God, Emptiness and Ethics Author(s): Masao Abe Source: Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 3 (1983), pp.

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BUDDHIST ETHICSRE-EXAMINED

andEthics God, Emptiness

I have been asked to present a final evaluation, from a Buddhist perspective,of the overall discussionof this panel. It is, however, extremelydifficult for me to evaluate the foregoing statements by four scholarsof such high caliber, each of whom is distinctive in his ideas and arguments. During the discussion, they have taken up in a complex form many important issues related to the theme. As a result, all that I can do in limited space is to consider the most central issues of the discussion, make comments, and add my own view. That which I take to be the most centralissue of our discussionis the role of ethics in relation to ultimate reality as understood in Buddhism and Christianity.This is a question of the role of ethics in relation to the realizationof Emptiness as ultimate reality in Buddhism and, in comparisonwith this, the role of ethics in relation to God as ultimate reality in Christianity.To clarifythe Buddhist standpoint I will discuss (1) the relation between Emptiness and dependent co-origination, and (2) the two-truthstheory in Madhyamika Buddhism. Now, to encapsulateCobb's and Rupp's interpretationsof the Buddhist perspective, let me quote Eckel's summary, which I think is quite accurate.In his paper Eckelsays: Cobb and Rupp approachthe Mahayanamaterialin different ways, but they end with remarkablysimilar judgments. They both emphasize the nondualistic aspectsof the Mahayana,found not only in the literaryexpressions of the Zen tradition, but also in such classic Indian statements as Nagarjuna's 'There is no difference between sapsara and nirvaoa, and there is no difference between nirvata and samsara'(Madhyamakakarika, 24.19). Cobb and Rupp then use this material to picture the Mahayanatradition as one that is so radicalin its dissolution of conceptual distinctionsthat the historical process, as a reality, simply slips away. The gradual transformationof what is into what ought to be is dissolved in the contemplation of the eternal truth reflected equally in everymoment.
Buddhist-ChristianStudies 3 (1983). ? by the East-WestReligions Project,Universityof Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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MASAOABE Against this understandingof the Mahayana position by Cobb and Rupp, Eckel, relying mainly on Svatantrika-Madhyamika materials,emphasizesthat "the thought are alwaysbalancedby statements negative expressionsof Madhyamika that stress the purposeful practice of religious life." He also emphasizes that "the understandingof Emptiness is not an event outside time, but a continuous emptying in which moral action plays a significant, indeed a crucial,part." In this regard, Eckel further talks about the two-truthstheory in the Madhyamika school to which I will returnlater. Thurmanalso emphasizesthe inseparabilityof the insight of Emptinessfrom ethical action and the interdependencyof metaphysicsand ethics in Buddhism. On this basis he criticizes both Cobb and Rupp, saying that they are not free from the typical Western understandingof Buddhism as ethically insufficient. In particular,ThurmanstronglycriticizesCobb as if Cobb were attackingBuddhism. In my view, however, Cobb is actually emphasizing the different roles of ethics in Buddhism and Christianity,which are based on two different Ultiof Buddhism mate Realities. He is stressingthe need for mutual transformation and Christianitythrough their encounter. I agree with Thurman, however, when he says that both Christianityand Buddhism have a kataphaticway and an apophatic way of dealing with the question of ultimacy, "simply, both the movement from the relativeto the ultimate (loving God, cultivatingWisdom), and the movement from the ultimate to the relative (loving one's neighbor since God is love, practicingselflessgreat compassion)." As for Rupp's typology of the "Zen-type" and "Existentialist-type" of modern religious commitment, Thurman makes the criticism that Rupp's "Zen-type" "arises from his drasticoversimplificationof Zen Buddhism." I vs. Processive"and "Realistvs. Nomifind Rupp's typology of "Transactional nalist," guite interesting and provocative. Also his "third type," Christian definition of God, is suggestive. We must give careful thought to the merit of Rupp's typologicalformulation. Nevertheless, I almost totally agreewith ThurZen as a man's critique of the "Zen-type" outlined by Rupp. To characterize T. 'holistic acceptance'type of religion, Rupp quotes D. T. Suzuki and R. V. Murti. For instance, Murti's interpretationof Nirvanais quoted as support for this contention: There is only change in our outlook, not in reality .... The function of prajna[wisdom] is not to transformthe real, but only to create a change in our attitude towardsit. The change is epistemic (subjective), not ontological (objective). The real is as it has ever been.1 I completely disagreewith this interpretationof Nirvaoa, for in his interpretaand Nirvana. In Budtion, Murtioverlooksthe discontinuity between samisara and endless is realized as the dhism, sarpsara process of livingbeginningless in other words, from to is no continuous There sarpsara Nirvana; path dying.

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RESPONSE and Nirvaia is not a mere continuous epistemic what lies between sampsara change, but a discontinuous ontological change. Only when the beginningless and endless processof living-dying itself is realized as 'death' in the true sense is sarpsara,just as it is, realized as Nirvaoa-Nirvaoa as the liberation from as 'death' in the true sense, living-dying. Without the realization of sarmsara there can be no realization of Nirvana as 'new life' liberated from transmigration. "Change in our outlook" or "epistemic change" is only something which happens in the processof sarpsara, and neverleads us to Nirvaoa. The same is true with Zen. The crucialpoint of Zen practiceis daishi ichiban zetsugo ni yomigaeru, "Upon the Great Death we are reborn through complete extinction" or shin/in datsuraku; datsurakushinjin, "Body and mind dropping off-dropped off body and mind." This is far more than "a transformation in the disciples' point of view'2 as Rupp understandsZen practice to be. However, Rupp is perceptive enough to recognize that Murti's sharp distinction "between epistemological and ontological change is problematic on the idealisticpremiseswhich inform this whole tradition."3Thus, he says, "For on those premises, a change in consciousnessis also a change in the real."4 However, the interconnectednessof consciousness(subject) and the real (object) is legitimately realized not before, but only after the realizationof Great of Zen as maniDeath. Accordingly, I cannot accept Rupp's characterization festing a type of merely "epistemological" transcendence. On the basis of the above rough summary, we may formulate the points of discussion as follows: Does the nondualistic nature of Buddhist "Emptiness" eventually dissolve ethics and history? If not, how can Emptiness or Nirvata ground the Buddhist view of ethics and history? To promote interfaith dialogue, these questions must be clarified in comparisonwith Christianity.Both Eckel and Thurmanhave alreadypresented their illuminating answersto these questions. In the following, I would like to offer my own understanding. In the Madhyamika-kaikad, dependent co-origination and Emptiness (and the Middle Way) areexpresslydeclaredto be synonyms.' It is dependent co-originating that we term Emptiness (Sznyata); this is a designation (prajnapti)based on some material. It alone is the Middle Way. When dependent co-origination and Emptiness are grasped as synonyms two things are indicated: (1) dependent co-originationis Emptiness, and (2) Emptiness is dependent co-origination. The meanings of "dependent coorigination" in (1) and (2) are not altogether the same. When Gautama Buddha preached dependent co-origination, he emphasized that everythingin the universe without exception is co-arisingand co-ceasing;nothing is self-existing or unchangeable; this mundane world is in samsara,in the endless process of transmigration;to take this conditioned as unconditioned is the basic perversion which is the root of clinging and originatesin avidya, i.e., ignorance. The

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MASAOABE Buddha thus showed the way to attain Nirvana by realizing the dependent coHowever, in the Buddha's origination of everythingin the processof sarpsara. teaching, although the transmigrational aspect of "dependent co-origination" was clearly emphasized, emptiness or the lack of self-existent reality of phenomenal things was just implied. It was Nagarjuna who made explicit the notion of emptiness implied in "dependent co-origination" and preachedthe way to enlightenment by awakening to the emptiness of things in this world. Hence, his emphasis on eightfold negation and the negation of all possible dualistic distinctions. Nagarjuna, however, equally stressed that sunyata is upadaya-prajinapti (designation or convention based on some material)which is a synonym ofpratitya samutpada. Here dependent co-originationis regrasped in the light of Emptiness. Accordingly,in his identification of pratitya-samutpada Nagarjuna, by indicating that dependent co-origination is Emptiness, refers to 'dependent coorigination in samsara'in which all dualism or conceptual distinction must be dissolved into Emptiness. On the other hand, by indicating that Emptiness is dependent co-originationhe signifies 'dependent co-originationin Nirvana' in which all dualism or conceptual distinction is reconstructedin the realizationof Emptinesswithout any possibilityof clinging to distinction. These negative and positive meanings of Emptinessare implied when Nagarjunadiscusses pratityasamutapadaas a synonymof snyata. In orderto make this point clearer,let me quote a well known discourseof a Chinese Zen master, Ch'ing-yuan Wei-hsin of the T'ang dynasty. It runs as follows: Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen I said, 'Mountains are mountains; waters are waters.' After I got an insight into the truth of Zen through the instructionof a good master, I said, 'Mountainsare not mountains; watersare not waters.' But now, having attained the abode of final rest (that is enlightenment), I say, 'Mountains are really mountains; waters are reallywaters.' His understandingof mountains and watersin the first state before Zen practice indicates relativityor distinction realized in the mundane world or conventional realm. In the second stage in which he understandsthat mountains are not mountains and watersare not waters, he realizesEmptinessand the lack of self-existent realityin which relativityor distinction between things is resolved. All distinction is emptied and the non-duality of reality is realized. At this stage, however, Wei-hsin realizesonly the negative aspectof Emptiness. But by emptying Emptiness, he finally realizes its positive or affirmative aspect at which point he says, 'Mountainsarereallymountains; watersarereallywaters.' In this awakeningto true Emptiness, the relativityor distinction of everything is most clearlyand definitely realized without attachmentto it. The dependent co-arisingand co-ceasingof everythingin the universeis fully realized just as it

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RESPONSE is, without attainment and suffering. Along the lines of Wei-hsin, we can state with full justification: Before Buddhist practice, I thought 'good is good, evil is evil.' When I had an insight into Buddhist truth, I realized 'good is not good, evil is not evil.' But now, awakening to true Emptiness I say, 'good is really good; evil is reallyevil.' Conventional ethics based on the dualistic view of good and evil must be dissolved in the realizationof Emptiness for such ethics entail an endless conflict between good and evil. But this dissolution is just a negative aspect of Emptiness. In the positive aspect of the emptying of Emptiness, the distinction between good and evil is most clearly realized without any clinging to their duality. Hence, Buddhist ethics is established in the realization of true Emptiness. As both Eckel and Thurman emphasize, Buddhist Emptiness is not merely an ontological ultimate reality devoid of practical commitment. The insight into Emptiness is always inseparablyconnected with ethical action. However, this unity of the ontological realization of Emptiness and ethical action must include the dissolution of conventional ethics and the constructionof ethics in light of true Emptiness. This last point inevitably leads us to considerationof the two-truthstheory in Madhyamika Buddhism. The two truths are samvrti-satyaand paramartha-satya.Samvrti-satya is the conventional or mundane truth which is valid for practicalliving. It includes common sense, ethical judgment, and scientific knowledge, all of which are based on conceptual distinction, and are constructed verbally. In contrast, is ultimate truth, which is sunyata, Emptinesscompletely free paramartha-satya from conceptual distinction and beyond verbal expression. From the point of view of ultimate truth, conventional or mundane truth, howevertrue it may be in its own right, is nothing but ignoranceor falsehood. Thus, the two truths are essentially different from one another. The conventional and the ultimate do not constitute a twofold division of the world, however. It is not that one half is conventional and the other ultimate. Rather, the conventional and the ultimate are co-extensive; both pervade the entire world. This means that there is no continuous path from the conventional to the ultimate. However, much conventional truth is accumulated, it can never reach ultimate truth. Only when conventionaltruth is realized as ignoranceand therebycompletely turned over does ultimate truth emerge. Being empty and nondualistic, however, Emptinessnot only negates conventionaltruth but also bringsit to fruition. Once ultimate truth is awakened to, it constructsconventional truth on the basis of Emptiness. Svatantrika terms this vyavasthapana,establishment of the conventional. In one sense, ultimate truth cannot expressitself apartfrom the conventional realm. Only in the conventional world can ultimate truth be expressed. In short, only by the negation of mundane truth is ultimate truth

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MASAOABE realized: only through the self negation of ultimate truth does it expressitself in the mundane world. This is the relationshipbetween conventionaltruth and ultimate truth, in which they are dynamically identical while essentially different. As I suggested before, ethics belongs to conventional truth. However, true and genuine ethics may be in the mundane world, it cannot arriveat ultimate truth as Emptiness. There is no continuous path from ethics to Emptiness. In orderto reachEmptinessethics must be realized as "ignorance" and be turned over completely. However, this is only the negative aspect of Emptiness. In its positive and affirmative aspect, in which Emptiness empties itself, ultimate truth expressesitself in the form of ethics and ethics is thereby reestablishedin light of Emptiness. Accordingly, although ethics belongs to the conventional realm, it is not subordinateto the realizationof Emptiness, for ultimate truth can expressitself only in the mundane world. In this sense Emptiness may even be said to be subordinate to ethics. In Madhyama-kakarika, Nagarjunasays, "The ultimate truth is not taught apartfrom practicalbehavior.' 6 In Nagarjunathe ontological realizationof Emptinessis alwaysconnected with practicaland soteriological concerns. In this connection it may be in order to examine the relation between sarpas somesaraand Nirvaia. Originally,Buddhism rejectsattachmentto sarpsara in which one is and the of real Nirvana, necessity reaching preaches thing is such and the resultant thus from attachment Nirvana suffering. emancipated in life. as the of the the Buddhist However, Prajoaparamitagoal regarded sutras, which constitute one of the most important groups of Mahayanasutras and form the backgroundof MadhyamikaBuddhism, not only attachment to saipsarabut also attachment to Nirvaoa is rejected. "Do not abide in sarpsara nor abide in Nirvaoa" is a main emphasisof the sutra. When one overcomesattachment to samsarathrough practice, one awakens to sunyata and attains Nirvaoa. At this point avidya or ignorance ceases and prajnaor wisdom is realized. When the eye of wisdom is opened, one comes to realize that not only oneself but also everythingin the universeis in Nirvana. This is why Mahayana Buddhism declaresthat somoku kokudo shikkaijobutsu, "All the trees and herbs and lands attain Buddhahood." If one says, "I have attained Nirvaoa but trees and herbs, he and she do not attain Nirvaoa as yet," one's attainment is not an authentic one. The attainment of trees and herbs and other personsis not an objective event. Togetherwith one's attainment the whole universe attains Nirvaoa. This is clearly termed by Dogen dojijodo, simultaneousattainment of the way. Since the whole universehas now attained Nirvanawith oneself, the flux of time is completely overcomeand historyends in this Nirvana.This is the wisdom aspectof Nirvana. Nirvaoa as understood in this way, however, is still involved in at least the following two problems: (1) People who are understood by an enlightened one to have alreadyattained Nirvanado not necessarilyrealize that they themselves

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RESPONSE are in Nirvana. Many of them view themselves as still involved in sarmsara. 'Simultaneous attainment' is not yet objectivelyactualized. (2) Accordingly,if one abides in Nirvaoa and simply enjoys his or her own emancipation and is merely satisfied with 'simultaneous attainment,' that person is not completely free from selfishness. Enjoyingone's own Nirvanaaloof from sampsara, one forgets the suffering in which fellow beings arestill involved. Due to these two problems, one should not abide in Nirvana, but return to samsarato save others from suffering. Here, historybegins in Nirvaoa, and it is endless, for those who take themselves to be unenlightened are innumerablein the world at present and will continue to appear forever in the future. Thus, history is the endless processof actualizing 'simultaneous attainment' in time and preciselythis is the compassionateaspectof Nirvana. Accordingly, true Nirvaoa in MahayanaBuddhism is not a quiet and static state of mind beyond the flux of samsaraas seen in the case of the Arhat, but rather a dynamic function of moving freely back and forth between so-called samsaraand so-called Nirvaoa as seen in the case of the Bodhisattva.The perfection of wisdom, i.e., prajnaparmita,is not realized in Nirvana beyond samsara, but in the midst of samsara,in which compassionateactivities are going on through the abandoning of Nirvana. True compassionis not realized in the supramundanerealm of Nirvaoa. Nor is it the humanistic love in the realm of the mundane world. Rather, it is compassion which is based on the wisdom realized in Nirvaoa, and yet is deeply workingin the munde world. In Nirvana, mahaprajnaand mahakaruna,i.e., true wisdom and true compassion, are not two but one. Buddhist ethics and historyare established in this dynamicmovement of true Nirvana. Nirvaoa in MahayanaBuddhism is thereforenot merely the goal of the Buddhist life but also the point of departurefrom which the Buddhist life properlybegins. When Nirvanais simply taken as the goal, ethics may be dissolved in Emptiness and history may not be clearlyrealized. This is why throughout its long historyMahayanaBuddhism has emphasized "Do not abide in Nirvana" and severelyrejectedan attachmentto Emptinessas a "rigid view of nothingness" or a "literal understandingof negativity."' In conclusion, we can say it is of course not the case that Buddhism is less ethical than Christianity.Ethical action is equally essential to both Christianity and Buddhism. However, the nature or character of ethics as understoodin the two religions is not the same. This difference in the understanding of the nature of ethics, as Cobb suggests, is related to the different realizationof the "ultimate" in the two traditions, that is, the principle of rightness in Christianity and Emptiness in Buddhism. Cobb says, "In the Bible, Yahweh is portrayed as righteous, and the appropriateresponseto Yahweh's righteousnessis human righteousness." Due to the transcendentcharacterof this divine righteousness, if I am not wrong, Christianethics becomes an eschatologicalethics which is somewhat future-oriented. According to so-called realized eschatology, the justice of God is alreadyconsummated, but in another sense, it is not yet. Christian ethics and its dynamism are based on this tension between

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MASAOABE alreadyand not yet. In Christianity,however, 'already'and 'not yet' arenot coextensive: 'not yet' has priority over 'already.' This is why even the realized eschatologyis future-oriented. On the other hand, in Buddhism 'already' and 'not yet' are completely coextensive and in a dialectical tension. This is because in light of the wisdom realized in Nirvana, the whole universeis alreadyin Nirvanaand time and history ceased there, but in light of compassionequally realized in Nirvaoa, innumerablefellow beings aresubjectivelynot yet enlightened and time and history thus begin. This dialecticalunity of 'already'and 'not yet' is possible becauseit takes place not in God whose essential nature is rightness, but in true Nirvaoa which is the realization of Emptiness. Buddhist ethics and its dynamism are based on this dialectical tension of 'already' and 'not yet', a tension which is not future-orientedbut absolute-present-oriented. Thus, in Buddhism, at each and every moment of history, a development toward the endless future is at once the total returnto the root and sourceof history, that is, unchanging eternity. Conversely,the total returnto this root and sourceof historyis also development towardthe endless future. The processof historyis a successionof such moments whose dynamic structureconsists of an advance which is simultaneously a return, a returnwhich is simultaneouslyan advance. Christianethics is an eschatologicalethics, based on the principle of rightness as stressedin Protestantism,and it is future-oriented. Buddhist ethics is compassionate ethics, as stressedin Mahayanareligiosity, based on the realization of Emptiness, and it is absolute-present-oriented.Since they are significantly different, they can learn greatlyfrom each other. When they learn and deeply appropriateeach other, Christianitywill become MahayanaChristianityand Buddhism will become ProtestantBuddhism.
NOTES 1. George Rupp, Beyond Existentialismand Zen, p. 38. Originally from T. R. V. Murti, The CentralPhilosophyof Buddhism, p. 273-274. 2. Ibid., p. 38. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. XXIV: 18. 5. Madhyamaka-karika, 6. Ibid., XXIV 10.

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