Wireless LAN Security: 802.11b and Corporate Networks
Wireless LAN Security: 802.11b and Corporate Networks
Wireless LAN Security: 802.11b and Corporate Networks
This low cost, combined with strong performance and ease of deployment, mean that
many departments and individuals already use 802.11b, at home or at work – even if IT
staff and security management administrators do not yet recognize wireless LANs as an
approved technology. This paper addresses the security concerns raised by both current
and upcoming 802.11x network technologies.
Wireless LANS may actually prove less expensive to support than traditional networks
for employees that need to connect to corporate resources in multiple office locations.
Large hotel chains, airlines, convention centers, Internet cafes, etc., see wireless LANs
as an additional revenue opportunity for providing Internet connectivity to their
customers. Wireless is a more affordable and logistically acceptable alternative to wired
LANs for these organizations. For example, an airline can provide for-fee wireless
network access for travelers in frequent flyer lounges – or anywhere else in the airport.
Market maturity and technology advances will lower the cost and accelerate widespread
adoption of wireless LANs. End-user spending, the primary cost metric, will drop from
about $250 in 2001 to around $180 in 2004 (Gartner Group). By 2005, 50 percent of
Fortune 1000 companies will have extensively deployed wireless LAN technology based
on evolved 802.11x standards (0.7 probability). By 2010, the majority of Fortune 2000
companies will have deployed wireless LANs to support standard, wired network
technology LANs (0.6 probability).
Reality Check
For the foreseeable future wireless technology will complement wired connectivity in
enterprise environments. Even new buildings will continue to incorporate wired LANs.
The primary reason is that wired networking remains less expensive than wireless. In
addition, wired networks offer greater bandwidth, allowing for future applications beyond
the capabilities of today’s wireless systems.
Although it may cost 10 times more to retrofit a building for wired networking (initial
construction being by far the preferred time to set up network infrastructure), wiring is
only a very small fraction of the cost of the overall capital outlay for an enterprise
network. For that reason, many corporations are only just testing wireless technology.
This limited acceptance at the corporate level means one or a small number of access
Finally, the 802.11b standard shares unlicensed frequencies with other devices,
including Bluetooth wireless personal area networks (PANs), cordless phones, and baby
monitors. These technologies can, and do, interfere with each other. 802.11b also fails
to delineate roaming (moving from one cell to another), leaving each vendor to
implement a different solution. Future proposals in 802.11 (802.11g, in particular)
promise to address these shortcomings, but no shipping products are on the immediate
horizon.
The following diagram depicts an intranet or internal network that is properly configured
to handle wireless traffic, with two firewalls in place, plus intrusion detection and
response sensors to monitor traffic on the wireless segment. One firewall controls
access to and from the Internet. The other controls access to and from the wireless
access point. The access point itself is the bridge that connects mobile clients to the
internal network.
The access point has a dedicated IP address for remote management via SNMP. The
wireless clients themselves – usually laptops or desktops and handhelds – may also use
SNMP agents to allow remote management. As a result, each of these devices contains
a sensor to ensure that each unit is properly configured, and that these configurations
have not been improperly altered. The network itself is regularly monitored to identify
access points in operation, and verify that they are authorized and properly configured.
While this paper focuses on the risk issues from a corporate network perspective, these
same issues apply to home networks, telecommuters using wireless, and “public use”
Known Risks
Although attacks against 802.11b and other wireless technologies will undoubtedly
increase in number and sophistication over time, most current 802.11b risks fall into
seven basic categories:
Insertion attacks
Interception and unauthorized monitoring of wireless traffic
Jamming
Client-to-Client attacks
Brute force attacks against access point passwords
Encryption attacks
Misconfigurations
Note that these classifications can apply to any wireless technology, not just 802.11b.
Understanding how they work and using this information to prevent their success is a
good stepping stone for any wireless solution.
Insertion Attacks
Insertion attacks are based on deploying unauthorized devices or creating new wireless
networks without going through security process and review.
Unauthorized Clients – An attacker tries to connect a wireless client, typically a
laptop or PDA, to an access point without authorization. Access points can be
configured to require a password for client access. If there is no password, an intruder
can connect to the internal network simply by enabling a wireless client to
communicate with the access point. Note, however, that some access points use the
same password for all client access, requiring all users to adopt a new password every
time the password needs to be changed.
Unauthorized or Renegade Access Points – An organization may not be aware that
internal employees have deployed wireless capabilities on their network. This lack of
awareness could lead to the previously described attack, with unauthorized clients
gaining access to corporate resources through a rogue access point. Organizations
need to implement policy to ensure secure configuration of access points, plus an
ongoing process in which the network is scanned for the presence of unauthorized
devices.
There are two important considerations to keep in mind with the range of 802.11b
access points. First, directional antennae can dramatically extend either the transmission
or reception ranges of 802.11b devices. Therefore, the 300 foot maximum range
attributed to 802.11b only applies to normal, as-designed installations. Enhanced
equipment also enhances the risk. Second, access points transmit their signals in a
circular pattern, which means that the 802.11b signal almost always extends beyond the
physical boundaries of the work area it is intended to cover. This signal can be
intercepted outside buildings, or even through floors in multistory buildings.
Wireless Packet Analysis – A skilled attacker captures wireless traffic using
techniques similar to those employed on wired networks. Many of these tools capture
the first part of the connection session, where the data would typically include the
username and password. An intruder can then masquerade as a legitimate user by
using this captured information to hijack the user session and issue unauthorized
commands.
Broadcast Monitoring – If an access point is connected to a hub rather than a switch,
any network traffic across that hub can be potentially broadcasted out over the
wireless network. Because the Ethernet hub broadcasts all data packets to all
connected devices including the wireless access point, an attacker can monitor
sensitive data going over wireless not even intended for any wireless clients.
Access Point Clone (Evil Twin) Traffic Interception – An attacker fools legitimate
wireless clients into connecting to the attacker’s own network by placing an
unauthorized access point with a stronger signal in close proximity to wireless clients.
Users attempt to log into the substitute servers and unknowingly give away passwords
and similar sensitive data.
Jamming
Denial of service attacks are also easily applied to wireless networks, where legitimate
traffic can not reach clients or the access point because illegitimate traffic overwhelms
the frequencies. An attacker with the proper equipment and tools can easily flood the 2.4
GHz frequency, corrupting the signal until the wireless network ceases to function. In
addition, cordless phones, baby monitors and other devices that operate on the 2.4 GHz
band can disrupt a wireless network using this frequency. These denials of service can
originate from outside the work area serviced by the access point, or can inadvertently
arrive from other 802.11b devices installed in other work areas that degrade the overall
signal.
Client-to-Client Attacks
Two wireless clients can talk directly to each other, bypassing the access point. Users
therefore need to defend clients not just against an external threat but also against each
other.
File Sharing and Other TCP/IP Service Attacks – Wireless clients running TCP/IP
services such as a Web server or file sharing are open to the same exploits and
misconfigurations as any user on a wired network.
Misconfiguration
Many access points ship in an unsecured configuration in order to emphasize ease of
use and rapid deployment. Unless administrators understand wireless security risks and
properly configure each unit prior to deployment, these access points will remain at a
high risk for attack or misuse. The following section examines three leading access
points, one each from Cisco, Lucent and 3Com. Although each vendor has its own
implementation of 802.11b, the underlying issues should be broadly applicable to
products from other vendors.
Server Set ID (SSID) – SSID is a configurable identification that allows clients to
communicate with an appropriate access point. With proper configuration, only clients
with the correct SSID can communicate with access points. In effect, SSID acts as a
single shared password between access points and clients. Access points come with
default SSIDs. If not changed, these units are easily compromised. Here are three
common default passwords:
“tsunami”
Cisco Aironet 340 series 11MBPS DSSS Wireless Lan Access Point
Cisco Aironet 340 series 11MBPS DSSS PCI Card with 128-bit encryption
“101”
3Com AirConnect 11MBPS Wireless Lan Access Point
3Com AirConnect 11MBPS Wireless PCI Card
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) – WEP can be typically configured as follows:
No encryption
40 bit encryption
128 bit encryption
All three access points mentioned above have WEP turned off. Although 128 bit
encryption is more effective than 40 bit encryption, both key strengths are subject to
WEP’s known flaws.
SNMP Community Passwords – Many wireless access points run SNMP (Simple
Network Management Protocol) agents. If the community word is not properly
configured, an intruder can read and potentially write sensitive data on the access
point. If SNMP agents are enabled on the wireless clients, the same risk applies to
them as well.
By default, all three access points are read accessible by using the community word,
“public”. 3Com access points allow write access by using the community word,
”comcomcom”. Cisco and Lucent/Cabletron require the write community word to be
configured by the user or administrator before the agent is enabled.
Configuration Interfaces – Each access point model has its own interface for viewing
and modifying its configuration. Here are the current interface options for these three
access points:
3Com access points lack access control to the Web interface for controlling
configuration. An attacker who locates a 3Com access point Web interface can easily
get the SSID from the “system properties” menu display. 3Com access points do
require a password on the Web interface for write privileges. This password is the
same as the community word for write privileges, therefore 3Com access points are at
risk if deployed using the default “comcomcom” as the password.
Client Side Security Risk – Clients connected to an access point store sensitive
information for authenticating and communicating to the access point. This information
can be compromised if the client is not properly configured. Cisco client software
stores the SSID in the Windows registry, and the WEP key in the firmware, where it is
more difficult to access. Lucent/Cabletron client software stores the SSID in the
Windows registry. The WEP is stored in the Windows registry, but it is encrypted using
an undocumented algorithm. 3Com client software stores the SSID in the Windows
registry. The WEP key is stored in the Windows registry with no encryption.
Wireless Security Policy and Architecture Design – Security policy, procedures and
best practices should include wireless networking as part of an overall security
management architecture to determine what is and is not allowed with wireless
technology.
Treat Access Points As Untrusted – Access points need to be identified and evaluated
on a regular basis to determine if they need to be quarantined as untrusted devices
before wireless clients can gain access to internal networks. This determination means
appropriate placement of firewalls, virtual private networks (VPN), intrusion detection
systems (IDS), and authentication between access point and intranets or the Internet.
Wireless network searches can identify unauthorized access points by setting up a 2.4
GHz monitoring agent that searches for 802.11b packets in the air. These packets may
contain IP addresses that identify which network they are on, indicating that rogue
access points are operating in the area. One important note: This process may pick up
access points from other organizations in densely populated areas
Wireless Client Protection – Wireless clients need to be regularly examined for good
security practices. These procedures should include the presence of some or all of the
following:
Managed Security Services for Wireless – Managed Security Services (MSS) helps
organizations establish effective security practices without the overhead of an extensive,
in-house solution. MSS providers handle assessment, design, deployment, management
and support across a broad range of information security disciplines. This 24/7/365
solution works with the customer to set policy and architecture, plus provides emergency
response, if needed. These services help an organization operating wireless networks
to:
Deploy firewalls that separate wireless networks from internal networks or the Internet
Establish and monitor VPN gateways and VPN wireless clients
Maintain an intrusion detection system on the wireless network to identify and respond
to attacks and misuse before critical digital resource are placed at risk.
Product Updates – Internet Security Systems’ X-Force research and development team
continually adds product enhancements that deliver new protections against wireless
LAN risks. The first of these checks is available now as an X-Press Update™ for Internet
Scanner.
Copyright © 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
Internet Security Systems the Internet Security Systems logo, Internet Scanner, RealSecure, SecureU, X-Force and X-
Press Update are trademarks, and SAFEsuite a registered trademark, of Internet Security Systems, Inc. 3Com and
AirConnect are registered trademarks of 3Com Corporation. ORiNOCO is a trademark of Agere Systems. Aironet is a
registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc. Other trademarks and trade names mentioned are marks and names of their
owners as indicated. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners and are used here in an editorial
context without intent of infringement. Specifications are subject to change without notice.