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    Notes98 105

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    peach5
    The document discusses risk analysis and assessment. It defines risk quantitatively as the sum of the likelihood of hazardous events multiplied by the consequences of those events. Risk analysis generally involves three components: 1) identifying and characterizing hazardous events, 2) estimating the likelihood of events, and 3) estimating the consequences of events. The document then provides examples of quantifying risk and comparing perceived versus actual risk for different activities. It also outlines the typical steps involved in conducting a probabilistic risk assessment.

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    Notes98 105

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    peach5
    29 views9 pages
    The document discusses risk analysis and assessment. It defines risk quantitatively as the sum of the likelihood of hazardous events multiplied by the consequences of those events. Risk analysis generally involves three components: 1) identifying and characterizing hazardous events, 2) estimating the likelihood of events, and 3) estimating the consequences of events. The document then provides examples of quantifying risk and comparing perceived versus actual risk for different activities. It also outlines the typical steps involved in conducting a probabilistic risk assessment.

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    The document discusses risk analysis and assessment. It defines risk quantitatively as the sum of the likelihood of hazardous events multiplied by the consequences of those events. Risk analysis generally involves three components: 1) identifying and characterizing hazardous events, 2) estimating the likelihood of events, and 3) estimating the consequences of events. The document then provides examples of quantifying risk and comparing perceived versus actual risk for different activities. It also outlines the typical steps involved in conducting a probabilistic risk assessment.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    29 views9 pages

    Notes98 105

    Uploaded by

    peach5
    The document discusses risk analysis and assessment. It defines risk quantitatively as the sum of the likelihood of hazardous events multiplied by the consequences of those events. Risk analysis generally involves three components: 1) identifying and characterizing hazardous events, 2) estimating the likelihood of events, and 3) estimating the consequences of events. The document then provides examples of quantifying risk and comparing perceived versus actual risk for different activities. It also outlines the typical steps involved in conducting a probabilistic risk assessment.

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    98 RISK ANALYSIS Risk is dened as Risk =

    (likelihood of hazardous event i) (Consequence of hazardous event i )


    N n=1

    Risk analysis (assessment) is a technique for identifying, characterizing, quantifying and evaluating hazards. It generally consists of three components: 1. 2. 3. Identifying and characterizing hazardous events. Estimation of the likelihood of these events. Estimation of the consequences of events.

    To illustrate the rst two components using the event/fault-tree approach, consider the pressure tank example:

    99

    If the likelihood of the basic events are known, then the likelihood of a rupture occurring can be quantied. Consequences of the rupture can be various, including damage to the tank system, environment and possible loss of life. Since the consequence of an event can contain many components, risk is a vector quantity, in general. However, for simplication and comparative purposes, often a single measure is used.

    100

    101

    Fatal Accident Frequency Rate From Various Daily Activities (per 108 hour) Some Example Risk Proles

    102 Risk Perception and Acceptability While a quantitative measure has been dened for risk, risk perception is often based upon subjective judgement, beliefs and societal bias rather that objective measure. Generally, risk associated with unfamiliar and incorrectly publicized activities is perceived as much higher than its actual value. Risk of motor and aviation accidents is perceived to be 100 times lower. Risk of nuclear power and food coloring is over estimated by a factor of 10,000.

    Risk conversion and compensating factors must be applied to account for public bias against events that are unfamiliar (X 10), catastrophic (X 30) involuntary (X 100) uncontrollable (X 5-10) with immediate consequences (X 30).

    For example, the risk from nuclear power production in the U.S. is less than 103 early fatalities/year and the risk of ying is about 10 deaths/year. However, nuclear power production is regarded to have higher risk compared to ying because nuclear power is unfamiliar (103 10 = 102 ), nuclear accidents may have catastrophic consequences (102 30 = 0. 3) and is involuntary (0. 3 100 = 30). Similarly, the gure above shows that while the risk associated with working in a chemical plant and domestic activities such as eating, washing, dressing are about the same (2. 5 108 /hour vs. 3. 5 108 /hour) the latter risk is usually regarded as much less since it is familiar, voluntary and controllable. It is interesting to note that the public bias is consistent with results from Bayesian statistics. Suppose there is a debate about the safety of a new facility. The facility is designed to withstand accidents. It is estimated that an accident yields 1 fatality with probability 0.01 and 1 fatality with probability 0.99. However, if a defect exists in the design or construction an accident yields 100 fatalities with probability 0.99 and 1 fatality with probability 0.01 (i.e. catastrophic consequence). The public believes the and nonexistence of the defect are equally probable. Now consider what happens following an accident with 100 fatalities. Dene the events A: Defect exists B: 100 fatalities in the accident From the Bayes theorem

    103 P ( A| B ) = P ( B | A) P ( A) (0. 99)(0. 5) = = 0. 99. P ( B| A) P ( A) + P ( B| A) P ( A) (0. 99)(0. 5) + (0. 01)(0. 5)

    Then once the accident with 100 fatalities occurs the public may be justied in thinking that the probability of a defect in the design/construction is high and hence future accidents will also yield 100 fatalities. The Chernobyl incident is a good example to this bias (but not the number of fatalities). The next two tables illustrate the difference between the technical expert and lay public to risks.

    104

    105 Steps in Conducting a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 1. 2. Methodology Denition: Includes required computer codes, facility experts and analytical experts and provides a road map for the analysis. Familiarization and Information Assembly: Acquiring a general knowledge of the physical system layout, administrative controls, maintenance and test procedures and safety systems. Physical interactions among all major systems should be identied. Past major failures and abnormal events should be noted and studied. Identication of Initiating Events: Delineation and grouping of external and internal off-normal conditions. Combine into different groups the initiating events that 4. directly break all hazard barriers, break the same hazard barriers (not necessarily all the barriers), require the same group of mitigating personnel or automatic actions, simultaneously disable the normal process as well as some of the mitigating human or automatic actions.

    3.

    Sequence or Scenario Development: Description of the probabilistic consequence evolution such as by using the event/fault-tree approach with computer codes modeling the relevant processes. Dependent Failure Considerations: Identify items that are similar such as similar pumps, valves, diesel generators. susceptible to common cause failure (e.g. devices powered by the same source), functional dependencies (e.g. generator is driven by the turbine).

    5.

    6.

    Failure Data Analysis: Determine generic failure data for each component in the fault-trees, test, repair, outage data (from experience if available), frequency of initiating events from experience, expert judgement or generic sources, common cause probability for similar items.

    6. 7.

    Quantication: Quantication of the event/fault trees using Boolean algebra as discussed earlier. Damage Assessment: Quantication of consequences using, for example, atmospheric dispersion codes and medical data for pollutant leakage into the atmosphere.

    106

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