UNITED

NATIONS E
Distr.
Economic and Social GENERAL
Council E/CN.4/2000/10
27 September 1999

Original: ENGLISH

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Fifty-sixth session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda

QUESTIONS OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL

FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD

Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation

of human rights in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 2 3

I. FINDINGS OF THE KOSOVO EMERGENCY OPERATION . . . . . 3 - 81 3

A. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 6 3

B. Displacement and deportation of ethnic

Albanians from Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 28 4

C. Killings/executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 42 8

D. Violence against women and children . . . . . . 43 - 50 10

E. Arbitrary arrest and detention . . . . . . . . . 51 - 60 11

F. Torture and mistreatment . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 - 67 12

G. Destruction of property . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 - 70 13

GE.99-15803 (E)
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CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page

H. Confiscation of property . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 - 74 14

I. The KLA factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 14

J. Impact of the armed conflict on civilians . . . 76 - 81 14

II. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROLE OF OHCHR IN KOSOVO

AFTER 10 JUNE 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 - 89 16

A. Return to Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 - 83 16

B. Cooperation and coordination with

other actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 16

C. Visits to Kosovo by the High Commissioner

and the Special Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . 85 - 86 16

D. Human Rights Advisory Unit of the Office

of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 - 88 17

E. OHCHR-Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 17

III. THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOSOVO AFTER

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNMIK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 - 128 18

A. Return of refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 - 91 18

B. Exodus of ethnic minorities from Kosovo

and “ethnic concentration” . . . . . . . . . . . 92 - 97 18

C. Humanitarian evacuation from Kosovo . . . . . . 98 - 100 19

D. Violations of human rights of

minority groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 - 110 19

E. Missing persons and the identification

of dead bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 - 112 21

F. Administration of justice - the judiciary . . . 113 - 118 22

G. Detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 - 122 23

H. Human rights consequences of the war outside

of Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 - 128 23

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 - 131 24

V. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 - 146 25

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Introduction

1. The situation of human rights in Kosovo has lately been the subject of
continuous attention of the members of the Commission on Human Rights and the
international community. At the outset of the crisis, in March 1999, the
High Commissioner dispatched a personal envoy to the area along with
Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, the Special Rapporteur. The High Commissioner also
established the Kosovo Emergency Operation (KEO) with deployments in Albania,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Podgorica (Montenegro, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)). The purpose of these deployments was to
register concern for the human rights situation then prevailing in Kosovo and
to gather first-hand information about those violations for the purpose of
accountability. During the fifty-fifth session of the Commission, the High
Commissioner submitted weekly reports as the situation evolved. Since the end
of the Commission, she has also visited the area on two occasions.

2. In its resolution 1999/2, the Commission requested the High Commissioner

to report to it urgently on the situation of human rights and the humanitarian
crisis relating to Kosovo and on the implementation of the provisions of its
resolution. Pursuant to this request, the High Commissioner submitted a
report to the Commission on 31 May (E/CN.4/2000/7). The High Commissioner is
now submitting a consolidated report which has a triple purpose: to present
to the Commission the major findings of the Kosovo Emergency Operation,
drawing on its database for the collection and analysis of information; to
update the Commission on the evolving human rights situation in Kosovo; and to
offer some observations and recommendations for consideration. The first part
of the report deals with the situation prior to the withdrawal of Serb forces
from Kosovo on 10 June; the second part deals with the situation from June to
August 1999.

I. FINDINGS OF THE KOSOVO EMERGENCY OPERATION

A. Methodology

3. OHCHR-KEO sought to interview refugees of diverse geographic

backgrounds, with a view to achieving an overall picture of the human rights
situation in Kosovo. In order to be able to verify facts and reports of
violations, corroborate testimonies and reconstruct patterns of violations,
efforts were made also to interview a reasonable number of refugees from each
geographic location.

4. Priority was given to quality as opposed to quantity. OHCHR staff,

including human rights monitors provided by the Governments of Switzerland and
Norway, conducted a total of 273 in-depth interviews in Albania and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while another OHCHR team gathered information
in Montenegro. Considerable time was spent in each interview in order to
build trust and get the witnesses/victims to provide many details which, in
turn, were useful to assess the reliability of the information provided.

5. From the moment they left their houses to the moment they crossed the
border to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Albania, refugees lived
an odyssey through the mountains and villages of Kosovo, witnessing and/or
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suffering countless human rights violations. By conducting in-depth

interviews, OHCHR has sought to obtain full accounts of the events witnessed
and abuses suffered by the interviewees.

6. The use of the database has been crucial to identifying all the
interview records referring to the same events, comparing them with each other
and obtaining a reliable reconstruction of the facts.

B. Displacement and deportation of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo

7. Human rights violations were among the root causes of the mass exodus of
more than 1 million ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Out of 273 refugees
interviewed, only 1 reportedly left his village out of fear of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) bombs, while all the others described how they were
compelled, either by direct violence or by intimidation, to leave their homes.

8. Different patterns of displacement and deportation emerged from the

interviews conducted by OHCHR-KEO. Trends of displacement vary considerably
from area to area. Cases which are particularly significant both for the
number of people involved and for the events which accompanied the
displacement and deportation are reported below.

1. Pristina

9. Twenty-six per cent of refugees interviewed by OHCHR-KEO were habitual

residents of the municipality of Pristina. After NATO launched the air
campaign, the security situation in the streets of Pristina deteriorated
rapidly and some of the inhabitants decided to leave owing to the general lack
of security. However, numerous interviewees also reported that a
comprehensive and systematic expulsion campaign was begun at the end of March
by Serb military and police units in predominantly Albanian neighbourhoods of
Pristina 1 and adjacent villages. 2

10. In the majority of cases Albanians were expelled from their apartments
during house-to-house raids conducted by Serb forces. Many interviewees
reported being escorted to the railway station and then forced onto trains
heading for the border. It appears that a corridor was left open by Serb
forces for people to flee to the Golak and Lap regions, with some people even
being ordered to flee in that direction. Some interviewees estimated that
more than 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) headed for these regions
from the municipalities of Pristina and Podujevo. In mid-April, Serb forces
undertook a major offensive in these regions, well known for being strongholds
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The inhabitants and the large IDP
population were targeted directly and the attacks resulted in a large number
of civilian casualties. 3

11. The inhabitants of the Golak and Lap regions, together with IDPs, were
forced by these attacks to head for Pristina. When IDPs reached Pristina, the
police ordered Podujevo residents to go back to their homes while the other
IDPs were allowed to remain. Many of them eventually decided to go by train
or by bus from Kosovo Polje to the border of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia owing to harassment, intimidation and abuse by groups of Serb police
and paramilitary personnel.
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2. Podujevo

12. Ethnic Albanians were forcibly displaced from Podujevo municipality by

methods similar to those used in the municipality of Pristina. In the town of
Podujevo, Serb troops evicted Albanians from their homes at gunpoint, while a
significant number of villages with predominantly Albanian populations 4 were
shelled and later entered and destroyed by infantry forces. These operations
were systematically undertaken in the period March/April and caused a large
influx of IDPs to the Lap and Golak regions. Many people from Podujevo were
sheltering in the villages of Kolic and Mramor at the time when Serb forces
attacked these villages in mid-April.

3. Mitrovica

13. In Mitrovica, Albanian intellectuals and political activists were

targeted, soon after the beginning of the NATO bombing campaign, according to
a list allegedly prepared by the police with the help of Serb civilians. Some
were evicted from their homes by the police while others went into hiding
after receiving reports of deliberate killings of Albanian intellectuals.

14. The Ibar river divides the town of Mitrovica in half: the northern side
was predominantly Serb, the southern predominantly Albanian. IDPs interviewed
by OHCHR described a system of ill-treatment of Mitrovica’s Albanian
population that combined wholesale violence, harassment, and a uniquely
strategic process to support intimidation and forced expulsion. During the
war food was available only on the northern or “Serb” side of the city, and
the road to obtain food, narrowed to one path because of the bridge, was a
gauntlet of attack and humiliation.

15. Serb police and paramilitary forces launched an extensive ethnic

cleansing operation in Mitrovica town and surrounding villages on 15 April.
Some 70,000 Albanians were rounded up in the centre of Mitrovica and
eventually forced to walk for several days towards the Albanian border,
escorted by paramilitary troops. When the convoy reached Gremnik, the
paramilitary troops ordered thousands of IDPs back to Mitrovica, while the
rest were deported to Albania.

16. From the beginning of May onwards, paramilitary troops started raiding
Albanian homes in Mitrovica and surrounding villages. People were rounded up
in large numbers and young men were arrested, detained, interrogated, and some
eventually deported by bus to Albania.

4. Orahovac

17. A few days before the beginning of the NATO air campaign, paramilitary
groups launched an offensive against several villages in the municipality of
Orahovac. Attacks intensified towards the end of March. During the offensive
inhabitants and IDPs sheltering in the area were forcibly evicted from their
homes and, in some instances, ordered under threat to leave for Albania. IDPs
were then escorted to the border or forced into buses going to Prizren, from
where they were ordered to walk the remaining distance to the border.
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18. Reportedly, several thousand 5 IDPs were rounded up in the town of

Belanica and prevented from escaping by encircling attacks on villages 6 in
adjacent areas. At the beginning of April, Serb forces eventually entered
Belanica and forced residents and IDPs to walk towards the Albanian border.
Some days later, paramilitary and police forces undertook a brutal military
offensive in the village of Pusto Selo. All the remaining villagers and IDPs,
mostly women and children, were expelled from their homes and rounded up in a
field. Women and children were ordered to walk to Ratkovac and from there to
Albania.

5. Lipljan

19. In mid-April, army and police forces together with local Serbs started
an offensive against several villages in the area. 7 Serb forces
systematically burned down Albanian houses. Local Serbs painted the symbol of
Serb unity 8 on the walls of Serb-owned houses in Slovinje to have them spared
from arson.

6. Urosevac

20. In Urosevac the police targeted Albanian intellectuals, such as trade

union leaders, journalists, prominent members of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) and civil rights activists. Some of them were forced to flee to
avoid persecution. Upon their departure their houses were destroyed. The
office of the LDK, the non-governmental organization “Mother Theresa”, and the
former office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) were blown up. At the end of March some of the neighbourhoods of
Urosevac were shelled by regular army (VJ) forces, while Serb military troops
undertook house searches in another part of the town, evicting people and
subsequently setting their houses on fire.

21. At the beginning of April, VJ troops together with paramilitary forces

undertook a massive offensive against a considerable number of villages 9 in
the municipality. Some villages were shelled 10 and then entered by
paramilitary infantry who set abandoned houses on fire. Inhabitants of these
villages 11 fled to Urosevac town, where Albanians were allegedly denied the
right to buy food in shops. The lack of food further pushed IDPs to leave by
train or by bus for the border.

7. Suva Reka

22. Immediately after the beginning of the NATO campaign, paramilitary

forces undertook a brutal offensive against the Albanian population in the
city of Suva Reka. People were systematically driven from their homes during
a three-day offensive and many houses were destroyed. Paramilitary troops
forced most of the population to leave in different directions. 12 Serb forces
repeatedly attacked the villages of the municipality in April and at the
beginning of May. During these attacks, inhabitants were displaced and
gathered in KLA-controlled areas in the mountains. 13 Serb forces repeatedly
shelled these positions forcing the KLA to withdraw and to leave the group of
IDPs behind. Serb forces entered the area in the middle of May and IDPs were
forced to move to Suva Reka. The arrivals were directed to the bus station
and taken by bus to the Albanian border. 14
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8. Glogovac

23. VJ and special police, together with paramilitary groups, started a

large-scale offensive throughout the municipality of Glogovac some days before
the beginning of the NATO campaign. People from a number of villages 15 fled
and gathered in the village of Cirez, Srbica municipality. The forces rounded
up IDPs in Cirez, separated men from women and children, and ordered people to
walk towards Glogovac town. The column was escorted by tanks and troops.
Later, IDPs decided to return to their villages in search of food, not
available in Glogovac. In another brutal offensive villagers were rounded up
and again forced back to Glogovac town. In May, paramilitary groups conducted
several house-to-house raids during which many people were robbed and some
killed. The police denied the requested protection to the residents and the
IDP population sheltering in town. Due to these circumstances, inhabitants
and IDPs boarded buses heading for the border.

9. Srbica

24. At the end of March, Serb military forces undertook joint offensives
throughout the municipality of Srbica. Villages were shelled by military
forces and then entered and set on fire by police and paramilitary groups.
Inhabitants of several villages 16 fled to Cirez, where a large number of IDPs
from the municipality of Glogovac had already taken shelter. Serb forces
surrounded, shelled and eventually entered Cirez. IDPs were gathered into
columns and forced to head for Glogovac escorted by Serb forces.

25. Serb forces used the same tactics in other villages 17 of Srbica
municipality: inhabitants were forced to the mountains and to the villages of
Rakitnica and Tusilje. At the end of March, Serb forces entered these
villages and forced a group of IDPs to Prizren, from where they were taken to
Albania by bus, while another group of IDPs was ordered to head back to
Tusilje. The IDP population continued to increase in Tusilje. In mid-April,
Serb forces once again stormed the village and forced inhabitants and IDPs to
walk in columns to Prizren, from where they were brought to the border by bus.
A large number of men from the municipality were brought to Mitrovica for
interrogation before being eventually taken to the Albanian border-crossing
point.

10. Kacanik

26. In Kacanik, before 24 March, army groups shelled several villages. 18

Most of the villagers fled to Kacanik town or took temporary shelter in the
mountains. At the end of May, the intensive shelling and the build-up of Serb
forces in the area of Vate made the population flee the village in a long
convoy. Serb forces let the convoy proceed, through their checkpoints, to the
border. As they left, IDPs witnessed Serb forces enter Vate and set houses on
fire.

27. The KLA was reportedly present in the town of Kacanik when the NATO
campaign was launched. Serb police forces and paramilitary groups searched
the town for KLA activists and other Albanian intellectuals. As a result of
these activities and the general climate of violence in town, a large 19 number
of people fled to a KLA-controlled area north of Kacanik. At the end of
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March, Kacanik was attacked from the north and south by the army and the
police. The attack lasted for some days and resulted in a large number of
civilian casualties and in a mass exodus of civilians to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.

11. Djakovica

28. From 24 March until 2 April, special police action, originating from
Djakovica itself, drove Albanian residents towards the periphery and towards
villages in the south, as well as towards Prizren. From 3 April until 6 May,
IDPs were driven further towards Albania by the police. On 7 May, a Serbian
offensive began in Cabrat, which eyewitness testimony described as a
combination of special police and paramilitary activity, characterized by mass
arrests and detention of military-age men, including teenagers, burning of
homes, and summary executions in house-to-house actions. From 7 May until
14 June, Djakovica was completely blockaded, its population driven into
concentrated areas within the city, whereupon the police conducted mass
registration of residents and began selected arrests.

C. Killings/executions

29. The displacement and expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo occurred
in a climate of lawlessness and total disregard for human life and dignity
which resulted in an extremely high level of violence.

30. According to several sources, and to the appalling discoveries made by

the international security force in Kosovo (KFOR) and the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) upon the return to Kosovo, as many as 10,000 Kosovo
Albanians died during the period of the NATO campaign and several thousand
remain missing. The majority of refugees interviewed by OHCHR indicated
having witnessed at least one incident in which one or more individuals died a
violent death.

31. In some instances, civilians died as a result of military actions and

indiscriminate shelling against towns and villages. It was especially
vulnerable and elderly people, incapable of leaving their homes or unwilling
to do so, who died in these circumstances. 20 However, only a small number of
cases reported refer to incidents of this nature.

32. About 10 per cent of the cases reported refer to orchestrated actions
conducted by military, police and paramilitary forces in order to gather
crowds of fleeing Kosovo Albanians in specific locations where the latter were
subsequently robbed and executed. 21

33. Almost one third of the cases reported refer to random executions of
civilians perpetrated mainly by police and paramilitary forces. In many
instances, men of military age were killed at police checkpoints upon
presentation of their identification documents, because they had come from
areas believed to be KLA strongholds. When villages and towns were besieged,
civilians became victims of appalling acts of violence at the hands of Serbian
military, police and paramilitary forces. In these circumstances, many
individuals were reportedly robbed, questioned, tortured and, in some cases,
killed in their own houses. 22
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34. Kosovo Albanians were also targeted by virtue of their real or supposed
affiliation with political associations or because they were believed to
support NATO intervention in Kosovo. 23

35. Many displaced Kosovo Albanians decided to return to their villages in

search of food, valuables or relatives and friends they had left behind and
were killed by Serbian soldiers who had resettled in their homes and/or
established control over the village. 24

36. Many of the reported killings occurred in the process of displacement

itself, in what seemed to be an attempt to gather and keep under control
crowds of terrified civilians and to speed up the process of departure, as
well as to show determination and to intimidate those who were reluctant to
leave. Reportedly, in many cases, shots were fired into crowds of civilians,
houses were set on fire and those who tried to escape were shot at and
killed. 25

37. A considerable number of the killings reported to the KEO refer to

incidents in which police and/or paramilitary and/or army forces attacked
groups of IDPs hiding in the mountains or proceeding to the border in convoys.
Sometimes fire was opened against civilian convoys, while in other instances
individuals were picked out of the crowd and executed. 26

38. A small number of the executions reportedly appear to have been

perpetrated by Serb forces in response to KLA activities or by way of revenge
or reprisal against KLA offensives. In some instances it also appears that
civilians who had sought KLA protection in the mountains died as a result of
fighting between KLA and Serb forces, or were captured and killed by Serb
forces upon retreat of the KLA. 27

39. One case of execution of an ethnic Albanian by the KLA was reported to
OHCHR-KEO. The man was suspected of collaborating with Serb forces and was
killed at a KLA checkpoint close to Kacanik the day after he had allegedly
buried bodies of KLA soldiers killed in fighting against Serb forces.

40. The corpses of executed Kosovo Albanians were either buried by civilians
(sometimes upon explicit demand by the perpetrators) or KLA soldiers, or taken
away by Serbian forces. In other instances Serb forces reportedly returned to
the place of massacres, dug out bodies previously buried in secret by
civilians and took them away. Many refugees declared having observed tractors
or trucks carrying piles of dead bodies driven by Serbian police to unknown
destinations. OHCHR heard testimonies and saw evidence of deliberate burning
of bodies, while on different occasions Serb forces were observed digging mass
graves. 28 Romas were reportedly often involved in the transport and burial of
corpses. 29

41. The majority of the killings documented were allegedly carried out by
paramilitary and police forces with the cooperation or complicity of the army.
However, in a few cases, police officers reportedly stopped paramilitary
forces from committing crimes and cruelties against ethnic Albanians. 30
Paramilitary groups and special police units were described as wearing
camouflage or black uniforms, gloves, black masks, and some of them wore red
scarfs and had shaved heads and wore a red insignia with a white eagle on
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their uniforms. Some refugees have explicitly described the paramilitaries as

“Arkan's troops”, while others have reported the involvement of “Seselj”
troops in the killings. Some ethnic Albanians claimed that Serbs from
neighbouring villages participated in abuses against them. Russian
mercenaries have also been reported to be present and active in Kosovo on the
side of Serb forces. 31

42. It appears that the action of paramilitary troops was characterized by

a very high level of violence and cruelty. Paramilitaries were allegedly
responsible for the killings of women and children, for stabbing people and
for mutilating dead bodies.

D. Violence against women and children

43. Twenty-two per cent of the incidents reported involved children,

while 17.5 per cent of the cases referred to violence against women.

44. Both women and children were victims of killings and executions. In
particular, several cases were reported in which women died as a result of
indiscriminate shootings into crowds of civilians, while in a few reported
cases women were picked out of convoys and executed. Children have been
deliberately targeted in several circumstances. 32

45. Twenty per cent of refugees interviewed reported incidents in which

women and children were separated from male relatives and exposed to
mistreatment. 33 In several instances, women and children were beaten by the
police during house-to-house raids. 34 Incidents of forced labour have also
been reported in which boys as young as 15 have been obliged by Serbian forces
to dig trenches. Furthermore, it appears that young boys suspected of being
KLA members were questioned, tortured and sometimes killed regardless of their
age. 35

46. Children and women have also been victims of episodes of discrimination:
for example, women giving birth were denied medical assistance and injured
children were refused treatment.

47. Fourteen interviewees spoke of confirmed or suspected rape and several

cases of sexual assault. Considering the cultural stigma attached to sexual
violence in the Albanian culture, it is reasonable to assume that the number
of incidents of this nature may be higher than reflected in public reports. 36

48. In some instances, women were reportedly raped in their houses when
their villages were under siege. 37 In other cases women were taken away and
raped by Serb soldiers after attacks on groups of IDPs. Cases of rape on the
train to the border or at the railway station in Pristina 38 were also
reported. Allegedly a woman was raped by a paramilitary soldier at the
hospital in Gnjilane where she was being treated for injuries suffered in a
grenade explosion. In several reported cases women were asked to hand over
money and other valuables in order not to be sexually abused.

49. OHCHR-KEO also recorded accounts of immoral and intimidating behaviour

towards Albanian women by Serb military and police personnel. For example,
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women have been ordered to undress during confiscation of valuables, addressed

with sexual language and sometimes touched and fondled in an intimidating
manner.

50. According to numerous reports, there appear to have been a pattern of

mutilating women by cutting off their ears and fingers. 39 At this stage it is
difficult to determine whether this macabre ritual had a particular
significance or was merely an act of sadism.

E. Arbitrary arrest and detention

51. Twenty-three per cent of refugees interviewed suffered or directly

witnessed incidents of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions occurred according to a similar pattern throughout Kosovo.
However, the frequency and circumstances of the incidents varied according to
the overall situation in the area of apprehension and adjacent areas.

52. Men of military age throughout Kosovo were often separated from their
families and detained on mere speculation of being KLA members, KLA
collaborators, or with the simple aim of obtaining information. In many
cases, mass arrests of men followed Serb military offensives against Albanian
villages. Inhabitants and IDPs were encircled by Serb forces in their
villages, or intercepted as they tried to flee, and captured. They were
detained for a brief period at assembly points, sometimes transported to
detention centres and eventually jailed for longer periods in regional
prisons.

53. Large numbers of men were captured by paramilitary groups and special
police forces during mopping-up operations against villages 40 in the
municipalities of Glogovac and Srbica. The mosque in Cirez 41 functioned as an
assembly point. At the end of April, these men were escorted by Serb troops
to Glogovac, transported to the police station in Pristina and then to a
location known as “Building 92”. Prisoners were eventually transferred to the
prison in Lipljan. Some men were released and deported to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia on 30 May.

54. Some of the detainees stated that they were charged with terrorism while
still in Pristina, while others claim to have been forced to sign confessions.

55. The arrest and detention of men from the municipalities of Podujevo,
Pristina and eastern parts of Vucitrn followed a slightly different pattern,
although the purposes of detention seem to have been the same as mentioned
above. Mass arrests of men occurred in locations where large convoys of IDPs
were expected to move in an attempt to escape heavy bombardment or mopping-up
operations. Especially during the month of April, large numbers of men were
arrested and detained in the villages of Lukare and Grastica. 42 Large IDP
convoys 43 were at that time heading for Pristina escorted by paramilitary
groups. Convoys were blocked by special police and detained for hours,
sometimes for days. During this time paramilitary troops searched people for
valuables and interrogated men. Many men were not released and their fate is
unknown.
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56. Serb special police troops maintained a checkpoint near Pristina, in the
village of Vrani Do, where Albanian men were separated from their families and
held back in large numbers. 44 Interrogation of the detainees took place in a
designated house near the road. Family members were forced by the police to
continue towards Pristina. After hours of interrogation the prisoners were
taken in buses to Pristina and detained further in “Building 92” or released.
Eventually some detainees were transferred to the prison in Lipljan.

57. The Albanian population of Vucitrn town and adjacent villages was
forcibly gathered in a field, where men were separated from women, children
and the elderly and taken by bus to a jail in the village of Smrekovnica. In
a similar incident inhabitants were gathered in an agricultural cooperative
and subsequently taken to the same detention centre.

58. Men abducted in Mitrovica and adjacent areas in the municipality of

Srbica were transferred, after interrogation in Smrekovnica, to an improvised
prison in the technical school in Mitrovica for further questioning. After
being detained for up to a month, a group of prisoners were deported to the
Albanian border in buses at the end of May.

59. Albanian intellectuals, human rights lawyers and activists, politicians

and others were arbitrarily arrested and detained throughout Kosovo. Some
were killed in detention while many others are still missing.

60. A group of young men were reportedly captured after an offensive against
a village in the municipality of Urosevac. The men were subjected to forced
labour and detained near Serb troops as human shields. Ethnic Albanians were
allegedly used as human shields also in the village of Stutica, near Glogovac
town, in mid-April. In some villages in the municipality of Vitina, there
were reports of people held in “house arrest” as human shields to protect Serb
military vehicles and tanks. Reportedly, large columns of IDPs were escorted
by Serb paramilitary troops and police from Mitrovica to Albania and then some
of the IDPs were compelled to head back in order to “protect” with their
bodies military convoys from NATO bombs.

F. Torture and mistreatment

61. Sixty-nine per cent of the refugees interviewed stated that they had
witnessed or personally suffered torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment at the hands of Serb forces.

62. The vast majority of cases of torture reportedly occurred in detention,

with the purpose of extracting information or confessions from the detainees.
OHCHR-KEO interviewed some of the prisoners who were released and deported to
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards the end of the
NATO campaign. They stated that they had been separated from their families
and temporarily detained at different locations until they were transferred to
a regular prison. Torture occurred at the place of apprehension and at
assembly points where men were detained pending transfer to a detention centre
or prison. 45

63. Several refugees reported severe beatings with wooden and metal poles in
“Building 92” in Pristina. Detainees were taken to different locations in
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Pristina for questioning and reportedly torture occurred during

interrogation. 46 Detainees were regularly beaten by guards. Reportedly some
were put in a cell with cold water up to their knees for a night.

64. Some of the detainees were transferred to the prison in Lipljan, where
similar treatment was inflicted on them. Corroborating statements describe
how a former Serb criminal, working as a barber in the prison of Lipljan,
continuously beat and harassed the prisoners.

65. Refugees reported that prison conditions in Smrekovnica, Pristina and

Lipljan were inhumane. Men were detained in cold cells without beds or
blankets. Cells were overcrowded and prisoners were only given bread and far
too little water. 47

66. Some of the most serious cases of torture reportedly occurred in

Urosevac, in a private house previously used as a café. Young Albanian men
were detained in the cellar of the house and occasionally brought to the upper
floors for interrogation about KLA activity. Some victims were reportedly
held for several days in the cellar immersed in water up to the knees. During
interrogations, detainees were severely beaten with wooden sticks and some
were allegedly given electric shocks. Some of the victims were hospitalized
in refugee camps in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for injuries
received as a result of the beatings.

67. A few cases of mock executions were reported to OHCHR-KEO. 48 In other

instances the systematic confiscation of valuables by paramilitary groups from
IDP convoys was accompanied by particularly sadistic and brutal acts. In
Grastica, through which 100,000 people passed in mid-April, paramilitary
personnel indiscriminately stabbed people’s arms and legs.

G. Destruction of property

68. About half of the refugees interviewed reported large-scale destruction

of property at the hands of Serb forces, especially burning of Albanian-owned
houses. Towns and cities were not heavily affected by the destruction,
although Albanian neighbourhoods were in some instances attacked and houses
burned down. More often, premises and properties of intellectuals, political
activists and suspected KLA collaborators were preferred targets, as well as
houses and apartments which had been rented by officers of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission.

69. Following military offensives, villages with predominantly Albanian

populations were systematically burnt down by Serb troops. In many cases
interviewees observed from hiding places in the hills Serb troops entering
villages and setting houses on fire. Along with houses, barns with hay,
remaining tractors and agricultural equipment were burnt as well. Villagers
who returned after the withdrawal of Serb forces found livestock killed or
disappeared, while corpses were sometimes thrown into wells to contaminate
drinking water.

70. Many Kosovo Albanians had their personal documents torn apart by Serb
troops during the eviction, at police checkpoints, at the border or elsewhere
in the course of searches by police, army or paramilitary forces. It appears
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that all of these acts of destruction were aimed at preventing Albanians from
returning to and resuming life in their places of residence. The destruction
of property was apparently not solely an act of vandalism but an attempt at
wiping out signs of the presence of the Albanian population in Kosovo, as well
as its national and cultural identity.

H. Confiscation of property

71. The majority of interviewees also reported confiscation of property by

Serb forces. Confiscation took place during raids into Albanian homes: Serb
troops went from house to house in villages and towns, people present in the
houses were searched and deprived of money and other valuables, and cars and
tractors were confiscated.

72. Serb police and paramilitary groups intercepted large groups of IDPs and
forced them to surrender money, jewellery, cars, tractors and other valuables
at gunpoint. Paramilitary groups occasionally stabbed or shot IDPs who failed
to meet their demands and threatened to kill hostages captured on the spot if
family members could not pay the demanded amount of money. 49

73. A few cases of extortion of money from Albanians at border crossing

points were also reported. Furthermore, IDPs were often ordered to abandon
their vehicles before they were allowed across the border. Car documents and
license plates were in some cases confiscated. Numerous cars were allegedly
stripped and parts transported away in trucks to be sold elsewhere. Personal
documents were also confiscated at border crossing points.

74. Abandoned Albanian houses were systematically and extensively looted for
movable property. As the Albanian population fled their villages, Serb
infantry systematically loaded goods onto trucks before setting houses on
fire. In some instances Roma civilians allegedly assisted Serb forces in
transporting confiscated goods.

I. The KLA factor

75. OHCHR has to date been unable to gather reliable and impartial
information on the role played by the KLA during the 11 weeks of the NATO
campaign. However, from interviews conducted by OHCHR-KEO it appears that
during that period, the KLA was actively involved in fighting against Serbian
forces in several areas of Kosovo. Moreover, in some instances civilians
allegedly sought KLA protection by resettling close to KLA positions, and KLA
soldiers moved to urban areas or fled the country by mingling with crowds of
displaced civilians. This circumstance might have negatively affected the
attitude of Serbian forces towards civilians. At this stage it is impossible
to determine whether and to what extent the “KLA factor” weighed upon the
events which took place in Kosovo.

J. Impact of the armed conflict on civilians

76. Outside Kosovo, the NATO air strikes were especially intensive in and
around the densely populated centres of Vojvodina, southern Serbia, and in
Belgrade itself. Several city centres suffered from missile or cluster
bombs attacks. Repeated attacks on Nis resulted on 7 May in the deaths of
 E/CN.4/2000/10
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15 civilians when cluster bombs exploded over the city market and central
hospital. In Aleksinac, 12 civilians were killed and more than 40 wounded
when bombs struck downtown housing blocks and commercial premises on 5 April.
In Novi Pazar, 13 were killed and 35 wounded in an attack that destroyed
25 buildings in the city's residential centre. Many civilians, including
27 children, died in repeated strikes to Surdulica and Kursumlija. 50 Strikes
on bridges and means of transportation resulted in the deaths of 55 persons on
a passenger train travelling through Grdelica gorge (12 April); 60 persons
when a bus was hit on a bridge near Luzani (1 May); 20 persons when a bus
travelling between Pec and Rozaje was hit (3-4 May). Large convoys moving
through Kosovo were attacked by air, resulting in the deaths of 87 IDPs at
Korisa on 14 May; exactly one month earlier, 75 persons, including
19 children, died when missiles struck refugee columns on the
Djakovica-Prizren road.

77. Following NATO attacks on fuel reserves, severe restrictions on fuel

imposed by the authorities brought civilian life to a standstill. Fuel is now
being rationed in Serbia. Many parts of the country were often without
electricity and water, and restrictions and shortages continue. Throughout
the FRY, damage done to the infrastructure of public utilities threatens an
extremely difficult winter.

78. During the war, the formal declaration of martial law gave men in
uniform, specifically officials of the Ministry of the Interior, vast powers
over most areas of civil activity. Moreover, even in areas where such power
was not formally extended to the military by the civil authorities, OHCHR
noted that Yugoslav Army and Serbian police either took or were granted
effective control. The Republic of Montenegro did not recognize the
declaration of martial law, but actions by the Yugoslav Army on the territory
of Montenegro challenged and threatened civil authority in that Republic. 51

79. Within the FRY, restrictions on information inherent in martial law

placed the army in control of public information management. Radio and
television towers were bombed, as were the Belgrade headquarters of Radio
Television Serbia. Throughout the FRY, foreign and domestic journalists were
brought to “informative talks”, detained, imprisoned, and charged in
proceedings before military courts. In Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army
attempted forcibly to conscript journalists from independent media.

80. In the Republic of Serbia federal authorities were denied the immunity
of elected or appointed officials by attempts to mobilize them, and the army
further moved to arrest several officials in Serbia and Montenegro for
refusing mobilization notices. Changes to the Law on Criminal Procedure
removed many legal protections of the accused and substituted expedited
procedures that allowed, for example, for searches without prior warrants, and
police investigations without prior request of the court or State prosecutor.

81. In many towns in south-eastern Serbia-Preshevo, in particular, but also

Leskovac and Vranja-Albanian inhabitants were arrested en masse during the war
but were cut off from advocacy, as Serbian human rights and media activists
from those regions were also targeted before and after 24 March. The Albanian
advocacy network, which is so strong throughout Kosovo, effectively stops at
the border. 52
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II. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROLE OF OHCHR IN KOSOVO AFTER 10 JUNE 1999

A. Return to Kosovo

82. On 10 June 1999, following confirmation by NATO of the withdrawal of

security forces of the FRY from Kosovo and the subsequent suspension of
NATO air operations against the FRY, the Security Council adopted
resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 which authorized the Secretary-General,
“with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an
international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim
administration for Kosovo”. The resolution also provided for the
establishment of an international security presence.

83. Following these developments, and in light of the return of refugees to

Kosovo, the Kosovo Emergency Operation was officially terminated and OHCHR-FRY
staff members returned to Kosovo with the advance team of the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The head of OHCHR-FRY had
already been in Kosovo since May under a temporary secondment as special
adviser on human rights to the acting Special Representative of the
Secretary-General.

B. Cooperation and coordination with other actors

84. On 21 June, the High Commissioner convened an informal consultative

meeting assembling international organizations with an interest in human
rights to commence the process of discussion of long-term strategies for the
promotion and protection of human rights in the Balkan region, with a special
focus on Kosovo. Following the interest expressed by all the participants in
continuing consultations and in increasing cooperation between different
organizations on the ground, a second consultation was held in Geneva on
28 July 1999. Similar meetings will be held in the future.

C. Visits to Kosovo by the High Commissioner and

the Special Rapporteur

85. On 30 June the High Commissioner travelled to Pristina for a one-day

visit to Kosovo. In Pristina the High Commissioner met the KFOR Commander,
the acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and other
representatives of United Nations agencies. The High Commissioner also
chaired a meeting with representatives of the Council for the Defence of Human
Rights and Freedoms and the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children.
She visited a massacre site at Maticane and met with a Serbian Orthodox
clergyman in Kosovo Polje. In Kosovo Polje she also visited a school housing
4,000 Roma fleeing persecution. On several occasions during this visit, the
High Commissioner was urged to increase the number of human rights personnel
on the ground. In response to this request, additional OHCHR officers were
deployed to Kosovo at the beginning of July.

86. Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, visited Kosovo from 7 to 12 July 1999. During
his visit, the Special Rapporteur met with representatives of the newly
established United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, and OSCE and KFOR
 E/CN.4/2000/10
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personnel in the various districts. He also discussed the situation with

representatives of the KLA, the LDK, local Albanian NGOs, the Serbian Orthodox
Church and other ethnic communities in Kosovo.

D. Human Rights Advisory Unit of the Office of the

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

87. The report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

of 12 July 1999 (S/1999/779) on the structure of UNMIK provided for the
appointment of a senior human rights adviser in the office of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The human rights adviser
should ensure a pro-active approach on human rights in all UNMIK activities
and the compatibility of regulations issued by UNMIK with international human
rights standards. OHCHR consulted with the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations on the establishment and staffing of the unit, and identified the
person appointed as senior human rights adviser.

88. The senior human rights adviser, Mr. William O'Neill, who arrived in
Pristina on 2 September 1999, will ensure that priority is given to the
establishment of institutions and infrastructures for the promotion and
protection of human rights in Kosovo, especially the rights of minority
groups.

E. OHCHR-Kosovo

89. As of 24 August 1999, OHCHR had 12 international officers in Pristina

and had reopened offices in Belgrade and Podgorica. In Kosovo, building on
its country-wide mandate and on long-standing experience in the area, OHCHR
will carry out the following tasks:

Following up on investigations initiated in Albania, the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro (FRY);

Sharing information, through the OHCHR database, with the United Nations
human rights mechanisms for follow-up action;

Maintaining institutional representation in bodies advising on

re-establishment of a judiciary in Kosovo;

Maintaining institutional representation in the Task Force on Minority

Issues with responsibilities for assessing the situation in the field
and devising protection response mechanisms and legal regulatory
policies;

Gathering information, in cooperation with ICRC, on the circumstances of

arrest of prisoners transferred to Serbia, for follow-up outside of
Kosovo;

Gathering information, in cooperation with KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, UNHCR and

ICRC, on persons kidnapped in Kosovo by KLA “police” and “military
police” and other non-State actors;
E/CN.4/2000/10
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Participating in the subcommission of the Kosovo Transitional Council on

detainees and prisoners;

Liaising with human rights NGOs;

Cooperating with OSCE on the possible establishment of an ombudsman's

office.

III. THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOSOVO

AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNMIK

A. Return of refugees

90. Immediately after the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo and the end
of NATO bombardments, Kosovo refugees spontaneously and massively started
returning to their homes. According to UNHCR figures, as of 24 August 1999,
more than 761,000 Kosovars had returned to Kosovo while 6,800 Kosovars
remained in Albania, 19,000 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
8,000 in Montenegro and 11,400 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

91. UNHCR estimates that about 50,000 refugees in the region are awaiting
repatriation and that of the returned refugees, 500,000 lack appropriate
accommodation for the winter.

B. Exodus of ethnic minorities from Kosovo and “ethnic concentration”

92. When the return of refugees to Kosovo began, it became clear immediately
that Serbs, Roma and other ethnic minorities in Kosovo, as well as Albanians
perceived as “collaborators”, would be the new victims of revenge and ethnic
hatred. 53 It also soon appeared that KFOR and UNMIK would face immense
difficulties in protecting these new vulnerable groups.

93. According to Yugoslav sources and still incomplete data, as many

as 165,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have left Kosovo since the arrival of
the international force, while more than half of Kosovo's estimated
120,000-150,000 Roma population has also fled Kosovo since mid-June. UNHCR
reported that as of mid-August, there were only 50,000 non-Albanians left in
Kosovo.

94. The reason for this exodus lies in fear, killings, kidnapping, looting
of properties, evictions, widespread burning of villages as well as cultural,
historical and religious monuments, and other forms of intimidation.

95. Muslim Slavs, including Bosniaks, have also been subjected to

harassment, destruction of property and killings. Apparently, at least some
of the violence is predicated on or provoked by the use of the Bosniak/Serbian
language, instead of Albanian. 54

96. In Gnjilane municipality there is an ongoing “ethnic concentration

process” in which Serbs and Albanians are leaving ethnically mixed villages
for ethnically “pure” enclaves, adding to the new group of internally
displaced persons. Even within towns, Serbs are retreating to ethnic
enclaves. This is similar to the patterns observed in Prizren, Pec, Djakovica
 E/CN.4/2000/10
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and other areas where Serbs, often elderly, are retreating to Orthodox Church
institutions after harassment, looting or attempted burning of their property.

97. In Mitrovica, Serbs are concentrating in the northern part of town and
further north towards Serbia proper in the municipality of Leposavic. All
Roma are reported to have left the Albanian part of Mitrovica. Continuing
tension in Mitrovica, which presents a Mostar-style divided city patrolled by
French units of KFOR, has resulted in repeated confrontations between Serbs
and Albanians, apparently fueled, at least in part, by excessive media
presence.

C. Humanitarian evacuation from Kosovo

98. Given the precarious security situation, many Serbs and Romas have
virtually no freedom of movement and are essentially prisoners in their own
homes, unable to go out for food, medical care or other needs. This desperate
situation has resulted, in some circumstances, in the need for humanitarian
evacuation out of Kosovo.

99. OHCHR visited the Orthodox seminary in the centre of Prizren where
approximately 180 local Serbs including injured persons, had taken refuge,
some more than a month previously. Some Albanians in mixed marriages and
about 30 Roma had also taken refuge there. The seminary is heavily guarded by
KFOR. On 2 August, UNHCR evacuated 88 Kosovo Serbs to Serbia. UNHCR and KFOR
are transporting Serbs still living in their homes to the seminary, and in
some cases advising others to move there. Approximately 120 Serbs remain
living in their own homes in Prizren. Of those sheltering in monasteries,
some are waiting to see if the situation calms down, while others have already
decided to be evacuated if international agencies agree that their case meets
the criteria for humanitarian evacuation.

100. OHCHR receives frequent requests from family or friends in Belgrade and
other areas of Serbia for information about the whereabouts and assistance
with evacuation of Serbs, particularly elderly parents, from Kosovo to Serbia
proper. Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo who want to visit family in Serbia
or Montenegro are fearful of travelling either by public transport or private
vehicle owing to security concerns. Family members from outside Kosovo are
similarly fearful of visiting their relatives in Kosovo owing to the tense
security situation.

D. Violations of human rights of minority groups

101. Minority ethnic groups have become victims of human rights abuses in
today's Kosovo. From a first assessment of the situation made by OHCHR, it
appears that some individuals have been carefully targeted for revenge -
indeed, that life and career histories have, over time, been assembled, based
on rumour or fact or unsubstantiated allegation, in a systematic selection of
individual victims or groups of victims. This follows the same pattern used
by Serbian authorities in targeting influential members of the Kosovo Albanian
community. Other individuals are being targeted on suspicion of “complicity”
in gross violations of human rights, 55 while some of the reported incidents
seem to be fishing operations directed at Serbs for being Serbs. 56 However,
E/CN.4/2000/10
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violence and harassment are not limited to inter-ethnic conflict. As of

mid-August, Albanians made up nearly half the casualty figures for violent
deaths.

102. The KLA reportedly has been threatening employees of international

organizations who are seen intervening on behalf of minorities, accusing them
of collaboration. Some victims of ethnic violence have reported that their
assailants included men in KLA uniforms, although it is possible that much of
the violence is simply the work of criminal elements masquerading in uniforms
of the KLA. Open borders have in fact allowed the large-scale arrival of
criminal elements, particularly from Albania. It has also been noted that KLA
uniforms are available for about DM 50 in Albania and that Albanian-national
men with no relationship at all to the KLA can use the uniform as a passport
through the German KFOR sector of Kosovo.

1. Murder

103. As of 14 August, 280 murders had been confirmed by KFOR to have been
committed in Kosovo since 15 June. The brutal massacre of 14 Serbian farmers,
women and children in the village of Staro Gracko, Lipljan municipality, on
23 July 1999 represents the most appalling crime committed since KFOR and
UNMIK were deployed in Kosovo. In Klokot, unidentified attackers fired mortar
rounds in August killing a 14-year-old girl and a 16-year-old boy. On
15 August, an elderly woman was beaten to death in her flat in the centre of
Pristina; on 2 August, a woman and her 10-year-old daughter witnessed the
murder of her elderly father in their flat in Pristina.

2. Evictions

104. Kosovar Serbs and other minorities continue to be forcibly evicted from
their places of residence. The methods employed vary from physical force and
harassment to those which evidence an attempt to ensure the legal loss of the
property under a subsequent property scheme. One such example in Pristina,
which unfortunately echoes schemes used in other parts of the Balkans, is the
forced signature of a document transferring the property ownership or
occupancy to person or persons who seize the property under threat. 57 KLA
“military police” are called to respond to cases of eviction and in the
absence of clear civil law and ownership use their own methods for resolving
the dispute.

105. In Pristina and Prizren, houses presumably owned by Serbs 58 which have
been destroyed either by fire or explosion have been razed and all traces
removed within days of the destruction. This complete destruction of the
housing structure not only eliminates evidence of a crime, but will likely
frustrate the ability of the owner to make a property claim, particularly
given the likelihood that a new structure will be constructed on the lot in
the interim. Such activities appear to go on outside the effective control of
UNMIK as the civil authority and under normal circumstances could only be
sanctioned by the local governing authorities. In Prizren, however, UNMIK is
attempting to exert its authority by taking action against illegal
construction.
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3. Rape

106. Several cases of rape, including of elderly women, have been reported to
OHCHR. OHCHR visited a 61-year-old Serb woman who had been raped in Pristina.
She stated that she remained in Pristina because she believed that her honesty
and her age would be respected. On 15 July, one person entered her flat,
grabbed her by the hair and put a pistol to her head. Three other men also
entered the apartment. She was pushed to the floor of her kitchen and hit
with a gun several times, and she was raped by two of the men.

4. Kidnapping

107. Kidnapping, primarily of ethnic Serbs and some Roma, continues in

numerous areas including Gnjilane, Pristina, Prizren and Djakovica.
Approximately 110 new kidnapping cases have reportedly occurred since the
arrival of UNMIK, and OHCHR has received a list of 80 names of specific
persons (43 from Pristina alone) kidnapped since 15 June. The military police
in Pristina and Mitrovica report that unless kidnap victims are found quickly,
i.e. within a matter of hours, they will most likely be found dead.

108. In Pristina, the bodies of kidnap and subsequent murder victims tend to
be found in the same parts of town and evidence similar forensic patterns,
leading police to believe that the same perpetrators are involved. In
Mitrovica, the military police report that none of the recent kidnap victims
have been found alive. OHCHR has conducted interviews with several women who
have taken refuge in the Orthodox Church Patriarchy in Pec concerning the
kidnapping of their male family members. In the Djakovica area, OHCHR
conducted similar interviews with family members, including an interview
concerning the abduction of a 16-year-old mentally disabled Roma boy.
According to OSCE, 59 kidnappings in the Gnjilane and Orahovac areas “are
beginning to form a disturbing pattern”.

109. KFOR has located some detention centres maintained and controlled by the
KLA. At least two of them, in Prizren and Gnijlane, were described as
containing instruments of torture.

110. KFOR has also reported that young Albanian women have been abducted near
Gnjilane, by what is believed to be a trafficking ring which forces the women
into prostitution.

E. Missing persons and the identification of dead bodies

111. Special problems are posed regarding missing persons. It is still

unknown how many persons are buried throughout Kosovo, where such graves might
be, and who is buried in them. Reports come in daily to KFOR, OSCE, UNHCR and
ICRC field offices of discovered bodies. Agencies have developed a standard
form for identification of the bodies which, when completed, is centralized
with the ICRC, so as to support its lead role in tracing. At the same time,
local doctors and hospitals, largely under the broad KLA “civil
administration” 60 are issuing ad hoc death certificates, but it is
questionable whether these have a legal character.
E/CN.4/2000/10
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112. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Commission on Missing Persons in the Former
Yugoslavia, ICRC and others have been working together to provide information
to families, a special effort will be needed not just to gather information
that can be useful for identification purposes, but to provide counselling and
support to family members.

F. Administration of justice - the judiciary

113. In response to the arrest and detention of persons by KFOR, and in the
absence of a functioning judiciary in Kosovo, the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, adopted emergency decrees
establishing a Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments
(JAC). JAC is composed of four national judges, including two ethnic
Albanians, one Serb and one Turk, and three international lawyers, including
one from OHCHR. JAC advises the Special Representative on the provisional
appointment of judges, judicial personnel and prosecutors in order to
re-establish an independent and multi-ethnic judiciary.

114. The Pristina district court has travelled around Kosovo to review the
legality of continued detention of persons held by KFOR on suspicion of theft,
looting, arson, murder, rape and other crimes. Since there is only one court
level so far, it is responsible for adjudicating all types of criminal
offences, from minor to serious.

115. As of mid-August, the judges and prosecutors had conducted hearings

in 144 cases involving 263 individuals, 120 of whom have been released. Prior
to the detention hearings before the provisional judiciary, KFOR legal
personnel had reviewed the detentions in hearings based on a KFOR regulation
and varying procedures based on contingent national laws. Decisions of the
investigating judge can be appealed to a panel of three judges.

116. The significant number of releases may be a result of the fact that many
persons appear before the tribunals charged with relatively minor offences and
their continued detention is deemed unnecessary, although the criminal
proceeding will continue. There is a concern, however, among KFOR legal
personnel that the judges are overly lenient in granting release. The problem
of KFOR locating witnesses, which it is required to do for detention hearings,
also makes it more likely that release will be ordered or charges dropped.

117. OHCHR has monitored the initial reviews conducted by the mobile
judiciary and visited KFOR detention centres and examined the workings of the
recently appointed judiciary in Pec, Lipjane, Bondsteel (at the United States
KFOR base) and Prizren, attending detention hearings as well as meeting with
court personnel and KFOR military police. As of mid-August, the Prizren court
had heard 17 cases; the proceedings related to the review of the legality of
the detention of persons, mainly Albanians, arrested by KFOR.

118. Three judges have refused to begin their work, protesting the continued
application of Yugoslav law under UNMIK regulation No. 1. Under this
regulation, the law applicable in Kosovo before 24 March 1999 continues to
apply insofar as it does not conflict with internationally recognized
standards, UNMIK regulations or Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The
 E/CN.4/2000/10
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three judges and others contend that the Kosovo Criminal Code, in effect until
the late 1980s, should be applied. In a related matter, some ethnic Albanian
defendants in Bondsteel (where detainees from Gnjilane region are detained)
refuse to speak to the Serbian judge who was assigned for their hearing.

G. Detainees

119. Allegedly, some 5,000 detainees in various phases of court proceedings

on terrorism charges were moved by Serbian authorities to prisons in Serbia
during the war.

120. In July, the Government of Serbia provided the names of

over 2,000 individuals who were transferred from prisons in Kosovo to
prisons in Serbia proper. The information indicates only the names of
individuals and the place of detention; it does not specify the criminal
basis for detention. 61

121. The issue of transferred detainees is an extremely potent and emotional

one for family members in Kosovo and is the subject of frequent demonstrations
making demands for action by UNMIK and the international community. Groups
representing detainees contend that there are many more persons who were last
seen in the custody of Serbian military and police than those named on the
lists.

122. Family members in Kosovo have difficulty visiting detainees in Serbia

given the fears for the security of Albanians in some parts of Serbia. Some
family members have also reported being denied access to their family members
in detention. Family members who have succeeded in visiting their relatives
in detention have expressed concern about the conditions of detention in
prisons such as Srmeska Mitrovica and Pozaravac. Groups representing the
detainees seek the release of these prisoners or at least their transfer back
to prison facilities in Kosovo. 62

H. Human rights consequences of the war outside of Kosovo

123. Several hundred Albanians have been expelled from southern Serbia into
the Gnjilane district of Kosovo. In the east, ethnic Albanians from the
Serbian towns of Medvedja, Bujanoc and Preshevo, which lie just beyond the
Kosovo boundary, continue to arrive in Gnjilane. According to the provisional
authorities in Gnjilane, 320 families (3,227 persons) have arrived from these
towns, reporting that they were evicted by Serb police and the Yugoslav Army.

124. Reciprocally, UNHCR reports that approximately 4,000 Serb displaced from
the Gnjilane area have now been registered in the adjoining area of Serbia.
Reportedly, there are some 170,000 Kosovo Serb IDPs inside the FRY. They are
disliked by the Government because they represent the failure of the
Government’s policy in Kosovo and allegedly are being herded around Serbia,
prevented from settling in Belgrade and from registering their children in
school.

125. In the past 10 years 20,000 refugees went to Montenegro from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 10,000 from Croatia and 70,000 IDPs from Kosovo. Of the 70,000
from Kosovo, 20,000 remain of those who went last year and 8,000 still remain
E/CN.4/2000/10
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from the recent war. Montenegro has taken in far more persons than its
capacities allow. In addition, it has not received the necessary support from
the international community.

126. According to a census done in 1991, Albanians constitute

about 7 per cent of the entire population in Montenegro. They are living in
five municipalities: Ulcinj, Bar, Podgorica, Plav and Rozaje. Two Albanian
political parties have called for a special status for Albanians in Montenegro
and to have representatives in the Montenegrin Parliament. However, the
prevailing opinion among all relevant political parties in Montenegro, except
the two Albanian parties, is that Albanians have no need for any kind of
special status. On the other hand, neither Albanian political leaders nor
their representatives in Government are sure what the term “special status”
should mean. From discussions of the Special Rapporteur and the High
Commissioner with Montenegrin authorities, it emerged that in the north there
is a fear of a repetition of what happened in other areas, as part of an
established strategy of disrupting multi-ethnic communities.

127. During the NATO campaign, the Government of President Milo Djukanovic
criticized and opposed Serbia’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and, despite
intense pressure from Belgrade, hosted Kosovo refugees. International
observers warn that Montenegro seems to be moving towards independence 63 from
Serbia and that an important minority of Montenegrins would resist this. For
these reasons, the Republic of Montenegro is increasingly considered to be the
likely next site of instability in the Balkans.

128. In the Republic of Serbia, with the lifting of martial law, public
political activity has resumed. Hundreds of thousands of persons have
participated in peaceful demonstrations and petition campaigns in several
locations in Serbia, demanding the ouster of President Milosevic.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

129. This report once again confirms that Serb forces committed shocking
crimes during the NATO air campaign which commenced on 24 March 1999. The
High Commissioner continues to believe that it is essential that those
responsible for such criminal violations be brought to justice. In this
respect, OHCHR supports fully the ongoing investigations of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In submitting this consolidated
report, the High Commissioner wishes to stress that the international
community cannot accept that those who are responsible for such terrible
atrocities would go unpunished.

130. As the present report has shown that, alas, the situation of the Serb,
Roma and other minority communities since the withdrawal of Serb forces has
been a painful one. Killings, oppression, harassment, intimidation,
expulsion, rape and other violations continue to take place at an alarming
rate, particularly targeting the non-Albanian communities of Kosovo. This is
a distressing situation for a number of reasons. In the first place, it
cannot be accepted that a campaign to vindicate the rights of the Kosovar
Albanians would be followed by a campaign of atrocities against the Serb, Roma
and other minority communities. In the second place, it is a matter of deep
anguish that international forces present in Kosovo have not yet been able to
 E/CN.4/2000/10
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extend effective protection to these endangered communities. The fact that

these communities are effectively disappearing from Kosovo raises serious
concerns. In the third place, there is no Government as such to which the
international community can address itself, and human rights special
rapporteurs and working groups are left to address themselves to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. As is well known, the Special
Representative and his staff are dependent on the physical protection that can
be extended to these endangered communities by the international forces
present on the ground.

131. The High Commissioner considered it a matter of conscience to bring this

situation to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights because what is
involved is, in fact, a situation of endangered communities without adequate
protection. The High Commissioner should like to invite the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to consider how the international community can
discharge its duty of protecting endangered communities in a situation that is
unfolding in full view of the international community. The Commission on
Human Rights may wish, after considering this situation, to address
appropriate recommendations to the Security Council and to others directly
involved with a view to urgent measures being taken to respond to the duty of
protection that is incumbent upon the international community.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

132. The High Commissioner attaches the highest importance to investigation

of the crimes committed by the Serbian forces during the conflict in Kosovo
and to efforts to bring the perpetrators of such crimes to justice. In this
context, the High Commissioner urges Member States to provide the ICTY with
the support and resources necessary to carry out this essential task.

133. The High Commissioner calls upon the ICTY, ICRC and OSCE to maintain
their efforts to investigate the fate and whereabouts of missing persons.

134. The international community should support UNHCR and other agencies
engaged in the effort of providing 500,000 Kosovars with proper accommodation
before the onset of winter.

135. The High Commissioner supports UNICEF’s efforts to ensure that all
Kosovar children will be back in school as soon as possible and stresses the
necessity of rebuilding damaged and partially destroyed schools and speeding
up the process of demining.

136. The High Commissioner recommends the rapid deployment of United Nations
police as the key step in guaranteeing respect for law and order and creating
a safe environment for all inhabitants of Kosovo.

137. Particular importance should be given to the re-establishment of customs

control at the borders so as to avoid the free access of criminal elements to
the territory of Kosovo and to combat the phenomenon of trafficking of women
and children.

138. The High Commissioner attaches the highest importance to the

preservation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which human rights of all inhabitants
E/CN.4/2000/10
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are respected. However, the High Commissioner recognizes that priority must
be given to the effort of saving lives of people at risk. In this respect she
supports the humanitarian evacuation programme undertaken by UNHCR but
stresses the necessity of preparing conditions for the safe return of all
displaced Kosovars.

139. The High Commissioner calls upon the population of Kosovo to refrain
from violence and to put an end to attacks against Serbs, Roma and other
minority groups. The High Commissioner calls upon the Albanian leaders to
condemn these acts of violence and invites the KLA to cooperate with UNMIK and
KFOR in investigating such crimes.

140. The High Commissioner calls upon neighbouring countries to provide the
appropriate protection to those fleeing Kosovo in fear of persecution and upon
the Government of FRY to respect the rights of Kosovar IDPs, in accordance
with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and to protect the
rights of Albanian minority groups.

141. The High Commissioner calls upon the Government of Serbia to provide an
updated list of all detainees transferred from Kosovo, specifying the charges,
if any, under which persons are detained, and to guarantee their families
access to them.

142. The High Commissioner stresses the need to investigate swiftly

allegations of KLA detention centres, killings, rape, torture, arson,
expulsion, looting, theft and other violations of the rights of all
inhabitants of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnicity.

143. As part of the measures necessary to the creation of a safe and secure
environment for all Kosovars, the High Commissioner urges UNMIK to proceed to
the complete demilitarization and disarmament of the KLA.

144. The High Commissioner stresses the importance of involving Kosovars in

civil reconstruction and in United Nations decision-making processes.

145. The High Commissioner urges the international community to take all
necessary steps to assess and redress from a broad humanitarian perspective
the effects of the NATO campaign on the civilian population of FRY. In
particular, the High Commissioner urges that similar efforts to those
undertaken in Kosovo be made to ensure that Serbian children can return safely
to school.

146. The High Commissioner also calls upon the international community to pay
particular attention to the situation of human rights in the Republics of
Serbia and Montenegro and to take all the necessary steps to prevent the
outbreak of violence and to strengthen democracy in the region. In this
context, the High Commissioner stresses the importance of designing long-term
strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Balkan
region and of improving coordination and cooperation among international
actors to promote a culture of respect for human rights and tolerance.
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Notes

1.Dragodan, Vranjevac, the hospital neighbourhood, etc.

2.Maticane, Zlatare and Kojlovica.

3.In Mramor and Kolic villages many civilians died as a result of this
offensive.

4.Bradas, Donja Dubnica, Donja Pakastica, Hrtica, Majance, etc.

5.Estimates given by interviewees of the number of IDPs ranged from 20,000 to

40,000.

6.Malisevo, Dragobilje, Ostrozub among other villages.

7.Smolusa, Marevc, Glavica, Oklap and Slovinje.

8.A cross with a Cyrillic C in each angle.

9.Kamena Glava, Zlatare, Staro Selo, Biba and Varos Selo, among others.

10.Four civilians were killed and eight wounded by a grenade in Zlatare.

11.Inhabitants of Zlatare fled to Slatina, Kacanik municipality, from where,

in mid-May, they were further expelled by the police and escorted to the
border.

12.Allegedly IDPs were escorted by paramilitary troops to the villages of

Musutiste and Selograzde and to Prizren.

13.Like the village of Grejcevce.

14.People walked from Zur, municipality of Prizren, to Morina, Albania.

15.Dobrosevac, Gladno Selo, Novo Cikatovo, Godance, Gradica, Likosane,

Stutica, among others.

16.Baks, Donje Prekaze, Gornje Prekaze.

17.Izbica, Rudnik, Ozrim, Leocina, Kladernica.

18.Palivodenica, Gajre, Kotlina, Bob.

19.Allegedly around 1,000 persons.

20.In the municipality of Podujevo, for example, Serbian aircraft reportedly

launched two rockets on a village killing 30 civilians; in March eight people
died as a result of a grenade explosion in Prizren.
E/CN.4/2000/10
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21.On 27 March, in Belanica, Suva Reka municipality, Serb forces reportedly

surrounded the village, precluding any escape, and then gathered the villagers
in an open space to extort money and valuables from them. Those who had no
money were taken to a private house and shot dead. Similar cases are reported
in Celina, Orahovac municipality, and in Slovinje, Lipljan municipality.

22.Some of these incidents allegedly took place in Maticane, Urosevac,

Glogovac and Staro Selo. In Mramor, a man who had been previously wounded by
a grenade was executed in his house because he was suspected of having been
injured while fighting against Serbian forces.

23.In Kacanik, local Serbs and police officers prepared a list of all
Albanians affiliated with different political organizations and went house to
house to question them. Some men were killed in the process. An interviewee
indicated that in Djakovica, in the early stage of the bombing campaign,
postal workers provided lists of addresses of targeted groups and individuals.
Concerning Pristina, OHCHR interviewed an eyewitness to the murder of the
Kosovo Albanian lawyer Bajram Kelmendi and his two sons. They were seen being
taken out of two white police jeeps. Mr. Kelmendi was asked to kill one of
his sons and refused to do it, then his older son was asked to kill his father
and he also refused. Then police officers asked Bajram Kelmendi whom they
should kill first, and in spite of the desperate appeal of the lawyer they
shot his two sons dead in front of him, and 30 seconds later they shot him as
well. In Stimlje, a father and son were killed because they had rented their
house to an OSCE officer. In Kosovo Polje two men were stopped at a police
checkpoint while going to repair their television and killed because they were
accused of wanting to watch “NATO air strikes”. In Orahovac a young man was
killed because he had a KLA emblem in his wallet.

24.In the municipality of Gnjilane, on 6 April, five men who had returned to
their village were ordered to lie face down by paramilitary forces and then
shot dead. In Lipljan municipality (Smolusa), after a first round of forced
displacement, a group of inhabitants decided to go back to their homes.
Paramilitary groups and police forces returned to the village and killed them.
Similar events were reported in Vitina, Verban and Stagova.

25.In the village of Gladno Selo, Glogovac municipality, paramilitaries set

houses on fire killing as many as 45 civilians, mainly elderly women. In Suva
Reka as many as 350 civilians were allegedly killed in the process of
displacement. In Pristina, while forcing people to the railway station the
police killed several civilians.

26.In Grastica, 30 young men were taken out of a convoy and shot dead; in
Kralan, two wounded women were asked to get off a tractor and, since they
couldn’t because of their injuries, they were burned alive on the tractor; in
Kolic, Serb forces fired into a group of IDPs, allegedly killing 91 civilians.

27.In the village of Vrbovac, Glogovac municipality, upon retreat of KLA, a

group of about 50 civilians was caught, ordered to gather in rows, tortured
and executed by paramilitary forces. In Srbica, after a KLA offensive and
subsequent withdrawal, 5 old men were killed. In Pusto Selo after fighting
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between KLA and Serbs in the area, Serb forces by way of reprisal allegedly
executed 106 persons after having humiliated and mistreated them.

28.The police were seen transporting some 40 bodies in Kosovo Polje in early
April. In Kacanik paramilitary groups and some Romas were observed digging
holes with bulldozers after the massacre at “Racak stream” . In Slovinje,
Lipljan municipality, Serbian forces buried 16 bodies and the day after
ordered the relatives of the executed to exhume the bodies and re-bury them in
a cemetery.

29.For example, Romas were allegedly observed burying bodies of Kosovo

Albanians executed in Rezala, Srbica municipality, after Serb forces had
exhumed them. In Vucitrn, Romas allegedly buried some 100 Kosovo Albanians
who had been killed by “snipers”. In Grastica, Pristina municipality, some
Romas were reportedly observed loading a tractor with dead bodies.

30.For example, in Kisnica/Pristina, on 25 March, paramilitary groups wearing

red bandanas, black masks and camouflage uniforms entered a house and started
robbing and killing the inhabitants one by one, until a police officer arrived
and stopped them.

31.Russian mercenaries were reportedly present among other places, in

Glogovac, Djakovica, Srbica.

32.In Kacanik, boys as young as 17 were killed; in Bela Crkva three children,
respectively six, four and three years old, were shot dead by Serb forces.

33.In Grastica, for example, children were threatened with knives.

34.Cases of this nature reportedly took place in Miratovc and Preshevo. In

Staro Selo, paramilitary groups went house to house to question suspected KLA
supporters and killed several males in the process, including a 15-year-old
boy.

35.Cases of this nature were reported in Vrani Do, Lipljan and Krusha e Made.

36.On 30 June 1999, in Pristina, the High Commissioner for Human Rights met
the Chairperson of the Centre for Protection of Women and Children. The
Chairperson said that the number of unreported cases of rape in Kosovo was
very high. She also said that in Kosovo two different forms of rape were
common: biological rape and gun-rape and that both women and men were
allegedly victims of rape before and during the war.

37.In Cirez, when IDPs were surrounded young women and girls were taken away
for one night by army soldiers. In Vranjevac, a woman was raped in her house
and her husband was killed while trying to protect her. In Kolic,
paramilitary troops, allegedly Arkan's, during the attack against the village
abducted a number of women. In Ponesh, paramilitaries entered a house and
raped a 20-year-old woman in front of her mother.
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38.In Pristina, the departure of one train was delayed for six hours. During
this time, many paramilitaries boarded the train and raped 10-15 young girls
in front of all, including young children.

39.In Gladno Selo, for example, when the village was attacked, many women were
allegedly killed and their ears cut off. In Celine, IDPs were surrounded,
women and men separated, young women separated from older women, and then
beaten and obliged to undress. The ears of at least 20 women were allegedly
mutilated while a lesser number had their fingers severed.

40.Gladno Selo, Vrbovac, Baks, Donje Prekaze, Gornje Prekaze.

41.Nearly 200 men were detained in the mosque at one point.

42.IDPs escaping offensives in the Golak and Lap region.

43.Some interviewees describe convoys 2-3 km long.

44.Two hundred men detained on 30 April.

45.Three young men were abducted by Serb paramilitary troops in the hills near
Vrbovac in Glogovac. They were interrogated on the spot and accused of being
KLA members. One of the interviewees was hit on the head with a rifle, the
second victim was stabbed in the arms and the third was shot dead. The two
survivors were later detained in the mosque at Cirez, where the interviewee
and others were severely hit in their kidneys with a wooden stick. In the
city hall, detainees were severely beaten with police batons and metal bars.
Shortly afterwards, they were transported to the police station in Pristina
and detained in “Building 92”. The inhabitants of Vucitrn were rounded up in
a square at the end of May, whereupon some 250 men were separated from the
rest and detained in a sports hall for three days. They were denied food and
water, forced to sit for 10 hours on steps with the upper part of the body
bent down, and given water mixed with diesel fuel.

46.Prisoners were taken in turns to a private house in the city, where their
hands were tested for gun smoke and powder. They were forced to face the wall
with legs spread and kicked in the genitals. They were furthermore hit with
police batons in the limbs and kidneys. Similar treatment occurred in
“Building 92” and the city jail.

47.In Smirkovnica, detainees were given food once a day: 500 g of bread and
some cookies for six persons and 50 litres of water for 500 prisoners. The
interviewee stayed in a cell of 4 x 4 metres together with eight other men,
but having 50 men in one cell was not uncommon. Prisoners were held in cells
for up to 24 hours without being allowed to use the toilet.

48.For example, in Cirez at the end of March.

49.IDP convoys targeted by paramilitary groups in Grastica were brutally

robbed and many persons allegedly killed or injured because they failed to
provide the demanded amount, which in some cases was as high as DM 1,000.
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50.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has

published two volumes of a survey of civilian casualties provoked by NATO
intervention: NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, Documentary Evidence.

51.On 18 April, eight people were killed by Yugoslav Army fire in Kaluderski
Laz, near Rozaje. OHCHR received several reports of military police and
reservists within or immediately outside northern Montenegro stopping civilian
buses and taking away large groups of men before permitting women and children
in the buses to go further. One such group of approximately 102 men was taken
away at Bozaj on 30 May and, after a media and international organization
outcry, was returned to Montenegro along with 56 others the same day. Some of
the men described being robbed and beaten along a gauntlet of army reservists,
after which a group of 10 were forced to engage in sexual acts while others
were made to watch.

52.Albanians from south-eastern Serbia are still particularly susceptible to

charges of “collaborationism” from more extreme elements within the Kosovo
Albanian community.

53.OHCHR has received reports that “politically suspect” Albanians are being
called in by KLA “police” for “informative talks”.

54.It has been reported to OHCHR that some 10 Bosniaks, primarily elderly,
have been killed by ethnic Albanians, some reportedly in KLA uniforms, in the
vicinity of Pec. There are also reports that Bosniaks have simply gone
missing in the region of Prizren and Klina.

55.The High Commissioner during her visit to Kosovo visited a Roma camp in
Kosovo Polje where she met a man who had been repeatedly beaten for his
supposed support to the ethnic-cleansing campaign carried out by Yugoslav
police, military and paramilitary forces.

56.According to several reports, KLA “parallel” civil administration has

issued instructions to its representatives to report the whereabouts of
Serb-owned houses and the number of Serbs still living in them.

57.In Pristina, in early August, four Serb women were forced under threat to
sign contracts giving their flats to Albanian families.

58.The apartments that are being taken over first are empty apartments and
those with Serb nameplates on the doors. However, just because an apartment
has a Serb nameplate does not mean that the property actually belongs to a
Serb. The Serbian Law on Real Property forbids the cross-ethnic sale of
property by Serbs to Albanians without the prior approval of a government body
in Belgrade. Such approval was virtually never granted, so individuals
entered into private transactions, retaining normal registration and external
identification with the Serb “owner”. Marauding and desperate Kosovo Albanian
apartment-occupiers, seizing property with Serb nameplates, are displacing
Kosovo Albanian residents.

59.Weekly mission report, 29 July-4 August 1999.

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60.Parallel institutions which existed during the past 10 years have quickly
resurfaced and present a constant challenge to the assertion of UNMIK
authority. Indeed, there is no way that UNMIK can compete in terms of speed
of development of institutions, given the Kosovar Albanians’ past experience
of running parallel institutions separate from those of the “official
government”, language, staff, etc. An alternative civil administration is
firmly established in most or all locales in which OHCHR is working or has
visited such as Gnjilane, Drenica, Djakovica and Malisevo. This civil
administration affects all levels of civic life including police, who have
identification cards permitting them to carry weapons and detain people. In
an effort to assert control in the different UNMIK regions, UNMIK Regional
Administrators have convened the Transitional Municipal Authorities which are
chaired by the Regional Administrator and composed of Kosovar members.

61.Some of these cases were brought to the attention of the High Commissioner
during her last visit to Kosovo. In particular, the High Commissioner met
with the husband of Dr. Flora Brovina, a human rights activist transferred to
a prison in Serbia during the war. Allegedly, her lawyer was denied access to
her and she was not being provided with necessary medical care. The High
Commissioner, upon return to Geneva, transmitted the information on this case
to the special procedures of the Commission on Human Rights for follow-up
action.

62.Of 420 prisoners from Prizren charged with terrorist crimes before 24 March
1999, 320 have been identified by local lawyers as being included on the list
made public by the FRY Ministry of Justice. Lawyers from Prizren have
requested the United Nations to demand the transfer of the Kosovar prisoners
back to Kosovo and the jurisdiction of UNMIK. In Gnjilane, OHCHR interviewed
an individual who had been transferred from detention in Gnjilane to Vranja
prison (inside Serbia proper) in mid-June along with a full busload of
detainees (approximately 45). He was, however, released within a few days of
the end of NATO hostilities and returned to Gnjilane. He provided information
about mistreatment during his detention.

63.The Government of Montenegro adopted a platform proposing substantially

diminished authority of the federal State in an “association” of Serbia and
Montenegro.

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