ARC FLASH COMPLIANCE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF NFPA-70 AND IEEE 1584 STANDARDS Christopher Inshaw Emerson Process Management

Electrical Reliability Services, Inc. Brea, CA Fred Toepfer Emerson Process Management. Electrical Reliability Services, Inc. Brentwood, TN

Abstract: Changing guidelines and regulations aimed at reducing the number of Arc Flash related injuries and deaths have focused attention on the dangers of Arc Flash events in energized low and medium voltage electrical equipment. Routine inspections and maintenance testing expose personnel to hazards that until recently have been difficult to quantify. This paper provides an overview of arc flash hazards, regulatory issues, and methods to apply the standards available to determine conditions and procedures required to work safely. I. WHY IS ARC FLASH AN ISSUE? The last few years have seen a great increase in the awareness of arc flash hazards. Injuries that result from the lack of adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) can be severe and frequently fatal. However, arcing faults and electrical burns and injuries have been problems since electricity was first used. So why after over a hundred years is it only now that actions are being taken to define and protect personnel against this hazard? One of the primary reasons is the shear magnitude and volume of electricity being generated and used all over the world. Utilization voltages have increased in commercial and industrial facilities so that medium voltage switchgear and on-site generators (both standby and parallel operation) are common. There has also been a large increase in the number of facilities taking power directly at high voltages (120kV and above) to take advantage of the lower rates, and the reduction or elimination of utility charges for facilities. As a result, facilities, employees and their contractors are exposed to higher voltages and fault duties than ever before. Another major reason is the increased need to perform work on energized equipment. When shutdowns (planned or unplanned) can cost millions of dollars, companies look for ways to increase their production by reducing downtime. On-line testing like infrared scans, load and power quality recordings, and partialdischarge cable testing must be performed while the equipment remains energized. Unfortunately, in many locations training has not kept pace with the increased hazards associated with larger sources and the need to do energized work. Without adequate initial training, and routine follow up training, employees may be unaware of (or become complacent toward) the hazards. Consequently they may not understand or use proper procedures to safely perform their work. A third reason is the liability (and cost) from lawsuits resulting from incidents. Lost production, damage and injury claims, and repair costs can add up to millions of dollars. Companies and jurisdictions are adopting procedures and methods relating to arc flash hazards specifically to address the potential liability.

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II. WHAT IS THE RISK? Working on energized equipment is inherently risky. The two major risks being shock and burn. Medium voltage locations and larger low voltage locations also include the risk of a concussive injury that can exceed the burn risk in the event of an Arc Flash event. An Arc Flash event is characterized by extreme heat (35,000 Degrees and above), a rapidly expanding pressure and sound wave that includes molten metal and other shrapnel debris. Since the vast majority of events (>80%) are caused by human error, there is a high risk that one or more people will be in the flash zone. Without adequate PPE, the risk of serious injury or death is high. In order to minimize the risk, standards have been published that outline the responsibilities for employers and employees and safe work practices. III. REGULATORY STANDARDS The two driving regulatory bodies related to Arc Flash are the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). OSHA regulations that apply to arc flash hazards are in 29CFR 1910 Subparts I, and S. These can be broken down into three general areas, hazard identification and PPE selection, training, and proficiency. Here are excerpts from 29 CFR: 1910.132(d) Hazard assessment and equipment selection. The employer shall assess the workplace to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). If such hazards are present, or likely to be present, the employer shall: Select, and have each affected employee use, the types of PPE that will protect the affected employee from the hazards identified in the hazard assessment; Communicate selection decisions to each affected employee; and, Select PPE that properly fits each affected employee. The employer shall verify that the required workplace hazard assessment has been performed through a written certification that identifies the workplace evaluated; the person certifying that the evaluation has been performed; the date(s) of the hazard assessment; and, which identifies the document as a certification of hazard assessment. 1910.335(a)(1)(i) Personal Protective Equipment Employees working in areas where there are potential electrical hazards shall be provided with, and shall use, electrical protective equipment that is appropriate for the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed. 1910.132(f) Training. The employer shall provide training to each employee who is required by this section to use PPE. Each such employee shall be trained to know at least the following: When PPE is necessary; What PPE is necessary; How to properly don, doff, adjust, and wear PPE; The limitations of the PPE; and, The proper care, maintenance, useful life and disposal of the PPE. Each affected employee shall demonstrate an understanding of the training specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section, and the ability to use PPE properly, before being allowed to perform work requiring the use of PPE. 1910.132(f)(3) Proficiency & Retraining
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When the employer has reason to believe that any affected employee who has already been trained does not have the understanding and skill required by paragraph (f)(2) of this section, the employer shall retrain each such employee. Circumstances where retraining is required include, but are not limited to, situations where: Changes in the workplace render previous training obsolete; or Changes in the types of PPE to be used render previous training obsolete; or Inadequacies in an affected employee's knowledge or use of assigned PPE indicate that the employee has not retained the requisite understanding or skill. The employer shall verify that each affected employee has received and understood the required training through a written certification that contains the name of each employee trained, the date(s) of training, and that identifies the subject of the certification. The NPFA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC) included a section (110-16) requiring the labeling of panels with an arc flash warning beginning with the 2002 edition. The 2005 edition of the NEC made minor changes and now reads; 110-16 Flash Protection Switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers in commercial and industrial occupancies that are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized must be field marked to warn qualified persons of the danger of electric arc flash. The marking must be clearly visible to qualified persons before they examine, adjust, service, or perform maintenance on the equipment. The NEC does not provide specific direction regarding label content. Consequently the information shown in Figure 1 could comply.

Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Appropriate PPE Required

WARNING

However, for personnel assigned to perform energized work this is not enough information since it does not quantify the hazard in a way that appropriate PPE can be selected. Fine print notes in the NEC reference NFPA 70E-2004 as a guide to quantifying the hazard. The NEC warning label is an interim step for work on energized equipment. NFPA released an update to NFPA-70E in 2004 that adopted the IEEE Std. 1584-2002 methods for determining the incident energy (a simplified explanation of this calculation method in included in Appendix 1). The standard was renamed to NFPA 70E Standard for Employee Safety in the Workplace 2004 Edition. This standard details methods and procedures that meet OSHA requirements for safe work practices. All new arc rated PPE include the Arc Thermal Performance Value (ATPV) with units in cal/cm2. The required PPE at specific locations is determined by comparing the calculated incident energy to the ratings for specific combinations of PPE. An example is given in NPFA 70E as follows:

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TABLE 1 Protective Clothing Characteristics Hazard/Ris k Category Required Minimum Arc Rating of PPE (cal/cm2) N/A (1.2) 4 8 25 40

Typical Protective Clothing Systems

0 1 2 3 4

Non-melting, flammable materials (natural or treated materials with at least 4.5 oz/yd2) FR pants and FR shirt, or FR coverall Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants and FR coverall Cotton Underwear, plus FR shirt and FR pants and multiplayer flash suit

This example should NOT be used for final calculations. For actual applications, the calculated incident energy must be compared to specific PPE combinations used at the facility being evaluated. The exception to this is the upper limit of 40 cal/cm2. While PPE is available in ATPV values of 100 cal/cm2 or more, values above 40 cal/cm2 are considered prohibited due to the sound, pressure and concussive forces present. Above 40 cal/cm2 these forces are more significant than the thermal values. It may be unfortunate that some PPE manufacturers have adopted these categories when promoting their PPE. In doing so these manufacturers label the PPE for any value within the category range. Therefore a garment with an 8.2 calorie/cm2 rating can be labeled HRC2 (Hazard Risk Category 2) even though the Category 2 can go up to 25 calories. NFPA 70E also contains an example set of Hazard/Risk Category Classifications that defines the PPE classification based on voltage and task being performed. These are not recommended for use since they assume the same combinations of PPE used in the example table. Additionally, some of the task/categories recommended do not make logical sense (i.e. removing a cover is determined a higher risk category task than directly working on the energized equipment). Also, the fine print notes and other notes indicate that the actual incident energy might be higher or lower based on higher or lower fault currents or clearing times. An alternate calculation method is included in NFPA 70E Annex D (D.1 through D.7). This method is based on earlier testing that differentiated the effect on incident energy when an arc in contained in a box versus open air. However this method is limited to low voltage (600V and less) applications. In addition to flash protection, NFPA 70E also defines requirements for shock protection and safe distances for qualified and unqualified personnel. These include: Flash Protection Boundary. An approach limit at a distance from exposed live parts within which a person could receive a second-degree burn if an electric arc flash were to occur. Appropriate flash-flame protection equipment must be utilized for persons entering the flash protection region. This distance may be outside or inside the following shock protection distances. Limited Approach Boundary. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live part within which a shock hazard exists. A person crossing the limited approach boundary and entering the limited region must be qualified to perform the job/task.
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Restricted Approach Boundary. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live part within which there is an increased risk of shock, due to electrical arc over combined with inadvertent movement, for personnel working in close proximity to the live part. The person crossing the Restricted approach boundary and entering the restricted space must have a documented work plan approved by authorized management, use PPE that is appropriate for the work being performed and is rated for voltage and energy level involved. Prohibited Approach Boundary. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live part within which work is considered the same as making contact with the live part. The person entering the prohibited space must have specified training to work on energized conductors or live parts. Any tools used in the prohibited space must be rated for direct contact at the voltage and energy level involved.

Distances Approach FIGURE 2 NFPA specifies the approach boundary distances based on the voltage at the point being evaluated as follows: TABLE 2 Approach Distances versus Voltage
SYSTEM VOLTAGE 208V 480V 5kV 15kV FLASH HAZARD LIMITED APPROACH 42 42 60 60 RESTRICTED APPROACH AVOID CONTACT 12 26 26 PROHIBITED APPROACH AVOID CONTACT 1 7 7

ANALYSIS REQD ANALYSIS REQD ANALYSIS REQD ANALYSIS REQD

In order to meet the requirements of the standards referenced here, more than just a warning is necessary. The following are two examples of labels generated using the arc flash module in a power systems analysis software package.
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Complete Arc Flash Labels FIGURE 3 The left hand label indicates a Class 0 protection (using the NPFA 70E example categories) and the label on the right indicates prohibited work (incident energy is far above the 40 cal/cm2 limit for energized work). Note that in the right hand label, the text and the color of the label changes to indicate the prohibited status of location. The labels show the calculated flash protection boundary, incident energy and PPE category (with description). In addition to the incident energy information, the label also includes required glove classification and the shock protection boundaries required by NFPA 70E. Since these labels are part of a certified process, they include who performed the work and on what date. Summarizing the various standards discussed here yields the following requirements. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The arc flash hazard must be quantified Appropriate PPE must be selected for non-prohibited work The arc flash assessment results must be documented Personnel must be trained, understand the hazards, and take appropriate action. Analysis should be re-evaluated if the standards, PPE types, or system configuration changes.

IV. QUANTIFYING THE HAZARD The majority of electrical facilities have yet to implement an Arc Flash protection program or perform analysis on their systems. This presents a quandary for the personnel assigned to perform energized work. How to perform the work safely?

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The first question to ask is does the work qualify as energized work? Does the location require hardware to be removed or will the plane of the equipment be passed, and is the voltage present above 50 Volts. If so, then it is considered energized work. The next step is to determine if the area of work has sufficient energy to require arc rated PPE. If the equipment is rated 240V or less and is served by a 125kVA transformer or smaller, then it is considered Category 0 (does not require arc-rated PPE). If it is determined that energized work needs to be performed and the location may require arc-rated PPE then a hazard assessment must be completed. If sufficient lead-time exists before the start of a project the locations where energized work is to be performed can be evaluated and labeled with the appropriate incident energy/shock protection information (This would be a complete Arc Flash study). The alternative is for the worker to do a field assessment to determine what PPE is required. For low voltage equipment this can be done using the simplified equations in IEEE 1584 in either a hand calculation or a spreadsheet program. Medium voltage applications are more difficult since the available fault current may be harder to determine from the installed equipment (the transformer impedance is not the dominant impedance for medium voltage systems as it is for low voltage). In order to quantify the arc flash hazard using the IEEE methodology for a specific location the following items are required. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Available fault current at the location. Clearing time for the source-side protective device(s) at the calculated arcing fault current. Location type (open air, cable, switchgear) Working distance for energized work. APTV values for PPE combinations used at the site. Site specific issues and limitations (egress, process)

The first two items are generally obtained from short-circuit and protective device coordination studies. In order for the results to be accurate, the study must be complete and up to date. However, unlike most short-circuit and coordination studies, accurate installed source information instead of worst-case information is required. Using worst case fault duties could result in using a clearing time that is too short, yielding an incident energy value that is much lower than that with an accurate short circuit duty. The third through sixth items are generally obtained though investigating the installed equipment configuration. Working distances are generally set at 18 inches for low voltage locations. Medium voltage locations have working distances set based on procedures and equipment configurations. The ATPV values for PPE and combinations available are also required to complete the assessment. Site specific installation data is collected to take into account any installed conditions that may increase the hazard/risk. This can include continuous process or chemical installations where an arc fault may increase the risk of other hazards. It also must take into account the physical location with respect to egress. Locations where the flash hazard boundary exceeds the limits of an electrical vault or room, or are elevated, may increase the risk due to limited egress.

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Arc Flash Field Evaluation FIGURE 4 The figure above is an example of a low voltage field evaluation spreadsheet used to determine incident energy and required PPE using the simplified equations in IEEE 1584. This example uses minimal data to determine PPE levels (and includes a table to indicate minimum distances for all PPE levels). However, it is not as rigorous as a full analysis, and should not be used in place of a full study or to develop labels for locations evaluated. Complete data (either with field collected data or an existing short circuit and coordination study that is accurate and complete), should be used to perform a full analysis using the IEEE calculation method. Example: An infrared scan on 2000A 12.47kV switchgear lineup needs to be performed. The switchgear is protected by ANSI very-inverse curve overcurrent protection (CT 2000:5, Pickup 2000A (5A secondary), Time Dial 3), with a 5-cycle circuit breaker. The available fault current is 14kA. The worst case working distance is 24 inches when the cover is being removed. Determine the incident energy for this work. Using the IEEE calculation method the arcing fault currents (100% and 85%) are determined to be 13.51kA and 11.48kA. Looking up these currents in the manufacturers literature yields clearing times of 0.55s and 0.65s. Adding these times to the clearing time for the breaker and applying these values and the working distance yields a worst-case incident energy value of 16.6cal/cm2 and a flash protection boundary of 358 inches. This is a Class 3 location that would require a two layer arc-rated outfit (ATPV equal to or greater than the calculated incident energy) with hooded head protection, Class II (15kV) gloves, electrical work boots, and hearing and eye protection. Figure 5 below uses the example data in a spreadsheet to determine incident energy and required PPE using the IEEE 1584 equations.
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If this same equipment has buss differential protection the time can be reduced to the operating time of the relay and the clearing time of the breaker (approx 7 cycles). The incident energy is reduced to 2.9 cal/cm2 and the flash boundary to 60 inches.

Full Arc Flash Field Analysis FIGURE 5 When performing the assessment, it may be determined that some locations would require extreme protective equipment (i.e. a flash suit), exceed the rating of available PPE, or be classified a prohibited work area. Without modifying the equipment there are only two ways mitigation can be utilized to reduce the incident energy to workable levels to allow for energized work.
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Increasing the Working Distance The incident energy drops significantly over distance (proportional to the square of the distance in open air), increasing the working distance will reduce the incident energy. Working distance can be increased by using remote racking devices, remote operating devices, and extension tools (i.e. hotsticks). Example: Using the above example determine the PPE required by the operator of the infrared camera assuming a minimum 48 inch working distance. Substituting 48 inches into the calculations reduces the incident energy to 11 cal/cm2. Reducing the Clearing Time Since the incident energy is directly proportional to the clearing time, reducing the clearing time can significantly reduce the incident energy. Reducing the settings or adding instantaneous trips can reduce the incident energy. The changes need to be weighed against the impact on selectivity. An alternative to permanently lowering coordinated settings is to temporarily reduce settings for only the time during which on-line work is performed. Locations with microprocessor-based relays can be programmed to implement lower settings (i.e. an instantaneous setting just above the peak demand level) with a contact input, such as a front panel control and/or switch. The disadvantage of this technique is that it results in nonselective operation for downstream faults during the maintenance window. Lowering device settings is the least cost solution to lowering incident energy exposure, but is limited by the range of available settings that will still achieve selective operation. In medium voltage relaying, this can be achieved by changing the curve shape or lowering the time dial settings. Low voltage protection changes are more limited due the device characteristics. V. CASE STUDIES The need for Arc Flash studies and training is not limited to commercial/industrial facilities. They are needed in any location where energized work is necessary. This includes, but is not limited to hospitals, data centers, utility substations and distribution systems, office buildings, factories, and municipal facilities. The following case studies some typical applications and results from Arc Flash evaluations. Naval Base: Relay testing and on-line partial discharge cable testing needed to be performed at a naval station. The areas of work are the 69kV and 12kV substations and the 12kV distribution cables between the substations out to the pad mounted unit substations. Many of the substations have single door access with the protective relays in the same cubicle as the circuit breakers. Partial discharge cable testing will require removal of switchgear covers to access the conductors. Additionally, access to the conductors outside the substations will require entry into manholes and vaults. No Arc Flash analysis had been performed for the base. The 69kV and 12kV substations all have bus differential protection. All conductors between substations have pilot wire protection. Conductors to feeder unit substations have no pilot wire or differential protection. A hazard analysis was performed based on an existing short-circuit and coordination study, which was current and accurate. Without the differential and pilot wire protection incident energies in the substations and conductor runs between substations were as high as 16 cal/cm2. With differential and
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pilot wire protection incident energies are less than 2 cal/ cm2. Analysis of the conductor runs to the unit substations resulted in incident energies less than 4 cal/ cm2 for all runs within the scope of the project. Review of all locations to be worked on determined that standard turnout gear consisting of 8.2 cal/ cm2 rated coveralls with appropriate hand, eye, head and foot protection was sufficient for all areas. Waste Water Treatment Facility: Arc Flash hazard evaluations were performed for the distribution system which consists of 12kV fused switchgear and pad mounted switches, 5kV motor control centers, and 480V switchgear and motor control centers. Energized work is performed at all levels for infrared scans and meter readings are taken at all low voltage locations. Analysis indicated that all the medium voltage locations had incident energies below 5 cal/cm2. Low voltage locations had incident energies from below 1.2 cal/cm2 to above 40 cal/cm2. Settings were recommended to reduce the incident energies with minimal impact on selectivity. As a result only two locations (out of a total of 225) were labeled as prohibited for energized work. Review of the incident energies calculated determined that a standard uniform consisting of a 8.2 cal/ cm2 rated shirt and 11 cal/cm2 rated pants with appropriate hand, eye, head and foot protection was sufficient for approximately 170 locations where energized work was allowed. Around 30 locations required an additional layer consisting of 11 cal/cm2 rated coveralls and a 25 cal/cm2 rated hood. The remaining locations require a flash suit or PPE combination with a minimum 40 cal/cm2 rating. Beverage Bottling Facility: Arc Flash hazard evaluations were performed for the distribution system which consists of four 480V services that included 480V switchgear, panelboards and motor control centers. Energized work including infrared scans and meter readings are performed on all equipment. Fused main switches protect three of the four 480V switchgear locations. Analysis indicated these locations have calculated incident energies above 100 cal/cm2 and cannot be worked on energized. The fourth location is protected by a circuit breaker, and has calculated incident energies below 20 cal/cm2. Recommendations were made to upgrade the fused switches mains to circuit breakers to reduce incident energy to workable levels. Review of the incident energies calculated determined that a standard uniform consisting of a 8.2 cal/ cm2 rated shirt and 11 cal/cm2 rated pants with appropriate hand, eye, head and foot protection was sufficient for all but five of the locations where energized work was allowed. The remaining areas required an additional layer consisting of 11 cal/cm2 rated coveralls and a 25 cal/cm2 rated hood. CONCLUSIONS The requirement to perform Arc Flash evaluations can no longer be ignored. The methods to quantify this hazard exist, and as a result the standards require that action be taken to protect personnel who perform energized work and assure they are properly trained to recognize the hazards present. This paper has described the process of arc flash hazard analysis, including the calculation of incident energy levels in arc flash faults and selection of appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) levels. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety Requirement for Employee Workplaces, 2000 Edition 2. IEEE Guide for Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Standard 1584-2002. 3. NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2004 Edition.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES Christopher Inshaw is a Consulting Power Systems Engineer for Emerson Process Management, Electrical Reliability Services (formerly Electro-Test) in Fresno, CA. He received his BSEE degree from CSU Fresno. He is a Member of IEEE and a Registered Professional Engineer in California and Nevada. He performs power systems studies including Arc-Flash on all levels and types of power systems. Chris.Inshaw@emersonprocess.com Fred Toepfer is business development manager for Emerson Process Management Electrical Reliability Services. He received his BSEE degree from Louisiana State University and MBA from Vanderbilt University. He has over 25 years of sales and marketing experience in the power industry related to service and new product/business development. He is currently responsible for the arc flash solution business of Electrical Reliability Services in the US. Fred.Toepfer@emersonprocess.com

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APPENDIX 1: IEEE 1584 Calculation Method IEEE Std 1584-2002 contains calculation methods developed through testing by several sources to determine boundary distances for unprotected personnel and the incident energy at the working distance for qualified personnel working on energized equipment. The incident energy level can be used to determine the proper PPE required for personnel. The equations developed in the IEEE standard assess the arc flash hazard based on the available (bolted) fault current, voltage, clearing time, equipment type, grounding, and working distance. The working voltage is also used to determine other variables. The equations account for grounding, equipment type, and construction. This method can also determine the impact of some classes of current limiting low voltage fuses as well as certain types of low voltage breakers. The calculations can be applied over a large range of voltages. The many variables of this method make it the preferred choice for Arc Flash evaluations, but at the same time requires either a complex spreadsheet or computer program to be used efficiently. The calculations are summarized as follows: 1. Determine the Arcing Current For applications under 1000V

lg I a = K + 0.662 lg I bf + 0.0966V + 0.000526G + 0.5588V (lg I bf ) 0.00304G (lg I bf )

(1)

lg I a = 0.00402 + 0.983 lg I bf
Convert from lg

(2)

I a = 10lg I a
where: lg Ia K Ibf V G is the log10 is the arcing fault current (kA) is 0.153 for open configurations Is 0.097 for box configurations is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical RMS)(kA) is the system voltage is the gap between conductors, (mm) (See Table 1)

(3)

Calculate a second arc current equal to 85% of Ia, so that a second arc duration can be determined. 2. Determine the Incident Energy The following equations should be used for both values of Ia determined in the first step.

lg E n = K 1 + K 2 + 1.081lg I a + 0.0011G
E n = 10 lg En
x t 610 E = C f En x 0.2 D

(4) (5)

(6)

for locations where the voltage is over 15kV the Lee method is used.
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 t E = 5.12 x10 5 VI bf 2 D
where: En K1 K2 G E Cf is the incident energy (cal/cm2) normalized for time and distance is 0.792 for open configurations Is 0.555 for box configurations is 0 for ungrounded or high resistance grounded system is 0.113 for grounded systems is the gap between conductors, (mm) (See Table 1) is the incident energy (cal/cm2) is a calculation factor 1.0 for voltages above 1kV 1.5 for voltages at or below 1kV is the arcing time (seconds) is the distance from the possible arc point to the person (mm) is the distance exponent from Table 1 is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical RMS)(kA) is the system voltage

(7)

t D x Ibf V

The arcing time t is the clearing time for the source-side protecting device that clears the fault first. TABLE 1 Factors for equipment and voltage classes
System Voltage (kV) Equipment Type Open Air Switchgear MCC and panels Cable Open Air Switchgear Cable Open Air Switchgear Cable Typical gap between conductors (mm) 10-40 32 25 13 102 13-102 13 13-153 153 13 Distance x Factor 2.000 1.473 1.641 2.000 2.000 0.973 2.000 2.000 0.973 2.000

0.208-1

>1-5 >5-15

The incident energy is the worst case of the two values calculated (100 or 85% Ia). 3. Determine the Flash Boundary The flash boundary is the distance from an arcing fault where the incident energy is equal to 1.2 cal/cm2. For the IEEE Std 1584-2002 empirically derived model

t 610 DB = C f E n 0.2 E B
For the Lee method

1 x

(8)

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 t DB = 5.12 x10 5 VI bf E B
where: DB En Cf t EB x Ibf

(9)

is the distance of the boundary from arcing point (mm) is the incident energy (cal/cm2) normalized for time and distance is a calculation factor 1.0 for voltages above 1kV 1.5 for voltages at or below 1kV is the arcing time (seconds) is the incident energy in cal/cm2 at the boundary distance is the distance exponent from Table 1 is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical RMS)(kA)

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