VW Porsche Case Study Final
VW Porsche Case Study Final
VW Porsche Case Study Final
- Corporate Finance Case study: Mergers & Acquisitions of listed companies by Joachim Hcker
VW: Market cap: 16 bn Book value: 24 bn Cash and cash equivalent: q 8 bn (+4 bn marketable securities)
Porsche: Market cap: 11 bn B k value: Book l 3 4 bn 3.4 b Cash and cash equivalent: 3.6 bn
1. Basic understanding: 1 How did the small fish try to eat the big fish - the takeover process! 2. Question 1: What does Porsche need to clarify in order to successfully attack the big fish? 3. Q Question 2: How can Porsche make sure that nobody realizes that the small fish is about to eat the big fish? 4. Question 3: How can Porsche finance the attack?
bn
bn
CAGR of f 10,2% ,
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Porsche was the biggest principal shareholder, followed by the Federal State of Lower Saxony. Through options, Porsche was able to increase its interest to more than 20%, thus obtaining a blocking minority status
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Phase 1: What was the Investor Reaction to Porsches entry into VW?
VW ordinary y share, ,p price movement from 12th Sep. p 2005 30th Sep. p 2005
Phase 1: What was the Investor Reaction to Porsches entry into VW?
Trading g volume of ordinary y VW shares, , 12th Sep. p 2005 30th Sep. p 2005
The trend line shows above average trading in VW securities from September 21st through g this period, p , Porsche seemed to have acquired q VW ordinary y shares, , thus 27th. During increasing demand .
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Phase 1: What was the Investor Reaction to Porsches entry into VW?
Price movement of Porsche from 12th Sep. p 2005 30th Sep. p 2005
Porsche shareholders were sceptical about the companys press release. In fact, after the ad h announcement, hoc t P Porsches h share h price i d dropped d 10 10.4%. 4%
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Phase 1: What was the Investor Reaction to Porsches entry into VW?
Traded volume of Porsche share from 12th Sep. p 2005 30th Sep. p 2005
The first trading day after Porsches announcement of its minority interest in VW, trade volume rose. Accordingly, the falling price of the shares indicate that many investors sold their Porsche stock soon after the companys announcement.
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Phase 1: Porsche might acquire VW: What are the threats and caveats
SWOT analysis, y , Porsche takes over VW
The pronounced discrepancy between the going rate and the actual market value (offer below market k t value) l ) resulted lt d in i a 0.06% 0 06% acceptance t rate. t
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On October 28th 2008 short sellers reacted with panic buys when Porsches stated that it held 42.6% VW common stock plus 31.5% cash-settled call options in bonds; and as a result, drove prices up (taking into account Lower Saxonys major share, the free float diminished to 5.9%).
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Shortly before Porsches entry, the trading volume of VW common stock rose sharply. Likely, in addition to investors, banks that had concluded option contracts with Porsche purchased VW securities in order to reduce risk, p , further f driving g up p demand.
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The VW stock Th k - intrinsic i i i l lack k of f di diversification ifi i because b the h majority j i of f the h stock k is i in i the h hands of three major shareholders. Moreover, the stock is market-dependent, because the three major shareholders dont actively ti l trade t d in i the th market; k t and d have h instead i t d made d long-term l t investments. i t t
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Decline D li in i trade d volume, l ongoing i since i November N b 2008 of f VW shares. h Th The tradability d bili of f the h stock has decreased. This puts the stock at risk of private shareholders, who favour shortterm investments. The risk remains that the stock will not immediately re-sell. The d decreasing i demand d d will ill lower l the th price i further. f th
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Phase 14 Summary: How and why did the VW share price increase?
November 2006 Porsche raised its VW share to 27 27.4%. 4% The price of VW common stock was at 82.25 euro, and had nearly doubled in a year. From October to November 2006, the trade volume increased by 206%. January March 2007 The tradng volume showed another enormous increase (251%) from January to March. By March, VW stock was at 112.50 euro. After Porsche increased its share to above 30%, media reports that indicated an imminent acquisition of VW were published. published Accordingly, over the next months, share prices were driven even higher. October 2007 VW stock held at 197.90 euro, , corresponding p g with a 387% increase in three y years. In the following months, the rate slipped to 150 euro; possibly because of the ECJs dismissal of VW law. March 2008 Porsche published a press release, according to which the supervisory board agreed to a majority share in VW. Then, VW common stock increased again, this time exceeding the 200 euro mark in the months that followed.
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Phase 14 Summary: How and why did the VW share price increase?
October O b 2008 The Th financial fi i l crisis i i reached h d the h German G market, k VW stock k was resistant, i initially, i i i ll and on October 28th 2008, worth more than 1,000 Euro. Short sellers reacted with panic buys when Porsches stated that it held 42.6% VW common stock plus 31.5% cash-settled call options in b d and bonds; d as a result, lt drove d prices i up. And A d taking t ki into i t account t Lower L Saxonys S major j share, h diversified holdings diminished to 5.9%. November 2008 Porsche triggered 5% of its call options based on cash settlement settlement. The VW rate normalized, but the stock was still overvalued. January 2009 Porsche attained a 50.76% 50 76% majority share, share and the rate of VW VWs s shares levelled off above 200 Euro. By May 2009, it was finally clear that Porsche could not stem the takeover. August 2009 Qatar entered into VW, as its third major shareholder.
2. Question 1: What does Porsche need to clarify in order to 2 successfully attack the big fish?
Answers to Question 1: 1: Constant improvement in terms of profitability and liquidity of business operations 2: The complete abolition of VW law 3: Financial assistance from the banks in the form of credits
The economic crisis hit all global automotive companies. Also Porsche could sell l cars. In less I response to t dwindling d i dli sales l figures, fi Porsche P h had h d to t curb b its it production. d ti
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Porsche succeeded in quadrupling its profit, due to the 6.8 billion euro profit generated t d through th h VW option ti sharing h i
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1) Profitability: Profits from the cash-settled options depended upon an increasing VW share price. 2) Liquidity: Further, in addition to the sales slump, net liquidity decreased by nine billion euro, when Porsche rushed to purchase enough VW stock to increase its holding form 30% to 50%. As it turned out, Porsche was unable to fund the acquisition through its own means.
The operating p gp profitability f y and liquidity q y was not constant but declining g
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The controlling stake remained at 20%, and Lower Saxony retained its right to veto. P Porsche h was prevented t d from f signing i i a domination d i ti agreement t and d a profit fit transfer t f agreement. t
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1) Economic crisis changed lending: Under normal circumstances, the banks would have supplied Porsche with the necessary capital. But the new credit climate following the global economic crisis necessitated new lending standards, which Porsche certainly felt during its 10 billion euro (originally 30bn euro) refinance in spring, 2009. 2) Mr. M Hrter H t tried t i d to t outsmart t t the th banks: b k Porsches P h b behaviour h i d during i the th reorganization i ti of its credit terms factored in to the banks decision making. Porsche failed to utilize the credit extended to it in March 2008, to expand its stake in VW, as was originally proposed. Instead, Porsche invested the loan loan, for a high return; effectively generating capital that Porsche would apply to its interest payments.
3. Question 2: How can Porsche make sure that nobody realizes that 3 the small fish is about to eat the big fish
Answers to Question 2: 1: Edging towards the 30% mark 2: Submitting a low tender offer 3: Using options (does not need to be reported to the BaFin)
Porsche tried to p play y the good g guy g y as long g as they y were below the threshold of f 30%
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The pronounced discrepancy between the going rate and the actual market value (offer below market k t value) l ) resulted lt d in i a 0.06% 0 06% acceptance t rate. t
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Until the beginning of 2007, it was not necessary to report call options with redemptive rights to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) even if the investors holdings met or exceeded the registration threshold. threshold
The current ratio shows that one quarter of Porsches then-current assets was enough to cover its it short-term h tt obligations. bli ti Moreover, M its it 3.77 3 77 billion billi euro debt d bt load l d was sufficiently ffi i tl covered by the positions cash, marketable securities, and trade receivables, which added up to 3.87 billion euro: Porsche was de facto completely debt-free.
Profitability: Porsches Net Profit Margin was above-average with an outstanding cost structure. Here again, Porsche outperformed the other manufacturers. While BMW booked a 5 cent per euro profit margin and Daimler-Chrysler, 1.74%, VWs performance lagged at 0 8% 0.8%. Liquidity: Acquiring 18.5% of VW shares, plus 3.4% of its call options cost Porsche approximately 3 3.3 3 billion euro - the shares were basically financed with operating liquidity liquidity.
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In February 2008, Porsche completely exhausted its ten billion euro loan, taken out in early l 2007. 2007 Th The syndicate di t i included l d d 15 b banks k ( (earlier: li 30 b banks) k ) and d was h headed d db by th the financial institution Barclays. The credit line, granted with very favorable terms, was originally earmarked to cover the payment from the original mandatory offer for the remaining VW shares. shares
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Strike price
Strike
Porsche held various options on VW shares (underlying) with a contractually determined strike price, divided into three types: yp Type 1 - Long Call 1 Porsche bought call options, which were designed for the delivery of shares, with a strike price that was in line with the shares current market price. Type 2 - Long Call 2 Porsche bought highly speculative call options, which were designed for cash compensation, with a strike price that significantly exceeded the shares current market price. Type 3 - Short S Put Porsche sold put options on VW shares to the banks. For the banks, these were protective put options used to safeguard against the effects of any decrease in VW share price.
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Porsche starts making profit when the VW shares exceed 140. Especially, if the shares are listed at 1,000 level!
-10 -15
85 (70 + 15)
Porsche starts making profit when the VW shares exceed 162,5 (+32,5- 37,5 + 5). Especially, if the shares are listed at 1,000 level!
For a moment, VWs market capitalization reached 295 billion euro. VW was the worlds most valuable company even outperforming Exxon Mobil.
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