Chapter 6

The Failure of Security Sector Reform to Advance Development Objectives in East Timor and the Solomon Islands
Derek McDougall

Introduction This chapter focuses on security sector reform (SSR) in East Timor and the Solomon Islands with a view to determining how such reform affects development in these countries. Since the 1990s SSR has become a significant issue in many developing countries, particularly in post-conflict situations. It is important to assess SSR not just in terms of changes occurring in the security sector, but also from the perspective of the impact on the wider society. It is possible to conduct such an assessment at a global or regional level, but also in relation to particular situations where SSR has taken place. Here the focus is on East Timor and the Solomon Islands as two post-conflict situations where SSR has been relevant. The aim is to assess the extent to which SSR has occurred in each situation, showing in turn how such change and the limitations associated with change have affected development. For the purposes of this assessment, the security sector refers to the military, police and the wider justice system, encompassing not just the organisations themselves but also the relevant aspects of the executive government and the legislative system (all located within the polity and society as a whole). In the Solomon Islands there is no official military force, hence the assessment of the security sector in that country relates primarily to the police and justice systems. In this chapter, development refers to the way in which human well-being is improved in any given situation. Given the broad nature of the concept, more specific areas of analysis have emerged, such as economic development, political development, social development and cultural development; another area of focus is international development, encompassing the international aspects of these more specific

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areas.1 Of course, these specific areas are still quite broad. However, for each area, and for development as a whole, there have been many debates and much research, all giving expression to the quest for improvements in human well-being in some form. At an official level we also have expressions of this quest in such measures as the Human Development Index of the UN Development Programme and objectives such as the UN Millennium Development Goals. This chapter adopts a comprehensive approach to development in the context of the security-development nexus: any aspect of development as outlined here that is affected by the situation in the security sector is relevant. East Timor and the Solomon Islands are both suitable as case studies for assessing the impact of SSR on development because they are polities where issues relating to the security sector have been central in the breakdown of order at particular times. Of course many polities have had such experiences, and I do not claim that East Timor and the Solomon Islands are unique. However, they are situations that I have studied, and both conflicts have received significant attention in Australia where I reside. Australia has played the leading role in external involvement in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and has been a significant influence on SSR in both situations. The impact of SSR on development and hence on longterm security is very relevant to Australian policy towards these countries. If Australian governments wish to achieve security in its neighbouring region, some measure of development in the various Southwest Pacific island states and East Timor is imperative; one component of development in this context is the way in which it is affected by SSR. In both East Timor and the Solomon Islands changes relating to the security sector have been difficult, but particularly so in the former case. Given the centrality of the security sector in the two countries, these difficulties in turn have a negative impact on the wider societies, undermining prospects for achieving development. While it is important to understand the particularities of the two case studies, East Timor and the Solomon Islands can also be taken as good examples of the way in which security relates to development, i.e. the security-development nexus. The situation of the security sector is not the only factor affecting development, but it is a very important one. Approaching SSR from the perspective of how it affects the wider society can result in a positive contribution to development in each context. It is thus important to assess clearly both the advances and the obstacles relating to SSR in any given situation, with particular reference to its impact on development. An important point to emerge in this study is that the attempts to reform security institutions in

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East Timor have frequently focused on the institutions alone, without sufficient reference to the security sector as a whole (particularly through security governance) and with little reference to the implications for development. In the Solomon Islands there has been relatively greater emphasis on overall coordination, but the security institutions are also less important than in East Timor. In both situations the security-development link has not received a high level of explicit attention. This situation can be attributed to the failure of the key political actors in the two situations to appreciate sufficiently the importance of the link between SSR and development. At one level this has been a failure on the part of the respective governments, attributable to internal divisions and more pressing political preoccupations. At another level external actors, particularly the United Nations in East Timor and Australia in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands, have given insufficient attention to the SSR-development linkage; and even where these actors have given some attention to the linkage and have some influence, their ability to effect change is circumscribed by local factors. After briefly reviewing SSR and the security-development nexus as general issues, this chapter proceeds to an analysis of SSR in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. This is followed by an assessment of the impact of SSR on development in the two situations. To understand this impact it is important in the first instance to understand what has been attempted in the way of SSR; this includes whether or not a specifically SSR approach has been adopted in the course of reforming security institutions. The conclusion highlights the current state of play in relation to the SSR-development nexus in the two sites. Preliminary comments Before embarking on an assessment of SSR in relation to the securitydevelopment nexus in East Timor and the Solomon Islands it is necessary to make some preliminary comments on SSR and the security-development nexus more generally. As far as SSR is concerned, a more systematic approach to reforming security sectors emerged during the 1990s; a major impetus was the problems associated with such sectors in post-communist Eastern Europe and developing countries that had recently experienced conflict. A definition used in the report of the UN Secretary-General on UN involvement in SSR presented in January 2008 is that SSR

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describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.2

This definition in turn relates to the characterisation of the security sector as encompassing
the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country [It] includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies [and] Elements of the judicial sector Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.3

The concern with the security-development nexus overlapped with the emergence of SSR on the international agenda, although the focus was somewhat broader.4 Situations of conflict where external intervention under UN or coalition of the willing auspices had occurred raised questions about how long-term security could be achieved. A narrow definition of security might deal with the immediate causes of conflict, but without the deeper causes being addressed. Longer-term approaches generally necessitated a focus on underlying economic, social and political problems. Such a focus could become part of a longer-term development strategy. The longer-term approach was also consistent with the increasing emphasis on human security, not necessarily at the expense of traditional politico-military security but certainly extending the previously dominant approach. The interests of external actors, whether as contributors to peacekeeping forces or as aid donors, were involved in the security-development nexus. While there could be a moral element to this interest (a humanitarian focus on states and societies in need), external actors were also motivated by a concern that failed or failing states could lead to increased numbers of refugees and the creation of havens for organised crime and terrorist groups. Whether from a local or an external focus, an understanding of the security-development nexus would mean increased attention to the underlying causes of insecurity. Many different areas would need to be considered in formulating and implementing a development strategy

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designed to overcome or at least manage these causes. SSR could be one of these areas, but even a broad conception of SSR would be insufficient in these circumstances. A whole-of-society approach based on whole-ofgovernment involvement would be necessary. Successful SSR could assist, but other dimensions would also require attention. From the perspective of the security-development nexus SSR that focused simply on reforming the security institutions would not be enough. The impact on society more generally needed to be an important focus. By focusing on development in this context one could think more explicitly about ways of ensuring that SSR improves human well-being more generally in a given situation. In the next two sections I consider what SSR in East Timor and the Solomon Islands has amounted to, before asking how it has affected development more broadly in the two situations. Security sector reform in East Timor Security institutions have played a key role in East Timors history during both the transition to independence under UN auspices (19992002) and subsequently as an independent state. The army, known as Falintil-Foras de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FNTL), had its origins in Falintil,5 the guerrilla force that fought for independence. During the period of UN rule (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor or UNTAET) Falintil was reorganised so that it could become East Timors official military force on the achievement of independence. In addition to the army, the United Nations established a police force in 2000, known as the Polcia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).6 Divisions within the military and between the military and police played a crucial role in the breakdown of order in East Timor in early 2006. In response to the divisions between the military and police, the East Timorese government requested international assistance, and an international force involving Australia (the major contributor), New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia was despatched. The United Nations also assumed a prominent role in responding to the situation through the replacement of the UN Office in Timor-Leste with the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) under UN Security Council Resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006. The United Nations was particularly important as an umbrella for international police contributions and in assisting with the reorganisation of policing in East Timor. Because the key security institutions were so prominent in the breakdown of order in East Timor in 2006, post-conflict peace-building

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efforts needed to give particular attention to SSR. In assessing these events central questions involve how the security sector contributed to the crisis of 2006, what has been attempted in SSR subsequently and what the outcome has been. In examining the security sector and attempts to achieve SSR I focus in particular on developments relating to the military, the police and the justice system.7 It should be noted at the outset that one of the key issues in SSR in East Timor is the blurring of the lines of responsibility between the military and the police. SSR is thus not simply a matter of organising each force in terms of effectiveness, but also entails the establishment of clearer lines of responsibility and better coordination between the two. Achieving this goal is difficult because of the armys origins in the pre-1999 struggle against Indonesia and the subsequent establishment of the police as a separate institution during the period of UN tutelage (19992002). What was the involvement of security institutions in the breakdown of order in 2006? In the period before 2006 the East Timor army and police developed as separate institutions but with overlapping responsibilities. Given the weakness of the executive and legislative bodies, the army and the police (along with the Catholic Church) were among the most significant institutions in the new state. Within a fragile political order there was space for strong-minded leaders to use both the army and the police for their own political ends. Constraints arising from the supposed authority of the legislative and executive institutions over the security sector were limited. At the same time discipline within both security institutions was weak. Such a situation could not only impede them in fulfilling their specific security responsibilities, but could also be a major factor undermining stability in East Timorese society more broadly. In the case of the F-FDTL, at one level internal tensions related to its origins as a reconstituted version of Falintil, the anti-Indonesian guerrilla force active prior to 1999. Falintil had been dominated by men from the eastern regions of East Timor (known as Lorosae). Although recruitment for the F-FDTL encompassed people from all regions of the country, there was a feeling that people from the western regions (Loromonu) were being discriminated against.8 This situation culminated in a group of 159 soldiers petitioning President Xanana Gusmo in January 2006 for redress of their grievances. Failing to achieve an adequate response, the petitioners left their barracks within a few weeks and were joined subsequently by other soldiers. Given the level of discontent within the F-FDTL, its commander,

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Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak, sacked 594 soldiers (almost half the army) on 16 March.9 Despite this action the petitioners remained a significant political group in East Timor. Demonstrations to highlight the grievances of the disaffected military group took place in Dili in late April 2006. Police attempts to control the protest and the accompanying violence involving discontented young men proved inadequate. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called on the army for assistance, but it lacked experience in controlling civil disorder; three civilian deaths resulted from the armys deployment on 29 April.10 The situation in the army was further complicated by the desertion of Major Alfredo Alves Reinado, head of the military police, and 17 of his men on 3 May in protest at the shooting of civilians (this group was known as the mutineers).11 Their disaffection was related primarily to politics within the military rather than the broader development context. While there had been tensions between the army and the police before 2006, these tensions were exacerbated by the situation that developed in the early months of that year. Given the rivalry between the two, calling in the army to deal with civil disorder amounted to a vote of no confidence in the police. Overall political authority appeared to be lacking. Some political leaders appeared to be manipulating the security institutions and the security situation more broadly for their own ends. There is some suggestion that tensions between President Gusmo and the Fretilin government contributed to the failure to resolve the situation created by the petitioners grievances in January 2006.12 Alkatiri as an easterner had an affinity with the easterndominated F-FDTL, and this might explain his calling upon the army to restore order. In the case of the police the relevant minister was Interior Minister Rogrio Lobato, who appeared to regard the police as a tool to facilitate his own political ambitions. It should also be noted that many of the police came from East Timors western regions and had previously been police during the period of Indonesian rule;13 the different regional orientations of the army and the police exacerbated their institutional rivalry. Tensions and occasional violence between the military and the police culminated in a police attack on army headquarters outside Dili and on Ruaks residence on 24 May; on 25 May the army responded by attacking police headquarters. Police members whose safe passage from their headquarters had been negotiated under UN auspices were attacked by army members, with eight police being killed.14 With violence spreading in this way, and the security institutions about to unravel, the East Timor government initiated a request for international assistance on 24 May (reluctantly signed by Prime Minister Alkatiri15). One month later, Alkatiri

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resigned under intense domestic and international pressure on 26 June and was subsequently replaced by Jos Ramos Horta.16 While international intervention would result in the restoration of order in the short term, the question remained as to what reforms would be instituted in the security sector to prevent a recurrence of the breakdown of AprilMay 2006. From a development perspective the main point emerging from the 2006 crisis concerns the weakness of the political institutions in dealing with the challenges coming from the security organisations. The authority of the government was not respected by those who were attempting to use the security sector for their own ends. While international intervention was a short-term solution to the crisis, a longer-term approach to ensure that SSR could enhance development was needed. What has been attempted in SSR since 2006? Gordon Peake summed up the situation after the crisis of 2006 with his statement that Events showed the PNTL and F-FDTL were more providers of insecurity than stability.17 Even though there had been some discussion before 1999 of an independent East Timor without a military (the Costa Rican model), the political strength of the F-FDTL meant this option was not seriously considered either after 1999 or after 2006.18 In the post-2006 situation the emphasis was on making both the military and the police more effective as institutions, but without necessarily focusing on their impact on the broader society. The relevance of SSR for long-term development was not explicitly considered. The existence of the military and the police was taken as a given; the institutions could be reformed to enhance their security role, but the benefits for wider society were assumed rather than argued. The assumption was that a well-organised security sector, with each component having a clear role and good overall coordination, would enhance domestic security in East Timor, thus enabling long-term socio-economic and political development to occur. In the immediate aftermath of the 2006 crisis the UN SecretaryGenerals report of 8 August 2006 emphasised the importance of SSR in East Timor as a means of dealing with the crisis: A holistic approach to the security sector will be required that coordinates reform efforts in the areas of policing and defence.19 Also relevant in emphasising the need for SSR was the report of the UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry established by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights after a request from the East Timorese foreign minister on 8 June 2006, and published on 2 October of the same year.20 The focus in these reports was on SSR alone, without

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explicit reference to development issues. They were prepared by external actors, but in consultation with local actors (both official and nongovernmental). Despite the emphasis on a holistic approach to SSR, in practice the focus was on the reform of the institutions themselves, downplaying institutional linkages and the impact on development. In the context of the calls for SSR a planning document, entitled Force 2020, was published by the government of East Timor in May 2007.21 This focused on the F-FDTL rather than the security sector as a whole. It should also be noted that work on this document began in 2004 at the instigation of army commander Taur Matan Ruak, and it was not a response to the 2006 crisis as such; one observer notes that References to the crisis are strikingly absent.22 Although one aim of the exercise was to Timorise policy development,23 a significant source of support for the work came from Australia.24 There is reference in Force 2020 to the F-FDTL as contributing to East Timors identity formation, but the precise security role of the military is not clarified adequately. The question of how the reform of the F-FDTL might relate to East Timors development objectives more broadly is not discussed. On the assumption that the F-FDTL will continue to be an important part of East Timors security sector, the report focuses on how the force might develop through to 2020 and beyond. There is a recommendation that F-FDTL be expanded to 3,000 personnel by 202025 (compared with 1,435 in January 2006 and 715 after the crisis26). The report did not propose conscription as such, but recommended that the law on conscription (approved in January 2007) be assessed in terms of whether it was in East Timors interest27 (universal conscription would result in a much bigger force than the 3,000 proposed). In relation to force structure, Force 2020 proposed a land force (45 per cent of the total force), a light naval fleet (35 per cent), a support and service unit (15 per cent) and a command unit (15 per cent).28 In the case of the police as another important component of the security sector, there has been a more explicit focus on the wider context, including SSR, with the reform process involving cooperation between the United Nations and the East Timor government. The crisis of MayJune 2006 led to a withdrawal of the PNTL from Dili. As a result, international security forces had responsibility for security in the capital. An agreement between the United Nations and the East Timor government on 1 December 2006 established two main dimensions for police reform. PNTL members were to be screened and monitored as a basis for reconstituting the force, while a reform, restructuring and rebuilding (RRR) plan provided for institutional development and strengthening.29 PNTL members who passed

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the screening would work alongside UN police (UNPOL) for six months before obtaining final certification. PNTL control in a given district would be restored once 80 per cent of PNTL officers were certified (but with UNPOL continuing to perform a support role). With many former police not making it through the screening process, this situation could also become a security problem.30 It should be noted that in the context of its involvement in SSR, UNMIT established a security sector support unit (SSSU). Given the UNs focus on policing issues, the SSSU has concentrated mainly on that aspect of the security sector and appears to have had limited effectiveness.31 The more politically ambitious RRR plan, which could be significant for SSR more broadly, has not proceeded very far.32 The reintegration of former police into East Timorese society was not part of the process. Another aspect of SSR in East Timor is the situation of the justice system. The violence of 1999 and then the further violence of 2006 have highlighted the limitations of the political order (different though it was at those two times) in upholding security. The inadequacies of the justice system are part of this general failure. The situation of the justice system within the wider security system and the link to development have not been emphasised in the reform packages. Two important reports relating to violence in the 19741999 period have been completed, but no action against perpetrators has occurred. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (in Portuguese, Commiso de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliao de Timor-Leste or CAVR) was set up under UN auspices to cover the whole period and reported in December 2005. The Truth and Friendship Commission was a joint initiative of Indonesia and East Timor, established in August 2005 and reporting in July 2008. It focused mainly on 1999 and by its nature was far weaker than the CAVR. In relation to both reports, governments in East Timor have judged that the pursuit of offenders would lead to a deterioration in relations with Indonesia and thus jeopardise East Timors security as a state. Nevertheless, the failure to pursue offenders has encouraged the development of a widespread culture of impunity in East Timor: acts of violence can be committed with perpetrators assuming that the chances of being apprehended are limited. Apprehension requires not just an effective police force but a legal system that functions properly in deterring crimes and administering justice. The failure to deal with perpetrators from the past encouraged the perception that perpetrators in the present will go unpunished. An independent report in 2009 highlighted the many challenges facing East Timors justice system, drawing attention to such issues as the incomplete legal framework, the need to strengthen the judiciary and courts (still based on a Court of Appeal and four district courts

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as instituted by UNTAET) and the requirements for effective law enforcement.33 It is clear that SSR in East Timor has been limited in scope. Reforms relating to the army and the police have concentrated on the institutions themselves. While there has been some progress relating to the institutions, the wider issues have received insufficient attention: the SSR-development nexus is generally not dealt with explicitly. Internal rather than external security is the main threat to East Timor, with crime, political violence and internal instability being most significant.34 The argument for the Costa Rican model in this situation is on national security rather than development grounds, although there would be development implications. In the event of a threat emerging from East Timors neighbours (meaning Indonesia or Australia), an East Timor military force would be in a weak position to offer resistance. Without a military force East Timor would have additional resources to devote to its domestic development. Tensions between the army and the police would no longer be part of political life; indeed, there would be no scope for military intervention in politics. The argument for East Timor following the Costa Rican model will, however, remain theoretical given the position of the F-FDTL in East Timors domestic politics. Therefore, a major challenge is to ensure an effective division of labour between the F-FDTL and the PNTL. The PNTL should have the main responsibility for internal security, with the F-FDTL in a support role; however, defining the precise terms of that support role is important. For instance, the F-FDTL has been assigned the role of protecting East Timors maritime security. The International Crisis Group has suggested that the army, with appropriate skills, could help respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises and participate in engineering and development work to benefit the population,35 but this suggestion has not been taken up as a major focus. The governments proposal to transfer border security from the police to the army is judged risky by the International Crisis Group on the grounds that there is a large Indonesian military presence on the western side of the border; an East Timorese military presence could exacerbate tensions.36 An effective division of labour would be facilitated by stronger oversight of the security institutions by the executive and legislative arms of government. This is also important in ensuring the development and consolidation of the justice system. The implications of the failure to achieve effective SSR for the security-development nexus in East Timor will be discussed subsequently, using the Solomon Islands as a comparison. Before getting to that point,

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however, I shall assess SSR in the Solomon Islands, giving particular attention to the development perspective. Security sector reform in the Solomon Islands In the case of the Solomon Islands the breakdown of order in the period from about 1998 to 2003 was less related to the role of security institutions as such than was the case in East Timor in 2006.37 Nevertheless, security institutions did play a role, and hence SSR has been a focus in the period of peace-building since 2003. This section reviews what has been attempted in SSR in the Solomon Islands and what has been achieved, keeping in mind the lesser significance of security institutions as compared with East Timor, but also paying attention to the broader way in which the security sector is conceived on the whole. This allows more scope for linking security issues to questions of development, although mostly the focus is implicit. It should be noted (as indicated previously) that the Solomon Islands does not have an army. The absence of an army points to a major difference with East Timor. As discussed, the F-FDTL occupies a significant place in independent East Timor because of the prominent role played by Falintil in the struggle against Indonesian rule in the 19751999 period; the colonial power before 1975 and formally sovereign until 1999 was Portugal. In the Solomon Islands independence from Britain was achieved peacefully in 1978. Keeping this very significant difference in mind, East Timor and the Solomon Islands are both small island countries (East Timor sharing a border with Indonesia), with similar levels of development and populations that are relatively small in international terms. East Timor and the Solomon Islands were ranked 122nd and 125th respectively in the Human Development Index for 2010 (both medium human development).38 The population estimates for July 2011 were 1,177,834 for East Timor and 571,891 for the Solomon Islands, predominantly young in both cases.39 Both countries have societies that are fragmented in terms of social organisation, language and regional identification, and have weak institutions that struggle to overcome this fragmentation. In relation to fragmentation, the breakdown of order in the Solomon Islands in the period 19982003 occurred mainly on the island of Guadalcanal where the capital, Honiara, is located. Over a period of decades people from the neighbouring island of Malaita had been attracted to Guadalcanal because of the greater economic opportunities there. This led to

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tensions between Guadalcanalese and Malaitans that could be exacerbated in periods of economic downturn, such as the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis of 1997. Clashes occurred on Guadalcanal between the Isatabu Freedom Movement (the political movement representing Guadalcanalese) and the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF, representing Malaitans), both of which had access to arms; over 200 deaths resulted from this conflict.40 The police force, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), was subject to politicisation and did not act to quell the disturbances. In June 2000 rogue elements of the RSIPF combined with the MEF to force the resignation of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufaalu (himself a Malaitan but regarded by the militants as an obstacle), and subsequently a change of government. The Townsville Peace Agreement of October 2000, brokered by the Australian government, was designed to facilitate reconciliation and involved some low-level international monitoring. By 2003 it was clear that the parties in the Solomons were so deeply divided that they were unable to effect longterm reconciliation on their own. Despite initial hesitation by the Australian government, by mid-2003 the decision had been made for Australia to lead an international operation to restore order and ensure more effective longterm governance in the Solomon Islands. While security was the first consideration, in the longer term issues of development strategy would also be important. Operation Helpem Fren, organised under the auspices of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), obtained prior approval from both the Solomons government and parliament. International legitimacy came from the approval given by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in a meeting of its foreign ministers on 30 June 2003. Although RAMSI initially had a large military component (about 70 per cent of the original commitment of 2,225), in the long term the most important element was the police; most personnel came from Australia, but New Zealand also contributed significantly along with representation from a range of PIF countries. Regional countries were concerned that the situation in the Solomon Islands had regional security implications. In the longer term development issues needed to be addressed to prevent any further breakdown in security, although this was not the immediate focus. Shahar Hameiri has argued that RAMSI represented not just an attempt to reconstruct the Solomon Islands as a state, but entailed a new form of transnational governance whereby Australia would have a continuing role in ensuring that a certain kind of model was followed in the Solomons.41 This model involved neoliberal economic assumptions and a centralised whole-of-government approach as practised by the national government in Australia. While it might be argued that this model is

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neocolonial, it can be contended that the arrangement is subject to the consent of the various parties involved. The approach adopted by RAMSI provides the context for understanding what has been attempted in relation to SSR in the Solomon Islands. In formal terms RAMSI reports to the PIF, but in practice the Australian government is the key actor. RAMSI is organised on the basis of three pillars, covering law and justice, economic governance and the machinery of government (essentially the organisation of government departments); the general aim in each pillar is to build indigenous capacity. Each pillar is headed by an Australian public servant, and there is also a special coordinator from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The coordinator not only facilitates an integrated approach among the three pillars but also liaises with the Solomons government, the PIF and its members, and the Australian governments RAMSI interdepartmental committee.42 Despite the goal of building indigenous capacity, it is clear that through RAMSI Australia remains the driving force in upholding peace and stability in the Solomon Islands. According to a Wikileaks report in August 2011, an assessment by the US embassy in Port Moresby stated that following any withdrawal of RAMSI it would take about a week for trouble to break out since none of the underlying issues [which caused widespread ethnic violence] have been addressed.43 As far as SSR is concerned, it does not as such feature in the programme of reforms instituted by RAMSI. However, many issues coming under RAMSIs law and justice pillar are relevant to SSR as normally defined. Achieving change within the military forces is not relevant since the Solomon Islands does not have an organised military. The emphasis rather has been on reforming the police, corrections service and justice system, and (at a cross-pillars level) combating corruption. Generally, the emphasis has been on individual institutions, although there is some attention to overall goals for the Solomon Islands. These goals relate essentially to the achievement of peace and stability in the country, assuming that long-term development (including institutional strengthening) is a necessary part of the strategy required for moving in this direction. While the Solomon Islanders can be assumed to share these goals (whatever their differences over questions of strategy and implementation), it is also clear that Australia through RAMSI regards these goals as very important for its own security and as part of its international responsibility; other Pacific island countries and New Zealand, expressing themselves through the Pacific Islands Forum in particular, similarly view the situation in the Solomon Islands as having regional implications. Although there can be differences with Australia over

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matters of emphasis and implementation, the goals of peace, stability and development for the Solomon Islands have wide support across the region at a general level. In the short to medium term RAMSI has been relatively successful in restoring law and order in the Solomons. Initially there was a major focus on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. This involved collecting illegal weapons and apprehending militant leaders and criminals; special constables in the RSIPF were demobilised and given opportunities for counselling and training to assist with reintegration into the local economy.44 Where the local economy was experiencing difficulties, however, such reintegration would clearly be difficult. A longer-term focus for RAMSI was to rebuild the RSIPF, with the removal of corrupt and incompetent officers and the implementation of a mentoring and partnership approach between the RSIPF and the participating police force from PIF countries. RSIPF personnel amounted to 1,050, with 250300 in the PIF force (predominantly from Australias International Police Deployment Group).45 In the case of the corrections service, this system had virtually collapsed in the Solomons. RAMSI has been able to institute a new approach to corrections with rehabilitation as the main aim; a new corrections centre has been built on Malaita in response to the needs of that island, and other facilities refurbished.46 In relation to the justice system the aim has been to ensure that all Solomon Islanders have access to justice through properly functioning courts from the local level up to the Superior Court of Record and Court of Appeal. Specific issues have included the completion of trials from the tensions (the local term for the 19982003 period), and facilitating reforms through the Solomon Islands Law Reform Commission. Anti-corruption activities have underpinned RAMSIs approach in relation to all three pillars, applying as much to economic governance and machinery of government as to law and justice as such. In so far as corruption is antithetical to development, this approach can be expected to have positive implications for development. The partnership agreement between the Solomons government and RAMSI as approved by the Solomons parliament in November 2009 provides a good indication of the stage reached in relation to SSR as well as for other aspects of RAMSI involvement.47 Assuming that RAMSIs law and justice pillar is the main focus for SSR, there was a continued emphasis in this agreement on both the RSIPF and the correctional service with a view to their functioning effectively and independently of RAMSI. The justice system should be capable and independent, with attention to capacitybuilding and law reform; strengthening traditional justice mechanisms in

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rural areas should also be a goal (thus contributing to the strengthening of traditional society as a development aim). Anti-corruption would continue to be a goal across all areas. Clearly, over a period of six years there was a judgement by RAMSI and the Solomons government that progress had been made in relation to the goals originally set for RAMSI, but a continuing role for RAMSI was clearly envisaged. Strengthening local institutions as specified in the document would enable a reduction in this role. However, consistent with Hameiris analysis, a reading of the agreement suggests that RAMSIs role in the Solomons is likely to be a long-term one. This has implications for SSR in relation to development as well as to the various other activities covered by RAMSI. Overall, perhaps influenced by RAMSI, there has been some attention to long-term strategic goals in relation to institutions within the security sector, as well as other aspects of government. Nevertheless, the emphasis has been on reforming the institutions themselves rather than having a more strongly coordinated security sector approach. The focus on goals has allowed some scope for development issues to be considered, but attention to the securitydevelopment nexus as such has been limited. The implications of this situation for the security-development nexus are examined in the next section in the context of a comparison with East Timor. Security sector reform in East Timor and the Solomon Islands in relation to the security-development nexus At this point we need to put the situation relating to SSR in East Timor and the Solomon Islands into the context of the security-development nexus.48 Whatever happens with the security sector in these two countries will have implications for development irrespective of whether or not the security institutions are explicitly coordinated as a security sector. If discussions of the security-development nexus have a particular concern for post-conflict situations and strategies for peace-building, it is important to ask how SSR contributes to the improvement of peoples lives. In other words, it is insufficient to focus on reforms within the security sector as ends in themselves, enhancing the effectiveness of the sector as such: one must ask whether SSR enhances human well-being in any given situation. In both East Timor and the Solomon Islands there has been a widespread recognition that what occurs in relation to security institutions has implications for development. This can be seen in the recognition that

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has occurred, albeit at a very general level, of the link between security and development in various development plans and also in the way in which external actors (such as donor countries or security partners) have attempted to highlight this issue. When one examines the way in which these general intentions are implemented the situation becomes more problematic. One needs to assess what has actually occurred in relation to SSR in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands to see whether the impact has been positive or negative in relation to development. In both situations I shall outline the general orientation concerning the SSR-development link, and then attempt a more precise assessment as to how the link has worked out in practice. In the case of East Timor the circumstances of the 2006 crisis have led to some attention being given to the reform of security institutions in official long-term development plans. The government that came to office in 2007 gave some priority to dealing with a number of the specific issues relating to the security sector that had been prominent in the breakdown of the previous year. At the same time the programme guidelines relegated issues that might be construed as SSR to the latter part of the document outlining the programme.49 There was a statement that Internal stability and the security of the people and properties [were] crucial elements for the social peace and serenity of citizens [and] also a sine qua non condition for the development of any country.50 Consequently the government aimed to confirm the authority of the State, promote national cohesion and give special attention to fighting violence generated by organized groups.51 The strategic development plan for 20112030, a summary of which was published in April 2010, focused mainly on economic and social issues.52 Included is a statement that Fragile institutions of the state will have to be strengthened,53 but there is no explicit attention to SSR as such. Among the external actors, through its Development Assistance Framework for 2009 2013 for East Timor the United Nations complements the approach taken by the government of the country. Among the three major outcomes set under this framework, Outcome 1 focuses on democratization and social cohesion and is most relevant to SSR. Outcome 1.3, for instance, specifies that Timorese society is better able to internalize democratic principles and use non-violent mitigating mechanisms. While there is recognition of the importance of SSR for development in official documents issued by East Timor and the United Nations, in practice the focus has been on effecting changes relating to the military and the police on the assumption that putting the house in order in both cases will be beneficial for development. However, the emphasis has been on the institutions themselves rather than on the link with development. Whether or

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nor there is explicit attention to the SSR-development linkage, there will be an impact. Assessments of the security situation in East Timor indicate a marked improvement, yet this outcome is not necessarily due to SSR. There appear to be some improvements in socio-economic circumstances, mainly due to the way in which funds flowing from oil and gas development have been used to finance new infrastructure, social programmes and employment opportunities. A 2009 AusAID assessment of progress towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in the small states near Australia suggested a bleak picture in relation to East Timor, with the country described as off track on six out of seven goals and of concern in the goal relating to gender equality and the empowerment of women.54 By 2011 AusAID was reporting that East Timor had improved 42 places in the UNs Human Development Index in 2010 as compared with 2009, and that there were improvements in maternal and child health and school enrolments.55 Despite these improvements it remained the case that the reform of security institutions was not contributing effectively to development goals in East Timor. Although the 2009 and 2010 Timor-Leste and development partners meetings had as their theme Goodbye conflict, welcome development, such optimism was premature. At the 2009 meeting UNMIT in its report stated that the UN System cannot underscore enough the importance of putting in place a legislative and policy framework that defines the responsibilities of each of the institutions of the sector. A clear demarcation of roles between the PNTL and the F-FDTL is particularly critical.56 However, as the previous assessment of SSR in East Timor indicates, there has been limited progress toward achieving this goal. While some socio-economic progress appears to have had beneficial consequences for security, the overall situation remains fragile. The F-FDTL and the police have both been undergoing changes, as indicated, but the F-FDTL remains a strong institution politically and the issue of an appropriate relationship between the military and the police remains unresolved. The fact that political institutions are weak in East Timor makes it difficult to ensure that the security sector conforms to the rule of law; this weakness also extends to the judicial institutions. In these circumstances one cannot be sure that in more difficult socio-economic circumstances powerful individuals within the security institutions might not act to uphold their own positions irrespective of whether this runs counter to the constitutional framework. Greater security, deriving from SSR but not confined to SSR (since security extends beyond the security institutions themselves), would enhance peoples sense of well-being and thus contribute to development. The problem in East Timor is that the F-FDTL is such a strong institution that it

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is difficult to effect more than modest reforms. While many small states function without military forces, such a goal is not practicable in East Timor. Having one security force alone (perhaps a police force, but with some enhanced capacity to deal with paramilitary situations) would overcome the problem of insecurity arising from police-military tensions. Yet such a goal does not resemble practical politics in East Timor. This situation will therefore detract from development. Maximising cooperation between the two institutions, with clear delineation of areas of responsibility and each institution functioning clearly within that framework and subject to the legislative and executive institutions, is the desirable goal. Such an outcome from SSR would be beneficial for development in East Timor, but the record so far is mixed. If well-coordinated SSR had paid due attention to the implications for development, one would have above all expected that the prospects for political stability in the country would be greatly enhanced. Given that both the military and the police will continue as major institutions within East Timor, there is a strong need for them to be clearly subordinate to the overall security governance that derives from the political structures of the state. Political stability provides a foundation on which it is possible for East Timor to focus more clearly on establishing strategies for moving towards supporting the various aspects of development that have been prioritised within the national political process, enunciated in such documents as the programme of the 20072012 government and the strategic development plan for 20112030.57 In the Solomon Islands SSR has been approached differently than in East Timor. In East Timor problems in the security sector as such were central to the breakdown of order in 2006. In the Solomon Islands the security sector was relevant to the way in which the situation evolved during the tensions from 1998 to 2003, although it was not a major source of conflict. Under RAMSI, since 2003 there has been an emphasis on restoring security while also giving attention to long-term development designed to overcome and prevent the problems that resulted in the tensions. SSR, or more specifically the reform of security institutions, has been one element of an overall national strategy that pays some attention to development issues. The aim has been to ensure that the security sector (meaning primarily the police and the justice system in this context) can deal effectively with any challenges to security in the Solomon Islands. Achieving this goal would contribute to human well-being and thus development. This approach to SSR has been evident in key documents for development strategy, beginning with the National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan, 2003

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2006, issued by the Solomon Islands government in October 2003.58 This document identified Normalising law and order and security situation as one of five key strategic areas. One of the objectives listed for this strategic area was the re-establishment of police services in all provinces by 2004. There was an assumption that SSR would contribute to development without this being spelt out in detail. Achieving SSR in the Solomons proved more complicated than the initial document for development strategy had assumed. In its 2009 annual performance report RAMSI indicated that the goal of the RSIPF of being capable of independently carrying out its mandated functions under law and order and targeting corrupt conduct had not yet been reached, although there was evidence of considerable progress in that direction.59 Matthew Allen argues more directly that The RSIPF, deeply fractured and compromised during the 19982003 conflict, remains unarmed, and is years away from being able to carry out its mandated functions.60 Essentially the Solomon Islands continued to rely on RAMSI for the provision of security services. Regarding the correctional services, the 2009 performance report argued that capacity development had been strong.61 However, progress in the law and justice sector was judged the weakest in RAMSI: The law cannot currently be administered without further assistance and it appears unlikely to be achievable by 2013.62 From 2009 a partnership framework between the Solomon Islands government and RAMSI provided a means for the two parties to assess progress towards key goals with a view to determining whether further responsibilities could be transferred from RAMSI to the government.63 Assessments of the situation in the Solomon Islands suggested the likelihood of an economic downturn over the next few years, linked particularly to the likely decline of the logging industry.64 A worsening economic situation would likely revive the kinds of tensions that led to the period of conflict from 1998 to 2003. It might also be noted that the Solomon Islands, much like East Timor, has made limited progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. AusAIDs 2009 report on progress had the Solomon Islands on track for two goals (child mortality; maternal health), of concern for three goals (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary education; combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases) and off track for two (promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women; ensuring environmental sustainability).65 Even if SSR in the Solomon Islands had achieved its goals, the positive impact of this situation on development would not compensate for the fact that, as

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indicated by the 2009 AusAID report, so many aspects of development in Solomon Islands are at risk. While there has been some attention to the reform of security institutions in the Solomons in relation to national goals, it is also the case that there could have been more effective overall coordination based on an SSR approach. This would have meant primarily more emphasis on establishing stronger security governance by the countrys political institutions, although under current circumstances in conjunction with RAMSI. As has been argued in relation to East Timor, a positive outcome would be the enhancement of political stability, thus providing a better framework for formulating and implementing agreed development goals. In terms of SSR and the security-development nexus in East Timor and Solomon Islands we thus face two different yet related situations. In both cases there has been little explicit focus on the SSR-development linkage as such. The emphasis has been on the reform of security institutions, with greater overall coordination and more attention to development in the Solomon Islands than in East Timor yet also with significant shortcomings in both cases. In the case of East Timor the problems in achieving effective SSR make it difficult to attain long-term stability; without the assurance of order, progress in relation to the socioeconomic and political goals of development becomes more difficult. The strong role of the security institutions in East Timor exacerbates this situation. In the Solomon Islands the security institutions are important but less central (particularly without an army), and relatively more attention is given to the overall justice system. The situation involving transnational governance based on RAMSI could conceivably continue on a long-term basis. SSR is a relatively minor aspect of the various factors affecting development in the Solomons. Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated that, while issues relating to SSR have been important in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands, the link between SSR and development has received less attention than it warrants. The main contribution of a strong SSR-development link would be the strengthening of political stability, thus providing a framework within which the goals of socio-economic and political development might be more effectively pursued. In both countries SSR has been approached mainly in terms of reforming specific security institutions rather than on the basis of an

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integrated approach involving overall security governance. The impact of the reform of security institutions on the wider society has generally been left implicit, although this criticism is less valid in relation to the Solomon Islands than it is with East Timor. More attention to the value of a wellfunctioning security sector for political stability would facilitate progress towards political and socio-economic development. While in practice focusing mainly on institutional reform, SSR still has an impact on development irrespective of whether governments and other relevant actors consciously try to determine the nature of the SSRdevelopment linkage. If political stability is the main development issue affected by SSR, then failure to make the linkage a positive one could have deleterious consequences. The focus on the reform of specific security institutions in East Timor yet with relatively weak overall coordination of the security sector could result in a well-functioning military force that could also be more effective as a political actor and conceivably undermine the civil authorities under some circumstances. A reformed military would face a reformed police force that could also be an important political actor. At the same time the institutional development of the legal system and the legislative and executive branches of government might remain relatively weak. The overall outcome would potentially be greater instability. Still, one would have to take into account a whole range of factors that would be relevant in the circumstances, such as the socio-economic situation, the involvement of civil society and the policies of external actors. To avoid this situation a more systematic SSR approach is needed that gives due attention to overall security governance. Focusing merely on the reform of specific security institutions is insufficient and could be detrimental to development. In the Solomon Islands the potential for instability derives mainly from the fragmented nature of the society. There are no potentially powerful security actors waiting in the wings. There is perhaps greater awareness of the significance of the security sector for development goals than is the case in East Timor. The focus has been on building indigenous capacity, on the assumption that this will contribute to political stability. Progress towards strengthening indigenous capacity in the security sector has been mixed, and RAMSI or a similar arrangement appears likely to have a long-term future in the Solomon Islands. Political stability is achieved, but derives to a great extent from the role played by the external actor. As far as the future is concerned, there is a strong case for developing a more integrated approach to SSR (including a clear role for overall security governance) in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands, while also making the SSR-development linkage much more explicit. The consequences for

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development of SSR-related policies should be spelt out. If some policies are likely to have negative consequences for development, then clearly they should be avoided. Policies that are likely to promote development should be emphasised. The recommendation for a more explicit approach to the SSRdevelopment linkage is primarily a matter for the governments in the two situations, but it should also be a focus for the major external players.66 The obstacle to moving in this direction has been the political factors affecting the way in which security sector issues are dealt with in the two countries. Factors such as the political position of the military in East Timor and the weak political institutions in both countries make it difficult to develop strong policies. If the arguments in favour of a stronger SSR-development linkage are appreciated by relevant actors in both situations and acted upon, this can have positive consequences in the long term. In the Solomon Islands RAMSI is strategically well placed to move in this direction. The same can be said for East Timor, although there is no single actor with the same authority and potential influence on national decision-making, and the overall political situation is considerably more complex.

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Notes
1

5 6

9 10 11 12 13 14

On the difficulties involved in defining development, together with an attempt to ground the concept in the discourse of political economy, see Anthony Payne and Nicola Phillips, Development (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). UN Secretary-General, Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform, UN Doc. A/62/659-S/2008/39 (23 January 2008): para. 17. Ibid.: para. 14. For other official statements relating to SSR see OECD, Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Policy Brief (Paris: OECD, May 2004), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf; OECD/DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf; UK Department for International Development, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (London: DFID, 2002), available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65 BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/supportingsecurity%5B1%5D.pdf. On the security-development nexus a good starting point is Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001); Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). Foras Armadas de Libertao Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor). For a full-length study of the PNTL see Bu Vicki Elizabeth Wilson, Smoke and Mirrors: The Development of the East Timorese Police 19992009, unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University (2010), available at www.regnet.anu.edu.au/program/ people/profile/thesis/BuWilson_Thesis.pdf. Two important and detailed assessments of SSR in East Timor are International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report no. 143 (Brussels: ICG, 2008); Gordon Peake, A Lot of Talk But Not a Lot of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in Timor-Leste, in Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, eds Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (Mnster: LIT Verlag, 2009): 213 240. The distinction between westerners and easterners should not be exaggerated; it has been described as one of mild prejudice in Sven Gunnar Simonsen, The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the Need for Inclusive Governance, Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (2006): 590. While there appeared to be discrimination against westerners in the F-FDTL, there is no evidence of significant maldistribution in terms of socio-economic development. It should also be noted that this mild prejudice could nevertheless be a strong influence on the way in which people behaved. International Crisis Group, note 7 above: 2. Ibid. Ibid. See Matthew B. Arnold, Challenges Too Strong for the Nascent State of Timor-Leste: Petitioners and Mutineers, Asian Survey 49, no. 3 (2009): 429449. Damien Kingsbury, Timor-Leste: The Harsh Reality after Independence, Southeast Asian Affairs (2007): 367. Svar Gunnar Simonsen, The Role of East Timors Security Institutions in National Integration And Disintegration, Pacific Review 22, no. 5 (2009): 581.

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15 16 17 18

19 20

21 22 23 24

25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32

33

34 35 36 37

38

International Crisis Group, Resolving Timor-Lestes Crisis, Asia Report no. 120 (Brussels: ICG, 2006): 12. Kingsbury, note 13 above: 368. Peake, note 7 above: 219. See Simonsen, note 14 above: 586. Note also the point made in Chapter 8 by Henri Myrttinen regarding the way in which SSR processes favoured people who were part of the armed resistance in East Timor (and Aceh). UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690, UN Doc. S/2006/628 (2006): para. 62. Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for TimorLeste (Geneva, 2 October 2006), available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ COITimorLeste.pdf. Government of East Timor, Force 2020 (2007), available at www.etan.org/etanpdf/ 2007/Forca%202020%20-%202007.pdf. Simonsen, note 8 above: 589. International Crisis Group, note 7 above: 8. Cynthia Burton, Security Sector Reform: Current Issues and Future Challenges, in East Timor: Beyond Independence, eds Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Press, 2007): 101. Government of East Timor, note 21 above: 134. International Crisis Group, note 7 above: 5. In 2010 there were 1,250 personnel in the army and 82 in the naval element see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011): 279. Government of East Timor, note 21 above: 52. Ibid.: 116. International Crisis Group, note 7 above: 67. Ibid.: 78. There is a detailed assessment in Peake, note 7 above. Recent assessments of the policing situation in East Timor, with particular reference to progress relating to the handover from the United Nations to the PNTL, include International Crisis Group, Handing Back Responsibility to Timor Lestes Police, Asia Report no. 180 (Brussels: ICG, 2009); International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, Asia Briefing no. 116 (Brussels: ICG, 2010). Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment Team, The Justice System of TimorLeste: An Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment, Dili (13 October 2009), available at www.laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/UNMIT/JusticeNeedsAssessment Oct09.pdf. This report was commissioned through UNMIT. International Crisis Group, note 7 above: 6. Ibid.: 15. Ibid. For overviews of the development of the situation in the Solomon Islands during this period see Jon Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004); Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failing State in Solomon Islands, 19982004 (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004). UN Development Programme, Human Development Index (HDI) 2010 Rankings, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.

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39

40

41

42 43 44

45

46 47

48

49 50 51 52

53 54 55

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: East & Southeast Asia TimorLeste (last updated 7 September 2011), available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Australia-Oceania Solomon Islands (last updated 23 August 2011), available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bp.html. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Economic Analytical Unit, Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004): 4. Shahar Hameiri, State Building or Crisis Management? A Critical Analysis of the Social and Political Implications of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009): 3552. Details of RAMSIs organisation are based on Hameiri, ibid.: 39. See also RAMSIs website at www.ramsi.org/. Phillip Dorling, Solomons Legacy: $1bn Wasted, Age (30 August 2011). Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, Solomon Islands (2010), available at www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Country-Profile-SolomonIslands-April-28.pdf: 4. Eden Cole, Thomas Shanahan and Philipp Fluri, Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic Framework (Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat/UN Development Programme Pacific Centre, 2010): 118. On policing issues, with particular reference to Australian involvement, see Sinclair Dinnen, Abby McLeod and Gordon Peake, Police-building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, Civil Wars 8, no. 2 (2006): 95101; Andrew Goldsmith and Sinclair Dinnen, Transnational Police Building: Critical Lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, Third World Quarterly 28, no. 6 (2007): 11011105. RAMSI, Corrections, available at www.ramsi.org/our-work/law-and-justice/ corrections.html. Partnership Agreement between Solomon Islands Government and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (April 2009), available at www.ramsi.org/Media/docs/SIGRAMSI_PartnershipFramework-f69fa231-cc6a-47bf-99a3-3e88eba95414-0.pdf. Derek McDougall, The Security-Development Nexus: Comparing External Interventions and Development Strategies in East Timor and Solomon Islands, Asian Security 6, no. 2 (2010): 170190. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Programme of the IV Constitutional Government (20072012), (Dili, 2007), available at http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=16&lang=en. Ibid.: Chapter VI, para. 10. Ibid. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Office of the Prime Minister, On Road to Peace and Prosperity: Timor-Lestes Strategic Development Plan, 20112030: Summary (7 April 2010), available at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/10TLDPM/RDTLStratDevPlan Summ7Apr2010En.pdf. Ibid.: 5. AusAID, Tracking Development and Governance in the Pacific, Annex 2 (August 2009), available at www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/track_devgov09.pdf: 69. AusAID, East Timor (2011), available at www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm? CountryId=911. Given Australias role as a major donor in both the South Pacific and East Timor, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) is well

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56

57

58

59

60

61 62 63

64 65 66

placed to report on progress or lack thereof towards development goals in this region, albeit from an official Australian perspective. UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, Statement to Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting (3 April 2009), available at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/09TLDPM/UN/ UNMITTLDPM.htm. However, note the point made by Ann M. Fitz-Gerald in Chapter 11 that national dialogue in East Timor (and her other case studies of Uganda and Sierra Leone) was stronger in relation to national development and poverty eradication than in relation to national security. Solomon Islands Government, National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan, 20032006, Strategic and Action Framework, Final Report (Honiara: Department of National Reform and Planning, October 2003), available at www.sprep.org/att/IRC/ eCOPIES/Countries/Solomon_Islands/42.pdf. Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, Annual Performance Report 2009, available at www.ramsi.org/Media/docs/RAMSI-Annual-Performance-Report-2009c93293d3-a6e8-4de7-81fc-e97c13adda0e-0.pdf: 2. Matthew Allen, Long-term Engagement: The Future of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, Strategic Insights no. 51 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011): 16. Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, note 59 above: 3. Ibid.: 5. See Graeme Wilson (RAMSI special coordinator), The Solomon Islands GovernmentRAMSI Partnership Framework: Towards a Secure and Sustainable Solomon Islands, paper presented in State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program seminar series, Australian National University (17 December 2009), available at www.ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm/ papers/seminars/09_1217_sp_wilson_RAMSI.pdf. See for example Allen, note 60 above: 2. AusAID, note 54 above: 62. The World Development Report 2011 argues that a problem for international agencies in contributing to violence prevention and recovery is that they are geared to minimizing domestic reputational and fiduciary risk. See World Bank, International Support to Building Confidence and Transforming Institutions, in World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, available at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/ default/files/WDR2011_Chapter6.pdf.

Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development

There has now been more than a decade of conceptual work, policy development and operational activity in the eld of security sector reform (SSR). To what extent has its original aim to support and facilitate development been met? The di erent contributions to this volume address this question, o ering a range of insights on the theoretical and practical relevance of the security-development nexus in SSR. They examine claims of how and whether SSR e ectively contributes to achieving both security and development objectives. In particular, the analyses presented in this volume provide a salutary lesson that development and security communities need to take each others concerns into account when planning, implementing and evaluating their activities. The book o ers academics, policy-makers and practitioners within the development and security communities relevant lessons, suggestions and practical advice for approaching SSR as an instrument that serves both security and development objectives.

Order the book from the publishers website:

www.lit-verlag.ch

DCAF

DCAF

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

a centre for security, development and the rule of law

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