical in developing a view on future economic growth. Credit cycles can be bifurcated by orders of duration: short term (less than 10 years) and long-term (generally 50 75 years).2 Importantly, short-term cycles are heavily influenced by the actions of central banks. For example, by decreasing interest rates, central banks make additional levels of debt easier to carry. Also, lower interest rates usually have a positive effect on asset prices, which are often used as collateral. By contrast, as well see below, central banks have little control over long-term credit cycles. To appreciate the nature of credit, imagine two parallel worlds: one without credit, whereby all transactions must be settled with actual money; and another where credit is readily available, allowing transactions to occur on the promise to pay money at a later date. In a credit-less world, the only way citizens can increase their consumption is through an increase in income, and the only way to increase collective incomes is for production to increase. For this reason, kick-starting a credit-less economy is challenging, particularly if at the onset, productive capacity exceeds the true demand of the economy (e.g. the US today). Generally, only after the painful but necessary process of discarding the excess supply does the economy reach new heights of prosperity. By contrast, in the credit-abundant world, individuals can simply borrow to increase their current consumption, which in turn, increases the aggregateor totaldemand of the economy. As a by-product, production will typically increase to reflect the new, incremental demand, which, in turn, drives incomes higher. For at least a while, a virtuous cycle ensues. What is noteworthy, however, is that the economy is no longer hostage to production and income growth. A willingness to take on more debtvia a pledge of either assets or future incomeis all that is necessary to engineer consumption growth.
As a result, the economy has failed to reach the 2007 pre-crisis peak
For more, see A Template for Understanding What is Going On by Ray Dalio
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Source: Bloomberg
Prior to the crisis, the private sector in the United States embarked on a multi-decade leveraging cycle. The collapse of this credit bubble has severed the traditional link with monetary policy, rendering it largely impotent. Therefore, despite increasing dosages of untested measures, its unlikely the Federal Reserve will be able to engineer a new credit cycle. Again, what is occurring is perfectly rational. It is how individuals and economies adjust to fundamental reality. Conversely, although additional monetary stimulus is unlikely to reverse todays troubles, it can compound them. For instance, take the Federal Reserves questionable and intensely-debated decision to implement another round of quantitative easing in the fall of 2010 an action that had a notable impact on commodity prices. In the 12 months through July 22, wheat prices rose 16%, cattle and hog futures increased 21%, rice jumped 65% while sugar and corn futures skyrocketed, increasing 71% and 76%, respectively. These commodity price rises serve as an obvious and unavoidable tax on consumers, reducing income that could otherwise be directed towards debt repayment, consumption or savings. So if repairing balance sheets is a critical step to a sustainable recovery, QE2 was an impediment, not an accelerant. Not surprisingly, the economy has now slowed to levels that economists are euphemistically referring to as stall speed.
MISDIAGNOSIS
As with any ailment, a proper diagnosis is crucial to reaching a cure. Otherwise, the tendency is to simply treat symptoms. In policy parlance, this tendency is commonly referred to as kicking the can down the road, the conscious and abject refusal to accept and confront reality. Since the onset of the financial crisis, we have feared that policymakers were either misdiagnosing the situation or refusing to accept reality. Therefore, they have repeatedly resorted to measures addressing symptoms, rather than the underlying structural problems. As a result, policymakers have wasted precious time and resources, arguably increasing the fragility of the system in the process. To be clear, this is true globally, not just in the US. For instance, in Europe, by failing to adequately address the insolvency of many of
On the other side of the coin, banks are struggling with existing loans. And because of the uncertain inflation outlook, they have difficulty in projecting whether new loans will be repaid with a real return that is sufficient to compensate for the credit risk undertaken. Compounding these problems is the uncertainty surrounding regulatory changes, which will affect bank capital requirements going forward. Therefore, its clear that borrowing and lending is a good deal for neither (i.e. borrowers nor lenders)hence the lack of bank credit expansion since 2008.
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Needless to say, understanding them is crucial in order to anticipate policy actions. Of the three, Keynesianismoriginating from John Maynard Keynesis perhaps the most well-known. According to Hoisington, disciples of this theory believe that economic contractions are caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand (or total spending). To address this problem, policymakers resort to deficit, or stimulus, spending. Keynesian responses are not unfamiliar to Americans. Over the years, and upon every cyclical downturn, these knee-jerk responses have increased in both frequency and magnitude. In response to the most recent recession, government spending in the previous three years was $2.2 trillion more than the three years ending 2008. For this sum, we have bought ourselves anemic growth and witnessed the first downgrade of our nations credit rating, an embarrassing symbol of gross fiscal mismanagement. With the explicit focus on aggregate demand, a Keynesian response in the midst of a deleveraging scenario directs attention to the symptoms, rather than the over-arching structural problem. In essence, it confuses cause and effect. The Friedmanite view, derived from the economist Milton Friedman, and the theory that our current Federal Reserve Chairman subscribes to is that protracted economic slumps are also caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand, but are preventable or ameliorated by increasing the money stock. Again, this is also a response we should recognize. Since September 2008 the monetary base in the United States has risen by 216%, from $850 billion to nearly $2.7 trillion. Despite this parabolic expansion, demandor consumptionremains uncharacteristically weak as the household sector continues to delever. Neither the Keynesian nor Friedmanite response has been the panacea Americans were promised. This did not surprise Hoisington, who believes both responses are flawed because both economic theories are consistent with the widely-held view that the economy experiences three to seven years of growth, followed by one to two years of decline. The slumps are worrisome, but not too daunting since two years lapse fairly quickly and then the economy is off to the races again. This normal business cycle framework has been the standard since World War II until now. In other words, the two theories may be effective in dealing with recessions resulting from short-term credit cycles, but as we have now witnessed, Keynesian and Friedmanite responses are ineffective in reversing deleveraging scenarios, which are by-products of long-term credit cycles. By contrast, the Fisherian theory, derived from the Great Depression-era economist Irving Fisher, states that an excessive buildup of debt relative to GDP is the key factor in causing major contractions, as opposed to the typical business cycle slumps. The authors continue: Only a time-consuming and difficult process of deleveraging corrects this economic circumstance. Symptoms of the excessive indebtedness are: weakness in aggregate demand; slow
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January 1, 2000 August 10, 2011 1,469 6.44% 101.87 $ $ $ 25.60 288 204.50 64% $ 52,388 130,572 141.7 4.0% 7.1% $ 5,776,091 $ 25,388,850 14.9% $ $ $ $ 668,906 154,680 8,250 7,322 48,960 $ $ $ $ 1,120 2.09% 74.74 105.68 1,805 688.50 58% 49,777 131,017 59.5 9.1% 16.1% $ 14,343,088 $ 52,603,830 20.4% $ 2,867,416 $ 3,197,490 $ $ 19,393 16,140 71,685
% Change -24% -68% -27% 313% 527% 237% -10% -5% 0% -58% 128% 127% 148% 107% 37% 329% 1967% 135% 120% 46%
As you can imagine, these theories are described as competing because they lead to drastically different policy responses.
3
Italy has more outstanding government debt than Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain combined
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