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Northeastern Political Science Association
Rationalism &Political Responsibility: Just Speech &Just Deed in the "Clouds" &the "Apology" of Socrates Author(s): Michael Zuckert Source: Polity, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter, 1984), pp. 271-297 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234508 . Accessed: 24/10/2013 17:59
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Rationalism &Political Responsibility:JustSpeech &JustDeed in the Clouds& the Apologyof Socrates MichaelZuckert
Carleton College
Almost a quarter century before the Athenians tried Socrates for impiety and for corrupting the youth, Aristophanes, the comic poet, had made similar accusations against him in his play, the Clouds. Reading Plato's Apology, the principal account of Socrates' trial, alongside the Clouds, Michael Zuckert observes that the two works are similar in structure, and that the Apology is a response to Aristophanes' claim, implicit in his criticism of Socrates' that rationalism is politically irresponsible in addition to being defective as an avenue to knowledge. The structural similarity may also aid our understandingof why Socrates' defense failed, a matter that has troubled students since antiquity. Michael Zuckert teaches political science at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota.
Socrates was in his seventieth year when his native Athens brought him to trial on charges of impiety and corrupting the young. Nearly a quarter century earlier similar accusations had been made against him by the comic poet Aristophanes in his play, the Clouds.' Aristophanes' Socrates is himself impious, for he denies the very existence of the Olympian gods. He corrupts the young Pheidippides and makes him, from the point of view of the city's laws, unjust, by arming that young man with a defrauding rhetoric. Not the city as such, but the irate father, Strepsiades, resolves to punish Socrates for his impiety and corrupting influence. With the full approval of the Olympian god Hermes, and even of
1. References to the Clouds and the Apology appear in the text. All readers familiar with his book will recognize my heavy reliance on Leo Strauss' interpretation of the Clouds, in his Socrates and Aristophanes (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 11-53. I have used West's translation of the Apology, infra, n. 2.
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The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates
Socrates' new goddesses, the Clouds, Strepsiades burns down Socrates' "think-tank." When life imitated art, when Socrates was accused a second time before the city of impiety and corrupting the young, the result was not comic, but more nearly tragic. Socrates, not the comic fool of Aristophanes' play, but the universally admired philosopher of the platonic dialogues, lost not his think-tank but his life. While the trial of Socrates is perhaps life imitating art, the chief account of that trial, Plato's Apology of Socrates is, like all Platonic writings, itself art.2 I propose to pursue here those aspects of the Apology which we might characterize as art imitating art. That is, I shall explore some of the fundamental connections between the Clouds and the Apology, emphasizing two themes in particular. I shall first explore the Apology as a response to Aristophanes' critique of Socrates in the Clouds. While Socrates' most pressing need was to answer his legal accusers, he wanted also, perhaps in a deeper way, to present to the city of Athens, in the only public address of his career, a defense against Aristophanes' version of the danger of the philosophic life, so far as he could do so in that context (Apology 17d). Second, I shall argue that not only is the Apology a response to the Clouds, but that Plato, art imitating art, has taken the most significant structural feature of the Apology from the Clouds. An appreciation of the relationship between the two works should further our understanding of the Apology and resolve some of the controversy that has always surrounded it. The insights that arise from juxtaposing the Clouds and the Apology of Socrates may be used to explicate two issue that have, in recent years, engaged students of the Apology. Since at least Burnet's commentary, we have been aware of the ironical character of this seemingly simple text. While Socrates claims to be a stranger to the courts, unfamiliar with the procedures and manner of speaking there, he goes on to deliver a speech which imitates, if ironically, the standard courtroom speech. As R. E. Allen, following Burnet, notes, the Apology is "a rhetorical
2. Plato, Second Letter 314c. Cf. Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 81; Thomas West, Plato's Apology of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979, pp. 76-79, 220; Leo Strauss, "On Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito," in Essays in Honor of Jacob Klein (Annapolis, Md.: St. Johns College, 1976), p. 155; R. E. Allen, "Plato's Earlier Theory of Forms," in Gregory Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor Books, 1971), p. 319 n.; Catherine H. Zuckert, "In Defense of Political Philosophy: An Examination of Plato's Apology of Socrates" (M.A. thesis University of Chicago, 1966), p. 7; James Redfield, "A Lecture on Plato's Apology," Journal of General Education 15 (July 1963): 106.
Michael Zuckert 273
parody of rhetoric." 3 He adds that, as such, it represents only "the first level of irony in Socrates' speech of defense." 4 Now to find a work or a speech ironic is to find that it does not mean just what it says in the way it says it. But what guides our interpretation of an ironic text? Surely many things, but not least structure. Structure tells the truth in ways that the surface may not. At the least, structure supplies us with a solid, one might say skeletal, mooring in the text by which we may orient ourselves towards it. Thus, I shall argue, the structural insight the Clouds offers us into the Apology can help overcome the wide variety of different readings which have appeared following recognition of the prominence of irony in the dialogue. The other issue I hope to elucidate here is the very difficult substantive question of why Socrates' defense failed. And, given that failure, what is its meaning? This is surely the central problem raised in the dialogue, and it is one to which many different solutions have been proposed. Two opposite views have emerged very recently. R. E. Allen, for example, presents what we might call the pious interpretation of Socrates' failure: he failed because of the defectiveness of the jury. He practices the true "philosophic rhetoric," which is mistaken by his ignorant jurors for "base rhetoric." He tells the truth, but they wish only flattery and pandering.5 At the other extreme, Tom West seems to see Socrates' failure resulting more from his own defects: he cannot make good his boast of possessing an art of education or legislation; he only "mockingly and haltingly pointed the way," while it was Plato who executed Socrates' "philosophic education," and who was thus able to supply the successful defense that Socrates himself could not. Socrates is too "theoretical" to know the "practice" of any art, and especially the educational art. His is the way of the seeker, who seems either unable or unwilling to codify his way of life and make it respectable... He is unable to lay down the foundations of a new order. His philosophy tries and fails to be more politically effective.... Only when Socrates is transfiguredand resurrected by the art of Plato does he appear to obtain the forcefulness and confidence of one who knows ... [It is] Plato's own rhetorical Socrates
3. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 5, 6; cf. also Redfield, "A Lecture," pp. 97-100; West, Plato's Apology, Ch. 1. 4. Allen, Socrates, Ch. 1. 5. Ibid.
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... who became the new teacher of Greece and eventually of the western world.6 Placing the Apology in the context of the Clouds as I do should help us decide which, if either, of these very different accounts of Socrates conviction deserves credence.7 Finally, we will also see that the Apology is the proper introduction to the political philosophy of Plato, but is only that, an introduction, requiring to be supplemented, above all, by the Republic. I. The Aristophanic Critique The Apology responds both explicitly and implicitly to the Aristophanic critique, which Socrates first cites early in his speech, while referring to the strong and old prejudice against him that he thought pervaded much of Athens, and much of his jury. Those who share this prejudice say of him that he "does injustice and is meddlesome, by investigating the things under the earth and the heavenly things, and by making the weaker speech the stronger, and by teaching others these same things" (19b). Thinking, no doubt, of the scene in the Clouds where he is suspended in his basket "contemplating the sun," while his students delve and dig into the earth beneath him, Socrates reminds his audience that You yourselves also saw these things in the comedy of Aristophanes: a certain Socrates was borne about there, asserting that he was treading on air, and spouting much other drivel. (19c) Socrates' most explicit response to Aristophanes is to insist that of the things said by the Aristophanic Socrates, he "comprehends nothing, either much or little" (19c). He invites his listeners to say whether any of them ever has seen or heard him doing or speaking of such things. 6. West, Plato'sApology,pp. 77, 119, 124, 157, 170, 177, 180, 212, 218-221, 231-232.
7. We might identify a third position in the recent literature, that of James Beckman, who implies that Socrates was found guilty because he was guilty. Whatever gestures he may have made in his speech toward traditional religion, Socrates' philosophical beliefs actually represent a thoroughgoing break with traditional religion, a break which the jury sensed or understood. The reader of the present essay will see that I accept many of Beckman'sconclusion. But he has no place for Socrates' deliberate provocativeness, nor his effort to assimilate his philosophical pursuitsto traditionalreligious beliefs. See, James Beckman, The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought, (Waterloor, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1979), pp. 58-60, 63, 64, 174, 179-181.
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Certainly Socrates' denial coheres with the portrait of his activity in the Platonic dialogues. He philosophizes by conversing with men, not by experimenting; he discusses the virtues, love, the good city, not the hum of gnats or the motion of the stars. Yet the denial is quite unclear in some respects. Does he mean merely that he knows nothing, and never did, of the "drivel" spouted in the Clouds, and that he does nothing, and did nothing, like the ridiculous things Aristophanes depicted him as doing? Or does he mean that he never had anything to do with investigations in natural philosophy? While Socrates, at the time of his trial, may not have engaged in the naturalistic philosophizing shown in the Clouds, his well-known autobiographical sketch in the Phaedo suggests that when younger, perhaps around the time the Clouds was produced, he did so. When I was young, I had a wondrous desire for the wisdom that they call inquiry about nature; this appeared to me to have lofty aims ... and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of such questions as these: Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts? And I went on to examine the... things of heaven and earth. As Socrates indicates in the sequel, he later turned from this sort of philosophy to the conversational inquiries for which he remains known. Yet this "pre-Socratic" Socrates, while perhaps not quite as absurd, does provide some basis for the Aristophanic portrayal. Indeed, Socrates emphasizes the link between the two when he asks, among other questions: "Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? Or perhaps, nothing of this sort" (Phaedo 96a). He surely means to remind his listeners of the explanation the Socrates of the Clouds offers for his habit of sitting in a basket: I never could have rightly searched out celestial matters if I did not suspend my judgment and mingle my intellect with its kindred air. (Clouds 228-30) So clear is the connection between the Aristophanic Socrates' views on the nature of thought and the surmises of the early Platonic Socrates that it is difficult to understand Kenneth Dover's claim that "the intellectual autobiography put into Socrates' mouth in the Phaedo is not evidence" for the view that Aristophanes caricatures Socrates as he was in his younger days.8 Given his own description of his earlier interests,
8. Kenneth Dover, "Socrates in the Clouds," in Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 67-68. Cf. Hegel's judgment: History of Philosophy, ed. Haldane (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1812), Vol. I, pp. 428-429.
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Socrates' reply in the Apology that he "has no share in these matters" may accurately describe his current situation, but it hardly applies to his past9 (Apology 10c-d). As Socrates says in the Phaedo, and as he soon says in the Apology, at some point in his career his interests changed, he gave up the sort of inquiries about nature he describes in the Phaedo, and took up instead his conversational inquiries. Only then did he go into the city to share his investigations with the citizens (21b-24b). He is perfectly safe therefore when he invites his jurors "to teach and tell each other, as many of [them] as have heard [him] conversing... if any of [them] ever heard [him] conversing about such things [natural philosophy], either much or little" (19d). Of course they had not, for only before his "turn" did he consider "such things," and his activities then were not public.'0 Socrates' implicit response to Aristophanes goes much farther. But to understand it, we must understand more fully the point of Aristophanes' attack. In the play, it will be recalled, a man named Strepsiades, on the verge of bankruptcy because of the debts run up by his horse-loving son, turns to Socrates for help. The latter, together with his chief companion Chaerophon and some other students, resides in a "phronteriston" or "think-tank" where they pursue studies in natural science (Clouds 14373). Strepsiades is hardly interested in these mysteries of nature; he seeks out Socrates to learn the other great branch of Socratic science, rhetoric. Strepsiades wishes to acquire the kind of knowledge that will enable him to defraud his creditors in court (Clouds 23946). During this instruction, Socrates introduces Strepsiades to his new gods, the Clouds, who, together with the gods Chaos and Tongue, replace the entire pantheon of previous gods. Socrates teaches that the Clouds, not Zeus, are responsible for the fearsome heavenly phenomena, but that, unlike Zeus, their celestial actions have nothing to do with justice (Clouds 364-407, but cf. 626). Since there is no divine support for justice, Socrates is free to teach, and Strepsiades to pursue, the kind of rhetoric that seeks to defraud. But Strepsiades proves a most unsuitable student. Too old, too foolish, with too weak a memory, he "flunks out" soon after he comes to Socrates (Clouds, 627-30, 784-90). His new friends, the Clouds, advise him to send instead his son, Pheidippides, a younger, quicker man, with real
9. Compare the lengthy discussion of this issue in Beckman,Religious Dimension, pp. 11-13; 189-213, summarizingthe scholarly discussions by Burnet, Taylor and other luminaries of Plato scholarship. 10. With some differences of emphasis, the above essentially agrees with West, Plato's Apology, pp. 84-92.
MichaelZuckert 277 naturaltalents in the mimeticarts (Clouds 794-96, 877-81). Pheidiplife, but he pides at first despises Socratesfor his indoor and sedentary soon comes to admirethe latter and learnsfrom him to value the intellectual life much more than his previous attachmentto horsemanship. (Clouds 102-104, 823-33, 870, 1399-1405). In additionto learning how to defraud creditors,he learns to defend father-beating, motherbeating, and perhaps,even incest (Clouds 1409-446). He is a comical versionof Oedipus,freedfromthe sacredrestraints againstpatricideand incest. When Pheidippides thatnot only attemptsto proveto Strepsiades but also mother-beating is just, the latter returnsto his father-beating senses and therewithto the old piety and justice. With the blessing of the Olympiangod, Hermes,and even with thatof the Clouds,Strepsiades acts in behalf of justice to burn down Socrates'"think-tank" (Clouds 1448-1510). has it, is incompatible with the requirePhilosophy,as Aristophanes ments of political and social life, even when practicedby a man dedicated to truth, like his Socrates,ratherthan by men dedicatedto gain like so many of the AthenianSophists (Clouds 245-47). Politicallife to philosrequiresattitudes,virtues,and beliefs which the commitment if it does not rejectoutright. The city is builton attachophy undermines ments-to one's place, people, family,city-based mainlyif not entirely on the fact they are one's own. WitnessStrepsiades' attachment to his fromeverything son as his own. Philosophyrequiresdetachment merely one's own. Witnessthe Socratics' lack of family,goods, and concernfor the city. The city is built on a caringfor the here and now, and the conto the temporalin favor of the tingent;philosophyon an indifference as eternal and necessary.The Socratesof the Cloudsgreets Strepsiades to a "creature is of a day" (Clouds223); an ephemeral he Socrates being, a distractionfrom his contemplationof the nonephemeral,the sun. NeitherSocratesnor his studentspay the slightestattentionto the political situation-the war with Sparta,whichis very muchpresentin Strepawareness. siades',and also in Aristophanes', Human life in general,as well as the city, requiresthe cultivationof certainhabits and virtueswhich philosophycounters.For the Socratics the earth itself is of much less interestthan what is above and below it; fool that he is, remembers of all hualwaysthe dependence Strepsiades, man life on the earth, its products and its cultivationby man. The Socraticsare mindlessof all necessities,it seems, until necessityforces itself upon them. They neither plan nor provide for their own sustenance, actingas thoughthey shareonly in the airystuffof thoughtrather need for food reminds than the earthystuff of body. Their unavoidable the audience,if not the Socraticsthemselves,of how ignorantthey are
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of their own nature and its requirements. They could learn something And they forget not only the physicalnecessitiesbut from Strepsiades. the political and moral ones as well. If the city is a necessaryfact of humanexistence, as Aristophanesseems to insist it is, then the moral qualitieswhich make politicallife possible are also necessary.If war is a fact, or potentialfact of humanexistence,as Aristophanes also seems to insist, then the moral qualities,strength,and disciplinewhich make men capable of defendingthemselvesare necessary too. All this the Socraticsheed not (e.g. Clouds 185-217). whole sets of beliefs which Political life requires,most importantly, the philosophers challengeand usuallycontradict-above systematically of justiceand of the taboosand all, beliefin the gods and the sacredness restraintsthat maintainthe family and the city. These beliefs, while necessary,can hardly bear the scrutinyof philosophy'scritical reason (Clouds 246-51, 364-426, 626, 1372ff).11Shouldphilosophysucceed in supplanting it could neverreplacethemwith them, says Aristophanes, thatwouldservethe samefunction. anything treatsphilosophycomically,however,becausehe thinks Aristophanes that on the whole the incompatibility betweenphilosophyand the city poses a greaterdangerto philosophythan it does to the city. In the first place, his Socratesis a ratherisolatedfigure,unknownand of little interest to most of the city, and despisedby those membersof the upper class who do know of him. But, more importantly, whateverSocratic reason may say, men know, or come to realize "in their bones," the truthsthat philosophychallengesor denies. Justiceand the sacredwill which reestablish themselves,and in doingso turnagainstthe philosophy them. At the end of the is he silenced; proves challenges play Strepsiades unableto respondto his son's rationalarguments, but is drivenby those or their conclusions,to see, or ratherto feel, that these very arguments, threaten most dearto him. He cannotanswerwith "speeches" everything but the more he all answerswith a deed, the destrucspeech, confidently to be sanctioned tion of the Socraticschool, which deed he understands of the The Clouds nature of the city and warns Socrates the by gods. what he and his kind have to fear of it, as much as it warnsthe city considersa "secular city"then againstthe foolish Socrates.Aristophanes to be an impossibility. In sum, the Aristophanic critiqueallegesthat philosophy,or rationalis in that it is, so far as it can be, simply ism, politicallyirresponsible or even hostile to the requirements indifferent of human political life. In being politicallyirresponsible, it is also irresponsible towardsits own
11. Cf. Beckman, Religious Dimension, pp. 58, 172-174.
MichaelZuckert 279 commitmentsto knowledge,and is especiallydeficientwith respect to knowledgeof the conditionsfor its own thriving. II. Art Imitating in the Cloudsandthe Apology Art: Structure in the Apology is not so The more deep-goingresponseto Aristophanes much the explicit reply as the implicitargument containedin the structural featuresPlato takes over from the Clouds.The high point of the Clouds, as in most of the Aristophaniccomedies,is a contest or agon, in this case between a personified Just Speechand a personified Unjust in the silencingof the Just by the Unjust,and thus Speech, culminating in the victory of the Unjust Speech. That contest is repeatednear the end of the play when Strepsiades the Just Speechin a debate personifies with his son Pheidippides, who represents the UnjustSpeech.The result of the second contest is much the same as that of the first: Strepsiades is silencedby his son's unjustargument in favorof fatherbeating.Twice beaten in argument, assertsitjustice,now in the personof Strepsiades, self in action againstSocrates.There is a noticeablerhythmto the play then-contest betweenJust Speech (defeated) and UnjustSpeech (victorious), followed finallyby a violent actionin favor of justicerequired by its apparentinabilityto supplya reasonedspeechin its favor.12 The Apology, with a slightbut important the modification, reproduces rhythm of the Clouds. Early in his defense speech Socratesraises an that "one of you mightretort"to what he has been saying. "objection" He characterizesthat hypotheticalinterventionas follows: "Whatthe speakerspeaks is just," i.e., is a just speech. Socratesdoes not characterize his own reply to this retort,but examination revealsit to bearsurto the UnjustSpeechof the Clouds.Later,he introprisingresemblances duces a similar hypotheticalintervention by "someone"which he calls "not noble."He says of his own reply, "I wouldrespondto him with a not only his assumption of the role of the just speech" (28b), suggesting Just Speech but also that the intervener's is speech unjust as well as are the two in the defense speech where These instances ignoble. only Socrates introducesan imaginaryinterlocuter who challengesor questions him, so as to give his speech the characterof a response,and to give a dialogic or even agonisticqualityto these parts of a work which is, for the most part, so undialogic.These are also the only two instances where languageso clearly echoing the decisive contests of the Clouds appearsin the Apology. They suggestthat, as in the Clouds,we findthe
12. On the significance of silence in Aristophanes, see Stanley Rosen, Plato's "Symposium"(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Ch. 5.
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rhythm of the Apology in alternating just and unjust speeches. In the first exchange, "one of you" personifies the Just Speech and Socrates, surprisingly perhaps, the Unjust Speech. The second exchange, reversing the order of the Aristophanic model which the first exchange had followed, finds "someone" taking the part of the Unjust Speech while Socrates apparently has the last word in his Just Speech. Strepsiades' deed on behalf of justice followed the last word secured by the Unjust Speech in the Clouds. The Apology seems to reverse that when not Socrates but the city has the "last deed," an unjust deed, the condemnation of Socrates, in response to his last word secured on behalf of the Just Speech. The following diagram may aid the reader in visualizing the structural pattern under discussion here:
First Round Second Round Third Round
Clouds JustSpeech-Unjust Speech Apology JustSpeech("oneof

you") (20c-d)-Un-
Just JustSpeech(StrepStrepsiades' Deed siades)-Unjust speech(Pheidippides) UnjustSpeech("some- City'sUnjustDeed

one") (28b)-Just ORSocrates'
justSpeech(Socrates) (20d-24b)
Speech(Socrates) 28c-35d)
NobleDeed13
We can understand much of both the Clouds and the Apology if we grasp the significance of the similar patterns in both. The inability of the Just Speech to defend itself against the Unjust Speech, to establish itself via a justifying discourse is not, for Aristophanes, evidence that "there is no justice," as his character, the Unjust Speech, believes. Instead, he interprets this situation as showing the superiority of the poetic over the philosophic mode of understanding, or the limits of rational discourse. The awakened reason questions the authority and credibility of all received claims about how men should live. It automatically adopts a critical attitude: are the teachings of traditional piety and justice consistent and plausible? Are they supported by adequate reason? When the pious and the just are faced by rationalist challenge, they are unable to supply an adequately reasoned discourse. Strepsiades is forced to accept Socrates' naturalistic account of the celestial phenomena and refutation of divine justice as rationally more satisfactory than his own traditional, pious account (Clouds 306-426). The Unjust Speech reduces the Just Speech to sputtering silence by easily turning the very materials of the tradition against the mortality they are to support (889-1104). And, finally, Pheidippides reduces Strepsiades to the same sputtering silence at the end of my argument. 13.Thislast cell in my chartcan only be explained
MichaelZuckert 281 with his slick arguments.It seems to be Aristophanes' view that tradition can never satisfactorily meet the challengesof awakenedreasonon the latter'sterms. froma distinctionwhich Secondly,awakenedreasontakes its bearings is altogetherforeign to the traditional the distincpious understanding, tion between nature and convention.It is not simply relativistic;the standardof nature,as Aristophanessaw it, is dissolvingof the city and its ways; like the Unjust Speech it pronouncespleasurethe good and therewith undercutsthe harsh virtues and self-disciplinerequiredfor political health. Most importantlyit decrees the city and, even worse, the familyto be merelyconventional: proofof the proposiPheidippides' tion that father-beating is just is that cocks beat theirfatherswithouta second thought.While the cocks do not form a properor naturalmodel for all human actions-it would not be naturalfor men to sleep on a perch as they do-they do providea propermodel for familyrelations, presumablybecause they reveal the truth that the family is not natural but entirely conventional(1427-1432). The intrinsically necessaryor desirable character of the familydoes not revealitselfto the eye of
reason.14
That is only to say, however,that reasonfails to see the whole truth. and The poet, who takes seriouslyall the particularity, interestedness, inwardnessthat the philosophicreason dismissesor ignores, first sees and then displaysthe truthsabout man, the gods, and justicefor which awakened reasonfindsno rationalproof. In the firstinstanceStrepsiades' action againstSocrates,and in the second the Cloudsas a whole, are the just answers to the argumentsof the Unjust Speech which the Just Speech cannot properlyanswer.But the Clouds is not a speech in the actionand revealsits meansense. It displaysStrepsiades' philosophical of its its silences.The structure but through ing, conveys rightnessonly the Clouds clearly emphasizesAristophanes' claim: justice is, but there is no defensibleJust Speech. In mirroring the structureof the Clouds,but givingSocratesthe last word in his Just Speech,the Apology makesthe claim that the Socratic believed philosophilosophercan supply the Just Speech Aristophanes to be a of, speech groundingjustice that is not selfphy incapable refutable as the non-philosophicspeeches in favor of justice in the Clouds are. The Apology is then assertingthat Socrates possesses a politicalphilosophyin that it can benefitthe city ratherthan dissolveit. As Socratesclaimsin the Apology, he is "thegift of the god"to the city of Athens, a great, perhapsthe greatest,benefactorthe city has (30e).
14. Strauss,Socrates and Aristophanes,pp. 42-44, 48.
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But just as the last word in the Clouds was not the last thing simply, just as the failure of the Just Speech is capped by the success of the just deed, implying the limits of the (philosophic) Unjust Speech, so in the Apology the Just Speech gives way to a deed, implying the limits of the (Socratic) Just Speech. We must now turn to the Apology's speeches and deeds to understand the substance of the Socratic reply to the profound critique of philosophy in the Clouds. III. The Socratic Reply I: Socrates' Unjust Speech Surely the most immediately noteworthy aspect of the first exchange is that Socrates casts himself in the role of the Unjust Speech. At first glance his speech appears to be as far as possible from anything that might be called unjust. He explains how the prejudices against him arose in the course of his performing the mission imposed upon him by the message his friend, Chaerophon, had received from the god at Delphi. That mission, as Socrates understood it, required him to examine everyone in the city, or at least everyone with any solid pretension to wisdom, with respect to what they knew. He discovered, much to his distress, that they, like him, lacked all knowledge of the most important things, but unlike him, lacked also the awareness of their ignorance. Those whose ignorance he thus exposed responded angrily to Socrates' embarrassing questioning, especially since he attracted a train of young men who followed him, eager to see their elders put down by his questions. Even though he aroused the anger of men, he could not leave off his questioning because his "service to the god" had a higher claim on him. This "service to the god" may account for the ill-feeling against him, but it surely would not seem unjust, much less impious or corrupting. Indeed, Socrates presents himself here as the most pious of men, dedicating his life, at the cost of much poverty and unpopularity, to following where the god leads.15How can this speech, in any sense, be an Unjust Speech? His audience apparently had some doubt as to whether Socrates' story was true. Twice during this part of his speech he asks them "not to make a disturbance." Noting that he will "perhaps... seem to some of the audience to be joking," he prefaces the story of his "service to the god" with the insistence that he tells "the whole truth" (Apology 20d). At the end, he reiterates that claim, but with one significant change: "This is the truth for you, men of Athens" (24a). What, one must ask, is the
15. Cf. Gerasimos X. Santas, Socrates (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 10; Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation, pp. 13-14.
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difference between "the whole truth" and "the truth for you?" Much later in the Apology, Socrates refers again to his Delphic mission, explaining to the jury that it would be impossible for him to "be silent," to give up his practice of discoursing and questioning. It is of all things [Socrates says] the hardest to persuade some of you about this. For if I say that this [keeping silent] is to disobey the god, and that because of this it is impossible to keep quiet, you will not believe me, since you will suppose I am being ironic. (Apology 37d-38a) Socrates admits that his story of the god might be unpersuasive: irony apart, the story of the oracle's "mission" is entirely unknown before his speech in court, and Socrates brings no witnesses forward to corroborate it. Nevertheless, the story is more persuasive than something else he might have said. But again, if I say that this does happen to be the greatest good for a human being, to make speeches every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me conversing, and examining both myself and others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being, you will believe me even less when I say these things. This is the way it is, as I affirm, men; but to persuade you is not easy. (37d-38a) Socrates means then, when he describes the Delphic story as "the truth for you," that it is, for his audience, a much more credible version of the impulsion behind his pursuit of the philosophic life than "the whole truth" that such a life is "the greatest good for a human being" and that "an unexamined life is not worth living." Or, perhaps better, it is Socrates' way of saying these very things to the multitude that stood before him.'6 Is telling the "truth for you" telling more of the truth? If the "whole truth" will necessarily be misapprehended because of the listeners' character and beliefs, is not an accommodation of the "whole truth" to them the only means whereby truth of any sort might be communicated? 17
16. Beckman, Religious Dimension, pp. 69-76, 171-181, provides an interesting account of how one might understand Socrates' pursuit of the philosophic way as "service to the god," while at the same time recognizing the story of the oracle as ironical. He does not, however, relate the story of the oracle to the context of a speech to the people of Athens. 17. A very fine example of this point is the story Leo Strauss retells from Al Farabi in "How Farabi Read Plato's Laws"; in What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 135.
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When Socrates characterized his way of life as service to the god at Delphi he was, to put it mildly, being ironic; one might even say that he lied. To lie about the god-is that not impiety? Does that not suggest disbelief in the god? The implicit characterization of Socrates' account of his mission as his Unjust Speech begins to seem more plausible. Moreover, upon examination, the story Socrates tells does not sustain the idea of his activity as divine mission. His friend, Chaerophon, portrayed as his closest companion in the Clouds, once asked the oracle whether there was anyone wisen than Socrates, to which the Pythia, according to Socrates, replied no. This divination did not necessarily impose a "mission" on Socrates. Only his peculiar interpretation did so -he could not believe the oracle and wished to "refute the divination" (21c). Like Oedipus, he sets off on his "wanderings,"in order to show that the oracle is false. Socrates' "service to the god" consists in an Oedipean rebellion against the god.18 Unlike Oedipus, however, Socrates does not answer riddles, but poses them. He questions those "reported to be wise" to see if they are indeed so. He begins with the politicians, for they take the leading role in making laws which set forth how men ought to live. Those who undertake such a task certainly ought to be wise about "the noble and the good" (21d), but Socrates discovers that they are not. He did not stop at learning for himself that these men lacked the wisdom they claimed; he "tried to show them that they supposed they were wise, but were not" (21c). This latter effort would not seem to have been required by the divination. There is a sense in which Socrates can be said to corrupt those he examines and even more the young ones who observe his questioning, and then imitate it. Since Socrates admits that he is unable to supply any of them with real knowledge to replace the supposed knowledge he strips away, one wonders whether he has made them, or anyone, better. Without real knowledge of how to live, do men not require at least the illusion of knowledge? 19 Or is it, as Socrates later says, that we do not
18. Cf. Republic V, Strauss, "On Plato's Apology," p. 169. Both W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Vol. III, p. 407, and H. W. Parke, Greek Oracles (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967), p. 85, believe that Socrates' response is both traditional and typical, in that the oracle usually "spoke in riddles." Socrates' reaction goes well beyond puzzlement, however, to denial-he means to "refute the oracle." Cf. Beckman,Religious Dimension, p. 71. 19. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, sect. 1-3, in Werke in Drei Banden, ed. Schlechta (Munich: Carl Ganser Verlag, 1962), Vol. I, pp. 211-230.
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even know that living is better than dying, and that therefore it must be a matter of indifference whether men live or die? (Apology 29a-b). In any case, he would seem guilty of corrupting young men when he teaches them to mock their elders, and slight those who are the most respected and authoritative in the city. Certainly, from the point of view of the city, Socrates would seem to admit to corrupting the young. Again, his Unjust Speech seems to be properly so named. But perhaps Socrates does make them all better off by publicly exposing the politicians' ignorance if, thereby, he shows them and others "that really the god is wise, and that... human wisdom is worth little or nothing" (Apology 23a). His work as a philosopher might then be pious not only in the sense of following the command of the god, but in the deeper sense of bringing men to realize the insufficiency of their own resources and their consequent need to depend on the god. According to this understanding, instead of stripping men of all guidance on how to live, Socrates should be seen as directing them to the wisdom of the gods. But how do men gain access to the gods' wisdom? Through the poets and diviners? No wonder that Socrates proceeds to examine the poets immediately following his examination of the politicians. But it is perhaps a surprise when he discovers that they are just as lacking in wisdom as are the politicians. "I quickly recognized that they [the poets] did not make what they made by wisdom, but by a certain nature and while inspired, like the diviners and those who deliver oracles. For they also speak many beautiful things, but they know nothing of what they speak" (22b-c). Contrary to what we might expect, that the poets and diviners say what they do out of inspiration, and not out of knowledge, speaks against them. Socrates' standard for judging the poets and diviners is entirely rationalistic. As James Redfield has noted, he "rejects the whole fabric of opinions that the community had gradually built up; he demands, in its place, a rational standard of action, a rational understanding of morality." 20 There is no knowledge but what reason warrants as such. Neither poets nor diviners possess anything deserving the name of knowledge. But then nothing they say can have credence as truth: Socrates must be skeptical of the entire content of Greek piety including, we must note, the Delphic oracle itself.21 Socrates says of the poets and diviners, for reasons we can readily grasp, that they say "many beautiful things," not many true things (cf. also 40b-41c). Their teachings have therefore no status for him.22 In
20. Redfield, "A Lecture,"pp. 103-104. 21. Cf. Santas, Socrates, pp. 54-56. 22. Cf. Hegel, History, Vol. I, p. 431.
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demanding reasoned discourse as the standard of truth, Socrates in his Unjust Speech takes exactly the position taken by the Unjust Speech in the Clouds, with the same dissolving effect. He concedes that Aristophanes is thus far correct in his accusations against the philosophers, even the conversational philosopher, the Platonic Socrates. The agreement with Aristophanes is shown in the absolutely daring, even Aristophanic, form in which Socrates makes his Unjust Speech: he presents his account of his rejection of the city's piety, including his rejection of the authority of oracles, as obedience to the oracle and as an act of deep piety. But there are limits to the agreement between the Platonic and the Aristophanic Socrates. Socrates of the Clouds openly, even zealously, proclaims his rejection of the city's gods. Socrates of the Apology does so only in the context of an apparent acceptance of at least part of the city's piety. Aristophanes' Socrates sponsors the Unjust Speech's demolition of the city's justice, and all the while he is indifferent to it; Plato's Socrates is not indifferent to the city's justice, and while he surely raises questions about it, he also exhorts his fellow countrymen to virtue, apparently at every opportunity (Apology 29d-31a). If they differ on nothing else, then, the Platonic and Aristophanic Socrates differ very much in the manner and context in which they present their break with the traditional pieties. Plato's Socrates tells "the whole truth" in the form of "the truth for you." His "whole truth" surely differs therefore from that of his comical counterpart. According to Aristophanes, Socrates not only damaged the health of the city, but his inquiry was less wise than poetry because it was extremely self-forgetting. His Socrates, for example, looked with contempt on all "ephemerals," without noticing that he himself was an ephemeral, and the knowledge he acquired was the knowledge of an ephemeral. Lacking self-knowledge he lacked knowledge of the whole, knowledge of others, and thus of his own actions. Lacking self-knowledge he did many foolish things, including his attempt to educate a fool like Strepsiades. For Socrates to devote himself to the service of the god at Delphi through his conversational philosophy could be properly understood as his attempt to remedy the defect in his self-knowledge brought out so forcefully in Aristophanes' play. Thus the whole story of the oracle at Delphi can also be said to be true, at least so far as Socrates might claim his conversational philosophy to be a service to the god. As Hegel says, "Socrates it was who carried out the command of the god of knowledge, 'know thyself.' "2 To take the motto seriously requires asking: what is it to know? what warrant do we have for any knowledge,
23. Ibid., I, 435; Cf. also Beckman, Religious Dimension, p. 73.
MichaelZuckert 287 much less self-knowledge?what sort of being is it for whom selfknowledgeis both a possibilityand a task?To obey the god is to become a philosopher,and therebyto questionor challengethe god. Such is the manifoldof Socraticirony, such is his truthtelling, that the "truthfor you" is indeed the "wholetruth." Socrates underlineshis rejection of Greek piety and the so-called knowledgeof the poets when he turnsto examinethe artisans.He finds that they "understand and in this thingswhich [he] did not understand, is way they were wiserthan [he]" (Apology 22d). The poets'knowledge thus lower than that of the humble artisans.Socrates'discoveryof the latter'spossessionof a genuineart, and genuineknowledge,indicatesat or ignorance, once the limitsto his skepticism and the natureof his standardfor knowledge(that is, the arts). But poetrydoes not qualifyas an art in this sense. The artisans'abilityreliablyto turnout the productof their respectivearts seems to vouch for their knowledge.The poets and oracles produce words only which cannot vouch for themselvesin the same way. Althoughthe artisans'knowledgeis limitedand does not extend to "the greatestthings,"itis nonethelessof great importance, for it demonstrates thereis knowledgeto be had. Wereknowledgeimpossible, or if one could not discernits possibility,the Socraticquest for knowis possible,Socratesis ledge would surelybe futile. But since knowledge over and againstthe poets justifiedin holdingto his rationaliststandard and oracleswho adhereto quitea different standard. IV. BetweenUnjustand Just:The City and the Necessityfor Philosophy Socrates'strong denigrationof the poets serves to introducethe scene which stands as a transitionbetween his Unjust Speech and his Just his acto cross-question Speech. Socratesnow exerciseshis prerogative the poet Meletos.He seemsto show that Meletos cusersby interrogating "knowsnothingof whathe speaks"(Apology 22c). One mightadd that more to accuseMeletosthanto clearhimSocratesuses the opportunity self of the chargeslodgedagainsthim. He even drawsup a formalindictmentof Meletos: I, men of Athens, assert that Meletos does injustice,because he jests in a seriousmatter,easily bringinghumanbeingsto trial, pretendingto be seriousand concernedaboutthingsfor whichhe never caredat all. (24c) to the two The two parts of Socrates'indictmentof Meletoscorrespond him.24 Meletos' of accusation parts against
two charges of Socrates' againstMeletos,however. explication
24. West, Plato's Apology, pp. 136-148. I do not agree altogether with West's
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Meletos does not "care" for the proper education of the young, because he believes or pretends to believe that Socrates is the only corrupter of the young, that everyone else in Athens benefits the young. That extreme statement makes sense only as an explication of the city's implicit claim that the laws make men good, and that all citizens make the laws.25Therefore, everyone except Socrates, who mocks the authority of the laws and their authors, makes the young better.26This implies that the laws are a sufficient condition of goodness, but of course they are not. There is, at the very least, the problem of Socrates himself; even Meletos would have to admit that. Moreover, Socrates himself would not voluntarily corrupt others, because to do so is to make them harmful to their associates, and surely Socrates would not act to bring harm to himself. Socrates, like all men, seeks the good. If he and others embrace something other than the good, it cannot be because they voluntarily and willfully turn their backs on it. He-and they-seek the good, but they may be mistaken about what it is. Therefore, needed above all is knowledge of the good. Genuine concern for the good of the city and especially of the young must culminate in philosophy, the systematic quest for knowledge of the good, which requires questioning received ideas about it. But Meletos prosecutes Socrates precisely because he, Socrates, engages in such a quest. Meletos must not genuinely care for what he claims to care for; otherwise he would urge all to philosophize as Socrates does. Philosophy seems as implicit in the city's commitment to make its citizens good as it was in the motto of the god at Delphi. When one thinks through Socrates' "proof" of his first charge againset Meletos, it becomes clear that the line between justice as the city and Meletos understand it, and the kind of injustice embodied in Socrates' Unjust Speech, is most difficult to maintain. Conventional justice seems to demand the sort of transformation into the philosophic quest that Socrates effects. The same is true of the city's piety, as Socrates makes clear in his "conviction" of Meletos on the charge that he (Meletos) "jests in a serious matter." From the point of view of the city, to question its gods is impiety. Given the dubious character of what the city and the poets say of the gods, such questioning is, of course, necessary for the philosopher. The city assumes that to question the gods is to deny the divine altogether; it is quick to believe that one who introduces "new gods" in fact accepts no gods. Why this closedness about the gods, this unwillingness to have divine things inspected closely? Is it not a kind of skepticism or
25. Cf. Redfield, "A Lecture,"pp. 102-103. 26. Cf. Hegel, History, Vol. I, pp. 442-444.
MichaelZuckert 289 even nihilismabout the gods, a fear or suspicionthat the mattersdivine will not bear examination? Those, like Meletos,who are the most eager to guardthe divine are those who, deep down, have the least confidence in it.27Thus, it is reallya jest for Meletos,the nihilistat heart,to prosecute Socrateson a chargeof impiety.As Socratessays at the very end of his defense speech, "For I believe, men of Athens, as none of my accusersdoes" (35d). He "believes," but he does not know.WereSocrates able to achievereliableknowledgeabout the divine,wouldthat not be a the nihilismandfear that gnawsat the greatboon to the city, overcoming hearts of men? In any case, it is Socrates'"belief"that gives him the strength,and perhaps the hope, to go forwardin his quest, in his inquirieseven into the "greatest things."As Socratessays later, if he gave "thenhe [Meletos]mightsay that I do not believein up philosophizing,
gods" (Apology 29a).
If one takes seriouslythose thingsthe city itself considersimportant, and pursuesthem intelligently, philosophyappearsas their culmination; it may also become, as in the Unjust Speech,their dissolution.It is the demandimplicitin each of these public commitments to become transformed into philosophythat serves as the transitionbetween Socrates' UnjustSpeechand his JustSpeech. V. The SocraticReplyII: Socrates' Just Speech Like the Unjust Speech in Aristophanes, Socrates' UnjustSpeechin the Apology insiststhat all traditional moralityandpiety dissolvein the light of reason. But he does not accept the thesis that thereis no justice.The promise of his Just Speech is to supportjustice on the basis of reason. Accordingly,the secondUnjustSpeech,the one to whichSocratesreplies with his Just Speech, accepts the view which the Unjust Speech in the Clouds maintained:self-preservation or more generally,pleasure,is the highestthing. In contrastto this, Socratesis to defendthe thesisthat a man "should not take into accountthe dangerof livingor dying,"but shouldonly consider "whether his actionsare just or unjust,andthe deedsof a good man or bad" (Apology 28b-c). Accordingly, while he had questionedeverythe poets said in his thing about the traditional morality,and everything UnjustSpeech,he now sides with the traditionand acceptsthe testimony of poets againsthis unjustinterlocutor. If the latteris correct,the heroes of Homer, especiallyAchilles, "wouldbe paltry,"for they chose a way of life that led to death. Socratesquotes,or rather,loosely paraphrases a
27. Cf. the speech of Aristophanesin Plato's Symposium.
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speech Achilles gave when challenged by his Mother over his choice to fight, and thus die soon, rather than withdraw and live long (Apology 28c-d). Socrates and Achilles, then, seem to agree, over and against the unjust interlocutor, that it is better to die than to live shamefully. Plato's Socrates thus seems to reverse one of the deepest thoughts of the Aristophanic Socrates, to say nothing of the Unjust Speech: no shame is worth dying for (Clouds 780-83). But, in considering Socrates' appeal to the example of Achilles, one must also take account of the latter's last word on his choice, delivered in the Odyssey.28 There Achilles in Hades tells Odysseus: "I would chose to be a serf on earth, and serve another, a man himself without portion whose livelihood is not great, rather than to be lord over all the dead who have perished." 29 "Death is worse than slavery," comments West; the shame of being a slave is preferable to the fate of death. Achilles' last word then supports Socrates' unjust interlocutor. The example of the great hero of traditional Greek consciousness shows traditional morality turned against itself. It endorses the thesis that it is better to die than face disgrace, but it also accepts the opposite. It is not reason that jeopardizes the traditional morality and justice: within the tradition, justice and morality are already fragile. Philosophy is not the only, or perhaps even the most important, source of the Unjust Speech. Its suppression will not secure justice against the threats of the Unjust Speech. Even in the Clouds this is clear, for while Socrates in a sense sponsors the
28. West, Plato's Apology, pp. 163-166, 229. Note also West's fine observation regardingthe Socratic importationof shame into the paraphraseof Achilles' speech to Thetis. West does not, however, see that the main point of that change derives from its connection to the Clouds. 29. Homer, Odyssey, Book XI, 11. 489-491. Plato, in a manner of speaking, calls attention to Achilles' last words when Socrates in his final speech to the jury recounts his own Odysseus-like journey to Hades where, among others, he sees Odysseus, Achilles' parallel Homeric character, and Agamemnon, Achilles' great enemy, but not Achilles himself. Socrates omits Achilles because Achilles in Hades denies the very point of Socrates' account of his trip to Hades: that "there could be no greater good than Hades" (Apology 40d). If Hades is as the stories present it, then Socrates can continue there what he does on earth-to converse with others about wisdom-but it would be better there than on earth. "For not only in other things are those there happier than those here: they are also deathless henceforth for the rest of time, at least if the things that are said are true (Apology 41c). The deathlessnessof men in Hades accounts for Achilles' great dissatisfaction with it. The meaning of his life, as a man of andreia, is entirely bound up in his willingness to risk his life. Only the backdrop of death gives his life meaning. This is simply not true of Socrates, whose way of life is choice-worthy even in the face of eternity. Perhaps Socrates gives a somewhat misleading impression of his philosophic activity when he earlier emphasizes its role facing death.
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two speeches, he does not present either of them as his own, nor for that matter is he even on stage while they debate. The Unjust Speech's arguments, moreover, retain a distinctly unphilosophic or traditionalist character, as opposed, for example, to the later reprise by Pheidippides. In the dialogue with Meletos, Socrates had suggested that the ordinary commitments of the city, when considered carefully, pointed to the philosophic life as their completion. He complements that thought here with the suggestion that the old ways are unstable by virtue of their own dynamic. The problem of death, the problem of the grounding of morality, the problem of the gods-these lie at the core of this fragility. The city, its gods and its justice, need support. If Socrates can supply that support he is indeed a great benefactor. Since it is the fear of death that undermines the just and the noble most powerfully, Socrates seems to find in his philosophizing, that is, in his knowing that he does not know and his showing others the same about themselves, the ground to overcome that fear and thus to secure the noble and the just far more effectively than the tradition had done. For to fear death, now, is nothing other than to seem to be wise, but not to be so. For it is to seem to know what one does not know: no one knows whether death does not happen to be the greatest of all goods for the human being, but they fear it as though they knew well that it is the greatest of evils. How is this not that reproachable ignorance of supposing that one knows what one does not know? But, now, perhaps I am distinguished from the many human beings also here in this, and if I were to declare myself wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this: that since I do not know sufficiently about the things in Hades, so also I do not suppose I know. But I do know that it is bad and shameful to do injustice. (Apology 29a-b) If Socrates could convice his fellow Athenians that they had no basis for fearing death, that would indeed work a moral revolution. But Socrates does not expect this to happen, and with good reason: he hasn't a very good argument. He seems to think that since death is perhaps the greatest good, men should not fear it. But perhaps it is not the greatest good, perhaps it is not a good at all; perhaps it is a great evil. In the face of this radical uncertainty about death, is it rational to face it with the equanimity Socrates recommends? Perhaps the uncertainty itself makes death even more fearful. Moreover, even if the only rational alternative is to suspend one's judgment about what death is, does it follow that one should not fear death or try to avoid it? Not if life is a good.30 This
30. Cf. West, Plato's Apology, pp. 229-230.
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is the consideration Socrates omits from the argument. One cannot help but think that this, like the story of the god, is an example of Socrates' noted irony: by way of reminding us of his radical ignorance, he rests his argument on his claim to know that "it is bad and shameful to do injustice." He knows the city also considers it to be bad and shameful to do injustice, but the question is what precisely grounds that judgment? Philosophy understood as knowledge of ignorance of death or other matters cannot ground justice. Yet Socrates does make as clear as possible that fear of death will not deter him from pursuing his chosen way of life: if the city set him the condition that he live if he stop philosophizing or die if he refuse, he would refuse. "As long as I breathe and am able to, I will not stop philosophizing" (Apology 29d). The activity of philosophy, not the mere awareness of ignorance about death or other matters, enables him to overcome his fear of death. If Socrates could get the entire city to philosophize perhaps he could secure justice. But he does not explain how this is so; nor does it matter, for he cannot persuade them to philosophize. The Athenians "care for having as much money as possible, and reputation, and honor, but they neither care nor think about prudence and truth, and how their souls will be the best possible" (29d-e). The crowd meets Socrates' charge with a clamor; it does not take much acquaintance with mankind to know he must be correct.31 He therefore makes not the slightest effort to persuade them to philosophize, and thus fails to prove the possibility that the philosophic activity itself can ground his Just Speech. VI. The Socratic Reply III: Socrates' Noble Deed Indeed Socrates turns away from speeches altogether, away from attempting to give the reasoned account in support of justice that the tradition could not provide. He turns instead to recounting his deeds. That turn is explained by something he says in the midst of his account: "I will offer great proofs of these things for you-not speeches, but what you know, deeds" (Apology 32a). The people as such respect-and can understand-deeds rather than speeches. Socrates, if indeed he possesses the Just Speech he claims to possess, cannot present it to his audience which is the many. He makes at best a half-hearted attempt to supply the promised Just Speech before he turns to his deeds. But he does not withdraw his claim to a Just Speech.
31. As with so many other issues raised in the Apology, the grounds for Socrates' judgment that the people cannot philosophize are most clearly and fully broughtout in Republic VI-VII.
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Socrates' Just Speech cannot then be a speech in the full sense, but only a description of his life and deeds in a way that might support his justice and service. Like the Clouds, the Apology culminates in a just deed which, however, has a rather different meaning in the two works. For Aristophanes, it bespeaks the ultimate muteness of justice, the irrational character of the whole, the supremacy of poetry over philosophy. For Socrates, it bespeaks not the inability of philosophy to generate a just logos, but the inability of philosophy to present that Logos to the city; it bespeaks not the inferiority of philosophy to poetry, but the continuing disproportion between philosophy and the city. If Socrates can make good his claim to have a Just Speech, then he can indeed be a benefactor as he claims he is, but his inability to present that Just Speech to the city means there must be real limits to his ability to benefit the city. If the political philosopher cannot convey his Just Speech to the public, then, it would seem, political philosophy cannot transform the city. The emergence of political philosophy transforms philosophy more than the political. Socrates offers descriptions of his life and deeds which are at best tokens of his Just Speech; they are not arguments. We need not dwell on these tokens. Unlike Aristophanes' Socrates, who openly mocks the city's justice, this Socrates constantly exhorts the citizens to virtue; he seeks not personal gain and sensual pleasure, but lives in "ten-thousand fold poverty." Under the democracy, and then under the oligarchy, this Socrates risked death by refusing to commit illegalities at the bidding of the rulers. But none of these tokens of his past life is enough; despite them he stands there on trial for his life. Perhaps their meaning is too ambiguous, or the tokens not forceful enough to make the point he wishes them to make. Is there a token, a deed, so strong and unambiguous that the people cannot misunderstand it? A token that will show them that his philosophy leads to justice rather than to injustice as they suspected was the case. Socrates' constant iteration of his willingness to risk death for philosophy and for justice surely suggests one such token-his death. To prove his point that through his philosophy he is just and can ground justice he can undergo death himself. Socrates' dying for his philosophy, while upholding at once his own justice and the justice of the city, can prove to the Athenians that philosophy is not the sort of thing they suspect it to be. If philosophy leads Socrates to die, willingly, then philosophy does not, as Aristophanes' and the Apology's Unjust Speeches did, decree selfpreservation the highest good. To complete his Just Speech before the city, to acquit philosophy from the charges leveled against it first by
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Aristophanes and later by his other accusers, Socrates must actually die; nothing less will do, for philosophy's identification with the thesis of the Unjust Speech can be decisively broken only if there remains no doubt about Socrates' stance toward that thesis. Socrates chooses to die that philosophy may live.32 In order to complete his Just Speech with his noble deed he attempts throughout his trial to provoke his jury to find him guilty, without ever conceding the charges against him. To the extent that he concedes those charges, as in his Unjust Speech, he does so only under cover, so to speak, of a more overarching submission to the city's piety. He was suspected of being a clever speaker. In his cross-examination of Meletos he makes that poor man look like a fool, but he himself looks all to clever, thus hurting his case in the eyes of many of his jurors. He strikes tones of arrogance and boastfulness, claiming to be the greatest boon to Athens ever, claiming to be too good to take part in the city's public life. When not doing that, he tears down his jurors: they do not care about justice or virtue, they wish only to make money; and so on. None of these provocations amounts to an admission of guilt, but they turn the jurors against him, provoke them to make Socrates a martyr for philosophy, and therefore to prove that philosophy recognizes goods higher than pleasure and preservation. When he is found guilty, he is invited, as Athenian law provides, to propose a punishment other than the death penalty which his prosecutors asked. Socrates instead responds as though the city has just awarded him a great honor; he proposes that the city publicly support him with meals in the Prytaneum, just as it honors winners at the Olympic games, so that he will have more leisure to pursue his philosophic activity. Again, Socrates provokes them in such a way as to leave them little choice but to vote for death. And more jurors vote for the death penalty than voted initially to convict him (Apology 36b-37a). VII. Conclusion Reading the Apology in light of the rhythmic structure of the Clouds allows us to understand much more clearly the problem to which the Apology is addressed and the meaning of the condemnation of Socrates.
32. Cf. West, Plato's Apology, p. 160. West does not go so far as I do in the direction of interpretingSocrates' actions as a choice for death, probably because that line of interpretationconflicts with the more dominant thrust of his argument in terms of the defectiveness of Socrates' philosophy. Even as muted in his text the conflict between the two lines of interpretationis problematic for his argument.
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It reveals Socrates' actions at his trial as an effort to reconcile philosophy and the city so far as possible. That insight in turn helps us understand not only the peculiarly immodest or provocative way in which Socrates presents himself but also the immoderately modest way in which he presents philosophy. It is clear that he shows only one face of philosophy to his auditors-it is the awareness of ignorance, not knowledge. He thus minimizes the resentment the non-philosophic multitude might have toward the philosopher. The non-philosophic need not feel any great resentment over their own exclusion from an activity which produces only knowledge of ignorance. They need not envy or fear philosophers for they are only harmless eccentrics. Socrates thus increases the possibility of peace between the many and the philosophers. We are led to question the usual inference drawn from the negative description of philosophy in the Apology compared to that contained in other dialogues such as the Republic or Symposium. Most Plato scholars posit, on the basis of these facts, an "early Plato," author of the Apology, close to the historical Socrates in doctrine, and various "later Platos," who have moved more or less away from authentic Socratic teachings. The foregoing analysis would suggest that, not Plato's development, but rather the context of Socrates' dramatic aims at his trial and the thematic concerns of the dialogue account for the strikingly austere portrait of philosophy in the Apology. Understanding Socrates' condemnation as analogous to Strepsiades' just deed makes the trial's outcome stand out quite clearly. Socrates' culminating deed, which amounts to courting suicide, refutes the portrait of the Aristophonic Socrates, for whom suicide was the most foolish thing of all. If we reflect on this awesome Socratic deed, we can see that both West and Allen have missed important aspects of its significance. As West says, Socrates' condemnation tells us something about the limits of Socratic speech; as Allen says, it speaks to the limits of Socrates' jury, or more accurately, of the non-philosophic many. But they both fail to understand the fact of, and the reasons for, Socrates' provocativeness at the trial. They fail to see the significance of Socrates' last deed following on, or replacing, his Just Speech. The non-philosophic many remain non-philosophic, that is, resistant to philosophy, and attached to a prephilosophic way of understanding the world and living their lives. The philosopher remains committed to his break with the pre-philosophic, but alive to the subtle continuities and dependencies that tie him to his fellows. He is also aware of the untransformabledifference between himself and his kind, on the one hand, and the non-philosophic many on the other. Socratic philosophy co-exists with the city in a far more complex relationship than Aristophanes portrayed in the Clouds: it is both at war
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with the city in that it remains philosophy, and at peace with the city in that, absorbing Aristophanes' preachments, it comes to grasp itself as the activity of an "ephemeral." It thus recognizes what it shares with other ways of life, and adapts its public posture to the continuing disproportion between itself and those other ways of life. Socrates may claim to know only that he does not know, but that does not prevent him, for example, from urging the citizens to virtue at every opportunity. Reading the Apology with the aid of the structural principle of the Clouds helps us see that Socrates' condemnation does not mean that he lacks the knowledge on which to base a public or political rhetoric, as West believes, but precisely the opposite-that he possesses such knowledge. The Socratic philosophy makes peace of a sort with the city by taking the position, through its claim to a Just Speech, that it is not indifferent or hostile to the city and its needs. But the city retains an old and deep-seated prejudice against not only Socrates but against philosophy as such. The issue in the Apology is not, as West and Allen seem to believe, why Socrates did not "get off," for the strong suggestion of the dialogue is that without his provocative behavior he could have done so. Allen attributes Socrates' conviction to the jury's desire to be flattered by an unjust rhetoric which Socrates refuses to practice. He notices Socrates' provocativeness, including his unwillingness to follow the most elementary rules of rhetoric, rules that would not require him to practice the false or dishonest rhetoric criticized in the Gorgias. But Allen is unable to account for these features of the Socratic defense.33According to him, Socrates' aim was to gain neither conviction nor acquittal, but to tell the truth in accordance with justice, let the chips fall where they may. Acquittal could only have been obtained by a defense which would have amounted to abject pandering.34 Because Socrates says that he could have avoided conviction had he engaged in the kind of flattery the jury expected, Allen concludes that such flattery was the only way in which he could have escaped conviction (Apology 38d). That surely does not follow. Moreover, Socrates' unwillingness to engage in that kind of flattery does not begin to explain the provocativeness of his discourse. One can strike a middle ground between provocation and flattery, and "this Socrates does not do," as Allen himself sees. The Apology suggests that Socrates could have "gotten off" by being
33. Allen, Socrates, p. 8. 34. Ibid., p. 14.
Michael Zuckert 297
less provocative, but had he done so he would not have mitigated the strong prejudice against philosophy that existed in Athens and elsewhere. He provoked a crisis between philosophy and the city so that through his death the two might be reconciled as much as possible. His defence speech proves the depth of his understanding of the many and the political rhetoric it takes to sway them. Contrary to West, Plato succeeds in his defence precisely because Socrates "failed" in his.
35. Cf. Strauss, "On Plato's Apology."

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Northeastern Political Science Association

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 273

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 275

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

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The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 283

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 285

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 291

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 293

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 295

The Clouds & the Apology of Socrates

Michael Zuckert 297

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