How Capitalism Was Built

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HOW CAPITALISM WAS BUILT
Anders slund is known for making bold predictions that initially arouse
controversy but become common wisdom a few years later. He foresaw the
collapse of the Soviet Union in his book Gorbachevs Struggle for Economic
Reform (1989). He depicted the success of Russias market transformation in
How Russia Became a Market Economy (1995), when others saw little but chaos.
After Russias nancial crisis of 1998, slund insisted that Russia had no choice
but to adjust to the world market (Building Capitalism, 2002), although most
observers declared the market economic experiment a failure.
r
Why did Russia not choose Chinese gradual reforms?
r
Why are the former Soviet countries growing much faster than the Central
European economies?
r
How did the oligarchs arise?
r
Where are the postcommunist countries heading?
These are just some of the questions answered in his newbook, How Capitalism
Was Built, which tells the story of how all but three of twenty-one former
communist countries were transformed into market economies from 1989 to
2007, but less than half of them became democracies.
Anybody who wants to understand the often confusing dramas unfolding
in the region and to obtain an early insight into the future will nd this book
useful and intellectually stimulating.
Anders slund is a leading specialist on postcommunist economic transforma-
tion with more than 30 years of experience in the eld. The author of seven
books, he has also worked as an economic advisor to the Russian government,
to the Ukrainian government, and to the president of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Dr. slund joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in
Washington, D.C., in January 2006. Before that he was the Director of the
RussianandEurasianProgramat the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. He teaches at Georgetown University.
He was born in Sweden and served as a Swedish diplomat. He earned his
PhD from Oxford University.
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Other books by Anders slund:
Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe, 1985.
Gorbachevs Struggle for Economic Reform, 1989.
Post-Communist Economic Revolutions: How Big a Bang? 1992.
How Russia Became a Market Economy, 1995.
Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, 2002.
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How Capitalism Was Built
The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe,
Russia, and Central Asia
ANDERS SLUND
Peterson Institute for International Economics,
Washington, D.C.
iii
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Cambridge University Press
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First published in print format
ISBN-13 978-0-521-86526-5
ISBN-13 978-0-521-68382-1
ISBN-13 978-0-511-34159-5
Anders slund 2007
2007
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Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
hardback
paperback
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eBook (EBL)
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For Anna, Carl, and Marianna
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures page xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction: A World Transformed 1
Overview of the Arguments of This Book 3
1. Communism and Its Demise 11
Real Socialism 11
Decline and Fall of Socialism 15
The Demise of Communism in Central Europe 20
The Collapse of the Soviet Union 23
2. Shock Therapy versus Gradualism 29
The Radical Reform Program: A Big Bang 31
Gradual Reform Programs 37
Rent Seeking: The Scourge of Transition 47
Criticism of Radical Reform after the Russian Financial Crash 53
3. Output: Slump and Recovery 57
Sharp Decline in Recorded Output and Varied Recovery 59
Exaggeration of the Slump 63
Radical Reform: Least Decline and Early Recovery 69
Late Reformers: Surged after 1998 75
4. Liberalization: The Creation of a Market Economy 82
Two Strategies of Deregulation 83
Liberalization of Foreign Trade 89
Labor Market Policy 92
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viii Contents
Combat of Monopoly: Gas and Coal 96
A Big Bang: Vital in Deregulation 101
5. From Hyperination to Financial Stability 104
Establishing National Currencies 108
Radical Fiscal Adjustment Was Key 111
Tax Policy: From Social Democratic to Liberal 116
Monetary Policy: From Loose to Strict 119
Exchange Rates: Currency Board or Free Float 123
Dramas of Financial Stabilization 127
6. Privatization: The Establishment of Private Property Rights 143
Differing Aims of Privatization 144
Small-Scale Privatization: If Started, Swiftly Done 154
Large-Scale Privatization: The Biggest Headache 155
Privatization of Land, Real Estate, and Housing 164
New Enterprise Development: The Ultimate Success 165
Great Achievements of Privatization 168
Vital: Speed and Legitimacy of Property Rights 178
7. An Inefcient Social System 182
Incomes: Differentiation and Poverty 183
Life and Health 187
Education Adjusting to Demand 194
Social Transfers and Pension Reform 197
Three Alternative Social Models 203
8. Democracy versus Authoritarianism 206
Democratic Breakthrough: Critical for Successful
Transformation 207
An Underreform Trap 215
Renewed Democratization: Colored Revolutions 221
Parties, Electoral Rules, and Constitutions 224
How to Tame the Leviathan: Reform of the Communist State 230
Public Opinion and Ideology 232
Democracy and Democracy Aid 236
9. From Crime toward Law 241
An Explosion of Crime 242
Attempts at Building a Legal System 245
Corruption: The Bane of Transition 249
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Contents ix
10. The Role of Oligarchs 256
Who Are the Oligarchs? 257
The Economics of Oligarchy 259
The Politics of Oligarchy 264
Complaints: A Matter of Ideology 267
A Question of Property Rights 272
Putins Alternative: Centralized Dictatorship 276
11. The Impact of the Outside World 281
The Dream of Europe 282
Western Failure to Act in the East 286
Trade Policy: A Gulf between the EU and the CIS 292
International Assistance: Insufcient but Crucial 297
Conclusions: A World Transformed 305
Five Models 305
Achievements and Revelations 307
Why Certain Polices Worked and Others Did Not 311
Bibliography 315
Index 343
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List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
3.1 Patterns of GDP Growth, 19957 70
6.1 Methods of Privatization of Medium-Sized and Large
Enterprises 156
8.1 Ex-Communist Vote Share in Parliamentary Elections in
Postcommunist Countries, 19892000 218
8.2. Communist Party Electoral Performance and Market Economic
Transformation, 1998 219
11.1 EU Agreement Policy and EU Accession 284
11.2 U.S. Peace Dividend, 19929 291
C.1 Success of Transition 306
FIGURES
3.1 Ofcial GDP Growth, 19902006 59
3.2 Total Ofcial Fall in GDP from 1989 to Nadir 60
3.3 Ofcial GDP Growth, 19992006 62
3.4 GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parities, 1990, 1998,
and 2005 62
3.5 Underground Economy, 198995 64
3.6 Expansion of Exports, 19912005 80
3.7 Gross Fixed Investment, 19912005 80
4.1 World Bank/European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) Transition Index, 19902005 85
4.2 Early Reform: Radical or Gradual? 86
4.3 Labor Regulations as a Problem in Doing Business, 2005 95
4.4 Unemployment Rate, 2005 96
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xii List of Tables and Figures
4.5 Russian and Polish Coal Production, 19882005 100
5.1 Ination in Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, 198997 106
5.2 Ination in CIS and the Baltic States, 19917 106
5.3 Ination in Central and Southeast Europe, Baltics, and CIS,
19982005 107
5.4 Fiscal Balance, 19892005 113
5.5 General Government Expenditures, 19892005 115
5.6 Russias Budget Decit, 19922000 134
5.7 Current Account Balance, 19902006 141
5.8 Total External Debt, 19912005 141
6.1 De Novo Share of GDP, 1995 168
6.2 Private Sector as Share of GDP, 19912006 169
6.3 Democracy and Privatization, 2005 170
6.4 Privatization and Corruption, 2006 177
7.1 Inequality: Change in Gini Coefcients, 19882002 185
7.2 Male Life Expectancy, 19892005 188
7.3 Infant Mortality, 19892005 190
7.4 Population Change, 19892004 192
8.1 Democracy and Market Reform, 2005 212
8.2 Democracy and Corruption, 2005 216
9.1 Corruption, 2006 250
11.1 Openness of the Economy, 1990, 1998, and 2004 297
11.2 Countries in Transition: Net Capital Flows, 19929 298
11.3 Foreign Direct Investment Inow per Capita, 19932005 299
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List of Abbreviations
BEEPS EBRD World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey
CBR Central Bank of Russia
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECE Economic Commission for Europe (United Nations)
EU European Union
FIG Financial-industrial group
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross domestic product
GDR German Democratic Republic
GNP Gross national product
IFI International nancial institution
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Initial public offering
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHARE EU technical assistance program for EU accession countries
TACIS Technical Assistance for the CIS (EU program)
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAT Value-added tax
WTO World Trade Organization
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Acknowledgments
This book is partly a sequel, partly an updating and revision of my book
Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002). At that time, the implications of the Russian
nancial crash of 1998 were still hazy. Today the perspectives on how cap-
italism was built are so much clearer, allowing me to paint the picture in
stronger colors and focus on its main features.
The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics and its
director, C. Fred Bergsten, has graciously permitted me to write this book
in the course of 2006. Julija Remeikaite has offered me wonderful research
assistance. Matthew Gibson and Christian Grabas have provided me with
additional assistance. Discussions at the Peterson Institute have been most
stimulating, andI amgrateful tomany colleagues, especially SimonJohnson,
Michael Mussa, and John Williamson.
Victor Pinchuk, Hans and M arit Rausing, as well as Adolf and Eva Lundin
have providedgenerous nancial support. I amdeeply indebtedtothemalso
for their intellectual input.
This is the fourth book I am doing with Cambridge University Press, and
I want once again to thank Scott Parris for his expedience and kindhearted-
ness.
To understand what is going on in this wide region, reading is never
sufcient. One also needs to travel extensively and talk to many people. I
am grateful to a great many interlocutors. The gratitude that I expressed
to many people in Building Capitalism remains valid also for this book. In
addition, I thank a large number of people for their oral contribution to my
understanding of the transformation of this large region (in alphabetical
order): Aivaras Abromavicius, Askar Akaev, Irina Akmova, Leon Aron, Ewa
and Leszek Balcerowicz, Carl Bildt, Peter Boone, Al Breach, Per Brilioth,
Olexander Chalyi, Anatoly Chubais, Keith Crane, Marek D abrowski, Pavel
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xvi Acknowledgments
Daneiko, Dennis De Tray, Mikhail Dmitriev, Peter Elam H akansson, Boris
G. Fedorov, Bohdan Futey, Clifford Gaddy, Yegor Gaidar, Ardo Hansson,
Andrei Illarionov, Bruce Jackson, Albert Jaeger, Nazgul Jenish, Andrzej
Kozlowski, Andrius Kubilius, Andrew Kuchins, Mart Laar, Nancy Lee,
Johannes Linn, Michael McFaul, Tatyana Maleva, Michael Marrese, Mark
Medish, Branko Milanovic, Vladimir Milov, Kalman Mizsei, Alexei Mozhin,
Boris Nemtsov, John Odling-Smee, Djoomart Otorbaev, Irina Paliashvili,
Vladimir Papava, Carlos Pascual, Alexander Paskhaver, Steven Pifer, Andrei
Piontkovsky, Olena Prytula, Nathaniel Rothschild, Charles Ryan, Stephen
Sestanovich, Lilya Shevtsova, BenSlay, Eva Srejber, Mats Staffansson, Angela
Stent, Carl Stur en, Fredrik Svinhufvud, Vito Tanzi, David Tarr, Marat
Tazabekov, Dmitri Trenin, Dmitri Vasiliev, Valentina Vedeneeva, Yevgeny
Yasin, Yuriy Yekhanurov, and Ksenia Yudaeva.
I have greatly beneted from comments on draft chapters by Simon
Johnson, JohnWilliamson, JohnOdling-Smee, Johannes Linn, Albert Jaeger,
Andrea Schaechter, Julija Remeikaite, Mathew Gibson, Anna slund, and
an anonymous reviewer.
Most of all I thank my understanding and supportive family, who have
helped me to write this book in more ways than I can mention here.
The responsibility for any remaining faults rests with me.
Anders slund
Washington, D.C.
November 2006
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Introduction: A World Transformed
In 1989, the Soviet bloc from Berlin to Vladivostok was struck by one of
the greatest liberal revolutions of all times. Since then, society has changed
profoundly. A complete ideological, political, economic, and social system
passed away, and some 400 million people had to choose a new system. The
rejection of socialism was unequivocal. A broad consensus aspired to build
democracy and a market economy based on private ownership and the rule
of law, and opposition to these goals was concealed in disagreement on how
to accomplish them.
At the collapse of communism, liberal revolutionaries seized the political
initiative. Theyaspiredtobuildanormal societyandtoreturntoEurope.
The petried communist dictatorships had to give way to democracy and
individual freedom, the state-controlled economy to markets, and public
ownership to private property. Communism had rejected the rule of law,
which should now be established. A total transformation was needed, and
nobody thought it would be easy.
Communists always feared the return of capitalism. They planted many
poison pills to secure the destruction of capitalism, such as the compre-
hensive nationalization of property, the annihilation of civil society, the
elimination of markets, and the suppression of law. Communism was dead
as an ideology, unable to resist the liberal revolution, but its poison pills
were alive. They bred a rent-seeking state that was actually the alternative
to free market capitalism. The main struggle of postcommunist transfor-
mation stood between radical market reformers, who desired a swift and
complete transition, and rent seekers, whose desire was to make money on
a prolonged period of market distortions.
The building of capitalism was widely seen as comprising four key steps.
The rst and most fundamental step was to deregulate prices and trade
so that a market could be formed. Second, when prices were freed, they
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2 How Capitalism Was Built
inevitably rose because of shortages caused by excess demand, and ination
had to be brought under control by many means. Third, the nominally
public enterprises lacked real masters, and the only plausible principals to
be were private owners, which required large-scale privatization. Fourth,
everybody understood that postcommunist transformation would involve
massive social dislocation, and all acknowledged the need for a new social
safety net. Democracy and the rule of law were, of course, desirable.
Perspectives change over time. As often happens during revolutions,
peoples expectations become exaggerated and then people become disap-
pointed. The institutional changes have been immense, but even so the lega-
cies of the old society remain palpable, as Alexis de Tocqueville (1856/1955)
noted so accurately in The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Some
institutions have been much more successfully reformed than others.
Postcommunist transformation has been an intense battle. On one side
of the barricades stood radical reformers, who wanted to build a normal
society. Their main opponents were rent seekers, not old communists. The
rent seekers goal was plain: to make as much money as possible on tran-
sitional market distortions. Their endeavors led to a great misallocation of
resources and slumping output. Their hunger for state subsidies and subsi-
dized credits boosted ination, disorganizing the whole economy. All their
successes skewed income and wealth distribution in their favor.
Despite all hardship, most socialist economies have swiftly become ordi-
nary market economies. Of the twenty-one countries studied in this book,
1
all but three Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have been success-
fully transformed. Transactions are monetary, reasonably free, and carried
out on markets. In almost all of these countries, ination has fallen to single
digits, and nearly two-thirds of the national output is produced in pri-
vately owned enterprises. The international community knew how to build
a market economy. Predominantly, it advocated a radical market economic
reform with deregulation, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and
the formation of a new social safety net. To a reasonable degree, this policy
was implemented, but mostly with delays. To build a market economy was
a political choice that most, but not all, governments made. The three CIS
1
They once formed the Soviet bloc in East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union. I call
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary Central Europe, and Bulgaria
and Romania Southeast Europe. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the Baltic states.
Together, I call these three subregions East-Central Europe. The rest of the region con-
sists of the twelve countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
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nonreformers showed that the success of the market economy was not a
given.
The building of democracy and the establishment of the rule of law have
been much less successful. Frequent complaints are that too much attention
andresources were devotedtoeconomic reformandtoolittle topolitical and
legal reforms. This may be true, but more striking is that in these spheres no
viable theory predominated and the policy advice was often too vague and
diverse tobe helpful. National leaders hadnoclear idea or programtofollow.
As a consequence, only the EuropeanUnion(EU) accessioncountries, which
adopted all the EU institutions, were successful in building democracy. The
promotion of the rule of law has been even more unsatisfactory.
Theoutcomes of postcommunist transitionhavebeenremarkablydiverse.
The results have depended on early policy choices, which were inuenced
by the conditions prevailing in each country. The Central Europeans swiftly
shifted to normal market economies and privatized. They adopted West
European social welfare systems with high taxes, large social transfers, and
excessive labor market regulation, which have impeded their economic
dynamism, but they have also become impeccable democracies, and cor-
ruption is relatively limited.
Nine Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reformers also devel-
opedmarket economies, but of a more East Asiantype withlowtaxes, limited
social transfers, and liberal labor markets. The low taxes are a major cause
of their recent high growth rates. Low at income taxes, decreasing corpo-
rate prot taxes, and the liberalization of labor markets are proliferating
from the East into the EU. Alas, they are at best semidemocratic and mostly
authoritarian states, with pervasive corruption.
The Baltics cleverly chose the best of both of these worlds, adopting
full-edged market economies with limited public sectors and high eco-
nomic growth. They also enjoy democracy and limited corruption. South-
east Europe straddles a middle ground between the social democratic
Central European model and the liberal Baltic model. It is still too early
to say what eventual choice it will make.
Three CIScountries are completely nonreformed, Belarus, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan. They are true tyrannies, and they maintain a state-domi-
nated, Soviet-style system.
Overview of the Arguments of this Book
Postcommunist transition has aroused many debates. Often the discussion
has been heated, because the issues involved have been of great importance
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to numerous people. To offer the reader an overview of the arguments of
this book, some of the most common, as well as contentious, questions are
posed here with brief answers summarizing what the reader will nd in this
book.
Why Didnt Russia Follow the Successful Chinese Model
of Economic Reform?
Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev attempted gradual economic reforms
for twoyears until herealizedthat theomnipotent partybureaucracyblocked
all his efforts. He responded by launching glasnost and partial democrati-
zation to undermine the apparatchiks. In China, the bureaucracy had been
disciplinedbythe Cultural Revolutionandstill obeyedthe Center. The Soviet
Union had experimented with gradual reforms in the 1920s, 1950s, 1960s,
and 1980s, but all these reforms had been reversed. The dominant reformist
conclusion was that reforms had to be more radical to become irreversible.
China had successfully started with reforms in agriculture, but that sector
was not very large in the Soviet economy, so any success would have had
limitedimpact onthe economy as a whole. Moreover, Soviet collective farms
were large-scale andindustrialized, rendering their reformfar more complex
than in the manual Chinese agriculture. Gradual price deregulation seemed
to work in China, but in Russia it was a major source of disruptive rent
seeking. The Soviet Union collapsed in hyperination, whereas the Chinese
leaders never lost control over macroeconomic stability. In the end, surpris-
ingly little canbe comparedinChina andRussia, because their preconditions
differed greatly. So it would be surprising if the same model would generate
similar results or even be applicable.
Why Was Postcommunist Transition So Arduous?
The postcommunist transition was replete with hardship. The initial condi-
tions were truly awful. Most countries entered transition amid serious eco-
nomic crisis with high ination and output nearly in free fall. The combina-
tion of excessive foreign debt, large budget decits, and prevalent shortages
necessitated price liberalization. But when prices were freed, they skyrock-
eted. The overarching early task was to defeat ination because as long as
ination stayed high, output plummeted. A whole new system had to be
built, and the knowledge of how to do so was limited.
Another reason for enduring hardship was that many rent seekers, who
were prominent members of the old and new elite, could make fortunes on
market distortions. They favored low regulated prices and restricted trade
to make money on privileged foreign trade arbitrage. They insisted on low
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state interest rates because they beneted from ample access to state credits.
As conditions altered, they swiftly found new means of extracting rents
until the construction of a market economy had been completed. They did
what they could to prolong the transition period because it was a windowof
opportunityfor them. Meanwhile, the rent-seekingelite ignoredthe negative
impact on output, not to mention on the well being of the population, of
their shenanigans. All measures indicate that as radical and early a transition
as possible yielded the best economic and social results.
Has Output Really Fallen More than During the Great Depression?
The decline in output can hardly be compared to the degree of decline expe-
rienced during the Great Depression, but we shall never possess an exact
answer because the problems of measurement and denition are immense.
All ofcial statistics exaggerate the decline in output, and the multiple biases
point in one direction. In the Soviet system, managers wanted to exaggerate
their output to reach their plan targets, whereas private businessmen prefer
to understate their production to alleviate taxation. Statistical systems could
not survey the many newprivate enterprises, and the unregistered economy
grew. Much of the socialist product was unusable and unsaleable sheer
value detractionthat shouldnever have beenrecordedas value added. Under
socialism, consumers suffered fromshortages, massive queuing, awful qual-
ity, limited choice, and forced substitutionbecause more oftenthannot they
could not nd what they wanted. Military production accounted for about
one-quarter of the Soviet gross domestic product (GDP) in the late 1980s.
This production was real, but demand for it plummeted with the end of
the Cold War. The energy and raw material producers in the former Soviet
Union gave large implicit subsidies to the energy-poor states in the west
and south, and the Central Asian republics received large annual budget
subsidies fromMoscow. Because we shall never be able to agree on the value
of the Soviet GDP, we cannot agree on how much it has fallen. All told, the
real output fall might have been about half as much as ofcial statistics
suggest.
Hadnt a More Gradual Dissolution of the Soviet Union Been Better?
Agradual dissolution would not have been better; the greatest disaster at the
dissolution was the maintenance of the ruble zone for one and a half years,
which led to hyperination (more than 50 percent of ination in the course
of one month) in ten of the twelve CIS countries because of competitive
issue of money by multiple central banks. The Baltic countries were the
most successful both in their building of market economies and democracy
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thanks to their early and clean break with the rest of the Union. The Soviet
Union had stopped functioning as a scal and monetary entity by late 1990
because the Union republics no longer passed on their scal revenues to the
Uniontreasury while irresponsibly boosting their expenditures beyondtheir
means. Because Russia had democratized more and earlier than the Soviet
Union, Russia enjoyed more political legitimacy than the Union. Finally, no
empire has succumbed with as little bloodshed as the Soviet Union. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 stands out as a wise and
heroic deed of great foresight.
Has Privatization Been Overdone?
Privatizationhas not beenoverdone. Thepredominanceof privateenterprise
has been a precondition of both market economy and democracy. Private
enterprises have generated virtually all economic growth. The price paid for
an enterprise at its privatization was not very important because successful
privatized rms often pay annual taxes exceeding the highest price imag-
inable of the original asset. Because private companies generally do better
than public enterprises, it is more important that enterprises are privatized
early than how they are privatized. The later the privatization, the greater
the destruction of both physical and human capital was. But it does matter
that a privatization be perceived as legitimate, so that the resulting property
rights are politically recognized. Restitution, mass privatization, and sales
to insiders have been more easily accepted than initial sales to outsiders,
although the latter have been economically successful.
Are Oligarchs Pure Parasites?
Oligarchs are not parasites per se. In the early transition, the oligarchs
were the most outstanding rent seekers, but as normal market economies
obtained, the oligarchs adjustedandhave beenhighly productive since 1999.
In Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, young, able, local businessmen have
revived and restructured many a Soviet mastodon, especially in energy and
metals. In these industries, existing enterprises were large and so were the
economies of scale. Foreign investors have mostly proved helpless in the
early restructuring of large Soviet factories. Local businessmenhave excelled
in these tasks: managing relations with both regional and central govern-
ments, defeating pervasive criminality at plants, and handling the complex
social rules while slashing the work force, utilizing the existing physical cap-
ital rationally, and securing both property rights and contracts. Because of
the weak legislation and judicial system, which resulted in poor corporate
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governance, concentrated ownership has been superior to widespread own-
ership. As a consequence of their concentrated ownership of large successful
corporations, the oligarchs have become very wealthy. By contrast, because
of unwillingness tosell cheaplytolocal businessmen, largeplants havemostly
diedinCentral Europe either inthe hands of inept foreigninvestors or, more
often, in protracted, unproductive state ownership.
Has Western Aid Been Excessive?
Western assistance to the postcommunist countries has been small by any
standard. The total grant assistance to the region was a couple of billion
dollars a year, which is tiny. By contrast, the U.S. peace dividend, that is,
the reduction in U.S. military expenditures that became possible because
of the end of the Cold War amounted to a stunning $1.4 trillion in the
1990s, or as much as 3 percent of the U.S. GDP in 1999. Amazingly, Western
governments received more in debt service on old communist loans than
they gave in both loans and grants to the postcommunist countries from
1993 to 1996. The Western negligence to make a serious effort at assistance
in the early transition is disturbing.
East Germany has suffered from the opposite problem. Since 1990, West
Germany has poured over $80 billion a year into its new Laender about
half its GDP and twice the global assistance to developing countries which
has greatly exceeded that regions absorption capacity. East Germany has
been priced out of the market by this giant nancial ow that has formed
an insurmountable social welfare trap. Strangely, this harmful wastage of
public resources is continuing unabated.
Is the European Union the Best Solution?
The European Union has made impressive contributions to the transfor-
mation of the EU accession countries. It provided the standard of a normal
society. Both through its demands and its transfer of institutions, it helped
to reinforce democracy in the accession countries. From an early stage, the
EU opened its vast market to them. In the accession process, the EU com-
pelled the new members to adopt 80,000 pages of legal texts in the acquis
communautaire. The great advantage was that the newmembers were forced
toadopt a standardWesternmarket economic andlegal system. The shortfall
was that they were induced to accept a West European social welfare model
with high taxes, large social transfers, and various forms of overregulation,
notably of labor markets and agriculture. That model is not conducive to
high economic growth, which is one of these countries greatest needs.
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Have the Postcommunist Countries Achieved Sustainable
Economic Growth?
Sustainable growth has probably been achieved. The Russian nancial crash
turned out to be the catharsis Russia needed to accomplish a full-edged
market economy with a critical mass of markets, macroeconomic stabil-
ity, and private enterprises. Its impact was felt throughout the post-Soviet
region. Growth returned with a vengeance. It has been driven by sound
macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, sharp cuts in public expen-
ditures, low exchange rates, and a commodity boom. Since 2000, the huge
former Soviet region fromthe Baltics to Kazakhstan has recorded an average
growth of more than 8 percent a year.
2
The former Soviet Union has joined
the growth belt that started in East Asia a few decades ago and has prolif-
erated through China and India. Common features of all these economies
are sound macroeconomic policies, low taxes, small social transfers, and
relatively liberal labor markets. In 2003, Goldman Sachs stunned the world
with a paper about the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), predicting
that in 2028, Russia would be the fth biggest economy in the world after the
United States, China, Japan, and India (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003).
If sustained high oil prices are added, Russia could become the fth biggest
economy in the world before 2020 (Westin 2005). Most of the former Soviet
Union is growing even faster than Russia. Will this growth survive the cur-
rent commodity boom? It probably will in the star performers the Baltics,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan because they have undertaken con-
siderable reforms. The main question mark is Russia, which has seriously
aggravated its structural policies and reverted to renationalization.
Alas, approaching the European Union, this dynamism fades away. Cen-
tral Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) got stuck
with a growth rate of only 4 percent a year from 2000 to 2005. Admittedly,
that is more thantwice the EUrate, but these still-poor countries need much
faster growth, and at this rate, they will not converge with the rest of the EU.
Latin America is a natural yardstick for achievements in the postcom-
munist region. Both before and after the collapse of communism, their
economic level was similar. The postcommunist countries have caught up
with Latin America by establishing a market economy and privatization.
Latin America has been more successful in democratization, whereas the
postcommunist region has achieved much higher growth rates because
2
Throughout this book, all averages are unweighted because we are interested in the relative
performance of different countries. In economic weight, Russia and Poland dominate.
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its structural economic reforms are proceeding. At present, the economic
future of Eurasia looks brighter, but the combination of authoritarian rule
and the energy curse might take major countries in this region astray.
This book is a history of the economic development of this postcommunist
region from 1989 until 2006. It is devoted to the postcommunist economic
transformation of the twenty-one countries in the former Soviet bloc in
Eurasia, includingPoland, the CzechRepublic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and all the fteen former Soviet Republics,
3
while excluding all
the former Yugoslav republics Albania, China, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
All these twenty-one countries had much in common: the hierarchical and
bureaucratic communist dictatorship, the socialist economic system, and
closely connected foreign trade system. Although reforms in Hungary and
Poland had altered their systems, the socialist principles remained, whereas
the economic andpolitical systems of Yugoslavia andChina were profoundly
different.
The structure of this book is systematic with one chapter for each major
topic. Chapter 1 discusses what communism was and how it collapsed.
Chapter 2 presents the main discussion with arguments for a radical or
more gradual market economic reform. Chapter 3 examines what actually
happened to output and how that can be explained. Chapter 4 focuses on
deregulation, Chapter 5 on macroeconomic stabilization, and Chapter 6 on
privatization. Chapter 7 deals with social developments and Chapter 8 with
the politics of transition. Chapter 9 considers the problems of establishing
the rule of law. The newly emerged oligarchs deserve Chapter 10 for them-
selves. Chapter 11 is devoted to the role of international assistance, after
which conclusions follow.
I published Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet
Bloc in early 2002. This book is not a second edition but partly a sequel
and partly a slimmed revision of that volume. Most of this book is newly
written. My ambition is to streamline the argument and concentrate on
the dominant trends, which have become more evident over time. I have
reducedtechnical details andstatistics, replacing many tables withsummary
graphs in the hope of providing a better overview. Today we can say that
the building of capitalism has been successful, and it is time to take stock
of how this was accomplished. The academic literature on postcommunist
3
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
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transition is immense, and I have tried to limit the references to the most
essential to make the book readable. I hope that this book will serve not only
as a standard for the academic community and as a textbook for students
but also as a source of inspiration to a broader public, notably investors who
want to benet from these growing economies.
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9780521865265c01 CUFX164/Aslund 978 0 521 86526 5 August 8, 2007 14:24
1
Communism and Its Demise
All happy families are similar, but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
Lev Tolstoy, Anna Karenina
Today, the case for socialism is no longer persuasive, but this was not always
so. Once, many intelligent people considered socialism not only morally
but also economically superior to capitalism and democracy. They thought
a benign state would pursue higher ideals than a petty democracy and exe-
cute them more effectively. Marxist-Leninist ideas and socialist institutions
conditioned the postcommunist transition. To provide some background, I
review the essence of the Soviet-type system.
1
As communism broke down,
countries faced very different political and economic preconditions, and
their collapses proceeded in sharply contrasting ways.
Real Socialism
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and other communist theo-
reticians left many ideas on how to develop a socialist state, but Josef Stalin
was the one who formed the classical communist economic system with the
rst ve-year plan of 192933. This system remained intact until his death
in March 1953, and he imposed it on all countries in the Soviet bloc. Despite
many reformattempts, the lasting changes were remarkably small. This sys-
tem was the least common denominator of all the countries discussed in
this book.
2
The institutional barriers built to reform it were formidable.
1
I use socialist and communist interchangeably as synonyms for Soviet-type commu-
nism.
2
This account draws primarily on Kornai (1992a), arguably the best account of the com-
munist economic system, Hewett (1988), and Nove (1969, 1977).
11
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The communist systemwas the most thoroughly politicized systemthe world
has seen. As J anos Kornai (1992a, p. 360) stated: The key to explaining the
classical socialist system is . . . the political structure. The starting point is
the undivided political power of the ruling party, the interpenetration of
the party and the state, and the suppression of all forces that depart from or
oppose the partys policy. The essence of communismbecame the dictator-
ship of a hierarchical Communist Party. Its elitist Nomenklatura systemwas
reminiscent of the hierarchical tsarist civil service (Voslenskii 1984). Every-
thing was politics and had to be imbued with Marxism-Leninism. Political
obedience became more important than work performance. Patron-client
networks were the hallmark of the communist system.
Nationalizationof the means of productionwas carriedout zealously. Indus-
try, trade, transportation, infrastructure, and banks were usually national-
ized. Agriculture, handicrafts, and some services were initially collectivized
and gradually nationalized. The collectivization of small farmers was bru-
tal. Hardly any legal entrepreneurs persisted. The main exception was the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), where Stalin delayed sovietization of
the economy because of uncertainty about the German question. As late as
1972, one-third of the urban labor force in the GDR was employed in the
private sector (slund 1985). The other exception was Polish agriculture,
70 percent of which remained private until the end of communism because
of ferocious popular resistance. Elsewhere, odd remnants of private enter-
prise persisted in housing, private agricultural plots, and craftsmanship.
The nearly complete nationalization of the means of production was sup-
posed to make communist domination over society eternal and to render
the restoration of capitalism impossible.
Centralized bureaucratic allocation replaced market allocation. The com-
munist state set physical production targets for all major goods and enter-
prises through thousands of material balances compiled by the State
Planning Committee (Gosplan). These plans were central commands that
were constantly altered at will by the political leaders, so the system has
often been called a command economy. With the growing complexity of a
moderneconomy withmillions of products, the systembecame increasingly
dysfunctional, leading to persistent shortages.
Economic policy making was strictly hierarchical. The Politburo of the
Communist Party made the key decisions, which had been prepared by
the Central Committee of the Party. The government or Council of Minis-
ters was subordinate to the Party and not very important. Within the gov-
ernment, the State Planning Committee dominated policy making, while
the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance were little but bookkeeping
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Communism and Its Demise 13
organs. Operative state control over enterprises was delegated to scores of
branch ministries. To simplify their administration and supervision, the
ministries gradually reduced the number of enterprises through mergers.
The political organization determined the size of enterprises, limiting the
size of the big companies but minimizing the number of small rms. As a
consequence, the Soviet Union had no less than thirteen companies pro-
ducing tractors, whereas the capitalist optimum might have been two or
three. As markets functioned poorly, enterprises preferred autarky, avoid-
ing subcontractors and incorporating most subordinate production, which
limited their specialization and efciency. This system left a problematic
legacy, such as the extreme centralization of decision making and the actual
supervision by the Party, which was an extralegal body.
Prices were subordinate because physical output was the central objective.
Prices of major products, such as rawmaterials and staple foods, were xed,
and most prices were set as cost plus a regulated markup; higher prices were
allowed for newproducts. As a result, the prices of rawmaterials were largely
constant, whereas more complex products were subject to rising hidden
ination. This pricing system encouraged intentional lowering of quality.
Because prices were not checked by market forces, they became increasingly
distorted.
There was no real money. The national currency was several separate
currencies because different people and enterprises had access to separate
market outlets with varying prices and supplies. The big divide was between
enterprise money or bank transfers and cash that was reserved for transac-
tions with ordinary citizens wages and retail purchases. A bank ruble and
a cash ruble had different values, and they were arbitraged in black markets.
Most communist countries experienced one or more conscatory currency
reforms, which undermined the condence in the domestic currency. It was
not perceived as a sound store of value despite low ination. Goods and
hard currency were frequent objects of savings.
Mobilization of resources. The socialist state tried to mobilize all resources
for the sake of long-term economic development. It organized jobs for the
unemployed and women and labeled unemployment parasitism. Public
savings were sharply increased to boost investment in heavy industry while
limiting private consumption, and gigantic construction projects became a
Soviet fetish.
The building of a strong military industry. Stalins economic policy did
not aim at economic welfare but at military strength, and Stalinism implied
the far-reaching militarization of the whole society. It embraced the idea
of unbalanced growth, allocating disproportionate resources to strategic
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industries to speed up economic development. Heavy industry, particu-
larly steel and heavy-machine building, was favored, whereas agriculture
was deemed backward and reactionary; most services were considered of
little value. Price regulation boosted industrial prices relative to agricultural
prices, forcing agriculture to nance investment in industry. Stalin mini-
mized investment in transportation, housing, and services as well.
Wages and private consumption were held back to the benet of investment
and military expenditures, and the standard of living stagnated. A saying
developed: They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work. Shoddy
work, poor quality, low efciency, and demoralization became hallmarks
of the command economies. Soviet people who had never traveled abroad
considered stories of capitalist shops without shortages ludicrous, rendering
any trip to the West a devastating disillusion with the communist system.
Investment in human capital was the most positive aspect of socialism.
Communism provided good education, ensuring general literacy, much
mathematics, and good engineering. However, three academic disciplines
were intentionally neglected for ideological reasons: ordinary economics,
because market economics was considered ideologically wrong; law, which
unduly restricted communist power; and foreign languages, because social-
ist citizens were discouraged from corrupting international inuences.
Eachcommunist country hada national economic systemaiming at autarky.
Foreign trade was accepted, but it was supposed to be isolated from the
domestic economy. The government maintained state monopoly over for-
eign trade to prevent opportunities for arbitrage. In the classical socialist
system, no exchange rate existed. The Ministry for Foreign Trade purchased
abroad according to instructions from the State Planning Committee and
sold as much as was necessary to pay for imports, separating foreign trade
prices from domestic prices. The Soviet Union was littered with expensive
uninstalled imported equipment because the customers did not know how
toinstall it, andthey were prohibitedfromcontacting the supplier for advice!
After World War II, the Soviet Union tried to develop a socialist foreign trade
system for its new satellites. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) was set up in 1949 as a Soviet bloc trade organization for eventu-
ally ten member states. Even by Soviet standards, it was considered overly
bureaucratic with prices and trade more distorted than domestically. Prices
of manufactured goods rose disproportionately in relation to raw materials
in CMEA trade, boosting implicit Soviet subsidies to all the other members
of the CMEA (Hewett 1974). Much of the CMEA trade was worthless, and
the extraordinary distortion of foreign trade was one of the greatest poison
pills communism left behind.
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Shortages. The outstanding characteristic of the communist economic
system was persistent shortages of goods and services. At the macro level,
the volume of money exceededthe volume of goods at givenprices, andat the
micro level people demanded other goods thanthose supplied. J anos Kornai
(1980) labeled this economics of shortage. To enterprises, money was not
scarce, which meant that they suffered from soft budget constraints, in
J anos Kornais terminology. The state subsidies available to state enterprises
were not xed but subject to bargaining (Kornai 1992a, p. 140). Such negoti-
ations alsoinvolvedtaxation, soft bankcredits, andadministrative pricing. A
state enterprise couldhardly gobankrupt because the state wouldalways bail
it out. Naturally, personal and political relations with superiors were more
important than economic performance in such an environment. Rationally,
state enterprise managers concentratedonlobbying among government and
party ofcials, ignoring efciency of production.
High growth rates. The great pride of the communists was double-digit
growth rates, especially in the early 1930s, when the capitalist world was
suffering from the Great Depression. In the rst half of the 1950s, the new
communist economies boasted growth rates of about 10 percent a year. This
was accomplished by a mobilization of all available resources: high savings,
directed to investments in machinery and new factories; high employment;
and comprehensive public education. Soviet growth rates were greatly exag-
gerated, however, and the real rates are still open to dispute.
3
This falsi-
cation was so extraordinary that the late Soviet authorities refrained from
publishinganyexact growthrates for the periodprior to1960. The iconoclas-
tic Russian economists Vasili Selyunin and Grigori Khanin (1987) assessed
that the real Soviet growth rate was an average of 3.2 to 3.5 percent a year
from 1928 to 1985 high but not extraordinary.
Decline and Fall of Socialism
The decline of communism was as protracted as its collapse was sudden.
Many dates can be regarded as the beginning of the end, and each date
indicates one particular cause of the demise. In 1919, Ludwig von Mises
(1920) declared that the economic principles of socialismcould never work.
The terror of Stalinism and the fear it had imbued in the population ended
with the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953. In June 1953, a rst major
workers protest against dictators ruling in their name occurred in Berlin.
3
The main downward revision was Bergson (1961). In the late Soviet period, Russians went
much further in degrading historical Soviet growth rates (Selyunin and Khanin 1987).
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The Hungarian revolt of October 1956 was the rst open challenge to both
communismandthe Soviet empire. The WarsawPact invasionof Czechoslo-
vakia in August 1968 discredited the notion that Soviet-type socialismcould
be reformed to attain a human face. Repeated Polish worker uprisings in
1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980 forewarned of socialisms collapse. The sixteen
months in 19801 when the Solidarity trade union existed legally indicated
that communismpersistedonborrowedtime. Communisms problems were
as multiple as its tenacity was impressive. Strong centralized control kept
communism alive for many years, but the systems petrication made its
collapse inevitable (Bunce 1999b).
By the 1980s, the collapse of communism was both overdetermined and
long overdue. The fundamental problem with communism was its institu-
tions. The overcentralized system could not handle challenges demanding
decentralized initiative, such as craftsmanship, agriculture and information
technology. Economic distortions of prices and industrial structure grew
worseover time. TheSoviet Unioncouldmobilizeneither thetechnologynor
the nancial strength to keep up the arms race with the United States. Eco-
nomic reforms were attempted, but they did not improve growth. Instead,
they delegitimized the socialist system both politically and economically.
In the end, most countries were hit by scal emergencies, accompanied by
external shocks.
4
Falling growth rates. In the early 1960s, growth rates started declining
sharply in the most developed socialist countries. In 1963, Czechoslovakia
was the rst communist country to register an ofcial decrease in national
income during peacetime a shattering event. By the early 1980s, general
stagnation had taken hold, and the long reign of Soviet Secretary General
Leonid Brezhnev from 1964 to 1982 later became known as the period of
stagnation. From 1985 to 1989, growth rates fell in most of the region. In
Romania, output dropped by almost 8 percent in 1989 because of Nicolae
Ceausescus draconian endeavors to pay back the entire national debt. The
Soviet Union suffered a complete breakdown in 1991.
Challenges from the arms race and information technology. Incredibly, in
the late 1980s the Soviet Union still harbored illusions of keeping up with
the United States in a modern arms race. Until 1988, the Soviet Union
steadily increased its defense expenditures every year, until they reached
about one-quarter of GDP, whereas the United States spent only 6 percent
of its GDP on defense (slund 1990). When U.S. President Ronald Reagan
4
My preferred source on the demise of communism and the Soviet Union is Dobbs (1997);
see also Dunlop (1993) for a detailed account of the Soviet collapse.
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challenged the Soviet Union with his high-tech Star Wars initiative, he
exposed Soviet technological and economic weakness. Mikhail Gorbachev
singled out the arms race as the rationale for his perestroika (economic
reforms) just before he was electedsecretary general of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in December 1984:
Only an intensive, highly developed economy can safeguard a reinforcement of
[our] countrys position on the international stage and allow it to enter the next
millenniumwith dignity as a great and ourishing power. (Gorbachev 1987a, p. 86)
The rigid communist system was helpless when facing new challenges
from the rise of information technology, because its incentive structure
resisted technological change and innovations. Its hierarchical command
structure could not handle small enterprises or entrepreneurship, which
newtechnology required. The communist police mentality opposed the free
transmission of information, facilitated by personal computers and modern
telecommunications. Even the use of photocopiers was restricted until the
downfall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet system could hardly have survived
the Internet, and it collapsed before the information revolution.
Delegitimization of communist ideology. Declining growth rates inspired
economic reforms in most communist countries. In the mid-1950s, Poland
pioneered market socialist reforms. Czechoslovakia and Hungary followed
in 1968, and the Hungarian reforms survived. Poland attempted market
economic reforms again in 1982. In the Soviet Union of the late 1980s,
Gorbachevtriedsomemarket reforms, but theoldStalinist systemcontinued
with little change in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
These reforms were too partial to generate the desired economic growth
and welfare, but they broke down many ideological dogmas. They augured
a social democratic welfare society, thus legitimizing social democracy, the
oldfoe of communism. Unemployment was legalized, andPoland, Hungary,
and the Soviet Union introduced unemployment benets. These capitalist
reforms annihilated socialisms claim to moral superiority over capitalism,
and social democracy was widely accepted in the communist elite as the
ideal form of socialism.
Deconcentration of power. The nature of Soviet political power changed
slowly but steadily. Under Stalin, Soviet power was truly totalitarian. As the
secretary general of the Communist Party, Stalindidwhatever he caredtodo.
Withthe endof terror, however, the communist elite or Nomenklatura of less
than 1 percent of the population arose as the collective dictator (Voslenskii
1984; Murrell and Olson 1991). Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Politburo
was the ruling body. Leonid Brezhnev succeeded in holding power from
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1964 to 1982 by obliging the collective will of the Nomenklatura. Power was
deconcentrated to lower levels of the Party and state hierarchy, rendering the
Soviet Union a dictatorship of industrial ministers and regional rst Party
secretaries. The real distribution of power became evident when Mikhail
Gorbachev was appointed secretary general of the CPSU. His endeavors at
reform of the system were foiled by the bureaucrats. As a Swedish diplomat
in Moscow, I visited a senior ofcial at the USSR Ministry of Agriculture
soon after Gorbachevs elevation to power to ask about his rst decree on
agricultural reform. To my great surprise, this ofcial told me that he could
not care less about a decree signed by the secretary general of the CPSU.
This decree would have limited the power of the Ministry of Agriculture, so
its ofcials openly deed it. Evidently, Gorbachev was not a dictator to this
ofcial.
Many have blamed Gorbachev for not having been sufciently reformist
during his early years (Goldman 1991), but he had little choice because of
political resistance posed by the communist elite. Too little power remained
at the top to make a top-down reform possible against the interest of the
bureaucracy. Gorbachevdrewthelogical conclusions that hehadtocheckthe
power of the conservative Party establishment. First, he opted for substan-
tial freedom of the media (glasnost) and, from January 1987, for partial
democratization. As a consequence of his considerable political skills and
stubbornness, Gorbachev succeeded in breaking down the CPSU and the
state economic administration, but that left economic power vested in state
enterprise managers, who were not accountable to anybody. They had all
incentives to steal their state enterprises bare (slund 1991).
Aggravated political illegitimacy. Nocountry hadchosencommunismvol-
untarily, and the communist system did not appeal to popular support but
relied on a loyal, privileged elite, the Nomenklatura. Nikita Khrushchev
ended the Stalinist terror with his secret speech to the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSUin 1956, and gradually society thawed. Rather than being grate-
ful, people began perceiving communist dictatorship as illegitimate, all the
more so as the external capitalist threat dwindled away. The political eman-
cipation of Soviet bloc peoples occurred in ts and starts through reform
movements andpopular uprisings in1956 inPolandandHungary, in1968
in Czechoslovakia, and in Poland in 1970 and 1980. After the Polish com-
munist regimes standoff against the anticommunist trade union Solidarity
for 16 months, the regime crushed this attempt at real democratization with
a military clampdown in December 1981.
5
Even so, Solidarity had dealt a
5
The story is eminently told by Ash (1983).
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death blow to communism. It was only a matter of time before Soviet com-
munism would falter. Thanks to greater international openness, millions of
Poles and Hungarians could travel abroad and see the West for themselves,
and they liked it.
Rising Soviet scal decits. Fiscal discipline varied greatly. The Soviet
Union had a large budget decit exceeding 6 percent of GDP from 1986,
and as the decit expanded, the country was heading toward hyperination
fromlate 1990. This was a direct result of the nancial negligence character-
istic of perestroika (slund 1991). Poland and Hungary had small decits
of 3 percent of GDP in 1989, whereas the communist stalwarts Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and the GDR had no ofcial scal decits until the bitter
end. Absurdly, Romania had a huge budget surplus of 7.5 percent of GDP
in 1989 because of Ceausescus idiosyncratic decision to repay Romanias
foreign debt (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE]
1991, p. 58).
Shortages and ination. Because of the absence of nancial instruments,
even a small budget decit could cause great harm. Apart from foreign
loans, the only available nancing was monetary emission, which led to
shortages, ination, or both. By 1989, Poland had lost control over nominal
wage increases, as the Soviet Union did in 1991, while Hungary experienced
substantial wage ination. The other countries proved the strength of their
dictatorships, controlling nominal incomes. Real incomes rose sharply only
in Poland because the Polish government could neither hold back wage
increases nor raise prices sufciently. Before the collapse of communism,
open ination was problematic only in Poland and the Soviet Union, which
both had inationexceeding 100 percent a year. Poland experienced a minor
incident of hyperination in the fall of 1989, although its budget decit was
ofcially only 3 percent of GDP. Incredibly, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and
Romania reported ination below3 percent a year even in the revolutionary
year of 1989, and Bulgaria had a moderate ination of 6 percent that year
(UNECE 1991, 1992).
Excessive foreign debt. The communist countries could do little to alleviate
a scal crunch but to borrow from abroad. In the early 1970s, Poland bor-
rowed heavily to increase both investment and consumption, but its return
on investment was poor because of its inefcient economic system. As a
result, Poland faced external default and remained a basket case throughout
the 1980s. Hungary drew more cautiously on foreign credits than Poland,
but it also came close to its limit. The GDR was also badly indebted, but
it was bankrolled by West Germany. Less conspicuously, poor Bulgaria had
accumulated excessive debts in the 1980s. The Soviet Unions foreign debt
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was comparatively limited, but its overall nancial crisis was all the deeper,
depleting its international reserves in 1991. All these ve countries suf-
fered fromserious foreign debt problems. Ironically, the two hard-line com-
munist countries, Czechoslovakia and Romania, had little foreign debt be-
cause nobody wantedto lendto Czechoslovakia, andRomania hadrepaidits
debt.
Falling oil prices. At the end of the 1980s, when the creditworthiness of
the Soviet bloc was poor, Soviet oil production started to plunge, and the
world oil price fell as well. The combination of an excessive debt burden,
falling oil output, and low oil prices was just too much. The Soviet nancial
crisis was beyond salvation.
Inthe end, the depthof crisis variedconsiderably. The Soviet Unionwas in
a profound macroeconomic crisis. It had lost control over its budget in 1986
and had run out of international nancing. Tremendous shortages caused a
dramatic fall in output, and hyperination was a near certainty. The Polish
crisis was similar but not as deep. The other countries faced much less severe
nancial concerns. Bulgarias problem was limited to its excessive foreign
debt, and Romania suffered from an idiosyncratic austerity crisis, making
the populationoutragedover their drastically falling standards of living. East
Germany lacked national legitimacy. Hungary had succeeded in reforming
itself into a socialist market economy while managing its macroeconomic
strains. Czechoslovakia, nally, maintained an amazingly well-functioning
Brezhnevian economy with little dynamism but good balance.
The Demise of Communism in Central Europe
Each country experienced its own unique demise of communism. In the
fall of 1989, the communist governments fell in one country after the other.
Revolution spread like wildre, reminiscent of the great liberal revolution
of 1849. Timothy Garton Ash (1990, p. 78) quipped: In Poland it took
ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: Perhaps in
Czechoslovakia it will take ten days! (It actually took 24 days.)
6
For Central Europe, the monumental event was the end of the Brezhnev
doctrine. After the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet
Union had ofcially declared that it had the right and duty to intervene to
defendsocialism inany part of the socialist commonwealth, whichbecame
known as the Brezhnev doctrine (Brown 1996, p. 240). However, after the
failed Soviet war in Afghanistan, Gorbachev declared in a major speech to
6
The outstanding account of these epic events is Ash (1990).
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the United Nations in December 1988 that all countries had freedom of
choice:
For us the necessity of the principle of freedom of choice is clear. Denying that
right of peoples, no matter what the pretext for doing so, no matter what words
are used to conceal it, means infringing even that unstable balance that it has been
possible to achieve. Freedom of choice is a universal principle and there should be
no exceptions. (Brown 1996, p. 225)
This speechendedthe Brezhnev doctrine, because socialist rule inCentral
Europe had been established and maintained by Soviet troops. The demise
of these Soviet-controlled regimes was only a matter of time.
Negotiated transition: Poland and Hungary. Because of prior democratic
and market economic developments, Poland and Hungary were ready for
early democratization. In Poland, the communist government could barely
rule because of strong opposition from the Solidarity trade union and the
Catholic Church. It started roundtable negotiations with Solidarity in early
1989, and the parties agreed to hold partially democratic parliamentary
elections onJune 4, 1989. The elections were a landslide victory for Solidarity
and resulted in a predominantly anticommunist coalition government in
September 1989, with the liberal professor of economics Leszek Balcerowicz
as minister of nance. This peaceful and negotiated transfer of power forced
democrats to substantial compromises, which caused lasting cracks within
their ranks.
The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was the most liberal ruling
communist party, and Hungary had undertaken more reforms than any
other socialist country. Following the Polish lead, the Hungarian com-
munist government negotiated with the opposition at a roundtable from
June to September 1989. The parties agreed to full democratization, with
free parliamentary elections on March 25, 1990. The opposition Hungarian
Democratic Forum won these elections and formed a government. It was a
conservative, Christian democratic party with rural roots. Although it was
committed to a market economy, it was more interested in national themes.
The Hungarian Socialist Party transformed itself into a social democratic
party, which brought benets in later elections. The smooth Hungarian
transfer of power immediately led to full democracy, but economic policy
was left without rm leadership (Stark and Bruszt 1998).
Popular revolt: East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The GDR and Czecho-
slovakia remained repressive dictatorships until 1989. Reforms in the Soviet
Union, Poland, and Hungary caused internal pressures in the GDR, but
East Germans responded by increasingly eeing to the West. The catalyst
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of change was the Hungarian governments decision to open its border to
Austria on August 23, 1989, allowing thousands of young East Germans to
cross that border to move on to West Germany, where they automatically
obtained citizenship. In the wake of this mass escape, large demonstra-
tions erupted in the GDR, primarily in Leipzig, under the slogan: We are
the people! Finally, unrest spread to Berlin, and on November 9, 1989,
the communist leaders agreed to open the wall to West Berlin. The ille-
gitimate regime crumbled in no time. On March 18, 1990, the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), under the leadership of West German Federal
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, won the parliamentary elections with the slogan
Nobody will be worse off and many will be better off. On July 1, 1990, East
Germany adoptedthe West Germandeutsche mark onfavorable conditions.
By October 1990, it reunited with the Federal Republic after having adopted
its legislation.
Despite its proudinterwar democratic traditions, Czechoslovakia was late
in its democratic transition because of its profound petrication after the
Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 and the ensuing severe dictatorship. Yet in
late 1989, Czechoslovakia was a tinder box. On November 17, 1989, stu-
dents staged a minor demonstration for freedom, and the police lashed out
at them with truncheons, igniting the spark that set Czechoslovakia alight
and caused its Velvet Revolution. Large mass demonstrations erupted,
and opposition groups united in the Civic Forum, a broad popular front led
by V aclav Havel, which demanded the ouster of leading communists, free-
dom, and democracy. By December 10, President Gust av Hus ak resigned.
A government was formed with a majority of Civic Forum members but a
communist prime minister. The leading Czech economic reformers entered
the government and V aclav Klaus became minister of nance. On Decem-
ber 29, 1989, V aclav Havel was elected president by the parliament (Ash
1990). Parliamentary elections were held in June 1990, and parties arising
out of the Civic Forum were victorious. The Velvet Revolution had an air
of a fairy tale. The old evil surrendered without bloodshed. After years of
suffering, well-educated dissidents came to power to serve their country,
eminently directed by the countrys greatest playwright, V aclav Havel. It
appeared too good to be true.
Communist coups: Bulgaria and Romania. Before the fall of communism,
Bulgaria had undertaken little reform and Romania none. On Novem-
ber 10, 1989, the day after the fall of the Berlin wall, Todor Zhivkov, Bul-
garias communist dictator since 1954, was ousted in an internal coup. This
putsch started the countrys democratization, but it was carried out under
tutelage of reform communists. A roundtable negotiation in early 1990 led
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to democratic elections to a Grand National Assembly on June 10, 1990.
Politically, Bulgarians were almost equally divided between socialists and
democrats, with a small Turkish minority party straddling the middle. The
rst democratic elections led to a narrow communist victory, now renamed
socialists (Bell 1997). The Bulgarian transition to democracy was peaceful,
but the political parties and democratic institutions were formed in haste,
and the communists maintained a strong hold.
By December 1989, only diehard Romania was left. It was relatively inde-
pendent from the Soviet Union, but Communist leader Ceausescu pursued
a ruthless dictatorship. Because of Ceausescus nepotism, his rule was char-
acterized as socialism in one family. Unrest started with a demonstration
on December 16, 1989, after police attempted to evict a Hungarian protes-
tant pastor from his house in a provincial town, resulting in carnage. On
December 21, a real revolution erupted. In freezing cold weather, Ceausescu
spoke totens of thousands of people orderedout intothe Palace Square. Sud-
denly, the crowd started booing, and the dictator ed by helicopter. Rebel-
lious masses stormed the Central Committee building, and wild shooting
started. A few days later, the eeing Ceausescu was caught and summarily
executed. The power vacuum was swiftly lled by disgruntled representa-
tives of the Communist Party, who formed the National Salvation Front, led
by an old communist functionary, Ion Iliescu. The Front won 66 percent of
the votes indemocratic parliamentary elections inMay 1990, andIliescuwas
elected president. The communist establishment managed to legitimize its
leadership by executing Ceausescu and maintained a strong hold on power
(Tismaneanu 1997).
The Collapse of the Soviet Union
Although the Soviet Union used to be one country, the fteen countries that
arose out of its ruins harbored even greater differences than Central and
Southeast Europe in culture, history, politics, and economic development.
Six countries drew on Muslim traditions and nine on different Christian
denominations. Communisms duration was much shorter in the Baltics,
Moldova, and Western Ukraine, which had been annexed during World
War II. The Baltics, Georgia, and Armenia could claim to be old nation-
states, but the others had less sense of national identity.
National causes became increasingly divisive. The Balts andWest Ukraini-
ans hadnever reconciledwiththe Soviet annexation, andthey were prepared
to exploit any opportunity for their national cause. Unwittingly, Gorbachev
contributed to the destruction of the Union, apparently believing that the
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Soviet Union had solved all national questions. In his book Perestroika,
Gorbachev (1987b, p. 118) stated: If the nationality question had not been
solved in principle, the Soviet Union would never have had the social, cul-
tural, economic and defense potential it has now. Our state would not have
survived if the republics had not formed a community based on brother-
hood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance. He allowed forbid-
den questions about national repression to be raised, but he had no good
answers. Why, for instance, had one-quarter of the Ukrainians and Kazakhs
been killed in an articial famine in the 1930s? The old conict between the
Armenians and Azerbaijanis erupted again in 1988.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1992) argued that the sequence of democ-
ratization sealed the fate of the Soviet Union. Democratization proceeded
faster at the national level than at the union level. Some elections to national
parliaments in early 1990 were more democratic and thus more legiti-
mate than the Union parliament elected in March 1989. Soviet President
Gorbachev never contested a democratic vote, which deprived the Soviet
presidency of legitimacy, and Boris Yeltsin was democratically elected Rus-
sian president on June 12, 1991. The national crisis led to a war of laws
between the Union and the republics, and the republican laws became more
legitimate than the Union laws in 1990 and 1991, because key republics
were more democratic. The republican parliaments legislated huge, pop-
ulist social expenditures but refused to send their tax revenues to Moscow,
starving the Uniontreasury. The result was a ballooning Soviet budget decit
of some 20 percent of GDP by the end of 1991, guaranteeing hyperination.
A farcical abortive putsch by hardliners from the Communist Party, the
Soviet government, the KGB, andthe military onAugust 1821, 1991, served
the death knell to the Soviet Union. In its aftermath, President Yeltsins
Russian administration emerged as the only legitimate power in Moscow.
In a democratic breakthrough in Russia, he quickly abolished the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union and most Soviet institutions. President
Gorbachev discredited himself for good by citing Lenin and claiming: I
am convinced that socialism is correct (Dunlop 1993, p. 259). The other
republics had no choice but to opt for independence. The Baltics made
themselves fully independent in August 1991, while the others waited until
December 1991.
The collapse of an empire is usually very bloody. World War I nished off
the Habsburg, German, Russian, andOttomanEmpires. By comparison, the
end and dissection of the Soviet Empire was remarkably peaceful, although
the civil war in Tajikistan and the war in Chechnya each claimed tens of
thousands of lives (Lieven 2000). The Commonwealth of the Independent
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States (CIS) was created in December 1991 to replace the Soviet Union for
twelve countries, all of the former Soviet republics but the Baltics; it was,
however, little but a conference organization. Ensuing developments in the
various former Soviet republics became remarkably different.
Russia: Attempt at democracy and radical economic reform. Russia set out
as a democracy after the abortive August 1991 coup under President Boris
Yeltsin. Rather than completing the democratic reforms, Yeltsin focused on
economic reform and appointed a reform government under the leader-
ship of Yegor Gaidar in November 1991. It attempted a radical reform in
January 1992, but the unnished democratic reforms caught up with the
new government. It was severely constrained by resistance from the quasi-
democratic old parliament, which had been elected without political parties
in March 1990. Its deputies were accidental, disorganized, unaccountable,
and predominantly communist. Russias two rst years of transition were
consumed by a constitutional crisis that ended in a failed armed uprising by
the old parliament in October 1993 (Aron 2000).
The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania): Determined democracy
and radical reform. The Balts had been independent in the interwar period,
and they knewthey wanted to be so again. In all three countries, broad anti-
communist popular fronts were established in 1988 with the aim to restore
their countries independence. The Lithuanian and Estonian Communist
Parties tried to keep up with the nationalists as the communists in Poland
and Hungary, while the Latvian Communist Party split in the middle. In
parliamentary elections in FebruaryMarch 1990, the popular fronts won
more than two-thirds majorities in all three parliaments and assumed exec-
utive power. They declared independence, which was nally recognized by
the Soviet Union after the abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow. These
countries were ripe for full democracy and radical economic reform. Their
national objectives were rmly set: to turn their backs on Russia, to rein-
tegrate with the West, and to establish ordinary Western systems (Lieven
1993).
Ukraine and Moldova: Communists stayed in power as nationalists. The
situation in Ukraine and Moldova was quite similar. Both had rather strong
nationalist popular fronts, but theywere not sufcientlypotent towindemo-
cratic majorities, and their eastern parts were less nationalist. Agile com-
munist leaders embraced national independence when they realized that
the communists were about to lose power in Moscow. As a result, com-
munist leaders were elected presidents with nationalist support in both
countries, and the old Nomenklatura stayed in power. National indepen-
dence and unity were the prime considerations. Economic reform barely
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entered the political agenda. As Ilya Prizel (1997, p. 344) put it: Ukraine
lackedbothanelite committedtodemocratic reforms andliberal economics
and a fully developed, capable democratic alternative.
7
The same could be
said of Moldova. Its situation was complicated by Russian separatists hav-
ing declared a large part of the country, Transnistria an independent Soviet
Socialist Republic, and it remains under the control of the separatists to this
day (Crowther 1997). The preoccupation with security and nation building
left little time for economic reform, and the politics were semidemocratic.
The war-torn Caucasus. The Caucasus inherited ancient minorities,
national disputes, and political violence. The three Caucasian countries
were ready to leave the Soviet Union early, but all were drawn into armed
conicts before its demise. The threat of warfare permitted little thought
or energy to economics. In Georgia, the hard-line communist leaders were
ousted after the Soviet military opened re on a peaceful demonstration,
killing twenty people on April 9, 1989. The Communist Party dwindled
away, and a prominent dissident, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, won both parlia-
mentary and presidential elections. Yet his rule foundered in his struggle
for more control over two autonomous national regions, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, which tried to break away by force. A brief but bloody civil war
raged in December 1991 and January 1992, leading to Gamsakhurdias over-
throw. Three years of chaos and economic collapse followed. Former First
Party Secretary of Georgia and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union Eduard Shevardnadze returned to take control of Georgia in March
1992, but he was elected president only in 1995 (Slider 1997). Shevardnadze
was ousted in the Rose Revolution in November 2003.
Armenia and Azerbaijan were clinched in mutual strife. In February
1988, the regional authorities in Nagorny Karabakh, an ethnically Arme-
nian autonomous region belonging to Azerbaijan, demanded its transfer
to Armenia. This Armenian-Azerbaijani conict escalated into a full-scale
war in February 1992, and it has dened the politics in both countries. In
Armenia, the Soviet leaders and the Communist Party were discredited for
their inability to defend Armenian interests against Azerbaijan. A coalition
of noncommunist Armenian parties won the parliamentary elections in
1990, and nationalist dissident Levon Ter-Petrossian was elected chairman
7
I spent the week before the August 1991 coup in Kiev talking to economic policy makers.
I was shocked by the predominance of hard-line communists in economic policy making,
while the rising nationalists had little clue about economic affairs. When I was in Kiev in
1985, I met a Soviet Academician, Aleksandr Emelianov, who struck me as the most ideo-
logical Marxist-Leninist I ever encountered. In August 1991, he was Kravchuks economic
advisor.
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of Parliament and later president. The Armenian government presented a
market economic program and launched the rst land reform in the Soviet
Union in 1991, but this small, landlocked country suffered badly from an
embargo by Azerbaijan and Turkey, putting reform in jeopardy (Dudwick
1997).
In Azerbaijan, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan maintained a harsh
dictatorship, and opposition was weak. In 1989, an Azerbaijani Popular
Front had been formed, and it called for democratization, but the commu-
nist authorities blamed it for a mysterious pogrom of Armenians in Baku
in January 1990. Soviet troops killed hundreds of people, and the anti-
communist resistance had been quashed. After some tumult in the early
1990s, Azerbaijans old Soviet leader Heidar Aliyev took over as a mild dic-
tator with neither democracy nor market economic reform on his agenda
(Altstadt 1997). The economy is run like a family corporation.
Belarus and Central Asia: Continued authoritarian rule. Belarus can be
described as the Prussia of the Soviet Union, being the most militarized,
sovietized, russied, and disciplined Soviet Republic. Dissent was weak,
repression harsh, and the Communist Party was solidly hard line. Nowhere
in the Soviet Union did the command economy work as well as in Belarus.
Nonetheless, Gorbachevs liberalization reached Belarus as well. Inspired
by Lithuania, nationalists established the Belarusian Popular Front in 1988,
but it went over the top and became more radical than Belarusian popular
sentiment. Independence came to Belarus as an accident in December 1991.
The Belarusian communists stayed in power until the elections in 1994
(Mihalisko1997). Their moribundrule promptedthe victory of the populist
Aleksandr Lukashenko in the presidential elections in July 1994, and he
nished off Belarusian democracy by 1996. Market economic reform was
never an issue.
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan saw no real democratization,
and their communist leaders stayed in power. Although they dismissed
the communist parties, they ruled through old Nomenklatura and clan
networks. Turkmenistans Saparmurat Niyazov was appointed rst party
secretary in 1985 to impose central Soviet control. Kazakhstans President
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Uzbekistans President Islam Karimov were
selected Party leaders in June 1989 by Moscow to conciliate their republics
interests. In Kazakhstan, the authoritarian rule softened somewhat, whereas
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan maintained severe dictatorships. Niyazov
called himself Turkmen-bashi, the father of Turkmens, and introduced his
owncult of personalitywhichlasteduntil his deathinDecember 2006(Olcott
1996).
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Kyrgyzstans communist elite was jolted by bloody ethnic riots between
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south of the republic in the summer of 1990,
whichresultedinthe ouster of the communist leader. The parliament elected
Askar Akaev, a prominent liberal communist and physicist, as its chairman.
Akaev was alsoelectedpresident. Althoughdemocracy faded, its civil society
and independent press were quite strong, rendering the country politically
open to market economic transformation. Akaev was ousted in the Tulip
Revolution in March 2005.
Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet republics, and it has remained
so. Bordering on Afghanistan, Tajikistan got trapped in a full-edged civil
war in 1992 between communists and Islamists. A Russia-led force inter-
vened and brought a communist, Emomali Rahmonov, to power after much
bloodshed. Rahmonov has managed to stay in power, but his leadership is
weak, and political stability remains evasive (Olcott 1996). All the Central
Asian countries are ruled like family corporations.
As communism nally broke down, countries faced very different politi-
cal preconditions, and their collapses proceeded in contrasting ways. A rst
group of countries, consisting of Central Europe, the Baltics, Russia, and
Kyrgyzstan, were reasonably democratic, with liberal regimes and strong
civil societies. Democratization there had brewed for a couple of years
before the democratic breakthrough. Most of them opted for successful
radical reform. A second group consisted of Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova,
and Ukraine. They were about as democratic as the rst group, but the old
communist elites stayed in power. Their choice was gradual market eco-
nomic reform, generating poor results. Athird group encompassed Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which were never democra-
tized and where the old communist elite simply continued to rule. Of these
countries, Kazakhstan chose gradual market reforms, whereas the others
have maintained Soviet-style economic systems. Finally, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Georgia, and Tajikistan (and to a lesser extent, Moldova) were caught
in military conicts and could neither democratize nor pursue much of an
economic policy in the early transition. With delays, they have undertaken
market reforms, which with necessity have been gradual.
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2
Shock Therapy versus Gradualism
The end of communism in Europe was the event of a lifetime. Suddenly
twenty-eight countries with 400 million people had to choose their politi-
cal and economic systems anew. Where should they begin? What was most
important? What was possible? What theory should be applied? What pol-
icy corresponded to their interests? A frequent point was that no book
prescribed how to transition from socialism to capitalism, whereas hun-
dreds elaborated on the opposite, no longer desired, direction. A popular
joke compared the transition from communism to capitalism to making an
aquarium out of a sh soup.
The discussion became heated from the outset because so much was at
stake. The fate of a large part of the world was up in the air. Could and
should the former Soviet bloc be embraced by the Western world, or should
it be shunned? Could armed conicts be avoided? How much economic
and social hardship would people in these countries have to suffer? Which
ideology would win?
Intellectuals of all disciplines and convictions, governments, and inter-
national organizations geared up to answer the many questions. Although
no clear goal was dened, a strong sense of direction prevailed. The popular
battle cry was, We want a normal society! By normal, people in the
Soviet bloc meant an ordinary Western society a democracy with a mar-
ket economy, predominant private property, and the rule of law. Because
all these countries had far to go, the nal destination did not appear very
relevant at the outset of the march, and any specication of the goal could
be politically divisive. In the havoc of a collapsing socialist system, East
and Central Europeans cared little whether their society would be a West
European social welfare state or a freer American market economy, both
29
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being evidently superior to their socialist ruins. These distinctions were left
for later.
For Central Europe, Southeast Europe, and the Baltics, the urge for a
normal society was complemented by another battle cry for a return to
Europe, meaning their integration in West European economic and polit-
ical organizations, notably membership in the European Union (EU) and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
This was a time of liberal triumph. In many ways, the Central Euro-
pean revolutions of 1989 most resembled the European revolutions of 1848
(Ash, 1990; Dahrendorf 1990) because late Communist society was remi-
niscent of feudal society, with its hierarchic rule and delegation of partial
property rights to vassals, with detailed regulation but no rule of law. The
instincts were the same. Many saw the state as evil in the tradition of the
great liberal thinkers of the midnineteenth century, such as John Stuart
Mill (1859/1975). The natural response was a demand for the same kind
of far-reaching liberalization that occurred in the 1840s and focus on the
creation of checks and balances to state power.
Many socialist ideas just died, whereas others reemerged later. Market
socialism, workers self-management or a third way between capitalism
and Soviet-style socialism, were no longer discussed. The central issue was
instead the strategy of transition to a market economy. Howfast and in what
order? The dominant intellectual debate over postcommunist transition
was between radical and gradual reformers, while the outright enemies
of market reform kept quiet. The focus of the debate lay on speed. The
issue was whether the possible reforms liberalization, macroeconomic
stabilization, and privatization should be undertaken as fast as possible or
deliberately more slowly. The purported objective of all reformers was the
same namely, to establish a market economy, leading to higher economic
efciency, economic growth, and improving the average standard of living,
but other agendas were concealed.
At the outset of transition, a broad and cohesive group of economists
and policymakers called for an early and radical economic reform, which is
outlined in section one. The gradual reformproposals of the early transition
were much more diverse. They are presented in the long section two. Section
three leaps out from the intellectual debate to the conditions that had been
created during the Gorbachev reforms for rent seeking and howrent seeking
was carried out in the early transition. Initially, the dominance of the radical
program was reinforced, but problems in the East, especially in Russia, led
to new criticism against radical reform, which culminated around Russias
nancial crash in 1998, which is discussed in the nal section.
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Shock Therapy versus Gradualism 31
The Radical Reform Program: A Big Bang
The radical program for market economic reforms was supported by three
powerful groups. The rst group consisted of leading mainstream West-
ern, primarily American, macroeconomists, such as Jeffrey Sachs, Stanley
Fischer, Lawrence Summers, and David Lipton. Harvard University, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the London School of Econo-
mics were focal points of radical reform thinking. A second important set
was the best economists in the East, notably Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland,
V aclav Klaus in Czechoslovakia, and Yegor Gaidar in Russia. They were few
but bright, andthey knewwhat they wanted. They were later joinedby politi-
cians with economic insights, such as Mart Laar in Estonia and Einars Rep se
in Latvia. Most of them became leading policy makers. The third group
supporting radical reform was the international nancial institutions, pri-
marily the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and
the major Western governments, primarily their ministries of nance and
central banks.
For American macroeconomists, the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S.
government the Latin American experience with macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion in the 1980s showed them the way. Their view was that a radical and
comprehensive reform program was the best cure (Bruno et al. 1988). This
programhadbeennamedthe WashingtonConsensus by JohnWilliamson
(1990). It canbe summarizedas prudent macroeconomic policies, outward
orientation, and free-market capitalism, and it drew on neoclassical main-
stream economic theory. The choice of name was somewhat unfortunate
because it seemedas if Washingtondictatedeconomic policies for the world,
but the fundamental ten points of this program were pretty obvious in that
they were not very detailed and avoided ideological controversy:
1. Fiscal discipline is needed.
2. Among public expenditures, discretionary subsidies should be min-
imized, and education, health, and public investment should be pri-
orities.
3. The tax base should be broad, and marginal tax rates ought to be
moderate.
4. Interest rates should be market-determined and real interest rates
positive.
5. Exchange rates should be competitive.
6. Foreign trade policy should be rather liberal.
7. Foreign direct investment is benecial but not a high priority.
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8. Privatization is benecial because private industry is managed more
efciently than state enterprises.
9. Deregulation is a useful means to promote competition.
10. Property rights need to be made secure.
Many economists simultaneously presented similar ideas about the need
for radical economic reform.
1
The intellectual development in the East was
very sudden. Even the most radical reformers in the Soviet bloc did not
think of a full-edged market economic transformation as a real possibility
until the late 1980s. The breakthrough occurred in Moscow in early 1987,
as the literary journal Novy mir published a couple of articles with devas-
tating criticism of the Soviet economic system (Selyunin and Khanin 1987;
Shmelev 1987).
The rst truly market economic program to propose large-scale priva-
tization was presented in Poland in 1988 (D abrowski et al. 1989). Leszek
Balcerowicz (1992) has detailed how the radical economic reform program
emerged. It was the result of an economic reform group that he led in
Warsaw throughout the late 1980s. Prominent members of his group were
Marek D abrowski and Stefan Kawalec, later deputy ministers of nance.
These Polish liberals were tired of gradual reforms that were reversed. They
wanted to break out of market socialismand accomplish a real market econ-
omy. Their fundamental insight was that the market reforms had to be truly
radical as well as comprehensive. Therefore, they were more radical than
others. In May 1989, Balcerowicz wrote a summary reform program, which
included privatization, liberalization of foreign trade, currency convertibil-
ity, and an open economy.
Before the Polish reform government was formed in September 1989,
the last communist government had liberalized food prices, which led to
an ination of some 40 percent in the month of September. An effective
nancial stabilization program had to be added to the radical structural
reform, which Balcerowiczs advisors Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs and
his collaborator David Lipton did with their experience of how to defeat
high ination in Latin America. They also assisted by propagating the Polish
radical reform program in the West, gaining Western sympathy.
The radical reform program for postcommunist countries followed the
Washington Consensus closely, but it went further and was more specic.
It is incorrect, as is often done, to equalize the two. The original radical
1
Notably Blanchard et al. (1991); Boycko (1991); Brada (1993); Fischer and Gelb (1991);
Kornai (1990); and World Bank (1996a). My own contribution to this discussion is slund
(1992).
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reformprogramwas adjusted to the prevailing Polish conditions. Moreover
Balcerowicz had not read the Washington Consensus when he drafted his
original reformprogram. Many issues hadto be addedor reinforcedbecause
they had already been done in Latin America notably, deregulation to cre-
ate a market and privatization to establish private property. The Balcerow-
icz program became the standard for a radical, comprehensive reform. Its
prescriptions applied also to other countries in similar predicaments. This
program was lucid and is easy to summarize:
2
1. Macroeconomic stabilization. Their immediate concern was to halt
hyperination, which required a swift reduction of a large budget
decit. Fiscal policy had to be centralized and brought under con-
trol by a reinforced ministry of nance. Monetary policies should be
tightened, and positive real interest rates were necessary. The Central
Bank had to be independent and focus on low ination. The exchange
rate should be unied and the currency needed to be convertible on
current account to be freely available for foreign trade.
2. Deregulation. Prices had to be deregulated and price subsidies elim-
inated to let demand and supply determine prices. Domestic trade
should be liberalized and monopolies broken up to avoid monopolis-
tic pricing. A regime of relatively free foreign trade had to be estab-
lished, eliminating rents in both exports and imports. A realistic price
structure would be imported. Free trade would alleviate the rampant
shortages, facilitate production, and boost living standards.
3. Privatization. Restrictions onthe private sector hadtobe abolishedand
newprivate entrepreneurs offereda maximumof freedom. Small-scale
privatization was to be initiated early on. The privatization of large
and medium-sized enterprises had to be started as soon as possible,
but everybody understood that it would take time, and no agreement
existed on how to do it.
4. Reinforcing the Social Safety Net. The ardors of restructuring required
the introduction of a social safety net targeted at new groups in need,
especially the unemployed, and an increase of pensions.
Key government functions notably, centralized scal and monetary
control did not exist. Radical reformers wanted to minimize the role of
the old state apparatus, eliminating its harmful parts, while building a new
democratic government. Any social engineering was out of the question.
2
See Lipton and Sachs (1990a), Sachs and Lipton (1990), and Sachs (1990, 1991, and 1993),
and Balcerowicz (1992, 1994, and 1995).
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Jeffrey Sachs (1994, p. 510) summarized the radicals view of the state in
transition:
Agovernment facing political andeconomic collapse (the case at hand) must give up
responsibilityfor market prices inorder tofocus onthe core functions of government
that are not being met: law and order, public security, a stable monetary system,
and basic social welfare. Governments that have reached hyperination cannot, self-
evidently, be expected to develop complex industrial policies or structural policies.
After all, they arent even carrying out their most fundamental tasks.
The state had an important role to play, but it would be very different
from what the socialist state had played. Many state functions had to be
strengthenednotably, the rule of law, the registrationanddefense of private
property rights, the scal system, central banking, regulationof banking and
nancial markets, and targeted social support.
Radical reformers supported unemployment insurance and higher pen-
sions, as they aspired to stimulate and facilitate structural change (Fischer
and Gelb 1991). The later, so frequent accusations that radical reformers
had forgotten about institutions and social policy had no base in reality.
Indeed, the successful radical reformers undertook the greatest institutional
reforms and spent greatly on social assistance.
On all these measures the radical reformers agreed, but their views varied
on some other measures, including exchange rate policy, wage controls,
international assistance, and privatization.
r
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Estonia pegged exchange rates early on as
nominal anchors for their nancial stabilization, whereas others opted
for oating exchange rates.
r
Poland and Czechoslovakia introduced strict wage controls as an
important part of their initial stabilization policy, whereas others had
little wage control.
r
The role and size of international nancial assistance and debt relief
varied. Jeffrey Sachs took an international lead as a proponent of aid,
whereas others opposed nearly all nancial support.
r
There were as many views on privatization as there were economists,
although the radical reformers considered speedy privatization impor-
tant.
The differences over exchange rates and wage controls were of a technical
nature, while the differences over international assistance and especially
privatization were profoundly ideological.
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The Importance of Speed And Comprehensiveness
The common conviction of the radical reformers was that these major mar-
ket reforms had to be undertaken as comprehensively and swiftly as possible
(slund1992). The protagonists of radical reformhada clear understanding
that many measures could not be undertaken instantly and that transition
would take at least a decade (notably, Fischer and Gelb 1991). Different pro-
cesses of economic reform have different maximum possible speeds (Balcero-
wicz 1994, p. 82, emphasis inoriginal). Everybody realizedthat privatization
of large enterprises would take years, as would complex reforms, ranging
fromtax reform, social reforms, civil service reform, and legal reforms to the
development of a nancial sector. The radical reformers were all convinced
that a radical and comprehensive reform was needed to bring about a real
breakthrough, which would minimize the social costs and render the eco-
nomic upswing earlier and sharper. This was their prime bone of contention
with the gradualists.
First, liberal economists in the Soviet bloc had bitter memories of failed
and reversed reforms. They concluded that the economic reforms failed
because they were not radical enough, that is, they did not reach a certain
thresholdof necessary changes rapidly via critical mass of market reforms
(Balcerowicz 1995). If the systemdidnot achieve a certaindegree of cohesion
and consistency, it could theoretically be even more inefcient than the old
command economy (Kornai 1990; Boycko 1991; Winiecki 1991a).
Second, the radical reformers were acutely aware of the prevalence of
both state and market failure, but they were more fearful of state failure. A
new market would be imperfect, but the communist state was even more
imperfect, so it could not be entrusted with much intervention. The reforms
had to deliver a shock that could break the hold of the old system to
introduce a viable new market economy (Gomul ka 1989).
Third, peoples expectations had to be changed to render the systemic
changes credible and irreversible. Balcerowicz (1995, p. 342) derived from
Leon Festingers theory of cognitive dissonance in social psychology that
people are more likelytochange their attitudes andtheir behaviour if theyare
faced with radical changes in their environment, which they consider irre-
versible, than if those changes are only gradual. Otherwise, people would
suspect a rollback toward communism and refuse to adjust their behavior.
Fourth, because of the severity of the crisis and the new hope of free-
dom, the public was prepared to make short-term sacrices for long-term
benets of society out of sheer idealism. Balcerowicz (1994) emphasized the
importance of utilizing this period of extraordinary politics to get a full
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package of reform laws adopted by the parliament, while radical economic
reforms remained popular.
Fifth, quick systemic change also transforms the intellectual paradigm. In
Central Europe and the Baltics, comprehensive reforms soon changed the
intellectual paradigm, while slower reforms kept rather parochial economic
ideas alive in the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) countries.
Sixth, standard theories agreed that macroeconomic stabilization had to
be done fast to break inationary expectations.
Seventh, liberalizationof prices andtrade hadtogofar enoughtogenerate
a critical mass of markets and provide credible incentives. Because the old
prices were hopelessly distorted, any gradual adjustment would send inac-
curate signals about costs, demand, and supply. Inationary expectations
would be maintained, and entrepreneurs would be unwilling to invest. The
protability of anenterprise wouldbe determinedby price regulation, which
would render bankruptcies socially unacceptable. Liberalized imports were
vital to activate the market and end shortages (Sachs and Lipton 1990).
Eighth, the hardest task was to convince enterprise managers to alter their
behavior. Their incentives had to be changed through the introduction of
hard budget constraints or a demand barrier. If they were not convinced
that the rules hadchangedfor good, they wouldnot adjust (Sachs andLipton
1990).
Ninth, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, and rent seeking
were ballooning amid the breakdown of communism. Partial liberalization
facilitated arbitrage between regulated prices and free prices, but a quick
and comprehensive reform could mitigate these distortions.
Tenth, extremely little accurate informationwas available during the early
transition, as everything was changing fast and radically, and new statistics
were often completely awed. If little could be measured and few relevant
facts could be established, it would have been both pretentious and foolish
to attempt anything but a policy based on principle (Balcerowicz 1995).
Finally, the state bureaucracy had numerous reasons to oppose a radical
reformprogram. Under reform, it would lose its prior power, and most of its
human capital would become obsolete because the old socialist microman-
agement of enterprises no longer existed. Bureaucrats easily colluded with
abundant secret service ofcers, state enterprise managers, and Communist
Party ofcials. Populist politicians will try to hook up with coalitions of
workers, managers and bureaucrats in hard-hit sectors to slow or reverse
the adjustment (Sachs 1990). It was vital for the sustenance of democracy
to disarm the old elite through radical reform. The abortive coup in August
1991 in Moscow and the armed uprising by the predemocratic Russian
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parliament in October 1993 illustrated the threat of a bureaucratic counter-
revolution.
Gradual Reform Programs
The opponents of radical reform did not form one school but proposed
more gradual reform in one or several regards, so no full conceptualization
of a gradual reformwas apparent. In 1990, the discussion was dominated by
contrasts between the just-launched reforms in Poland and Hungary. Grad-
ualists defended the Hungarian methods against the Polish shock therapy
with little regard for diverse preconditions. Another source of inspiration
was the successful Chinese reform. Then there was ignorance, nostalgia for
the old, and rent seeking.
The fundamental difference between gradualists and radical reformers
was their view of market failure and state failure. First, gradualists thought
the old communist economy and state more viable than radical reformers
did. Second, gradualists downplayed the economic crisis after communism,
looking at the mild predicament of Hungary rather than the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Third, gradualists refused to accept that the communist state
was highly corrupt or evenkleptocratic, being more concernedabout market
failures, such as possible monopoly effects. They favored state intervention
and retained a strong belief in social engineering. Fourth, while radical
reformers considered the transition a risky task that could fail, gradualists
took the success of the market economy for granted because of the strength
of the state, suggesting detailedoptimal sequencing of reformmeasures. As a
consequence, gradualists wanted to impede the transition process, whereas
radical reformers feared it would be stalled. Fifth, gradualists wanted to
stimulate output through demand management, whereas radical reformers
saw a systemic lack of supply as the prime problem. The overt disputes were
limited to the speed and order of reforms, but hardly anybody defended a
larger public sector than in Western Europe in the early transition debate.
In reality, however, many gradualists retained more socialist views than they
wanted to reveal at the moment of liberal triumph.
The dominant argument for a more gradual approach was the evident
economic successes of the Chinese model of communist reform, whichmany
people of all kinds of persuasions wanted to apply to the former Soviet
bloc.
A broad group of Western social scientists based their opposition on the
contention that radical reform would lead to a greater fall in output and be
more socially costly than gradual reform. They wanted to make the reforms
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less radical and argued for trade-offs between reform and social costs. On
such premises, they developed theoretical models of political economy.
Institutional economists wanted to postpone the introduction of market
economy until most institutional reforms had been undertaken.
In the former Soviet Union, reform communists, who had gained con-
siderable authority by calling for market reforms in the early Gorbachev
years, now turned against such reforms and refused to accept the reality of
a normal market economy.
The Chinese Model
When communism collapsed in the Soviet bloc, East Asia stood out as
a shining economic success, and many praised China as a model for the
transition countries.
3
One contention was that Mikhail Gorbachev mis-
takenly started with democratization in January 1987 and that he should
have begun with economic reforms instead (Nolan 1995; Goldman 1996).
However, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opposed any market
economic reform when Mikhail Gorbachev became its secretary general in
March 1985 (slund 1991). At that time, Soviet society was utterly petried
and increasingly dysfunctional. After having attempted economic reforms
for two years, Gorbachev realized that the omnipotent party bureaucracy
blocked everything, which convinced him to launch partial democratiza-
tion to undermine it. In China, by contrast, reforms were launched after the
devastating Cultural Revolution, which had brought economic decline and
terrorized the Party apparatus. To argue that democratization should have
followed market economic reform amounted to opposition to any change
in the Soviet Union.
4
Russian liberal Vladimir Mau (1999) retorted that
the Chinese path entails leaving power in the hands of the old Nomen-
klatura in order to preserve a one-party systemand the ideological purity of
the regime. Economic transformations then are to be undertaken gradually
under Nomenklatura control. Any attempt to increase the political activity
of individuals must be heavily suppressed. The Soviet Nomenklatura was
almighty, and the public had no voice.
3
For example, Parkhomenko (1992), Amsden et al. (1994), Nolan (1995), Goldman (1996),
and Stiglitz (1999a).
4
Marshall Goldman(1991, p. 224) presentedamore plausible viewof the Gorbachevreforms
in 1991: even if Gorbachev had adopted a more rational and coherent policy, it is unlikely
that he would have succeeded. The Soviet population . . . was too resistant to evolutionary
change. For that reason, the odds are that no one else would have done much better. The
problem, though, was the Nomenklatura rather than the population.
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Another argument was that experimentation was better than full-scale
reforms (e.g., Murrell 1992b; Stiglitz 1999a), but no communist country
had experimented as much with economic reforms as the Soviet Union.
It carried out reforms and experiments in the 1920s, 1950s, 1960s, and
1980s, but the problemwas that they were all reversed. The same was largely
true of Central Europe (Balcerowicz 1995). Only in Hungary did signicant
systemic changes persist, but they did not lead to signicant growth, and a
broad Hungarian consensus advocated more radical reforms (Kornai 1986,
1990). The question is rather why experimentation succeeded in China and
failed in the Soviet bloc.
Third, the champions of Chinese reforms agreed that it was right to
start the reform with agriculture and small enterprises and leave the large
industrial enterprises in state hands, creating a dual economy with a mar-
ket economy for the small enterprises and the old state governance for the
large state enterprises. The new private or quasi-private sector could gener-
ate growth and develop without antagonizing the old state sector (Murrell
1992b; Amsden et al. 1994; Goldman 1996; Nolan 1995). Jeffrey Sachs and
Wing Thye Woo (1994) objected that agriculture in China was dominant,
whereas it was a small part of the overindustrialized economy in Central
Europe and the Soviet Union. Soviet state industry dominated the economy
and could not be left aside. Furthermore, Soviet agriculture was indus-
trialized and large scale, too. To break up big state and collective farms
was technically difcult. In addition, the huge communist agrarian bureau-
cracy blocked any progressive economic development for its selsh reasons.
Gorbachev tried agricultural reforms in the Soviet Union in the spring of
1985, but he got nowhere. He grandly legalized cooperatives in May 1988,
but they became predominantly vehicles of management theft (slund1989,
1991).
Fourth, most proponents of the Chinese model favored gradual price
liberalization and opening of the economy (Amsden et al. 1994; Nolan 1995;
Goldman 1996). Well, the Soviet Union did so, and the result was truly dis-
astrous: massive rent seeking by prominent members of the Nomenklatura,
which is also going on in China (D abrowski et al. 2001).
A nal argument was that China was right in carrying out a far-reaching
decentralization, but the Soviet Unionfailedtodoso. However, Peter Murrell
and Mancur Olson (1991) argued convincingly that the decline of the cen-
trally planned economies could be explained by the devolution of power
within the party and state hierarchy and the collusion of bureaucrats at
lower levels undoing the dictatorship of the secretary general. The last stage
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of communism is not the stateless and classless society that Marx forecast,
but rule by a rather large aristocracy of upper level bureaucrats (p. 260).
Power was devolved both within the party bureaucracy and to state enter-
prise managers, but without accountability or responsibility. The Chinese
Communist Party maintained some control over its bureaucrats, whereas
the Soviet state fell apart. Soviet bureaucrats were relatively more numer-
ous than Chinese bureaucrats and had more awed incentives, rendering
them more harmful. China and Russia are today deemed similarly corrupt,
but Russian corruption is perceived as socially more costly (Shleifer and
Treisman 2000; Transparency International 2006).
In the end, surprisingly little can be compared. Although both China and
the Soviet Union were communist dictatorships with socialized economies,
most preconditions differed when they launched market economic reforms
in 1978 and 1985, respectively. First, the Soviet state and Party were so petri-
ed that they could no longer reformbut only collapse, yet the Chinese state
andits Communist Partywere still reformable (slund1989). Second, China
was dominated by agriculture, but the Soviet Union by large-scale industry
(Sachs and Woo 1994). Third, the Soviet Union collapsed in hyperination,
whereas the Chinese leaders never lost control over macroeconomic stabil-
ity. China did not need any macroeconomic shock therapy, but the Soviet
Union did.
Western Arguments for Gradualism
Four main arguments for gradualism are social democratic political econ-
omy, theoretical political economy, the concept of disorganization, and evo-
lutionary or institutional economics.
Przeworskis Political Economy. European social democrats were pro-
foundly uncomfortable during the collapse of communism. Many of them
had argued that nothing of the kind could ever happen, and everything
was wrong from their point of view. As the postcommunist output collapse
started, left-wingers drew parallels with the Great Depression of 192933,
the worst crisis of capitalism. In a highly acclaimed book on democracy and
the market in Eastern Europe, Adam Przeworski (1991), a leading scholar
of comparative politics, laid out the argument. His rst postulate was that
democracy had to justify itself by material achievements: To evoke com-
pliance and participation, democracy must generate substantive outcomes:
it must offer all the relevant political forces real opportunities to improve
their material welfare (p. 32). Implicitly, he assumed that people opted
for democracy for the sake of economic welfare, not for political reasons.
Przeworskis secondpostulate was that people demandedquickresults. Can
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structural economic transformation be sustained under democratic condi-
tions, or must either reforms or democracy be sacriced? (p. 138). His
underlying thought was this: Even if the post-reform system would be
more efcient . . . a transient deterioration of material conditions may be
sufcient to undermine either democracy or the reform process (p. 137).
Third, Przeworski (1991, p. 163) assumed that the social cost is higher
under the radical strategy, where social cost is dened as the cumulative
decline in consumption during the period of transition. Ination is likely
to are up again and again under inertial pressures. Unemployment, even
if temporary, is difcult to tolerate. Increasing inequality stokes conicts
(p. 189). Finally, he presumed that the threat to democracy came froma dis-
satised population. In his 1995 book, Przeworski (1995, p. 85) came back
withanevenharsher judgment: we have beencritical of the standardneolib-
eral recipes since we believe that they are faulty in three fundamental ways:
they induce economic stagnation, they incur unnecessarily large social costs,
and they weaken the nascent democratic institutions. Przeworski assumed
that the continuing material deprivation, the technocratic style of policy
making, andthe ineffectiveness of the representative institutions undermine
popular support for democracy (1991, pp. 18990). His assumptions were
shared by a large number of political scientists.
5
The problem with these assumptions was that they did not square with
reality. Larry Diamond (1999) has debunked Przeworskis rst postulate,
showing that people see democracy as a value in itself and do not judge it
only by economic results. As we shall see, economic reform and democracy
were positively correlated, and radical reforms caused less economic decline
andsocial costs. Joel Hellman(1998) made the profoundpoint that the main
threat to reforms did not come from the population but from the winning
elite. Because of his inaccurate assumptions, Przeworskis conclusions were
faulty as well.
Theoretical political economy. A small group of Western economists, pri-
marily G erard Roland, Mathias Dewatripont, Phillipe Aghion, and Olivier
Blanchard, developed an extensive theoretical literature on the political
economy of transition.
6
With a cursory look at economic developments
in a fewtransition countries, mostly Poland and Hungary, they made rather
heroic assumptions in line with Przeworskis, which were not realistic. The
5
Similar views were expressed by Elster (1990), Offe (1997), Andreas Pickel in Pickel and
Wiesenthal (1997), and Stark and Bruszt (1998).
6
See in particular Dewatripont and Roland (1992a, 1992b), Aghion and Blanchard (1994),
and Roland (1993, 1994, 2000).
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gist of this literature is the assumption that radical reformleads to a sharper
decline in output and greater social costs than gradual reform: Assume
that big bang . . . has a negative expected outcome (Roland 1993, pp. 534
5). Another assumption was that the population would not tolerate more
than a certain decline in output or a certain degree of unemployment As
a trade-off, they suggested slow liberalization and privatization, as well as
more social benets andsubsidies, tomake reforms politically possible. They
also made other unrealistic assumptions, for example, that the key political
actor was the majority of the population (Dewatripont and Roland 1992b),
implying that the nascent democratic institutions were both representa-
tive and effective. Then, gradualism may allow for divide and rule tactics
when compensation for the losers from reform is costly, provided the gov-
ernment has enough agenda-setting power (Roland 1994, p. 1162). They
presumed not only a very democratic but also a strong and effective govern-
ment, assuming nearly perfect social engineering (Dewatripont and Roland
1992b). They also assumed that a more radical reform would lead to higher
taxes and, therefore, to a slower growth of the private sector (Dewatripont
and Roland 1992a; Aghion and Blanchard 1994).
Economic models can be relevant, even if a few assumptions are not
very realistic. The problem with these models, however, was that all of their
major assumptions contradicted reality, as we shall see in the rest of this
book, and that their conclusions largely depended on the assumption that
moreradical reformbrought moresocial hardship. This theoretical literature
hangs detached from most empirical research, which has found that radical
reformhave been less socially costly. Katz and Owen (2000) have shown that
if the assumptions in Dewatripont and Roland (1992b) are changed to the
real situation, their article may be viewed as lending strong support to the
big-bang strategy (Havrylyshyn 2006, pp. 234).
Disorganization. Olivier BlanchardandMichael Kremer (1997) developed
an alternative model to explain the decline in output with disorganization.
Under communism, a typical industry had fewer rms than in the West.
For many inputs, rms knew of only one supplier, and for many outputs
only one buyer. During transition, old trade links were disrupted or became
uneconomical. With asymmetric information or incomplete contracts, the
initial results of bargaining might have been inefcient, implying that mar-
ket imperfections caused output to fall with the transition. Blanchard and
Kremer noticed that shortages persisted because adjustments took time.
Looking at Central Europe, the Baltic countries, and Russia, they found
empirical evidence for the decline in output having been more pronounced
for goods withmore complexproductionprocesses. They inquiredwhether
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the needtopreserve existingproductionnetworks provides a justicationfor
gradualism and whether a commitment by the government to subsidize
state rms for some time may avoid their immediate collapse (Blanchard
and Kremer 1997, p. 1123). However, the authors cautioned that this was
only a limited, theoretical case for gradualism, and they acknowledged that
it was valid only in the short term because enterprises could be presumed
to solve their contract and bargaining problems relatively soon.
Blanchard and Kremers empirical proof was a regression, showing that
more advanced manufacturing industries experienced greater decline, but
because those were also the greatest value detractors, it was desirable
that their substandard production plummeted. The systemic disruption
prompted every enterprise to review its contracts, which was one of the
original arguments for radical reform (Boycko 1991; Murphy et al. 1992).
The question is rather which kind of reform minimizes the period of disor-
ganization, and as we shall see, the answer is radical reform.
Institutions rst. Nobel laureate Douglass C. North accused radical re-
formers of having forgotten institutions. North (1994, p. 359) saw radical
reform ideas as dominated by neoclassical theory, which he argued is sim-
ply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce
development. While the rules may be changed overnight, the informal
norms usually change only gradually . . . transferring the formal political and
economic rules of successful Western market economies to third-world and
EasternEuropeaneconomies is not a sufcient conditionfor goodeconomic
performance. Privatization is not a panacea for solving poor economic per-
formance. However, he offered no evidence for this alleged forgetfulness
of institutions. In reality, all radical reformers were deeply committed to
changingtheoldcommunist institutions, usingFriedrichHayek(1944/1986,
1960), the leading liberal institutionalist, as the main source of inspiration
(Balcerowicz 1992; Klaus 1992; Mau 1999; Akaev 2000).
Peter Murrell (1992a, 1992b, 1992c) tried to develop an evolutionary
theory for postcommunist economic transition. He observed that in Cen-
tral Europe organizations that were expected to change their behavior in
response to the new conditions have failed to do so, particularly the dom-
inant large state enterprises (Murrell 1992b, p. 81). He agreed with the
radical reformers on the need for a coherent economic environment, but
he drew the opposite conclusion: little in the economic record of the past
two years suggests that the radical program of reform can be successful.
The old cannot be simply destroyed and therefore the radical reform plans
have serious problems of coherence (Murrell 1992b, p. 82). He concluded:
The information and skills of existing personnel are attuned to the existing
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set of institutions and lose much of their value when those institutions are
destroyed (Murrell 1992c, p. 50). Hence, gradual reforms would cause less
output losses, because the old sector would suffer less, whereas the new
private market sector would develop better (Murrell and Wang 1993).
Many gradualists insisted that market institutions should be established
before the economy was liberalized to avoid market failures. The UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (1990, p. 23) pleaded: legal and nancial
infrastructures of the market economy must be put in place before markets
can perform. Only East Germany did so, because West Germany imposed
its commercial legislation, but East Germany stands out as one of the most
costly and least successful transitions (see Chapter 11). If nothing was done,
market reforms wouldcertainly fail, as Belarus has shown. OlehHavrylyshyn
(2006, p. 272) starkly pointed out: it is easily seen in the time-path of the
transition index that those countries which moved most slowly on liberal-
ization elements moved even more slowly on the institution-building ele-
ments. This implies that the proclamations of the political elites in these
countries that the society was not ready for the market and a gradual evo-
lution was necessary, were not sincere proclamations but masked a hid-
den agenda. Obviously, institutions could not be built very fast, but the
issue was what kind of reform would lead to a faster and better building of
institutions.
Reform Communists Opposing a Normal Market Economy
The starkest antireform opposition came from the old Soviet establishment
in Russia, but it resonated throughout the former Soviet Union. As soon
as Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar presented their ideas of radical economic
reform in late 1991, reform communists started attacking them viciously
withamixture of vulgar Marxism, populism, andvestedinterests. Most vocal
were Russias Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, Chairman of the Central
Bank of Russia Viktor Gerashchenko, and parliamentary Speaker Ruslan
Khasbulatov.
The old reform communists regarded the real economy, production,
and investment as important while disregarding nance, money, and ina-
tion because they saw money as a free utility. Because the sharp output fall
had caused the high ination, they wanted to issue more money to sup-
port production. Their thinking was so out of line with modern macroeco-
nomics that it needs tobe quotedat length. Gerashchenko(1992) wantedthe
money supply to rise with the price level: Could the economy manage with
the former money supply when the prices were rising . . . were the previous
monetary resources really sufcient to exist at the present price level, when
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the wholesale prices have risen1618 times? According tomy view, they were
inadequate. Prominent Soviet economists insisted: Financial stabilization
cannot precede the stabilization of production . . . As long as the fall of pro-
duction does not turn into sustained growth, it is necessary to abandon
any attempt at forming a state budget without decit. When the volume
of production in a country is falling, a budget without a decit can only
be accomplished at the price of hyperination . . . there are no state bud-
gets without decits even in well-to-do countries with market economies
(Fedorenko et al. 1992). The highly respected Director of the Institute of
Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences Leonid Abalkin reckoned:
the budget decit cannot be diminishedby tax increases. Their rise will lead
to price hikes and the reduction of production and tax evasion (Abalkin
1992).
Ination was seen as structural and unrelated to monetary policy:
Liberalization of prices on energy will indisputably lead the economy to
open hyperination. The government faced the choice either to abandon
strict monetary policy and satisfy the demand for money to preserve pro-
duction or to allow mass bankruptcy of commercial banks and completely
disorganize monetary circulation (Yaremenko et al. 1992). At that time,
commercial banks were making more money than ever before or after, while
high ination was disorganizing the payment system. The leading commu-
nist economist, Academician Dmitri S. Lvov (1996, pp. 1812), insisted that
ination stimulated production:
Macroeconomic calculations show that a reduction of ination by one percent
results in a fall of output of threeve percent . . . to cut ination from 10 percent
a month to zero, it is necessary to reduce production almost to zero. But if we agree
to increase ination to, for instance, 15 percent a month, it is possible, as these
calculations evidence, to reach a production level that is 70 percent of the level of
1991.
Although these Soviet economists considered themselves market social-
ists, they regarded the deregulation of prices and trade as simplistic and
unprofessional. The state had to build the market, which could not develop
spontaneously. Only under the conditions of sufciently strong state reg-
ulation can the transition to the market take place; the most important part
of this transition must be a state program for the establishment of a mar-
ket infrastructure (Petrakov et al. 1992). Russian Vice President Aleksandr
Rutskoi (1992) could not imagine the absence of price controls: The liber-
alization of prices without the existence of a civilized market requires strict
price control. . . . In all civilized countries such strict controls exist.
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Withtheir limitedbelief inthemarket andknowledgeof theoutsideworld,
these critics did not think liberalization would abolish shortages. I suppose
that we shouldnot place great hope inthe abolitionof the multiple shortages
and the appearance in the shops of an abundance of goods (Bogomolov
1992). The state, on the contrary, was considered omnipotent despite its
rampant crisis, and the issue was political will. Is the state really not able
to establish control over the prices of monopolized production? Of course
it can, if it wants to (Rutskoi 1992). Whereas the reformers aspired to
restructuring of Soviet-era production, the Soviet economists desired the
full utilization of the old production capacity, advocating higher export
tariffs, state subsidies tothe export industry, andmore protectionism, which
were major causes of corruption in Russia (Glaziev 1996).
Sequencing was another major concern. The Soviet establishment op-
posed the privatization of large and medium-sized enterprises until 1991,
yet now they suddenly argued that it should have been undertaken before
price liberalization. As one old Soviet academician put it: And why was
it not possible to start with a fast privatization and the breaking up of
monopolies already? [in October 1991] (Arbatov 1992). Soon, however,
after the Russiangovernment hadcarriedout a stunningly fast privatization,
the same people complained that privatization had been too fast (Russian
Academy of Sciences 1994).
The reform communists last stand was that Russia was unique. Our
situation is special. It cannot be described by general rules (Petrakov et al.
1992). The economic reforms must not be based on abstract and extremely
simplied models, but on decisions derived fromreal life, on considerations
of the real situation in the economy, the population of the country, and the
experiences of the whole political and socioeconomic history of Russia
(Khasbulatov 1992).
The ultimate feat of these Soviet economists was when ve American
Nobel Prize laureates in economics joined the whole Soviet economic estab-
lishment in what was a campaign effort for the communist presidential can-
didate Gennady Zyuganov in 1996.
7
Together they claimed: In spite of the
hopes of the reformers for a ourishing private business which supports
the economy, their program generated economic collapse, a strengthening
of the maa and growing political instability, which is destructive for the
7
The ve Nobel Prize winners were Kenneth Arrow, Lawrence Klein, Vassily Leontieff,
Douglass North, and James Tobin. They were joined by John Kenneth Galbraith and
Marshall Goldman (Bogomolov 1996, pp. 213; Klein and Pomer 2001). Their joint dec-
laration in apparent support of Zyuganov was published in Nezavisimaya gazeta (July 1,
1996), just before the presidential elections (Mau 1999).
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business climate. They demanded a higher progressive income tax, price
controls, higher protective customs tariffs and industrial policy, including
government subsidies and credits. Their key request was the necessity to
reinforce the role of the government in the process of transformation,
but the malfunctioning of the state was ignored. Instead, corruption was
presented as a consequence of privatization: To a considerable extent, pri-
vatization, which goes together with the spreading corruption, lowers the
existing level of welfare and leads to the impoverishment of most of the
population (Bogomolov 1996, pp. 1721).
Although Soviet economists and populist politicians took the public lead
in the Russian debate, the ultimate beneciaries of their arguments were the
state enterprise managers. They abstained fromacrimonious criticismwhile
cautioning that government policy should be pragmatic. They called for
commonsense, consensus, andmoderation, whichall meant minimal
and slow reforms, but they did not desire to return to the Soviet system
(Parkhomenko 1992).
Such was the gist of the public debate in the CIS countries in 1992 and
1993, of which gradual reform became characteristic. In most of them,
the old communist leaders stayed in power, and they wanted a minimum
of political and economic change. They were forced to adjust to nancial
collapse and reform in Russia, but they delayed scal stabilization, which
threw ten CIS countries in the ruble zone into hyperination in 1993. The
Russian price liberalization compelled them to liberalize some prices, but
they limited it and regulated foreign trade, creating huge price differentials
between regulated and free prices. Although central planning had fallen
apart, the CIS governments maintained state orders for much production.
Privatization was slow, favoring insider privatization by state managers. As
the state remained omnipotent, democracy was weak. Eventually, most of
these countries became market economies, but a few reverted to socialist
economies without ideology.
Rent Seeking: The Scourge of Transition
The most important gradualist group consisted of those who wanted to
make money on the very transition to a market economy.
8
They dominated
in the former Soviet Union, where they hid their real agenda behind old
Soviet reform communist economists and populists, the most ardent crit-
ics of radical reform. This politically most inuential group consisted of
8
I rst developed this theme in slund (1996) and elaborated on it in slund (1999).
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rent-seeking state enterprise managers and Soviet ofcials, who beneted
from the inconsistencies of the transitional system and wanted to perpet-
uate them. They did favor a market economy, but their aspiration was to
prolong and complicate transition to maximize market distortions, from
which these people knew how to make fortunes. In the real policy world,
these rent seekers were the main opponents of the radical reformers.
Postcommunist transformation is the history of the war for and against
rent seeking. Reformers wanted to establish a normal market economy,
but rent seekers desired to make money on both market and state failures.
Initially, the prime rent seekers were state enterprise managers and ofcials,
but soon new entrepreneurs surged, and the wealthiest of them became
oligarchs.
A useful denition of rents is prots in excess of the competitive level
(Brealey and Myers 2000). Anne Krueger (1974) introduced the term rent
seeking in modern economic inquiry in reference to the costs of govern-
ment regulation. The Western discussion about rent seeking focused on the
regulation of foreign trade and domestic prices, which were much smaller
than the rents generated at the end of communism.
Liberal reformers won in Central Europe and the Baltics, while rent seek-
ers dominated in the CIS countries. The rent seekers strategy involved a
confusing mixture of freedomand regulationbecause they aspired to a max-
imumof economic freedomfor themselves but severe regulations for others.
Wisely, they avoided pronouncing their strategy openly. At the collapse of
communism, the opportunities for rent seeking were probably greater than
at any other time in world history. Huge resources lay unguarded. Large
rents arose from arbitrage between free market prices and state-controlled
prices, aggravated by multiple exchange rates. As ination mounted, state
interest rates remained low while huge interest subsidies became available.
Large state enterprise subsidies persisted, and state enterprise managers pri-
vatized them through transfer pricing. Rents faded away with time, but
successful rent seekers bought politics to impose new rents. A vicious circle
of self-reinforcing rent seeking evolved. Finally, the rent seekers privatized
the state enterprises, which ironically turned them into prot seekers and
caused high economic growth.
In hindsight, the seemingly haphazard economic reforms introduced by
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s appear designed to
construct a rent-seeking machine. Althoughmost deregulations were minor,
some were amazingly liberal. The explanation for why these reforms, later
so obviously a result of trial and error, provide such a clear pattern is that
certain reforms were accepted because they facilitated rent seeking by Soviet
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ofcials, but they refutedother reforms that contradictedtheir interests. Pre-
sumably without understanding it himself, Gorbachev built a hothouse of
rent seeking from1987 to 1991. Seven changes in economic policy provided
the preconditions for extraordinary rent seeking.
9
One of Gorbachevs rst signicant reforms was a partial liberalization
of foreign trade in August 1986, long before the domestic market was liber-
alized. The prime goal was to break up the monopoly power of the Ministry
for Foreign Trade. By 1988, more than 200 corporations had been granted
the right to pursue foreign trade, and in 1990, their number approached
20,000. This liberalizationwas premature, but it allowed powerful state bod-
ies to make money on foreign trade. A privileged few obtained an opportu-
nity to arbitrage between low domestic prices and many times higher world
prices.
Second, these early foreign trade reforms also introduced up to 3,000
so-called currency coefcients, effectively one exchange rate for each sig-
nicant foreign trade good. Their ratio varied from one to twenty, offering
extraordinary opportunities for arbitrage. In late 1990, these coefcients
were replaced by a unied commercial exchange rate, but even so, the Soviet
Union had one ofcial rate, one commercial rate, and a plummeting black
market exchange rate, permitting ever greater arbitrage gains.
Third, in January 1988, the Soviet Law on State Enterprises came into
force. It was a halfway attempt at economic reform, leaving the economy
with neither plan nor market. Compulsory plan targets were abolished,
and enterprises were given more freedom in setting prices and wages. As
managers preferred to produce less but charge more money, both wages and
prices started to skyrocket.
Fourth, with the Law on State Enterprises, the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan), and the industrial ministries lost control over state enterprise
managers and could no longer dismiss them. State enterprise managers
obtainedfreedomwithout accountability, becomingquasi-owners of their
state enterprises, andsoonthey startedspontaneous privatization (slund
1995).
Fifth, the revolutionary Soviet LawonCooperatives of May 1988 legalized
all kinds of private enterprises with minimal regulation. Predominantly,
the new cooperatives were trading companies owned by a state enterprise
manager andattachedtohis statecompany. Statemanagers startedsellingthe
produce of their state companies totheir private tradingcooperatives at a low
9
The section that follows draws on slund (1991). Peter Boettke (1993) analyzes the failure
of perestroika from this perspective of rent seeking.
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price, and their cooperatives reaped the prot. These trading cooperatives
became management theft companies.
Sixth, another form of new cooperatives was commercial banks, which
mushroomed without regulation. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia already had 1,360 commercial banks. They demanded unlim-
ited access to state credit at minimal nominal interest rates, which was pos-
sible because of the competition between the Soviet and Russian Central
Banks in 1990 and 1991 (Johnson 2000). Effectively, they usurped the ina-
tion tax of mounting hyperination.
10
Seventh, traditionally the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank were
weak authorities, subordinate to the State Planning Committee and dozens
of industrial ministries. As partial markets started operating, the previously
passive money assumed real life, and many called for more money to be
issued. Because of the lack of scal or monetary restraints, money ooded
freely. The Soviet budget decit exploded to at least 20 percent of GDP
in 1991, and it was nanced with the emission of money. An economic
madhouse had been created. By late 1990, the standard assessment of both
Soviet and Western economists was that Soviet hyperination was virtu-
ally inevitable. Then, the country and its political and economic systems
collapsed.
As Michael Dobbs (1997, p. 373) wrote, There was a n de regime atmo-
sphere in Moscow in the spring of 1991, and bureaucrats were lining up to
jump ship before it was too late. . . . Why drive a Volga when you could be
driving a Mercedes? This division of the elite helps to explain the pathetic
abortive August 1991 coup. Pragmatic state enterprise directors opposed
the coup because of their rising commercial interests, contributing to the
peaceful termination of communism. The durability of communism and
the speed with which it collapsed were two sides of the same coin. There
came a point at which the strengths of the system massive repression,
rigid centralization, an all-embracing ideology, the obsession with military
power turned into fatal weaknesses (Dobbs 1997, p. 440). The extraor-
dinary economic distortions necessitated radical reform, but they had bred
overwhelming vested interests that cherished these market distortions.
10
In May 1990, I chaired a seminar in Stockholm with the Moscow Professor of Economics
Ruslan Khasbulatov, who later became chairman of the Russian Parliament. Responding
to a question about the monetary overhang in the Soviet Union, Khasbulatov exclaimed:
What is the problem? If there is more money, there will be more production! True to this
policy, as chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, he commanded the issue of massive
cheap credit (Matyukhin 1993).
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From 1988, the Soviet Union displayed an incredibly innovative spirit.
Soviet citizens made money in every conceivable way. Most people were
shocked, because the methods were often objectionable, the damage in-
curred was huge, and the fortunes accumulated were monumental. The
forms of rent were multiple, and the methods of rent seeking shifted swiftly.
The basic method of rent seeking was arbitrage between xed state prices
and private market prices, preferably abroad. The multiple exchange rates
had all along fed a corps of black exchange traders, offering tourists six
times the ofcial exchange rate. In the late 1980s, foreign trade rents surged.
Western computers were imported and sold at high prices on the domestic
market, because of extreme shortage and high domestic sales taxes. In 1990,
the real bonanza opened up, when some managers of Soviet commodity
plants started exporting oil and metals independently through their private
trading companies. The domestic oil price plummeted with the Soviet ruble
to as little as half a percent of the world market price. In 1992, the state-
controlledprices of commodities were at most one-tenthof the worldmarket
prices, and more than 70 percent of Russias exports were commodities
subject to export quotas (Aven 1994, p. 84). Total Russian exports outside
of the CIS amounted to $42.2 billion. The collected export tariffs amounted
to some $2.4 billion, while GDP was only $79 billion in 1992, because of
the very low exchange rate (World Bank 1996b). That means that the total
export rents were no less than $24 billion, or 30 percent of GDP.
Another major source of rents was subsidized imports. Because of the fear
of starvation, Russia maintained special exchange rates for so-called critical
imports until 1993. The Russian importers of grain bought hard currency
for only 1 percent of the going exchange rate in 1992, allowing them to pay
only 1 percent of the world market price for imported grain, while bread
was sold at ordinary domestic prices. The IMF (1993, p. 133) calculated total
Russian import subsidies at 17.5 percent of GDP that year.
A third source of rents was the emission of subsidized state credits. The
Central Bank of Russia issued new credit equivalent to 31.6 percent GDP
in 1992 (Granville 1995b, p. 67). Because these loans were largely given
at an interest rate of 10 or 25 percent a year while ination that year was
2,500 percent, they were sheer gifts (slund 1995). These gifts rendered the
chairman of Russias Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, very popular in
the Russian elite, although the banking sector was impregnated with crime.
Fourth, the state budget provided direct enterprise subsidies, amounting
to10.4 percent of GDPinRussia in1992 (EuropeanBankfor Reconstruction
and Development 1997, p. 83). From these four sources, total gross rents
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amountedtoalmost 90 percent of Russias GDPin1992. Evenso, we have left
some rents, such as tax exemptions, aside. Presumably rents have never been
larger as a ratio of GDP anywhere in the world than they were in the former
Soviet Union in 1992. As select citizens transferred these rents and subsidies
from state enterprises to their private accounts through transfer pricing or
outright theft, they became very wealthy. This took place throughout the
CIS. The more partial and slowthe reforms were, the greater the distortions
and the larger the rents. The most prominent source of rent seeking in
the public mind was privatization, but rent seeking peaked in 1992 when
privatization had barely started.
Rent seekers were cold-blooded, rational businessmen. Theyhadnoideol-
ogy but convenience. They engaged in politics mainly to secure their rents.
Confusingly, they were reformist and progressive as long as communism
lasted, because their prots derived from the market, however distorted,
and they wanted to escape the old communist control system. As soon as
communism was over, however, the threat to rent seekers came from a truly
free market. Logically, they tried to slow down market reforms to preserve
market distortions that generated rents while invoking many ne social
causes. Later on, many wealthy businessmen became interested in securing
their property rights against capricious rulers, which rendered them more
liberal again. Now they stood up for the principles of a free society.
Rent seekers were the ultimate gamblers. They knew that a game could
not last for long, but if possible, they would try to prolong it. When one
game was over, they jumped on another lucrative market distortion, such as
barter, to make more money. As a result, macroeconomic stabilization and
liberalization often looked hopeless, but suddenly something happened
an economic crisis, a determined political attack, or the emergence of more
attractive rents anda politically impossible policy was instantly carriedout.
Examples are price liberalization, the abolition of import subsidization or
subsidized credits, the deregulation of exports, cuts in enterprise subsidies,
and the transition from soft to strict monetary policy in most post-Soviet
countries.
Rents couldbe brought downby many means, but they couldnot stay that
high for long. Arbitrage would inevitably dissipate rents caused by extreme
regulation, and the slump of the ination tax during hyperination would
devalue inationary rents. Rents ended with privatization. The course of
postcommunist transition was determined by what means policy makers
chose to deal with rent seeking, and that choice depended on the political
regime. The path selected determined the nature of society after transition.
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We can dene postcommunist transition as the period of this extraordi-
nary rent seeking. In the former Soviet Union, it started in 1990 and ended
on August 17, 1998, the day of the Russian nancial crash, which disci-
plined the prime rent seekers of the day, the Russian oligarchs. In Central
Europe and the Baltics, the transition period was much shorter, and its end
was not so distinct. Afterward the transformation of postcommunist society
has continued in a less dramatic fashion. In the period after 1998, a quite
different pattern of more normal development took over.
Criticism of Radical Reform after the Russian Financial Crash
After the aggressive early debate and a nervous start of transition, policies
started to bite, and the international community cheered the successes of
radical economic reform in Central Europe and the Baltics, and the pre-
vailing sentiment was that Russia and the rest of the CIS countries were
eventually getting on the bandwagon.
11
In 1996, the World Bank (1996a)
devoted its annual World Development Report to transition. Its main con-
clusions read as a credo of the radical economic reform(pp. 1425, emphasis
in original):
r
Consistent policies, combining liberalization of markets, trade, and new
business entry with reasonable price stability, can achieve a great deal
even in countries lacking clear property rights and strong market institu-
tions.
r
An efcient response to market processes requires clearly dened prop-
erty rights and this will eventually require widespread private owner-
ship.
r
Major changes in social policy must complement the move to the
market.
r
Institutions that support markets arise both by design and from de-
mand.
r
International integration can help lock in successful reforms.
As the years passed, however, Russias economic growth failed to take off,
although mass privatization had been carried out. Ination had abated in
1996, and the new stock market skyrocketed. The loans-for-shares priva-
tization in late 1995, which transferred a dozen of Russias most valuable
11
A number of quite positive books on the Russian economic transition were published; see
slund (1995), Granville (1995a), Layard and Parker (1996).
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oil and metals companies to a handful of new oligarchs aroused an outcry
about original sin in both Russia and the West. The view that Russia had
lapsed into a morass of organized crime and corruption proliferated in vivid
journalism.
As the question marks piled up around Russias transition, the coun-
try approached a nancial crash in slow motion. On August 17, 1998, the
Russian government defaulted on its domestic debt, let the ruble exchange
rate plummet, and froze all bank accounts, and roughly half the Russian
bank system went bankrupt. The shock was horrendous. The Russian mid-
dle class lost most of its bank savings for the second time. Russian ination
exploded again, and output fell. In an article in the New York Times, John
Lloyd (1998) famously asked Who lost Russia? Had the attempts to build a
market economy in Russia failed? In Russia, the main conclusions were that
the long-lasting large budget decit had to be eliminated and the exchange
rate be made competitive.
In the West, however, the left-wing criticism of Joseph Stiglitz came to
dominate, especially through his best-selling book Globalization and Its
Discontents (2002).
12
Stiglitz (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2002) attackedIMFpolicy
onRussia, arguingthat theWashingtonConsensus model didnot workthere.
He reckoned that Russia should have followed Chinas example, but the
Western advisers, especially fromthe United States and the IMF . . . marched
in so quickly to preach the gospel of the market economy . . . arguing for a
new religion market fundamentalism (2002, p. 134). Logically, Stiglitz
(1999b, p. 4) praised the gradual reforms in truly tyrannical Uzbekistan.
In his support of gradualism, Stiglitz lauded Gorbachevs policies: The
Gorbachev-era perestroika reforms furnish a good example of incremental
institutional reforms (Stiglitz 1999a, p. 24). The problemwas that they had
brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economy, a fact on
which Stiglitz refrained to comment.
Another criticism was institutional, that the reformers had ignored the
importance of the institutional infrastructure of a market economy and
dissipated the communist organizational capital. Stiglitz criticized radical
reformers for blaming the failure of the shock therapy on corruption and
rent seeking at every turn . . . without recognizing any role of the institu-
tional blitzkrieg in destroying but not replacing the old social norms and
thus in removing the last restraints against society-threatening levels of cor-
ruption . . . Once dissipated, organizational capital is hard to reassemble
12
Similar views were expressed by Cohen (2000), Klein and Pomer (2001), Reddaway and
Glinski (2001), and Goldman (2003).
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(Stiglitz 1999a, p. 9). Stiglitz defended the postcommunist state: The state
is seen as the primary source of the problems: interfering in state rms and
preyingonprivate rms. The emphasis is ongovernment failure, not onmar-
ket failure (p. 20), while he called radical reformers market Bolsheviks.
The organizational capital he lauded contained the Communist Party and
the secret police, which are rarely considered assets in democratic societies.
Stiglitzs third and greatest concern was the Russian privatization. He
condemned the Russian loans-for-shares scheme as the main source of cor-
ruption. Russias oligarchs stole assets, stripped themleaving their country
much poorer (2002, p. 160). Russias kind of ersatz capitalismdid not pro-
vide the incentives for wealth creation and economic growth but rather for
asset stripping (p. 162). Instead, he wanted to give away state enterprises to
the old elite: Perhaps trying to discipline spontaneous privatization might
have offered the greatest hope (Stiglitz 1999a, p. 6). Stiglitz largely ignored
the macroeconomic crisis, simply arguing that the rapid liberalization at
the beginning had led to the burst of ination (2002, p. 156), and that the
tight monetary policies also contributed to the use of barter (p. 157). He
concluded: Prospects for the future are bleak (p. 133).
Ironically, this criticism dismissed Russias economic transformation as
a failure just when Russia rose from its ashes, accomplishing sound macro-
economic stability and an average GDP growth of nearly 7 percent for at
least eight years, while the region as a whole recorded even higher growth
rates.
13
A nearly unison choir of macroeconomists argued that the prob-
lems with Russias stabilization was not shock therapy but gradualism: It
was not the shock therapy programbut the refusal to stick to it that catalyzed
many contradictions in Russias postcommunist development, including its
institutional problems (Mau 1999). It is said that institutional reforms
and privatization should take place rst, and liberalization and stabiliza-
tion should take place later . . . but the experiences of those countries that
undertook market reforms does not provide a single case to prove such a
concept viable (Mau 1999). Oleh Havrylyshyn (2006, p. 272) underlined:
those countries whichmovedmost slowlyonliberalizationelements moved
evenmore slowly onthe institution-building elements. Mau(1999) refused
to blame the IMF, because a good part of the IMF conditions were devel-
oped in Moscow, not in Washington. . . . This is a typical way for a weak
13
Two of the sharpest responses were produced by the Russian liberal Vladimir Mau (1999)
and the Polish liberals Marek D abrowski, Stanisl awGomul ka, and Jacek Rostowski (2001).
See also Yevstigneev and Yevstigneeva (1999). Havrylyshyn (2006) offers a later and full
criticism. My own contribution was slund (1999).
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government to launch unpopular reforms. With regard to privatization,
Mau and other liberal Russians emphasized that the government could not
control state property. Property manipulation is an important feature of
weak state power. Therefore, early and fast privatization with some order
was the best option to create a stratum of private owners as a base for a
market economy.
The most unabashed rebuttal of the criticism of the Russian economic
transformation was presented in a much noticed article by Andrei Shleifer
and Daniel Treisman (2004) in Foreign Affairs. Their thesis was this:
Russia was in 1990, and is today, a middle-income country . . . comparable
to Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. Almost all democracies in this
income range are rough around the edges: their governments suffer from
corruption, their judiciaries are politicized, and their press is almost never
entirely free. They have high income inequality, concentrated corporate
ownership, andturbulent macroeconomic performance. Inall these regards,
Russia is quite normal (p. 22). Insum, Russia startedthe 1990s as a disinte-
grating, centrally plannedeconomy andendedthe decade as a market system
in a burst of rapid growth (p. 30). Boldly, Shleifer and Treisman defended
the economic performance of the oligarchs in the loans-for-shares compa-
nies. Have the oligarchs stripped assets from the companies they acquired
in privatization, rather than investing in them? The audited nancial state-
ments of these companies suggest that their assets have grown dramatically,
especially since 1998. . . . And the major oligarchs have been investing hun-
dreds of millions of dollars annually in their companies. . . . In contrast, the
greatest asset-strippingscandals occurredincompanies that remainedunder
state control (p. 29).
As growthandmacroeconomic stability of the CIS countries have become
stellar, the interest of international debate has faded away.
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3
Output: Slump and Recovery
A fundamental but poorly understood issue of postcommunist economic
transformation is what actually happened to output. There is no agreement
on the fundamental facts, and the statistical uncertainties are too great for
any consensus to emerge any time soon. Throughout the region, transi-
tion started with huge recorded falls in output. Some argued that a unique
devastation was taking place; others saw a combination of measurement
problems and creative destruction in Joseph Schumpeters (1943/1976)
sense.
The universal output slump after communism has been greatly exagger-
ated. Asubstantial part of the big recorded decline, probably about half, was
not real but can be explained with mismeasurement, an expansion of the
unregistered economy, and the elimination of value detraction. In addition,
many countries lost substantial subsidies as well as implicit trade subsidies.
Output did fall in almost all countries, but not nearly as much as ofcially
recorded. The main real problem was the long delay in economic recovery
in many countries, not the initial slump.
The initial development of output was closely correlated with reform
policies. Radical reformers soon returned to growth, whereas partial and
nonreformers experienced a long period of contraction. The duration of
the output decline varied greatly. A strong early supply effect occurred in
the radical reform countries, especially Poland, which returned to growth
in its third year of transition; Ukraine, by comparison, was a very gradual
reformer, and experienced ten years of economic decline. The output fall
lasted much longer and was steeper in the former Soviet Union. The covari-
ation between many possible causes makes it impossible to distinguish the
decisive reason, but hyperination and the general collapse of the state are
strong candidates.
57
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The great difculty of the laggard states to return to economic growth
shows that neither establishment of market economy nor economic recovery
were automatic and that the initial slump was no cyclical recession. Before
recovery could start, ination had to be brought under control, and mone-
tary and scal stimulation was not only ineffective but counterproductive.
Structural reforms, primarily liberalization, especially of foreign trade and
prices, and privatization, drove economic recovery.
In the transition lasting until 1998, the region could roughly be divided
into three groups: successful reformers in a virtuous cycle in Central Europe
and the Baltics, which swiftly returned to economic growth; unsuccess-
ful partial reformers in a vicious cycle, including Romania, Bulgaria, and
most of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) countries,
which suffered protracted decline; and the three nonreformers, Belarus,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, whose economies contracted less.
The picture changed in 1998, when the laggards in the former Soviet
Union turned into leaders in economic growth. The catalyst of this new
development was the Russian nancial crash of August 1998. It compelled
most post-Soviet states to clean up their acts and become real market
economies. In particular, they were forced to cut their public expendi-
tures dramatically, which gave them sufcient economic freedom to allow
substantial economic growth. In parallel, the global energy boom boosted
demand and prices for the regions ample resources of oil and gas, also
driving economic growth. The conclusion is that high public expenditures
and taxes are bad for economic growth, at least in corrupt postcommu-
nist countries saddled with excessively large governments of poor quality.
Unsurprisingly, greater economic freedom promotes economic growth.
The overall picture, as reected in the ofcial statistics, is shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. From 1989, the whole region saw substantial declines in output,
which were greater in the former Soviet Union than in Central Europe.
Central Europe returned to growth in 1993, the Baltics in 1995, and nally
the CIS in1997. The surprise is that the CIS countries have hadroughly twice
as high a growth rate as Central Europe from1999, although the Baltics have
almost reached the CIS level.
The rst section scrutinizes the ofcial data on output, the total decline,
the length of decline, and the potency of the new growth, taking note of the
new patterns of growth. The second section queries whether the huge but
variedinitial declines inrecordedoutput were real. Sectionthree investigates
the causes of renewed economic growth, drawing on an extensive literature
of cross-country regressions. Finally, I examine the boom and the changed
growth pattern since 1999.
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Output: Slump and Recovery 59
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
%

C
h
a
n
g
e
Central and Southeast Europe Baltics CIS
Figure 3.1. Ofcial GDP Growth, 19902006. Sources: World Bank (2006) and IMF
(2007).
Sharp Decline in Recorded Output and Varied Recovery
When the transition to a market economy began, the Soviet economy was
already in free fall, and recorded output plummeted in all former Soviet
countries. In 1990, only Poland and Hungary launched their transitions.
Their relative economic performance set the stage of the early debate. Reg-
istered output in both countries fell shockingly, by 11.6 percent in Poland
and 3.5 percent in Hungary. Although Poland swiftly caught up, the forma-
tive idea of the debate was that Polands radical reform prompted greater
decline in output than Hungarys gradual reform. The farther market tran-
sition proceeded, the worse output fared. When other countries in Central
and Southeast Europe launched transition in 1991, their registered output
plunged by 1215 percent. In 1992, the former Soviet republics entered
transition, with monumental recorded output falls.
The total recorded decrease in output was staggering. Overall, the for-
mer Soviet countries, including the Baltics, recorded much greater output
declines than the Central Europeans. In Central Europe, the total registered
output fall stopped at 18 percent and in South-East Europe at 28 percent.
1
In the former Soviet Union, the collapse was truly stunning. Despite the
1
All averages in this book are unweighted, giving each country equal weight.
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60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Central Europe Southeast Europe Baltics CIS
P
e
r
c
e
n
t

o
f

G
D
P
Figure 3.2. Total Ofcial Fall in GDP from1989 to Nadir. Note: Nadir years range 1991
93 for Central Europe; 199297 for Southeast Europe; 199495 for the Baltics; and
199398 for the CIS. Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2004,
p. 80).
Baltic countries having launched early and vigorous reforms, their output
fell by an average of a staggering 42 percent, compared with 52 percent for
the CIS countries, which undertook much less reform (see Figure 3.2). Sta-
tistical revision has been considerable. In earlier statistics, the slump was far
greater.
Within the former Soviet Union, four of the ve war-torn countries
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Moldova suffered the worst total of-
cial slumps, ranging from 67 to 77 percent, and Armenia experienced a fall
of 56 percent. The two least reformed countries, Uzbekistan and Belarus,
saw the smallest drops of barely 20 percent and 36 percent, respectively.
The economy of the most radical reformer, Estonia, shrank by only 36
percent, but other reformers, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Kyrgyzstan,
went through bigger contractions. Terms of trade changes were obviously
of great importance; the three big energy exporters Kazakhstan, Turk-
menistan, and Russia faced comparatively small declines of 3944 percent
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE] 2004, p. 80).
It was costly to get rid of socialism, but the cost varied, and it was much
greater in the former Soviet Union than in Central Europe.
As substantial declines continued, attention turned to their duration.
Poland took an early lead by returning to growth in 1992. Slowly, growth
proceeded to the south and the east. The Czech Republic and Romania
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followed in 1993. By 1994, the whole of Central and Southeast Europe
registered growth, and two of the most vigorous reformers in the former
Soviet Union had also arrived Armenia and Latvia. In 1995, they were
followed by three other reformers, Estonia, Georgia, and Lithuania. Five
countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Armenia)
achieved growth rates of 67 percent that year. By 1997, Georgia, Estonia,
andKyrgyzstanevenreached10 percent growth. Central Europe, the Baltics,
the Caucasus, and Kyrgyzstan appeared to have attained sustainable eco-
nomic growth. The unreformed countries, Belarus and Uzbekistan, also
achieved growth but through recentralization of state control rather than
reform.
Still, several CIS countries experienced prolonged decline followed by
stagnation, in particular, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. Their
market economic reforms did not sufce for growth. Just as they seemed to
have hit the bottom and began recovering, a severe international nancial
crisis hit the whole region in 1998, most of all Russia. Russias nancial crash
in August 1998 reduced growth rates throughout the region as other CIS
countries saw both their export markets and borrowing options drying up.
Paradoxically, the Russian nancial crisis provided the CIS countries with
the necessary catharsis, and the whole postcommunist growth pattern was
turnedupside down. Whatever was true until 1998became its opposite after-
ward. From 1999 to 2005, the CIS countries had excellent average annual
growthof 8.2percent, whereas the four Central Europeancountries recorded
mediocre average annual growth of 3.9 percent. The three Baltic countries
came closer to the rst group with 7.5 percent growth, and Romania and
Bulgaria closer to the Central Europeans with 5.0 percent (see Figure 3.3).
Sharp devaluations beneted all the CIS countries and rising world market
prices of oil helped the four energy exporters Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbai-
jan, and Turkmenistan. Most of the difference in growth, however, can be
explained by the varying courses of structural reforms in the CIS countries
and Central Europe (slund and Jenish 2006).
An alternative, less extreme picture is offered by GDP per capita in pur-
chasing power parities, which the World Bank heroically calculates. Fig-
ure 3.4 shows these statistics for 1990 (presumably overestimated), 1998,
and 2004. By 1998, only Poland had a signicantly higher GDP per capita in
purchasing power parities (PPP) in 1998 than in 1990 (24 percent higher).
From 1998 until 2004, by contrast, all countries in the region went through
substantial growth. The disparity in performance varies greatly. Poland is
an outstanding success with a growth of 54 percent from 1990 to 2004, and
Moldova recorded the greatest decline at 57 percent (World Bank 2006).
P1: KNP
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
%

C
h
a
n
g
e
Figure 3.3. Ofcial GDP Growth, 19992006. Sources: World Bank (2006) and IMF
(2007).
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
Central Europe Baltics Southeast Europe CIS
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t

2
0
0
0

I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

U
S
$
1990 1998 2005
Figure 3.4. GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parities, 1990, 1998, and 2005.
Sources: World Bank (2006) and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(2003, 2004).
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Exaggeration of the Slump
Much of the literature about the postcommunist slump discusses it as a
colossal tragedy, exceeding the Great Depression of 192933. However, the
words depression andrecession evoke the images of a business cycle gone
awry, whereas this was a profound systemic change, representing a desired
return to a normal market economy. Many perceived costs of transition
were purely statistical because most real costs had already been imposed
on society by communism. Both communist and postcommunist statistics
are deeply awed, but in different ways. Although all analysts recognize
these biases and some authors detail them, all proceed to work with ofcial
statistics because no full alternative set exists, leaving the question about the
fate of real output unanswered. Especially the Soviet economy had been in
far worse shape than understood.
The rst statistical confusion concerns the starting point of the tran-
sitional slump. Economic chaos prevailed at the end of communism, and
Romania andthe Soviet Unionregisteredsharpoutput falls inthe last year of
communism. East-Central Europeantransitionis sensibly measured against
the last communist year, but the standard for the former Soviet republics is
1989, although communism ended in late 1991. That correction eliminates
an average of 12 percent of 1989 GDP of the decline for the former Soviet
republics (UNECE 2006).
Second, notorious socialist overreporting was replaced by capitalist
underreporting. Under central planning, all bonuses depended on gross
production, which motivated everybody to exaggerate their production and
led to persistent overreporting of probably some 5 percent of GDP (slund
1990). This incentive disappeared immediately with transition. Under cap-
italism, on the contrary, people and enterprises often underreport their
production to avoid or evade taxes.
Third, with capitalism, the unofcial economy expanded. It was not nec-
essarily illegal, but just not reported to the state statistical ofce. Statistical
agencies were not designed to measure the performance of small and private
enterprises and failed to keep up with myriad new enterprises. An under-
ground economy existed also in the Soviet Union, but it was tiny, as evident
from the pernicious shortages and interviews with Soviet emigr es (Ofer
and Vinokur 1992). The only comparable GDP numbers available for many
transition countries are rough estimates based on electricity consumption,
assumed to develop broadly in line with GDP (see Figure 3.5; Kaufmann
and Kaliberda 1996; Johnson et al. 1997a). The initial underground econ-
omy was comparatively large in the liberal socialist economies Hungary
P1: KNP
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
U
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l

G
D
P

a
s

%

o
f

T
o
t
a
l

G
D
P
Central Europe
CIS reformers (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia)
CIS non-reformers (Belarus and Uzbekistan)
Figure 3.5. Underground Economy, 198995. Source: Johnson et al. (1997a, p. 183).
and Poland and small in the strict socialist economies. With transition, the
underground economy expanded everywhere, but soon it started to shrink
in successful reform countries. In East-Central Europe, the unofcial share
of GDP rose from 17 percent in 1989 to 21 percent in 1992 but declined
to 19 percent in 1995. The development was similar in the most repressive
state-controlled economies, whereas the underground economy continued
to grow in partially reformed economies. The average unregistered share
of real GDP in former Soviet countries rose from 12 percent in 1989 to
36 percent in 1994. In the extreme cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia, it
exceeded 60 percent of total GDP. The unregistered economy peaked
approximately when the ofcial GDP hit its nadir. Repeated revisions of
ofcial GDP gradually include more of the unregistered economy, boosting
output numbers, but statisticians err on the conservative side, and their
revisions remain timid.
Fourth, thanks to pervasive shortages and soft budget constraints under
socialism, state enterprise managers enjoyed extreme monopoly and could
ignore consumer demandandquality. They producedwhat was easy because
anything could be sold in the Soviet Union. As transition ended excess
demand, enterprises built up a normal inventory of nished goods, which
amounted to a one-for-all reduction of demand (Kornai 1994). People
P1: KNP
started using up all the consumer goods they had hoarded at home for
their security, which reduced their aggregate demand for some time.
Fifth, much of Soviet manufacturing was sheer value detraction or value
destruction. For instance, Soviet shermen caught excellent fresh sh.
Rather than selling it on the market, they processed it into often inedi-
ble sh conserves, reducing the shs value to almost zero. Incorrectly, this
value detraction was recorded as value added in Soviet national accounts
and included in GDP. Value detraction increased throughout the process-
ing chain. Soviet raw materials were excellent. Intermediary goods (such as
metals and chemicals) were shoddy, whereas consumer goods and processed
foods were substandard. Many unsalable goods disappeared in storage or
were quietly scrapped without any statistical recording. Proper national
accounts should exclude most of the production of consumer goods and
processedfoods. Whentransitionset in, thedeclineinmanufacturingoutput
was staggering everywhere. Roughly half of consumer output just vanished
from the market when exposed to the least import competition, although
imports were exorbitantly expensive because of lowexchange rates. InRussia
from 1991 to 1996, output fell by no less than 84 percent in light industry,
44 percent in food processing, and 57 percent in civilian machine building
(Goskomstat 1997, p. 336). As few manufactured goods were worth buying
even at extremely lowprices, this contraction reected a desirable reduction
of value destruction, although it was recorded as a decrease in GDP.
Unfortunately, we cannot calculate the eliminated value detraction di-
rectly because manufacturings share of GDP is not available. The most rele-
vant available measurement of reduced value detractionis probably reduced
overindustrialization, measuredas the decline inthe industrial sectors share
of GDP. Usually, this decline in industrial share or reduced value detrac-
tion in industry was in the range of 920 percent of GDP until 1995
(World Bank 2006). But value was also detracted outside of industry, and
state subsidies and regulation maintained it for years. The share of unsalable
goods probably amounted to around 20 percent of GDP in the last year of
communism.
A sixth statistical conundrum was implicit foreign trade subsidies and
interrepublic budgetary subsidies. Socialist states mostly exchanged goods
nobody wanted, forcing substandard and overpriced merchandise on one
another. The wrong things were traded for the wrong reasons between the
wrong people in the wrong places at the wrong prices. The share of unsal-
able goods in mutual trade was probably even greater than in the domestic
economies. Much of the intraregional trade consisted of exports of manu-
factured goods from the more developed countries to the energy exporters.
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Hungarian losses of exports to formerly socialist countries consisted pre-
dominantly of machinery and buses, which hardly anybody wanted in
the West (G acs 1995). Raw materials, on the contrary, were valuable, but
their low prices meant that the energy exporters, Russia, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, paid huge implicit export subsidies to other
socialist countries. A lot of these raw materials were wasted and were not
demanded at market prices under capitalism. The decline in mutual trade
between the postcommunist countries resulted from the dissolution of the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991, the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1992, and the overall systemic change. It combined
the benecial shake-out of unsalable goods with the elimination of implicit
trade subsidies, but it also contained an element of disorganization (Berg
et al. 1999; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD]
1999; Popov 2000).
Economists calculated the costs or changes in terms of trade for South-
east and Central Europe from the dissolution of the CMEA from a high of
7.8 percent of GDPfor Hungary (Rodrik 1992) to 1.5 percent for Czechoslo-
vakia, and negligent for Romania in 1991 (Rosati 1995, p. 152; cf. G acs 1995,
p. 179). The trade effect was greater on countries that traded more with the
Soviet Union and the CMEA (notably Bulgaria), countries that were more
open (most of all Hungary), and countries that imported a lot of energy
(Bulgaria and Hungary).
Withinthe Soviet Union, foreigntrade distortions were far greater thanin
Central Europe because extreme protectionismforcedmost Soviet republics
topursue 90 percent of their trade withone another. LucjanOrlowski (1993)
and David Tarr (1994) calculated implicit trade subsidies for the former
Soviet republics, comparing the prior prices with prevailing world market
prices. In 1990, three countries exporting oil and natural gas provided sub-
stantial subsidies as a share of their GDP: Russia (17.7 percent of GDP),
Turkmenistan (19.5 percent), and Kazakhstan (7.4 percent), which bene-
ted greatly from the abolition of implicit trade subsidies. Consequently,
they experienced limited output contraction. Five states enjoyed substantial
implicit trade subsidies: Moldova (16.1 percent of GDP), Estonia (12.7 per-
cent), Latvia (11.3 percent), Lithuania (9.7 percent), and Armenia (7.6 per-
cent). Not surprisingly, these countries, suffered fromlarge falls in recorded
output, although most undertook signicant reforms. For the remaining
former Soviet republics, the total effect was less than 5 percent of their
GDP. Because of the very gradual transition in the CIS, implicit transfers
remained signicant in 19924, complicating any comparisons (Olcott et al.
1999).
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Substantial direct budget transfers were limited to Central Asia in Soviet
times. In 1989, Kyrgyzstan received 7.8 percent of its GDP in union budget
transfers; Tajikistan, 8.2 percent; Turkmenistan, 9.0 percent; Kazakhstan,
9.3 percent; and Uzbekistan, 11.3 percent (Orlowski 1995, p. 66). Natu-
rally, Russia had no reason to maintain such transfers when these countries
became independent. Their elimination hurt economic welfare in Central
Asia, especially the provision of public services, while the previous donors,
primarily Russia, beneted.
A seventh statistical issue is Soviet military expenditures. An old saying
runs that the United States had a military-industrial complex, whereas the
Soviet Union was one. Soviet defense expenditure was a matter of persistent
dispute among Western Sovietologists. Gradually, the U.S. Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) raised its assessment of Soviet defense spending to
1517 percent of GDP in 1986 (Berkowitz et al. 1993), but that was based
on the CIAs exaggerated estimate of Soviet GDP. As late as 1990, the CIA
considered Soviet GDP per capita 43 percent of the U.S. level in PPP. The
European Comparison Program, which cooperated with Soviet statistical
authorities, undertook a careful empirical analysis, setting Soviet GDP per
capita at 32 percent of that of the United States in 1990 (and Soviet house-
hold consumption per capita at only 24 percent of the U.S. level; Bergson
1997).
2
If we use the CIA assessment of Soviet defense expenditures and
the European Comparison Program assessment of Soviet GDP, the defense
burden would amount to 22 percent of GDP. Even these GDP numbers are
likely to be too high because the poor quality of goods and services were
not fully accounted for, and shortages and the resulting forced substitution
were disregarded. The Soviet Union probably spent about one-quarter of its
GDP on military purposes in the late 1980s (slund 1990).
The Russian reform government slashed ofcial military spending to an
internationally normal level of about 3 percent of GDP, although Western
intelligence argues the real number was 5percent of GDP, because a substan-
tial part of military spending occurs outside of the budget of the Ministry
of Defense. Most other postcommunist countries decreased their defense
expenses to 12 percent of GDP. This reduction in military demand would
result in a 20 percent nominal decline in the 1989 GDP in the whole former
Soviet Union, and more for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, which harbored
most of the military-industrial complex. In East-Central Europe, military
expenditures were not much higher than in the West, but even there the
2
This tallies well with a World Bank study led by Paul Marer (1985) setting the Soviet GNP
per capita at 37 percent of the U.S. level for 1980.
P1: KNP
trimming of the military sector probably accounted for a couple percent
of the fall in recorded GDP. The military production was real, although
its utility may be disputed. When demand for it disappeared, no sensible
alternative use could be found for most of the military resources.
Aneighthstatistical issue is socialist investment. Socialismwas a systemof
waste. ASoviet factory needed about three times more input than a Western
factory to produce the same output, because managers were insensitive
to costs. Some of these losses represented inefciency, others theft. With
the introduction of hard budget constraints, managers started bothering
about costs, reducing domestic demand for inputs, such as steel, metals,
and chemicals. Communist regimes prided themselves on huge investment
ratios, but the socialist landscape was scarred by unnished construction
projects (Winiecki 1988, 1991b). The high ratios of xed investment were
indications of theft and waste rather than real investment. Because ample
capital goods were underutilized, a contraction of investment for a fewyears
was desirable. Conversely, socialist enterprises hoarded large inventories of
inputs, such as raw materials, which were labeled investment in national
accounts. These inventories continuously accumulated without any cyclical
tendency, indicating sheer waste. Poland had the best statistics, showing that
investment in inventories amounted to 7 percent of GDP or one-quarter
of total investment in the mid-1980s (World Bank 2000a).
Already in the early transition, reformers imposed demand barriers in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and Latvia. The national demand curve
shifted permanently, initially reducing recorded output. Substantial dis-
hoarding of inputs and capital goods started, as desired, and stocks of n-
ished goods rose, reecting the problems of selling that are characteris-
tic of capitalism. Andrew Berg (1994) calculated that the total reduction
in inventory because of dishoarding accounted for two-thirds of the total
decline in Polands GDP in 1990. Scrutinizing statistics on consumption,
investment, and exports, Berg and Sachs (1992) found that the decline in
Polish GDP from 1989 to 1990 was not 12 percent as stated in the produc-
tion statistics but 4.9 percent. Heavy manufacturing and mining contracted
the least, suggesting that their budget constraints remained relatively soft.
Investment that was sheer waste should preferably be deducted from GDP,
so the average decline in the investment ratio of 11 percent of GDP makes
sense. Most countries undertook large-scale wasteful public investment long
after they had returned to growth, and new productive investment started
early on.
Summingupall these factors, it is obvious that the ofcial numbers greatly
exaggerate the overall decline in output. Every bias led to the exaggeration of
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the decline of output. East Germany offers anenlightening illustrationof the
degree of statistical distortion. The German Institute of Economic Research
(Deutsches Institut f ur Wirtschaftsforschung 1977) in West Berlin assessed
East German GDP per capita at about 60 percent of the West German
level, and East Germany had a higher investment ratio than West Germany.
After the Berlin Wall fell, East German productivity turned out to be barely
30 percent of the West German level, only half of the previously estimated
level. It also became obvious that the East German xed capital per capita
was only 30 percent of the West German level (Siebert 1992, p. 39).
Alas, too many factors are uncertain to allowany agreement on a reassess-
ment of the actual slump as yet. In a detailed reassessment (slund 2002,
chapter 4), I argued that roughly half the recorded decline in output appears
to have been ctitious, although varying by country, suggesting that Poland
did not really see any decline in output (Berg 1994), whereas Moldova faced
a drastic drop of perhaps 35 percent in total. A careful overall assessment
by Oleh Havrylyshyn (2006) acknowledged all the factors mentioned earlier
and consequently argued that ofcial data highly exaggerates the output
decline, but rather than provide specic numbers, he offered a wide range
of alternative numbers depending on counterfactual assumptions.
Statistics are an important input in economic policy making, and the
distorted ofcial statistics were a major cause of bad policies. They did not
reveal the strong, early supply effects caused by radical reforms. Conse-
quently, the successful Polish model was not widely adopted, and many
started calling for scal and monetary stimulation instead. Even if postcom-
munist people were healthily skeptical of ofcial statistics, they believed in
bad news, which led themastray. The distorted ofcial statistics encouraged
a march of folly toward bad policies. Given the poverty of statistics, policy
makers were better off acting on principles than trying to ne-tune their
policies.
Radical Reform: Least Decline and Early Recovery
Initially, all countries suffered from large drops in output, but different
trajectories of economic growthdeveloped. Until 1998, the radical reformers
in Central Europe and the Baltics performed the best. From 1999, on the
contrary, the CIS countries have greatly outperformedthe Central European
countries while the Baltic countries have continued their stellar growth.
Romania and Bulgaria have occupied the middle ground but stayed closer
to Central Europe (see Figure 3.3). The dramatic turning point was the
Russian nancial crash in August 1998.
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Table 3.1. Patterns of GDP Growth, 19957 (Average GDP change
in percent per year)
Central
Europe Baltics
Southeast
Europe CIS
Consistent growth,
U-curve
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
4.5
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
5.1
Armenia
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
5.8
Growth reversals,
W-curve or
stagnation
Bulgaria
Romania
1.3
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
0.6
Little growth,
L-curve
Russia
Ukraine
Moldova
Kazakhstan
3.5
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
8.8
Sources: This table is adapted fromHavrylyshyn and Wolf (2001). Growth rates are calculated from
World Bank (2006).
Before 1998, postcommunist countries could roughly be divided into
three categories radical reformers, intermediate reformers, and nonre-
formers. A rst group of highly reformist countries can be described by a
healthy U-curve, with an initial decline followed by a steady recovery. They
include Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hun-
gary), the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Armenia, Georgia, and
Kyrgyzstan (see Table 3.1). Six countries in a second group are marked by
a sad L-curve of a sharp decline followed by stagnation. Four were slow
CIS reformers: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kazakhstan; two, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan, undertook minimal reform. Tajikistan was devastated
by civil war, and Turkmenistan was the victim of Russias temporary refusal
to let it sell natural gas through Russian pipelines. A third group, Bulgaria
and Romania, ended up with a W-curve, a double-dip with a rst decline
followed by an unsustainable recovery and a new decline, or stagnation.
They were intermediate reformers, whose market reforms remained fragile.
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Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan experienced stagnation. None of them
was a reformer, and they maintained the old socialist economy.
A large number of cross-country regression analyses were undertaken
from1996through2000.
3
They investigatedthe impact oneconomic growth
of a great variety of variables, and this literature displays a great deal of
agreement.
4
Control of ination: A necessary precondition for growth. All transition
countries except Hungary and Czechoslovakia were hit by scal calamities,
withinationsurgingtomore than100percent a year. Financial stabilization
became the natural focus of economists attention, with macroeconomists
and the International Monetary Fund coming to the fore. All the multi-
country regressions have found a strong positive correlation between high
ination and falling output. Fischer et al. (1996b, p. 89) concluded: The
simple but essential message that emerges . . . is that real GDP rebounds
following ination stabilization, which in turn appears highly correlated
with the improvement in the public nances. The fall in output outlasted
high ination in every single country, and no country returned to economic
growth until ination had fallen below 45 percent a year. The longer high
ination lasted, the greater the total contraction in output (De Melo et
al. 1997a). Christoffersen and Doyle (2000, p. 439) observed: There is no
evidence that disination necessarily incurs signicant output costs, even
at moderate ination rates. Early on, Stanley Fischer (1993) established
through cross-country regressions that growth was negatively associated
withination, large budget decits, anddistortedforeignexchange markets.
Bruno and Easterly (1998) suggested that the crucial ination threshold was
as high as 40 percent a year, whereas Christoffersen and Doyle (2000) put it
at 13 percent a year.
Macroeconomic stabilization was a necessary, but not sufcient, condi-
tion for economic growth (Havrylyshyn and Wolf 2001). In several former
3
The main contributions are as follows: De Melo et al. (1997a) was the pioneering work that
provided most of the fundamental answers, and De Melo et al. (1997b) studied the role of
initial conditions. Fischer et al. (1996a, 1996b, and 1997), Lougani and Sheets (1997), and
Christoffersenand Doyle (2000) focused onthe role of macroeconomics. Berg et al. (1999),
Havrylyshyn and Wolf (2001), and Campos and Coricelli (2002) provided the current view
of the state of affairs. Other relevant papers are slund et al. (1996), De Melo and Gelb
(1996, 1997), Sachs (1996), Selowsky and Martin (1996), Hernandez-Cata (1997), Krueger
and Ciolko (1998), Heybey and Murrell (1999), and Fischer and Sahay (2000). Of all these
papers, Berg et al. (1999) is by far the most ambitious, which I see as the most authorita-
tive.
4
The output data used are by necessity the ofcial data, which means that later studies are
based on better data, and countries with large unofcial economies are underrated.
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Soviet economies (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus),
growth did not rebound after stabilization, and over time the direct link
between macroeconomic performance and output became more tenuous.
Berg et al. (1999, p. 9) concluded: The impact of macroeconomic variables,
while signicant, is much smaller than that of either initial conditions and
structural reforms. They found that the scal balance was more important
for growth than the control of ination. Several countries brought down
ination through very strict monetary policy, with lasting real interest rates
of 50100 percent a year, because their budget decits remained too large.
This was a stinging empirical rebuke to the Russian economists, who
had argued that it was structurally impossible to lower ination to less than
100 percent a year without hampering growthbecause of the preponderance
of monopolies and state ownership in the Russian economy (Yavlinsky and
Braguinsky1994; Lvov1996). Theevidencealsocontradictedtheadvocacyof
softer macroeconomic stabilization. Guillermo Calvo and Fabrizio Coricelli
(1992, 1993) argued that Polish output had suffered froman excessive credit
crunch. Andrew Berg (1994, p. 21) retorted that surveyed enterprise man-
agers complained of a lack of demand for their output, not inability to
purchase inputs, and concluded that there is no evidence that tight credit
causeda supply constrainedoutput decline. The conclusionis that the post-
communist economies badly needed harder budget constraints or demand
barriers, which were very difcult to impose but necessary to unleash supply
(Fischer and Sahay 2000).
Liberalization: most important for growth. The rst cross-country regres-
sions on transition economies established that economic growth is posi-
tively correlated with reform progress (Sachs 1996, p. 128), and the evi-
dence has grown ever stronger. The most fundamental structural reform
was the deregulation of prices and trade. Liberalization is usually divided
into internal and external liberalization. Internal liberalization comprises
the freeing of domestic prices and the abolition of state trading monopo-
lies, and external liberalization consists of the unication of the exchange
rate, the introduction of currency convertibility, the elimination of export
controls and export taxes, and the substitution of moderate import tariffs
for import quotas and high import duties (De Melo et al. 1997a). As with
macroeconomic stabilization, Central Europe andthe Baltics startedoff with
radical liberalization. Bulgaria and Romania did only a little better than the
CIS countries, which were generally slow liberalizers.
Initially, liberalization was often seen as a subfactor of nancial sta-
bilization, perceived to impose initial costs (Selowsky and Martin 1996;
Hernandez-Cata 1997). Over time, however, liberalization has emerged as
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the most effective growth-stimulating factor in the transition countries.
Berg et al. (1999) found that liberalization helped all countries in the later
transition and most of them even in the early transition. From the fourth
year after the transition, structural reforms were the main determinant of
growth, driving economic recovery. External liberalization had a particu-
larly great positive effect on output. Havrylyshyn and Wolf (2001) reckoned
that most measures of structural reformwere closely correlatedwithgrowth,
but the only measure they could single out as uniquely effective on its own
was price liberalization.
It is easy to understand why liberalization has had such great positive
impact on output. The initial output slump was largely attributable to sub-
stantial shifts in relative prices and demand, which rendered many old prod-
ucts unsalable. Competition brought about the necessary, dramatic changes
in the composition of output, which drove the recovery in output (De Melo
et al. 1997a). For over-industrialized, distorted, and inefcient economies,
recovery only comes after some elimination of the wasteful old production
(Havrylyshyn and Wolf 2001, p. 102). Jeffrey Sachs (1996, p. 129) summed
up the evidence: Experience suggests that a quick move on liberalization
following the fall of communismwas important inachieving comprehensive
liberalization, since delays in liberalization gave time for vested interests to
form around remaining barriers to trade.
Privatization. Privatization has been heralded both as the key solu-
tion (Yavlinsky and Braguinsky 1994) and as of little consequence (Stiglitz
1999a). Regression analyses on the impact of privatization on economic
growth show a strong positive correlation between the share of GDP arising
from the private sector and output (slund et al. 1996; Havrylyshyn and
Wolf 2001). However, a lag is evident, because it takes some time for priva-
tized enterprises to shape up. Berg et al. (1999) found that privatization and
private sector conditions had signicant effects on growth in the ensuing
period.
Until 1999, privatization appeared less effective in the former Soviet
Union than in Central Europe. A number of studies argued that privati-
zation to insiders had little or no benecial effect, whereas privatization to
outsiders had a pronounced positive effect (Frydman et al. 1998). Newly
started enterprises were doing much better than former state enterprises
that hadbeenprivatized(JohnsonandLoveman1995). Many enterprise sur-
veys in the former Soviet Union showed little difference between large and
medium-sizedenterprises that were still state-ownedor hadbeenprivatized.
The EBRD (1999) even argued that privatization might be counterproduc-
tive if it allowed vested interests to reinforce their hold on the state. Yet with
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the growth spurt after 1999 in the CIS region, its predominant mass privati-
zation generated higher growth than other forms of privatization (Bennett
et al. 2005). Not surprisingly, thepositiveeffects of privatizationhavebecome
more tangible over time.
The evidence is overwhelming that early, radical, and comprehensive
reforms constituted the best option. Almost all the arguments for gradual
reforms reported in Chapter 2 have been empirically disproved. Fast and
comprehensive stabilization and liberalization proved better for economic
growth than slow or partial reforms. More privatization was better than
less. Radical reform led to less overall decline in output and accordingly to
greater economic welfare than partial reform. The countries that undertook
the most radical and comprehensive structural reforms also implemented
the most far-reaching institutional reforms (Havrylyshyn 2006). They were
also the most democratic (see Chapter 8).
A dichotomy is apparent. Either a country entered a virtuous circle or a
vicious circle (De Melo and Gelb 1997). A slow start of reform led to little
subsequent reform, whereas a radical start usually brought about ever deeper
andmore comprehensive reforms andbetter economic results. The question
remains why some countries chose a suboptimal pathof delayedandgradual
reforms. Initial conditions strongly inuenced the choice of policy. Coun-
tries withadverse initial conditions were inclinedtopursue disadvantageous
economic policies. If highly distorted prices and exchange rates persisted,
people with privileged access to power made fortunes on rent seeking, arbi-
traging between regulated and unregulated markets, and extracting money
from the state. If the rules of the games were not swiftly changed, the well-
placedestablishment wouldreassert its grasponpower. Suchpassive policies
concentrated economic wealth and power in the hands of privileged groups,
which later could purchase state power to their continued advantage (EBRD
1999). These vested interests often began by accumulating wealth through
the economic rents resulting from large price distortions in energy and raw
materials, and by borrowing fromcentral bank credits during years of ina-
tion. . . . The potential virtuous circle of reform and growth is replaced by a
vicious circle of suspended reforms and stagnation (Havrylyshyn and Wolf
2001, p. 112). Growth did not occur because it did not enhance the revenues
of the privileged few.
Radical reformpolicies representedabroadpublicinterest, whichexplains
why they were positively correlated with democracy. The virtuous path of
reinforcing market economic reforms led to substantial economic growth.
The main drama of the early transition was whether a small group of vested
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interests focused on rent seeking were to dominate society or whether a
broader constituency truly interested in the public interest, and thus eco-
nomic growth, would assume political power.
Late Reformers: Surged after 1998
Inthe longer term, standardneoclassical growththeory suggests that growth
is largely determined by the initial level of income, the investment rate,
investment in human capital, and the rate of population growth (Levine
and Renelt 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
Yet postcommunist idiosyncrasies persist. As these countries suffered
from overindustrialization and overinvestment, they needed to rationalize
and reallocate their physical capital rather than expand it. Total investment
includes inventory, whichshouldshrinkbecause of growing efciency under
capitalism. The communist countries had invested more in education than
they could benet from, leaving vast underutilized human capital. The stan-
dard measurement of human capital is secondary school enrollment, or,
alternatively, the teaching of mathematics. By both measures, the postcom-
munist region is richly endowed, which could generate growth in the future.
The rate of population growth, however, is low or even negative because of
lowbirth rates and emigration, which hampers growth. The key bottlenecks
requiring investment appear to be infrastructure and housing.
Another determinant of long-term economic growth is economic policy
and institutions, which are often difcult to distinguish from one another.
All conceivable variables have been analyzed in multicountry regression
analyses (notably Sala-i-Martin 1997). Market distortions, measured as real
exchange rate distortions or black market premia, stand out as critical.
Another central economic policy is the openness of an economy. Jeffrey
Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) showed that countries that had been
open to foreign trade for a number of years do achieve economic growth.
The degree of capitalism in the economic organization has also proven of
signicance (Hall and Jones 1999).
There is also the laggard effect. Ceteris paribus, countries with a lower
level of development tend to grow faster than more advanced countries.
Hence, the CIS countries would be expected to grow faster than the Cen-
tral Europeans after they had caught up with regard to transition reforms.
However, this laggard effect would hardly explain a difference of more
than 12 percent annual growth between these two groups of countries
(slund and Warner 2004). Until 1998, however, the post-Soviet countries
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with lower levels of development grew more slowly than the Central Euro-
peans, because they pursued worse economic policies, constrained by the
dominance of rent-seeking interests on the politics of these states.
Strangely, whatever had been true until 1998 was false from that year
(slund and Jenish 2006). All of a sudden, the twelve CIS countries started
growing more than twice as fast as the four Central European countries
year after year (see Figure 3.3). The dividing event was the Russian nancial
crash of August 1998, which had repercussions for the whole CIS region.
Several CIS countries underwent similar crises, and they reacted in the same
fashion. They had accumulated large external debts during years of sizable
budget decits. When they nally approached the verge of external default,
the CIS governments had no choice but to slash their budget decits because
they could no longer borrow money from abroad or their population, and
tax revenues could not be boosted in haste. Several countries curtailed their
public expenditures by about one-tenth of their GDP in a year or two, often
when their GDP was falling sharply. These cuts amounted to one-quarter
or more of total public expenditures.
5
Such drastic reductions differ from ordinary budget trimming. As gov-
ernments fought desperately to avoid disaster, the budget politics changed
completely. Whatever was politically impossible suddenly became accepted
as economically vital. In crisis, most transition countries have drastically
cut enterprise subsidies, which often involved rent-seeking schemes, such
as barter. As a consequence, enterprises budget constraints were hardened,
and the playing eld became more level. Many former state managers, who
had seized their old enterprises but did not know how to run them under
capitalism, feared they would lose everything. They were persuaded to sell
their plants to skillful new entrepreneurs, which helped revive many seem-
ingly moribund factories.
The Russian nancial crash was the crucial event that rendered nine CIS
countries full-edged market economies. Their scal systems were put in
order, and budget decits and ination have been moderate ever since. A
critical mass of market economy and private enterprise has been achieved,
although the CIS countries continue to lag behind the EU accession coun-
tries. The nine CIS reformers derive an average of 64 percent of GDP from
their private sectors. Markets, albeit encumbered, drive their economies.
5
For instance, Bulgaria reduced its public expenditures as a share of GDP by 11 percent in
1997, Moldova by 10 percent from 1998 to 2000, Kyrgyzstan by 9 percent from 1995 to
1997, and Russia by 8 percent in 1999 (slund 2002, p. 226; EBRD 2005, p. 53).
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A regression analysis of the causes of growth (slund and Jenish 2006)
shows that cuts ingovernment spending explaintwo-thirds of this difference
in economic growth between the CIS countries and Central Europe since
1999. Conspicuously, the CIS countries slashed their public expenditures
to about one-fth less as a share of GDP than in Central Europe. Because
the many and high taxes evidently could not be collected, they made little
sense, and they have been replaced by low and at taxes. As tax rates fell, tax
administration was simplied, corruption diminished, and tax collection
improved. J anos Kornai (1992b, p. 15) noticed that the Hungarian welfare
state was born prematurely, which was also true of the rest of Central
Europe. It has turned out to be a social welfare trap with West European
tax rates, social transfers, and labor market regulations. Sachs and Warner
(1996b; Sachs 1995b) argued that not even the Central European countries
would catch up with the European Union if they did not adopt more aggres-
sive growth policies than those prevalent in the EU. Sachs and Warner were
prescient. They warned that the transition countries needed lower rates of
marginal taxation, lower levels of current government expenditures as a
share of GDP, relatively high levels of government investment expenditures,
andpensionpolicies basedonindividual savings accounts rather thanpublic
pay-as-you-go transfers.
The Russian nancial crash was followed by several other dramatic devel-
opments. Russia devalued the ruble by three-quarters in 1998, and most
other CIS countries subsequently devalued their currencies by about 50
percent, which beneted exporters. Soon afterward, a commodity boom
started, driven by Chinese imports, allowing the CIS countries to boost
their exports despite stagnant EU markets and EU protectionism. Energy
exports are the second signicant explanation of the differences in growth
in the transition countries (slund and Jenish 2006). Although only four
of twelve CIS economies were signicant energy exporters (Russia, Kaza-
khstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan), growth rates across the CIS were
strong. Commodity-poor Armeniaregisteredone of the highest growthrates
(12 percent a year during 20015). The export boom was followed by
increased investment, which further reinforced the economic growth. Oil-
richAzerbaijanandKazakhstanhavereceivedverylargeforeigndirect invest-
ment, motivated by potential oil production. Economic regulation and cor-
ruption have moderate impact, whereas the laggard effect and investment
play a negligible role.
Asubstantial literature oneconomic growthandthe size of the state exists,
but it contains no agreement. A basic work is Robert Barro (1989), who did
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cross-country regressions on about 100 countries after World War II. He
found that government consumption was inversely related to growth. La
Porta et al. (1999b) showed with empirical surveys from 200 countries that
bigger governments are usually better, but such a regression does not say
anything about causality. The Scandinavian countries had very small states
in the 1930s, but because they had minimal corruption, the public sectors
role was allowed to increase.
But the postcommunist states were noaverage states. First of all, the public
sector was much larger than in other countries at that level of development
regardless of measurement (taxation, public distribution, degree of regula-
tion, or the share of public property). Although severely overstretched, it
was subject to fewer checks and balances than in most other states. Second,
the postcommunist state was parasitical. It did the wrong things, hindering
economic development rather than promoting it while antisocially redis-
tributing fromthe poor to the rent-seeking elites (Hellman 1998; Milanovic
1998). Third, thepostcommunist statewas ineffectiveandinefcient because
of a highdegree of corruption(Transparency International 2006). Naturally,
it would be desirable to reduce corruption swiftly, but that is rarely possible.
Corruption is usually sticky, but it falls with rising income and openness
(Treisman 2000). Under those preconditions, a sharp reduction in pub-
lic expenditures is the best, and perhaps the only, way to boost economic
growth.
In effect, the CIS countries have adopted the highly successful East Asian
growth model lock, stock, and barrel, with low taxes and small social trans-
fers, but an authoritarian and rather corrupt political system. The less
dynamic Central European countries have adopted the EU model, which
has not been conducive to high economic growth, even if some countries,
mainly Ireland and the three Baltic countries have gone against the current.
Growthanddemocracy were nicelycorrelatedinthe 1990s, but the picture
was reversed after 1998. The CIS countries, which are by and large authori-
tarian, have grown faster than the democratic countries in Central Europe
(Freedom House 2006). The CIS countries also have de facto freer labor
markets than the Central European countries. The old idea of authoritarian
advantage has some relevance when the main risks to economic develop-
ment are popular pressures for high taxes on the rich, large social transfers,
and the regulation of labor markets in favor of insiders. The dominant risk
during the rst decade, by contrast, was rent seeking by elites, which was
best checked by democracy (cf. Acemoglu 2003).
A few additional possible explanations of the rising growth rate of the
CIS countries should be mentioned. One is recovery growth, drawing on
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the considerable unused capacity in many post-Soviet economies after an
ofcial decline in output of about half of GDP(Gaidar 2005). The McKinsey
Global Institute (1999) concluded a study on Russia with the assessment
that Russia could reach an economic growth rate of 8 percent a year with
the right economic policies without signicant increase in investment ratio
because the physical capital was in better shape than widely believed. The
key problem for this region was economic policies, not resources.
In the longer run, the predominance of the resource sector in the energy
exporting countries is likely to play a negative role (Gaddy and Ickes 2005).
Sachs and Warner (1996a) showed that the larger the share of a countrys
exports that consists of rawmaterials, the slower it will grow, as the presence
of raw materials tends to generate rents and poor economic policies.
Renewed growth has been export-led. Foreign trade has driven both sys-
temic change and economic recovery. Invariably, exports have started surg-
ing before output, often massively (World Bank 2005a). The restructuring
of foreign trade has been truly amazing in both speed and quality, especially
in the most fortuitous reform countries. All the former communist coun-
tries reoriented their trade from one another to the West, and until 1999,
postcommunist growth depended on access to Western markets. Christof-
fersen and Doyle (2000) found that output growth was strongly associated
with the expansion of export markets, and the most reformist countries saw
an impressive and steady increase of their exports (Havrylyshyn and Wolf
2001). For most CIS countries, Russia remains the main export market, as it
should according to the gravity model, which means that Russias economic
recovery was vital to growth in many transition economies (Christoffersen
and Doyle 2000). This leaves open the question whether reforms were more
successful in some countries because of their access to Western markets
or whether they accessed these markets because they had been successfully
reformed (slund and Warner 2004). Figure 3.6 shows how exports took
off even before output expansion in 1992 in Central Europe. The Baltics
followed in 1994, and the CIS countries only in 1996. From 2000, the whole
region has seen a very similar export expansion, with exports increasing
impressively by about 10 percent a year.
Withgrowingexports, the successful exporters have receivedmore foreign
earnings, allowing themtoincrease their imports. Most countries went from
current account crisis to trade surplus. As they obtained access to foreign
nance, they could import more than they exported, allowing the East-
Central Europeans to nance signicant current account decits.
Amajor macroeconomic distortion under socialismwas underconsump-
tion and overinvestment. As anticipated, consumption has increased from
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40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
P
e
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C
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Figure 3.6. Expansion of Exports, 19912005. Source: World Bank (2006).
40
30
20
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0
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30
40
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
A
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Figure 3.7. Gross Fixed Investment, 19912005. Sources: World Bank (2006) and United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2006).
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an average of 73 percent of GDP before the transition to 84 percent around
1997. As superuous inputs and underutilized real assets were sold off, the
overall investment ratio contracted from an average of 28 percent of GDP
in 1989 to 21 percent of GDP in 1997, which is still quite respectable. Yet
differentiation increased. Three groups of countries were spending a larger
share of their GDP on investment in 1997 than before the transition
namely, the most advanced reformers in Central Europe; the conserva-
tive states Belarus and Uzbekistan, which continued the Soviet practice of
wasteful public investments; and Azerbaijan, buoyed by oil-related foreign
investment. Most countries, however, saw sharp declines in their invest-
ment shares because of limited need, poverty, and poor investment climate.
Rather than being the engine of growth, investment surged after growth
reemerged and reinforced growth (De Melo et al. 1997a; Havrylyshyn and
Wolf 2001).
The decline ininvestment was generally far greater thanthe decline inout-
put, whereas the later investment expansion was all the greater in successful
economies. Figure 3.7 shows the development of investment. East-Central
Europe started increasing investment in xed assets in 1994; the CIS coun-
tries reached that hurdle only in 1996. The Baltic countries took an impres-
sive lead from1996 to 1998. Most countries sawsome decline in investment
in1999inthe aftermathof the Russiannancial crash, but from2000, invest-
ment has grownthe fastest inthe CIScountries andconsiderablymore slowly
in Central Europe. The superior growth in the CIS countries and the Baltics
is likely to continue.
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4
Liberalization: The Creation of a
Market Economy
The essence of a market economy is economic freedom the freedom of
trade, prices, and enterprise. Liberalization transformed a shortage of goods
and services to a scarcity of money, which is the predicament of capitalism.
The sellers market became a buyers market, transferring economic power
from producers to consumers. The growth analysis in Chapter 3 indicates
that the liberalization of prices and foreign trade were the most forceful
structural reforms. Because economic freedom is the very foundation of a
market economy, I discuss liberalization before macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and privatization.
Although deregulation is the most important systemic reform, for a long
time, it received little scholarly attention. One reason is the paucity of rele-
vant economic indicators, such as the degree of shortage, regional price dis-
persion, relative prices, product quality, and market structure. Economists
had to create their own data sets, complicating empirical work.
Another reason was that economists tended to look on liberalization as
something simple, done quickly, and requiring little afterthought. Initially,
liberal politicians and economists harbored an excessive belief in the spon-
taneous formation of markets, reckoning that it was enough to eliminate
central planning, destroy the administrative command system, and intro-
duce private property (Akaev 2000, p. 39). Deregulation of the domestic
economy was usually discussed as price liberalization, taking the equally
important deregulation of domestic trade for granted. With fewexceptions,
the vital freedom of enterprise was not even on the agenda. Economists
preferred sophisticated issues, such as nancial markets and corporate gov-
ernance, rather than bureaucratic impediments.
A third cause was that the old administration was in such disarray for
a couple of years after the collapse of communism that it was no plausible
threat. Moreover, the problemwas not classical monopolies, whichare easily
82
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Liberalization: The Creation of a Market Economy 83
handled by normal price theory, but high transaction costs, which are more
difcult to analyze (Coase 1988).
In the mid-1990s, deregulation attracted new attention. There was a
broad realization of how difcult deregulation actually was. Several empiri-
cal indexes oneconomic freedomandbusiness environment were developed
inthe 1990s. As soonas deregulationcouldbe measured, it became anobject
of policy action. The World Bank took the lead on business environment
and governance.
The rst sectioninthis chapter outlines twocontraryapproaches todereg-
ulation. Section two discusses the liberalization of foreign trade. The third
section deals with labor market policy, which is remarkable because the lag-
gards in transition became leaders in labor market liberalization. In section
four, I lookmore closelyat problems withmonopolyintwomajor industries,
natural gas and coal. This chapter concludes that a big bang was particu-
larly important in deregulation, because most countries did not reach much
farther than they did in their rst jump for years.
Two Strategies of Deregulation
At the outset of transition, all countries in the former Soviet bloc undertook
signicant deregulation, but two diametrically opposed approaches were
evident. One strategy was a radical and comprehensive deregulation to a
real market economy. It was the Balcerowicz programof radical deregulation
to the benet of the population at large. The alternative model comprised
gradual and partial liberalization, but it had little in common with the
theoretical ideas of gradual liberalization to maximize popular support and
minimize social suffering. The purpose of the actual gradual reforms was to
maximize the rents to the select few in the ruling elite.
The World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD) composed a transition index at the outset of transition, of
which deregulation was the dominant element. It is the most complete and
empirical index but not very detailed. It was followed by the Heritage Foun-
dation and the Wall Street Journals Index of Economic Freedom in 1995,
which covers all the twenty-one countries discussed in this book since 1998.
Unfortunately, each assessment of this index is somewhat formal (Miles
et al. 2006). The Fraser Institute established its own index of economic
freedom, which is more empirical but initially it covered only 1990, 1995,
and 1997, and until 2002 just eleven of the twenty-one countries covered in
this text (East-Central Europe, Russia, and Ukraine) (Gwartney and Lawson
2006).
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Daniel Kaufmann, who was resident representative of the World Bank in
Ukraine in the early 1990s, understood that corruption was the key problem
and initiated extensive research on corruption within the Bank. The EBRD
and the World Bank carry out a major survey, Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). BEEPS is based on large pub-
lic opinion surveys of businesspeople in all these countries. It is detailed
and quantitative, and it covers all countries discussed herein, except for
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rendering it my preferred source, although
it only exists for three years: 1999, 2002, and 2005. The World Economic
Forum has an empirical Competitiveness Index that is related to BEEPS,
but it contains only three of the twelve CIS countries. My favorite is BEEPS,
although I used the EBRD transition indicators for other years. On the
whole, all these indexes offer similar results, but the differences are often
great in areas where law digresses from reality.
1
The EBRD Structural Reform Index measures the composite degree of
structural reform from 0 (no market reform) to 1 (normal Western market
economy). Countries below 0.50 can be dened nonmarket economies, and
countries over 0.70 are full-edged market economies, leaving countries
in the interval of 0.500.70 as intermediary market economies. Central
and Eastern Europe undertook massive structural reforms in the rst 3
4 years of their transitionand thenlittle more. For the CIS reformers, reform
proceeded slowly from1990 until 1998, whenthey became full-edged mar-
ket economies, whereas the CIS nonreformers (Belarus, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) have not advanced at all since 1995 (see Figure 4.1). This index
has changed minimally since 1998. Each country reached a certain degree
of deregulation in its early transition, and after that little happened. The
longer the rst jump, the farther each country went.
Early, radical actionwas important for the course of reform. I dene early,
radical reform as when a country advanced at least 0.45 on the structural
1
The World Bank has undertaken another extensive study on business environment, called
Doing Business, with excellent Web design. Doing Business is not based onempirical surveys
but on assessments by a few prominent experts in each country. Unfortunately, several of
these assessments are rather odd. One example is that Doing Business alleges that it is easier
to hire and re workers in Central Europe than in the Baltics. BEEPS and the World Eco-
nomic Forummake the opposite empirical observation. Especially Poland, with its massive
unemployment, is considered more liberal in this regard than the Baltics, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This is impossible. Another
example is that Doing Business assesses it is much more difcult to enforce a contract in
Poland or Slovakia than in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, which is
obviously untrue (World Bank and International Finance Corporation 2006). With such
evident inaccuracies about checkable data, Doing Business is under a cloud of relevance.
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0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
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Central and Eastern Europe
CIS reformers (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic)
CIS non-reformers (Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan)
Figure 4.1. World Bank/European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Structural ReformIndex, 19902006. Note: The formula of this index is 0.3 times EBRDs
indexfor price liberalizationandcompetitionpolicy; 0.3times EBRDs indexfor trade and
foreign exchange liberalization, and 0.4 times EBRDs index for large-scale privatization,
small-scale privatization, and banking reform. Thus this index represents liberalization
to 73 percent and the rest is privatization. Sources: De Melo et al. (1997a); Havrylyshyn
and Wolf (2001); authors calculations from EBRD (1998), (1999), and (2006).
reform index during the rst two years of its transition. In Central and
Southeast Europe, transition was launched in 1990 or 1991, whereas the
whole former Soviet Union was thrown into transition by the Russian price
liberalization through the common ruble zone in 1992. The differences in
initial reform were substantial, as is evident from Figure 4.2. By this mea-
surement, all the four Central European countries undertook very radical
reforms, closely followed by Bulgaria. In addition, Estonia, Lithuania, Rus-
sia, and Kyrgyzstan passed the hurdle, a total of nine radical reformers.
Moldova and Latvia barely missed the threshold.
Poland and Hungary carried out equally radical structural reforms in
1990. The only difference was that Poland concentrated its liberalization
into one big bang in January 1990, whereas Hungary spread it out over a
year. In January 1991, Czechoslovakia launched an even more radical and
comprehensive deregulation, andEstonia andLithuania followedin19923.
As Latvia advanced and kept close to Lithuania, the Balts can be discussed as
a group of radical reformers, even if Latvia did not quite make it. All these
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0
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
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Figure 4.2. Early Reform: Radical or Gradual? Note: Horizontal line delineates border
between radical and gradual initial reform. Source: De Melo et al. (1997a).
countries aspired to create real market economies with a level playing eld
swiftly, and by 1992 Central Europe, had already accomplished far-reaching
liberalization. It has proven irreversible, and they have become full-edged
market economies.
The three other early radical reformers, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia,
were less fortunate. Much of Bulgarias radical deregulation in 19912 was
undone in 1993, when the communists came back to power. Bulgaria repre-
sents the only case of a signicant reversal of a radical deregulation, whichled
to the horrendous nancial crash of 1996, which transformed the country
into a real market economy. Far out in Central Asia, President Askar Akaev
launched a truly radical marketizationinKyrgyzstanin1993, debunking the
cultural myth that a country could not break with its peers and its history.
Russia undertook a reasonably radical reform in 1992, but then its reforms
slowed down, and only in 1996 did it cross the threshold to a full-edged
market economy.
The remaining elevencountries inthe region, Romania andtenCIS coun-
tries, started with partial, slow liberalization (see Figure 4.2). Most of them
undertook signicant marketization. By 2000, all but three had become real
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market economies or came close to the hurdle after several years of partial
reforms. For many, the decisive push was delivered by the nancial crisis of
1998.
Three CIS countries got stuck with nonmarket economies, namely,
Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and they have been unable to move
out of their nonreform traps. Initially, Belarus and Uzbekistan launched
some liberalization, but because their reforms were halfhearted, both coun-
tries stayed nonmarket economies, showing the danger of gradual reforms.
Price regulation was a central communist dogma. For most products,
decentralizedcost-plus pricingwas used, andthe liberalizationof suchprices
was not controversial. The contentious prices were the heavily subsidized
prices of meat and bread. Attempts at hiking them repeatedly led to pop-
ular unrest in communist Poland and the Soviet Union. Only Hungary
had undertaken broad price liberalization before 1990. Radical reformers
warned of the pitfalls of partial price liberalization, which could aggravate
price distortions and depress output (Boycko 1991; Murphy et al. 1992).
Their opponents, particularly audible in Russia, argued that price liberal-
ization could not lead to the creation of a market economy and was even
harmful, because Russia lacked the prerequisite market infrastructure.
They insisted that the far-reaching monopolization of the Soviet economy
impeded market competition, so price liberalization would only lead to
monopoly rents and ination (Yavlinsky and Braguinsky 1994; Goldman
2003).
All politicians were very nervous before their great price liberalizations
and feared popular riots, as had been the habit under communism. In each
country, price liberalization led to a sudden price hike, ranging from 70
percent in Poland to 250 percent in Russia, but shortages disappeared and
the public accepted the price liberalizations. A country did not liberalize
prices much more than in its initial deregulation, as any additional freeing
of prices was impeded by unending debates. Therefore, the initial price
liberalization had to be as comprehensive as possible. Liberalization was
both more important and difcult in the CIS countries than in Central
Europe. The relative prices in the CIS countries were far more distorted,
and any delay in liberalization caused enormous social costs. But a sudden
freeing of prices dealt a great shock to society, as people balked at massive
changes of relative prices.
One of the most confusing themes in the transition has been monopolies.
As Vladimir Capelik (1994), the leading Russian specialist on antimonopoly
policy, wrote: Authors frequently see monopolistic behavior where it does
not exist. Yet they did not notice real monopolies. The conviction among
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Soviet economists and Sovietologists alike was that the Soviet economy was
characterized by production monopolies and that numerous goods were
produced by a single enterprise (Hewett 1988; Yavlinsky and Braguinsky
1994; Goldman1996), but this was a misperception. Oftena single enterprise
delivered a highly specied product to the State Committee for Material and
Technical Supplies (Gossnab), but thereweremanyother producers. Annette
Brown, Barry Ickes, and Randi Ryterman (1994) showed that the monopo-
listic industrial structure was a myth. The largest enterprises inSoviet Russia
were actually comparatively small. The total number of employees in the
twenty biggest Russian enterprises in 1989 was less than in the twenty largest
companies in the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France. In virtually every industry, Russia had too many large companies
in urgent need of consolidation. The problem with the Russian enterprise
structure was not that the biggest companies were too big, but that small
enterprises were nearly absent. Russias monopolies were not production
but trade monopolies, maintained by state orders, monopolistic wholesale
organizations, and protectionism.
These opposing perspectives on the nature of monopolies inspired two
contrary approaches to liberalization of domestic trade: radical deregula-
tion versus antitrust policy. Leszek Balcerowicz took the lead on radical
liberalization in January 1990. His policy consisted of four vital measures:
rst, a far-reaching price liberalization; second, a truly radical external lib-
eralization; third, the breaking up of state concerns and associations into
single enterprises; fourth, and, possibly most important, a legal act allowing
anybody to sell anything anytime in any place at any price to anybody. As a
result, central squares in big cities were ooded with people who just started
trading and soon made a living, absorbing substantial employment. Within
two years, the most successful street traders had established themselves
as real merchants and shopkeepers (Balcerowicz 1992; Lipton and Sachs
1990a).
In Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar took his cue from Bal-
cerowicz and attempted a similar liberalization in January 1992. Ordinary
Russians behavedexactlyas inPoland, llingcentral squares withtheir wares.
But the ofcial response differed. After three months of busy street trading,
the mayors of the big cities prohibited this informal trade, overruling the
presidential decree. Although the police ignored skyrocketing violent crime,
they imposed this prohibition rigorously. Ofcial shops and racketeers suf-
feredfromcompetitionwiththe cheapstreet trade, whichdrove downprices
so that traders could no longer afford to pay racketeers their hefty charges
(slund 1995). In collusion with city authorities, organized crime won over
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economic freedom. Competition remained feeble because of limited liber-
alization of both domestic and foreign trade, keeping Russian retail prices
abnormally high.
The alternative to Balcerowiczs laissez-faire was antimonopoly policy,
which came to dominate in the CIS. It was based on the lingering Soviet
idea that no market was possible until its infrastructure had been built.
The Russian Federation established a State Committee for Antimonopoly
Policy and the Promotion of New Economic Structures as early as 1990
and adopted an antimonopoly law in March 1991. Rather than liberalizing
trade, going after real monopolists, or breaking up enterprises, the Russian
Antimonopoly Committee imposed price controls on rather small rms.
By 1993, it had registered more than 5,000 monopolists, dened as rms
supplying at least 35 percent of the market for a particular good in any of
Russias 89 regions. Some local antimonopoly committees evendemanded
that an enterprise sell a certain quota locally (Capelik 1992, 1994; Slay and
Capelik 1997). Russias biggest monopolist, Gazprom, by contrast, was reg-
istered as a monopolist only in 1997. The Antimonopoly Committee did
not promote competition but stied the market, often with the intent of
promoting monopolists and extorting money. The same was true of most
of the CIS.
For the domestic liberalization of prices, trade, and the entry of enter-
prises, a big bang was necessary. Each country tended to reach as far as it
jumped at its initial big deregulation. The liberalization had to be both sim-
ple and comprehensive because any complication generated rents. Sooner
than anybody had expected, the bureaucracy recovered its vigor and began
to thrive on extortion.
Liberalization of Foreign Trade
External liberalizationalso hada great positive impact ongrowth(see Chap-
ter 3). The liberalization of imports was relatively easy, whereas the dereg-
ulation of exports aroused great political controversy.
With the unication of exchange rates, foreign trade tariffs started having
real impact. The most reformist socialist countries Hungary and Poland
had experimented with import tariffs, but foreign trade regulation and
taxation remained discretionary until the demise of communism. Initially
extremely low real exchange rates made all imports so expensive that they
could not compete with domestic goods in price. Because the liberalization
of imports meant an end to shortages, it enjoyed strong popular support
and occurred quickly in all reformist countries. Import quotas and licenses
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became exceptions, and rather low import tariffs were introduced in their
place. Russia had no import tariffs in the rst half of 1992, and Estonia
abolished them altogether.
Ironically, the early pressure to raise import tariffs to 1015 percent came
from three international organizations. The International Monetary Fund
advocated low and uniform import tariffs as a suitable means of collecting
state revenues. The EuropeanUnionpressedthe countries aspiring toaccede
to the Union to have at least as high tariffs as the EU, with liberal Estonia
being the victim. For entry negotiations with the World Trade Organization,
it was benecial to have some import tariffs over which to negotiate. Only
after several years, when real exchange rates had appreciated with nancial
stabilization and domestic producers recovered, did domestic protection-
ist pressures mount. Yet resistance against protectionism was quite strong,
and average national import tariffs have stayed in the range of 312 per-
cent despite much talk about the need for protection (World Bank 2005c,
p. 3). The newurban middle class and entrepreneurs dependent on imports
formed a bulwark against protectionism.
It was far more difcult to deregulate exports than imports because pow-
erful exporters advocated their regulation. The domestic prices of major
export commodities energy, metals, agricultural produce, chemicals, and
lumber stayed low because of state regulation. In December 1991, the
price of 1 ton of crude oil in the Soviet Union was 50 cents, while the world
market price was about $100. Enterprise managers, commodity traders,
bankers, and ofcials, who had exclusive access to export licenses, joined
hands in a highly lucrative export of commodities. They bought commodi-
ties on their personal account at low domestic state-controlled prices and
sold them abroad at world prices, cashing in anything from 10 to 100 times
their purchasing price from 1991 to 1993. These huge rents nanced strong
opposition to the deregulation of exports.
At the popular level, unfounded fear reigned that the liberalization of
exports would deplete the domestic market. Once, arguing with a top
Ukrainian ofcial for the liberalization of exports of grain, I encountered
the conviction that our country will be left empty. After many years of
shortages, people could not imagine that the simultaneous liberalization of
prices and foreign trade would balance the domestic market. They consid-
ered the domestic currency worthless and assumed that all attractive goods
would be exported. Similarly, people thought most enterprises would go
bankrupt if energy prices rose to world levels. Many Western economists
reckoned the price discrepancy for commodities was so large that this price
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adjustment had to be gradual. As a means, they advocated export tariffs
and the auctioning of export quotas. But in the 1990s, export tariff revenue
could barely be collected. Repeated attempts at the auctioning of export
quotas failed because big exporters were too powerful for the weak state.
They obtained exemption from export tariffs and acquired export quotas
for free.
Foreign trade went through dramatic changes. As long as high ination
prevailed, enterprises had little incentive to export because of the ease of
selling at home, and exports plummeted. When macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion started biting, domestic demand contracted, forcing producers to turn
abroad to earn money, which they could do if exports had been liberalized.
Typically, liberalizing countries experienced an early, concentrated export
boost. The export potential proved great, and it was not dependent onexter-
nal demand, which was always underutilized, but on domestic supply.
Few Western businesspeople saw the opening of Eastern Europe as an
opportunity. Some big companies favored early establishment there, for
instance, ABB, Tetra Pak, Procter and Gamble, McDonalds, and the big
tobacco companies. Volkswagen undertook the biggest investment of all in
the Czech Republic. Most of these companies held the view that they had to
secure the market before their competitors even if they would not be able
to make prots for years. But the new Eastern markets were small, risky,
and immature. At the end of communism, the Soviet bloc accounted for
only 2 percent of world trade and twice as much of EU trade. Nor were big
Western enterprises sufciently agile to operate in the new postcommunist
economies, which required plenty of senior management time. Only after
several years did foreign direct investment take off.
Many countries and regions have toyed with free economic zones. Ini-
tially, they were promoted by reformist regions, such as Leningrad. Later on,
they were favored by proponents of industrial policy as well as local inter-
ests that lobbied for tax exemptions or their right to collect central taxes.
The international nancial institutions resolutely resisted free economic
zones, which they saw as tax loopholes, which was largely the case. Despite
their staunch resistance, free economic zones were legislated in many coun-
tries. Prominent examples were the Kaliningrad exclave in Russia and the
Crimea in Ukraine. They often obtained substantial tax exemptions, but
they rarely thrived. Tax privileges attracted organized crime, and why lib-
eralize one region but not another? In Ukraine, the Donetsk free economic
zone became a giant tax loophole for importers, and it was abolished in
2005 after the Orange Revolution. The only ourishing free economic zone
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I saw in the CIS was the Bishkek Free Economic Zone in Kyrgyzstan, which
relievedenterprises frommany taxes but most of all fromundue government
interference.
Labor Market Policy
The labor market is one of the most paradoxical areas of the transition.
Widely held expectations turned out to be completely wrong. First, real
wages were not driven up by strong trade unions but were depressed, and
often not even paid, by ruthless managers. Second, the anticipated mass
unemployment never materialized anywhere but in East Germany. Third,
workers did not become a major source of unrest but proved exceedingly
complacent. Fourth, labor markets in Central Europe became more regu-
lated than in the former Soviet Union.
2
Labor was primarily discussed as a social concern rather than as a market.
Over time, three labor market paradigms have evolved. The rst is the EU
model, which found its most extreme expression in East Germany but was
also adopted by Central Europe and Bulgaria. Old socialist regulations were
maintained, and EU regulations were added to provide full social welfare.
Already highpayroll taxes were allowedtorise further tonance anextended
social safetynet, especiallyhigher unemployment benets because of the fear
of mass unemployment andsocial disruption. Thelabor market becameeven
more rigid than under socialism. As a result of this social democratic model,
East Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary saw an early and
sharpriseinunemployment. InPolandandBulgaria, unemployment peaked
at 20 percent of the labor force in 2002 and 2001, respectively. Slovakia
reached 19 percent in 2001 (United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe 2006).
East Germany was a special case. When Germany reunied in 1990, the
East German mark was set equal to the deutsche mark, and social benets
were equalized with those in West Germany. Wage setting was delegated to
employers and trade unions. But because civil society and social organiza-
tions were weakinEast Germany, West Germantrade unions andemployers
associations took over. Neither had any interest in competitive wages in the
East, whereas both wanted to minimize competition. Nor was the privatiza-
tionagency Treuhandanstalt, whichmanagedall state companies, concerned
2
This section draws on Commander and Coricelli (1995), Allison and Ringold (1996),
Commander and McHale (1996), Dmitriev and Maleva (1997), Maleva (1998), and Boeri
and Terrell (2002).
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about controlling wages. As a result, the amalgamated West German inter-
ests priced East Germany out of the market through excessive wage increases
(Pickel and Wiesenthal 1997). East Germany lost no less than 40 percent of
its jobs, resulting in mass unemployment, like nowhere else in the post-
communist world, of 35 percent of the labor force in 1991 (Siebert 1992,
pp. 349, 1203).
3
A veritable social welfare trap had been created at a huge
cost to West German taxpayers.
In the CIS countries, a second very different model evolved. Old Soviet
labor codes stayed on the books, but managers largely disregarded them,
allowing a relatively free labor market to develop. Alas, employers did not
respect the most fundamental rule: topay wages for workdone. Wage arrears
became notorious, yet unemployment stayedsurprisingly low, increasing far
less thanthe fall inoutput. The immediate cause of the small unemployment
was that real wages wereextraordinarilyexibledownwardbecausetheywere
not indexed for ination. All over the CIS, wage arrears became standard,
harming as much as two-thirds of the Russian workforce, not necessarily
because enterprises could not pay but because they perceived no need to do
so. Even worse, workers in Russia and Ukraine were often forced to accept
their enterprises products as payments in kind. The saddest example I saw
was in a southern Ukrainian village in August 1996. A block of reinforced
concrete stoodfor sale infront of eachhouse, representing the poor workers
wages in kind, which they tried to hawk to passersby. As it was not necessary
to pay wages, employers had no need to lay off workers, yet at the same time
wage arrears were almost unknown in Central Europe.
At the endof communism, workers protests hadledtouncontrolledwage
rises. As transition started, reformers were greatly concerned over excessive
wage ination and that cost-push ination could lead to mass unemploy-
ment. Therefore, they opted for strict incomes policies. Poland launched a
tax-basedincomes policy, imposing a heavy penalty tax onany wage increase
above a fractionof the inationrate, and several countries followed Polands
lead. Gradually, however, it emerged that no country suffered signicant
wage ination and that incomes policies were superuous (Tait and Erbas
1995). As Jacek Rostowski (1998, p. 139) noted: Indeed, in Poland in 1990
prices soared far ahead of wages during the rst quarter of the stabilization
programme, so that wage controls are unlikely to have been important in
forming ination expectations.
3
Including open unemployment, part-time workers, employees in public works, and labor
market training.
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Many analysts had presumed that, as communism was a form of social-
ism, workers would emerge as a strong social force when released by democ-
racy. Socialism was not the workers but the Nomenklaturas state, however.
Instead of the workers, the Nomenklatura rose like the Phoenix. Even where
it was understood that enterprises were controlled by their managers, their
ruthlessness surprised. For a long time, managers refused to believe in sys-
temic change, sticking to the old system. Operating under soft budget con-
straints, they continued hoarding workers. Each worker was an argument in
negotiations with the authorities for more subsidies, rendering overstafng
benecial, and labor and tax laws provided strong incentives against dis-
missals. Enterprise managers preferred to keep workers but not pay them.
Mass layoffs were rare, and most labor mobility arose out of voluntary res-
ignations. The labor market remained tight for skilled workers (Layard and
Richter 1995; Tait andErbas 1995; Commander andMcHale 1996; Garibaldi
and Brixiova 1997; Maleva 1998).
Workers lacked effective representation, and they were fearful of unem-
ployment. Although many countries had a formal trade union membership
of more than 80 percent, in the former Soviet Union, these trade unions
were sheer social security administrations. Their main task was to adminis-
ter extra-budgetary funds nanced out of the payroll tax for various social
benets, such as holiday trips (Dmitriev and Maleva 1997). Many lived
by the old socialist saying: They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to
work. Workers preferred to look for a new job while still having one. Even
if they were not being paid, they had access to enterprises social benets,
such as child care. Many workers started working in the informal economy,
but their old formal employment helped them escape taxation and undue
interest from the authorities. Millions of post-Soviet workers formally
retained some public employment while they roamed around as shuttle
traders or temporary laborers (Commander and Schankerman 1997). A
large part of the labor force disappeared into the lawless underground
because the economy was divided into a highly regulated ofcial labor mar-
ket with high taxes and an unregulated informal economy with few taxes or
social benets.
Over time, a third labor market model has come to the fore, the dereg-
ulated Anglo-American model. As usual, Estonia was the pioneer. It was
followed by a rather idiosyncratic series of countries: Latvia, Kazakhstan,
Bulgaria, and Slovakia. Estonia launched its reform out of ideological com-
mitment. Kazakhstan saw it as an element of its liberal Asian economic
model, whereas Slovakia and Bulgaria reacted to large and lasting unem-
ployment. The reason for this convergence is that some countries wanted
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
%

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Figure 4.3. Labor Regulations as a Problem in Doing Business, 2005. Source: European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank (2005).
to legalize the actual situation, whereas others wished to deregulate. The
question is how fast this model will proliferate.
Labor regulations were most problematic for business in Central Europe
(see Figure 4.3). They are rather cumbersome in the whole of East-Central
Europe, whereas CIS labor markets are more exible despite rigid legisla-
tion. Some undesirable rules are respected, notably two or three months of
severance payment, whereas the fundamental right to be paid wages earned
ontime is widely disregarded. Most countries have adoptednewlabor codes,
but only Kazakhstanhas truly liberal labor legislation. Among the CIS coun-
tries, a prime purpose of labor market reform has been to legalize the exist-
ing liberal order but to make sure that workers are being paid the wages they
have earned. Among the East-Central European countries, only Estonia,
Slovakia, and Bulgaria have achieved such liberalization.
Most of Central and Eastern Europe, however, has established West Euro-
pean social democratic models, with considerable barriers to the dismissal
of workers, producing even higher unemployment than in Western Europe.
Although one chapter of acquis communautaire is devoted to labor mar-
ket regulation, the EU does not impose too many rules. The European
trade unions demanded regulation as exists in Western Europe, however,
notably protesting against the absence of collective bargaining inEstonia and
Latvia. Top politicians in Germany, Sweden, and France fretted about
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Central Europe Southeast Europe Baltics CIS*
%

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F
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e
* CIS countries with plausible statistics (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine).
Figure 4.4. Unemployment Rate, 2005. Source: United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (2006).
wage dumping and tax dumping, trying to bully the new EU members
into taxing and pricing themselves out of the market. The EUhas effectively
advocated a social democratic paradigmof social welfare, even if the United
Kingdom and Ireland have abandoned it. Still, the new EU members are
experiencing competitive pressures to deregulate their overregulated labor
markets andreduce payroll taxes, following the leadof Estonia, Slovakia, and
Bulgaria, to reduce their excessive unemployment and boost their sluggish
growth rates.
Unemployment reects the severity of labor market regulations. As we
would expect, Central Europe has steadily had the highest unemployment
in the region with an average of no less than 12.3 percent in 2005 (see
Figure 4.4). The Baltics and Southeast Europe are signicantly better off
with 8.4 percent unemployment. The CIS countries, for which plausible
unemployment statistics exist (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and
Armenia) have average unemployment of 7.5 percent, although they have
suffered far greater economic dislocation. The harmful impact of European
labor regulations is evident.
Combat of Monopoly: Gas and Coal
In each postcommunist country, the managers of a few big state monopo-
lies resisted market adjustment at great cost to society, and they were often
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successful. These companies suffered from the standard shortcomings of
monopolies, such as inefciency, overstafng, and uneconomical overin-
vestment. Each country went through its own drama, focusing on a few
major industries oil, gas, coal, electrical power, and railways (Slay and
Capelik 1997). I focus here on Russia, the biggest and most difcult case.
The WorldBank(1994b) prescribedstandardprinciples for the regulation
of natural monopolies and assisted in their implementation. An indepen-
dent regulatory authority had to be established, preferably one for each
industry. Prices should be raised to cover costs and allow for a moder-
ate prot. If potential for competition existed, privatization was desirable.
Some purported natural monopolies were broken by new technologies that
facilitated competition, a situation most evident in the telecommunications
industry. Otherwise production, transportation, and trade should be sepa-
rated, because only transportationwas a true natural monopoly. Production
and trade could usually be subdivided into several companies. The key to
achieve competition was to develop wholesale trade, and a favorite idea was
wholesale auctions. Next, production companies could be privatized. Suc-
cessful rent-seeking monopolists resisted any real market. Their defense of
monopoly lay inthe control of ve levers uniedcompany, transportation,
state ownership, prices, and trade.
To develop a market, monopolistic companies had to be broken up. In
Russia, that was done in the oil and coal industry as well as in telecommuni-
cations, whereas Gazpromand the railroads have stayed unied companies.
Transportation is a pillar of monopoly power. The standard international
advice was to separate transportation from production, but the experiences
of the Russian oil pipelines (state-owned monopolist Transneft) suggest
this is not enough. The obvious solution is to allow competing private
pipelines. Even when a transportation monopoly is not broken up, it often
faces competition from other means of transportation. Railways compete
withpipelines, shipping, andtrucks. Quite a lot of privatizationhas occurred
in telecommunications, oil, airline, and coal industries, which has gener-
atedcompetition. Because it is difcult todefenda private monopoly against
public criticism, privatization facilitates the emergence of private competi-
tors. Innumerable forms of price regulation have been tried, but nothing
has worked in these weak states. Sensible price regulation and auctions were
impossible in the face of strong monopolists. Marginal wholesale markets
beside a national giant were inevitably manipulated and emasculated. Thus,
the most intractable problems of natural monopolies arose out of monop-
olistic gas pipelines and electricity grids. Other concerns could be managed
by breaking up and privatizing monopolistic companies.
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Russia offers two stark examples of opposing development, its natural gas
and coal industries. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas monopoly company,
was the only Soviet industrial ministry to be corporatized lock, stock, and
barrel. With more than 300,000 employees, it contained all the assets of the
oldministry: all gas production, gas pipelines, plentyof relatedandunrelated
enterprises (such as 200 large state farms), and even all regulatory bodies.
While other enterprises were selling off social and noncore assets, Gazprom
bought whatever it could in the old Soviet mode of hoarding. Gazproms
power was based both on resources and political protection. The last Soviet
minister of gas industry and Gazproms founder, Viktor Chernomyrdin,
was prime minister from December 1992 to April 1998. In this role, he
reinforced the companys monopoly power and undertook a large partial
insider privatization to the benet of its managers and employees, but he
let the majority of the shares stay with the state. Gazprom was so powerful
that its CEO was allowed to vote for the remaining state share until 2001. It
had become a state within the state (Slay and Capelik 1997).
The nancial dealings betweenGazpromandthe state were excruciatingly
complex. Gazprom regulated everything itself for a long time, and it dis-
torted prices and payments at will. Domestic gas prices were kept far below
world market prices (although above costs), but the monopolist did not
press for higher prices (Gray 1998). Industry subsidized households, which
could be charged as little as one-sixth of the industrial price. Gazprom was
prohibited fromcutting off deliveries to many nonpaying users, and numer-
ous government bodies were not given state funds to pay for necessary gas.
Gazprom responded to this distorted incentive structure by accumulat-
ing barter and arrears. In 19967, only 7 percent of retail gas purchases
were paid in cash, and arrears abounded (Slay and Capelik 1997). Rather
than protesting against this state of affairs, Gazprom exploited arrears to
extract substantial discounts in its taxes through offsets against their unpaid
taxes, extracting implicit subsidies from the government (Commander and
Mumssen 1998; Gaddy and Ickes 1998).
Gazproms managers exploited the nontransparency to their personal
benet. Russias gas exports to other CIS countries, especially to Ukraine,
were notoriously criminal. Gazpromsold such gas to a private trading com-
pany (Itera), close to the Gazprom management, at an extremely low price.
Itera charged Ukrainian purchasers high prices, but Ukrainian gas imports
were heavily subsidized by the Ukrainian state through a special exchange
rateuntil 1995. TheUkrainiangovernment awardedafewUkrainiangas pur-
chasers, some state-owned and some private, regional monopolies. Because
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the Ukrainian state guaranteed payments for gas shipments from Russia,
importers paid only for a faction. Gazprom raged against Ukraines arrears
and also accused Ukrainians of stealing gas from the pipeline, but Russia
could not cut off deliveries to Ukraine, because most of its gas exports to
the West went through Ukrainian pipelines. In reality, Itera and a handful
of Ukrainian gas oligarchs could each year split a couple billion U.S. dollars
at the expense of Gazprom and the Ukrainian state (Lovei 1998; Mercedes
Balmeceda 1998; Timoshenko 1998; slund 2000).
The government could do little against these big state monopolies. In
the spring of 1997, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov
declared a kamikaze attack on the natural monopolies, which was an apt
description. Within half a year, the natural monopolies had won at the
expense of Nemtsovs political career (Slay and Capelik 1997). In 2001,
the resurging Russian state had grown so strong that President Vladimir
Putin replaced the old Gazprom management with his own people. Rather
than reforming the company, Putin continued the old monopolistic poli-
cies. Another private trading company, Eural Trans Gaz, and later RosUkr-
Energo, took the place of Itera. They represented the interests of the new
Gazprom management, which continued skimming off some of Gazproms
earnings.
Unlike the prosperous natural gas industry, the coal industry was per-
ceived as hopelessly obsolete. It persisted primarily in Poland, Romania,
Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Everywhere it was terribly inefcient
and unprotable. It remained fully state-owned and was managed like one
national corporation. Coal prices were regulated far below both costs and
world prices, aggravating losses. In Ukraine and Russia, the coal indus-
try became infamous for huge state subsidies, persistent wage arrears, and
many strikes. The state coal managers thrived on state subsidies, which they
extracted through transfer pricing and management theft, criminalizing the
industry. In Russia, middlemen and mine managers typically kept one-third
of the price for themselves. Toaddinsult toinjury, coal-mine managers com-
plained that they could not pay wages to their workers, whom they urged to
strike to extract more subsidies from the government. The coal miners had
formed a radical, democratic force behind Boris Yeltsin in 1989, but in 1998
the miners helped to bring down the reformist Russian government under
Sergei Kirienko.
After the Russian nancial crash, the Russian coal industry took a sharp
turn for the better. Two consecutive liberal Russian Ministers of Economy
(Yevgeny Yasin and Yakov Urinson) and the World Bank had already agreed
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Figure 4.5. Russian and Polish Coal Production, 19882005. Source: BP (2006).
on a comprehensive reform program for the whole coal industry in 1996.
The rst and critical step was to break up Rosugol, the Russian coal associ-
ation, which was a hybrid of ministry, industrial association, and company.
The second step was the privatization of the coal mines in reasonably small
portions. Soon the coal mines were consolidated in half a dozen relatively
large private companies. With fragmentation and privatization, price liber-
alization became possible, and competition caught on. Russian coal output
that had plummeted by 45 percent from 1988 to 1998 suddenly started ris-
ing, and increased by 20 from1998 to 2005 (see Figure 4.5). Prots surged as
the newprivate owners cut costs, red workers, and cleaned up the nances.
The World Bank prides itself of having designed a social safety net for min-
ers and mining communities, which facilitated its popular acceptance. The
Russian government could swiftly eliminate its coal subsidies, and notori-
ously unreliable coal supplies became predictable. This troubled industry
turned healthy within a few years. Rarely have marketization and privati-
zation proved more successful. The precondition for this success was that
Russia accepted the consolidated ownership of wealthy owners, known as
oligarchs (see Chapter 10). In Kazakhstan, a similar privatization of the
coal industry was carried out with World Bank support, with perhaps even
greater success.
The same was not true of the coal industry elsewhere. Poland had
the proudest coal industry in the former Soviet bloc, and until 1997, its
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production decline was comparatively limited, but as late as 2006 not a sin-
gle Polish coal mine had been privatized. Output continues to fall year after
year, while it is rising in Russia (see Figure 4.5). The number of workers
and operating mines was slashed by about one-third at great public cost.
Despite high international coal prices and large state subsidies, the Polish
coal industrybarelymanagedtoturnaprot, andproductionis set tofall fur-
ther (Cienski 2006). Regardless of substantial successes in other industries,
thanks to Polands excellent big bang deregulation, Polands coal industry
failed miserably in comparison with Russia and Kazakhstan because the lat-
ter privatized, but Poland did not. Russia and Kazakhstan also allowed the
consolidation of large companies in the hands of a few domestic oligarchs,
which Poland resisted.
A Big Bang: Vital in Deregulation
This chapter offers rather strong empirical conclusions. Twoopposing polit-
ical choices were made dependent on political power. If the old elite held
sway, it chose gradual deregulation, which permitted it to maintain power
andextract resources withstate at. Democratization, bycontrast, ledtorad-
ical deregulation, which threatened the old elites omnipotence. Only three
dictators, Lukashenko in Belarus, Niyazov in Turkmenistan, and Karimov
in Uzbekistan, thought the old Soviet economy could prove viable.
Deregulation has been characterized by three important dichotomies.
The rst dichotomy concerns the choice of liberalization strategy. Demo-
cratic Central Europe and the Baltics opted for radical and comprehensive
deregulation from the outset, whereas Romania and most of the CIS coun-
tries pursued a gradual and partial deregulation, which maximized rents
for a small elite. In most countries, this hybrid system evolved into a more
ordinary market economy, but three countries Belarus, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan decided to keep Soviet-style systems. The initial choice
proved crucial. A country hardly reached further in domestic liberalization
of prices, trade, and enterprise than it did in its rst jump. The reformers
had a brief window of opportunity of extraordinary politics, as Balcerow-
icz (1994) emphasized. If they did not seize that chance, the rent-seeking
establishment soon blocked liberalization. Their rents grewso large that the
rent seekers bought political power, impeding marketization to maximize
their personal rents.
Unfortunately, it is not true that in most of the [postcommunist] states,
liberalization was quickly achieved (Lavigne 2000, p. 18). The socially ori-
ented gradual strategy about which many Western economists and social
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scientists had theorized (see Chapter 2) was nowhere to be seen in real life,
because gradual liberalization and a socially oriented economic policy were
mutually exclusive. Even well-meaning economists who had advocated a
gradual strategy became pretty radical when they joined government.
4
A second dichotomy concerns foreign trade, where the division is strictly
geographic. East-Central Europe opted for a return to Europe with far-
reaching early liberalization of foreign trade and a reorientation toward the
EuropeanUnion. The CIS countries, onthe contrary, hadnowhere togoand
tried to minimize the disruption. As a result, their trade was restructured
slowly while it contracted sharply.
Athirddichotomy concerns the labor market. East-Central Europes labor
market is overregulated, because it suffers from the combination of old
socialist regulations and newEUregulations, which are imposed with rigor.
The CIS countries have a comparatively free labor market because labor law
is largely ignored, and increasingly legislation is being adjusted to reality.
In sum, early radical deregulation was of fundamental importance for a
successful transition to a market economy. Any inconsistency caused prob-
lematic rents, and they were aggravated rather than resolved in the medium
term, as rent-seeking interests became entrenched. Several countries were
trapped at suboptimal equilibria with high rents and low output. Murphy,
Shleifer, andVishny (1993) pointedout that suchsuboptimal equilibria were
a natural consequence of increasing returns to rent seeking. After a certain
set of economic rules hadbeenestablished, a powerful groupof beneciaries
arose, blocking further reform. The winners did take all, both the economic
system and politics (Hellman 1998). These equilibria may not be eternal,
but they can last for years, especially if they are reinforced with energy rents
as in Russia and Kazakhstan (Arendh 2005; Gaddy and Ickes 2005; Tompson
2005).
Fortunately for the late and slow reformers, the story did not end on this
sad note. Over time, rents dissipated and dwindled. Rents betweenregulated
prices and free prices inevitably disappeared after a few years of expanding
arbitrage. Over time, most CIS countries have opened their economies. In
a few cases, the CIS countries have actually chosen a more liberal approach
thantheCentral-East Europeancountries becauseof EUregulations, notably
in labor market policies and agriculture. Liberal labor markets are prolifer-
ating from the East because authoritarian elites now live on prot seeking
of export industries and thus benet from freer markets. Authoritarian CIS
4
The outstanding example is Grzegorz Kol odko (2000), Polish minister of nance and
deputy prime minister, 19947.
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countries, especially Kazakhstan and Armenia, have adopted the East Asian
economic model with high growth based on private ownership, a small
state, little regulation, but extensive corruption. As a consequence, the CIS
reformers continue to make some progress on deregulation, while Central
Europe and the Baltics have stopped doing so.
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5
From Hyperination to Financial
Stability
Whencommunismcollapsed, macroeconomic chaos prevailed. Inlate 1991,
salespeople stood behind the counters of the large Moscow grocery stores,
but they had absolutely nothing to sell. Even the last inedible sh and veg-
etable conserves had been sold out. Long lines lingered outside other shops,
which had received some substandard meat. The lines could last for days,
and entrepreneurial organizers distributed numbers to the queuing public,
but the produce distributed could scarcely pass for meat. In the Russian
language, the verbs buy and sell had been replaced by take and give,
showing how unequal Russians perceived the exchange between goods and
money. Some kolkhoz (collective farm) markets that sold private produce
existed, but they were few and their prices were several times higher than
the ofcial state prices. People stopped going to work because they could
not use the money they earned, and they needed the time for queuing. Life
was hell.
When prices were deregulated, they skyrocketed in almost all transition
countries. Many major steps had to be taken to achieve reasonable price
stability. First, national currencies hadtobe established. Second, scal policy
had to be tightened. Third, a new tax policy was needed. Fourth, monetary
policy also had to be made strict. Fifth, the exchange rate had to be unied
and devalued to become competitive. Alas, these tasks were complex, and
the local knowledge of macroeconomics was minimal. The very institutions
of macroeconomic policy had to be built or rebuilt. The dramas of nancial
stabilization engaged all.
High and Persistent Ination
All formerly socialist countries but Czechoslovakia were in severe nan-
cial crises when they entered transition. The liberalization of domestic
prices in the presence of shortages and excess demand unleashed high
104
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From Hyperination to Financial Stability 105
ination. Polandandthe former Soviet republics were approaching hyperin-
ation, that is, more than 50 percent monthly ination according to Phillip
Cagans (1956) classical denition. The unication and market adjustment
of the exchange rate involvedsubstantial devaluations, whichfurther inated
domestic prices. International nancial markets were largely closed, with
only Hungary and Czechoslovakia being creditworthy. This was a macro-
economic nightmare. All preconditions for high ination were at hand, and
extraordinaryefforts were requiredtovanquishit. Most CIScountries joined
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the spring
of 1992.
In every country, the initial price liberalization led to a greater price
hike than anticipated. For Russia, the IMF had forecast a price rise of 50
percent in January 1992, but prices rose by 250 percent. In Czechoslovakia,
Minister of Finance V aclav Klaus (1992) argued that the height of this initial
price surge could not be predicted, only its shape in case of a radical and
consistent stabilization, and he proved right. The large price increases had
two immediate effects. One was that the volume of money to GDP fell
sharply, and the other was a strong demand for compensatory monetary
expansion (Boone and Hrder 1998).
A chasm initially divided Central and Southeast Europe from the former
Soviet Union, including the Baltics, where extreme ination raged in 1992
and 1993. In 1992, Russia saw its price level surge by no less than 2,500 per-
cent, andin1993 inationexceeded10,000 percent inArmenia andUkraine.
CISinationpeakedwithtenof the twelve CIScountries experiencinghyper-
ination in 1993. Even the virtuous Baltic states had approximately 1,000
percent ination in 1992 (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
We candistinguishfour inationary patterns. Hungary was the single suc-
cessful gradual stabilizer, with ination never exceeding 33 percent a year.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three Baltic countries forma second group
of successful radical stabilizers. Poland and the Baltic states started transi-
tion with high ination, but they undertook early, rigorous, and successful
stabilizations, although ination remained in the double digits for years.
The third group encompasses most CIS countries. They experienced hyper-
ination in 1993 but launched serious stabilization efforts from 1994 to
1996 and brought ination under control. Finally, ve countries succeeded
in reducing ination below 40 percent a year temporarily but later faced
newhigh ination. These were Bulgaria in 19967, Romania in 1997, Russia
in 1998, Belarus in 19979, and Tajikistan in both 1995 and 1997. Bulgaria,
Romania, and Russia had all carried out late and slow stabilizations heav-
ily dependent on strict monetary policy, but their budget decits remained
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0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
E
n
d

Y
e
a
r
,

%

C
h
a
n
g
e
Poland Czech Republic Hungary
Figure 5.1. Ination in Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, 198997. Note: Czech
Republic numbers for 198990 refer to former Czechoslovakia. Sources: EBRD (1996)
and (1999).
too large. When they could no longer raise credits to nance their exces-
sive budget decits, renewed ination crises erupted, as well as debt crises,
bank crashes, and large devaluations. Figure 5.3 shows the later inationary
pattern.
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
E
n
d

Y
e
a
r
,

%

C
h
a
n
g
e
Baltics CIS
Figure 5.2. Ination in CIS and the Baltic States, 199197. Source: EBRD (1999).
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
E
n
d

Y
e
a
r
,

%

C
h
a
n
g
e
Figure 5.3. Ination in Central and Southeast Europe, Baltics, and CIS, 19982005.
Sources: EBRD (2004) and (2005).
Hyperinationis a modernphenomenon, requiring at andbank money.
It rst emerged after World War I, and until the late 1980s, the world had
recorded only 16 hyperinations (Fischer 2005). The distinction between
high ination and hyperination can be illustrated with an analogy. Under
high ination, a thief steals the money and leaves the bag, but under hyper-
ination he takes the bag and leaves the money, because money is of little
value. If we disregard the initial price hikes after liberalizations, the post-
communist regionsawno less thantwelve hyperinations during the transi-
tion: Poland in 1989, ten former Soviet republics in 1993, and Bulgaria in
1997. In addition, Yugoslavia had two bouts of hyperination. Thus, the
broader region experienced fourteen hyperinations, almost as many as the
whole world had suffered before the demise of communism.
The highand unpredictable inationbrought about not only great wealth
redistribution but also a huge destruction of wealth and output, as it desta-
bilized the economic environment. The bank savings of the population were
inatedaway, hurtingparticularlythewell-to-doandelderly. Ironically, their
anger was directed against the reformers, who liberalized prices, rather than
the communists, who had issued more money than they could afford. High
ination devastated condence in local currencies, prompting demonetiza-
tion and a mass ight to dollars. As the velocity of money rose, the volume
of money as a ratio of GDP plunged. Dollarization proliferated in both the
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consumer and enterprise sphere, and cash dollars circulated as a second
currency. Capital ight caught on as the smart and wealthy transferred their
money abroad to safeguard it, although such capital transfers were strictly
prohibited. Relative prices vacillated sharply and unpredictably, impeding
investment. The only sensible economic activity was speculative arbitrage.
Establishing National Currencies
Before any macroeconomic policy could be pursued, basic state institutions
hadtobebuilt. Themost important was anational currency. WhentheSoviet
Unionfell apart inDecember 1991, the breakwas not clean, because the ruble
persisted as the last Soviet relict. A competitive issue of ruble credits had
already started between the old Soviet State Bank and fteen newly formed
republican central banks. The more ruble credits one republic issued, the
larger share of the common GDP it extracted, but the worse overall ination
became. This was a prisoners dilemma. Everybody had a strong incentive
to behave worse than others, but as a consequence, all were worse off than if
they had restrained their expenditures. At the time, many CIS policy makers
did not understand that credits equaled money. Only ruble currency, which
was exclusively printed in Russia, was rationed. The consequence was a great
shortage of cash, peaking in the summer of 1992, which led to the emission
of surrogate money in the form of coupons in most CIS countries (Hardy
and Lahiri 1994).
The former Soviet republics adopted three approaches to the ruble zone.
The Balts wanted to leave the ruble zone as soon as possible. They regarded
a national currency as their best border against Russia, and they ignored
transitioncosts (Hansson1993). Nationalists inUkraine, Moldova, Georgia,
and Azerbaijan favored independent national currencies in principle, but
they felt poorly prepared and wanted to extract maximum benets from
cheap Russian credits and raw materials in the meantime. Therefore, they
delayed their introduction of a national currency. A third group stayed
close to Russia out of necessity or convenience. Neighboring Belarus and
Kazakhstan considered themselves too dependent on Russia, and distant
Armenia and Tajikistan sought Russias support because they felt small and
weak.
WithinRussia, reformers advocatedanearlynationalizationof the ruble
(Gaidar 1993). They realizedhowcostly the ruble zone was toRussia andthat
the competitive issuance of money would cause hyperination. Yet for tech-
nical reasons, such as the printing of a newcurrency, they thought the break
could not be undertaken until the middle of 1992. Their Western economic
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advisors were unanimously for the instant introduction of an independent
ruble (Sachs and Lipton 1993). But the old Soviet establishment prevailed.
It included the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), the old Soviet ministries,
and state industry, which all resisted the demise of the Soviet Union. State
enterprise managers wanted to continue delivering their substandard pro-
duce to other former Soviet republics in return for Russian state credits. The
sales of Russian oil and gas at very low prices to other CIS countries facili-
tated lucrative arbitrage for state enterprise managers, commodity traders,
and bankers throughout the CIS. A rent-seeking elite beneted from the
persistence of the ruble zone, as did Soviet deadbeats, whereas the broader
public didnot understandthe issue, instinctively preferring minimal change
(slund 1995).
The IMF was the main international agency involved. It considered the
ruble zone such a politically infected issue that it preferred to be neutral.
Initially, the IMF (1992) reckoned that the CIS countries needed to agree on
a controlled system of emission, but this was never feasible. After the Baltic
states had decided to launch their own currencies in mid-1992, the IMF
assisted them. In the fall of 1992, the IMF privately urged Ukraine to leave
the ruble area, but only inMay 1993 didthe organizationpublicly encourage
a country (Kyrgyzstan) to depart from the zone. Because the EU was about
to establish its single currency, EU spokespersons defended the ruble zone
(Emerson 1992), and the EU was prominent on the executive board of the
IMF. Throughits neutrality, the IMFeffectively supporteda monetary chaos
that condemned the CIS to hyperination (Granville 1995b, 2002).
1
The only sensible policy was to divide the common currency zone early,
as Czechoslovakia had done after the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire
after World War I. All the other successor states kept the old Habsburg cur-
rency, despite the absence of a single currency authority, and plunged into
hyperination. Czechoslovakia, by contrast, escaped the havoc by swiftly
establishing its own currency and central bank. Eventually, the other suc-
cessor states launched their own currencies and independent central banks
and achieved nancial stability with the help of international nancial assis-
tance through the League of Nations (Pasvolsky 1928). Only Czechoslovakia
remained democratic throughout the interwar period. These insights were
alive in the international economic debate (Sargent 1986; Dornbusch 1992).
One lesson was that the best economic cure was to break up a common
1
The IMF ofcials concerned strongly dispute that they effectively supported monetary
chaos, as they urgedall these countries totightentheir scal andmonetary policies (Odling-
Smee and Pastor 2002).
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currency zone as soon as possible after a common monetary authority dis-
appeared. Another was that international nancial support is vital for the
creation of new currencies, and a third that independent central banks help
to render currencies stable. Finally, the post-Habsburg case showed the dan-
ger of dictatorship after hyperination, which made the population call for
elementary security at any price.
Alas, all the mistakes that had been made after the dissolution of the
Habsburg Empire were repeated with the ruble zone. Its breakup was pro-
tracted and agonizing. The Russian government tried to limit credit to the
other former Soviet republics fromJuly 1992, but with little success because
of opposition from the CBR. As a result, ten of the twelve members of
the ruble zone experienced hyperination in 1993. The only exceptions
were Kyrgyzstan, which left the ruble zone in May 1993, and Russia, which
pursued the strictest monetary policy. In Ukraine and Armenia, ination
exceeded 10,000 percent, and the hyperination caused economic chaos.
The cost of the ruble zone to Russia in 1992 amounted to no less than 9 per-
cent of its GDP in subsidized credits and 13 percent of GDP in implicit trade
subsidy, that is, a total of 22 percent of Russias GDP (IMF 1994a, p. 25).
Although the formal gains of other CIS states were enormous, ranging from
11 percent of GDP in Belarus and Moldova in 1992 to 91 percent of GDP in
Tajikistan (IMF 1994a), this owof money did not benet the whole nation,
only individual rent seekers.
In 1993, Russias reformist minister of nance, Boris Fedorov (1994), did
his utmost to break up the ruble zone, trying to cut credits to other CIS
countries and supporting Kyrgyzstans departure. Strangely, his nemesis
Viktor Gerashchenko, the old-style chairman of the CBR and the main
advocate of the ruble zone, suddenly terminated the ruble zone by declaring
old Soviet banknotes null and void in July 1993. Gerashchenkos intention
was possibly to force other countries to accept the rule of CBR, but his action
caused panic and compelled all remaining members of the ruble zone to
establish their national currencies within the next few months (Granville
1995a).
Althoughthe dysfunctional ruble zone lingeredfor solong, fewCIS coun-
tries prepared themselves for monetary independence. They fell into com-
plete disarray, and ination actually surged in several CIS countries in late
1993. However, with the exception of Azerbaijan, they all had less ination
in1994 thanin1993. The end of the ruble zone made monetary stabilization
possible. Although other causes contributed, it is noteworthy that democ-
racy failed in all the CIS countries that experienced hyperination in the
CIS exactly as in interwar Europe.
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In sharp contrast with the CIS, the Czech Republic and Slovakia repeated
their postWorld War I success after their peaceful split into two countries
onJanuary 1, 1993. The original intentionwas todivide the currency onJune
1, 1993. However, an immediate run on the currency led to a separation of
the Czech and Slovak korunas in mid-February 1993, and the Slovak koruna
was devalued in relation to the Czech koruna. Thanks to this early division
of the currencies, monetary stability was maintainedinbothcountries (Nuti
1996).
Radical Fiscal Adjustment Was Key
Macroeconomic stabilization policy came to characterize a countrys ap-
proach to postcommunist economic transformation. The two alternatives
were early, radical stabilization or a gradual approach.
Poland pioneered radical nancial stabilization or shock therapy. Its
main architects were Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz (1992) and
his advisors Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton (Balcerowicz 1992; Sachs 1990;
Lipton and Sachs 1990a; Sachs 1993; Sachs and Lipton 1990). They wanted
a comprehensive radical market reform to get the fundamentals right from
the outset and thought it better to play it safe than to risk failure. The
budget had to be brought to balance, which could be done as price liber-
alization eliminated large price subsidies, and enterprise subsidies needed
to be reduced. In 1991, Czechoslovakia launched a similar but even more
radical program of liberalization and stabilization. Estonia escalated fur-
ther. Latvia and Lithuania followed suit (Lainela and Sutela 1994; Banarjee
et al. 1995). Only these six countries undertook radical stabilization pro-
grams. Even they had problems pursuing a sufciently strict stabilization
because scal loopholes abounded.
The apparent alternative was Hungarys halfhearted nancial stabiliza-
tion. The Hungarian government did as little as it could get away with. It
tightened its budget decit in 1990 but then let it lapse, borrowing as much
money abroad as it could possibly service (Sz ekely and Newberry 1993;
Banarjee et al. 1995). The key difference between Hungary and Poland
was the initial conditions. Poland suffered from hyperination, whereas
Hungary only faced somewhat high ination and a large foreign debt ser-
vice. These two situations inspired different attitudes and policies, but they
became two opposing models in the debate. In structural reforms, by con-
trast, Hungary excelled.
The real gradual alternative was little or no stabilization, which was the
choice by default of most transition countries. It amounted to a very gradual
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policy, but without Hungarys justications. Throughout the CIS, enormous
budget decits persisted for no good economic reason. They were nanced
with the hyperinationary issue of money, as monetary policy remained
very lax. Only after serious nancial crisis, nancial stabilization was under-
taken.
The ministry of nance had to be reinforced. Because of the socialist legacy,
postsocialist ministries of nance hadlimitedcontrol over state expenditures
and revenues. Price subsidies and foreign trade subsidies were automatic.
The presidential administration was beyond scal control, taking what-
ever it desired. Many state agencies established extra-budgetary funds with
independent taxation and expenditures. The central bank issued subsidized
credits without asking the ministry of nance. Yet under capitalism, the
minister of nance must control scal policy and the governments purse
strings. The Central European and Baltic reformers successfully central-
ized scal control to their ministries of nance, and the minister of nance
became deputy prime minister in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
In the CIS countries, Romania, and Bulgaria, this struggle lasted longer.
Politically weak ministries of nance did not dare to refuse requests for
expenditures, piling up far larger planned expenditures than they could
nance.
Large budget decits were of no benet. Most of the region suffered from
large budget decits for a protracted period, but scal policies varied.
2
In
the early transition, three approaches were apparent. The virtuous stabilizers
(the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia; see Figure 5.4) started
their transition with more or less balanced budgets, which they maintained,
suggesting that the easiest way of balancing a budget is to do so consistently.
A second group (Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania) failed to reduce their
budget decits sufciently, compelling them to undertake substantial later
readjustments. Theywerenot as successful intheir budgetaryrestraints as the
rst group. The third group (all the CIS countries, Bulgaria, and Romania)
haddurable, largebudget decits. Theyall beganwithhugescal imbalances,
which they found very difcult to reduce. Their revenues declined as a share
of GDP, but the governments refused to face up to reality and undertake the
necessary expenditure cuts.
In1998, the picture changedcompletely. Approaching membershipinthe
European Union, the Central Europeans relaxed. They allowed their budget
decits to widen to about 6 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2003, far beyond
scal caution. The CIS countries, by contrast, were badly burned by the
2
Budget statistics are amazingly poor and contradictory.
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18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
2.0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%

o
f

G
D
P
Central Europe Baltics CIS
Figure 5.4. Fiscal Balance, 19892005. Sources: EBRD (1996), (2002), and (2006).
Russian nancial crisis. They realized that the cost of large budget decits
was unbearable and were forced to minimize their budget decits, because
both domestic and foreign nancing dried up. They now hover around
1 percent of GDP. Because little could be done to revenues in the short
term, they did so by cutting their expenditures. Only the three small Baltic
countries stayed virtuous throughout, with budgets close to balance.
The lesson is that the initial scal policy usually continues unless crisis
strikes. The Baltic experience suggests that the best policy was to stick to a
balanced budget. No large budget decit has led to economic recovery, and
the extensive advocacy of economic stimulation through scal decit seems
baseless.
State revenues contracted slowly. Socialist governments had redistributed
about 50 percent of GDP through the central government, although public
revenues of 1525 percent of GDP are normal for countries at that level of
economic development (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000). Czechoslovakia topped
with state revenues of no less than 61 percent of GDP in 1989, the highest
level of taxation in the world in a tie with Sweden. If the purpose had been
to promote economic growth, public expenditures and overtaxation should
have been slashed, but an unholy alliance supported large public redistri-
bution. West Europeans considered such a tax level normal, and many East
European reformers saw Western Europe as their model. Most economists
thought the state required more resources to meet the social challenges
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of transition. The IMF insisted on a small budget decit but had no strong
views on the level of public expenditures. A widespread fear of collapsing
public revenues prompted reform governments to raise tax rates.
Surprisingly, public revenues stayed high for years. In Central Europe,
total state revenues lingered at 46 percent of GDP until 1996 before moder-
ating to 40 percent (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
[EBRD] various years). The Baltic republics, Bulgaria, and Romania soon
approached an average of 35 percent of GDP. Only the CIS countries went
below 30 percent of GDP by 1995. The CIS falls into two categories. One
group of countries had total state revenues of 1423 percent of GDP at
the nadir in 1999, namely, the three Caucasian countries and four in Cen-
tral Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan). The other
ve CIS countries (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, andUzbekistan) have
maintained stable state revenues averaging 35 percent of GDP.
As long as ination stayed high, state revenues did so as well, which
contradicts the standard Olivera-Tanzi effect that enterprises delay their tax
payments during high ination to reduce their real taxes. One reason was
that public enterprises had no effective owners, and their managers did not
mindpaying taxes. Moreover, the state collectedtaxes throughthe state bank
system. As a result, it extracted much of the tax in advance, reversing the
Olivera-Tanzi effect tothe advantage of the state treasury. Whenstabilization
began to bite, state revenues started falling as expected because money was
becoming scarce, banks no longer collected tax, and many enterprises had
real owners who wanted to minimize taxes. State revenues contracted much
more in countries with durable high ination, which were also the most
corrupt. The worse the macroeconomic predicament, the lower the revenues
the state obtained.
Public expenditures were eventually severely cut. For years public expendi-
tures stayed excessive. Initially, the postcommunist states tried to maintain
public expenditures of around 50 percent of GDP, which they considered
socially necessary. Many countries even boosted them with new social
transfers, designedto mitigate social hardshipcausedby the transition. Usu-
ally, public expenditures have only been curtailed because of serious crises.
Exceptionally, the three Baltic states sensibly reduced their public expendi-
tures to some 30 percent of GDP by 1995 (see Figure 5.5). Severe trouble in
the early 1990s forcedmost CIScountries tohuge cuts inpublic expenditures
in 19945, although Russia stumbled on with an oversized budget decit
until its nancial crisis of 1998. The Central European countries, however,
never entered such a crisis and still maintain large public expenditures.
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%

o
f

G
D
P
Central Europe Baltics CIS
Figure 5.5. General Government Expenditures, 19892005. Sources: Tanzi and Tsibouris
(2000, p. 22); EBRD (2004) and (2006).
In the CIS, public expenditures cuts have been impressive. Public expen-
ditures plummeted from an average of 54 percent of GDP in 1992 to only
30 percent in 1996 in the midst of a large slump in output. In several coun-
tries, public expenditures were reduced by one-tenth of GDP during one
year. Successful budget cuts aimedat specic items. Price subsidies were usu-
ally about one-tenth of GDP, and they disappeared with the initial price lib-
eralization. Another early target was military expenditures. Enterprise sub-
sidies were more difcult to reduce, although they frequently exceeded one-
tenth of GDP. During the so-called shock therapy in Poland in 1990, more
than 7 percent of GDP was still spent on enterprise subsidies (EBRD 1997,
p. 83), and in 1998 it amounted to no less than 16 percent of GDP in Russia
(Pinto et al., 1999). It normally took a severe scal crisis to make it politically
possible to cut corporate subsidies, as in Bulgaria in 1997, Russia in 1998,
or Ukraine in 2000.
Ironically, those countries that insistedonlarger public expenditures than
they couldaffordcondemnedthemselves tohighandlasting ination, which
prompted their state revenues to fall even further, eventually compelling
these countries to make do with even less (Gaidar 1998). Similarly, the
stabilization process was not sustained in countries that had persistent scal
decits and slowstructural reforms (Fischer and Sahay 2000, p. 9). On one
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hand, lasting high ination led to greater corruption. On the other, the very
dysfunction of the state made it necessary to cut public expenditures more,
which later would facilitate new economic growth.
Tax Policy: From Social Democratic to Liberal
Everybody agreed on the need for substantial changes in taxation.
3
The
original socialist economy hadno real tax system. At the endof eachyear, the
state simply conscated the remaining prots of state enterprises. Turnover
and foreign trade taxes were nothing but the balance between arbitrarily set
prices. This system of arbitrary discretion could not continue. However, tax
reformwas deemed too complex to be in the forefront of the transition, and
all stopped at piecemeal measures. This neglect would come back to haunt
policy makers and eventually cause radical innovation.
Several principles for taxation were widely embraced. First, a broad con-
sensus supported a move from individually set taxes to universal tax rates.
Second, the worry about the collapse of tax collection made governments
opt for high tax rates. Even reformers accepted tax hikes, contradicting their
long-term vision of low taxes. Third, a simple and transparent system was
desirable. Fourth, taxes should no longer be concentrated to enterprises, but
the tax base should be broadened to people. Fifth, a desire prevailed to move
taxes from production to consumption. Finally, the consensus was that tax
reformwas so complicated that it had to be legislated and implemented over
many years.
From the outset, two tax philosophies developed. One was social demo-
cratic, favoring high taxes and progressive income taxes. It originated in
Hungary, which had reformed its tax system thoroughly before the end of
socialism. In 1988, it had adopted the Swedish tax system with high value
added tax (VAT), a progressive income tax reaching 60 percent, a payroll tax
of almost 60 percent, but comparatively low prot taxes and import tariffs.
This social democratic model became one standard for tax reforms in the
region, adopted by Central Europe and the least reformist CIS countries
Ukraine, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.
Estonia pioneered a liberal alternative, a simple tax system with few and
low taxes with minimal loopholes. Its main innovation was a at personal
income tax of 26 percent for all. Estonia alsoabolishedall foreigntrade taxes.
A VAT of 18 percent was the main tax. Apart from a moderate payroll tax
3
This section draws heavily on IMF, notably Tanzi (1992) and Ebrill and Havrylyshyn
(1999), as well as D abrowski (1996), Dmitriev and Kartsev (1996), and Dmitriev (1997).
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(33 percent), prot tax, and land tax, Estonia hardly had any other taxes.
Even so, it collected nearly 40 percent of GDP in state revenues thanks to a
highly legitimate tax system and eminent collection. Because of its high tax
revenues, it was able to abolish the prot tax in 2000. As usual, Latvia and
Lithuania closely followed Estonias example (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2000b).
Under socialism, taxes had been paid by a limited number of state enter-
prises and automatically collected through the state bank system. Now each
country needed a large new tax collection agency. From the left to the IMF,
fear reignedthat taxcollectionwouldcollapse, but theresurgenceof thecom-
munist bureaucracy was not to be underestimated. Not only East-Central
Europe but also the post-Soviet states organized huge tax inspections in no
time, because the old communist system mastered bureaucracy, inspection,
and punishment. The CIS countries also set up tax police with full-edged
policemen, who were highly motivated because they worked on commis-
sion. These two agencies collected the same taxes fromthe same taxpayers in
severe competition. Also the customs service and various extra-budgetary
funds joined the competition for tax revenues, resulting in an overgrazing
of the tax base (Shleifer and Treisman 2000).
The state monopoly of taxation had broken down and been replaced by
lawless persecution of honest taxpayers. If you paid taxes to one service, you
were more likely to be charged again, as the tax system was too arbitrary
to offer any legal protection. Prot-making enterprises without political
protection were overgrazed, often fatally so. Budding new entrepreneurs
were visited by scores of new revenue and inspection agencies, which rav-
aged enterprises with cumbersome inspections, arrests, penalties, and fees,
extorting money. A Sovietlike bureaucratic Leviathan arose in countries
that needed to be liberalized from the state, and the vital legal protection of
businessmen was ignored. As EBRD (1999, p. 120) put it:
Although the formal systemof central planning has beenabandoned, the bargaining
between the state and rms has not ceased but rather changed form . . . state and
enterprises engage in a web of interactions beyond the standard provision of public
goods in exchange for taxes. The state gives a wide range of benets to rms, in
the form of state nancing, explicit subsidies and implicit subsidies, including tax-
related benets (for example, offsets) and tolerance of arrears. Firms provide state
ofcials withpolitical andprivate benets inthe formof control rights over company
decisions and bribes.
Regional and local authorities also threw themselves into the tax compe-
tition. Although a handful of taxes reaped more than three-quarters of state
revenues, regional and local taxes started proliferating, because most of the
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major taxes were reserved for the central government, and the regional gov-
ernments wanted to boost their meager revenues as well. Russia had some
200 taxes in the late 1990s, as each region invented taxes to cover its own
needs. Usually, these taxes were highly cumbersome andinefcient, typically
licensing fees or penalties (McKinsey Global Institute 1999). The regions had
noincentive todeliver additional funds tothe center. Kravchuk(1999) found
that the marginal tax effect on a Ukrainian regional government exceeded
100 percent. Economically devastating extortionary raids that disrupted the
work of enterprises were most lucrative to regional treasuries.
This overcentralized scal systemseems too dysfunctional to last. Shleifer
and Treisman (2000) drew the logical conclusions for Russia, arguing for
a system of full-edged scal federalism with separate tax bases, taxes, and
tax services for the center, the regions, and the municipalities. Each level of
government shouldbe fullyincharge of certaintaxes, andthe responsibilities
for various kinds of expenditures should be clearly divided between various
levels of government. Actual developments are proceeding in this direction,
but very slowly.
For too long, the IMF and other Western agencies resisted tax cuts until
tax administration had improved, but the tax administration could not
improve much when actual taxes were conscatory. A new tax philosophy
evolved after expenditures had been slashed. One country after the other
rethought its taxation, opting for fewer, lower, and atter taxes because it
made no sense to have many taxes that bred corruption and little revenues
but hampered growth. This wave of tax reforms did not come fromthe West
but from the East.
Personal income taxes were insignicant under communism. As transi-
tionstarted, virtuallyeverybodywantedtoraiseincometaxes for amixtureof
social democratic ambitions, populism, and aspirations to tax people more.
Hungary had a progressive income tax rising to 60 percent, but Ukraine
raised its maximum personal income tax to 90 percent in 1994. As hyper-
ination had boosted nominal incomes, this marginal tax rate applied to
people whoearnedas little as $100a month(D abrowski et al. 2000). Needless
to say, no Ukrainian paid that tax.
Gradually, the at tax revolution originating in Estonia in 1994 started
spreading. The big breakthrough was Russias introduction of a at income
tax of 13 percent in 2000, which led to a big boost in revenues frompersonal
income taxes. In2004, Ukraine followed. Slovakia introducedthree at taxes
of 19 percent for personal income tax, corporate prot tax, and VAT. After
a right-wing electoral victory in Romania, that country did one better in
2005, introducing a at personal income tax, corporate prot tax, and VAT
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of 16 percent. President Akaev in Kyrgyzstan enacted at tax rates of 10 per-
cent for both corporate prots and personal income, but he was blocked
by the IMF, which feared falling tax revenues. These low tax rates were
introduced eventually, but only in 2006, after Akaev had been ousted in the
Tulip Revolution of March 2005. The Baltics have slightly reduced their at
income tax to about 24 percent.
4
Meanwhile, corporate prot taxes in East-
Central Europe have generally fallen to 1519 percent, and tax competition
is proliferating in the region. Still, in Central Europe, most taxes remain
high. In Poland, the payroll tax is 48 percent, and the progressive income
tax reaches 40 percent.
Despite a slow start, most of the postcommunist region has realized that
it can no longer live with West European taxation. It needs fewer, simpler,
lower, and atter taxes than Western Europe. Low at income taxes and
corporate prot taxes are proliferating. Only after taxes have been reduced
and simplied can tax administration be reformed.
Monetary Policy: From Loose to Strict
With transition, money became real. Reformers identied three broad tasks
for monetary policy: to strengthen the central banks, to restrict the issue
of money, and to move from administrative measures to market-oriented
instruments. Monetary policy went through swift and complete transfor-
mation, from black to white, turning from very loose to quite strict.
Central banks faced problems similar to those of ministries of nance.
In the old socialist system, the central bank was a subordinate agency for
the distribution of credit and cash. Central banking was not distinct from
commercial banking because the central bank issued credits directly to
enterprises.
In line with the prevailing macroeconomic orthodoxy, reformers wanted
to grant the central bank autonomy fromboth government and parliament,
which had a habit of ordering the issue of money. Although the chief refor-
mer was mostly the minister of nance, central banks reformed faster than
ministries of nance. One reason was their relative independence from
the state administration, which allowed their chairmen and staff compara-
tively safe tenure. As they were self-nancing, central banks had substantial
resources, permitting them to offer high salaries and attract more quali-
ed staff, forming an elitist corps desprit. Western central banks offered
their new colleagues effective technical assistance and good training. Many
4
The IMF remains skeptical of at income taxes (Keen et al. 2006).
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chairmen of central banks had long tenures and became the heroes of sta-
bilization in their countries (for instance, in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Romania, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). Russia, by contrast, illustrated
the problem with an independent central bank without accountability.
Thrice Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, Viktor Gerashchenko,
5
issued more money than anybody else, causing both high ination and cur-
rency collapse, while stalling banking reforms. His generous credits enriched
so many privileged that his popularity in the elite was guaranteed.
Another priority was to stop direct commercial credits by the central
bank to enterprises. In 1990, only Hungary and Poland did so, and direct
enterprise credits remained substantial in most CIS countries until 1995.
All CIS countries started with very low old Soviet interest rates of just a few
percent, while reformers wished to raise real interest rates to a positive level
and have the Central Bank interact with the commercial banks only through
renancing and open market operations (De Melo and Denizer 1999).
The money supply exploded in the early transition, and so did ination.
The high ination led to sharp demonetization. It was used by the establish-
ment toadvocate more emissionof money, althoughemissiononlyincreased
the supply of money, not the demand. In 1989, the volume of money (M2)
to GDP was 55 percent in Central Europe and the Soviet Union compared
with 7580 percent inthe West. At face value, this rationlooked sensible, but
much of the socialist savings was involuntarily because people could nd
nothing to buy as a result of shortages. It was impossible to estimate how
much money people would like to hold when shortages had disappeared.
In addition, ination undermined the condence in money as a store of
value and thus reduced the demand for money (Boone and Hrder 1998;
De Melo and Denizer 1999). As high ination persisted while interest rates
remained low, hard currency or commodities proved better stores of values.
After three to four years of high ination, the ratio of M2 to GDP had fallen
to 820 percent in most CIS countries (EBRD 1997, 1999, 2000).
Yet after a few years, one country after another suddenly went from soft
to strict monetary policy. Temporarily, many countries opted for extremely
high real interest rates 150 percent a year in Russia and even 200 percent
a year in Ukraine in 1996. They stayed high for long in many CIS countries
because of sizable scal decits, and treasury bonds crowded out private
investment. People had learned that a loose monetary policy was socially
costly, as massive cheap credits made production plummet. Another expla-
nation of this sharp turnaround was that the benets of cheap credits had
dwindled. As demonetization proceeded, the seignorage or ination tax
5
His rst term was at the UUS Gosbank.
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declined because people and enterprises were no longer willing to hold
much money. The beneciaries proceeded to other forms of rent seeking,
rendering high real interest rates politically possible (slund et al. 1996).
Instead, the highyields of treasury bills became a newboondoggle (Treisman
1998).
Entrepreneurial but Problematic Banking Systems
The socialist economies had institutions called banks, but that was an unde-
served compliment, because they merely carried out payments and dis-
tributed credit on government command to state enterprises (Begg 1996).
State credits were seen as subsidies. Unfortunately, state banks outlived
socialism. Their decisions remained politicized. They had no staff or rel-
evant information system for credit assessment, and economic trends were
enigmatic. In the absence of both skills and information, bankers gave polit-
ical and personal preference to large state enterprises, which were least likely
to do well. Adding corruption to this cocktail of misallocation, the bank
system was dysfunctional.
Banks developed very differently in Central and Southeast Europe on one
hand and in the Baltics and the CIS on the other. In Central Europe, the
old state banks remained dominant, while new small private banks, usually
specialized, business-oriented banks, evolved slowly. In most CIS countries
andtheBaltics, statebanks weresobadthat their rolesoondwindled. Instead,
hundreds of new commercial banks mushroomed in the last years of the
Soviet Union. In January 1992, Russia alone had 1,360 banks registered, and
their number peaked at more than 2,500 in 1994 (Johnson 2000, pp. 7, 27).
These banks were subject only tothe most rudimentary regulation. They had
been set up under the Soviet Law on Cooperatives of May 1988 and thrived
on cheap credits issued in competition by the Soviet State Bank and the
Central Bank of Russia. As Grigory Yavlinsky put it: Usually banks attract
deposits from the population and give credits to enterprises, but our banks
take money from the state and put it into bank accounts in Switzerland.
6
These banks were designed as rent-seeking vehicles, and many were pocket
banks of enterprises, richindividuals, or oldministries (Johnsonet al. 1993;
Dmitriev et al. 1996; Johnson 2000).
Almost all countries in the region have gone through bank crises. One
cause was that customers went bankrupt, another that banks miscalculated
currency risks, borrowing in hard currency and giving credits at home in
local currency or buying treasury bonds. Corruption and incompetence
were contributing factors. Newbankers made easy fortunes onhighination
6
Statement at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999.
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in the early transition, but they suffered from stabilization. As commercial
banks were collapsing, the government had to make two important choices:
whether to bail out banks and whether to give priority for state banks.
Big bank crashes started in Hungary, and they led to excessive recapital-
ization by the state, which was soon repeated and became costly (Bonin and
Schaffer 1995). When Hungary nally put its public nances into order in
1995, the government sold all the remaining state banks to foreign investors.
That helped. Hungarian banks became transparent, competitive, service-
oriented, andcautious, probably the best banks inthe region. The large-scale
admission of international banks solved the bank morass.
Once again, Estonia offered a contrast to Hungary. After its vigorous
stabilization, Estonia faced a major banking crisis in late 1992. As usual, it
went for a radical solution. Its commercial banks were forced to accept truly
hard budget constraints. Revealing extensive fraud, the Bank of Estonia
closed and bankrupted the countrys three biggest commercial banks. The
shareholders lost everything, and the depositors received only partial
compensation because they had bet on high interest rates while facing a
wide choice of interest rates differentiated by risk (Hansson and Tombak
1999). Almost all major banks in the Baltics were sold to foreigners, as in
Hungary.
Surprisingly, most CIS countries followed the Balts in their severe treat-
ment of failing banks, closing down most large post-Soviet banks. Even
Ukraine closed scores of banks with little compassion for the bankers. Polit-
ically, this was possible because the banking system was not very important
to the economy. With so limited monetization and credit volume, the banks
lacked political leverage, and even weak governments dared to bankrupt
banks. The newly rich bankers were widely disliked. The independence of
central banks helped. The combination of little economic damage and lim-
ited state largess to banks rendered bank crises in the region much less costly
than in other parts of the world (Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez 1996). Apos-
itive result of the fast bank expansion was that ATM machines spread like
wildre through Russia, and credit cards became widely used, developing
technical sophistication in payments.
Since the completion of nancial stabilization at the end of the 1990s,
the postcommunist banking system has developed fast and amazingly well.
Credit anddeposit volumes have exploded, andthe gapbetweenlending and
borrowingrates has shrunk. Anewgaphas openedupbetweenRussia, which
remains dominated by state banks, and most of the other countries, which
have predominantly private and foreign-owned banks. The explanation is
that duringits nancial crashin1998, theRussiangovernment discriminated
in favor of state-owned banks. As a consequence, Russia is less monetized
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than Ukraine or Kazakhstan, and the Russian banking system is far less
dynamic.
Capital Flight
Capital ight became a big theme in the discussion of Russias transition.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan had similar capital ight, although it was more
limited in other countries. Common estimates put the capital ight from
Russia at about $20 billion a year, starting in 1991. The origin of the capital
ight was underinvoiced commodity exports, mainly oil and metals. This
private windfall was kept in banks in offshore havens.
Capital ight went through three stages. In the initial capital ight, state
managers were stealing from state enterprises through transfer pricing and
evading export tariffs. Besides, they wanted to escape the unstable Soviet
ruble. In19945, the capital ight fromRussia abatedwiththe reducedgains
on commodity arbitrage and the onset of stabilization.
Asecondwave of capital ight startedin1996, as the taxpressure increased
and tax evasion became essential. Transfer pricing for commodities contin-
ued, because new managing owners wanted to defraud not only the state
but also the other owners.
A third wave followed because of lacking condence in local currencies
and Russian banks after the bank crash of August 1998. Nobody wanted to
keep more money than necessary for transactions in Russian banks. Simi-
larly, the 1998 devaluation deterred everybody from keeping local CIS cur-
rencies for years. The so-called Bank of New York scandal that absorbed
U.S. media in the fall of 1999 was a reection of sensible Russians transfer-
ring their money holdings abroad, which the Russian state tried to prohibit
in vain.
Joseph Stiglitz (1999a, 2006) has blamed capital ight on these countries
early introduction of convertibility and deregulation of capital markets, but
this is incorrect. Capital ight ballooned in Soviet times in 1991, when full
currency regulations were in force. Russia introduced convertibility on cur-
rent account inJune 1996 and Ukraine inMay 1997, but currency regulation
was in fact severe (EBRD 1997). Only in July 2006 did Russia introduce full
convertibility. Deregulation of capital markets and convertibility were not
the causes of the capital ight but vice versa. The huge capital ight neces-
sitated the deregulation of capital ows.
Exchange Rates: Currency Board or Free Float
At the outset of transition, exchange rate policy was a major theme. Most
radical reformers advocated an exchange-rate-based stabilization, using a
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pegged exchange rate as nominal anchor, but others preferred the money
supply as nominal anchor in a money-based stabilization, allowing the
exchange rate to oat.
The rst task was to unify the exchange rate, because all countries started
with multiple exchange rates. The public sawthe black market exchange rate
as the real rate because it was set on the market. However, the black mar-
ket rate was depressed by the diversion of government funds at a subsidized
ofcial rate, the domestic monetary overhang, pent-up domestic demand
for importedgoods, highinationary expectations, ight fromthe domestic
currency in crisis, and great uncertainty. Even so, when exchange rates were
uniedandliberalized, the initial result was huge devaluations (Halpernand
Wyplosz 1996). In Russia, the average wage was merely U.S. $6 a month by
the free exchange rate in December 1991, and the level was similar in other
CIS countries. The higher the initial ination and the worse the shortages,
the greater the initial devaluation was. Many economists warned against
these initial market exchange rates as undervalued, complicating price sta-
bilization (Nuti 1996). Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, and
Russia framed the debate.
In 1989, the Polish exchange rate uctuated wildly before the onset of
hyperination in October. This vacillation was perceived as an unnecessary
harm, leading to the thought of pegging the Polish zloty to the U.S. dol-
lar, Polands informal currency. The peg would serve as a nominal anchor
for macroeconomic stabilization (Granville 1990; Sachs 1990, 1992). To
make the peg possible, Poland needed to replenish its depleted international
reserves. The country successfully raised credits of $1 billion for a stabi-
lization fund, which was nanced by Western countries (IMF 1994c). In
January 1990, Poland also made its zloty convertible on current account. It
presented its peg as a temporary measure, and in May 1991, it was com-
pelled to devalue without drama. It adopted a crawling peg, committing
itself to staying within a band of moderate devaluation, which was modied
from time to time. This policy of a temporary xing of the exchange rate
and an ensuing gradual devaluation was widely acclaimed. Financial sta-
bilization was accomplished, but Poland avoided an overvalued exchange
rate (Wyplosz 1999; Nuti 1996; Rosati 1996). Poland is considered a rare
successful exit from a peg (Fischer and Sahay 2000).
Another big-bang country, Czechoslovakia, also pegged its exchange rate
to the U.S. dollar from January 1991, with the support of a similar sta-
bilization fund, provided by Western bilateral nancing. The peg worked
well as a nominal anchor, and ination was checked. But Czechoslovakias
ination remained higher than in the United States or Western Europe,
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leading to a continuous real appreciation. The increasing overvaluation of
the Czech koruna hampered exports and economic growth. In May 1997,
the Czech Republic was forced to abandon its peg (Begg 1998). Slovakia
pursued a similar policy with the same results. For the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, the temporary peg had unintentionally become permanent as a
matter of national pride. The Czech example became an argument against
pegs, illustrating how easily a peg could lead to an overvalued exchange
rate. Several Latin America countries had similar experiences. Their suc-
cessful exchange-rate-based stabilizations bred overvaluation of their cur-
rencies, which caused balance-of-payments crises (Calvo and V egh 1999).
Moreover, such stabilization provided governments with little incentive to
undertake scal reform because the low ination was associated with the
stable exchange rate rather than with a limited budget decits (Tornell and
Velasco 1995).
As usual, Hungary made a different choice from Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia. Having attained near-convertibility by 1989, it had little reason to
rush to full convertibility. With a market-adjusted exchange rate and almost
constant ination, Hungary had no need to devalue greatly or to use the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor; its sophisticatedmonetary policy already
served as a nominal anchor. Its choice was frequent but small devaluations
to limit real appreciation and stay competitive. In 1995, Hungary adopted
a preannounced crawling peg to limit the uncertainty and irregularity of
devaluations (Halpern1996). This pragmatic policywas successful. Through
slightly different paths, Hungary and Poland arrived at the same policy of
crawling pegs maintaining a reasonably valued currency. To the interna-
tional community, the Hungarian example suggested that a xed exchange
rate was not necessary as a nominal anchor. This policy was cheaper because
no stabilization fund, and less international funding, was required. Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary all adopted ination targeting after they
had exited their pegs.
In the Baltics, Estonia took the lead as usual and went for an even more
radical choice than Poland.
7
As other former Soviet republics, Estonia faced
near hyperinationinearly1992, but it wantedtominimize inationregard-
less of costs and integrate with the West. It was the rst country to break
out of the ruble zone and establish its independent currency, the kroon, in
June 1992. It adopted the so-called currency board, permanently xing the
7
Estonia was lucky to have Ardo Hansson, an American of Estonian extraction with a Ph.D.
in economics from Harvard University and an associate of Jeffrey Sachs, as the leading
economic advisor to the Estonian government and the Bank of Estonia for years.
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exchange rate of the kroon to the German mark to facilitate macroeconomic
stabilization. Estonia was also the rst postcommunist country to opt for
full convertibility in 1994. Lithuania carried out a similar currency reform
in October 1992 and opted for a currency board in April 1994 (Hansson
1997; Berengaut et al. 1998).
The lesson from Estonia was that currency boards are suitable for small,
open economies with great need for macroeconomic credibility and exi-
ble domestic markets, but a xed misaligned exchange rate, as well as the
Balassa-Samuelson effect, could lead to protracted ination as in the Baltics,
or squeeze exports as inthe CzechRepublic. In1996, whenBulgaria entereda
severe macroeconomic crisis, the IMFprescribeda currency boardtorestore
its credibility. Similarly, the international community conceived of a cur-
rency board for Bosnia in 1998 (Minassian 1998). For large countries, such
as Russia and Ukraine, however, it seemed inappropriate that the balance
of payments would determine the money supply. Besides, it was difcult to
mobilize reserves covering the whole money supply, to abstain from central
bank policy, and to commit credibly to a balanced budget. The absence of a
lender of last resort was also a concern (Williamson 1995; Berengaut et al.
1998).
Russia and the other CIS countries presented a very different drama. As
Russia was preparing for a big bang in early 1992, Jeffrey Sachs (1995a)
campaigned for a $6 billion stabilization fund for the pegging of the ruble.
However, international support was not forthcoming, and the idea of fur-
ther stabilization funds fell off the table as neither economically appropriate
nor possible to nance. With minimal international reserves and little credi-
bility, Russia and most CIS countries had no choice but to let their exchange
rates oat by default. Although the rubles nominal exchange rate plum-
meted, the ruble underwent a substantial real appreciation. As stabilization
was approaching in early summer 1995, even the nominal exchange rate
started rising, causing worries about destabilizing exchange rate vacillation.
The Russian authorities responded by introducing a broad currency band
in July 1995, which contributed to the stabilization of both prices and the
exchange rate. Ironically, it was too successful in attracting foreign portfolio
investment because the very high domestic interest rates enticed a massive
inow of foreign funds into short-term domestic treasury bills, offering up
to 100 percent a year in yield. The currency band provided a false sense
of nancial security, which led to too little devaluation and too soft a s-
cal policy, contributing to the Russian nancial crash of August 1998. The
result was devaluation by 75 percent (Illarionov 1998a, 1998b). The Russian
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nancial crash brought a lasting disrepute to currency bands and pegs, and
a managed oat became the favored exchange rate policy (Wyplosz 1999).
In May 2004, Central Europe and the Baltics became members of the
European Union, and Bulgaria and Romania joined in January 2007. They
are all supposed to join the European Monetary Union and adopt the euro
in due time. To do so, they must comply with the Maastricht criteria on
limited ination, limited budget decits (maximum 3 percent of GDP),
limited debt (maximum 60 percent of GDP), and exchange rates pegged
to the euro. The three Baltic states and Bulgaria have xed exchange rates
because of their currency boards, but all have too high ination. The Central
European economies have only ination and debt ratios under control, but
they have not pegged their exchange rates to the euro, and their budget
decits are excessive. They cannot adopt the euro for many years to come.
The crisis of the EU after its failure to adopt the new European constitution
and to impose the rules of the EU Stabilization and Growth Pact leaves the
possible expansion of the euro area in a quandary.
After the Russian 1998 crash, a near consensus developed about two
alternative exchange rate policies. Small open economies may opt for a
currency board and eventually adopt the euro, whereas other countries are
advised to let their currencies oat. Yet years of stability have shaken this
wisdom. The Central Europeancountries are supposedtoadopt a peg before
they join the euro. Moreover, does it really make sense that the small, poor
CIS countries have independent national currencies with minimal nancial
depth?
Dramas of Financial Stabilization
A decade after the collapse of communism, ination was under control
everywhere. Ination rates have continued to decline to the single digits.
Foreign direct investment is rising steadily. Yet many countries suffered
fromextreme ination for years. Amyth runs thus: All the postcommunist
countries pursued similar policies aimed at curbing ination, balancing the
budget, and stabilizing the exchange rate (Lavigne 2000, p. 18). Alas, the
differences inmacroeconomic policy were considerable, and the contrasting
outcomes were natural consequences of these policies. Large budget decits
do nurture high ination. A few nancial stabilizations stand out: Poland
1990; Russia 1992, 1995, and 1998; Kyrgyzstan 1993; and Bulgaria 1996.
Many of the facts have been discussed separately earlier in the chapter, but
this section ties together the different knots.
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Poland was the pioneer of transition, doing everything to control ina-
tion. Its high ination prompted a radical reform program. The Polish
government devoted the last two months of 1989 to the double task of get-
ting the necessary reform legislation promulgated by the parliament and of
raising international nancing. Both of these efforts were necessary for suc-
cess, and they were accomplished thanks to the stubborn and clearheaded
Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz, who was rewarded by becoming
the most hated man in the land. The West displayed a broad consensus on
Poland from the outset, gathering in the G-24 (the then 24 members of the
OECD) and pledging nancing to the stabilization fund. Key elements were
price liberalization, anoverbalancedbudget, a peggedexchange rate, anIMF
standby program, substantial international funding, incomes policy, and a
reasonably rm monetary policy. Still, political furor made it impossible to
maintain these strict policies for long. Monetary policy eased in the summer
of 1990, and the budget decit ballooned to 7 percent of GDP in both 1991
and 1992, leading to a high ination of 44 percent in 1992, when Poland
returned to growth. Alas, in the spring of 1991 Poland failed to comply with
the IMFs scal andmonetary conditions. Consequently, the IMFsuspended
its disbursements for 1992 and 1993 in accordance with its rule book. Even
so, or perhaps because of IMF stringency, Poland succeeded in its systemic
change and stabilization, returning to economic growth rst of all post-
communist countries in 1992. What was widely perceived as an excessively
tough stabilization policy turned out to be wise precaution. Besides, the
strong Western support for Poland was relatively cheap. The up-front cost
was about $1.6 billion. Poland was a stellar example of what international
support could accomplish in a postcommunist crisis (Sachs 1993).
The evenmore radical Estonianstabilizationbrought downinationfrom
954 percent in 1992, to 36 percent in 1993. The currency board required a
permanently balanced state budget, and it eliminated both monetary pol-
icy and public borrowing because the money supply was determined by
the current account balance. The idea of a currency board arose in sev-
eral quarters (Hanke et al. 1992; Hansson and Sachs 1992). Although the
IMF did not initiate the currency board, it accepted the idea and provided
technical assistance andinsistedonadequate scal policies. This was a robust
arrangement, creating maximum credibility both at home and abroad.
Financially, the currency boardwas possible inEstonia because before World
War II, the Estonian government had deposited its large gold reserves in
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, and it obtained them back.
The currency board and stabilization policy were introduced in a true big
bang in June 1992, combined with an IMF standby programand substantial
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Western nancial support with great success. The currency board, together
with completely free trade, minimized government interference in foreign
trade, rendering Estonia the freest trader and the least corrupt postcommu-
nist country. It attracteda large early inowof foreigndirect investment. The
drawback was that ination remained in double digits until 1998 because of
the low initial exchange rate, leading to a substantial real appreciation, and
the large capital inows could not be sterilized. Again, the G-24 rose to the
task and identied a nancing need of $1 billion for the three Baltic States
for one year, but it was more difcult to nd donors this time. For such small
economies, the IMF and the World Bank were constrained by their rules to
pledge only $400 million. The European Union, Japan, the Scandinavian
countries, and Germany saved the day with disproportionate bilateral con-
tributions, while the United States offered no nancial support (Lainela
and Sutela 1994; Citrin and Lahiri 1995).
8
Although the international aid
effort to the Baltics was a triumph, it revealed the Wests limitations. The
U.S. refusal to provide balance-of-payments support to the Baltics in 1992
marked the end of major Western aid efforts to transition countries because
the Europeans were not prepared to offer nancing without a U.S. share. In
the future, the international nancial institutions had to face the music on
their own.
The abortive Russian stabilization in 1992 was heroic but partial. Its main
achievement was the balancing of the budget in the rst quarter, thanks to
far-reaching price liberalization and cuts in military expenditures. Russias
reformer, Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, initially slashed arms pro-
curement by 85 percent, which eventually became 70 percent, although the
military-industrial complex hadbeenperceivedas invincible (slund1995).
Alas, the Russian reformers failed to attract any international nancing, and
soon domestic political acrimony arose. The Russian reformers lacked the
political muscle to undertake key reforms. First, the reformers failed to gain
political control over monetary policy, and the persistence of the ruble zone
warranted the competitive emission of money. Second, they lost their strug-
gle to liberalize energy prices and exports of commodities. Third, they had
no chance to abolish huge import subsidies. The outcome was near hyper-
ination of 2,500 percent in 1992. Stabilization and market reform suffered
a devastating blow, which reverberated throughout the whole of the CIS.
Soon after the radical reform attempt had faded in the early summer of
1992, some Western leaders woke up and realized that this attempt had been
8
I was marginally involved in this fund-raising campaign on behalf of Swedish Prime
Minister Carl Bildt.
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genuine, but it was too late. A period of limited reforms and limited IFI
nancing followed from mid-1992 to October 1994. The IMF concluded
several small loan agreements on soft and not very credible conditions,
but Russian implementation became a persistent problem because the IFIs
mainRussiancounterpart was no reformer but Prime Minister Viktor Cher-
nomyrdin, an experienced Soviet industrial minister and the leader of the
energy lobby. Some important structural reforms were accomplished by a
few remaining reformers in the Russian government, such as the abolition
of the ruble zone, import subsidies and subsidies credits, great deregulation
of exports, as well as mass privatization, but no stabilization was in sight.
Russians adjusted their old Soviet saying to: We pretend to reform, and
they [the IMF] pretend to nance us.
The other CIS countries watched Russia closely. They saw how spectac-
ularly Russia failed in 1992, and they concluded that if even Russia could
not attract international nancial support and accomplish price stabiliza-
tion, they had no chance, so why challenge their own establishments (Akaev
2000)? Their only short-term hope was Russian price subsidies and subsi-
dized credits supplied through the ruble zone. Thus, the Wests refusal to
support the Russian reformers brought disaster on the rest of the CIS. Their
nancial stabilization was delayed by a fewyears, and reforms were not only
delayed but distorted, breeding extraordinary corruption.
The rst CIS country to opt out of the ruble zone and undertake a suc-
cessful nancial stabilization was faraway Kyrgyzstan. It did so with an IMF
program and substantial international nancing in May 1993. Despite con-
siderable expenditure cuts, it maintained a large decit, mainly nanced
with international loans. As a compensation for soft scal policy, it pursued
a very strict monetary policy with high positive real interest rates. Because
of scarce reserves, its exchange rate was left oating. Kyrgyzstans ination
declined from 1,363 percent in 1993 to 32 percent in 1995. Moldova under-
took a similar stabilization later in 1993, and Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan followed in 1994, Russia in 1995, and Ukraine
in 1996. A problem with these stabilizations was that they relied too much
on monetary policy, resulting in very high interest rates, whereas the budget
decits of most CIS countries remained excessive. Their scal laxity was to
come back to haunt them.
Russian stabilization was renewed in 1995. In October 1994, a currency
crisis woke the Russian establishment up. After the budget decit and mon-
etary emission had expanded excessively, the ruble exchange rate plum-
meted by 27 percent in a single day, and ination shot up. Money had
assumed economic signicance, and this currency crisis suddenly made
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macroeconomic stabilization a political priority. Russias successful priva-
tizer, Anatoly Chubais, became rst deputy prime minister for macroeco-
nomic policy. The Russian government sharply reduced the budget decit
and concluded its rst full-edged standby agreement with the IMF in April
1995. Withthe authorityof real nancial support, Chubais wonthe intragov-
ernmental struggle over the reduction of subsidies and the elimination of
tax exemptions for privileged lobbies. By the summer of 1996, nancial sta-
bilization had been attained, and ination dropped to 22 percent (slund
1999).
Many factors made the Russian stabilization of 1995 possible. First, the
initial transition rents from high ination had shrunk because subsidized
credits andimport subsidies were gone, andexport rents were small. Second,
the currency crisis of October 1994 created a political momentum for re-
form. Third, the emissionof treasurybills denominatedinrubles hadcreated
a strong constituency for a more stable exchange rate (Treisman 1998).
Fourth, the reformers in the government fought better than ever, hitting all
important interest groups rather than offering them trade-offs, delivering a
shocktorent seekers. Althoughthe government was dominatedby industrial
lobbies, enterprise subsidies and regional transfers were cut by two-thirds.
The paradigmswitchedfromrent seekingtowardprot seeking. Fifth, nally
the Russian government and the Central Bank were pursuing a coordinated
economic policy, aiming at macroeconomic stabilization, which enhanced
credibility.
9
Sixth, for the rst time, the IMF offered substantial credits. Its
standby loan amounted to 2 percent of Russias GDP in one year, giving the
IMF substantial political weight. Finally, Gaidars reformist party, Russias
Choice, was the largest parliamentary faction, providing the reformers with
a strong base in the State Duma. All these factors taken together generated
credibility.
Bulgarias ex-communist government had undertaken a halfhearted sta-
bilization, but in 1996, it bumbled into a serious scal crisis. As the budget
decit exceeded 10 percent of GDP, it could no longer service its external
debt. The dominant state banks hadbeendolingout subsidies togovernment
cronies, whichwere replenishedby the state budget. Eventually, however, the
state had to let plenty of banks go bankrupt. Because of external default, the
exchange rate went into tailspin, and hyperination was a fact in February
1997. The GDP collapsed by 10 percent in 1996, and Bulgarians protested
in the streets and democratically ousted the irresponsible ex-communist
9
President Yeltsin sacked Viktor Gerashchenko as chairman of the Central Bank of Russia
after the October 1994 currency crisis.
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government through the ballot boxes. In 1997, Bulgaria adopted a currency
board and economic polices similar to those of Estonia ve years earlier, and
they worked.
The Arrears Crisis
One of the most perplexing macroeconomic anomalies of postcommunist
transformationhas beentheproliferationof arrears, barter, offsets, andother
forms of nonmonetary payments. Reformers did not anticipate them, and
their critics invoked the rise of arrears and barter as evidence that ordinary
market economic laws did not apply to postcommunist reality.
Any attempt at macroeconomic stabilization rendered money scarce. As
a consequence, enterprises tried to avoid paying anybody, piling up debts
to banks and other enterprises, tax debts to the state, and wage arrears to
their workers (Rostowski 1993, 1994). Their inclination not to pay showed
that their incentives had changed. In the old socialist system, state banks
had regularly netted out arrears by issuing credit. People were unaware that
unpaid bills and their collection are normal under capitalismand that trade
credits of a few months duration were standard. They thought something
was seriously wrong (Schaffer 1998).
However, there were several real problems. One was that creditors had
no effective tools to extract their claims. For years, bankruptcy laws were
missing. Courts were ineffective, and debt collection notoriously poor. Even
so, enterprises could make sure that they were paid, mostly by insisting on
prepayment (Begg 1996). Another problem was that the payment systems
were rudimentary. Payments were manual and slow because ordinary mail
was used. Banks lacked the capacity to service the rising number of enter-
prises and payments under capitalism. In Poland, this problemwas resolved
easily by allowing everybody to pay in cash. In the CIS countries, however,
bank transfers remained compulsory to avoid tax evasion, which allowed
inept andpower-hungry central banks toclog the payments systemfor years.
Commercial bankers further delayed payments to utilize their customers
money for themselves in the meantime.
A more fundamental problem was the credibility of stabilization pro-
grams. If enterprise managers assumedthat nostabilizationwouldtake hold,
they would be fools to pay because their debts would be inated away. Enter-
prise managers collectively demanded the traditional netting out of mutual
debts, as happened all over in hesitant stabilizers Romania, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. They
all beneted from new cheap state credits, each netting out operation-bred
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demands for new bailouts, while the monetary expansion boosted high
ination (Citrin and Lahiri 1995). A serious moral hazard had arisen.
A simple mechanism in the Soviet payments system facilitated collective
action among enterprise managers: all bills were paid in chronological order
of ling by the banks. If more credit was issued, everybody would be paid,
and nobody could jump the queue, extracting a payment before the others.
Therefore, all enterprises pressured government and central banks to issue
more credit. Hungary and Poland had liberalized their payment systems
under socialism, but it lingered for years in the CIS (Sachs and Lipton 1993).
Only after the oldpayments systemhadbeenabolisheddidstabilizationtake
hold.
The Russian Financial Crash of 1998
The greatest stabilization drama was the Russian nancial crash in August
1998. At the time, it was widely perceived as the end of the market eco-
nomic experiment in Russia (Lloyd 1998; Stiglitz 1999a). The idea of trying
to build capitalism in Russia was condemned as absurd (Reddaway and
Glinski 2001). Joseph Stiglitz (2000) blamed the IMF and the U.S. Treasury
for awed interventions. Both he and Andrei Illarionov (1998a, 1998b) saw
the overvaluation of the ruble caused by the currency band as the main
shortfall. Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes (1998) pointed to the underlying
problem of extensive and rising barter, which facilitated tax avoidance and
diverted tax revenues fromthe federal government to regional governments.
Others emphasized the unsustainable scal decit and all the unmanage-
able debt burden (slund 1998; Kharas et al. 2001). A proper analysis of
the Russian crisis of 1998 is vital for our understanding of postcommunist
transformation.
Russias nancial crisis was reminiscent of Bulgarias. After the initial sta-
bilization of 1995, the Russian government had irresponsibly allowed the
budget decit to rise to some 9 percent of GDP in 1996 and 1997 (see Fig-
ure 5.6). This decit was nanced with international credits and short-term
domestic bonds, many of which were bought by private Western portfolio
investors. Their purchases resulted in a massive inow of portfolio invest-
ment of $46billion, or 10percent of GDP, intoRussia in1997(RussianEuro-
pean Centre for Economic Policy 1999). This inow boosted the exchange
rate within its currency band. The Russian stock market was booming and
quadrupled in value in 1996 and 1997, but investor sentiment to emerging
markets suddenly reversed in the wake of the Asian nancial crisis in late
1997. Contagion effects from the East Asian crisis hit Russia hard.
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25
20
15
10
5
0
5
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
%

o
f

G
D
P
Figure 5.6. Russias Budget Decit, 19922000. Source: EBRD (1999) and (2004).
InMarch1998, President Yeltsinunexpectedly sackedhis long-time Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdinand replaced himwith a young liberal Sergei
Kirienko. It made sense to blame Chernomyrdin for having been too com-
placent facing the burgeoning crisis, but it took a month for Kirienko to
be approved by the parliament, and another month to form a government.
Furthermore, the new government seemed insouciant and unaware of the
severity of Russias nancial crisis.
By May 1998, investors lost condence in Russias macroeconomic poli-
cies, but most of Russias public debt was very short term, and it required
persistent renancing. As a result, yields were driven ever higher, making
the Russian treasury bills appear a Ponzi game. Meanwhile, the currency
inow had turned into an outow, which accelerated quickly. In July 1998,
the IMF and the World Bank organized a substantial nancial package with
the prodding of the U.S. Treasury. The IMF disbursed $4.8 billion, but the
Russian State Duma rejected the key scal measures proposed by the gov-
ernment as part of the IMF conditions for this loan. Russia had failed to
shore up its scal policy, which was no longer tenable (Owen and Robinson
2003; Odling-Smee 2004).
Until August 1998, Russia managed to defend the exchange rate with
its declining international reserves. Ination was kept low, while output
started decreasing because of the extremely high interest rates and the high
valuation of the ruble. On top of everything, the world price for Russias
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oil exports plummeted to a low of $10 per barrel. Realizing that Russias
policy improvements fell far short of what was necessary, the IMF decided
not to offer any additional nancial support. The U.S. Treasury concurred.
By letting Russia default, the IMF reinforced its credibility. On one hand,
the IMF had done its utmost to get Russian scal policy on a sustainable
track, and it had provided substantial nancing. On the other hand, when
Russia evidently ignored agreed conditions, the IMF stood by its standards.
On August 17, 1998, the Russian government let the exchange rate oat
downward, defaulted on its domestic bonds, and declared a moratorium
on foreign debt payments for 90 days. The reformist, but powerless, gov-
ernment of Sergei Kirienko fell within a week. The result was devaluation
from 6 to 24 rubles per dollar and an ination of 85 percent that year
(Illarionov 1998a, 1998b). Yet a little-noticed fact was that Russias cur-
rent account never turned to a decit. Russia seemed set to follow Bulgaria
towardhyperination. The economy came toa standstill, as the banking sys-
tem closed down for several days. Now the queues were outside the banks
instead of the grocery stores. Russians lost their ruble and bank savings once
again.
But soon events took a different turn. In the absence of both domestic
andinternational nancing, the government was forcedtoeliminate its bud-
get decit, sharply reducing expenditures as well as arrears. The proigate
regional governments suddenly faceda hardbudget constraint, forcing them
to cut enterprise subsidies. The default on the domestic debt reduced total
public debt substantially, and the devaluation led to a competitive under-
valuation of the ruble. Because the government had chosen to devalue when
international reserves remained substantial (about $10 billion), no large
foreign loans were needed to replenish reserves. The worst half of the banks
closed down, and the payment system improved. At long last, the Russian
economy faced the shock therapy that its reformers had failed to deliver
because of insufcient political credibility. Russia took a decisive step to
defeat rent seeking and cement a prot-seeking market economy with a
reasonably level playing eld. Russias opening to short-term international
nancial ows exposed the country to the vagaries of world nancial mar-
kets, which ultimately forced Russia to accept their discipline. With its open
economy, Russia had little choice but to adjust to world market standards.
Russias fundamental macroeconomic problem was its large budget
decit. The federal tax revenues were small because most of the revenues
stayed with the regional governments. In July 1998, the Russian govern-
ment tried to transfer more regional revenues to the federal budget, but
a triumvirate of forces defeated the government in the State Duma. The
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regional governors refused. Many politically inuential oligarchs ignored to
pay taxes, and the communist-dominated majority in the State Duma reg-
ularly voted for more public expenditures, neglecting revenues. Although
the reform-oriented Kirienko government was formally responsible, these
three groups dominated the Duma. Because they were the obvious villains,
they lost most of their political power to the federal government in the next
fewyears (Citrin and Lahiri 1995; slund 1999; Komulainen and Korhonen
2000).
The diversion of federal tax revenues to regional governments and busi-
nesspeople was facilitated by the rise of barter. Contrary to expectations,
barter had steadily expanded from a nadir in May 1992, when barter
accounted for only 4 percent of industrial sales, to peak at 54 percent in
August 1998 (The Russian Economic Barometer 2000). Barter was most
prominent in industry and construction, whereas little barter was used in
the consumer or service sectors. Stabilizationwas not a cure, but nor had the
abundant emission of money been helpful, so monetary policy was not the
issue. One idea was that barter had been inherited from the old system, but
it had risen during the transition. It could be seen as another transitional
distortion. The masters of barter trade were big companies selling natural
gas, electricity, metals, and construction materials, which could all be sold
on the market (Aukutsionek 1998).
The main answer to the enigma of rising barter was delivered by Gaddy
and Ickes (1998). They showed that different companies and the state had an
interest in the development of a virtual economy. Enterprises that failed to
sell their produce for real money resorted to barter, but enterprises selling
valuable goods also did so because they could extract tax discounts from
the state through barter. Barter prices were inated by 4050 percent, facil-
itating manipulations. An offset usually implied that a government agency
accepted payment in kind instead of money. By not paying taxes, enter-
prises extracted public contracts at favorable prices, often for unplanned
construction projects. A variety of absurd legal rules, such as restrictions
on sales below prime cost, were avoided. Regional governments could for-
mally fulll their tax collection targets and increase their share of total tax
revenues through offsets. Both loss-making companies and the protable
energy companies colluded through barter and other nonmonetary trans-
actions against the state to extract additional subsidies at the expense of the
federal government and the rest of society, making clear that the cause of
barter amounted to tax avoidance. Barter and offsets were just the latest
fashion in rent seeking (Commander and Mumssen 1998; Gaddy and Ickes
1998; OECD 2000a).
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The implicit subsidy of the participants in barter and nonpayments was
great, justifying a transactioncost of 2030percent of the gross price (Broad-
man 1999). A study by Pinto et al. (1999) estimated the implicit Russian
budget subsidies through barter and nonpayments at 7.6 percent of GDP in
1996, rising to 10.4 percent of GDP in 1998. Total subsidies to the Russian
enterprise sector amounted to no less than 16.3 percent of GDP in 1998.
Barter of this type was localized to Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova (Hellman
et al. 2000).
In August 1998, barter seemed a permanent ailment of the Russian econ-
omy, but after the nancial crash, barter plummeted in both Russia and
Ukraine. The dominant reason was that the governments cleaned up their
nances, reducing subsidies as well as government arrears. In particular,
they insisted on all taxes being paid in cash and they prohibited offsets.
Meanwhile, bankruptcies soared. The crash itself lent credibility to the hard
budget constraints that reformers had failed to deliver because of their polit-
ical weakness. It brought about a ight to quality payments, that is, money.
Cashbecame king inthe aftermathof the crisis. Achange of payments meant
also a switch from the rent-seeking transitional economy to a more normal
market economy (Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 2000). Paradoxically, the crash
convinced entrepreneurs that the market economy had come for good.
Naturally, it was wrong to depend onthe sales of huge volumes of treasury
bills at outrageous yields. The size of the federal debt service was unsustain-
able and precipitated a default (Kharas et al. 2001). It would have been
preferable to devalue the ruble earlier, but until the summer of 1998 huge
foreign portfolio investments were owing into the Russian economy. The
prospect of yields in the order of 100 percent a year was just too attractive.
This was particularly true of the Russian banks, which had borrowed in hard
currency abroad to buy Russian ruble-denominated treasury bills. Half of
them would have been bankrupted by devaluation already in the late spring
because of imbalance between foreign currency credits and ruble assets.
The most prominent victims in the Russian bank crash of 1998 were the
banks whose high quality the World Bank and the EBRD had certied and
supported with international nancing (Johnson 2000, p. 211). These two
organizations thought postcommunist enterprises suffered from a dearth
of nancing, but their primary problem was, on the contrary, soft budget
constraints.
In hindsight, Russias nancial crash seems an economic catharsis. Sud-
denly, the Russian government undertook all those measures it should have
carried out in 1992. In Moscow, somebody put up posters with the text:
Nobody will help us but ourselves. What had been politically impossible
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for years was quickly done. The budget decit was eliminated, and since
2000 the Russian budget has shown a signicant surplus, as enterprise sub-
sidies were cut and barter and offsets were eliminated. Social transfers were
indexed at less than the rate of ination. A larger share of the tax revenues
went from the regional governments to the federal government. The s-
cal cleansing paved the way for a comprehensive liberal tax reform, which
reduced the number of taxes and lowered their rates, and other market
reforms were carried out. Russia has let its currency oat, but it has kept the
exchange rate low by accumulating huge reserves, reaching $315 billion by
the end of 2006. In 1999, Russia started a period of high economic growth
averaging nearly 7 percent a year. The recovery was facilitated by rising oil
and commodity prices. The one serious mistake in economic policy was that
the bank crash was utilized for a substantial renationalization of the bank
system (Owen and Robinson 2003).
The rest of the former Soviet Union looked on the Russian drama with
awe. They were all hit. The Russian demand for their exports declined, as
did their total exports. International nancing also dried up for them. The
CIS countries got frightened, and, exactly like Russia, they reduced their
budget decits and undertook long-delayed structural reforms. Since 2001,
their average economic growth has been as high as 9 percent a year.
Major Lessons from Postcommunist Stabilization
The macroeconomic policies pursued by transition countries have been
remarkably different, but the outcomes have also varied greatly, and they
suggest several general conclusions.
First, macroeconomic stabilization was very difcult, requiring great
attentionandpolitical will. The political resistance to stabilizationwas enor-
mous. It came primarily from a small elite that made fortunes on ination.
The chief issue was whether the rent seekers couldbe brought under political
control.
Second, a radical, early, and comprehensive stabilization proved the best
cure, because it minimized the rent seeking connected with high ination.
The early stabilizers also excelled in institutional reforms, showing that
these reforms were complementary. All the strictures of excessive focus on
nancial stabilization and monetarism were unfounded.
Third, contrary to all gradualist arguments, a prolonged period of high
ination incurred far greater costs than the process of stabilization, because
high inationprecluded economic growth, whereas rent seeking transferred
incomes to the wealthiest. The early stabilizers became the rst growth
countries. Noriskof overshootingis inevidence, because nocountryoverdid
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stabilization and proceeded too early to low ination.
10
Even in relentlessly
radical Estonia, ination was as high as 29 percent in 1995, three years after
its ambitious stabilization, andexamples of insufcient stabilizationpolicies
abound. Inationary inertia has been considerable (see Figure 5.3).
Fourth, large scal decits had to be eliminated. Otherwise, these time
bombs exploded and devastated the economy. An early shift to a strict bud-
getary policy was vital for successful nancial stabilization. The key to scal
balance was the realization that expenditures had to be slashed rather than
revenues increased. An excessive scal decit usually led to a nancial crisis,
whichnecessitatedmore severe budget cuts at a higher social cost. Successful
expenditure cuts were targeted. Enterprise subsidies were the critical stum-
bling blocks. Inmost countries, they couldbe cut only after a severe nancial
crisis. Social transfers are much more difcult to cut in democratic states,
and excessive social transfers have become a lasting handicap of Central
Europe. Since 2000, the whole postcommunist world, apart from Central
Europe, has impressed with nearly balanced state budgets (see Figure 5.4)
Fifth, public expenditures have remained too large in most transition
countries (see Figure 5.5). Not a single country has small public expendi-
tures by international standards. One of the greatest shortfalls inscal policy
has beenlacking emphasis onexpenditure cuts. Only the Baltic governments
intentionally slashed them from the outset. Other countries have done so
after protracted stagnation or severe crises. Today, Central Europe is stale-
mated by excessive public expenditures. Cuts of public expenditures have
generated not only macroeconomic balance but also economic growth, and
they have limited the damage caused by corruption.
Sixth, the breakup of the ruble zone was a necessary precondition for
any stabilization in the former Soviet Union. This common currency zone
generated monetary irresponsibility because of the competitive emission of
money. Its perseverance for more than one and a half years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union was probably the greatest single mistake in transition.
Belonging to the ruble zone in 1993 is a dividing line between success and
failure in the early transition.
Seventh, ordinarymacroeconomics appliedperfectlywell tothetransition
countries. More vigor and rigor were needed for stabilization in postcom-
munist countries than elsewhere, because of the weakness of institutions.
Moreover, rent seeking was outlandish, and the powerful old elite utilized all
possible means to perpetuate it. Both factors complicated macroeconomic
10
Azerbaijan and Armenia recorded deation in 1998, but that was long after their stabiliza-
tion.
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stabilization, especially in weak states. After a fewyears, however, most rents
had dissipated, and businesspeople could be persuaded to switch from rent
seeking to prot seeking.
Finally, the IMF has played a crucial role in macroeconomic stabilization
in transition countries. No country has stabilized and undertaken market
reforms without the assistance of the IMF, bothwithnancing andtechnical
advice.
If no serious scal adjustment is undertaken, nancial crises erupt. They
involve large social costs, but they are highly pedagogic both to the elite and
the population. If people cannot learn from the bitter experiences of others,
they have to go through purgatory themselves. Crises lead to the political
activation of people as in Poland in 1989, and in Bulgaria and Romania in
1996. They render hard budget constraints credible for governments and
enterprises. Crises force governments to make sound scal adjustments and
render necessary expenditure cuts politically possible.
Initially, the transition countries had limited current account decits
because so little international funding was forthcoming. With nancial sta-
bilization and the opening of their economies, substantial international
nancing has been forthcoming, and many countries have sustained large
current account decits for many years. The Baltic star performers have
average current account decits around 10 percent of GDP, and Central
and Southeast Europe had 7 percent of GDP in 2005 (see Figure 5.7). As
long as these decits are nanced with foreign direct investment and other
forms of long-term equity investment, even large decits are sustainable.
The CIS countries have had small current account decits since 2000, partly
because they could not obtain large foreign credits any longer and most
attract limited foreign direct investment.
Amazingly, public debt has declined to such an extent that it is no longer
a concern in all but the poorest CIS countries and Hungary. For total foreign
debt, including the private sector, trends are diverse. The Baltic countries
that have no net public debt have attracted all kinds of international nance,
especially loans toforeign-ownedsubsidiary banks by their parent company,
swelling their external debt. The CIS governments are still shocked by the
1998 crisis and are steadily reducing their external public debt, which also
reduces their total foreign debt. In addition, their debt to GDP ratio has
declined because their GDPs in dollar terms have risen with substantial
real appreciations. As private inows increase, their external debt will rise.
Central and Southeast Europe offer a middle path with a rather constant
external debt (see Figure 5.8).
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20
15
10
5
0
5
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
%

o
f

G
D
P
Figure 5.7. Current Account Balance, 19902006. Source: International Monetary Fund
(2007).
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%

o
f

G
D
P
Figure 5.8. Total External Debt, 19912005. Sources: EBRD (1999), (2000), and (2006).
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A general observation in the economic growth literature is that nancial
depth is benecial for economic growth (e.g. Levine and Renelt 1992). In
the early transition, by contrast, the correlation between nancial depth and
economic growth was negative. The explanation is that growth is spurred
by hard budget constraints that activate supply, and hard budget constraints
arise when money becomes scarce. Remonetization is still under way. When
it is complete, the usual positive correlation between nancial depth and
economic growth might emerge.
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6
Privatization: The Establishment of
Private Property Rights
The postcommunist privatization was unprecedented. In one incredible
decade, more than 150,000 large and medium-size enterprises, hundreds
of thousands of small rms, and millions of apartments and houses have
been privatized (Djankov and Murrell 2002).
1
The private sector went from
being nearly nonexistent to producing almost two-thirds of GDP. This was
the most fundamental change brought about by the transition.
Strange as it may sound today, the privatization of public enterprises was
a novelty that was introduced by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
after her election in 1979, and President Augusto Pinochet in Chile at about
the same time. The United States did not start advocating privatization
abroad until 1985 (Williamson 1990), and the now abundant privatization
literature started in 1987.
2
Nothing aroused more passion than privatization. It involved every-
thing politics, law, justice, morals, and economics. It was the fundamental
dividing line between a socialist and a capitalist society. No obvious prece-
dent existed for such a profound transformation. Thatcher had leisurely
privatized less than a dozen enterprises a year. Such a pace would have con-
demned the postcommunist countries to socialism for many years to come.
This need for novel approaches contradicted one of the radical reformers
battle cries, no more experiments. Privatization also provoked emotions
because it was so concrete and visible. All people wanted their own piece of
property for living or work (I want to own my house!). This concreteness
confused people about the value of enterprises. As state factories were badly
1
Useful reviewarticles that are general sources for this chapter are EuropeanBankfor Recon-
struction and Development (1999), Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000), Megginson and
Netter (2001), and Djankov and Murrell (2002).
2
However, the concept of reprivatizationwas coinedinNazi Germany in1934, andit became
topical after the collapse of the Nazi system (Bel 2006).
143
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managed, obsolete, and overstaffed; many were worthless smokestacks, but
few understood that.
The nationalization of the means of production was one of the most
sacred Marxist-Leninist dogmas. Nobody in the communist world dared
to discuss large-scale privatization seriously until 1988.
3
Then, however, a
consensus quickly formed that privatization was both necessary and urgent
in that public enterprises are inefcient because they address the objectives
of politicians rather than maximize efciency (Boycko et al. 1995, p. 109).
In the East, popular disillusion with public enterprises was extraordinary.
In contemporary Russian, kolkhoz (collective farm) is a synonym for chaos.
Suddenly, the question was not whether to privatize but how.
Private might appear an obvious concept, but it is not. Most post-
communist countries require 70 percent private ownership to classify an
enterprise as private because the state possessed additional levers as owner.
Even so, in numerous companies, the state has retained a golden share,
granting it a veto, undermining the rights of other owners. Privatization
was often encumbered with government restrictions, forbidding a newpro-
prietor to change the prole of a shop, lay off workers, choose suppliers,
change its interior design, and so on, blurring the dividing line between
deregulation and privatization.
An intense discussion erupted on privatization, and disagreements have
not abated to this day as reported in section one. Privatization was discussed
in three categories: small enterprises, large and medium-size enterprises,
and land and real estate. Section two considers small enterprises, which
were most easily privatized. The privatization of large and medium-size
enterprises was the most complex assignment, attracting the ercest dis-
putes, discussed in section three. Section four is devoted to land reform and
the privatization of real estate. These implied the largest transfer of wealth,
but they aroused less national interest because they were often handled
as local issues and constrained by traditional claims. Section ve observes
the importance of new enterprises, which was not much noticed early on.
Section six discusses the relative success of various forms of privatization.
Finally, overall conclusions are pondered.
Differing Aims of Privatization
It made perfect sense that the privatization debate was so intense, because
no other measure had as great an impact on the formation of the new
3
Astoundingly, the rst substantial discussionof privatizationeveninPolandwas D abrowski
et al. (1989).
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Privatization: The Establishment of Private Property Rights 145
society. The most fundamental goal of privatization was political to divide
enterprises from the state, which was the very foundation of democracy
and pluralism. The second goal was to build the foundation of a market
economy. This required independent enterprises, and they could be noth-
ing but private. A third major issue was justice. Finally, initial claims to
ownership and actual control over property constrained privatization. On
the basis of all these considerations, national privatization strategies were
formed.
The Political Goal: Depoliticization of Enterprises
The dominant political aim of the reformers was to break up hegemonic
state power and make private ownership the foundation of freedom and
democracy, inspired by Friedrich Hayeks The Road to Serfdom (1944/1986,
p. 78), the system of private property is the most important guarantee of
freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those
who do not.
Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1995), the main
thinkers behind the Russian privatization, published a brief but forceful
book, Privatizing Russia, which served as a lucid handbook for privatiza-
tion. Their view was that at least in Russia, political inuence over eco-
nomic life was the fundamental cause of economic inefciency, and that
the principal objective of reform was, therefore, to depoliticize economic
life. Price liberalization fosters depoliticization because it deprives politi-
cians of the opportunity to allocate goods. Privatization fosters depoliticiza-
tion because it robs politicians of control over rms (pp. 1011). Under
communism, managers had been selected and promoted by political crite-
ria. The only cure was to separate politicians from property: In our view,
controlling managers is not nearly as important as controlling politicians,
since managers interests are generally much closer to economic efciency
than those of politicians. Once depoliticization is accomplished, the sec-
ondary goal of establishing effective corporate governance canbe addressed
(p. 65).
The state couldnot be separatedfromenterprises once andfor all, because
the state easily reemerged in many shapes. Reformers saw a threat in indus-
trial ministries, but they were defeated with surprising ease in Hungary,
Poland, and the former Soviet Union by an alliance of reformers and state
enterprise managers. Even so, numerous proposals for new holding com-
panies, reminiscent of the old ministries, recurred for years. The networks
between regional ofcials and state enterprise managers were strong and
tenacious. The worst opponents of reformwere the natural monopoly min-
istries, which stayed largely unied.
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Another important liberal political objective was to build a new middle
class of educated and property-owning people. For this reason, V aclav Klaus
(1994) and Yegor Gaidar (2000) favored voucher privatizationas well as new
startups.
In the end, privatization is a political process, reecting the art of the
possible (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996, p. 439). Politically, one scheme
of privatization could not be rammed through, and little legal privatization
occurred until a broad coalition had been formed, built on a compromise
between the strong claims of many stakeholders, such as managers, employ-
ees, ministerial ofcials, and regional ofcials. The key to successful reforms
was to establish consent among these interests (Boycko et al. 1995). The
strength of these demands varied with country, prior legislation, and the
distribution of power, and privatization schemes had to adjust accordingly.
In most cases, only stakeholder privatization could be undertaken, but it
contradicted the aspirations of effective corporate governance, because the
leading stakeholders were incumbent managers and employees, who were
widely considered the least suitable owners of large companies. This cir-
cumstance complicated postcommunist privatization. A cure to any ini-
tially problematic distribution of property rights was to make shares freely
tradable.
The Key Economic Goal: Building the Foundation of a Market Economy
Privatization had at least seven major economic objectives.
Awell-functioning market economy. The foremost aimof privatizationwas
to build the foundation of a well-functioning market economy and breed
new private enterprises. Czech Minister of Privatization Tom a s Je zek (1997,
p. 480) put it succinctly: the primary purpose of privatizationinCzechoslo-
vakia was not to increase the efciency of particular companies, but to cre-
ate market structures to encourage private businesses. Fundamentally, this
meant that privatization sought to bring about an essential transforma-
tion of the role of the government in the economy. Ludwig von Misess
(1920/1972, p. 81) profound truth came home to roost: Socialism is the
abolition of rational economy. . . . Exchange relations between production-
goods can only be established on the basis of private ownership of the means
of production. No clear line delimits a socialist economy from a capitalist
economy, but no Western economy has a public sector that produces more
thanone-third of GDP. Increasing empirical evidence shows that onaverage
private and privatized enterprises outperformpublic enterprises all over the
world (Megginson et al. 1994; Megginson and Netter 2001). Although this
was true even in Western countries with well-run public corporations, the
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situation was obviously far worse in the former socialist countries where
the mismanagement of public enterprises was notorious and obvious to the
naked eye.
Enterprises needed real owners. A leading theme in the socialist reform
debate was that state enterprises had no real owners. Under Gorbachev
a prominent slogan was that enterprises must be given real masters
(khozyayeva). The conclusion was that only privatization could establish
real owners.
Companies had to be made independent. State enterprises were linked to
one another through multiple networks imposed by the state. Privatization
was neededtobreak enterprises free fromsuchnoneconomic considerations
and make themtruly independent of one another. As Kyrgyzstans President
Askar Akaev (2000, p. 47) stated: Efciency is primarily determined by
the market structure and the development of competition. The main goals
of privatization are, therefore, to change property relations, to form the
market structure and to reinforce competition. Foes of privatization tried
toargue that competitionanddemonopolizationwere more important than
privatization (Bogomolov 1996; Stiglitz 1999a), but no such contradiction
existed. No competition agency succeeded in breaking up state enterprises,
but this occurred on a mass scale in the privatization process (Slay 1996).
Privatization helped impose hard budget constraints on enterprises. Al-
though governments may also give subsidies to private rms, state enter-
prises receive more subsidies (European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [EBRD] 1999). Politically, it is much easier to defend subsi-
dies to public corporations. Socialist countries were littered with rundown
and malfunctioning factories, which often crowded out newenterprises and
polluted city centers. Even today, a huge old power station fumes opposite
the Kremlin. Akey goal was to facilitate the exit of such obsolete enterprises,
and the entry of newrms to accomplish Schumpeters (1943/1976) creative
destruction. A hard budget constraint was a precondition and bankruptcy
the ultimate verdict. For years, few companies went bankrupt, but many
were compelled to sell underutilized assets, creating an asset market and
breeding new enterprises.
Enterprise restructuring and corporate governance. Although the effects
of privatization on the economic system are most important, analysts of
privatization have been preoccupied with the narrow topic of enterprise
restructuringandcorporategovernance. Enterpriserestructuringis typically
categorized as the improvement of allocative efciency (the reallocation of
resources from old to new activities) and X-efciency (restructuring within
surviving rms) (Blanchard 1997). Only strong owners (principals) could
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control and motivate managers (agents). Obviously, one single powerful
owner was ideal from this perspective, whereas highly dispersed ownership
to the public was considered dangerously ineffective. The dominant view
was that outside owners were economically preferable, but inside ownership
dominated and employees with their many disparate interests were unlikely
to focus on protability. Another risk was that their property rights could be
usurped by their manager. Westernexperts have persistently emphasized the
qualitative superiority of foreign direct investment, involving management
skills, capital, andtechnical know-how(HavrylyshynandMcGettigan2000).
The creation of a real capital market. Large-scale privatization was a pre-
condition for the creation of a real capital market, leading to a more rational
allocation of capital. Most privatization schemes were not likely to engender
an efcient initial structure of ownership. Therefore, it was vital that small
owners who had received their shares because of their employment could
sell them to facilitate the accumulation of shares by strong new owners.
Stock markets had to be developed early on, and they needed to be suf-
ciently transparent to provide meaningful corporate governance (Frydman
and Rapaczynski 1994).
Investment. Although investment, especially foreign investment, was
widely considered a major objective of the privatization process, confusion
reigned. Many argued for sales of enterprises rather than free distribution
because they wanted more investment, not realizing that such payments for
enterprises were supposed to be state revenues and did not involve any real
investment. Logically, reformers opposed sales because they diverted private
savings to the state treasury (Je zek 1997). Furthermore, the initial hopes for
foreign investment were exaggerated by the lasting communist belief that
international capital was dying to enter the former communist countries.
State revenues. In the West, state revenues are usually a major reason
for privatization, but this was a subordinate issue in most transition coun-
tries, where systemic change and justice dominated the debate. Considering
that public corporations were usually extremely badly managed and the
enterprise environment was hazardous, their market value was small. The
exception was Hungary, where enterprises were reasonably valuable because
of prior reforms, and its patent budget decit required nancing. With few
exceptions, a postcommunist government was nancially better off giving
its enterprises away than trying to run them itself, because only strong pri-
vate owners could undertake the necessary restructuring, and annual tax
revenues from successful privatized enterprises soon dwarfed the highest
possible sales prices of an enterprise.
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What Justice?
Privatization was a matter of justice, but four moral imperatives guiding it
contradicted one another: restitution to old owners, equitable free distribu-
tion to the people, free distribution to the employees, and market sales to
the benet of the state.
Restitution. The returnof propertytothe original owner or legal inheritors
was what was meant by restitution. This principle was strongly embraced
in the Baltic republics for national reasons and in East Germany because
of German legal principles and West German political interests. Liberal
economists, in particular V aclav Klaus, objected to restitution. Many peo-
ple had suffered in different ways from communism. Why compensate for
the loss of property but not for deaths, incarceration, and so on? There
were technical complications too. Communists, World War II, and res had
sometimes destroyed documented titles of land. Nor was the legal system
prepared to handle all claims. In East Germany, which instantly imported
both legislation and courts fromWest Germany, some 2 million claims were
presented, clogging the courts for years andstopping thousands of construc-
tion projects because of uncertain legal claims. Some restitution occurred in
most Central European countries, particularly of farmland and real estate,
whereas the restitution of medium-size and large enterprises was avoided.
In the CIS, restitution was hardly an issue, because communism there had
lasted for more than seventy years (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994; Klaus
1994; World Bank 1996a).
Property distribution through privatization. The moral upshot from the
conclusion that the suffering under communism could not be assessed was
to distribute all property evenly to the whole population through mass pri-
vatization. All citizens could be given vouchers with claims to state property,
and the state could auction property for vouchers. Milton Friedman is cred-
itedas the originator of voucher privatization, whereas inRussiathis ideawas
broached by the neoliberal Moscow economist Vitaly Naishul, who wrote a
bookonvoucher privatizationin1987(Chubais 1999). V aclav Klaus became
its main protagonist in the postcommunist world. Opponents argued that
this radical solution was communism in reverse and accused the adherents
of market bolshevism (Glinski and Reddaway 1999).
Share distribution to workers. Amore socialistic idea was the free distribu-
tionof shares to the workers of eachenterprise. This viewwas muchstronger
in the Soviet Union than in East-Central Europe, and it was most popular
in small enterprises, which had often been cooperatives under communism.
Managers often exploited this argument to their own benet.
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Property sold at market price. A contrary, right-wing stand was that no
property should be given away, but sold at a market price, because what was
given for free would not be respected. Such a position was widely held in
Hungary, Estonia, and Poland, where a domestic bourgeoisie had evolved
beforetheendof communism, andthestatefunctioned. Yet moral objections
were strongbecause onlyfour controversial groups possessedenoughmoney
to buy enterprises in the early transition: communist ofcials, organized
criminals, dubious new businessmen, and foreigners. With a large supply
of property but little demand, property would inevitably be sold cheaply,
which would benet those lucky to be endowed with cash. In addition, sales
would require more time than mass privatization. Aplausible argument was
to utilize the large monetary overhang for privatization, but in practice it
proved impossible to organize privatization before price liberalization had
been unleashed.
In the former Soviet Union, bank savings were inated away by massive
monetary emissions under socialismand ensuing price liberalization. Those
hurt demanded compensation, possibly through privatization. This option
was investigated in Russia, but the state Savings Bank (Sberbank) insisted
that it could not open privatization accounts for lost savings faster than
after three years, whichdissuadedthe reformers (Chubais 1999). InUkraine,
the liberal Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk revisited this idea after
stabilization in 1996. A law established state liability for lost savings, and
valued them at 160 percent of GDP. Compensation certicates for lost
savings were issued to be used as privatization vouchers. However, this
liability would only be paid when budget means were available and this state
debt was not indexed. Actual repayments have been limited to only some
0.10.2 percent of GDP each year, and this scheme aroused no appreciation
(Yekhanurov 2000).
4
The Specter of Spontaneous Privatization
When communismcollapsed, control over enterprises varied by country. In
the Soviet Union, the Lawon State Enterprises of 1987 had made incumbent
state enterprise managers quasi-owners by rendering them independent of
the industrial ministries, which could no longer sack them. The managers
controlled the enterprises but were not entitled to their cash ows (slund
1991). In Poland, workers councils had assumed power, arousing paral-
lels with Yugoslav workers self-management, which had boosted workers
wages and state investment per worker, at the expense of high ination
4
Additional information from the International Monetary Fund.
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and unemployment (Lipton and Sachs 1990b). In Hungary, workers coun-
cils existed, but their strength was in doubt. The state and its industrial
ministries remained the real owners of state enterprises in Czechoslovakia,
Romania, and Bulgaria. The politics of privatization differed accordingly,
but the relative strength of political groups was poorly understood in
advance. The power of workers, trade unions, and industrial ministries was
exaggerated, whereas the power of state enterprise managers was under-
estimated.
Ownership rights to an asset are usually divided into control rights and
cash ow rights. Control rights encompass the rights to decide on the usage
of an asset, including its sale or lease, whereas cash ow rights are the rights
to the yields. The standard problemin the former communist countries was
that these rights hadbeenseparated. The state formally maintainedcashow
rights andpart of the control rights, namely, the eventual sale; state managers
had most of the control rights over state enterprises. These property rights
had to be united to allow for efcient enterprise management. Otherwise,
the managers incentives were to divert the cashowto themselves withlittle
consideration of the cost to the enterprise (Boycko et al. 1995; Kaufmann
and Siegelbaum 1996).
Incumbent state managers had already started a large-scale spontaneous
privatization in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Often a manager
leased the state enterprise he managed, gaining control also over its cash
ow. Usually, leasing gave the manager, or nominally the workforce, the right
of a gradual managementemployee buyout at a very low price. Managers
also tapped money from their rms through transfer pricing. A manager
sold the output of his state enterprise, or a part of it, to his private rmat a
lowprice, reselling the product at a muchhigher price, thus seizing the whole
prot from the state. Even in the Czech Republic, where the government
possessed the greatest power over state enterprises, Minister of Privatization
Tom a s Je zek (1997, p. 480) observed: Managers of state-owned enterprises
typically establishedprivate companies under their ownershipandsiphoned
state-owned assets into these companies through various dubious tech-
niques. So-called tunneling or management theft through transfer-pricing
has remained notorious in most postcommunist countries. Managers often
indulged in asset-stripping and stole their enterprises bare (Grosfeld and
Hare 1991; Johnson and Kroll 1991). An early focus of privatization was
to stop spontaneous privatization, which was seen as inequitable, slow, and
inefcient, beneting the incumbent managers. Reformers feared it would
arouse a popular political backlash against reform, as indeed happened all
over the region (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996).
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The urgency of privatization varied with the degree of economic and legal
crisis. The Soviet Union was in a rampant economic crisis, with output in
free fall and widespread lawlessness. The saying went what is not privatized
will be stolen, underlining the need for speedy privatization. In the absence
of any effective state authority, a common conclusion was: The only way of
remedying the crippling inefciency of post-socialist state enterprises is to
move as fast as possible toward a genuine property regime (Frydman and
Rapaczynski 1994, p. 13).
Neither rules nor institutions for the selling of property or enterprises
were in place. The only capital markets socialist countries had permitted
were marginal markets for summer houses and small machinery. Hungary
hada formal stock market, but it was a bogus institutionat whichstate banks
traded marginal stocks in state banks for no economic purpose. Without
markets, no asset prices existed, and book prices or historical costs reected
the olddistortedprices. Whenproperty markets startedemerging, they were
illiquid and thus haphazard, with lowand arbitrary market prices (Frydman
and Rapaczynski 1994). Commercial law was rudimentary, although more
developed in Poland and Hungary because of their substantial legal private
sectors, enabling them to opt for more complex schemes of privatization
than other countries.
Naturally, no state administration for privatization existed, and the old
industrial ministries were unsuitable for managing privatization, which
they either opposed or wanted to exploit. Each country built up a rela-
tively decentralized, large privatization administration, leaving most real
estate and enterprises to be privatized by regional and local administra-
tions. The privatization authorities persistently fought the old industrial
ministries over control of state enterprises. Legal, commercial, or adminis-
trative expertise for privatization was lacking, and Western consultants and
investment bankers did not have the right know-how. In the early 1990s,
an American investment banker told me that his rm was only interested
in advising on the privatization of enterprises worth $100 million or more
given their fee level, but only a score of enterprises in the region were of such
value.
Hungarians argued in a normal Western fashion that privatization had
to be proper, creating strong owners with good corporate governance, and
that the state should receive due revenues: State property must not be
squandered by distributing it to one and all merely out of kindness. . . . The
point now is not to hand out the property, but rather to place it into the
hands of a really better owner (Kornai 1990, pp. 812). The precondition
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for such a viewwas that the state was in such good shape, that it was capable
of managing public enterprises. Only Hungarians, Poles, andsoonEstonians
could share Kornais positive viewof the state: But the state is alive and well.
Its apparatus is obliged to handle the wealth it was entrusted with carefully
until a new owner appears who can guarantee a safer and more efcient
guardianship (1990, p. 82). Then, speed was less signicant.
In the post-Soviet chaos, however, state enterprises were subject to
extraordinary theft, not least through the ongoing spontaneous privati-
zation by incumbent managers. Privatizers also hoped to thrive on chaos,
launchingprivatizationbefore the oldestablishment hadrecoveredandrein-
forced its claims on public property. Because the transaction cost and time
of illicit deals were high, reformers were offered a window of opportunity,
which was a strong argument for mass privatization. Their aimwas to create
a critical mass of private enterprise to secure the survival of a market econ-
omy. The vast unregulated public property would inevitably entice many
top ofcials into corruption. High pace required the mass mobilization of
people, which would render privatization more equitable as well. Hence,
privatizers saw mass privatization as a way to regularize and speed up pri-
vatization, and all postcommunist countries but Hungary, East Germany,
and Azerbaijan opted for some mass privatization (slund 1992; Boycko
et al. 1995; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996; Chubais 1999).
Choices of Privatization
Initially, the eventual scope of privatization was barely discussed. Reformers
privatized in accordance with the law of the least resistance, as public prop-
erty abounded. Still, a tacit understanding was that Western Europe had a
public sector of normal size.
Some industries caused special problems. In the Czech Republic, an early
debate ragedover the family silver, enterprises of emotional national value,
which would not be privatized. In Russia, the kernel of the defense indus-
try was excluded from privatization. In Ukraine, the communists specied
thousands of enterprises to be excepted. Natural resources and monopolies
were controversial everywhere because people feared they would be sold off
too cheaply. Domestic ownership of agricultural land was treasured by peas-
ants, who feared speculative purchases by absentee landlords. Few opposed
the privatization of multiple small and medium-size enterprises and most
big manufacturing enterprises. A standard compromise was to establish a
list of industries or enterprises that would not be privatized for the time
being.
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This discussion led to a fair degree of consensus on some broad
principles:
1. Privatizationhadtoleadtoreal, clearlydened, private propertyrights.
2. The new owners must effectively control management.
3. Economic efciency should be promoted both within the privatized
enterprises and in the economy as a whole.
4. Privatization had to be socially acceptable.
Onother points a choice hadtobe made betweencontradictory positions:
r
Some emphasized speed, others the quality of privatization.
r
Some favored insiders, and others preferred outside investors.
r
Principles of justice and political convenience weighed against eco-
nomic efciency.
r
Some desired swift adjustment, whereas others aspired to minimal
change.
The choice of privatizationmethodvariedwiththe nature of the property,
political situation, bureaucratic capacity, and prior claims. The ve main
alternatives were as follows:
1. open sales,
2. management or employee buyout,
3. mass privatization,
4. restitution, or
5. bankruptcy and liquidation.
In contrast to the strife over liberalization and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, both reformers and rent seekers aspired to privatization. The rent seek-
ers wanted to benet, whereas reformers adopted all conceivable positions.
The process of privatization has involved many surprises for everybody,
and the inability to predict outcomes probably facilitated privatization. The
drawback is that many participants nowregret the outcome of privatization
because they miscalculatedtheir personal benet or as most of themwould
argue were cheated.
Small-Scale Privatization: If Started, Swiftly Done
The most reformist countries had pioneered limited small-scale privatiza-
tion of retail shops before the end of communism, and in every country
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small shops and kiosks were easily privatized, but it was vital to get it done.
5
Normally, small-scale privatization took off grandly, but it was not auto-
matic. Even reformist Kyrgyzstan did its small-scale privatization as late as
19946, and Ukraine pursued it in 19956.
Several preconditions hadtobe inplace. First of all, the government hadto
authorize local authorities to privatize small public enterprises because the
central government lacked the necessary administrative capacity. Second,
local governments neededtoestablisha privatizationadministration. Third,
local governments had to decide to sell rather than lease, often persuaded by
a nancial squeeze. Usually, small-scale privatizationwas delayed until these
decisions were made, but once the process started it was swiftly completed
withintwo years because everybody realized they had to act fast to seize their
share.
Before small-scale privatization, a heated discussion raged about whether
shops should be sold at auctions, which liberal economists favored, or
cheaply to the employees, preferred by them. Some auctions took place
in many countries, but the bulk of small enterprises was sold cheaply to
insiders. Auctions led to faster structural changes, not least because of fewer
liens and residual regulations.
After privatization, most problems were caused by local regulations, such
as short leases on premises, licenses that must be renewed each year, limited
rights tochange the prole of a shop, restrictions onthe laying off of workers,
and dependence on state wholesale trade. Although these problems arose
fromthe lack of freedomof trade, they were often reinforced by conditional
privatization. For years, no difference could be noticed between state shops
andprivatizedshops inMoscow, whereas newprivate shops lookedsplendid.
Frequently, even the staff did not know whether their shop had been priva-
tized or not. Yet after small-scale privatization, market forces started biting.
In the region as a whole, hundreds of thousands of small enterprises have
been privatized, and the success of small-scale privatization is underscored
by the absence of discussion about it.
Large-Scale Privatization: The Biggest Headache
Large-scale privatizationwas the greatest drama of transition, andit remains
controversial. Here all the political, economic, and technical problems of
5
Earle et al. (1994) offer an exhaustive account of this process in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, and the World Bank (1996a) accounts for the whole region.
P1: KNP
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P1: KNP
privatization coalesced. The debate was lengthy and acrimonious, resulting
in extensive and complex legislation.
6
The questions were as many as they were daunting. Governments had
to decide what to privatize and who should do it. A vast volume of legal
acts had to be drafted and adopted by parliaments. Some enterprises were
broken up rst. The property of each enterprise had to be specied. Then,
enterprises were corporatized, and sales were organized by special privatiza-
tioncommittees. Often, privatizationvouchers or coupons were distributed.
Demand and supply had to be matched. Frequently, the legal and technical
problems became so cumbersome that mass privatization was stalled for
years in countries as different as Poland and Ukraine.
The design of large-scale privatization varied signicantly between coun-
tries that otherwisepursuedsimilar reforms. Typically, onecountryoptedfor
one primary method of large-scale privatization but pursued other options
in parallel, and failure could abort the initial choice. Most strikingly, the
Polish government opted for mass privatization but could not agree on its
details for years, and liquidation became a major form of privatization by
default. This accidental pluralism ascertained progress in privatization.
Statistics on privatization are amazingly poor. In Table 6.1, the EBRD
gives us an approximate picture of the dominant methods. Sales to outsider
owners dominated only in East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Esto-
nia. The main alternative, mass privatization with vouchers, prevailed in
the Czech Republic, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Unexpectedly, management-employee buy-
outs were most prominent in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. In
Belarus and Turkmenistan, no large-scale privatization took place.
The choice of privatization strategy went through two phases. Initially,
privatization was an intellectual and idealistic exercise, which gave birth
to the many voucher schemes and untold harebrain schemes. Next, pow-
erful economic and political interests were mobilized, and privatization
became the art of the possible. As a consequence, the strategies that were the
most equitable and the least corrupt emerged rst, but over time they were
downgraded to the benet of strategies that accommodated vested inter-
ests. Out of the ve major privatization strategies for large and medium-size
enterprises, voucher privatization and international public offerings are, in
6
The literature on large-scale privatization is enormous. The privatization programs and
principles of most countries have been publicized in several anthologies. When not indi-
catedotherwise, I have drawnthe facts onthe various national privatizationprograms from
Earle et al. (1993), Frydman et al. (1993a, 1993b), Borish and No el (1996), and Lieberman
et al. (1997).
P1: KNP
principle, transparent and involve little administrative discretion. They
should generate the least corruption. Reformers fought primarily over these
two options, but neither has become all that signicant. Instead, the dom-
inant privatization strategies have been management and employee priva-
tization, spontaneous privatization, and direct sales, which offer no trans-
parency but allow great administrative discretion. The cleanest form of pri-
vatization, liquidation, has playedonlya minor role, because fewunderstood
its charm. Equity has playedsome role, promotingvoucher privatizationand
employee privatization as the most equitable forms of privatization.
Initial public offerings. In the West, initial public offerings (IPOs), that
is, sales of stocks on the stock exchange, have been the standard form of
privatization of large companies. In the 1980s, this practice was nessed in
the United Kingdom, and its practitioners looked for new markets. Imme-
diately after Poland had announced that it would privatize, half a dozen of
London-basedinvestment banks sent their missionaries toWarsawtopreach
the virtues of IPOs, largely at the expense of the UK Know-How Fund.
Many sound arguments favored IPOs. First, it was the most public and
transparent form of privatization, with extensive disclosure of information.
Second, the privatization would be open both to the public and foreign
investors. Third, outside investors would enter with the right incentives and
fully entitled to restructure the company. Fourth, the pricing would be done
by the market, guaranteeing the maximum revenue for the government.
Fifth, corporate governance would be ideal, and IPOs would form the basis
for a sound stock exchange. Yet there were serious objections. First, the
required information would not be available for years, delaying privatiza-
tion. Second, the cost of an IPO was so large that few enterprises could
come into question. Third, IPOs could alienate the population because
foreign investors were likely to dominate, and they would acquire their
stocks cheaply because of the dearth of domestic capital. Fourth, existing
stakeholders had no incentive to accept IPOs. Hence, IPOs could not be a
major avenue of privatization (Lewandowski and Szomburg 1989; Lipton
and Sachs 1990b).
In the rst decade, Poland, Hungary, and Estonia undertook a score of
IPOs each, but hardly anybody else did. IPOs provided an excellent foun-
dation for the Warsaw Stock Exchange, but they became insignicant for
privatization during the rst decade of transition. The critics proved right:
IPOs were never a feasible option for substantial privatization.
Direct sales or investment tenders. The advantages of direct sales or invest-
ment tenders were that one or a few outside owners would acquire dom-
inant ownership and be motivated to restructure enterprises, and they
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could attract foreign investors. Through investment tenders, the state could
demand substantial investment, and reap considerable state revenues. For
certain big enterprises in need of a specialized Western owner, this was the
only plausible option for survival.
The disadvantages, however, were palpable. Direct sales were not trans-
parent, and investment tenders even less so. The many conditions that were
negotiated with government ofcials bred maximumadministrative discre-
tion and corruption. They were the least equitable privatizations, and they
offered no incentives for stakeholders who resisted them. This was the worst
form of formal privatization. All countries have undertaken some direct
sales and investment tenders, but they became the primary form of privati-
zation only in East Germany, Hungary, Estonia, and Bulgaria, and they were
perceived as successful merely in Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech Republic,
the countries with the best public administration. Only in these countries
did privatization become a substantial source of state revenues, and these
countries became major recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) per
capita.
The East German privatization was presented as an extraordinary success
at the time, which must be one of the greatest achievements of government
propaganda on record, because the outcome is anything but impressive.
The German governments Treuhand privatization agency sold 13,000 state-
owned enterprises in East Germany from1990 to 1994, surprisingly fast but
at an extraordinary cost. Prices charged for rms being sold were low, and
the Treuhand often paid new owners to take over state-owned enterprises
and to guarantee their future. Thus, in the course of its existence, the Treu-
hand took in $50 billion but spent $243 billion on privatization (Brada
1996, p. 71). This was by far the most costly and wasteful privatization.
The sales were heavily concentrated to West German companies, signify-
ing a very closed shop. Treuhand was the worlds most generous corporate
welfare agent, which was apparent to outside observers early on (Akerlof et
al. 1991; Brada 1996; Kaser 1996). Among other postcommunist countries,
only Estonia followed the East German example, and the unpopular privati-
zation strategy is considered to have contributed to the loss by the Estonian
reform government in the 1995 elections (slund et al. 1996).
Looking to the east and south, the results of direct sales and investment
tenders have been uninspiring. The state revenues have been insignicant,
because these sales were akin to corrupt giveaways to the rich and power-
ful. Investment commitments were hardly ever substantiated. In Bulgaria,
direct sales to the elite lay the ground for business empires, such as Multi-
group, which contributed to the nancial collapse of 19967. When Pavlo
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Lazarenko was the prime minister of Ukraine in 19967, he considered the
privatization of large enterprises so sensitive that he took them over himself
andprivatizedmany to his ownbenet.
7
InKazakhstan, major metallurgical
assets were sold off to dubious businesspeople in discrete deals. In Russia,
the infamous loans-for-shares sales of stocks in a dozen major companies
took place in late 1995 after voucher privatization had ended and all other
forms of privatization had been blocked. In particular in Russia, Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan, such privatizations coincided with the evolution of large
nancial-industrial groups. Still direct sales were preferable to leaving
enterprises with the state. In the longer term, the economic results of the
oligarchic groups improved spectacularly (see Chapter 10). The economic
recovery of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was driven by large nancial-
industrial groups in energy and metals. But the political reaction against the
oligarchs rendered their property rights insecure.
Voucher privatization. Voucher privatization was the pet idea of liberal
economists and the chief invention of postcommunism. It became the dom-
inant formof privatization in the Czech Republic, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and initially in Slo-
vakia, but almost all countries issued some vouchers. Mass privatization
through vouchers, distributed to virtually the whole population, was theo-
retically attractive. It was fast, and it would create a market and an equitable
wealth distribution. The distribution of vouchers alleviated the shortage of
domestic demand for property purchases. Because the whole population
would benet, it had great popular potential. Its administration was much
less costly and complex than IPOs, since voucher auctions simplied eval-
uation problems. However, voucher privatizations were riddled with many
practical, administrative, and political problems. Their main economic dis-
advantage was that they led to dispersed ownership with ineffective corpo-
rate governance.
Amajor dispute between reformers and managers was which enterprises,
and how much of each, should be privatized through voucher auctions.
In Russia, Minister of Privatization Anatoly Chubais was committed to a
maximum of voucher privatization, but only 20 percent of the stocks in the
16,462 enterprises that went through voucher auctions until June 1994 were
sold for vouchers, and 51 percent of the shares were usually given cheaply
7
Information from the State Property Fund of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cabinet of Min-
isters at the time. Lazarenko was later sentenced in the United States for having laundered
some $130 million.
P1: KNP
to managers and workers (Blasi et al. 1997, p. 192), showing how managers
defeated the state. Moreover, the most attractive enterprises were usually
withheld from voucher auctions (Marcin` ein and van Wijnbergen 1997). As
a result, people were disappointed, obtainingless thantheir anticipatedshare
of national property, especially as their expectations had been exaggerated
by the reformers propaganda about the potential benets of privatization.
Privatization involved many sensitive technicalities. Initially, the new
voucher funds in the Czech Republic appeared genial, facilitating invest-
ment by ordinary people, but popular enthusiasm evaporated when the
head of the biggest voucher fund eloped to the Bahamas with a considerable
fortune. These investment funds were a late improvisation, and time did
not sufce for their regulation. After they had emerged as major owners,
they opposed regulation (Je zek 1997). Furthermore, they became closely
linked to state-owned banks, reducing the impact of the privatization. In
Russia and Ukraine, voucher funds emerged but just faded away, offering no
benet to their many tiny investors (Pistor and Spicer 1996). As no country
managed to solve the problemof corporate governance of investment funds,
it was probably insolvable.
Even so, voucher privatization made a huge contribution to privatization.
Thanks to voucher privatization, two-thirds of many CIS economies were
actually privatized. The alternatives were no privatization or much more
corrupt privatization. In Kyrgyzstan, President Akaev (2000, p. 48) noticed
with satisfaction: The fast mass privatization allowed us to sharply restrict
the informal privatization, which had been named Nomenklatura prikhva-
tizatsiya (grabbing). Initially, the Czech Republic excelled with eminent
enterprise restructuring thanks to dominant outsider ownership (Frydman
et al. 1997). Inthe long run, however, the murky nature of the Czechvoucher
funds might have hampered the countrys economic development. Voucher
privatization suffered from exaggerated popular expectations, but those
expectations facilitated privatization. It has become commonplace to blame
voucher privatization for any unrelated problem, including insider privati-
zation and management theft (see Stiglitz 1999a). After 1999, however, mass
privatizationappears tohave beenthe distinguishing feature of the countries
with the highest economic growth (Bennett et al. 2005). A positive revision
of voucher privatization appears justied. It facilitated the fastest, biggest,
and least corrupt privatization at minimal administrative costs. It was also
comparatively equitable, and after some delay, it has facilitated substantial
industrial restructuring. Most important, the resulting property rights are
widely accepted as legitimate.
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Manager or employee privatization. In many countries, managers and
employees had such strong claims to state enterprises that nothing but
insider privatization was feasible.
8
The real choice was between giving own-
ership to insiders and leaving enterprises in nebulous collective ownership
while subject to extensive management theft. This was true of Poland and
most CIS countries. Management or employee privatization dominated in
a motley group of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. Only the Polish privatization was geared toward employees,
whereas elsewhere managers took charge. In Russia, managers typically
owned about 20 percent of the stocks and employees about 40 percent
after so-called voucher privatizations. In Ukraine, managers owned about
30percent, andGeorgianmanagers were usually majority owners (Blasi et al.
1997; Djankov 1999). The term buyout is a misnomer, because insiders
paid next to nothing.
Insider privatization had three great advantages. It was fast. It created
legitimate property rights. Administratively, it was the easiest form of pri-
vatization. Otherwise, insiders would block privatization whenever they
could (Lipton and Sachs 1990a; Boycko et al. 1995). Some argued that
management-employee buyouts couldenhance efciencybecause the incen-
tives for managers and employees would improve (Earle and Estrin 1996;
Shleifer and Vasiliev 1996). Adrawback was that incumbent managers, who
needed to be replaced by outsiders, were entrenched. The insiders had poor
incentives to act fast, which was likely to slow down restructuring. The pri-
vatization of highly valuable companies to its managers transferred huge
wealth to a privileged few. Some of the wealthiest companies in the region
underwent insider privatization beneting their managers. Outstanding
examples are Gazpromand the two respected Russian oil companies, Lukoil
and Surgut. These managers were allowed to get away with their booty,
because they were not only strong but also considered competent, and
they wisely accepted privatization. Lukoil and Surgut were initially slow
to restructure, but they have accelerated.
Curiously, insider privatizations are probably the least criticized major
privatizations, and a positive revision of insider privatization is also due on
the same lines as the voucher privatization. The resulting property rights
are widely respected, although insider privatizations are not at all equitable.
Bankruptcy and liquidation. Bankruptcy is one of the best forms of pri-
vatization, but little studied and poorly understood. First, the very threat
of bankruptcy imposes a hard budget constraint on enterprises. Second,
8
A general survey on employee ownership is Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead (1997).
P1: KNP
it ousts failing managers. Third, it is the most effective and comprehen-
sive means of restructuring of enterprise assets, because all old debts are
wiped out. Executors may split up a misconceived company and sell off its
assets piecemeal. Fourth, a bankrupt enterprise is sold through executive
auction, the preferred method of privatization. Fifth, bankruptcy improves
the competitive environment and levels the playing eld because govern-
ment subsidies to loss-making enterprises are terminated. It opens markets
captured by subsidized producers and frees up underutilized productive
resources. Finally, bankruptcy is a complete sale, leaving no residual state
equity (Mizsei 1993; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996; Balcerowicz et al.
1997; Gray and Holle 1997).
Bankruptcy took time to catch on. Bankruptcies gained early signicance
in Central Europe and the Baltics. In Poland, liquidation with ensuing sales
of the enterprise became a major means of privatization of medium-size
rms. Atypically, Hungary introduced a draconian bankruptcy law with an
automatic trigger in 1992, which resulted in an explosion of more than
14,000 bankruptcies that year (Balcerowicz et al. 1997). Only Estonia em-
braced liquidation intentionally as a privatization strategy, and the results
have been excellent (Nellis 1994; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996). Many
other countries introduced bankruptcy laws, but it took long time before
they became effective. In Russia, bankruptcy became signicant only with
a new Bankruptcy Law in March 1998, the edge of which was reinforced by
the nancial crash of August 1998. Bankruptcy dealt a devastating blow to
the old system (slund 1995; Novoprudsky 2000).
For bankruptcy tobecome effective, several relatedlaws hadtobe inplace,
a commercial code, a civil code, and some laws regulating debts. Bankruptcy
proceedings were personnel intensive, andthey were delayedby understaffed
courts. In addition, few had any incentive to initiate a bankruptcy, because
creditors doubted legal recourse would give them any money. The state was
reluctant to challenge powerful enterprise managers or provoke unemploy-
ment, and tax revenues were no top priority. Bankruptcy fell between all
stools. To economists, hard budget constraints, creative destruction, and
the reallocation of scarce assets were laudable, but bankruptcy was left for
lawyers, who cared little about these phenomena. In the CIS, American
lawyers provided most legal advice, and they saw bankruptcy as the reha-
bilitation of enterprises in line with Chapter 11 in the U.S. bankruptcy
law, which concurred with the vested interests of lame-duck Soviet enter-
prises. In a populist vein, the opponents of bankruptcy frightened peo-
ple that all companies would go bankrupt, leading to mass unemploy-
ment and depression. Such fears postponed the introduction of bankruptcy.
P1: KNP
Eventually, bankruptcy produced a credible threat of exit for those who did
not pay.
Bankruptcy also had drawbacks. One was that it required the usage of
courts, whichstoodout for their malfunctioning andcorruption. As a result,
bankruptcy has become a favorite means of corporate raiders in CIS coun-
tries, and they may undermine the security of property rights. Overall, how-
ever, bankruptcy was highly useful, and for years it was one of the greatest
sins of omission in the postcommunist transformation.
Privatization of Land, Real Estate, and Housing
The ownership of land, real estate, and housing differed greatly in various
socialist countries for arcane historical reasons. In the German Democratic
Republic, residential real estate was predominantly private, as in the Russian
countryside, whereas Czech and Slovak houses were thoroughly socialized
(slund 1985). Nor was their privatization particularly related to other
reformpolicies. Because these privatizations were so peculiar, I discuss them
only briey.
Real estate falls into three major categories: agricultural land, commercial
real estate, and housing. The efcacy of their privatization depended on
the existence of a legitimate form of privatization, and only two forms
were perceived as legitimate: restitution to former owners and privatization
to tenants. Restitution was exercised widely in the whole of East-Central
Europe, especially for housing andcollective farmland, accounting for about
three-quarters of all farmland in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltics (Swinnen 1999). Usually, old land titles
had remained on the books and could be restored, and a lot of land and
housing soon found legitimate owners. In Czechoslovakia, agricultural land
held by collective farms had never been formally socialized, facilitating its
restitution. In 1990, Romania undertook a swift spontaneous land reform
by allowing peasants to retake their old land. The other form of legitimate
privatizationwas the transfer of ownership to occupants of agricultural land
or housing, which became standard in the CIS, where residents possessed
such strong quasi-property rights to their apartments that they claimed
them for free.
Little has been as difcult to privatize as commercial real estate. Because
communism had not recognized private property, new commercial real
estate had been neither properly delineated nor registered. The various
property rights formal ownership, beneciary of sale, beneciary of rent,
right of utilization, and approval of disposal were often distributed among
P1: KNP
several state organizations in an unwieldy fashion. This fragmentation of
property rights meant that a simple lease of a commercial unit could require
permission by as many as seven agencies. Before anything could be priva-
tized, the property rights had to be unied in one hand, which often took
many years (World Bank 1996a; Harding 1995).
The privatization of land and real estate was even more political than
other forms of privatization. In the end, it was not important how privati-
zation was undertaken, but it was crucial that it took place and resulted in
property rights that were respected and could be freely transferred through
sales. When this was not the case, for example, in Russian and Ukrainian
agriculture, local magnates with good contacts with the regional governors
accumulated hundreds of thousands of hectares. As usual, restrictions ben-
eted the wealthy and well-connected rather than the original landholders,
who received a lower price because of liens. In many countries, it took about
a decade to sort out the property rights of commercial real estate and only
then a long-delayed construction boom could take off to respond to the
pent-up demand for new ofces. Even in 2006, a quarter of Warsaw, espe-
cially its center, was stagnant and dilapidated because its property rights
remained in dispute. Poland is the only East-Central European country that
has never promulgated a law on restitution.
The conclusion is that all economic arguments about how to under-
take real estate privatization were at best irrelevant but probably harm-
ful because political perceptions were all-important. Restitution was most
effective bothinprocessing privatizationandgenerating legitimate property
rights, whereas auctions were rare and unpopular. After privatization, nor-
mal land and real estate markets have evolved where governments allowed
them. The second best solution was to just let people possess their housing
and agricultural land.
New Enterprise Development: The Ultimate Success
Lenin cherished the idea of the whole country as one big company, and
gigantomania was the hallmark of communism, especially in the Soviet
Union and Romania. This idea was popular. Many Soviet citizens could not
imagine that small enterprises could be productive or relevant for economic
growth, seeing no point in facilitating their entry even after the end of
communism.
A few countries differed. The main exception was Poland, where com-
munists failed to collectivize agriculture, which had remained private. From
1956, Poland and Hungary accepted a revival of small, urban enterprises.
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By the early 1980s, these two countries already had a class of self-made,
wealthy, private businesspeople, making Poles and Hungarians realize the
economic signicance of small entrepreneurs and a good business environ-
ment (slund 1985). So did the Balts, who cherished a petty bourgeois ideal
of peasants, craftsmen, and shopkeepers that represented the normality of
the interwar period, when they had enjoyed independence. They lived for E.
F. Schumachers slogan small is beautiful, and they wanted to revive their
old beautiful world of smallness.
Over time, the understanding of the need for small enterprises grew, but
two very different perspectives on how to promote small entrepreneurship
took hold. The radical reformers, led by Leszek Balcerowicz, emphasized
economic freedom: he imposed this policy in Poland, and the small enter-
prise sector ourished in no time. His policy consisted of two major ele-
ments. The rst was to grant small entrepreneurs nearly complete freedom
to do virtually anything without government permission. The second ele-
ment he had inherited. Most communist countries had lump-sum taxes
for individual entrepreneurs. In Poland, they had laid the foundation for
the large private sector before the end of communism (slund 1985). At
their best, lump-sum taxes guaranteed low, stable, and predictable taxa-
tion, as well as liberation from government inspectors. Given the dearth
of small enterprises under communism, the formation of new enterprises
was essential. The rst transition countries followed Balcerowiczs liberal
line, and hundreds of thousands of new small enterprises emerged in every
country (Johnson 1994).
The other view, which dominated in the CIS countries, was permeated
with statist, paternalist thinking: small enterprises could not manage with-
out support from the state through subsidies, subsidized credits, and tax
exemptions. Everything was wrong withthis approach. State ofcials wanted
to help small entrepreneurs in exchange for personal commissions,
whereas the entrepreneurs wanted freedom. State committees and funds
for the support of small business were set up in several countries, but they
allocatedsmall nancial resources tofriends not necessarily possessing small
enterprises, becoming nothing but breeding grounds for corruption. The
same was true of discretionary tax exemptions, which also had to be paid
for. Rather than stimulating private enterprise with economic freedom and
a level playing eld, these governments suffocated them with regulation
and extortion. Even so, the transitional chaos offered sufcient freedom for
legally registered private enterprises to mushroom in Russia during the rst
twoyears of transition, but thenthe bureaucrats came backwitha vengeance,
and they had not retreated much. In the CIS, small enterprises remained
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sparse, because enterprise entry was increasingly restricted by a ubiquitous
bureaucracy that made extortion its bailiwick. The opportunity to liber-
alize entry was missed (slund 1997b; Hellman et al. 2000; World Bank
2002).
For a long time, the door to the liberalization of small enterprises seemed
closed for good. But then Kyrgyzstan adopted low xed land taxes in con-
nection with its land reform in 1996, which boosted agricultural produc-
tion by some 8 percent a year for years. Surprisingly, in 1998 both Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan undertook far-reaching deregulation of small enterprises.
Their secret was a single, xed lump-sum tax from small entrepreneurs. In
no time, Kyrgyzstan had 650,000 and Ukraine more than 6 million small
entrepreneurs mainly in trade and various services. Single businesspeople
were left alone because they were too small to pose a threat to big busi-
ness and they were not attractive targets for extortion (slund and Johnson
2004).
In early inquiries, entrepreneurs assured that most important for their
development was a decent tax system, freedom from bureaucratic interfer-
ence, free foreign and domestic trade, and access to a market for premises
(Johnson 1994). One of the most comprehensive surveys of new rms was
undertaken by Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff
(2000) in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine in 1997. They
found Poland and Romania far advanced, with Slovakia slightly behind,
whereas Russia and Ukraine were backward. The prots of an entrepreneur
depended primarily on the efciency of the resolution of commercial dis-
putes andsecondly onthe unofcial andofcial taxes actually paid. Contrary
to the perception of lawlessness, courts were widely used by businesspeople
in all these countries, and they worked, although much less efciently in
Russia and Ukraine. Total ofcial taxes paid were substantial, amounting
to 1617 percent of sales in Central Europe but 24 percent in Russia and
Ukraine. Coincidentally, the Russian and Ukrainian entrepreneurs also had
to pay about 50 percent more in unofcial payments to government ofcials
than the 4 percent of their sales paid in Poland and Slovakia. The higher the
taxes, the higher bribes tax inspectors could extort.
Notwithstanding many problems, entrepreneurs proved a tremendous
force. People throughout the region built up good and mighty companies
from nothing in a very short time. As early as 1995, Simon Johnson, Daniel
Kaufmann, and Andrei Shleifer (1997b) estimated that 33 percent of GDP
in the region arose in startups. This share ranged from half of GDP in
Poland, Estonia, and Latvia to 10 percent of GDP in Belarus (see Figure 6.1).
Naturally, the size of the legal private sector as well as the small enterprise
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Figure 6.1. De Novo Share of GDP, 1995. Source: Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000).
sector was inversely related to the underground economy, which was caused
by excessive regulation and taxation (Johnson et al. 1997b).
Virtually every enterprise survey veried that startups were most efcient
in every regard. The best early explanation was provided by Simon Johnson
and Gary Loveman (1995). Because everything socialist enterprises had
done was wrong from a market economic standpoint (see Chapter 1), it
was so difcult to transform them that it was better to start anew if they
did not possess extensive physical capital. Firms needed to produce better
products; develop marketing that had been rudimentary and reach out to
newmarkets; establishproper accounting, withcost controls andadjustment
to a different cost structure; cease hoarding excessive supplies of input and
labor; andchange suppliers of inputs andoftenequipment. At the same time,
they needed to stop the piecemeal theft that was institutionalized at state
enterprises and introduce a mentality of honesty and service-mindedness.
Most companies needed total change, but then newrms were likely to do a
better job, whichexplains the success of the startups. As muchof the socialist
productionwas value detracting, muchof the socialist organizational capital
was negative (D abrowski et al. 2000).
Great Achievements of Privatization
Too often, privatization is judged by the degree of restructuring in priva-
tized enterprises, but that was only one of the aims of privatization. It was
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Central and Eastern Europe CIS Reformers CIS Non-Refomers
Figure 6.2. Private Sector as Share of GDP, 19912006. Sources: EBRD (2000) and
(2006).
supposed to change the whole economy and society. It must be judged by
democracy, structural reforms, and market structure as well.
Extraordinary expansion of the private sector. The world has never seen
anything like this expansion. In the rst decade of postcommunist transi-
tion, more than 150,000 large and medium-size enterprises, hundreds of
thousands of small rms, and millions of apartments and houses were pri-
vatized (Djankov and Murrell 2002; Nellis 2001). Figure 6.2 depicts the
overall picture of the share of GDP originating in the private sector with
three groups of countries, East-Central Europe, nine CIS reformers, and the
three CIS nonreformers. At this aggregate level, the picture is clear. The three
curves have stayed separate and stabilized at different levels. East-Central
Europe privatized most radically and reached 76 percent by 2006, close to
the standards of the Western Europe. The CIS reformers advanced the most
gradually to around 66 percent. Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
reached 30 percent in 1997 and stopped.
Democracy. The foremost political aimof privatizationwas tobreakupthe
socialist state hegemony and facilitate democracy. The correlation between
democracy and privatization is strong (see Figure 6.3). The logic is evident.
All countries with a private sector of more than 60 percent of GDP in 2005
were considered free or partially free by FreedomHouse (2006). The leaders
in privatization (as well as in structural reform) in Central Europe and the
Baltics are fully democratic, whereas semiprivatized countries tend to be
semidemocratic. The three countries with minimal privatization are true
P1: KNP
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170
P1: KNP
tyrannies. A state that is hegemonic through ownership, such as Belarus
and Turkmenistan, leaves little room for democracy.
Formation of a market economy. The countries that have privatized most
have also undertaken most other structural reforms, and the correlation
between liberalization and privatization is extremely close (slund et al.
1996). This was the intention of the privatizers: It is precisely because of
privatization, and the creation of groups with a vested interest in protecting
their own property, that the Russian government began to take steps to
create market-supporting institutions (Shleifer and Vishny 1998, p. 10).
Hardening of budget constraints. Enterprises have been depoliticized and
made independent from the state. A prime objective of privatization was to
terminate enterprise subsidies. Opponents of fast privatization have argued
that soft budget constraints and rent-seeking are not unique to [state-
owned enterprises]. Private rms also lobby to get subsidies and to seek
rents (Roland 2000, p. 7). Although this is true, subsidies are highly con-
centrated to state-owned enterprises throughout the region. In 1999, state
enterprises received 26 percent of all nancing for xed investment from
the state, compared with only 3 percent in privatized enterprises, whereas
startups receivedvirtually nosubsidies (EBRD1999, p. 137). EveninCentral
Europe and the Baltics, state enterprises obtained one-fth of their invest-
ment nancing from the state, showing that good structural reforms were
not enough to terminate these subsidies without privatization. Privatization
has made a major contribution to the hardening of budget constraints.
Competition. Critics of privatization argue that competition is more
important thanprivatization, but this is a false dichotomy because privatiza-
tionbreeds more competition. Withprivatization, the number of enterprises
increases, and thus competition likewise increases. The countries with the
largest private sectors also have most startups. Finally, there is much less
competition among state rms. Nearly 30 percent of the state-owned enter-
prises in the region face no competitor, but this is true of only 5 percent of
the new entrants and 9 percent of the privatized enterprises (EBRD 1999,
pp. 1356).
Enterprise restructuring has been extensively studied. At a rst stage of
enterprise restructuring, managers can be replaced. A second stage involves
defensive restructuring, essentially cost cutting. A third stage comprises of-
fensive restructuring, with the expansion of sales, prots, exports, and
employment as well as the introduction of new products and new invest-
ments. Afourthstage arises whensubstantial equity capital is raisedthrough
the stock market. At each stage, various factors inuence enterprise perfor-
mance, and ownership is only one of them. By 2000, a broad agreement
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about the overall outcome of privatization for enterprise management had
surfaced (Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 2000; Megginson and Netter 2001;
Djankov and Murrell 2002):
1. Private rms perform better than state enterprises.
2. Startups perform the best.
3. Privatization to outsiders leads to higher efciency than privatization
to insiders.
4. Foreign ownership is mostly benecial.
5. Firms privatized to insiders, especially employees, perform about as
badly as state-owned rms.
6. Partially privatized companies do much better than completely state-
owned rms.
7. New outside managers perform better than the original managers.
8. Investment funds have played an ambiguous role. They facilitated pri-
vatization but left the new private sector in an ownership limbo.
9. The positive results fromprivatizationwere immediate inEast-Central
Europe but took years to emerge in the CIS countries.
Since 1999, the massive economic growth in the CIS countries, which
mostly carried out mass privatization, has changed this picture. Using data
from23 transition countries from1990 to 2003, one ambitious study found
that mass privatization is associated with a positive structural break in the
growth process unlike other privatization methods (Bennett et al. 2005).
One explanation is that the incumbent manager usually stayed on for some
time after privatization, but little happened until an outsider bought the
privatized company and changed managers. Moreover, because of lagging
structural reforms, the CIS enterprise environment was too inhospitable
until 1999.
9
Replacement of enterprise manager. From 1988, it was all but impossible
to oust a Soviet enterprise manager. The rst goal of privatization was to
facilitate managerial turnover. The managers never had it so good, enjoying
more freedom, power, and money than ever before or later. They held quasi-
property rights over their enterprises without accountability. Privatization
proved a potent threat to managers. Wherever privatization took place,
9
Another extensive study of enterprise productivity inmanufacturing inHungary, Romania,
Ukraine, andRussia until 2002 showedstrongly positive results of privatizationinHungary
andRomaniabut negative results inRussia(Brownet al. 2005). Presumably, the explanation
for Russias poor result lies in the choice of industry. Manufacturing has not spearheaded
Russias economic recovery, and Russias old manufacturing plants might simply have been
so poor that greeneld investment made more sense.
P1: KNP
a normal turnover of managers started, even when insider privatization
dominated. Blasi et al. (1997, p. 203) recorded that the manager changed
in 33 percent of the privatized Russian enterprises they surveyed from 1992
to 1996. The threat of hostile takeovers had appeared, and in Russia they
became common. By 1999, managerial turnover reached about 10 percent
a year in both state-owned and privatized enterprises in the whole region
(EBRD 1999, p. 139; Mau 1999).
Defensive restructuring imposed by hard budget constraints. The second
transition task at rm-level was defensive restructuring to enhance ef-
ciency by cutting the large unjustied costs of labor, inputs, investment, and
unrelated activities. Liberalization gave managers a freedom of choice, and
their incentives changed when money became scarce. Even if state enter-
prises enjoyed more subsidies than private rms, their budget constraints
grew harder as well. Surprisingly, all kinds of enterprises, including state
enterprises, undertook substantial restructuring (Pinto et al. 1993). Gros-
feld and Roland (1995) found that 600 large state enterprises in Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary shed some 30 percent of their workforce
in the rst two years of transition. The explanation is that macroeconomic
stabilization was the main tool imposing hard budget constraints and thus
prompting cost cutting (Commander and Mumssen 1998).
Privatization needed for offensive restructuring. The third step, offensive
restructuring, was a muchmore complex undertaking. It requiredthe devel-
opment of an expansionary business strategy with new products, innova-
tions, expanded sales and exports, new investment, and more staff, leading
to greater protability. In the West, a new manager is usually desired for
such efforts. Now greater differences between various kinds of enterprises
emerged, and ownership was critical. In sales, startups did far better than
both state enterprises and privatized rms, followed by privatized compa-
nies (EBRD 1999, p. 133). New entrants and privatized enterprises changed
suppliers approximately as often in the whole region, whereas state enter-
prises were more conservative (EBRD 1999, p. 134; Earle and Estrin 1997).
The expansion of employment was one of the best indicators. As expected,
startups were most expansive, followed by privatized rms, with state enter-
prises coming last (EBRD1999, p. 134; Frydman et al. 1997). The essence of
successful performance is higher protability, but here statistical problems
are palpable. Several early studies, which controlled for the selection bias
of privatized enterprises, come to the overall conclusion that they outper-
formed state-owned enterprises (Claessens and Djankov 1997; Grosfeld and
Nivet 1997; Frydmanet al. 1998). One wouldexpect private enterprises to be
more innovative thanstate enterprises, but the state enterprises inRussia and
P1: KNP
Ukraine are actually doing as well as privatizedenterprises inCentral Europe
and the Baltics (EBRD 1999, p. 134). The explanation is presumably that
the high-tech military-industrial complex in Russia and Ukraine remained
state owned, andunderemployedresearchers continuedto invent newprod-
ucts. One study of Central Europe concluded: Privatization is effective in
enhancing revenue and productivity performance of rms that come to be
controlled by outsider-owners, but produces no signicant effect in rms
controlled by insiders (Frydman et al. 1998). Over time, however, insider-
owned enterprises did better than state-owned enterprises, although worse
than those subject to outsider privatization, including mass privatization
(EBRD 1999).
The evolution of stock markets. As one would expect in an economy char-
acterized by market failures, retained earnings are the dominant source of
nancing for newand growing enterprises because of high risks, poor infor-
mation systems, moral hazard, and insufcient regulation and supervision
(Pleskovic 1994). By 1999, retained earnings provided half of the funding
for xed investment in Central Europe and the Baltics and about two-thirds
in the rest of the region (EBRD 1999, p. 137).
The importance of the initial distribution of stocks depends on the ease
with which they can be redistributed. The Coase theorem states that under
perfect competition, private andsocial costs will be equal (Coase1988, p. 14).
To Coase, this was only a theoretical construct; he argued that transaction
costs determined the design of economic institutions. The privatizers hardly
harbored this illusion, but the idea that the original distribution of titles was
of limited importance enjoyed great currency. The redistribution of prop-
erty depended on the efciency of secondary markets, which was bound to
be inadequate for years (Sutela 1998). Both Western and local stock mar-
ket specialists focused on supercial technical features, such as electronic
trading systems. Early on, Kiev received as technical assistance a modern
stock exchange equipped as in Lyons, but for years only three or four stocks
were traded, and the Kiev stock market remained rudimentary in 2006. Key
problems were instead legal regulation (the registration of titles, custody,
externally audited accounts, corporate governance, and the supervision of
stock exchanges) and the supply of stocks.
In the 1990s, stock markets took off in only four countries: Hungary,
Poland, Estonia, and Russia. The rst three went through a similar evo-
lution, based on privatization through IPOs. Their quality was ne, but
market capitalization stayed low because of limited supply of stocks. Major
companies, such as energy and telecommunications, were not privatized.
Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania followed in the footsteps of the pioneers,
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but their markets were smaller and less reputable. The supply of stocks
remains small, because foreign direct investors buy whole companies and
take them off the local stock exchange, and IPOs are few. The Baltic stock
exchanges have merged with the Scandinavian stock markets, and Vienna
is gathering the Central European stock markets. The Czech stock market
never thrived because after the voucher privatization, it was ooded with a
couple of thousands of listed stocks, most of which were not actively traded,
and regulation was poor. In all countries with real stock markets, broker-
ages and investment banks swiftly developed, and the stock markets have
contributed to international nancial integration.
The Russian development has been a world apart, being big, wild, and
spontaneous (Frye 2000). A couple of hundred exchanges had arisen before
the endof communismas wildcat entrepreneurship, andthanks to the large-
scale privatization, the country was awash in stocks from 1993. If an enter-
prise was of value, a market for its stocks developed easily, and ownership
was consolidated by new core owners who bought up its stocks in Moscow.
Local stockbrokers visited such enterprises and purchased stocks from the
workers, delivering large packages of stocks toMoscow. Particularly valuable
companies, such as telecommunications, utilities, and oil, surged in a rst
stockmarket boomin1994, whichwas followedby a minor bust. In1996and
1997, the Russian stock market quadrupled, becoming the best-performing
market in the world in both years with a market capitalization peaking at
$100 billion, one-fth of GDP at the time or ten times more than the Polish
market capitalization. However, Russias market capitalization plummeted
by 84 percent between October 1997 and August 1998. Apart from the Rus-
sian nancial collapse, pervasive dilution of minority shareholders deterred
foreignequity investors. Russia had promulgated amazingly good legal stan-
dards after its mass privatization, but the Federal Security Commission had
little power and failed to implement most rules. The Russian stock market
revived spectacularly. By 2005, valuations reached such a level that a ood
of IPOs reached the market, and equity had become important for raising
capital. The Russian stock market, however, has largely emigrated to Lon-
don, which has become the stock market of the whole of Eastern Europe.
Primarily, this is a result of the globalization of nancial markets, but it has
been spurred on by Russias failure to develop a credible rule of law. By the
end of 2006, Russias stock market capitalizationreached $1 trillionequaling
the GDP. This dynamic but speculative stock market is more reminiscent of
NewYork or Londonbefore World War I or Hong Kong inrecent years. Even
if the Russian stock trade mainly occurs abroad, its stock market has become
a strong force, facilitating both nancing and enterprise restructuring.
P1: KNP
Justice? Looking at postcommunist privatizationfromtodays perspective,
the overwhelming impressionis that muchhas beenaccomplished, andlittle
economic recovery occurred until a critical mass of private enterprise had
been assembled. Private enterprise has driven the long-lasting economic
boom. It is difcult to understand the vitriol that has been characteristic of
so much of the Western literature about privatization, especially just after
the Russian nancial crash (e.g., Stiglitz 1999a, 2002; Reddaway and Glinski
2001; Ellerman 2003; Goldman 2003), which reects a similar tone in the
Russian literature. Ageneral complaint is that privatization was not fair and
that the oligarchs accumulated huge fortunes, which I discuss in depth in
Chapter 10. Another concern was that the privatization became lawless, but
law and order broke down before the collapse of communism. Naturally,
regulation lagged behind as hundreds of new laws had to be adopted and
calibrated through repeated amendments. Finally, some complained about
the new businesspeople having paid too little to the state, but that was no
major goal in any of these countries with the exception of Hungary. In short,
people got upset when others beneted more than they. The complaint that
privatization did not lead to economic recovery in the CIS countries has
been disproved by the high economic growth after 1999.
The ultimate accusation against privatization was that it bred corruption.
However, the sale of an enterprise to the private sector limited state ofcials
opportunities to extort bribes for that property, and a once-for-all price
could hardly discount all their future rents. A slow start of privatization led
to the entrenchment of an establishment that thrived on state ownership in
corrupt ways, exactly as Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1996) had predicted.
Even in reformist Latvia, an observer reported in 1996:
Many members of Latvias new political elite serve on the boards of directors of
large state enterprises, where their salaries in most cases are several times higher
than those for governmental or parliamentary posts. Ofcials in such positions
have diverted funds through state enterprises by having the enterprises guarantee
loans to private rms in which the ofcials themselves had interests. Those loans
were seldom repaid. (Paeglis 1996, p. 37)
Similarly, Polish politics has suffered from the corrupting inuences of
many large enterprises remaining state owned, whichare consideredvital for
campaignnancing. This is another example of dangerous pathdependence
leading toa suboptimal equilibrium. Withminimal or limitedinitial privati-
zation, the danger was great that strong vestedinterests wouldthrive onstate
ownership and impede further privatization. The correlation between cor-
ruption and privatization is strong and negative, showing that privatization
does not boost corruption (see Figure 6.4).
P1: KNP
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177
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The performance of enterprises with various types of ownership has repeat-
edly upset the conventional wisdom. The rst surprise was that small star-
tups outperformed all other enterprises. A second revelation was that even
the dinosaurs, the large old state enterprises, could undertake defensive
restructuring because cost cutting depended primarily on hard budget con-
straints and not on ownership. Third, initially voucher privatization disap-
pointed because of ineffective corporate governance, but after having been
sold to new entrepreneurs many of these enterprises have shone. Fourth,
few expected so many strong new entrepreneurs to emerge so fast. At the
end, however, the pattern is approximately as expected. Private ownership
has proved to be the key to economic revival. Startups and foreign-owned
enterprises are the star performers. Privatized enterprises comprise a second
group, and state-owned enterprises perform the worst. The old organiza-
tional capital of state enterprises was largely harmful andwas best liquidated,
but the physical capital was better than many had thought, and the human
capital was excellent but underutilized (McKinsey Global Institute 1999;
D abrowski et al. 2000).
Vital: Speed and Legitimacy of Property Rights
Mass privatizationwas the greatest innovationof postcommunist transition,
andit touchedeverybody. Little surprise that it has beensocontroversial and
so differently assessed. Two major questions remain. One is the relationship
between timing and quality of privatization, and the other is the durable
respect for resulting property rights.
A standard assumption both in the theoretical political economy litera-
ture and the public debate has been that privatization could be undertaken
either soon or later, but this is a dubious premise. Privatization has not been
a continuous process, andstrong pathdependency is apparent. Eachcountry
adopted a path of privatization that was not easily altered. State enterprises
remained dominant until a government undertook a concerted effort at
large-scale privatization, leading to a major boost in the private sector in
one or two years. In countries with little privatization, notably Belarus and
Turkmenistan, no such jump occurred, because minimal large-scale pri-
vatization took place. As the dictatorial state recovered its economic and
political control, privatization stopped altogether. Ukraine and Moldova
launched their privatization late, and they moved ahead but only after Her-
culean efforts. Thus, the real choice was between fast privatization and little
privatization.
Another popular view has been that the timing and pace of privatiza-
tion do not matter, but that the quality of privatization is important and
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that policy makers had a choice between fast privatization or slower priva-
tization of higher quality (Murrell 1992b; Murrell and Wang 1993; Roland
1994, 2000). This idea presupposed the absence of positive complementar-
ity between the volume of privatization and other structural reforms, which
contradicts the evidence. It also presumes a strong state, which is equally
unrealistic. It is based on a comparison between Poland, which failed to
undertake its intended mass privatization, and Russia that succeeded in lit-
tle but its mass privatization. As a result, Russia caught up with Poland in
privatization, and from 1997 to 1999, 70 percent of the Russian GDP was
considered by the EBRD to come from the private sector, but only 65 per-
cent in Poland. For most other years, Polands private sector was larger
than Russias. A substantial literature has developed on the basis of this odd
incidence, ignoring that Poland had carried out many more reforms than
Russia, that all the other Central European countries had privatized more
than Russia, and that the measurement is in doubt. This is monocausal rea-
soning at its worst. It makes more sense to compare Russia with its East
Slavic neighbor, Belarus, which had very similar preconditions. Russia, with
its mass privatization, proceeded with structural reforms, whereas Belarus,
with a minimum of privatization, regressed into a state-regulated economy.
In the CIS and Southeast Europe, the choice was not between a late priva-
tization of high quality and an early dirty privatization but between early
privatization and no privatization. Countries that started their major pri-
vatization efforts late, such as Ukraine and Moldova, suffered qualitatively
worse privatizations than in Russia because more stocks went to insiders,
corporate governance and minority shareholders rights were more limited,
stock markets faltered, and fewer market reforms occurred (Djankov 1999;
Yekhanurov 2000).
A third common technocratic view is that each polity has a free choice
in its countrys privatization, but the options of privatization have been
severely constrained by initial claims on property, political power, legal and
administrative capacity, prior privatization, and other reform policies. The
harsher the prior dictatorship, the more dominant state ownership, and the
worse both state and corporate governance have become. What works in
one country might be detrimental or impossible in another, and the feasible
methods have been fewer than usually understood. Only three countries
have successfully undertaken the qualitatively most advanced form of pri-
vatization initial public offerings on a signicant scale, namely, Poland,
Estonia, and Hungary, countries also renowned for being the least corrupt.
Outside these three countries (and the Czech Republic), direct sales have
been exceedingly corrupt, and they incurred incredible losses on the state
in East Germany. As widely anticipated, initially voucher privatization led
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to poor corporate governance, but more was privatized than otherwise pos-
sible in several difcult countries. For nationalist reasons, Ukraine did not
want to follow the Russian example of voucher and insider privatization,
but the prolonged debate over privatization aroused such acrimony that
little privatization was executed until Ukraine implemented an essentially
Russian scheme in 1996 (Yekhanurov 2000). The real choice CIS countries
faced was minimal and very corrupt privatization or combined voucher and
insider privatization.
This leads to conclusions at variance with the conventional wisdomabout
privatization. A rst conclusion is that there is a strong positive correlation
between the degree of privatization and output (see Chapter 3).
Second, a major concentrated privatization effort was necessary in all
countries but Poland to ascertain the dominance of the private sector.
Third, the earlier this major privatization was undertaken, the higher the
quality of privatization was likely to be, because privatization was a vital
lever against corruption and the period of revolutionary disruption was
propitious.
Fourth, the breakthrough in privatization was always a large-scale pri-
vatization effort, regardless of how it was undertaken. The purported
choice between large-scale privatization and new enterprise development
was another myth. The real choice was whether to undertake large-scale
privatization and promote new enterprise development or do neither.
A fth conclusion is that it is less important how large-scale privatization
was undertaken than that it was carried out. The choice of privatization was
primarily a matter of what was politically possible.
Finally, privatization was a prerequisite for the sustenance of democracy.
All postcommunist countries with less than 60 percent of its GDP arising in
the private sector are classied as unfree by Freedom House (2006).
Liberalization, stabilization, and privatization are all positively correlated
both logically and empirically. Their relative impact has varied over time.
Liberalization was necessary to create freedom of choice, but enterprise
restructuring only started when enterprises faced hard budget constraints,
whichrequiredthat stabilizationhadtakenhold. Acompetitive environment
encourages further restructuring, but private ownershipandgoodcorporate
governance are required for strategic expansion.
The concerns about the respect for resulting property rights have risen
over time. Virtually all countries have serious privatization scandals that
involve multiple top politicians and businesspeople. The obvious, oft-
proposed solution would be to issue a statute of limitation for violations of
privatization legislation. In some countries that has happened, but they are
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unpopular. Voters want to punish the rich, whereas other wealthy business-
people aspire to pick up the spoils. The cure is uncertain. In democracies as
well as authoritarian states, politicians appeal to populist sentiments against
the wealthy. After Ukraines Orange Revolution, reprivatization from cer-
tain oligarchs became the craze, and at the time of this writing, President
Putin pursues a renationalization campaign, with Russian state-dominated
companies buying well-run private companies to the apparent benet of the
personal enrichment of Russian top ofcials.
Future respect for property rights is one of the weakest links in post-
communist states. Over time, it appears to matter less economically how
privatization is carried out, but the respect for the resulting property rights,
or the political legitimacy of privatization, is crucial. Therefore, mass pri-
vatization and insider privatizations by the old management and workers
have become more attractive in hindsight, and sales of big enterprises to
outsiders remain controversial. Ownership arising from secondary sales is
respected, however low the prices were. Similarly restitution and privatiza-
tion to occupants and tenants appear effective because they bred respected
property rights as well. These observations cast doubt on the relevance of a
large literature measuring the economic effects soon after privatization. The
time perspective was too short, and the key to good long-term economic
performance is the sanctity of property rights, on which medium-termeco-
nomic performance offers little or no guidance.
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7
An Inefcient Social System
The main aim of economic policy is to enhance economic welfare. When
transition to capitalism began, however, everybody anticipated social suf-
fering, and in its early stages, postcommunist economic transformation was
often presented as a social catastrophe. There was certainly trauma, and
results have varied greatly among transition countries, but the initial per-
ception of social disaster was exaggerated.
1
Chapter 3 concluded that the decline in registered output was highly
exaggerated. Although we know even less about real incomes, they must
have fallen less than output. Initially, real incomes plummeted, but they
have surged with economic recovery. Income differentials have increased
everywhere, but much more in the east and the south than in the west.
Countries pursuing more radical initial reform, which generated less rent
seeking, sawa smaller increase ininequality. Poverty balloonedinthe poorer
CIS countries, but muchpoverty was shallowandhas shrunk witheconomic
recovery, as I discuss in the rst section.
The most disturbing social development, considered in section two, was
declining life expectancy among EasternSlavic and Baltic men, who found it
difcult to adjust to the change of system. Infant mortality, by contrast, has
fallen sharply in most of the region, except in six of the least reformist CIS
countries. This suggests that health care has improved in most countries,
but it is still in poor shape because of lagging systemic reform.
The education system is the theme of section three. It has seen a dynamic
but erratic development. Public nancing has held up well, and substantial
1
This chapter draws heavily on work carried out by the World Bank (2000b, 2005b), partic-
ularly Branko Milanovic (1998). The Carnegie Moscow Center undertook a social policy
project in the second half of the 1990s, largely by my former Carnegie colleagues Mikhail
Dmitriev and Tatyana Maleva, which is another major source (slund and Dmitriev 1996;
Maleva 1998).
182
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An Inefcient Social System 183
private funding has been added. An extraordinary expansion of higher edu-
cation has taken place, although quality might have deteriorated. Primary
and secondary education has been neglected throughout the CIS, and in the
poorest countries, universal literacy might be on the wane.
Because of the expected social suffering, politicians agreed to increase
social expenditures both as a share of GDP and in absolute terms in most
postcommunist countries, as discussed in section four. The most developed
transition countries have become encumbered by untenably large social
expenditures, whereas they have contracted in the poorest countries. Unfor-
tunately, social transfers have not been very social because they often were
not targeted at those in the greatest need but rather at privileged groups.
Reforms are needed to target social benets at neglected groups.
As a consequence of disparate social policies, the countries in the region
are developing three social models. Central Europe has adopteda West Euro-
pean social welfare system, and some CIS reformers are moving toward an
East Asian model with much smaller social expenditures. Southeast Europe
and the Baltics occupy intermediary positions. The three CIS nonreformers
are maintaining an expensive but inefcient Soviet model.
Incomes: Differentiation and Poverty
From the outset, the common assumption was that postcommunist trans-
formationwould involve great social trauma because incomes would plunge
with output. Another assumption was that income differentials would
widen, because rapid economic restructuring would alter the relative val-
ues of professions and income differentials had been articially compressed
under socialism. A third assumption was that poverty would be aggravated
because of the contraction of average incomes and a widening of income
differentials. However, nobody had a clear sense of the dignity or speed of
these changes.
In Chapter 3, I discussed the strong downward bias in ofcial output
statistics in the transition. Whatever is true of output statistics is even more
applicable to personal income statistics. All show that real incomes fell
more than output, which is impossible. The most important reason for
this statistical distortion is that in their death throes, the communists gave
people more money instead of goods or services, and this mounting mon-
etary overhang bolstered statistical real incomes just before price liberal-
ization. A huge chunk of these monetary incomes was illusory, reecting
increased shortages and queuing. Personal incomes were less recorded and
thus more underestimated than virtually anything else, because auxiliary
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private incomes, tax avoidance, tax evasion, and social transfers ballooned
in the new market economy, whereas wages from their main state employer
had dominated peoples incomes in socialist times. Unlike the old declining
heavy industry, much of the new and unofcial economy beneted con-
sumers. In addition, as investment and defense expenditures decreased as
shares of GDP, the private consumption share expanded. Hence, average
incomes must have contracted much less than GDP.
Curiously, household surveys give us an even stranger picture of personal
incomes thanofcial statistics (Milanovic 1998). Without going into details,
the unfortunate conclusion is that we have little idea of what happened to
incomes in the early transition. In all likelihood, a substantial decline in
personal incomes occurred in the initial transition, but how large it was we
dare not say, and it was followed by a substantial and long-lasting rise.
Consumption statistics are partial and unreliable, although slightly better
than income statistics. According to ofcial statistics, Poland stood out as
an unchallenged star, with an increase in total consumption of 36 percent
from 1989 to 1999. The Czech Republic and Romania also exceeded their
communist level of consumption by 1999, but the others fared considerably
worse (UnitedNations Economic Commissionfor Europe 2000, p. 161). The
actual standard of living is difcult to assess because of the radical alteration
of relative prices and consumption baskets, as well as access to new goods
and improved quality. Those who want to show how arduous the transition
was use consumption of meat as a yardstick, showing radical declines, but
meat was the most subsidized product under communism. Those who want
to play down the costs of transition, on the contrary, emphasize the rapid
increase in the volume of fruits, vegetables, cars, household appliances, and
consumer electronics, whose relative prices dropped. People queued for a
new car for up to ten years under communism (Berg and Sachs 1992).
Like incomes, living conditions deteriorated everywhere during the end of
communism and the early transition, but we dare not say by how much,
and this decline was followed by a substantial rise. Mirroring the growth
in output, there has been a sharp upswing in average wages in all economies
in the Region. For example, in the low income CIS group, real wages have
almost doubledsince 1997 . . . this upswinghas beensharedalike byunskilled
and skilled, poor and nonpoor (World Bank 2005b, p. 16).
Income differentials are still more difcult to measure, but their develop-
ment is easily understood. On the whole, income differentiation increased
approximately as expected. In Central Europe, income differentials were the
most compressedinthe world, andnomarket economy couldmaintainsuch
extreme egalitarianism. The average Gini coefcient of disposable income in
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
G
i
n
i

C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
1988 2001/2002
Figure 7.1. Inequality: Change in Gini Coefcients, 19882002. Source: UNU-WIDER
(2006).
Central Europe rose froma Scandinavian level of 22 in 19889 to a lowWest
European level of 29 in 20012 (see Figure 7.1). The rise in differentiation
was concentrated to the rst few years of transition and leveled off around
1995. In the Baltics and Southeast Europe, differentiation went a bit further
to a level slightly higher than in Western Europe.
Inequality grew much more in the CIS countries. Initially their degrees
of inequality diverged, with reformist Georgia and Kyrgyzstan reaching
extreme levels of income differentiation, and little happening in the non-
reformers. Over time, however, their levels of inequality converged. The
most extreme measurements of inequality proved inaccurate, whereas late
reformers and nonreformers saw their inequality surge.
2
The Gini coef-
cients of the CIS countries have risen from a West European level of 28 to
the U.S. level of 43, but this is still signicantly below the Latin American
level. Oddly, the course of reforms did not have much impact. The high new
growth in the CIS countries led to a decrease in inequality in those countries
between 1998 and 2003, whereas no trend was apparent in Central and East-
ern Europe (World Bank 2005b, p. 13).
2
Gross wage statistics show the greatest income disparity, which decreases in steps when
taxation, additional monetary earnings, additional nonmonetary earnings (from the
widespread private plots), state transfers, and, nally, private transfers are added (Keane
and Prasad 2000).
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Here, too, statistical challenges are daunting. In a ne analysis of Polish
statistics, Michael Keane and Eswar Prasad (2000) debunked the prevailing
view that Polish inequality had increased substantially and showed that the
inequality in incomes and consumption was virtually the same in 1997 as
in 1989 and even fell in the early transition. Although wage differentials
expanded, larger social transfers fully compensated for them. Presumably,
Poland was an outlier because of its successful early reforms and its broad
development of new small enterprises, but we are left wondering whether
Poland excels because of better policies or more accurate statistics.
The income differentiation reected the prior distribution of power. In
the Soviet Union, the Nomenklatura was much more dominant than in
Eastern Europe. It collectively imposed a partial reform strategy, which
allowed it to usurp a share of the wealth that corresponded to its power.
This observation is an argument for both radical comprehensive reform
and democratization prior to a change of economic system. A more pro-
saic explanation is that more initial economic distortions caused more rent
seeking, breeding greater income differentials.
Any newspaper reader would presume that the increased inequality
reects the predominance of a few tycoons, but they fall outside any statis-
tics. Instead, the main cause of widening income differentials is to be found
in wages (Milanovic 1998). In the mid-1990s in Russia, wages accounted
for no less than three-quarters of the increased inequality, indicating the
emergence of a large new middle class, which ourished in the new private
sector. Increased wage differentials also explain most of the gulf between
the former Soviet Union and Central Europe. Next, our newspaper reader
would assume that the reduction of social transfers, such as pensions, has
aggravated inequality. In fact, social transfers grew as a share of GDP, but
they did not help the poor much. Particularly in the former Soviet Union,
they actually aggravated inequality because a disproportionate share of pen-
sions went to the privileged (Misikhina 1999). Surprisingly, entrepreneurial
incomes hardly contributed to recorded inequality, but these statistics are
probably especially unreliable.
Because GDP has developed very unevenly in the region, regional dis-
parities in personal incomes have increased. Previously, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan were similar in economic development, but today the average
dollar wages in Kazakhstan are ve times higher than in its southern neigh-
bor Kyrgyzstan, which still has twice as high a dollar wage as its southern
neighbor Tajikistan, which has become the poorest postcommunist state.
If income disparities rise dramatically in relatively poor countries with
falling output, poverty is bound to rise. Recorded poverty soared shockingly
in the early transition. The World Bank (2005b) chose $2.15 per person per
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day in 2000 prices in purchasing power parties as a standardized poverty
line. By this standard, in 2003, poverty was minimal in East-Central Europe,
below 5 percent in all countries but Romania (12%). Not very plausibly,
the World Bank claims that poverty was minimal in Belarus, Ukraine, and
Azerbaijan. Only Russia and Kazakhstan form a middle ground with 9 and
21 percent poverty, respectively. The low-income CIS countries, by contrast,
sufferedfromextensive poverty ranging from43percent of the populationin
Moldova to 74 percent in Tajikistan. Seven poor CIS countries, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Moldova,
have become trapped in deep and widespread poverty. No comparison with
the Soviet situation is possible because the Soviets denied the possibility of
poverty, but poverty has undoubtedly increased substantially in most CIS
countries. About two-thirds of all the poor are working adults and children,
withunemployedandelderlyaccountingfor therest. Thefour characteristics
that indicate a high-poverty risk are youth, rural living, unemployment, and
low level of education (World Bank 2005b).
The saving grace about poverty in the region is that most of it is relatively
shallow, with many people living just below the poverty line. An anomaly
in comparison with the rest of the world is that the poor are literate and
comparatively well educated. Under propitious political and economic con-
ditions, this should lead to a fast decline in poverty (Milanovic 1998), and
that has indeed happened. The number of poor has plummeted during the
long economic boom that started in 1999 in the CIS. The overall poverty
rate for the region fell from 20 percent in 1998 to 12 percent in 2003, as
more than 40 million people in the region moved out of poverty. Much of
this poverty reduction occurred in the populous middle-income countries
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, but poverty dropped almost everywhere.
Alas, in recent years poverty in the low-income CIS countries has deepened,
whereas it remains fairly shallowinthe richer CIS countries andinSoutheast
Europe (World Bank 2005b).
Life and Health
One of communisms proudest claims was well-developed, free public health
care. However, the system was neither efcient nor effective because it fo-
cused on the consumption of certain inputs, especially hospital beds, rather
than health outcomes. Actual health standards were poor in comparison
with countries at a similar level of economic development.
3
This inconsis-
tency between public claims and reality became obvious toward the end
3
Communist Cuba and China, by contrast, have quite impressive life expectancy.
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56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
T
o
t
a
l

Y
e
a
r
s
Central Europe Baltics
West CIS and Russia
Caucuses and Central Asia
Figure 7.2. Male Life Expectancy, 19892005. Source: World Bank (2006).
of communism. Yet transition has been accompanied by such disturbing
tendencies as declines in life expectancy, population, and nativity, prompt-
ing the question of what has happened to life and health.
Declining Male Life Expectancy
The early fall in life expectancy in many transition countries was the most
shocking development. The average life expectancy at birth for all the tran-
sition countries decreased insignicant from70.3 years in 1989 to 70.0 years
in 1995 (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] 1998, p. 213).
The shock was sharply declining male life expectancy in nine post-Soviet
countries the three Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Kaza-
khstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia experienced the greatest decline seven
years from 1989 to 1994, when male life expectancy at birth reached the
deplorable nadir of 57.6 years, 14 years less than for Russian women, the
greatest gender disparity in the world. Disturbingly, it has stayed very low,
around 59 years (World Bank 2006).
In Central Europe, male life expectancy rose by 3.6 years from 1989 to
2004, and in Southeast Europe by one year. Strangely, the war-ridden coun-
tries inthe Caucasus didnot suffer, nor didthe destitute Central Asianstates,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan, althoughtheir poor statistics may
not tell us the whole truth (see Figure 7.2). The countries concerned do not
form any clear economic pattern.
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ThelowmalelifeexpectancyinRussiahas beenthoroughlyanalyzed. Most
of the additional deaths are due tocardiovascular diseases andaccidents. One
obvious explanation is that alcohol sales increased with the falling relative
price of alcohol, following Mikhail Gorbachevs severe antialcohol cam-
paign (Brainerd 1998). A ne regression analysis by Vladimir Shkolnikov
et al. (2000) examined all possible health-related causes and socioeconomic
factors and found no other explanation among them. The health problems
of Russian males seem psychological. Judith Shapiro (1995) suggested that
the problemmight be mens inability to handle stress caused by uncertainty
in the transition, and Shkolnikov et al. (2000) concurred. The problem was
not starvationor abject poverty. Nor was it deterioratinghealthcare. Instead,
the dilemma was that East Slavic and Baltic men were typical company men
with little ability to handle change. Their cultural response to transition
was to start drinking even more heavily than usual, which reduced their life
expectancy. In recent years, [d]eclines in male life expectancy . . . have gen-
erally been arrested. However, many of the proximate causes of high male
mortality, notably the high incidence of cardiovascular and circulatory dis-
ease and death from accidents and acts of violence, remain (World Bank
2005b, p. 25).
Falling Infant Mortality
Infant mortality is a more relevant indicator of the quality of health care.
It was always much higher in the communist countries than in the West.
Most postcommunist countries have experienced a considerable reduction
ininfant mortality since 1989, andthis decline is positively relatedtoreform.
Central Europe has recorded a stunning fall in infant mortality by no less
than 65 percent from 1989 to 2005, and the Czech Republic has one of the
lowest infant mortalities in the world reecting truly remarkable progress
(see Figure 7.3). The Baltic countries have done almost as well with a decline
byhalf from1992to2005. Withinthe CIS, twoopposingpatterns are evident.
The six most reformist CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) experienced a respectable 40 percent reduc-
tion in their infant mortality from 1989 to 2005. By contrast, the six least
reformist CIS countries (Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan) faced a substantial rise in their infant mortality
of almost 30 percent from 1990 to 2005. Remarkably, relatively wealthy and
purportedly socially oriented Belarus made no advances in infant mortal-
ity, whereas poor Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan did. The conclusion
is that radical economic reform helped reduce infant mortality. A comple-
mentary argument is that more democratic polities are more responsive to
their people and offer better health care than dictatorships.
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
P
e
r

1
,
0
0
0

B
i
r
t
h
s
Baltics and Central Europe
CIS Leaders (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan)
CIS Laggards (Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
Figure 7.3. Infant Mortality, 19892005. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
Contrary to popular perception, health expenditures did not collapse
after communism but have been reasonably stable in real terms rising as a
share of GDP. For instance, Russias real public health spending exceeded
the 1990 level as early as 1994 (Davis 2001). Hungary (8.4%) and the Czech
Republic (7.5%) spend a higher percentage of their GDP on public health
care than some of the richest countries. Seven countries, Georgia, Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, spend
less than 3 percent of GDP on public health care, which appears to be too
little (World Bank 2005b, p. 184). The most relevant measure, however, is
the regions total health expenditures as a share of GDP. They increased by
no less than half from 4 percent of GDP in 19901 to 6 percent of GDP in
2003 (World Bank 2006, UNDP 1998, p. 215). Even so, 19901 was a time of
radical increase in health budgets because of populist pressures throughout
the region. This is almost a West European level of health care spending, and
it is highly respectable for countries at this level of development, suggest-
ing that people care about their health and can inuence such spending. A
major explanation behind this counterintuitive development is that private
expenditure on health has risen sharply.
The contrast with public health care in the Soviet Union is stark. ASoviet
economist reported in 1988: The USSR has 4,000 district hospitals, but
more than1,000 of themhave nosewage system, 2,500 nohot running water,
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600 have neither hot nor cold water (Bolotin 1988). In 1985, Soviet public
health care funding had fallen to a dismal 2.2 percent of GDP, although it
rose to 2.9 percent of GDP in 1990 (Goskomstat 1991, pp. 9, 16). Health
indicators improvedgreatly under Gorbachev, but only temporarily because
of his brief and unsustainable campaign against alcohol. After this last
Soviet campaign faded away, the long-term decline in most health indi-
cators recurred in most former Soviet republics.
Although the level of health expenditures is respectable, most public
health care systems are deplorably inefcient. At the beginning of the 1990s,
East European countries had over 50 percent more hospital beds for their
population than EU countries, and hospitals accounted for over 70 percent
of the health care budget compared with less than 50 percent in most EU
countries (Eurohealth, Autumn 2001, p. 1). Most countries had too many
hospital beds and too many specialists but not enough general practitioners,
nurses, medicines, and modern medical equipment. Under communism,
health care was free in theory, but bribes and tips were commonplace. A
large gray sector has persisted, as medical staff use the capital of the public
health care system for informal private work instead of setting up expensive
private clinics. In transition, health care systems have remained highly cen-
tralized, stiing local initiatives. The performance of the health care system
probably deterioratedfor a fewyears despite large budget allocations. Unlike
other parts of the postcommunist economy, it has hardly beneted fromany
privatization.
Health care has attracted a lot of policy attention. The rst political ambi-
tion was to raise health care expenditures, but reforms have been late. They
have aimed at the separation of the funding of care, the purchasing of medi-
cal services andmedicines, andthe provisionof care as inmost Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The Hun-
garian, Czech, and Polish governments have launched far-reaching medical
insurance schemes nanced with a payroll tax, and so has Kyrgyzstan. Many
other countries have introduced some medical insurance, but most of these
schemes have been partial (Nicholls 1999; World Bank 2005b).
Healthcare reforms have perkedupefciencysomewhat, but initial results
have been humble. Funding levels have stabilized or increased, but quality
has barely improved. The health care system has too much real estate and
staff, and resources for basic public health activities are insufcient. One
outcome has been repeated failures to stem communicable diseases (World
Bank 2005b). The restructuring of health care has accelerated since the
mid-1990s in most countries. Often, reforms have taken on a decentralized
life of their own, when hospitals and other local bodies have gained some
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independence. A good measure of rationalization is the reduction of the
previously abundant hospital beds. All postcommunist countries but Poland
reduced the number of hospital beds from1989 to 2003, but in 2003 Belarus
andRussia hadthe largest number of hospital beds per population, revealing
that they had undertaken the least health care reform (World Bank 2006).
Fewreforms are as complex as health care reforms. No good model exists,
although elementary West European public health care system serves as a
model. The medical systems involve large numbers of staff, who have often
resisted reforms. This is particularly true of senior administrators, the main
beneciaries of the gray economy in health care. Little competition between
service providers has developed, and the corruption of public health care
breeds inefciency and dissatisfaction (Chernichovsky et al. 1996; Nicholls
1999). One of the greatest improvements lies outside of the public health
care system because with the introduction of a market economy, all kinds
of medicines have become available.
Confusing Demographic Developments
Demographic changes have been dramatic. Four major demographic trends
are apparent. In the whole European part of the region, fertility has been
far below the human net reproduction rate of 2.1 children per woman,
and death rates have been high. As a result, all European postcommunist
countries, apart from catholic Poland and Slovakia, have recorded a natural
decline in their population. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries,
except Kazakhstan, by contrast, have had a substantial natural population
growth because of high birth rates. A second trend has been that Russians,
and people ethnically close to them, have emigrated from the Baltic states
and Central Asia, partially to Russia. Third, the ethnic core population too
has emigrated on a large scale from the poorest and war-ridden countries
Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia but also from all the poor Central Asian
countries. Finally, many citizens of the poorest EU accession countries, as
well as Moldova and Ukraine, have sought work in the EU countries.
The overall population picture is diverse. The region can be divided
into three groups with regard to population developments. A rst group
of ten countries have experienced a considerable decline in their popula-
tions. According to ofcial statistics, ve countries lost about 15 percent of
their populationsince 1989: Georgia, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, andBulgaria
(see Figure 7.4). In reality, Moldova and Ukraine should be added to this
group, and Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova actually lost as much as one-
fth to one-quarter of their populations. Other countries with substantial
decreases of their populations are Lithuania, Romania, and Kazakhstan.
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Asecondgroupof ve countries, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan, has experienced a strong population growth of
17 to 33 percent from1989 to 2004, according to the ofcial statistics. These
numbers are somewhat exaggeratedbecause of signicant unregisteredemi-
gration, mainly to Russia and Kazakhstan.
A third group comprises six countries: the four Central European coun-
tries, Russia, and Belarus. They are the only countries with more or less
stable populations. Considering all the talk about Russias demographic cri-
sis, it may come as a surprise that its population is among the most stable
among transition countries, but this is the average between a substantial
natural decline and large immigration from other former Soviet republics.
New threats are rising. The whole region has one of the most rapidly
growing infection rates of HIV/AIDS in the world, particularly in Russia,
Ukraine, and Estonia, because of the increased use of injected drugs, high
migration rates, and limited government response (World Bank 2005b), but
the impact has been limited as yet.
Education Adjusting to Demand
The situation in education resembles health care, but it is much better
because of more private initiatives. Comprehensive education was the pride
of communism, and unlike socialist health care the education system could
boast of considerable achievements. The whole region enjoyed 99 percent
literacy. Secondary education was standard, and university education was
as common as in Western Europe. In particular, the communist countries
were strong in mathematics and engineering.
Education was a real priority of communism. In 19901, the transition
countries spent on average 5.9 percent of their GDP on education, even
more than the 5.4 percent of GDP in the OECD countries (UNDP 1998,
p. 217). By 2002, average public spending on education remained high at
5.0 percent of GDP in the postcommunist countries, compared with 5.3
percent of GDP in the rich OECD countries. Yet a few countries (Armenia,
Georgia, and Tajikistan) had such low public education expenditures that
basic education for all was endangered (World Bank 2006). Private expen-
ditures on education have surged, but they are not well surveyed. Real total
expenditure on education has probably risen after communism.
Unfortunately, the public education system is poorly managed. Teachers
have suffered from low wages and long-lasting wage arrears, and shortages
of textbooks have prevailed. The most worrisome tendency is that primary
school enrollment is no longer comprehensive in several former Soviet
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countries. A poor underclass might be dropping out of education, although
since 1998, enrollment in the compulsory education has improved.
4
University education offers the real surprise. Denitions vary, but the
number of university students has risen greatly, approximately doubling
from1989 to 1999. The newEUmembers have as high a share of their youth
enrolled in higher education as the old EU members (World Bank 2005c,
p. 83). This surge is particularlymarkedinPoland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Arme-
nia, Russia, and the whole of Central Asia (UNDP 1998, pp. 74, 217). The
expansion of university education seems a response to increasing demand,
with the greatest rise in enrollment in business administration (Pleskovic
et al. 2000). At the beginning of the transition, many in the region reck-
oned that higher education was no longer of signicance for their earnings
because only the ability to trade counted, but that view lasted only a cou-
ple of years. Soon people realized that investment in their human capital
was worthwhile. Youngsters decided to learn economics, business admin-
istration, law, and languages. These subjects were no specialties of the old
universities and institutes, so numerous new institutions developed. Dur-
ing a trip to St. Petersburg in 1992, I learned that the city harbored no
fewer than 200 institutions that proudly, although somewhat pretentiously,
called themselves business schools. Many barely existed and most closed
down, but the degree of entrepreneurship in higher education, particularly
business training, has been extraordinary. As reected in the rising income
differentials, the return on human capital soared with transition.
In a study of economic education in twenty postcommunist countries,
we found a proliferation of new, usually private, universities. This develop-
ment was most prominent in relatively liberal CIS countries, notably Russia,
Ukraine, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Small Georgia took the
prize withnofewer than279ofciallyregisteredinstitutions of higher educa-
tion. People are evidently drawing the sensible conclusionthat the oldpublic
universities in the Caucasus and Central Asia are no good, establishing new
institutions, but the new pluralistic and competitive climate has reinvigo-
rated the old universities as well. In the Baltics, Central Europe, and South-
east Europe, the old universities have remained dominant, and much fewer
newschools, primarily business schools, have been added. Although educa-
tion is politically sensitive, most postcommunist countries have evidenced
considerable openness to private initiative and outside funding, except the
4
Alas, the two main sources of data, the World Bank and United Nations Educational,
Scientic and Cultural Organization, present numbers that are completely contradictory
(World Bank 2005b; TransMONEE database 2006).
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hard dictatorships of Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Pleskovic et
al. 2000).
Another positive aspect of postcommunist higher education is the vast
volume of private nancing that has become available. In the CIS, about half
of the students pay tuition fees. Because bribes for admittance were com-
mon in Soviet days, and still are, people easily accept formal tuition fees. In
recent years, local businesspeople have started giving substantial donations
for education. Unfortunately, state nancing is extremely centralized, and
the private nancing that often accounts for half the funding of state univer-
sities is gray, inciting university administrators to illicit actions. Reformers
demand that universities become independent foundations, accountable to
a board of trustees. The increased reliance on private nancing has led to a
new dominance over the education system by the middle class, reected in
the greater emphasis on university training at the expense of primary and
secondary education reminiscent of Latin America.
Both the old state institutions and the new private universities suffer
from severe problems with quality. Bribery has became pervasive both in
private and public institutions of higher learning, especially in the Cau-
casus and Central Asia. In many CIS countries, professors demand bribes
for exams, which reduces the students incentives to study. Falling stan-
dards of higher education have become a serious concern, particularly in
the Caucasus and Central Asia. As a reaction, reformers demand standard-
ized national tests and entrance exams, without subjective interviews, but
university presidents, whobenet fromcorruption, put upsevere resistance.
Amajor bottleneck is the training of university teachers andresearchers. Few
good graduate programs in social sciences exist in the region, rendering the
education of a new corps of teachers in the West necessary, as well as the
building of newinstitutions in the region. For natural sciences, the problem
is lowfunding andsalaries, whichhave convincedtens of thousands of Soviet
scientists to emigrate to the West or to the local private sector (Pleskovic et
al. 2000).
Unlike the Chinese government, these postcommunist governments have
shown little interest in organizing major scholarship programs to send stu-
dents abroad. The main exception is Kazakhstan, which in 2006 increased
the number of scholarships for study abroad to 3,000 a year. The best insti-
tutions of higher education in the former Soviet Union have been set up
in cooperation with foreign institutions and donors, but in many cases,
the foreign partners have lost interest or nancing after several years, and
many projects have collapsed. Among the best new universities are a series
of American Universities in Bulgaria, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. There are
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also excellent graduate schools, the main one being George Soross Central
European University in Budapest. Virtually all of the best education estab-
lishments in the region have been conanced by George Soros (Pleskovic
et al. 2000).
The situation is better with textbooks. Many Western textbooks have
been translated from English into local languages or written anew, again
throughGeorge Soross generous nancing, andthe free bookmarket swiftly
spreadmoderntextbooks throughout the region, providing a strong base for
better education in social sciences. Similarly, the curricula of good Western
university courses have swiftly proliferated, especially at new universities.
Unfortunately, mediocre professors with old training insist on using their
own textbooks, denying their students the benets of better textbooks.
In sum, education has seen far more entrepreneurship and experimenta-
tion than the health sector, as postcommunist people seem more prepared
to invest in their brains than in their health. Part of the explanation might
be that the young want education, whereas the old demand health care.
Moreover, teaching requires less starting capital. Yet young customers are
not necessary well informed and many students are trapped in expensive
education of poor quality. Like the public health care system, the public
education system calls for profound reforms. Fewer resources should be
wasted on real estate, and qualied teachers need higher salaries. Univer-
sities and school districts require nancial independence from the central
governments, although they should be accountable to local boards. The
state should administer standardized national tests and exams to combat
the deleterious effect of pervasive bribery, and it must not stie initiative
through bureaucratic interference. Poor quality and high cost are the main
concerns in education (World Bank 2005b).
Social Transfers and Pension Reform
Social support is one of the most misperceived elements in the transition.
5
The main problems have not been collapsing social support systems, but the
expansion of social transfers beyond a sustainable level and their misdirec-
tion to the relatively wealthy. In the rst years of transition, social transfers
increased sharply as a share of GDP in Central Europe, the Baltics, and
the Slavic states of the former Soviet Union (UNDP 1998 p. 94). Only in
the Caucasus and Central Asia did they shrink, but they still exceeded East
5
This section draws on slund and Dmitriev (1996), Dmitriev (1996), Goleniowska (1997),
Holzmann (1997a, 1997b), Kramer (1997), UNDP (1998), and World Bank (2005b).
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Asias level. The exceptions were Georgia and Tajikistan, states that were on
the verge of disintegration. In addition to direct social support, substan-
tial subsidies to enterprises, housing, and utilities have been maintained in
some countries. Social transfers were outsized and unaffordable for middle-
income countries, without providing effective social protection. Atransition
to a more efcient and targeted system has started, but developments are
diverse.
Over the 1990s, social transfers were scaled down. By 2000, their share
had declined to 6.5 percent of GDP in the poor CIS countries (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, andMoldova), whereas they were 13.8 per-
cent in the new EU members. Pensions constituted 70 percent of the social
transfers inthe newEUmembers and50percent inthe poorest CIScountries
(World Bank 2005b, p. 118). Compared with other countries at the same
economic level, social transfers are still high.
The Dilemmas of a Social Safety Net
The old social benets were not very social, because a relatively limited
share went to the poorest. A sharp line falls between Russia and Ukraine on
one hand and Central Europe together with the Baltics on the other. In the
former, about 10 percent of all social transfers has gone tothe poorest 20 per-
cent (Milanovic 1998, p. 113). A couple of hundred categorical benets
remainedonthe books inRussia andUkraine in1999, andthey were targeted
at the old Nomenklatura, which received such benets instead of higher
salaries. In 1998, the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs found that
70 percent of all social transfers went tothe wealthiest 30 percent households
(Dmitriev 1999; Misikhina 1999). Central Europe and the Baltics, on the
contrary, had relatively efcient social assistance, which helps to explain
their more even income distribution (Milanovic 1998).
Family andmaternal allowances are very small, inthe range of 12 percent
of GDP, althoughfamilies withchildrenbelong to the poorest. Little wonder
that these countries suffer fromextremely lownativity. Inrecent years, many
countries have raised child support to stimulate nativity. This has occurred
as a matter of national policy for instance, in Ukraine and Russia because
young parents with small children do not constitute a pressure group.
Under communism, the government provided large price subsidies, but
workers paid for these with their articially lowwages. Some countries tried
to maintain subsidies for essential foods, but the outcome was shortages.
In 1992, the government of Kyrgyzstan xed low milk prices, which led to
the mass slaughtering of cows to the long-term detriment of milk and meat
production (Chu and Gupta 1993, p. 25). Politically most difcult were
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housing and utilities subsidies, which were defended tooth and nail by the
upper middle class in the big cities, the main beneciaries. Transportation
subsidies were also politically sensitive, but they were small.
The old Soviet-type social support systemwas corporatist, although pen-
sions comprised a centralized state system. Health care and education were
centralized state systems, but ministries and enterprises had their own facil-
ities. Because many social benets were provided by enterprises, no compre-
hensive social welfare system existed (OECD 1996). After communism, the
countries in the region developed rather different social support systems,
which can schematically be divided into three distinct models.
Hungary and Poland opted for West European social democratic wel-
fare systems in the late 1980s and maintained them after communism. The
advantage of this model was that the social welfare systembecame universal,
independent of enterprises, but the costs of social protection in Hungary
and Poland rose to 3035 percent of GDP, which was not sustainable. The
Czech Republic and Slovakia emulated these developments, although they
checked the costs and chose a slightly less rigid model. These high expen-
ditures are forcing the Central Europeans to undertake signicant social
welfare reforms. In 2004, Slovakia parted company with the other three
more social democratic countries, but these reforms contributed to the loss
by the reformist center-right government in the 2006 elections to left-wing
populists.
The Baltic states were more liberal and radical, not least because they
had less money. They chose a mixture of a liberal and a social democratic
social welfare model, developing the most modern and efcient social wel-
fare systemin the region. Their model was both less costly and more exible.
Among the Caucasian countries, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, public rev-
enues dropped below 20 percent of GDP, forcing them to prioritize among
their public expenditures. The result has been some radical social welfare
reforms. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have sought inspiration fromEast Asia
andinternational liberal ideas. Together withtheBalticstates, thesevestates
have undertaken the most far-reaching and sensible social welfare reforms.
The most conservative countries are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
and Uzbekistan, which largely maintain the old Soviet model of social wel-
fare. Russia and Ukraine are suffocated by bloated bureaucratic systems
because of their sheer size, whereas the rulers of Belarus andUzbekistanhave
been hostile to most reforms.
6
Until the end of the 1990s, they maintained
6
Turkmenistan has let its social sector decline because its priority is to build palaces for the
omnipotent President Niyazov.
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substantial enterprise subsidies 8 to 10 percent of GDP in Russia and
Ukraine and big housing and utilities subsides steadily around 4 percent
of GDP in Russia. Their social support was extremely inefcient. The old
elite maintained such power that it was able to concentrate social benets to
themselves. The Russian nancial crash in 1998 forced Russia, Ukraine, and
Moldova to undertake signicant social reforms, but they are still lagging
behind Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Curiously, a motley group of the Baltics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
recently Slovakia feature the most modern social support models. Poland,
Hungary, andthe CzechRepublic labor onwithanold-fashionedandexpen-
sive model, but the awareness of the need for reform is insufcient. Belarus
and Uzbekistan stand out as unreformed old Soviet corporatist systems.
After the rst bout of populism at the end of communism and in the
early transition, domestic support for social safety nets has been limited.
It is difcult to reach the truly poor with targeted support in the former
Soviet Union, considering the lack of reliable data on personal incomes
and the corrupt public administration. Too much of the purported social
benets go to middlemen rather than the poor. Branko Milanovic (1998)
wisely concluded that an OECD-like minimum income guarantee would
hardly work in the CIS because of the great income underreporting. Instead,
support tospecic groups pensioners, children, andthe unemployed will
have to sufce. In the CIS, it makes sense to raise the minimum wage as a
social protection for poor workers, considering that they have so little clout,
as Russia and Ukraine have done in recent years. A decent unemployment
benet for half a year is one way to reach a truly poor group. Because
families with children form an exposed group, family allowances whether
universal or means tested can help. Altogether, this does not amount to
much. Means-tested local social welfare is still needed for the truly poor
because there is no plausible solution with such a poor information basis
and corrupt delivery system.
Private transfers are also important. In low income CIS countries, remit-
tances and other private transfers by far exceeded public transfers. In
Moldova, remittances account for more than 10 percent of GDP and boost
consumption levels, including among the poor, helping to reduce poverty
(World Bank 2005b).
On the whole, little has been done to create an effective social safety net
targetedat thetrulypoor. Oneexplanationis that theyoungandmiddle-aged
poor have been disorganized, lacking political representation. The commu-
nists have shown little interest in this conundrum, but have fought tooth
and nail for Nomenklatura privileges and pensions. Moreover, no delivery
system can easily reach the poor, whereas the centralized pension systems
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were incomparatively goodshape. The government has little real knowledge
of personal incomes, and its apparatus is quite corrupt. The social adminis-
trations, which are large and conservative, have resisted reform. Finally, the
socialist principle that those who do not work should not eat was popular
in the CIS, breeding opposition to public payments to the poor.
An Expensive but Inadequate Pension System
The pension system provides the most important social transfers. All the
socialist countries had comprehensive public pensions, although millions of
Soviet citizens were excludedfromold-age pensions until 1985. However, the
old pension systems suffered from many shortcomings. They were rather
expensive, with costs ranging from 4.4 percent of GDP to 9.1 percent in
the European part of the Soviet bloc in 1989. Even so, the postcommunist
regimes raised pensions substantially, and by 1994, the costs of pensions had
surged to 6.515.8 percent of GDP. By comparison, the OECD average was
about 7 percent of GDP, ranging from 2 percent in Iceland and Australia to
13 percent in Italy in 1995 (Impavido 1997, p. 107). Poland took the lead,
doubling the real costs of its pensions to almost 16 percent of GDP, the
highest share in the world. The rst Polish reform government decided to
index pensions fully, maintaining real pensions even when real incomes fell,
to mitigate the resentment of the elderly (Goleniowska 1997). The old were
angry in any case and voted disproportionately for the communists, and the
young had to pay their high pension costs.
The large costs were not caused by a high level of benets but by excessive
coverage. The retirement age in the Soviet Union was the lowest in the
world 55 for women and 60 for men, whereas 60 for women and 65 for
men were standard in Central Europe. Many professional groups, ranging
from coal miners and ballerinas to colonels, were entitled to early pensions.
Inexaggeratedfear of mass unemployment, the Central Europeanreformers
encouraged workers to take early pensions. Altogether, about one-quarter
of the population was entitled to pensions.
The pensions were nanced with exorbitant payroll taxes. Hungary had
the highest total payroll tax, peaking at 62 percent in 1993. The old Soviet
payroll tax of 38 percent was actually the lowest, but most former Soviet
republics had raised them to 4050 percent, compared with 15 percent in
the United States (Holzmann 1997a). These payroll taxes were not tenable.
They led to massive tax evasion and the ight of a large share of the labor
force into the underground economy.
The pension system was unjust as well. Contributions and resulting pen-
sions were barely related. The Nomenklatura enjoyed special high state
pensions paid directly from the state budget. Working pensioners received
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full pensions and paid little or no tax because their pensions were not sub-
ject to taxation. Politicians meddled with pensions, rendering them unpre-
dictable. In the CIS, pension arrears became as notorious as wage arrears.
In Ukraine, pensioners had to wait six months for their pensions in the
mid-1990s. As state nances worsened in the CIS countries, the state could
no longer afford reasonable pensions, driving average pensions down and
below subsistence minimum in the poorer countries. Notwithstanding a
very expensive pension system, CIS pensioners could not entrust their sur-
vival to ordinary pensions. With the nancial crash in Russia in 1998, the
average Russian pensioner fell below the ofcial poverty line. Unlike other
social benets, pensions were actually paid out to everybody entitled, even
if delays occurred. A fundamental pension reform was needed.
Discussion on pension reforms started in the early 1990s, when the exces-
sive costs and insufcient social protection became evident. This debate
has developed in three waves, which have affected different regions under
the inuence of international experiences. Initially, the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the OECD, and the EU took the lead. They proposed a
West European pension system, maintaining the basic state system but with
higher retirement age, taxation of working pensioners, closer connection
between contributions and pensions, and the elimination of various priv-
ileges. They wanted to x the pay-as-you-go system rather than replace it
(Holzmann 1997a). Only Estonia succeeded in undertaking such a reform,
but a radical increase in the retirement age was not popular with anybody
and it contributed to the demise of its young, reformist government in the
elections in 1995.
A more radical reform was necessary. In 1994, the World Bank (1994a)
publishedits report Averting the OldAge Crisis, whichpropagatednewthink-
ing about pension reform. As a consequence, the organization became the
leading international agency on pension reforms. Its approach was inspired
by the Chilean pension reformand ensuing reforms in Latin America, but it
didnot goas far, favoring a three-pillar pensionsystem. The rst pillar would
be a minimum pay-as-you-go state pension for all. The second pillar was
to be a funded system based on compulsory saving in individual accounts,
and the third would be voluntary private pension savings. Apart fromsecur-
ing pensions and lowering the payroll tax, such a reform would stimulate
savings, the development of the capital market, and ultimately economic
growth. From 1998 to 2004, this system was legislated by all countries in
Central Europe andthe Baltics (WorldBank2004). This more radical reform
had political advantages. The connection between contribution and benet
became credible, transforming pensions froman entitlement to savings and
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insurance, which generated middle-class support. Retirement age became a
matter of personal choice rather than a political battle.
In the CIS, citizens distrusted the state and its competence much more
than in Central Europe and the Baltics, where the old pension system still
functioned. Reformers in Kazakhstan opted for a pure Chilean pension
reform, with private, funded pensions, maintaining minimal state pensions
for those in the old system and the poor. By doing so, they joined a lib-
eral international ambition to privatize social security. Kazakhstan adopted
such a systemin 1998, with a contribution rate of 10 percent of incomes, but
old pensions were not touched (Holzmann 1997a). Three major problems
arose. The rst was the paucity of sensible investment objects inKazakhstan,
because the stock market was underdeveloped, and the treasury bill mar-
ket hardly offered positive returns. Another problem was that funding was
diverted from the old pension system, but its expenditures burdened the
budget (Cangiano et al. 1998). The third problem was that the private pen-
sion savings were insufcient. As a result, the government of Kazakhstan
reintroduced a minimum state pension for all in 2006, and it is considering
reintroducing a payroll tax on enterprises to raise pension benets.
A bizarre incident occurred in Ukraine in 2004. Although the country
had partially legislated a three-pillar system in 2003, it was thrown back to
the populism of 1990 in the presidential election in 2004. The incumbent
government doubledpensions, andUkraines pensioncosts shot uptonearly
16 percent of GDP, the highest in the world. The government formed after
the Orange Revolution did nothing to scale back these excessive pensions
because it was considered too politically sensitive. Ukraine thus repeated
Polands mistake inthe early transitionandmay have formeda social welfare
trap.
Pension systems in the region remain comprehensive and expensive. The
pendulum has swung back to the middle-of-the-road World Banks three-
pillar system, whereas both the pure Chilean model as well as the old West
European pay-as-you-go model are out of fashion.
Three Alternative Social Models
Today the wilder claims about a universal collapse in living standards and
social expenditures can be left aside as misperceptions. A more relevant
observation is that three alternative social models have arisen that corre-
spond to three models of taxation.
Belarus and Uzbekistan have retained the old Soviet social model. Their
social expenditures are still large as a share of GDP, but their efcacy and
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efciency are deplorable, as is evident from their rising infant mortality.
They maintain the Soviet social welfare system that primarily benets the
old Nomenklatura.
The second model is the social democratic social welfare system that
Hungary and Poland introduced toward the end of socialism, and the Czech
Republic has a similar system. The characteristic of this systemis large social
transfers, which require high taxes. These two features go together with an
overregulated labor market (see Chapter 4). This model is a social welfare
trap. Still all these countries have greatly improved the functioning of their
public health care and education sectors, and they have undertaken pension
reforms. Their states function well enough to convince many citizens to
favor the public sector.
The third model is liberal, represented by the three Baltic states, Kyrgyzs-
tan, and Kazakhstan. They all have a much smaller state, lower social trans-
fers, and consequently lower taxes. They offer a larger role for the private
sector and the market. Kazakhstan has gone the furthest in liberal pension
reform and labor market reform. Arguably, Armenia, Georgia, Bulgaria,
and Romania are moving in this direction along with most of the late CIS
reformers.
Many social developments appear unrelated to these three models. One
of the most important dividing lines is democracy. Amartya Sen established
that famines haddisappearedwithdemocracyinIndia(Dr` eze andSen1989).
Inthe same way, the efcacy of social support systems is positively correlated
with democracy. The fully democratic countries in Central Europe and the
Baltics have comparatively well-functioning and equitable social support
systems. In the not very democratic CIS countries, the prime problem with
the social welfare system has been that it mainly benets the upper middle
class, andsocial transfers remainregressive. EspeciallyinRussiaandUkraine,
it has beenpolitically controversial toreduce the oldNomenklatura benets,
and it has been equally difcult to raise unemployment benets.
A similar explanation can be hypothesized for the increased income dis-
parities. Income inequality appears to rise with authoritarian rule. In demo-
cratic East-Central Europe income differentiation has widened to a West
European level, whereas in the not very democratic CIS, income inequality
has reached a U.S. level regardless of economic system. Similarly, the public
education system throughout the CIS has become exceedingly focused on
the interests of the middle class, whereas the supply of education appears
more balanced in East-Central Europe.
The reason for the fall in male life expectancy in Russia, the Western CIS,
andthe Baltics is completely different. The simple but sadreasonseems to be
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that East Slavic and Baltic men are company men who found it exceedingly
hard to adapt to the transition and instead fell for the temptation of heavy
drinking, causingmanytodieyoung. Becausetheinitial fall inlifeexpectancy
was equally scary in radically reformist Estonia as in nonreforming Belarus,
the cause cannot be sought inthe nature of their reforms. After several years,
however, the Baltic states saw their male life expectancy rise almost as in the
Central European countries, so in the longer term, the economic system
mattered.
Large public systems supplying social services, notably health care and
education, have been among the slowest to reform and restructure, which
explains why people complain so much about them. They suffered from
being state-owned and centralized, allowing neither private nor local initia-
tive. It is illuminating that unreformed Belarus has about the worst devel-
opment of mortality and vitality indicators, although it boasts little initial
output decline and high economic growth.
The demographic situation is the most complex. Several countries have
already lost one-fth to one-quarter of their populations. One group is the
war-ridden and poor countries, such as Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia,
but other countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria, suffered a large
decline in their population because of a combination of low nativity and
large emigration. The Muslim countries in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, by
contrast, are seeing a substantial increase in population.
Finally, resources matter. The poorest countries inthe regionhave suffered
the most, as is evident especially from their high poverty rate. High infant
mortality and poor education are other indicators of poverty.
Although social reforms arrived late, they gained momentum in the late
1990s. They were driven by rising costs, declining public revenues, and
increasing public dissatisfaction. The rst concern was to secure sufcient
nancing for basic needs, such as health, pensions, and basic education,
which has largely been accomplished. The next issue was to check costs and
improve efciency through systemic reforms. Two focal points have been
health care, which has been strikingly inefcient, and pensions, which have
been expensive yet left everybody dissatised. Much remains to be done;
complex social reforms take a lot of time, and large public institutions are
the most difcult toreform. Substantial social reforms are discussedinmany
countries and do occur, but resistance is entrenched and remains severe.
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8
Democracy versus Authoritarianism
An important reason for the breakdown of the communist dictatorship was
a split in the old elite, the Nomenklatura. Liberals in the old establishment
thought they would be better off economically and also freer under a more
liberal regime. Many members of the old elite were now discovering that
they could maintain their privileged positions in society even without the
ideology . . . the party was no longer a monolith. And once it ceased to be
a monolith, it was no longer viable (Dobbs 1997, pp. 3734). The party
reformers were opposed by dogmatic hardliners who wanted to maintain
the old order, and the escalating struggle between these two factions made
it possible for outside reformers, often true democrats, to start playing a
political role (McFaul 2001).
When communist power collapsed, the political situation changed in
a revolutionary fashion. Usually, two dominant political forces emerged.
One was a broad popular movement embracing democracy and freedom,
and its opponent was the reformist part of the old elite; the hardliners
simply disappeared. The dilemma for the rising democrats was whether to
opt for a full defeat of the old system or for a compromise with its more
progressive members, with whom they had cooperated until the end of
communism. The new political leaders made different choices depending
on preconditions, popular opinion, and their own preferences. All Central
European countries started off with roundtable negotiations, whereas the
abortive hard-line 1991 coup in Moscow forced abrupt transitions on all
the Soviet republics. The same was true of the violent uprising in Romania.
Ironically, the more sudden the collapse of the old system was, the greater
role the old establishment assumed, as liberal opposition had little time to
evolve. Democracy never had a chance in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan, where the old rulers stayed in power, just abandoning their
communist cloaks.
206
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Democracy versus Authoritarianism 207
Democratizing newregimes had to choose between fast and slowdemoc-
ratization in the same fashion as they had to choose economic reform strat-
egy. The fundamental problemwith the communist state was that it worked
for the Nomenklatura rather than for the people. Democratization meant
making the state work for the population instead. At this time, however, able
members of the oldelite exploitedthe weakness of the political andeconomic
institutions to enrich themselves at the expense of society through extraor-
dinary rent seeking. Defeating rent seeking and democratization were two
sides of the same coin. They bothrequiredanearly andradical breakwiththe
old system. Otherwise the Nomenklatura could amass sufcient fortunes to
purchase political power for the foreseeable future.
In the same way as market forces check monopolies and rent seeking,
democracy restricts the political power of the elite. Democracy was cru-
cial for a successful market economic transition: the higher the quality of
democracy, the more far-reaching market economic reform was. To render
democratic pressures effective, the structure of the constitution and polit-
ical representation was essential. Real political parties had to be allowed,
and they were best promoted through proportional representation, with a
threshold for representation in parliament. An early election after the col-
lapse of communism facilitated the consolidation of parties and impeded
their proliferation.
In this chapter, I consider political issues of signicance for the economic
reform process. Section one explains why democratic breakthrough was
critical for a successful early economic transformation. Section two notes
that democratization is not a sufcient political precondition for success-
ful market reform. The rule of the old elite must also be broken. Otherwise
society might be captured in an underreformtrap. Colored revolutions have
transformed semidemocratic societies, as discussed in section three. Section
four considers howelectoral rules and constitutions matter. Atrue challenge
is how to tame the Leviathan that was the communist state apparatus, out-
lined in section ve. Section six is devoted to public opinion and the role
of ideology. The nal section ponders over the future of democracy in the
region and the ineffectiveness of democracy aid.
Democratic Breakthrough: Critical for Successful Transformation
The basic purpose of a state is to provide external and internal security. If
the borders of a state are not secure or if anarchy rules within the country,
people are naturally too preoccupied with these questions to think about
anythingelse. Weshouldnot expect countries that intheearlytransitionwere
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riddenby civil wars (TajikistanandGeorgia), war (Armenia andAzerbaijan)
or attempts by territories at violent secession (Georgia and Moldova) to be
democratic. This fundamental line of thinking goes back to Thomas Hobbes
(1651/1968) and was elegantly specied by Dankwart Rustow (1970, pp.
3501): National unity must precede all other phases of democratization
(cf. McFaul 2001).
For countries inpeace, the next questionis: For whomis the state working?
Two opposing views stand out. One sees the state as good, but the people are
unable tounderstandtheir real interests, whicheasily becomes a justication
for more or less enlightened despotism. The other camp worries that the
elite exploit the state for its own purposes. Instead, such classical liberals
want the elite to be held accountable, seeing democracy as the cure. An
intermediary position is that the state is good and that you have to make
peace with the old elite to build a stable democracy.
The rst position, that the state was good and the people foolhardy,
was shared by traditional social democrats as well as some conservatives of
the modernization school. An outstanding social democratic example was
Nobel Prize laureate Gunnar Myrdal, who advocated dictatorship in Third
World countries to speed up their economic and social development. His
argument ran: The experience of the countries in central, eastern, and
southern Europe after the First World War suggests that when a democratic
form of government is imposed on an economically and politically imma-
ture nation it rapidly succumbs to authoritarian pressures and does so for
internal reasons (Myrdal 1968, p. 774). As an enlightened social engineer,
Myrdal put his ideals of modernization over democracy: Yet it may be
doubted whether this ideal of political democracy with political power
based on free elections and with freedom of assembly, press, and other civil
liberties should be given weight in formulating the modernization ideals
(p. 65). An authoritarian regime may be better equipped to enforce a social
discipline, though its existence is no guarantee of this accomplishment
(p. 67).
The idea that democracy was the preserve of the West and countries
of high economic development was deeply embedded in modernization
theory, whose leading representative is Samuel Huntington. As late as
1992, he argued that authoritarian governments are better positioned than
democratic governments to promote economic liberalization (Huntington
19923, p. 12). When transition started, many argued that the precondi-
tions for democracy had to be built rst. A premature move to democracy
could hinder growth by increasing the inuence of special interest groups
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and fostering political instability (Isham et al. 1997). This idea of benign
authoritarianism is paternalistic, and it is shared both by social democrats
and some conservatives.
The most extreme advocates of authoritarian modernization may be
labeled the Pinochet school. They argued that a temporary dictatorship
was needed to introduce a market economy. Not surprisingly, the Pinochet
argument has been more popular among old communists (for instance,
Brucan 1992) and Russian industrialists than among supporters of a liberal
market economy. It has been a key argument for the Chinese model. Yet
some Russian economic liberals have called for a Russian Pinochet (e.g.,
Aven 2000).
The opposing view is that the state is evil, a Leviathan, and that it has
to be minimized and controlled. The original authors of that view were the
classical liberals, such as Jeremy Benthamand John Stuart Mill (1859/1975).
They considered the state a means of oppression of political and economic
freedom by the rulers. The best people could hope for was that the state
would leave them alone, a line of thought leading to laissez-faire. In the
nineteenth century, the state developed the instruments for the rule of law.
Its expenditures expanded during time of war, whereas the social welfare
state is a product of the last century (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). Many
political scientists havelongreckonedthat democracyandamarket economy
belong together, but this positive correlation has been tenuous (Lindblom
1977).
A second school drew the corollary to this view, that early democrati-
zation was essential to defeat the old Nomenklatura, which was the main
obstacle to market reform. Strangely, this was a minority view, but it found
a home in the inuential Journal of Democracy. Prominent advocates of
combined early democratization and radical economic reform were Larry
Diamond (1995), Valerie Bunce (1999a, 1999b), Michael McFaul (2001).
Larry Diamond (1995, p. 108) argued:
There are powerful logical, theoretical, historical, and empirical reasons to expect
a close association between capitalism and democracy, with a logical relationship
owing almost inescapably from the very denitions of these terms. Capitalism is
an economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and
the determination of prices and rewards through competition between private pro-
ducers. . . . Democracy is a political system based on the autonomy and freedom of
individual citizens, and the determination of public power and policies through
competition between groups of citizens, based in parties and interest groups. Eco-
nomic freedom and political freedom thus would appear, at a minimum, to be
natural companions, even if one does not strictly require the other.
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In one large cross-country regression for the whole world, Robert Barro
(1996) established a universal positive correlation between democracy and
growth. However, he argued that when the effects of the rule of law, free
markets, small government consumption, and high human capital were set
aside as well as the initial level of GDP, the overall effect of democracy on
growth was weakly negative, but those effects are typical consequences of
democracy. No free markets and no rule of law exist in postcommunist
tyrannies.
The reputation of democracy was greatly enhanced in the late 1980s
after the economic reforms in Latin America, which were usually preceded
by democratization (Maravall 1994). Only in Asia does authoritarianism
appear conducive to economic liberalization (Geddes 1994a, p. 107), which
could be explained by the very limited role of the state in East Asia, the tra-
ditional macroeconomic discipline, and so on. Most dictators reveal limited
compassion for their people, caring more for the fortunes of their families
and friends. After all, the many dictatorships in Africa have not been known
for socially inclinedpolicies. Barbara Geddes (1994a, p. 113) summedupthe
new democratic insights thus: In many countries the biggest, and certainly
the most articulate and politically inuential, losers from the transition
to a more market-oriented economy are government ofcials, ruling-party
cadres, cronies of rulers, and the close allies of all three. These are groups
whose ability to make effective demands does not decline as regimes become
less democratic, which explains why many authoritarian governments have
had difculty liberalizing their economies.
Larry Diamond (1995, p. 131) pursued the democratic case for postcom-
munist countries, arguing for the early adoption of a new constitution and
the consecutive holding of parliamentary elections: the state in these last
decades of communist rule had ceased to represent any common national
interest, and its collapse left nothing but powerful congeries of rent seekers,
utterly contemptuous of law, with the skills and ruthlessness to accumulate
enormous wealth, rapidly and illegitimately. Permitting them to do so risks
discrediting the entire new order.
Valerie Bunce (1999b) argued that the uncommonly inert socialist insti-
tutions could not stand the challenges of domestic as well as international
change in the 1980s. The self-destructive nature of the socialist institutions
also explained the course of change. A natural consequence of this argu-
ment was that the socialist institutions were no asset but a hindrance to
market reform, which led Bunce to argue for rapid institutional cleansing
and for democratization as a support for market economic transformation.
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In later empirical work, the slow political and economic reforms are tar-
geted as causes of failure of both economic reformand democratization. For
instance, Steven Fish (2005, p. 247) found that Russias failure to democra-
tize was explained by too much oil, too little economic liberalization, and
too weak a national legislature.
A third school was called transitology. It was dominant in compara-
tive politics, and it was based on studies of the democratizations in South
Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, which Samuel Hunting-
ton (1991) named the third wave of democratization. Most transitologists
were social democratic. Their key idea was that a regime change should be
pacted, that is, agreedina negotiationbetweenthe oldandthe newregime.
Terry Lynn Karl and Phillipe Schmitter (1991), major authors of transitol-
ogy, argued that negotiated, pacted transitions produced more successful
democratic outcomes than nonnegotiated transitions, but they were likely
to produce restricted democracy. Rather than calling for a defeat of the old
elite, the transitologists wanted to avoid intimidating it. Therefore, they
warned against overloading the transition. They argued that economic and
political transition should not be undertaken simultaneously (ODonnell
and Schmitter 1986).
1
Adam Przeworski (1991) specied the transitologist arguments for the
postcommunist world. Like Myrdal and Huntington, Przeworski saw a
choice between democracy and radical economic transformation, seeing
radical reform as a threat to democracy. As discussed in Chapter 2, all his
main arguments have been disproved. First, radical reform did not cause
a greater but a smaller fall in output than gradual reform. Second, people
did not rise against reform or endangered democracy because of steep falls
in recorded output, as long as their governments appeared serious about
reform. Third, the threat to democracy did not come from the people but
fromthe elite. Furthermore, that people wouldbe sopreoccupiedwithshort-
term economic results that they would let them jeopardize democracy runs
against any consideration of expectations.
Similarly, Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss (1998, p. 272) sum-
marized two kinds of vicious circles that they had anticipated. Either the
unrestrained use of democratic freedoms would undermine any national
1
Meanwhile, Latin American growth has stalled because of insufcient structural reforms,
caused by the perseverance of old vested interests, which raises the question whether the
delay in economic reforms might have been harmful for Latin America, but that query
goes beyond this study.
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program of economic recovery because the citizens would use their newly
acquired voting power to remove out of ofce every government that dared
to impose on them economic and social hardships. Or the unrestrained
use of state power to impose economic reform of the shock therapy kind
on society irrespective of the social costs would necessarily provoke active or
passive resistance of society against the reform and at the same time cause
a considerable number of people to live in poverty and even misery. They
concluded, however, that fortunately neither of these hypotheses has come
true in their extremely pessimistic versions.
As a result of the limited explanatory power of transitology for the post-
communist world, this scholarship has not evolved much empirically, but
it was the dominant mind-set in comparative politics supported by a large
number of academic luminaries at the outset of transition. Its signicance
for shaping the Western thinking about postcommunist transformation at
the early stage must not be belittled.
This book concurs with the second school advocating early democrati-
zation to be undertaken simultaneously with a radical market reform. The
strife over radical market reform versus gradual reform was a matter of
whether the interests of the people or a small rent-seeking elite dominated
over society. The same was true of politics. Ademocratic breakthroughcould
best ensure the dominance of the popular interest over the state. Therefore,
we would expect the correlation between democracy and successful mar-
ket economic reformto be particularly strong in postcommunist transition.
First, the communist state was far more dominant over economy andsociety
thananywhere else inthe world. Second, its elite was tightly knit, forming an
isolated cast. Third, the few checks and balances of communism faded with
its demise, leaving the powerful without constraints. Fourth, the opportu-
nities for rent seeking were extraordinary.
Not surprisingly, inone of the rst substantial regressionanalyses De Melo
et al. (1997a) found such a strong correlation between political freedomand
economic liberalization and it has persisted. If we plot the Freedom House
index for political and civil rights against the EBRD structural transforma-
tion index for 2005, all the nine East-Central European countries are both
the most reformed and the most democratic countries, whereas the nonre-
formers Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are the most authoritarian
(see Figure 8.1). Initially, most democracies in the region opted for radical
reform, and the others for at least gradual reform, and the dictatorships
chose little or no market reform (cf. Bunce 1999a; Havrylyshyn 2006).
From Figure 8.1, we can specify combinations of political regime and
reform strategy that have reinforced one another either in a vicious or a
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virtuous circle. Focusing on the state of democracy and market economic
transformation in 2005, we obtain four groups of countries:
1. Full democracies with normal market economies: East-Central Europe.
These nine countries are full democracies, and they have established
normal market economies. Most of themstartedoff withradical reform
strategies, although Bulgaria and Romania were greatly helped onto
the right track by their severe nancial crises in 19967. All these
countries are members of the European Union, which has proved a
strong anchor both for democracy and market transformation.
2. Full-edged authoritarian systems with Soviet-type economies: Belarus,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is still ruled by its last rst
communist party secretary; but without ideology. In Belarus, Alexan-
der Lukashenko was elected with overwhelming majority in 1994 as a
populist raging against the corruption of the Communist Party, but
he has consolidated a dictatorship. None of these countries undertook
much reform, and their economies are completely dominated by the
state, serving the interests of their dictators.
The remaining states are usually labeled captured or oligarchic. Most of
them started off as semidemocratic and undertook gradual reforms, which
generated extraordinary rent seeking, leading to great inequality. The rul-
ing elite achieved substantial economies of scale in its rent seeking, which
reinforced the economic distortions. To maximize its rents, the ruling elite
strengthened its political control, rendering the state more authoritarian.
In that way, rent seeking contributed to authoritarianism. Although these
countries are often discussed as captured, they are actually changing the
most dynamic with regard to both democracy and market economic trans-
formation. In 2006, they can be described accordingly:
3. Mildly authoritarian states with rent seeking dominated by the rulers:
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In these countries, the
president and the people closest to him maintain a rm grip on both
the economy and politics, but market economies prevail. State power
has been consolidated in the hands of the president. Although private
ownership dominates, property rights are conditional on the political
approval of the ruler. Hardly by chance, the rst three countries in this
group are major energy exporters, and they seem to have fallen victim
to the oil curse. The question arises whether the current rulers can
sustain their dictatorial powers if the world oil prices fall substantially.
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In these countries, transitional rent seeking has been reinforced by
natural rents (Arendh 2005; Gaddy and Ickes 2005).
4. Semidemocratic oligarchic states with market economies: Armenia,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. This group is the most
diverse and unstable. All these countries are electoral democracies,
but their degree of democracy varies considerably. They are market
economies with signicant distortions, and they are pervasively cor-
rupt. They may either evolve toward full democracies with normal
market economies, or some president may consolidate power in an
authoritarian regime.
These regimes vary not only by political nature but also in stability. The
full democracies are most stable, followed by the full-edged dictatorships,
whereas the semidemocratic oligarchic states and the mildly authoritarian
states are rather unstable. Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Ukraine were all mildly
authoritarian states before their colored revolutions.
Amajor cause as well as purpose of authoritarianrule is high-level corrup-
tion. Not surprisingly, the FreedomHouse index for civil and political rights
is closely correlated with the corruption perception index of Transparency
International, as is evident fromFigure 8.2. The competitive political system
has acted as a check on corruption, and the opposite of corruption has been
radical reform (cf. Rose-Ackerman 1999).
An Underreform Trap
A democratic breakthrough was a necessary but insufcient condition for
successful early market economic reforms.
2
Outside democrats had to oust
the old ruling elite, because political discontinuity was a prerequisite for
successful early reforms. The political logic of radical market programs was
that people in the midst of drastic decline in output and high ination
would vote for economic stability and long-term economic growth. This
idea runs counter to the perception that communist parties soon made a
great electoral comeback.
In reality, however, neither was true. The outstanding Bulgarian political
scientist IvanKrastev (2000) has pointedout that the postcommunist region
can be divided into two parts. In the not very democratic CIS countries
that were still electoral democracies, the governments (almost) always win
2
This section draws on slund et al. (2001).
P1: KNP
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.
216
P1: KNP
elections, whereas indemocratic East-Central Europe governments (almost)
always lose elections. The explanationis that voters focus oncorruption, and
the incumbent government is naturally deemed responsible. Remarkably
few incumbent parties have won reelection in postcommunist democra-
cies. The swings are often huge from one election to the next. We must be
careful not to draw far-reaching conclusions from single elections because
ideological preferences are more submerged by such protest votes.
To test these contradictory perceptions on the electoral record, we exam-
ine all parliamentary elections in democracies in the area from 1989 until
2000.
3
Fifteen countries in our postcommunist region enjoyed a reason-
able degree of political freedom, being classied as free or partly free by
Freedom House, whereas seven countries were not even partly free and are
excluded (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan; Freedom House 1999). Electoral outcomes are
most easily classied by the size of the national Communist Party. Even
if renamed, one party is usually its evident successor. Communist parties
have become social democratic inPoland, Hungary, Slovakia, andLithuania,
although throughout the 1990s, they remained hard-line intheir opposition
to market economy inthe CzechRepublic, Bulgaria, Romania, andthrough-
out the former Soviet Union all countries that saw little democratization
before the end of communism.
The results from all these parliamentary elections contrast sharply with
conventional wisdom. Communist parties fared poorly regardless of coun-
try and policy (see Table 8.1). By 1998, no Communist Party in the region
had attained one-third of the votes cast in the most recent democratic elec-
tion. The communist parties in Italy, France, and Finland were actually
larger during the Cold War. Their main strength was relative unity and solid
organization. A few governments contained the odd communist minister
at times (Slovakia, Russia, and Ukraine), but the Communist Party was not
the senior partner in any government. Apparently, the popular nostalgia for
communism was very limited. A cross-country regression for postcommu-
nist countries shows that governments pursuing radical reform fared better
in democratic elections than gradualist governments. Most governments
lost their second election in the transition, but all nonsocialist governments
that had opted for gradual reform lost, and some of those that had chosen
radical reform won (slund et al. 1996).
3
Presidential elections tend to be dominated by personal factors, whereas local elections are
not very relevant for national policy, and participation is limited. The countries considered
democratic have varied minimally, and I picked 1998 as a neutral standard.
P1: KNP
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.
218
P1: KNP
Table 8.2. Communist Party electoral performance and market economic
transformation, 1998
Communist parties
doing well
Communist parties
doing badly
Radical Transformation Hungary
Poland
(0.93)
(0.86)
Czech Republic
Estonia
(0.90)
(0.90)
Latvia (0.86)
Lithuania (0.82)
Slovakia (0.90)
Incomplete Transformation Bulgaria
Moldova
Romania
Russia
Ukraine
(0.79)
(0.76)
(0.76)
(0.64)
(0.65)
Armenia
Georgia
(0.76)
(0.79)
Note:The borderline between radical transformation and incomplete transformation has been
put at a high 0.80 on the structural reform index for 1998 (in the brackets), and as borderline between
communist parties doing badly 20 percent of the votes in the last election before 2000 has been
chosen (see Table 8.1).
Source:Table 8.1 and authors calculations from European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (1999).
Still, the strength of the Communist Party mattered. By its performance,
these countries can be divided into two groups those where the commu-
nist parties received more than 20 percent of the votes cast in the latest
parliamentary election before 2000 (seven countries), and those where they
obtained less than 20 percent (seven countries). This is a natural threshold
with no country in the interval of 16 to 21 percent. Our summary classica-
tion is displayed in Table 8.2, matching this political division by their degree
of market reform in 1998, splitting the democratic transition countries into
four quadrangles.
We can distinguish three typical electoral paths. First, the top left box
in Table 8.2 contains two countries that undertook radical transformation,
but even so their communist parties did well. In Poland and Hungary, the
former communist parties were initially almost routed, but they staged
strong comebacks to about 30 percent of the vote, as they were thoroughly
reformed early on. They could be described as right-wing social democratic
parties by West European standards.
4
The success of these countries market
economic transformation convinced even communist leaders to reform,
4
If we had chosen a different time, the similarly reformed Lithuanian postcommunist party
could have joined them.
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securing their political survival. Their conversion veried the formation of
a market economic consensus.
In seven countries the communist parties were devastated, receiving only
10 to 16 percent in the most recent elections before 2000. All went through
substantial market economic transformationandachievedconsiderable and
lasting growth and are in the right upper box in Table 8.2 (or just below).
These communist parties undertook far-reaching reform, but they did not
reform fast enough. A broad consensus in favor of market reform was
achieved without them.
The bottom left box in Table 8.2 contains ve countries where commu-
nist parties have been relatively successful, although the market economic
transformationwas incomplete. These ve countries are Bulgaria, Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. All these countries were in an underreform
trap during most of the 1990s.
Russia, Moldova, andUkraine enduredthe most long-lastingrent seeking.
Their old communist parties remained strong, gathering 20 to 30 percent
of the votes cast. Although not formally in power in Ukraine or Russia,
the communists were highly inuential in parliament because the electoral
system made them overrepresented, allowing them to block reform legis-
lation. That suited powerful oligarchic business groups, which thrived
on an all-intrusive state, demanding high taxes from all but them, whom
the state offered ample subsidies instead. Thus both communists and oli-
garchs favored similar economic policies, forging a consensus around a
rent-seeking state. The concentrated economic power around the state cir-
cumscribed democracy, and politics became polarized between oligarchs
and communists.
The liberal right was weak, because the performance of the partial mar-
ket economy was mediocre, and few strong independent entrepreneurs had
emerged. Liberals faced the unenviable choice between compromising with
oligarchs (Anatoly Chubais in 1996) or staying in the political desert, ren-
dering themselves politically irrelevant (Grigori Yavlinsky). Electorally, the
communists remained strong because of dissatisfaction with the poorly
functioningsemireformedsystem, whereas most noncommunist voters sup-
ported oligarchs as the strongest opponents of the communists. As a con-
sequence, communists stayed both strong and unreformed when market-
oriented economic transformation was slow.
The best examples of communists and oligarchs helping each other to
dominate politics were the Russian presidential elections in 1996 and the
very similar Ukrainian presidential elections in 1999. In both cases, a com-
munist systemic threat convinced all anticommunists to unite behind the
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victorious incumbent president, with the oligarchs as the main benecia-
ries. The natural outcome was an oligarchic economic and political power
structure. Interestingly, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment ([EBRD] 1999) found that state capture, that is, the inuencing
of government policymaking by a narrow set of interest groups, was the
greatest in these semireformed countries.
Southeast Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova represented a political
underreform trap. The combination of political polarization between com-
munists and oligarchs and their commoneconomic programof rent seeking
was difcult to break. But this underreformtrap burst. In Bulgaria, the hor-
rendous nancial crisis of 19967 discredited the ruling ex-communists
as well as undermined them nancially. As a result, the Bulgarian peo-
ple elected a nonsocialist parliamentary majority, and a liberal government
launched radical market reform. In Romania, the nancial crisis of 19967
was sufciently severe to lead to the democratic ouster of the ex-communist
government, although the new government pursued somewhat less radical
reforms than Bulgaria. In both cases, the underreform trap broke under the
combined pressure of nancial emergency and democracy (cf. Drazen and
Grilli 1993). Similarly, the Russian nancial crash undermined the most
corrupt oligarchs, regional governors, and the communists, who appeared
most responsible, but the crash led to state consolidation and authoritari-
anism rather than liberalism and democracy. In Ukraine, the shock of the
Russian nancial crash was sufcient to discipline the oligarchs to allow
radical reforms. Exceptionally, the Communist Party has consolidated its
hold on power through elections in Moldova, which is the country that has
suffered the most economically after communism.
Renewed Democratization: Colored Revolutions
By the time of the Russian nancial crash of August 1998, the perception
had taken hold that some countries had been lastingly captured by rent-
seeking elites. Many thought little could be done inthese countries, inwhich
predatory mismanagement bred stagnation. But then something happened,
both economically and politically.
Twocontrarypoliticallydevelopments occurred. Insome oligarchic coun-
tries, notablyRussia, Kazakhstan, andAzerbaijan, the central state power was
reinforced and the oligarchs were weakened. In another group of countries,
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, botched elections led to so-called col-
ored or color revolutions, because of the locally adopted names. In Novem-
ber 2003, the Rose Revolution overthrewPresident Eduard Shevardnadze in
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Georgia. It was followedby the Orange RevolutioninUkraine inNovember
December 2004, andnallybythe TulipRevolution, whichtoppledPresident
Askar Akaev in the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005.
5
These three political transformations have a lot in common, as they do
with the revolution in Serbia in September 2000. All the prior regimes were
semidemocraticandallowedelections, but their democracywas constrained.
The spark for each regime change was a fraudulent national election. The
dominant revolutionary claim was that the old regime was highly corrupt,
and the revolutionaries called for freedom and democracy. In Ukraine, a
major slogan was Bandits to prison! Both the incumbent regime and the
oppositionhonoredcertainconstitutional rules, suchas whenelections were
to be scheduled and how they were to be undertaken. The opposition could
hold the regime to its own standards. A general sense prevailed that the old
president and his regime had outlived themselves and did not know what
to do next. People wanted change, but they doubted that the forthcoming
election would allowit. All these revolutionary situations ended without the
massive use of violence by either the state or the opposition, although the
opposition groups used extra-constitutional tactics. In Serbia, Georgia, and
Ukraine, but not in the Kyrgyz Republic, the new regime appears to have
become more democratic (McFaul 2006).
The three post-Soviet colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and the
Kyrgyz Republic had seven common conditions for democratic break-
through. The fundamental condition that made these regime changes pos-
sible was that the incumbent regimes were neither strong nor united. They
were no centralized dictatorships but semidemocratic or mildly authoritar-
ian polities, which a skillful old president managed by playing various oli-
garchic groups against one another. InUkraine, only one oligarchic clanfully
supportedthe presidential candidate of the oldregime (Viktor Yanukovych),
whereas the others were lukewarm (slund 2006).
A second related ssure went through law enforcement. Its various
branches were rivals, pursuing competing oligarchic interests. Because the
troops were not very reliable, the old regime did not know whether it could
deploy them against demonstrators. In Georgia, the security forces were
called out but refused to shoot in defense of Shevardnadze.
A third condition was that the old regime had an unpopular leader. In
Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic, Shevardnadze and Akaev seemed in-
clined to stay on, whereas in Ukraine, President Kuchma tried to appoint a
5
This section draws heavily on slund and McFaul (2006), especially McFaul (2006). See
also Wilson (2006).
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successor. All of them had originally been popular, but corruption or nepo-
tism had eroded this.
Fourth, a strong and well-organized opposition existed. The opposition
was reasonably structured in a limited number of major parties that acted
together. It had a popular leader, who had substantial executive experience
and parliamentary representation. In the Orange Revolution, the billion-
aires supported the regime, but the multimillionaires opposed it, generously
funding the Orange Revolution (slund 2004b).
Fifth, the opposition had access to independent media. The Orange Rev-
olution marked the breakthrough of the Internet era, as an Internet news-
paper, Ukrainskaya pravda, became the foremost news medium. Mobile
phones, which could also take photos, transmitted revolutionary news.
Strangely, boththe GeorgianandUkrainianoldregimes permittedthe oppo-
sition access to a minor TV channel, which proved very important. These
countries were sufciently free so that foreign broadcasting could not keep
up with events and meant little to the locals (Prytula 2006).
Asixth condition was timely and credible independent election monitor-
ing undertaken on a national scale, and the instant spreading of the actual
election results. This required strong domestic nongovernmental organiza-
tions as well as international election monitors. Exit polls as well as alterna-
tive vote counts were carried out, and nally the actual fraud was revealed,
verifying the vote rigging.
A nal critical condition was the ability of the opposition to mobilize
the population, which required strong nongovernmental organizations. A
model student organization, Otpor, developed in Serbia, and a similar orga-
nization, Kmara, emerged in Georgia. Next, the Belarusian Zubr evolved,
but no revolution took place in Belarus, and in 2004, the youth organization
Pora was formed in Ukraine. These organizations started street demonstra-
tions, but they would have mattered little if the population had not followed
them. The number of people in the streets was vital for the success of the
protest. The mobilization was facilitated by the public sense that it was now
or never because the election had evidently been stolen.
In all these regime changes, foreign actors were conspicuous. Western
nongovernmental organizations happily assisted with the training of acti-
vists, election monitors, and independent journalists. The Orange Revolu-
tion was top TV news throughout the world for one month, and promi-
nent international politicians went to Kiev to participate in a roundtable
with the Ukrainian leaders on how to conclude the revolution peacefully.
The Kremlin and other incumbent dictators labeled the colored revolutions
Western conspiracies. That was an exaggeration, but the opposition enjoyed
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strong Western sympathy. The colored revolutions showed that these cap-
tured regimes were not all that entrenched but harbored seeds of democ-
racy. According to more stringent denitions of revolution, the colored
revolutions do not quite qualify. They were peaceful, and constitutions were
obeyed. No major redistribution of property occurred. It might be more
appropriate to call them democratic breakthroughs (McFaul 2006).
The colored revolutions bred a counterrevolution in the remaining, more
authoritarian, oligarchic regimes. In April 2005, an armed uprising in the
Uzbek city of Andijan was quashed in bloodshed costing hundreds of lives.
In Russia, the Kremlin drew the conclusion that it needed to become more
autocratic tostay inpower. It tightenedauthoritariancontrols over all factors
that may have contributed to the colored revolutions. Effective one-party
rule was imposed. All media of signicance were brought under Kremlin
control. A new restrictive law on nongovernmental organizations gave the
Kremlin arbitrary control over their registration and funding. Independent
electionmonitoringwas prohibitedbylaw, as was criticismof publicofcials.
Judicial reformwas haltedtothe benet of arbitrary secret police action. Still
the question remains whether the remaining oligarchic regimes will evolve
into democracies or strict dictatorships in the longer term.
Parties, Electoral Rules, and Constitutions
The essence of democracy is institutions that effectively represent the public
interest, and elections are the main vehicle in their construction. The timely
execution of political institution building was vital, and timely meant early.
A few seemingly technical aspects of the rst elections have been essential
for the political development of each country.
First, political parties had to be built to represent a broader public inter-
est. Their formation depended greatly on whether parties were permit-
ted in a founding election (McFaul 1997). Central and Southeast Europe
launched ordinary party elections from the outset, but all the elections in
the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1990 precluded any formal role for political
parties, whichrenderedthemmerely semidemocratic. As a consequence, the
post-Soviet electorates and the ensuing parliamentary factions were neither
structurednor disciplined, andthe deputies were accidental gures account-
able to nobody. The only exceptions were the Baltic states, Georgia, and
Armenia, where the national popular fronts had grown so strong that they
became real political parties despite the electoral system. In Ukraine, parties
were proscribed even in the second parliamentary elections in 1994. The
result was the freewheeling corruption of individual deputies in an unruly
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parliament. About one-third of the Ukrainian deputies elected in both 1994
and 1998 were active businesspeople. Their purpose was not to facilitate
deregulation but to extract their share of rents through legislation benet-
ing their enterprises or by selling their votes to other businesspeople.
Another important election rule was the choice between proportional
representation and majority election in single-mandate constituencies. The
East-Central Europeans and Balts chose proportional elections, whereas the
CIS countries opted for mixed systems. Some had proportional representa-
tion (Armenia and Georgia); some single-mandate constituencies (Belarus,
previously Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan); and some had a combination of both
(Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). In the countries with proportional rep-
resentation, the party system gained strength, and those are the strongest
democracies in the region (Kitschelt et al. 1999), and there is a trend toward
proportional elections. As elsewhere in the world, proportional represen-
tation facilitated the formation of strong parties and thus reform efforts
(Geddes 1994b). The challenge from the Communist Party often forced the
other political groups to get organized and improve the efcacy of their
democracy.
A third election rule with great impact was whether any threshold for
proportional representation existed, usually 4 or 5 percent of the votes cast.
Some countries introduced such a hurdle from the beginning, and they
obtained neatly structured parliaments with up to six parties. This was
true of East Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania. The main exception was Poland. In its
rst freely elected Sejm in 1991, Poland had no less than 28 parties. Initially,
hurdles left a large share of the votes cast without representation because
of the large number of small parties. Georgia took the prize in its October
1992parliamentary elections; more thantwo-thirds of the votes were cast for
small parties that werenot represented. Soonpeoplelearnedandincreasingly
selected parties that gained representation (McFaul 2000).
Afourth important factor for the future party structure was the timing of
the rst founding parliamentary elections (McFaul 1999). The population
was most enthusiastic for economic reforms just after their launch, when
they focused on vision rather than costs. The later the rst elections after
democratizationwere held, the worse the result was for reformers. Countries
that had mobilized to overthrow communist rule tended to unite around
one popular movement. If elections were held within less than a year, these
movements could be transformed into large democratic parties; any further
delay caused divisions. Successful early elections took place in East Ger-
many, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Poland, Russia, and Latvia, on the
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contrary, held their rst parliamentary elections very late, almost two years
after they had attempted radical economic reform programs. These late
elections resulted in a complete fragmentation of the popular movement
for democratization and serious backlashes against reform. In Poland, Soli-
darity was brokenupintoa score of parties, andinRussia the once impressive
popular movement Democratic Russia dwindled into insignicance. Latvia
saw its popular front fractured and demolished.
National peculiarities do matter. None of the postcommunist countries
has a party structure that resembles that of any other postcommunist coun-
try, showing more originality than West Europeans (Kitschelt et al. 1999).
The degree of stabilization of the party structure varies, but big parties still
come and go even in Central Europe. Yet the party elections, proportional
representation, hurdles for representation, andtiming of a founding election
have had the predicted great impact (McFaul 1997).
The impact of the choice of constitution was even more profound. The
fundamental alternatives were parliamentary or presidential rule. The for-
mer communist countries were left with a contradictory constitutional
inheritance. On one hand, they had written constitutions that had been
promulgated. On the other, these constitutions had never been applied.
These bogus communist constitutions assumed real life only after commu-
nism. To a surprising extent, constitutions and politics were seen as national
prerogatives, and most countries tried to draw on precommunist national
history, however miserable it had been, and international experience was
ignored. The impact of Western models was much more limited than in the
economic sphere. Fortunately, in the western part of the region, one of the
dominant slogans was returnto Europe, andthe EuropeanUnionhaddef-
inite ideas about political systems, offering its advice toEast-Central Europe.
As a result, East-Central Europe has by and large adopted the democratic
rules of Western Europe.
The most dramatic constitutional conict concerned the division of
power between the president and the parliament. They were worst in
CIS countries with some democracy Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, andArmenia. This strife escalatedbecause
the principle of the division of power, which had prevailed in the rest of the
world since the late eighteenth century thanks to Montesquieu (1748/1977),
had never been accepted by the communists, since it circumscribed the
power of the Communist Party. The public understanding of the benet of
the division of power was absent.
The Soviet parliament was a rubberstamp institution that convened twice
a year to adopt one or two laws each time. Its members were often token
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representatives of various social strata, suchas picturesquemilkmaids, rather
than powerful individuals. According to the Soviet Constitutionof 1977 and
its republicanvarieties, however, the parliament was powerful andsovereign.
On this basis, post-Soviet parliamentarians demanded substantial executive
powers, notably in scal and monetary matters as well as privatization,
just trying to grab what they could. These constitutional problems were
aggravated by the lack of party structure and the not fully democratic par-
liamentary elections in early 1990.
Initially, the presidency was given strong powers in most countries to
offer rm leadership. Only Hungary chose a pure parliamentary system
from the beginning. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic
republics had ambiguous constitutions, but inspired by WesternEurope, the
powers of their presidents have beenincreasingly circumscribed. Legislation
became the concern of parliament, and the government was responsible to
parliament, and the president focused on constitutional and international
issues.
In the former Soviet Union, presidential powers have persistently been
muchstronger thaninEast-Central Europe, but parliaments have challenged
them, leading to virulent conicts. Presidents reacted to irresponsible par-
liaments by demanding more power, but the parliaments usually refused,
pointing to the corruption of the government. The most dramatic strife
occurred in Russia in SeptemberOctober 1993, ending with bloodshed
after the president had dissolved the predemocratic and unrepresentative
parliament, which launched an armed uprising. Similar conicts occurred
in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, but
they were resolved without bloodshed. Over time, some clarity has been
established. The less democratic a country is, the stronger its presiden-
tial powers. Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan have moved in
the direction of stronger parliamentary system, whereas all the other CIS
countries have reinforced presidential powers, which has coincided with the
strengthening of authoritarian rule.
Throughout the postcommunist world, establishments have claimed that
political stability, consensus, and strong leadership are necessary for suc-
cessful market economic reform. These views are so common that many
Western political scientists do not even query the benet of political sta-
bility, seeing it as a goal in itself (Elster et al. 1998, pp. 2923). Yet, a good
rule of thumb is whatever the old communist elite wanted must be wrong,
however sensible it sounded. Empirically, government instability has actu-
ally been an advantage. The ve countries with the most frequent changes
of governments are Poland, the three Baltic states, and Bulgaria, some of
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the most successful reform countries. Their governments have lasted only
one year on average. A plausible explanation is that frequent changes in the
executive mean that vested interests cannot control the government, which
becomes more transparent, more accountable, and less corrupt, better cor-
responding to the public interest. Initially, Bulgaria illustrated the danger of
inconsistent policies and erratic policy reversals, but in the end its economic
reforms have succeeded. So far, vested interests have been a far greater threat
to sound economic policies in transition than disorder. After all, the Central
Asian dictatorships Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have had the most
stable governments. The main problem has not been to maintain govern-
ment stability but to accomplish sufcient change and to secure the public
interest through the establishment of checks and balances.
Instinctively, many people think that a one-party majority government is
preferable. However, in transition the most successful reform governments
have beenbroad-based, multiparty coalitions. Illustrative examples are mul-
tiple Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Czech governments. This is
logical if the main threat is that the old establishment will corrupt the new
government, because a coalition government involves political competi-
tion, transparency, and accountability. With several parties in government,
no single group can capture the state. Transparency is enhanced because
each coalition partner sees what is going on. Each party fends for its own
long-term reputation, which makes any coalition partner object to another
partner ripping off the country. Naturally, corrupt deals may be struck,
but the risk is less than in a majority government. Government instabil-
ity and coalition governments indicate a competitive political system, and
countries with the most competitive political systems have achieved most
economic reform. Democratic systems can constrain the capacity of narrow
elite groups that exercise undue inuence on government (EBRD 1999).
Several key principles need to govern the constitutional order. First, there
must be aclear divisionof executive andlegislative powers, whichthe democ-
racies inthe regionhave accomplished. Second, lawshouldrule society. Con-
cretely, the parliament must possess substantial legislative powers, whereas
the rights of the government and the president to rule by decree should
be restricted. Third, the government must be transparent and accountable,
which is a strong argument for parliamentarianism, because a parliament
can supervise a government relatively closely, while presidents and their
administrations are patently nontransparent and unaccountable. Under the
existing conditions, parliamentary rule is preferable to presidential rule in
the whole region. The purported need for a strong president is a variety of
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the myth of the need for a dictator. A strong state is a legal, transparent, and
accountable state.
Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003, 2004) have spearheaded an extensive
theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of constitutions and elec-
toral rules on economic policy in recent years in up to 80 democracies,
primarily Western and Latin American countries. Although some of their
lessons apply to the postcommunist countries, others do not. The main
commonality is that a parliamentary form of government is associated
with better performance and better growth-promoting policies, measured
by indexes for broad protection of property rights and of open borders
(Persson and Tabellini 2004, p. 95).
Strangely, Persson et al. (2000) presumed that a presidential democ-
racy would have stronger accountability because of a straighter chain of
command and a clearer separation of powers and thus stronger checks
and balances, although they noted that this result does not hold true for
weak democracies. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2001) received the more
plausible empirical result that presidential systems are associated with more
widespread corruption. As a postcommunist presidential system represents
a continuation of the arbitrary rule by the Party apparatus, it is naturally
subject to few checks and balances and more inclined to corruption, and
therefore it is also likely to be less democratic.
Persson et al. (2003) argued that voting over individuals correlates with
lower corruption, but the opposite is true in the postcommunist states. The
less corrupt East-Central European countries have proportional elections,
whereas the more corrupt CIS countries predominantly pursue personal
elections. It has beeneasier to purchase individually electedseats thanparty-
list seats inthe mixedRussianandUkrainiansystems. The resulting coalition
governments in East-Central Europe have been much better at controlling
corruption than the CIS governments, contrary to Persson and Tabellinis
argument. Some of their more specic points on economic policies, how-
ever, appear valid, namely, that proportional elections lead to higher public
spending, higher taxation, and larger budget decits.
The limited applicability of this political economy of constitutions to the
postcommunist countries raises the question what is wrong with it. One
possibility is that East-Central Europe and the CIS countries are different.
Another possible explanation, suggestedby DaronAcemoglu(2005), is great
covariance withunobservedvariables. The peculiarities of the parliamentary
systems that predominate in Europe might pertain to the European social
welfare ideology, the EUrules, or recent policy fads, especially given that the
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period of these studies is very short. The degree of democracy is important,
and it must not be seen as exogenous but endogenous because authoritarian
and semiauthoritarian regimes prefer presidential rule. Finally, policy in
the transition period should differ from stable conditions. Its purpose is
to construct a new system rather than to manage an old one, and its rent
seeking was most peculiar. The declining relative economic performance
of the Central European countries could be explained with their transition
having been completed, rendering further reforms almost as difcult as in
reform-shy Western Europe.
How to Tame the Leviathan: Reform of the Communist State
The new postcommunist governments had to seize control over the state
apparatus and rebuild it. In the communist states, the formal government
and its state apparatus were only appendices to the real state, the Com-
munist Party. The Party stood above the law, intervening however it found
convenient without accountability. Unfortunately, the communist institu-
tions did not just go away. After communism, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party was transformed into a presidential administration,
and the regional party committees into gubernatorial administrations. By
communist tradition, these administrations couldinterfere at will. The pres-
idential administrations were quite large in the late 1990s, 6,000 people in
Russia and 1,000 people in Ukraine.
6
These bureaucracies became centers of
rampant corruption because of their large assets, freedom of intervention,
and absence of accountability.
People whonever dealt withcommunist states are usually unaware of how
problematic they were. The communist state did too much and the wrong
things, while vital state functions were ignored. Communist states did not
regulate but managed enterprises. To get bureaucrats out of enterprises, the
government had to be separated from business, which was the basic reason
for privatization (Boycko et al. 1995). Numerous state bodies designed for
the management of industries and enterprises had to be abolished, ranging
from the State Planning Committee, its subordinate State Material Supply
Committee, and the State Price Committee, to scores of industrial branch
ministries. PolandandHungary hadcompletedthese changes before the end
of communism, but abolished branch ministries reemerged in most post-
Soviet countries because their functions had not been eliminated. Intrusive
6
Personal information from work with these governments.
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state intervention persists in enterprise decisions throughout the region
(EBRD and World Bank 2005).
For communism, secrecy was even more sacrosanct than openness is for
democracy. A rst step toward transparency was to publish all legal acts,
which authoritarian post-Soviet countries are still reluctant to do. Even-
tually, their publication on the Internet is likely to solve this problem in
democracies and semidemocratic countries. Another novelty was public
audits of the government. Under communism, Poland exceptionally had
a strong Auditing Chamber, but now most countries have established an
independent auditing agency.
The reform of the communist bureaucracy has caused extraordinary
headache. Under communism, senior ofcials were members of the Com-
munist Party, muddling the distinction between politicians and civil ser-
vants. Communist bureaucrats had the wrong qualications, being largely
engineers rather than economists and lawyers. Many had been preoccupied
with intricacies of a command economy, without relevant knowledge of a
market economy. Inthe gerontocratic Brezhnev era, ofcials were promoted
by seniority rather than merit. These ofcials represented a negative human
capital, and their layoff was urgently needed. Depoliticization, rejuvenation,
and professionalization were crucial.
The reform of the government was a daunting challenge, and only one
country was really successful in this undertaking: Estonia. Under the truly
radical Prime Minister Mart Laar (2002), the young Estonian government
concluded that a maximum of disruption was desirable to stop communist
telephone rule and corruption. It drew up a completely new government
structure with clear borderlines between political and civil service positions.
It laid off all civil servants, allowing everybody to apply for the new govern-
ment jobs, and their applications were judged on merit. Amazingly, Estonia
succeeded in this radical reform, and it can boast of the least corruption of
all postcommunist countries. However, one important reason for its success
was probably that Estonia was the smallest of all the transition countries. In
Russia, President Yeltsin and his advisors were painfully aware of how the
abolition of the tsarist foreign service by the liberal Russian government in
early 1917 had led to chaos and they concluded that it was necessary to work
with the old administration (Pipes 1990; slund 1995; Havrylyshyn 2006).
The greater the initial turnover of political elites was, the higher the proba-
bility of successful market reforms. Communist governments that retained
power have been reluctant to reform. Progress in liberalization has been
twice as high in countries where the political executive has been replaced as
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in those where the incumbent from the communist era remained in ofce
(EBRD 1999, p. 106). Indeed, in several countries liberalization and stabi-
lization were delayed until the incumbent postcommunist government was
nally removed through elections, notably in Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova,
and Ukraine. This is a strong empirical argument for lustration, that is, the
exclusionfromsenior government service of secret policemenandparty of-
cials. It was undertaken systematically only in East Germany and the Czech
Republic, although several other countries made some efforts, notably the
Baltic states, Poland, and Bulgaria. The counterargument is that old ofcials
can make amends, and if allowed to make a comeback, they can contribute
to advantageous competition. The exclusion of a large group of people has
serious implications for civil rights and the legitimacy of democracy as well.
In the successful reformcountries, especially Poland, Hungary, and Estonia,
civil service reforms were impressive, clearly improving the quality of public
administration.
Contrary to the general perception, the communist administration was
not all that large, andmost transitioncountries sawtheir bureaucracies swell
or even double. One reason was that the government assumed a number of
newfunctions, notably tax collection. Another cause was the absence of hard
budget constraints, which led to a wasteful expansion of the bureaucracy.
A third explanation is that many additional bureaucrats, who were largely
inspectors, made their own living in the name of the state, by extorting
money for paid services.
Not surprisingly, it has been extremely difcult to reform government.
The EU has made the greatest contribution. Although numerous necessary
changes are obvious, many of those working in the government appara-
tus have little reason to welcome such changes, because of their perverse
incentives. Quite a few ofcials are more interested in enriching themselves
through extortion and theft (Hay and Shleifer 1998; Shleifer and Vishny
1998). How to defeat these enemies from within has been one of the most
difcult tasks of the transition. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1998,
p. 12) concluded that deregulation and liberalization are far more impor-
tant for ghting corruption than the improvement of incentives and per-
sonnel selection inside the bureaucracy.
Public Opinion and Ideology
Do people support reform? A large number of opinion polls have been
conducted in former communist countries. For our purposes, the European
Unions Eurobarometer is most useful, because it posed the same questions
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to the population of up to fteen countries in our region annually from
1990.
A rst question was whether people thought their country was going
in the right or wrong direction (European Commission, various years). In
countries that had launched a serious economic reform, people tended to be
positive about the direction of their country just before and at the beginning
of the reform, whereas sentiments often turned sour later on (Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states). The only two
countries where the population was persistently optimistic were the most
radical early reformers, the Czech Republic and Estonia. When the Czech
reforms ran out of steam in 1997, the mood plummeted. Most countries
did not undertake very radical reforms, and their populations were highly
dissatised. All this suggests that people favor quite radical reforms.
The second question is even more telling, namely, whether people reck-
oned the reform in their country had been too fast or too slow. This query
was only meaningful at an early stage of reform, and European Commis-
sions Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer shows that in 1994, an
overwhelming majority in fteen postcommunist countries thought reform
in their country was too slow. The radically reforming Czech Republic was
the only exception where only a slight majority advocated faster reform.
Apparently, the problem was not the people but the ability of the political
process to translate their will into radical market reform.
But why dopeople inopinionpolls indicate that the material situationhas
deteriorated? EveninEast Germany, where people admit tomassive material
improvements on all specic questions, they claim a general deterioration.
The causes are multiple. They involve real effects, changed income distribu-
tion, psychological reaction to change, altered social status, and increased
uncertainty and risk. Some people adjusted fast and beneted. Others were
unable to handle change and risk and started drinking. Income differen-
tials increased, rendering the winners fewer than the losers. Social status
changed rapidly in favor of entrepreneurs, but they were few. In the CIS,
wage and pension arrears became notorious. Hyperination ate up bank
savings. People were not used to negative publicity about their own society,
because it had been prohibited under communism, and they presumed that
bad news reected real deterioration. Law and order declined, and all kinds
of risks increased. People do not think of total welfare or even their own wel-
fare but of their relative position. Considering the multitude of momentous
changes, it would be strange if not many people were upset by one aspect or
another, which does not necessarily say anything about their real standard of
living.
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Postcommunist transformation was an intensely ideological process,
albeit this was concealed by antipolitical slogans, such as no more experi-
ments, which repudiated the complete politicization of communism. Vir-
tuallyall the leadingeconomic reformers LeszekBalcerowicz, V aclavKlaus,
Mart Laar, Einars Rep se, Yegor Gaidar, and Anatoly Chubais were com-
mitted neoliberals, with favorite books such as Friedrich Hayeks The Road
to Serfdom (1944/1986) and The Constitution of Liberty (1960). They were
no sheer technocrats but professed an alternative vision of a more humane
society. Transformation was not only about economic efciency and wel-
fare but also about freedom and human dignity most clearly formulated by
V aclav Klaus (1992, 1994). One of his favorite expressions was: The third
way leads to the Third World. The prime purpose of the reformers was less
to win elections than the public debate, reestablishing the norms of West-
ern civilization in these morally degenerate communist states (D abrowski
et al. 2001). The ideological commitment of these reformers provided their
societies with a sense of direction. The importance of ideology is best illus-
trated by a society with no sense of ideology, such as Belarus. When society
has no evident purpose, all that is left is interests in a society dominated
by a small elite, rendering dictatorship and the prevalence of rent seek-
ing the natural outcomes in line with Ivan Karamazovs thesis in Fyodor
Dostoyevskys The Brothers Karamazov: If there is no God, everything is
permitted.
Successful reformers have also nurtured a strong national commitment,
often seeing the rebirth of their nation as their goal. This was particularly
apparent in the Baltics but also in Central Europe and Armenia. The non-
reformers, on the contrary, harbored little national purpose, as is evident
in Belarus and Central Asia. Ukraine and Moldova cherished national con-
sciousness, but their people were not verycondent. The nationalists inthese
two countries joined hands with the old communist elite because their own
strength was insufcient, whereas the old elite realized that they could no
longer rely on Moscow. As a result, these countries were captured by the old
elites, which indulged in massive rent seeking, while the nationalists lacked
economic program.
When Leszek Balcerowicz (1992) launched radical economic reforms in
Poland, one of his greatest concerns was strikes and other forms of social
unrest. Two years later in Russia, Yegor Gaidar (2000) was of a similar opin-
ion, and worries were rampant in many other countries, such as Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, which had experienced serious strike
movements that had undermined the power of the old communist dictator-
ships. However, labor relations changed instantly with transition. Fears of
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strikes and labor unrest proved exaggerated, and the problem has not been
too many but too few strikes. When more than half the workforce is not
paid its salaries in time and in full, as was the case in Russia and Ukraine,
workers should go on strike. The most active trade unions were those that
could extract the largest public subsidy per person. The frequent misper-
ceptions of how labor would react were based on a lack of understanding of
the perversity of the old ofcial communist trade unions. Previously, labor
unrest, especially coal miners strikes in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, had
been expressions of democratic pressures rather than of trade unionism.
Much of the early political activities took the form of trade unions or envi-
ronmental movements. When the Polish trade union Solidarity was formed
in 1980, it was an actual national front. Similarly, the environmentalismthat
thrived in Estonia and Lithuania from 1987 was primarily an expression of
national and democratic opposition. Whenreal national fronts were formed
in 1988, the previously strong environmentalism faded.
Each government that liberalized consumer prices was afraid that people
would take to the streets in protest. After all, Poland had experienced bloody
riots because of price increases, primarily on meat, in 1956, 1970, 1976, and
1980, and even the Soviet Union had seen a massacre in Novorossiisk in
1962, unleashed by a meat price hike. In many other countries, notably in
North Africa, bread price rises had unleashed serious riots. To great positive
surprise, nosingle postcommunist price liberalizationarousedsocial unrest.
I was inMoscowaround the time of the price liberalization. The atmosphere
was tense. Before the deregulation, a public fear prevailed, as if a Damocles
sword was hanging in the sky, and people who were expecting the sky to
fall upon them suddenly became very kind to one another. When the prices
were liberalized, they rose instantly by 250 percent, but there was no sign of
protest. People took it calmly and serenely as in all the other postcommunist
countries. Why was there no public reaction? A price increase for a limited
number of commodities is politically less acceptable, because people can
measure how much they lose personally and gure out that the privileged
escape. A price rise is directed against certain groups. With general price
liberalization, on the contrary, the whole economic paradigm changed, and
nobody could assess the effect onspecic groups, rendering collective action
difcult.
People were not completely passive. When a country pursued an ostenta-
tiously hopeless and damaging economic policy, people took to the streets.
The best examples are Bulgaria and Romania in 1996, when huge mass
protests broke out, although the economic mismanagement had gone very
far before people reacted.
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9780521865265c08a CUFX164/Aslund 978 0 521 86526 5 August 8, 2007 12:4
On the whole, society reacted as a student of Mancur Olsons (1971) Logic
of Collective Action would have assumed. Civil society and all kinds of orga-
nizations were weak. Hence, only small and tightly knit interest groups with
a great deal to benet were able to collude, and they represented primarily
the rent-seeking elite.
Democracy and Democracy Aid
The future development of democracy in the postcommunist countries is
by no means obvious. There are many reasons to presume that democracy
will be sustained in most of the current democracies and erupt in some
authoritarian states, but there are also contrarian tendencies.
A fundamental precondition for democracy is peace and secure borders.
Wars have been signicant in postcommunist transition. Even excluding
Yugoslavia, ve countries have endured wars: Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova, in approximate order of damage, not to mention
Russias war inChechnya. The initial effect of war was unambiguous. Output
fell sharply, notwithstanding that much of the ofcial decline reected an
expansion of the underground economy. Georgia and Armenia now belong
to the most corrupt countries in the world. Yet after considerable suffering,
both countries have undertaken signicant reform, and especially Armenia
has attained impressive economic growth. Georgia and Armenia experience
the least state interventioninenterprise decisions (EBRD1999). They might
represent an example of Mancur Olsons (1982) thesis that the destruction
of obsolete state structures through war may facilitate the establishment
of more adequate state structures than a gradual reform within the old
institutional structure could have done. Olson used the examples of West
Germany and Japan after World War II. Both countries were well endowed
with human capital, which was a precondition for Olsons thesis because
it is an asset for which allocation can be improved. Yet the Georgian and
Armenian governments deliver few public goods, not even elementary law
and order. The so-called frozen conicts persist: Transnistria in Moldova,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorny Karabakh in Azer-
baijan. In Chechnya, warfare continues. So far, Dominic Lievens (2000)
judgment holds that no empire has collapsed as peacefully and with as little
bloodshed as the Soviet empire. Although national strife can emerge, it is
most remarkable how submerged it has been outside of the Balkans.
Most of the classical preconditions for democracy exist in the former
Soviet bloc (Lipset 1959). The level of education is remarkably high. The
same is true of urbanization and industrialization. With some exceptions,
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the postcommunist countries are economically upper-income countries.
Most such countries in the world are democracies. In addition, they are
enjoying high and sustained economic growth.
The main threat to democracy in the region may lie in corruption, which
can delegitimize the political system. Ivan Krastevs judgment holds. Cor-
ruption is the main theme in almost all elections, and nearly all governing
parties lose elections, because they are blamed for corruption. Seymour
Martin Lipset (1959, p. 86) taught us: Legitimacy involves the capacity of
a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political
institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. Many
Russians think that their state is unique and has to be authoritarian and
corrupt. The post-Soviet states have serious problems with the efcacy and
therefore legitimacy of the state.
Many of the worst threats to democracy reside inhistory, both distant and
recent. Authoritarian ideology remains strong in the former Soviet Union.
In an excellent recent book on Russian conservatism, the grand old man of
Russian history Richard Pipes (2005, p. 1) concluded: The dominant strain
in Russian political thought throughout history has been a conservatism
that insisted on strong, centralized authority, unrestrained either by law
or parliament. The current Russian regime draws parallels with Count
Sergei Uvarovs famous triad Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality, which
became the ideological foundation for the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (Pipes
2005, p. 100). Characteristically, the Russian governments have accepted
the economic laws of the market as universal and applicable to Russia, but
they have perceivedtheir politics as uniquely Russian. They have by andlarge
ignoredthe insights of foreignpolitical scientists. The absence of democratic
traditions and inherited democratic institutions is a problem. A particular
threat is old antidemocratic elites, notably the old security services, which
currently rule Russia. For the former Soviet people, continuity as a source
of democratic legitimacy is not available.
In more recent history, the multiple collapses in the Soviet Union in 1991
make manyRussians hanker for securityregardless of cost. None of the coun-
tries emanating fromthe Habsburg Empire that experienced hyperination
stayed democratic until World War II. The same can now be said about
the former Soviet Union. Of these fteen states, only the three Baltic states,
which escaped the ruble zone in mid-1992 and thus hyperination, have
stayed persistently democratic.
7
The cost of the fateful attempt to preserve
the ruble zone after 1991 does not diminish in hindsight but big political
7
At the moment of writing, Freedom House (2006) assesses Ukraine as free.
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damage is added to its economic dread. A similar argument could be made
about the breakdown of law and order and the collapse of other essential
state functions, such as the payments of pensions and wages.
The radical reform program has been criticized for the clear and spe-
cic answers it provided, but this book suggests that this broad body of
the mainstream Western economic advice was amazingly appropriate, both
theoretically and practically. Out of the twenty-one countries we discuss in
this book, eighteenare market economies. Democracy building, by contrast,
has been as relative failure. Only nine of these twenty-one countries have
become sustainable democracies. Looking upon how democracy building
was been attempted, this failure is no surprise.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, unlike economists, political
scientists had not reached any broad agreement on howdemocracy building
ought to proceed. The authoritarian modernization school and the domi-
nant transitology turned out to be outright wrong on just about everything,
and the protagonists of the successful combination of early democratization
and radical economic reform were a small minority.
8
Consequently, political scientists could not agree on any consistent body
of policy advice suchas the radical reformprogram. Whenadvice was offered
it was surprisingly vague. Literature about democracy aid typically suggests
which questions should be discussed as well as methodology but refrains
from concrete policy advice on key issues (e.g., Carothers 2000). The sound
answers that actually existed were not understood, compiled, or spread.
The best summary of the main lessons from the building of democracy was
oddly published by the EBRD (1999) in its Transition Report 1999, from
which many of the conclusions in this chapter are drawn.
9
The dominant
orthodoxy, transitology, has provedinadequate. Nowidely appreciatedbody
of concrete policy recommendations existed.
The Western world did not provide relevant advice on most of the big
political questions posed in the postcommunist world. Should early parlia-
mentary elections be held after the democratic breakthrough, or should a
nationsticktooldconstitutions androundtable agreements? Russia, Poland,
andLatvia sufferedbadlybyholdingparliamentaryelections about twoyears
after their democratic breakthrough, missing their chance of having their
democracy consolidated in an early election. Western political scientists
are divided about the merits of presidential versus parliamentary system,
8
Michael McFaul (1997, 2001), Larry Diamond (1995, 1999), and Valerie Bunce (1999a,
1999b) took positions close to those expressed here.
9
The main author of the political chapter was Joel Hellman.
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whereas postcommunist practice shows that presidential systems recreated
the Communist Party apparatus. Nor do most of them have any principled
position on the choice between proportional and majoritarian elections in
one-person constituencies, whereas practice has shown that proportional
elections with a reasonable hurdle for representation of a party work best
for effective democracy. When it comes to more difcult questions, such as
how to organize a government effectively, the West has little advice to offer
but imitation of its own institutions.
Most political scientists even braced themselves against giving policy
advice, as if that would degrade their academic professionalism. Unlike the
classical political philosophers, few contemporary political scientists dare
to be normative in sharp contrast to many economists who went to the
countries in question and made very concrete policy suggestions. Politi-
cal scientists stopped at more or less academic seminars, for which leading
policy makers have little time.
Nor does any international organization have the mandate to build
democracy, as the IMF takes responsibility for global macroeconomic stabil-
ity and the World Bank for privatization. The nearest substitutes are USAID
and the EU, but neither organization professes any explicit ideal of democ-
racy beyond the most obvious elements, such as free and fair elections.
The complaint is often made that Western democracy aid has been too
small, but given the lack of substance, this is hardly the main problem.
10
It
is true that most policy makers showed little interest in international advice
on democracy building, but considering the paucity of relevant content in
what was presented to them it is not very surprising that highly occupied
politicians decided that they could spend their scarce time with something
more useful.
The main exception to this failure of international support for democ-
racy building has been the organization of democratic elections and their
monitoring, which has become an important and successful part of Western
democracy assistance. Two international organizations, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, have
developed a healthy competition in election monitoring. Several interna-
tional nongovernmental organizations, notably George Soross Open Soci-
ety Institute, Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, and
the National Democratic Institute have also committed themselves to the
promotion of democratic elections and election monitoring. What to do
10
The spectacular U.S. failure to build democracy in Iraq with virtually unlimited resources
veries howlittle knowledge about democracy building the U.S. government has absorbed.
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after a democratic election, however, remains as confused as a decade ear-
lier, leaving the nations of the colored revolutions oundering. In hindsight,
it is all too clear that the newly elected president Yushchenko should have
been advised to dissolve the old parliament and hold fresh, fully democratic
elections.
The only successful method of building democracy inthe postcommunist
world has been the wholesale emulation of EU institutions through the
twinning of various state agencies in one postcommunist country with one
EU country. This worked because the EU countries are much better at
applied bureaucracy than at the formulation of ideas. Arguably, the EUs
greatest contribution to postcommunist institution-building has been its
proliferationof democracy. The EUhas imposedthe idea that nodecent state
can be anything but a democracy, and the East-Central European countries
have acceptedandinternalizedthat standard. The CIS countries hadnosuch
peer states.
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9
From Crime toward Law
One of the key Soviet tenets was that the Communist Party must not be
constrained by anything. Consequently, the Party refuted the rule of law.
With the bureaucratization of communist power, some law or rules became
necessary, but the socialist legal system served the Party. Its function was to
enforce the commands of the government that was subordinate to the Com-
munist Party. Formally, crimes against the state were judged more severely
than crimes against individuals, although that idea never took root in public
sentiment.
The socialist states had many rules that were alien to a market economy.
Most private enterprise or entrepreneurship was criminalized as specula-
tion. Unemployment was not pitied but prohibited as parasitism and
was punished with labor camp. Because only a minimum of personal prop-
erty was allowed, little legislation existed for the defense of private property
rights. Nor did the state have any need for nancial legislation, although
Central European countries maintained some prewar legislation on their
books.
A legal system with prosecutors and judges had existed under socialism,
but, peculiarly, the public prosecutors were superior to the judges. Defense
councils were not common and had little authority. Soviet judges were
not particularly corrupt, but they were obeying political orders and the
prosecutors. They were few and poorly trained for commercial disputes.
Debt collection services barely existed.
Evenso, communismwas a systemof kleptocracy, working for the enrich-
ment of the Nomenklatura. The extremely centralized socialist economic
system was so inconsistent that the only way of making it work was to allow
state managers to trade on the side to make sure that they could acquire
the necessary inputs to fulll the state production plans. Law was so sub-
ordinate that few bothered about its consistency. The Nomenklatura was
241
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supreme and did what it wanted within certain informal boundaries. The
absence of a clear borderline between right and wrong led to the need for a
huge law enforcement apparatus of police and secret police as well as many
and severe punishments. The Soviet Unionhad the largest number of prison
inmates as a share of the population in the world.
The communist legal system was inefcient at the height of totalitarian-
ism, and it was at complete loss in the transition. Meanwhile, the Nomen-
klatura persisted and enriched itself through rent seeking, and its members
honored only loyalty to other members of the Nomenklatura. The daunt-
ing task of reformers was to transform this kleptocratic monster into a
law-abiding state, serving the interests of the people. Old Nomenklatura
networks had to be broken, or the negative organizational capital of the
communist dictatorship had to be disbanded (Shleifer and Vishny 1998,
p. 233). A maximum disruption was desirable, but at the same time public
order had to be maintained.
The collapse of the old order was particularly troublesome in lawenforce-
ment, which allowed ordinary crime to rear its ugly head, which is discussed
in the rst section. Institutions that protect property rights are crucial for
economic growthandparticularly for investment (North1981) because they
diminish transaction costs, but the question was how to create them. A new
legal system had to be built, but that was possibly the most complicated
task of postcommunsim, which is reviewed in section two. In the void of
an effective legal order, corruption evolved, which is discussed in section
three.
An Explosion of Crime
Crimeexplodedduringthecollapseof communismandtheinitial transition,
which was a natural consequence of the breaking down of the old order. The
explosion of crime shook society. Crime statistics are not standardized, but
most transition countries probably saw an approximate doubling of their
crime rates. The rise incrime seemedrelatedto howthe oldregime easedup.
A more radical reform brought about an earlier peak in crime followed by
stabilization, whereas the gradual reformers sawa longer but steady increase.
Poland and Hungary experienced the sharpest surge in their crime rates in
1990, their rst year of reform, after which they stabilized (slund 1997a).
The reformers, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, faced a doubling of crime from 1988
to1992, whereas the crime rate grewmore gradually inthe most conservative
countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Mikhailovskaya 1994).
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From Crime toward Law 243
The disorganized individual crime became unbearable. New business-
people complained that they were visited by different racketeers, and they
did not know whom to pay, but they had to pay protection fees to save their
lives. Numerous entrepreneurs were murdered, and many more saw their
premises burn. The former Soviet Unionhad a great supply of potential pro-
tectors war veterans fromAfghanistan, former police and military ofcers,
sportsmen and traditional Soviet criminals. Lawand order effectively broke
down as the old police stayed passive, generating great demand for protec-
tion. This was a truly Hobbesian world. Diego Gambettas (1993) economic
analysis of the evolution of the Sicilian maa appears perfectly applicable,
and a young Russian social scientist, Vadim Volkov (2002) has written an
excellent analysis of the Russian evolution of crime.
Crime evolved in response to market forces and organized itself spon-
taneously. Through great violence, organized crime imposed its own order
withracketeeringfees anddividedthebusiness worldintowell-denedmaa
districts. Businessmen actually appreciated the organization of crime that
occurredin19934. First of all, they knewwhomtopay, sothe riskof double-
paying disappeared. Second, their risk of being shot declined. Russias very
high murder rate peaked in 1993. Third, racketeering fees declined as the
security business became standardized. The drawback, of course, was that
most Russian businesses were compelled to pay racketeering fees. The main
exceptions were enterprises under solid state protection, such as enterprises
belonging to the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Interior.
As Volkov (2002, p. 19) put it: Since the actions of the state bureaucracy and
of law enforcement remain arbitrary and the services provided by the state
tend to have higher costs, private enforcers (read: the maa) outcompete
the state and rmly establish themselves in its stead. The state played a very
small role in the early 1990s.
Curiously, this seemingly impenetrable system of organized crime did
not last for long. Three forces brought it down. First, the awestruck Russian
reformers made a masterstroke: they legalized private security companies in
1992. Swiftly, organized crime legalized itself as private security companies,
which the state could increasingly supervise and regulate. Step by step, the
private security companies became more orderly and legal in their activities.
Second, new big businesspeople, oligarchs, thought the fees of the pro-
tection rackets were too high originally 20 percent of turnover, falling
toward 10 percent of turnover over the years. Instead the oligarchs set up
their own security forces. By the mid-1990s, 8 percent of the employees in
a typical oligarchic corporation were occupied with security, both guards
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and counterintelligence, nding out what their enemies were doing. The
top oligarchs hired a deputy minister of interior to run their security and a
deputy chairman of the KGB to manage their counterintelligence. As early
as 1995, the oligarchs had squeezed out organized crime.
Third, both the dangers and temptations of organized crime were exces-
sive. Within a few years, almost all the famous maa kingpins had disap-
peared. Many had been killed by one another or the police. Others had been
sentenced to long prison terms, while successful criminals had the choice
of selling out and retiring in the West or gentrifying (Brady 1999). Very few
organized criminals were able to legalize themselves at home. Among the
current 60 known billionaires in Russia and Ukraine, only a few might have
started as racketeers, although most were black marketeers.
Despite the many books written about the exciting post-Soviet organized
crime, it lasted for only a brief period, approximately 19925, although it
persists in many places. As late as 2006, the Russian city Novgorod was run
by seven organized crime gangs, and the Russian state does not interfere.
Also the oligarchic period of legal private security prevailed for only a
brief period, from 1995 until 1998. By 1998, the state had come back. Gone
were the complaints fromthe early transitionthat the criminals hadstronger
cars, better arms, bulletproof vests, and computers, unlike the police; but
the new, well-equipped police were not necessarily a legal force.
In 2000, I sat down with a driver in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan and asked him
howmany racketeers hadstoppedhimwhenhe haddrivenhis newly bought,
secondhand Mercedes from Germany to Kyrgyzstan. He had counted
120 times. On my question how many of the racketeers where private and
how many were policemen, he answered: They were all policemen. There
is hardly any private racket left in the CIS. They took over much of the
organized crime and racketeering, especially in the CIS. The ofcial law
enforcement bodies had the advantage of being legally armed and entitled
to make raids and arrest people. Little wonder that it came back and took
over within seven years.
Courts are often seen as the key defenders of property rights, but they can
do little without an effective police. In a survey of shopkeepers in Warsaw
and Moscow, Timothy Frye (2001) found that shopkeepers considered the
performance of the police more important for the security of their property
rights than the courts, and the Polish police were more inclined to abide by
the lawthan their Russian colleagues (cf. European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development [EBRD] 1997, 1998). Violence has been consolidated
anewin the hands of the state through its police. The big remaining problem
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is to make the police obey the law and work for the public good. Essentially,
that is an issue of democracy.
Attempts at Building a Legal System
Today it is obvious that the construction of an effective legal system should
be one of the foremost tasks of postcommunist transition.
1
In the early
transition, however, that was not so evident. A legal system existed, and
nonlawyers assumed that it somehow functioned, not quite realizing how
abnormal it was. It was bound to deteriorate, because capitalism required
more active courts, and as the judges became more independent and pow-
erful, they also became more corrupt.
The corps of socialist lawyers was a major impediment to legal reform.
Most of them were conservative civil servants who desired no change. They
served the state at its pleasure rather than the law. Prosecutors fought tooth
and nail for the preservation of the old Stalinist system that granted them a
maximum of power. Independent lawyers were few, and most of them were
alsodependent onthe state. The best of themourishedoncommercial work
and stayed out of politically controversial reforms. The few reform-minded
lawyers were intent on writing their countrys constitution, following in the
footsteps of Thomas Jefferson. Alarger group of lawyers engaged in drafting
commercial legislation, yet the vital reform of the whole legal system was
left aside for years.
2
A nonlawyer would assume that the academic discipline of comparative
law would have a clear theory of how legal systems evolve, that a sensible
set of policy advice would exist and that experienced international legal
advisors would be forthcoming to advise governments how to reform their
legal systems, but little emerged. A book on law during the rst decade
of transition makes the stunning statement that applied analysis of the
effects of legal and institutional reform is still in its infancy (Murrell 2001,
p. 8). The lawyers were so detached that [i]ronically, economists rather
than lawyers have been the promoters of the new relevance theory of law
for corporate governance (Pistor et al. 2000, p. 326). Alas, economists
started with odd side issues closest to their hearts, such as privatization and
corporate governance, while mainstream legal issues, such as criminal law
and legal procedural codes, were long left untouched.
1
An overall source to this section is Anderson et al. (2005).
2
I owe some of these observations to Judge Bohdan Futey, judge U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, Washington D.C.
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Nor didanyinternational organizationspecialize inthe promotionof legal
reform. An exception was the American Bar Associations Central European
and Eurasian Law Initiative, which started working in Central and Eastern
Europe in1990 and inthe CIS in1992, but it was only a national nongovern-
mental organization.
All the postcommunist countries had a legal tradition. They were part of
the Europeancivil lawtradition, basedoncentralizedlegislation, as opposed
to the Anglo-American common law tradition, which draws extensively on
precedence. A substantial literature has evolved around the importance of
legal origin (La Porta et al. 1998), but these countries had no real choice
because they were already so deeply entrenched in the civil law tradition.
And that was no tragedy. Many developing countries with French civil law,
such as Chile, Morocco, the Philippines, and Turkey, rank high in terms of
property rights (Levine 2005). After all, before World War I, France had a
larger stock market capitalization in relation to GDP than the United States
(Rajan and Zingales 2003).
The leading reformers, most of whomwere economists, started with what
they understoodlegislation. At a rapidpace, hundreds of laws were drafted,
notably civil codes and privatization legislation. Both the European Union
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were
keen on nancing the drafting of legislation, which was effective and inu-
ential. This was the area of the greatest competition between the EU and
the US; both sides wanted to have their legal standards spread. The initial
quality of draft laws was oftenpoor, but as soonas one lawhadbeenadopted,
proposals for its amendment developed, and legislation quickly improved.
The spurt of legislation during the rst decade of transition was impres-
sive almost everywhere, but the progress in legislative activity varied greatly
depending on the dynamism of a few reformers in each country. Some
reformist countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, still display a disconcert-
ing lacuna of legislation, whereas Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic have
promulgated an impressive array of laws (Anderson et al. 2005, p. 24).
The adoption of thousands of new laws in the region has brought about
some stunning improvements: In fact, many of the countries of the former
Soviet Union which received legal technical assistance primarily from the
United States can today boast higher levels of investor rights protection on
the books than some of the most developed market economies, such as
France or Germany (Pistor et al. 2000, p. 357). A new irony is that Russias
Gazprom in 2006 had a market capitalization that was three times larger
than that of the biggest German company, Siemens or Eon, not least because
Russia has more shareholder-friendly corporate legislation than Germany.
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The popular demand for knowledge of the new legislation was impres-
sive. In the early transition, collections of laws and legal handbooks could
be found at every street stand, together with management books and dictio-
naries of foreign languages. Enterprise surveys in Russia showed that both
large andmedium-size enterprises paidfor legal services andkept themselves
well informed about newlegislation (Hendley et al. 1997). The Internet pro-
vided new opportunities to publicize laws, decrees, and court judgments.
Despite much bureaucratic resistance, the transparency of law has greatly
improved.
Unfortunately, the quality of the law on the books has little or no
explanatory power for the effectiveness of legal institutions (Pistor et al.
2000, p. 345). Some early judicial reforms were undertaken. Most countries
added a constitutional court to their judiciary system to hold the govern-
ment accountable. Judges were given independence from the state and were
depoliticized, securing safer tenure for them and rendering the judiciary
more self-governing. Over time, the salaries of judges have risen, and court
budgets have improved. The problem is that the judges obtained freedom
without accountability.
What businesspeople demandfromcourts is fairness, honesty, strengthof
enforcement, speed, and affordability. In fact, demand for judicial services
appears to be driving judicial reform. Central Europe and the Baltics stand
out with both the greatest demand for judicial services and the best capacity
to deliver them. The demand for judicial services, in turn, depends on the
progress of market reforms (Anderson et al. 2005, p. xvi).
The European Union and its accession process have greatly inuenced
legislation and judicial reform. Every EU accession country had to adopt
the common EU legislation, acquis communautaire, which consists of some
170,000 pages. The EU has also set standards and regularly assessed the
progress of candidate countries in their legal development.
Still a World Bank survey of judicial systems concluded that less over-
all progress has been made in judicial reform and strengthening than in
almost any other area of policy or institutional reform in transition coun-
tries since 1990 (Anderson et al. 2005, p. xiv). There is no sign of the
new EU members catching up with the old members in terms of court
performance. Comparing judicial reforms and the effectiveness of judicial
systems in various countries, the idiosyncratic variations from country to
country are most striking, suggesting that a fewlegal reformers did wonders
where they existed. The disconnect between legislation and efcacy of laws
is equally astounding (Anderson et al. 2005, p. 28). Courts are persistently
rated among the most corrupt bodies.
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Considering the weakness of the legal system and the poor compliance
with law, one would assume businesspeople ignore courts, but enterprises
are suing both each other and the government more each year (Hendley
et al. 1997). The logical conclusion is that over time, new laws change busi-
nesspeoples behavior.
For commercial disputes, an alternative to the corrupt public courts has
been private arbitration courts, usually attached to Chambers of Commerce
at home or abroad. Foreign companies have typically insisted on arbitra-
tion in an international court, usually in Stockholm, Vienna, Zurich, or
London. Their judgments have been recognized by national courts though
with certain resistance.
In practice, businesspeople have different possibilities of defending their
rights. In an article distinguishing the enforcement of property rights and
contract, Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2005) found that property
rights institutions have a major inuence on long-run economic growth,
investment andnancial development, whilecontractinginstitutions appear
toaffect the formof nancial intermediationbut have a more limitedimpact
on growth, investment, and the total amount of credit in the economy.
Indeed, contractual payments can be secured by many means. The standard
solution is to request advance payments. Leasing has proliferated because
the creditor can easily seize the leased property without going to court. A
supplier can also ask for collateral. Finally, international arbitration courts
can be used. By contrast, little can be done to secure real estate by alternative
means, which is inevitably under local jurisdiction.
Considering the minimal policy attention devoted to legal developments,
the results are not all that disappointing. Just a few years ago, some schol-
ars argued that it was impossible to implant one countrys legal system into
another country. Soonit emergedthat the worldwas dominatedby four legal
systems, the Anglo-American common law and three variants of European
civil law, and that the postcommunist countries already had a centralized
civil lawsystem. Alarge volume of legislation of rising quality has been pro-
mulgated in most countries. The knowledge about this legislation is quickly
spreading. The demand for judicial services is steadily increasing, and the
judicial systems have beenreformed, evenif the appreciationof the improve-
ments is scant. Ever more lawyers are being trained, and the resources of
the court systems are increasing. The major shortfall has been that the cor-
ruption of courts has increased with their importance, and the judges are
painfully unaccountable. Yet in the last fewyears, the measurement of court
performance has developed, and whatever is measured tends to improve.
A precondition of improvement, however, is that the government does not
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oppose it. The last step in judicial reform is to make the collection effective.
Especially East-Central Europe has taken a giant step from communist
kleptocracy and lawlessness toward the rule of law.
Corruption: The Bane of Transition
Corruption is dened as the misuse of public power for private gain
(Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 91). It means the malfunctioning of the state, with
politicians and civil servants selling public goods for private gainrather than
working for the goals of society as a whole.
At the collapse of communism, the preconditions for corruptionwere par-
ticularly propitious. The Soviet Union had a strong tradition of corruption,
particularly in the three Caucasian countries and Central Asia. Empirically
it takes a long time to amend corruption (Treisman 2000). In transition, the
formal powers of the state remained nearly complete, and the discretion of
state employees was greater than ever because they no longer had to obey
their superiors. The old apparatus of repression had ceased to function, but
no new rule of law existed. Most countries did not even have laws against
corruption, rendering it nearly unpunishable.
There was noclear understandingof what corruptionwas. The idea spread
that civil servants should be allowed to work on commission. When the old
system collapsed, its administration attracted little attention because of its
near complete chaos. Its employees were demoralized, keeping a low public
prole. Few could imagine that these small gray men would soon come
back and make big money on corruption, but that was what happened.
Their demoralization was all the greater because most of them regretted the
demise of the communist system, and their real salaries became ridiculously
small with hyperination. For several years, the best civil servants departed
for the private sector, where senior staff could instantly catchup to 100 times
higher incomes. The remaining staff was often poorly qualied and appoin-
ted because of personal at. A popular belief evolved that transition has
boosted corruption, widely seen as the greatest bane of the transition.
Quantitative measurement of corruption did not start until the mid-
1990s, but since then a number of alternative measurements have evolved.
3
Five overall tendencies in the region are evident from the end of the 1990s.
First, the total volume of bribes has increased. Second, the average bribe
tax, that is, the percentage of annual revenue a rm pays in bribe, declined
3
The most relevant and extensive is the EBRD-World Bank business survey, BEEPS, which
is based on queries among businesspeople, although its validity in severe dictatorships is
doubtful. Unfortunately, it has only been undertaken in 1999, 2002, and 2005.
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from 1.6 percent in 2002 to 1.1 percent in 2005 for the whole region,
according to Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS). Third, corruption has been rationalized. The frequency of bribery
has declined, prices have been standardized, and people better understand
what they pay for. Fourth, nuisance extortion in taxation, customs, busi-
ness licensing, and all kinds of inspections has declined, but corruption has
increased in courts and government procurement. Fifth, businesspeople see
corruption as a big but steadily declining problem (Anderson and Gray
2006). Overall, corruption seems to have become more pervasive but also
standardized and more rational. Therefore, it has become more tolerable.
Corruption has maintained a strong hold with a clear geographic pattern.
According to Transparency International, it is worst in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, and almost as bad in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova,
whereas Southeast Europe has less corruption, and Central Europe and the
Baltics are the least corrupt (see Figure 9.1). Estonia has persistently been
far ahead of the others, followed by Hungary. Good governance is closely
correlated with the degree of market reform.
Initially, graft in Russia appeared especially harmful, damaging economic
development more thanelsewhere. One particular complaint by people who
paid bribes was that they did not receive the services that they paid for
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Another grievance was that the extortion by
ofcials was unnecessarily cumbersome. In 1996, Daniel Kaufmann (1997)
found that Ukrainian enterprise managers spent more than one-third of
their time with government ofcials, but by 1999, this time had fallen by
half (to 17 percent) an impressive improvement in an economy that was
perceived as totally stalemated by bureaucracy (Hellmanet al. 2000). Appar-
ently, businesspeople and ofcials rationalized their relations, lowering the
transaction costs caused by inspectors stopping production and wasting
management time through bargaining.
The degree of bribery varies with type of enterprise. Private rms pay
more bribes, and they view corruption as a bigger problem than do state-
owned rms. Small private rms pay more bribes as a share of their revenues
than big rms because they are more vulnerable. Manufacturing rms pay
the most bribes because they are sitting ducks for predatory government
inspectors. Firms in urban areas pay more bribes than rms in small towns
or rural areas because more inspectors are present there. The longer a rm
has been in business, the less subject to extortion it becomes. Foreign rms
pay fewer bribes. This pattern makes clear that most of the corruption is
extortion, forcing the most vulnerable rms to pay more (Anderson and
Gray 2006, p. 24).
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Few phenomena clarify the need for both radical and comprehensive
reformbetter than the rise of corruption. The array of possible and effective
measures is extensive, and it touches on all kinds of policies. The funda-
mental cause of corruption is that corrupt incentives exist because state
ofcials have the power toallocate scarce benets andimpose onerous costs
(Rose-Ackerman1999, p. 39). Democracy was vital to break the power of the
elite andtodiscipline politicians andbureaucrats, introducing transparency,
free media, and checks and balances. Unfortunately, transparency has made
surprisingly little headway. Only Estonia has adopted a full-edged public
information act as exists in the Scandinavian countries. In most post-Soviet
countries, the Stalinist practice of secret but legally binding decrees persists.
The repetitive corruption scandals that oust politicians and governments
in East-Central Europe show that voters do care about corruption and that
democracy is an effective check.
The opportunities to engage in corruption need to be scaled down by
reducing the government role inthe economy (Tanzi andSchuknecht 2000,
p. 169). The rst BEEPS showed a strong positive correlation between state
interventionand corruption(EBRD1999). The power of the state apparatus
hadtobe reducedthroughderegulation, whichwoulddiminishthe power of
ofcials to extract bribes, by legalizing previously prohibited activities, such
as private enterprise, by abolishing licenses and permissions, and by free-
ing prices and trade. State monopolies were notorious dens of corruption,
maintaining as many distortional regulations as possible. Naturally, of-
cials opposed truly radical liberalization, because a simple and draconian
deregulation was most likely to beat them.
Privatizationcanreducecorruptionbyremovingcertainassets fromstate
control and converting discretionary ofcial actions into private, market-
driven choices (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 35; cf. Kaufmann and Siegelbaum
1996). Even if privatization itself inevitably is discretionary and therefore
often fraught with corruption, it can be completed once and for all. The
alternative to full privatizationis leasing fromthe public sector, which seems
highly corrupt all over the world.
The next step is to deprive the state apparatus of material resources by
cutting public expenditures. Reductions of public expenditures have proved
vital for the return to economic growth in the CIS countries (slund and
Jenish 2006). These cuts do not need to be antisocial. In corrupt states,
public investment and subsidies typically crowd out investment in human
capital through education and health care (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Mauro
1995, 1998; Knack and Keefer 1995).
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A large number of scal changes are important for the reduction of cor-
ruption, as discussed in Chapter 5. The self-nancing of state inspection
agencies through penalties must be prohibited. Taxation in some countries
degenerated into tax farming, in which tax rates were at most nominal and
taxation was a matter of negotiation rather than law. The assessment and
payment of both taxes and customs fees should be separated and formalized
to avoid corruption-generating negotiations.
On the expenditure side, corruption-prone items such as subsidies and
public investment need to be kept short. A strange communist feature was
that the state invested directly in enterprises, and these practices have con-
tinued even after enterprises have been privatized. Unnanced mandates
shouldbe abolished, because otherwise the agencies inquestiontrytoextract
nancing in corrupt ways. Program budgeting is needed so that the state
budget covers all costs necessary to carry out government programs. Simi-
larly, sequestration should be avoided, because when an adopted budget is
tampered with, the wrong programs are cut to the benet of administration
and public investment, as was persistently the case in Ukraine in the 1990s
(slund and de M enil 2000).
One peculiar feature of postcommunism was a multitude of inspection
agencies. Some were new, such as the huge tax inspection, the ferocious
tax police, and the antimonopoly committees, but most had existed before.
Suddenly, dozens of agencies were out inspecting enterprises. Inspectors
made money for both their employers and themselves by penalizing busi-
nesspeople. Many of these agencies should simply be abolished or at least
merged. Their huge labor forces must be cut, and they should be prohib-
ited from visiting enterprises. In 1997, I visited a small factory in Ukraine
and learned that seven or eight tax inspectors visited the company every
day. I checked how that could be the case and received the explanation
that Ukraine had 70,000 tax inspectors but only some 10,000 real taxpaying
rms, and one single tax inspection was allowed a year, so the tax inspectors
distributed themselves on different enterprises that had to take care of them
and feed them the whole year. Naturally, the inspectors fought tooth and
nail for their rights to onsite inspection. In Kyrgyzstan, I actually encoun-
tered extra-budgetary police, that is, police in uniformwho were not paid
by the state, which sounds like the denition of legalized racketeering. The
Internet offers wonderful opportunities for hands-off contacts betweenstate
and citizens, such as income declarations on the net and e-procurement. To
combat corruption the state needs to minimize contacts that can lead to
extortion, minimize discretion, and standardize the remaining contacts.
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During years of high ination, salaries in government service fell sharply,
with pay scales becoming compressed, often making it impossible for even
a minister to live on his or her salary. It has been extraordinarily difcult to
raise salaries for senior ofcials, offering no incentives for hard and honest
work. For many civil servants, additional incomes became a necessity. They
wereoftenextractedas bribes, but entrepreneurial activitywas alsocommon.
Substantial fringe benets inkind, suchas free apartments, dachas, cars with
drivers, and holiday trips, are still distributed to senior ofcials in the CIS
countries ina more or less discretionary fashion. Commissionremuneration
has proliferated on a grand scale. Especially CIS tax police and customs
ofcials have become used to receiving certain shares of the state revenues
they extract. Rather than satisfying their needs, these commissions whetted
their appetite. Characteristically, CIS tax police have focused on easy and fat
prey, such as foreign investors, aggravating an already unjust tax burden. As
an effect, the public service was partially privatized, and the dividing line
between public and private was blurred further.
The whole civil service is steeped in conspicuous conicts of interests.
In the late Soviet period, ministers boasted about being so progressive that
they set up private enterprises, not realizing that it was an obvious conict
of interest. Communist ofcials had learned Pierre-Joseph Proudhons the-
sis that property was theft, and they thought they might as well start their
career as capitalists by stealing state property. Only gradually have mul-
tiple employments and commissions extracted by public servants been
prohibited. Clear lines must be drawn between business and the state, pro-
hibiting all combinations of the two. Explicit codes of ethics dening bribery
are needed. The widespread practice of appointing government ministers
to supervisory boards of enterprises, through which they can earn much
more than their ofcial salary, is another unacceptable practice. The many
fringe benets should be minimized and replaced with money because they
inevitably breed crime. One of the most effective checks on corruption
would be to allow public access to the income declarations of all citizens, as
in the Scandinavian countries.
Ultimately, the civil service needs to be reformed to become competent,
meritocratic, and regulated. Standardized civil service exams and depoliti-
cization are also needed. Estonia undertook a profound homemade reform
of the state apparatus, and the EU has assisted other accession countries.
To reduce and improve the quality of the public service has proved very
difcult and to discipline it even more so. Naturally, violations of discipline
should be punished, but punishments must be proportional to the crime to
be taken seriously.
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In the end, the legally armed law enforcement agencies are likely to win
out in corruption and crime, as is apparent from the police taking over
racketeering almost all over the CIS, and the current rule of KGB ofcers in
Russia. The advantage of this concentration of power is that the monopoly
of violence is being restored. The problem is that democracy has not taken
root in most of the CIS countries so that the population does not control
the state, which does not serve the people.
Estonia has been the champion in virtually all measures that can reduce
corruption, and the result is impressive. Although Estonia belonged to the
Soviet Union for forty-six years, it is now the twenty-fourth least corrupt
country in the world according to Transparency International (2006). One
may object that Estonia is a special case with only 1.4 million inhabitants,
but Hungary, which has done signicantly less still, comes forty-rst in the
world. Clearly, corruption can be controlled if a government makes it a
priority, but it requires rigorous and comprehensive reforms that challenge
the elite.
The approach to the development of crime, corruption, and lawstands in
stark contrast to the economics of transition. Although economists both in
the region and abroad fought over postcommunist transition, few lawyers
seemed to care. Nobody presented a relevant theory for the transforma-
tion of the legal system, and few were working on it. Consequently, no
appropriate set of policy advice could be available. Some local lawyers were
admirable reformers, but they were few. The absence of international orga-
nizations focusing on the legal transition was striking. Interpol is a minimal
organization for exchange of police information. There is no international
supreme court. Lawyers associations are usually very national, apart from
those dealing with international commercial law. In recent years, the EU,
USAID, and the World Bank have engaged in legal issues, but none with
the single-mindedness of the IMF in its pursuit of macroeconomic stability.
Considering all these shortfalls, it is no surprise that the development of the
legal system and legality has been the weakest part of the transition.
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10
The Role of Oligarchs
Suddenly, the Russian steel industry has become a hot topic in the international
business community. A few years ago, this would have seemed a crazy notion.
During the Soviet era the Russian steel industry was ridiculed for its obsession
with planning targets and was a byword for inefciency. But since the break-up of
the Soviet Union, a series of large and powerful steel companies has been created
from the privatization of previously government-owned steel operations in Russia.
Financial Times, June 14, 2006
Nothing is as controversial as oligarchs. The opening quote marvels over
how Russian oligarchs have transformed the Russian steel industry, but
as if to avoid praising them, the word oligarch is avoided (Marsh 2006).
Oligarch is an ancient concept, and an oligarchy is dened as govern-
ment in the hands of a few by the Oxford University Press Dictionary. In
that sense of the word, the semidemocratic countries in the former Soviet
Union may be described as oligarchic.
In Russia and Ukraine, oligarch became a popular label for the wealthi-
est tycoons around 1994, as the rst truly rich people emerged. The meaning
of oligarch in the two countries is similar.
1
An oligarch is a very wealthy
and politically well-connected businessperson, a dollar billionaire, or nearly
so, who is the main owner of a conglomerate of enterprises and has close
ties to the president. Oligarchs or robber barons are few and tremendously
wealthy. Bradford DeLong (2002, p. 179) has suggested that a present-day
billionaire would be a good proxy for a robber baron. It might be more
appropriate to call them plutocrats, because their aim is to make money
1
There are four excellent journalistic books on the Russian oligarchs, showing how they
evolved and how they operated, Brady (1999), Freeland (2000), Klebnikov (2000), and
Hoffman (2002). Less has been written on the Ukrainian oligarchs; see Puglisi (2003),
slund (2006), and Grygorenko et al. (2006).
256
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The Role of Oligarchs 257
rather than to rule the state. Joel Hellman (1998) has coined the phrase
state capture to characterize the relationship between big businesspeople
and the state in a country such as Ukraine, because these businesspeople
inuenced the state by multiple means.
Many mix up old-style state enterprise managers with these newly rich
upstarts. Others confuse oligarchs with the godfathers of organized crime.
Much of the literature on privatization argues that no privatization is bet-
ter than privatization to well-connected businesspeople at prices below the
market level (Black et al. 2000; Goldman 2003). Opinion polls show that
oligarchs are the most hated people in Russia. As a consequence, the public
condoned the Kremlins lawless conscation through taxation of Russias
biggest and best oil company, Yukos, and the Ukrainian government dis-
cussed widespread reprivatization in 2005 after the Orange Revolution.
The many questions about oligarchs deserve a separate chapter. In sec-
tion one, I consider who the oligarchs were. Section two discusses the
economics of oligarchy, and section three its political aspects. Section four
argues that the standard complaints about oligarchs are a matter of ideology.
Sectionve concludes that the key policy issue is toreinforce property rights.
The nal section considers Russian President Vladimir Putins attempt to
resolve the issue of oligarchs.
Who are the Oligarchs?
Oligarchs are bynomeans unique toRussiaandUkraine. Muchof the discus-
sion about economics in Latin America has circled around the entrenched
power of oligarchs (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Rafael La Porta, Flo-
rencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (1999a) studied the ownership
of the twenty biggest listed companies in 27 predominantly Western coun-
tries. They found that even very large corporations have controlling share-
holders in most countries, and they are usually extremely wealthy families.
The diffuse corporate ownership characteristic of the United States and
the United Kingdom is highly exceptional. Having surveyed recent litera-
ture on ownership around the world, Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon,
and Bernard Yeung (2005, p. 693) concluded: Control pyramids effectively
entrust the corporate governance of the greater parts of the corporate gover-
nance of the greater parts of the corporate sectors of many countries tohand-
fuls of elite, established families, who can quite reasonably be described as
oligarchs. Rather than considering oligarchs an exception, as most of the
Anglo-American literature about Russia does, we must accept them as the
international standard.
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The most remarkable observation might be that oligarchs are not very
commoninmost former Soviet bloc countries. Out of our twenty-one coun-
tries, people are preoccupied with oligarchs in only three: Russia, Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan. In East-Central Europe, few billionaires have been allowed
to develop, and the richest man in Central Europe, the Pole Jan Kulczyk, was
forced to escape abroad in 2004. In the small, poor countries Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, and Tajikistan, no billionaire is to be found, and that is also true of
the lingering socialist economies, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.
In East-Central Europe, billionaires are barely allowed to develop, and in
most CIS countries the ruling family possesses most wealth. The formation
of an oligarchy indicates more openness.
The historically most prominent oligarchs are the so-calledrobber barons
in the United States. The New York Times referred to the new big business-
men in America as robber barons in the 1850s, alluding to the knights who
livedincastles alongthe Rhine andextortedfees for passage. That label stuck.
The robber barons were the men who built great industrial and transporta-
tion empires in the late 19th century in the United States (Steele Gordon,
2004, pp. 21112).
I focus here on the most prominent postcommunist oligarchs, those in
Russia and Ukraine. They have displayed greater similarities with the Amer-
ican robber barons than is usually understood because time has beauti-
ed U.S. history, and we can better understand the Russian and Ukrainian
oligarchs by comparing them with their American colleagues. In all three
countries, big businessmen responded rationally to the existing economic,
legal, and political conditions. The oligarchs stood out as the true homos
oeconomicus in a world of bewilderment.
By 2005, the social features of the oligarchs are easy to establish. Most of
them are around 40 years of age. They were about to graduate from univer-
sity when the Soviet Law on Cooperatives was adopted in 1988, which usu-
ally formed the legal basis of their rst enterprise. Almost all of them are
engineers, and several are doctors of engineering, from the best schools in
the Soviet Union, primarily inMoscow. Their social origins are mostly hum-
ble, and many of them come from the provinces, but the Soviet education
system gave them the opportunity thanks to their outstanding mathemati-
cal skills. Initially, the dominance of Jews was striking, but the ethnicity of
the oligarchs has become more varied. Nearly all the oligarchs manage huge
companies. All but one of the Russian billionaires are men.
2
By all criteria,
2
The single woman is the wife of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who has proved highly
skillful in Moscow real estate.
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the current oligarchs are outstanding self-made entrepreneurs, although
most made their fortunes on the reanimation of existing Soviet mastodons
rather than developing new enterprises.
The Russian oligarchs are typically preoccupied with oil and metals. Of
26 Russian billionaires identied by Forbes in 2005, twelve had made most
of their money on metals, nine on oil, and two on coal (Kroll and Goldman
2005).
3
Ukraine had no less than ten billionaires in 2006, and six of the
biggest Ukrainian oligarchic groups concentrate on steel.
4
An oddity is the
dearth of bankers among the current Russian oligarchs, which is explained
by the state dominance over the Russian banking system after the nancial
crash of 1998, which was used as a means of renationalization.
Curiously, many oligarchic groups in Russia are run by tight groups of
friends, typically school friends, suggesting a surprising degree of trust out-
side the family in that country. A consequence of this great trust among
Russian business partners is that several of the big enterprise groups gener-
ated multiple billionaires: Yukos seven, Alfa three, Interros two, Mechel two,
and so on (Kroll and Goldman 2005). The uncommonly large number of
billionaires in Russia is partially explained by the countrys strong partner-
ships. Also in Ukraine, two of the four biggest oligarchic groups have three
billionaire owners each (Privat Group and Industrial Union of Donbass).
5
The Economics of Oligarchy
Let us look more closely at the economic and legal conditions that generated
oligarchs in the United States as well as in the former Soviet Union.
One fundamental cause of this generation and concentration of wealth in
America after the Civil War was the sudden achievement of great economies
of scale in certain industries, especially metals, oil, and railways. Such
economies of scale cannot be attained in a small country. The super-rich
mainly emerge in countries with large markets, which may partially explain
why they are only prominent in the three largest post-Soviet economies
(Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan).
A second feature common to the U.S. industrialization and postcommu-
nism was rapid structural change, which facilitated great accumulation of
wealth among those few who knew how to take advantage of the trends of
3
Inoil: Yukos, Lukoil, Surgut, TNK, Sibneft; inmetals Rusal, SUAL, NorilskNickel, Severstal,
Evrazholding, NLMK, MMK, Mechel, and UMMK.
4
System Capital Management, Interpipe, Privat Group, Industrial Union of Donbass,
Zaporizhstal, and MMK imeni Ilicha (Korrespondent 2006).
5
Interviews with owners of both groups in March 2003 and December 2004, respectively.
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the day. In the United States, the period of reconstruction after the Civil War
was characterized by radical changes, and in the former Soviet Union, the
state and the economic system collapsed.
A third economic characteristic was the presence of rent, which is
often difcult to distinguish from economies of scale. The U.S. antitrust
case against Microsoft attempted to determine whether Microsofts prots
depended on rent or economies of scale and failed to make this distinction
to anyones satisfaction. Most of the original U.S. robber barons made their
money on railways, which generated large monopoly rents until competing
lines had been built. Other robber barons focused on the natural rents of
resource industries, John D. Rockefeller on oil and Andrew Carnegie on
steel (DeLong 2002). The Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs focus on oil and
metals, industries with ample natural rents.
Fourth, the U.S. robber barons beneted from the free distribution of
state assets, notably landaroundthe railways, andcheapstate credits because
multiple early railway investments endedupinbankruptcy because of insuf-
cient state support to attain the desired economies of scale (DeLong 2002).
Inthe postcommunist world, privatizationtook place throughcheapsales of
old assets either through direct privatization, as the loans-for-shares privati-
zationinRussia, or the accumulationof vouchers or stocks onthe secondary
market. Giventhat thestateenterprises weremismanagedandthus lost inter-
national competitiveness until they were privatized, early privatization was
vital.
Fifth, the absence of strong legal institutions also determined the rise of
oligarchs. Well-functioning legal systems are a recent invention, and even
withinthe West legal systems are subject tomany aws. Many Westerncoun-
tries adopted insider legislation only in the last two decades. As multiple
corporate accounting scandals, from Enron to WorldCom, illustrate, cor-
porate governance remains poor in the West even today. John Steele Gordon
(2004, pp. 2078) has eloquentlycapturedthe state of lawinthe UnitedStates
in the 1860s, which saw the rise of the robber barons:
Nowhere was . . . corruptionmore pervasive thaninNewYork, andespeciallyonWall
Street. . . . In 1868 the New York State Legislature actually passed a law the effect of
which was to legalize bribery . . . the popular English Frasers Magazine wrote that
in New York there is a custom among litigants as peculiar to that city, it is to be
hoped, as it is supreme within it, of retaining a judge as well as a lawyer.
By comparison, the current legal practices in Russia and Ukraine appear
nothingbut normal for this stage of capitalist development. Poor judicial sys-
tems breed poor corporate governance, impeding the evolution of nancial
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markets. Without strong corporate legislation and a potent judicial system,
partners nd it difcult to agree or resolve conicts. Nor can principals
(owners) control their agents (executives), so they are compelled to manage
their companies themselves. As a consequence, businesspeople with con-
centrated ownership tend to be more successful than those who have to
deal with many minority shareholders. When institutions are weak, doing
business with strangers is dangerous and unreliable (Morck et al. 2005,
p. 672). Therefore, businesspeople want to escape the hazards of concluding
too many contracts that they cannot secure in court. They rationally opt for
vertical integration to avoid the hazards of arbitrary court judgments about
contracts; that is, they prefer corporate hierarchies to horizontal markets
(Williamson 1975). Tarun Khanna and Jan Rivkin (2001) investigated busi-
ness groups in fourteen emerging economies that are not postcommunist.
They conceived of business groups as responses to market failures and high
transaction costs and found that group afliation had a profound, positive
effect on protability.
The combination of all these ve factors large economies of scale, vast
economies, fast structural change, the prevalence of rents, and poor legal
systems led to the concentration of fortunes in oil, metals, and railways in
the United States in the nineteenth century, as well as in the same industries
in Russia and Ukraine today. It is difcult to see how a market economy
could be introduced under these conditions without generating super-rich
businesspeople, and the emergence of oligarchs seems nothing but a nat-
ural consequence of the development of capitalism under the prevailing
conditions.
Economically, the oligarchic systems have proved highly adaptive. It is
inaccurate to equate oligarchic enterprises with state-owned enterprises as
Anne Krueger (2002 p. 3) has done, arguing, with reference to politically
connected big businesspeople in East Asia, that state-owned enterprises are
almost exactly the same intheir effects as cronyism. The difference between
oligarchic companies and state companies is immense. Big state enterprises
tend to be monopolies or quasi-monopolies, whereas the oligarchic cor-
porations typically indulge in vicious competition rather than price xing.
Characteristically, the domestic Russian prices of oil and coal have been
liberalized for many years, but the prices of state transportation, natural
gas, and electricity are still regulated. Large state enterprises enjoy ample
access to subsidies, and their investments are often decided by the govern-
ment, whereas oligarchic enterprises have had to make do without subsidies
since 1998. Russian state enterprises are notorious for acquiring assets and
wasting resources, presumably to the benet of management, rather than
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undertaking productive investment. Russian state-dominated enterprises,
such as Gazpromand Rosneft, patently fail to boost production organically,
inwhichprivate Russianoil, coal andmetallurgical companies have excelled.
Gazprom has succeeded in maintaining a negative cash ow regardless of
howhigh gas prices have surged, whereas the private oil and coal companies
are ooded with prots despite much more severe taxation. After the nan-
cial crash of 1998, the Russian oligarchs swiftly streamlined their business
structures, and mergers and acquisitions caught on. State-dominated com-
panies such as Gazprom, by contrast, not only resisted selling noncore assets
but bought more. The oligarchic corporations excelled in buying interna-
tional services of all kinds, whereas the state companies resisted doing so
until it hadbecome standard. Inshort, the oligarchic companies have proved
highly innovative in management, whereas the state enterprises are the last
acceptors of any novelty (Dynkin and Sokolov 2002; Shleifer 2005).
Standard advice to foreign investors in the former Soviet Union is not to
touch old, unrestructured Soviet enterprises with more than 1,500 employ-
ees, because their operationis toocomplex. Manysuchenterprises are viable,
but only locals appear to possess the relevant skills to turn themaround. Just
think of all the skills that are required! For truly big enterprises, strong and
good relations with both the central and regional governments are neces-
sary. In the absence of a functioning legal system, the owner/manager must
be able to secure property rights and contracts in the most effective and
affordable extra-legal fashion. One of the prime tasks on a Soviet plant is to
outroot rampant theft by the employees. Post-Soviet countries have plenty
of social regulations, but only some of these are actually honored. Soviet
enterprises were chronically overstaffed, but only local businesspeople tend
to have the guts and ability to cut the labor force downto aneconomical size.
Soviet factories were typically overloaded with equipment. Most of it must
be scrapped, but foreign businesspeople tend to gut the factories, using little
but the premises, whereas local businesspeople with less capital are anxious
to utilize valuable physical capital and technology. Soviet management had
its peculiarities, and in factories with tens of thousands of workers, knowl-
edge of the old management is necessary for its successful renewal; nancial
skills and management consultants can easily be brought in from outside.
Therefore, there are many reasons to expect that local businesspeople can
do better than foreign investors in basic industries, such as metallurgy and
other resource industries, especially at the early stages of restructuring, if
they get the chance to own them despite limited capital.
Yegor Grygorenko, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Dmytro Ostanin (2006)
studied a sample of almost 2,000 Ukrainian companies. They found that
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oligarchs picked underperforming rms with large capital stock and sales,
and they established that rms owned by oligarchs had much higher pro-
ductivity growth than others. This tallies with a relatively early empirical
study of Russian nancial-industrial groups in the mid-1990s, which found
that these hierarchical groups were more efcient in their real investment
than independent owners (Perotti and Gelfer 2001).
The only plausible alternative owners of large factories are foreign
investors and the state. In Central Europe, the public insistence on fair
privatization at full prices was so great that most large enterprises remained
state-owned for far too long. They deteriorated for years and stayed unprof-
itable. Some big enterprises were nally sold to foreign investors, who usu-
ally proved themselves both clueless and hapless. As a result, most large
industrial enterprises in Central Europe have closed down, and the myth
has evolved that such enterprises could not be restructured. In Russia and
Ukraine, by contrast, the old large metallurgical and chemical industries are
booming as never before because skillful oligarchs are allowed to own them.
The other alternative was not to privatize. Belarus is an eminent example.
Its economic restructuring has been tardy, and neither market economy nor
political pluralism has evolved.
Twomajor conclusions canbedrawn. First, onlyafewbusinesspeoplewith
concentrated private ownership and supreme knowledge of the informal
rules could manage large Soviet enterprises in the early transition. The
real alternatives were to keep them state owned and unreformed until they
collapsed or to sell them off to foreign investors, who usually closed down
most of the original enterprise because they did not know how to manage
it. The question was whether the state would allow local big businesspeople
to emerge or not, and only a few countries did so. They have successfully
restructured large Soviet mining and metallurgical industries.
The second conclusion is that the oligarchs were not guilty of the con-
ditions that arose, but they responded rationally to the existing conditions.
Whenever state regulation created wedges between xed state prices and
market prices, they arbitraged between these prices to their personal ben-
et. When privatization was launched, they transferred state property to
themselves in the cheapest way. During the mass privatization, they bought
vouchers and stocks. Given that so many enterprises were privatized simul-
taneously, they had no time to develop a business strategy but bought
opportunistically what they could get cheaply until mass privatization had
been completed. Meanwhile, they did little to their newly won enterprises
because they obtained the greatest marginal value by acquiring more assets
rather than investing in their enterprises. After the mass privatization was
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completed, the oligarchs elaborated business strategies; streamlined their
assets, specializing in a few industries; and invested heavily (Brady 1999;
Dynkin and Sokolov 2002; Shleifer and Treisman 2004).
The Politics of Oligarchy
The key legal and political issue in emerging capitalism is property rights.
Hernandode Soto(2000) has pointedout howthe absence of property rights
harms the poor inmiddle-income countries andthe developing worldtoday,
but the rich face the same hazard. Nothing could be done by law when laws
were indisarray, the courts unreformed, and the lawenforcement ineffective
(Gaidar 2003). The question was how to handle state failure.
Inthe early postcommunist periodthe business worldwas Hobbesian. In
the state of nature, property rights exist only as long as they can be protected
by the claimant as Vadim Volkov (2002 p. xi) formulated it. Before the oli-
garchs, organizedcrime prevailed. The oligarchs broke throughinthis world
of organized crime. Initially, they bought security from organized crime as
everybody else, but soon they established their own security services, which
were cheaper and more reliable than criminal gangs.
Later on, the oligarchs increasingly purchased state services, or politics,
to reinsure their shaky property rights. They used the agency that appeared
most effective at the time ina typical succession: reliance onorganizedcrime,
their own security forces, government agencies, and politics (cf. Klebnikov
2000).
Oligarchs could act in two contrary fashions depending on their sense of
security and access to political power. If they were strong, they acted in line
with the concept of economic entrenchment as a feedback loop, whereby
weak institutions place sweeping corporate governance powers in the hands
of a tiny elite group, who then lobby for weak institutions to preserve their
concentratedcontrol over the countries large corporations oligarchic cap-
italism (Morck et al. 2005, p. 711; cf. Shleifer 1997). Or as Konstantin Sonin
(2003) wrote: In unequal societies, the rich may benet from shaping eco-
nomic institutions in their favor. Boris Berezovskys behavior and his and
Vladimir Gusinskys attack on the Russian government because of their
decent privatization of the state telecommunications holding Svyazinvest in
the summer of 1997 may be described inthat way (Freeland2000; Klebnikov
2000). Common tricks by powerful oligarchs were to send tax police, pros-
ecutors, and other law enforcement agencies on competitors with poorer
political connections.
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If the oligarchs felt weak by contrast, they would act in the opposite
manner: But sometimes, highly concentrated corporate control does not
induce economic entrenchment. Strong institutions develop and diffuse
capitalism takes hold (Morck et al. 2005 p. 711). The conclusion is that the
more competition oligarchs are exposed to, the better they behave. Because
oligarchs stand out as the ultimate homos oeconomicus, we would expect
their behavior to vary with the situation. The ultimate success is when an
oligarch tries to gentrify after a fewyears of dubious enrichment, as Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the main owner of Yukos oil company, did.
Politics offer anumber of attractive goods. Startingfromthe top, business-
people canbuy presidential decisions, usually not directly fromthe president
but from his family or closest aides. The difference between the adminis-
tration of U.S. President Ulysses Grant (186977) and that of Boris Yeltsin
or Leonid Kuchma is less than Americans want to recognize. Although the
U.S. robber barons arose in the 1850s (Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt
is considered the rst one), it was not until the early 1900s that President
Theodore Roosevelt opposed them. The Russian situation has changed pro-
foundly since 2000, when President Putin came to power. Now, oligarchs
are extorted by the Kremlin rather than being entitled to buy its services.
The problem with Russia is rather that the oligarchs have proved too weak
to resist the large-scale renationalization undertaken since 2003 in Russia by
President Vladimir Putin. Unlike in the United States, the Russian oligarchs
are hardly strong enough to safeguard their property rights when the ruler
turns against them.
The second kind of political good on sale is legislation from the national
parliament. The United States has not prohibited the purchasing of legis-
lation, or lobbying, but legalized and regulated this process, rendering it
transparent. President Putin complained that Yukos blocked minor tax leg-
islationdirectedagainst oil companies inRussia inJune 2003. He usedthis as
an argument for his demolition of the company and the jailing of its owner.
But the United States can tax energy much less because of its strong energy
lobby. The corporate lobbies in the legislatures of the United States, Russia,
and Ukraine were long strengthened because parliamentary elections were
dominated by one-man constituencies, but the introduction of full propor-
tional elections, in Ukraine in 2006 and in Russia in 2007, is likely to weaken
their power. Individual candidates needed to mobilize their own campaign
nancing, which is much easier if the candidates themselves are rich or have
a few large contributions. The U.S. Senate was called a Club of Millionaires
in the Gilded Age of the 1880s, as is the Ukrainian parliament today. After
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the March 2002 elections, Ukraine had its most oligarchic parliament. It
was commonly said that 300 of the 450 deputies in its Supreme Rada were
dollar millionaires, and until the Orange Revolution, half the Supreme Rada
was dominated by nine oligarchic factions, each representing the interests
of one major business group (slund 2006).
A third group of political goods is government decisions. Several of the
ministers of President Ulysses Grants administration were direct bene-
ciaries of corrupt payments from railway companies (Steele Gordon 2004,
p. 219), and the corruption of cabinet ministers has been a patent problem
inthe United States. With the U.S. revolving doors betweengovernment and
the private sector, conicts of interest slightly detached in time have become
almost impossible to prosecute. By contrast, in the 1990s the Ukrainian and
Russian oligarchs devoted amazingly little attention to government posts.
Ministers tended to be civil servants. In Russia, the half-year appointments
of the oligarchs Vladimir Potanin and Boris Berezovsky to senior govern-
ment posts were exceptions. Russian businesspeople preferred to buy ser-
vices fromofcials or purchase public jobs for their helpers. Again, Ukraine
has been far more oligarchic than Russia. Two prime ministers in the 1990s,
Yukhum Zviahilsky (19934) and Pavlo Lazarenko (19967), were major
businessmen themselves (slund 2000). Even so, the Ukrainian govern-
ment remained dominated by civil servants until November 2002, when
the countrys rst coalition government was formed under Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych, and big businesspeople moved from Parliament to top
government jobs. President Viktor Yushchenko promised to draw a sharp
line between business and government, but his rst administration con-
tained three substantial businessmen.
6
In August 2006, Yanukovych became
prime minister, and a group of big businesspeople joined his cabinet.
Afourth political good of great value is court decisions. The earlier quote
about New York courts in the 1860s says it all about American courts at
that time. In Russia and Ukraine, the use of courts has risen steadily as law
has evolved. Alas, as courts have become more important and independent,
they have also become more corrupt, and the prices of court decisions have
likewise risen.
Media is a fth, mostly private, political good. In the United States, media
owners have enjoyed a free hand for a long time. Publicity has long been
traded freely in Russia and Ukraine, which is legal. In Boris Yeltsins Russia,
the oligarchs Boris BerezovskyandVladimir Gusinskydominatedthe media.
President Vladimir Putin has gradually expanded government control and
6
Petro Poroshenko, Yevhen Chervonenko, and David Zhvania.
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ownership over media, but the trade in news publicity for commercial
purposes is continuing as before, and public relations agencies in Moscow
provide price lists, specifying how much it costs to buy news reporting by
various prominent TVpersonalities. InUkraine, oligarchs (primarily Viktor
Medvedchuk and Victor Pinchuk) purchased a lot of media, especially TV,
before the presidential elections in October 1999, inspired by the Russian
presidential elections of June 1996. Oligarch even acquired the additional
meaning of media owner.
7
The main media have so far stayed in the hands
of a few oligarchs.
Thus, considering the economic, legal, and political conditions of oli-
garchy, the Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs are by no means atypical. They
are responding rationally to the prevailing conditions to maximize prot
and security. How well or badly they behave depends on how much compe-
tition they are exposed to. A major concern caused by the current Russian
renationalization and the recent Ukrainian discussion about reprivatization
is that the oligarchs are too weak politically to achieve a balance of power
with the state that could secure property rights for the future.
Complaints: A Matter of Ideology
Oligarchs are controversial, andsowere the Americanrobber barons (Veblen
1899/1994). The primary political complaint about Russian and Ukrainian
oligarchs is their excessive wealth. The number of billionaires is large in
Russia. By its number of billionaires, Russia ranks as the third country in
the world after the United States and Germany (Kroll and Fass 2006).
A related argument is the considerable inequality in Russia and Ukraine,
but it is similar to that of the UnitedStates, andfar belowthe average of Latin
America (see Chapter 7). Inequality is substantial but hardly inordinate and
more or less constant.
Criticism of the oligarchs has focused on the purportedly awed priva-
tization, perceived as the key to their wealth. This is the popular view in
Russia and Ukraine as well as in the West. That a view is widespread does
not mean it is well founded. Volumes have been written about the Russian
loans-for-shares privatizations in late 1995, which marked the rise of the
Russian oligarchs, but the relationship between privatization and oligarchs
was more tenuous.
8
The oligarchs in question were all known as such before
these privatizations. The loans-for-shares privatizations did not make them
7
I owe this observation to Olena Prytula, editor-in-chief of Ukrainskaya Pravda, Kyiv.
8
The best are Freeland (2000) and Hoffman (2002). See also, Blasi et al. (1997).
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oligarchs, and most of them did not participate in the loans-for-shares pri-
vatizations.
9
Moreover, unlike many other privatizations, substantial money
was paid in the loans-for-shares deals, even if the amounts were paltry in
comparison with the potential values of the enterprises. Several of the dozen
enterprises involved in loans-for-shares did extremely well, especially Yukos
and Sibneft, which led the revival of the Russian oil industry. Soon they
paid as much in taxes in one year as anybody could possibly have asked
in return for these enterprises in 1995 (Shleifer 2005). A majority stake in
Yukos was privatized for $310 million, but at the time nobody suggested
that a maximum price of more than $45 billion was feasible. As early as
2000, Yukos paid no less than $6 billion in taxes that year. Thanks to the eco-
nomic success after its privatization Yukoss market capitalization peaked at
$45 billion in 2003 before Putin destroyed the company.
Economically the Russian loans-for-shares privatizations were an unmit-
igated success. The state would have lost greatly if it had retained these
companies and privatized them later, regardless of the eventual sale price.
That was the fate of Central Europes now moribund steel industry and
coal mines. People detest privatizations more than straightforward theft of
money because they can see privatized factories with their naked eye. They
do not react when billions of dollars are spirited out of the state treasury
because they do not see them. Privatization is too transparent, making the
wealth of the few apparent to ordinary people (Shleifer and Treisman 2000;
slund 2002). The conspicuous success of others is rarely appreciated.
In Ukraine, privatization was later and messier than in Russia (Yekha-
nurov 2000), which bolstered the power of the oligarchs. Until 2000,
Ukraines oligarchs focused on gas trade and little else. One leading oli-
garch, Ihor Bakai, stated famously: All really rich people in Ukraine have
made their money on gas (Timoshenko 1998). The oligarchs rent-seeking
excesses delayed economic recovery for longer in Ukraine than in Russia.
Finally, in 2000, substantial economic policy changes occurred against the
will of the Ukrainian oligarchs, which contributed to high economic growth
(slund 2001). The big controversial privatizations in Ukraine took place in
20024, when its oligarchy was at its peak. Although the oligarchs increased
their wealth more than ever, competition from emerging big businesspeo-
ple challenged the oligarchy. After the Orange Revolution, Prime Minister
9
Of the seven famous oligarchs in Russia in 1996 and 1997 (Petr Aven, Boris Berezovsky,
Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin, andAlek-
sandr Smolensky), only three participated (Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and
Vladimir Potanin).
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Yuliya Tymoshenkodirectedthe popular anger against twoleadingoligarchs,
Victor Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov. They had made the transition from
commodity trading to production and developed large steel corporations,
withtransparent andefcient corporate structures. The shadier oligarchs, by
contrast, escapedthe brunt of the critique. Admittedly, PinchukandAkhme-
tov were the beneciaries of the most disputed privatization in Ukraine,
10
but the point is rather that the most successful, transparent, and productive
businesspeople were the focus of the public fury.
A common complaint about oligarchs was that they bribed, stole, and
committed all conceivable crimes. The profound problem with postcom-
munist society, however, was that it was lawless in the exact meaning of the
word. Multiple ordinary human rules were not codied in law. Worse, many
such rules were criminalized. Under these circumstances, it was difcult to
establish the requirement for legal behavior. Contracts had to be enforced
somehow and payments collected, but courts would not do so.
Oligarchs were alsoaccusedof being parasites, of not producing anything.
As discussed earlier, however, the less rent seeking and the more productive
oligarchs became, the more unpopular they were. At the time of the Orange
Revolution in 2004, Ukraines GDP was growing at a staggering pace of 12
percent a year. Much of its steel was produced in the oligarchs mills, and
many other branches of industry were taking off in the oligarchs hands.
The oligarchs became subject to much greater public criticism when they
no longer stole but produced. Similarly, the popular reaction against the
Russian oligarchs caught on around 2000 after several of the major oligarchs
had decided to become fully legal and legitimate, pay taxes, declare their
ownership and spend substantial amounts on charitable donations. This
voluntary transparency might have been the greatest mistake the Russian
oligarchs ever made. People nd the transparency of wealth hard to tolerate.
Marshall Goldman (2003) argued that American robber barons were bet-
ter than the oligarchs because they invested and built new enterprises, but
that distinction hardly holds. After the Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs
acquired their enterprises, they invested heavily by any standard (Shleifer
2005). Moreover, why should big old enterprises be wasted? Only oligarchs
have proved able to save them.
Alas, economic utility and popular acclaim seem negatively correlated.
Insider privatization, which dominated in the early transition, has been
10
In the summer of 2004, just before the presidential elections, they acquired the huge
Kryvorizhstal steelworks for $800 million without real competition. The Yushchenko gov-
ernment reversed the privatization and sold Kryvorizhstal to Mittal Steel for $4.8 billion.
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found economically less effective, but politically it has been more easily
accepted. If the rst beneciary squandered his funds, he was easily for-
given, or at least forgotten. Also, if somebody buys a mismanaged privatized
enterprise on the secondary market for a penny, nobody complains. Nor
do people react much if somebody takes over a well-managed company at
a low price after ordering law enforcement agencies to engage in lawless
persecution.
The sense morale is not pretty. The shadier the machinations through
which oligarchs made their money, the safer they are from public condem-
nation. The more productive and transparent they become, the more criti-
cized they are, and the more taxes they pay, the more exposed they become,
as Yukos so well illustrates. Admittedly, time heals all wounds, and so does
failure. Today few are concerned about the retired organized criminals who
emigrated (even if they were serial killers) or state enterprise managers who
lost their fortunes after having run their ill-gotten enterprises aground.
So what is the problemwith oligarchs? People dislike successful capitalists
for purely ideological reasons. The U.S. government did not react against
the robber barons in the 1860s and 1870s when their excesses were worst,
but it did so only in the early 1900s, when populism grew strong under the
inuence of Thorstein Veblen, Louis Brandeis, and Theodore Roosevelt. It
helped little that AndrewCarnegie was giving away his wealthat anunprece-
dented pace (Morris 2005).
In the end, the acceptance of large fortunes and certain inequality is
a matter of ideology. People do not accept others afuence, unless they
believe that great riches are permissible. This is the secret of the economic
success of the Western world, and it is not limited to the Anglo-Saxon world.
Forbes reckons that Germany is the country in the world with the second
largest number of billionaires, and the whole of continental Europe has
dominant family groups owning their biggest companies (La Porta et al.
1999a). Postcommunist nations nd it difcult to accept the amassment
of huge personal fortunes because socialist ideas opposing the very rich
persist. The situation has become more dramatic by economic and legal
conditions skewered in favor of the formation of oligarchs. Property rights
remain feeble and are easily questioned. The very speed of change suggests
that it may be reversed. Contrary to popular convictions, the peculiarity
of postcommunism is not that oligarchs have arisen but that they have
only been permitted to evolve in three countries. The economic problem of
postcommunismis not oligarchy but societys ideological inability to accept
large fortunes and ultimately private property rights. If the property rights
of the richest are not secure, no property rights are. The best formulation
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of such an ideology for the acceptance of the formation of wealth and its
inheritance is probably Friedrich Hayeks (1960) book The Constitution of
Liberty.
Ironically, postcommunist reforms were not sufciently ideological, as
Hillary Appel (2004) has shown in her comparison between privatization in
the Czech Republic and Russia. She concluded that in the Czech Republic
V aclav Klaus wisely used classical liberal ideology to facilitate privatization.
Although the Russian privatizers were equally radical liberals, they chose
to justify privatization with concrete material benets, advocating the par-
ticipation of various stakeholders (Boycko et al. 1995; Chubais 1999). The
Russian public felt cheated when their anticipated material benets did not
materialize, whereas the Czechs happily reelectedKlaus because he promised
nothing but ideology. Neither large-scale fraud by the investment funds nor
low growth upset the clear-sighted Czechs. The riches of the Russian and
Ukrainian oligarchs can hardly be accepted by the public if these people do
not embrace capitalist ideology.
The mainenemy of liberalismis nolonger socialism, evenif many socialist
sentiments linger, but populism. Populism is no longer directed against the
laws of macroeconomics, as was the case in Latin American in the 1970s
and 1980s. Today the value of macroeconomic stability is widely understood
throughout the world. Instead, the newpostcommunist economic populism
pokes intoa less well understoodarea of economics, namely, property rights.
It agitates for redistribution of property. As usual, populism is driven by a
combination of forces. Some suffer from the lack of justice, and others
want to make fortunes by undermining the property rights of others. No
sound capitalism can develop without respect for property rights, however.
The origins of Western property rights are not pretty. Indeed they made
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon exclaim Property is theft in 1840, but capitalism
succeeds in the West because property rights are accepted even so.
After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the new government spoke of
the possible reprivatization of up to 3,000 enterprises. The redistribution of
property is often considered a characteristic of a revolution (Mau and Star-
odubrovskaya 2001), but the complications of a large-scale re-privatization
would be immense. Only very recent privatizations could be effectively
reversed, because many enterprises had changed hands. How would partial
sales and investments be valued? Obviously, the oligarchs would resist their
expropriation, and their willingness to spend money on politics and courts
in a corrupt state made it likely that they would win. Nor would new case-
by-case privatizations be successful, because they rarely are in weak post-
communist states (Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 2000). In a revolutionary
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situation, many businesspeople, especially respectable foreigners, are prone
to stay out of competitive privatizations, although the Ukrainian oligarchs
could be replaced by Russian oligarchs. The old owners would undoubtedly
sue the state. Primarily as a consequence of this harmful debate, Ukraines
growth rate plummeted from 12.1 percent in 2004 to 2.6 percent in 2005 as
the oligarchs slowed down their economic activities. The Ukrainian econ-
omy speeded up again after the parliamentary elections in March 2006 put
an end to the danger of reprivatization.
After the Rose Revolution in November 2003, the new Georgian regime
under President Mikheil Saakashvili also questioned the existing property
rights. It arrested dozens of businesspeople whom it considered criminals
and let them out for a fee, arbitrarily set at an amount from $300,000 to
$1 million. In tiny Georgia, the positive effect on the treasury was palpa-
ble. The public complained, however, that friends of the new regime were
not asked to pay up, regardless of how they had earned their money. The
amounts were perceived as arbitrary extortion, and the guarantees of prop-
erty rights have not been proved.
11
Complaints have arisen that the govern-
ment has continued on its initial arbitrary track of extortion.
The obvious alternative policy option would be to guarantee the oligarchs
full property rights without asking them for compensation, which is, of
course, the preferred choice of the oligarchs. The Russian and Ukrainian
oligarchs are trying to develop this option with huge charitable donations
primarily to the social sector, taking their cue from Andrew Carnegie and
John D. Rockefeller.
A Question of Property Rights
Inthe mid-1990s, young locals took onthe challenge totransformseemingly
moribund Soviet smokestacks. They succeeded beyond any expectation,
revitalizing old factories and spawning economic recovery. Soon, some new
owners became conspicuously rich, because economies of scale were great,
rents ample, and only enterprises with concentrated ownership could make
it because of the weakness of the legal system. Because their property rights
were weak, the new entrepreneurs, commonly called oligarchs, reinsured
their property rights by buying politicians, judges, and other ofcials, which
is called corruption or state capture. Ironically, the present problem is to
safeguard the civil rights of the generators of this unprecedented boom.
11
Personal information fromTheresa Freese, a journalist living in Georgia, on May 12, 2005.
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Recently, both Russian and Ukrainian politics have been driven by a pop-
ular urge to defeat corruption, identied with oligarchs. In the Gilded Age,
the United States faced the same dilemma: how to quell the excesses of the
new big businesspeople. Russia under Putin has instigated conscatory tax-
ation of the biggest oligarch and extorted the rest with periodic payments.
Ukraine considered a large reprivatization scheme, which destabilized both
politics and economics, not to mention law.
The problem with these schemes is that they are driven by the wrong
ideology a populist dislike of the rich plus a desire by rising businesspeople
to grab the assets of the old oligarchs, and disrespect for both law and
property rights. Neither should be encouraged. The emergence of oligarchs
must be understood as a natural consequence of the prevailing economic,
legal, and political conditions in the aftermath of communism and needs
to be accepted by the public. This requires that the public understands and
embraces the fundamental principles of capitalism.
In a theoretical paper, Daron Acemoglu (2003) took a dispassionate view
of the problems of property rights in an oligarchic versus a democratic
society. He denedanoligarchic society as a society where political power
is inthe hands of the economic elite, andhe comparedthe trade-off between
the distortions of such a society with those of a democracy, where political
power is more equally distributed.
The big problemhe sawwitha democracy is hightaxes, whichredistribute
income fromentrepreneurs toworkers, discouragingentrepreneurial invest-
ment. This is exactly what is described in Chapters 3 and 6. Democratic
East-Central Europe has higher taxes, greater public redistribution (notably
social transfers), andlower investment growththanthe oligarchic CIS coun-
tries. In addition, the democratic countries have much more regulated labor
markets and thus higher unemployment (see Chapter 4). The problemwith
an oligarchic society, in Acemoglus view, is that it offers a less level playing
eld. It restricts the entry of new enterprises, distorting the allocation of
resources and redistributing income toward the entrepreneurs by reducing
labor demand and wages.
The growth rate in the respective case depends on which distortion has
the greatest economic impact. Acemoglu (2003) argued that the typical
pattern is that an oligarchy rst becomes richer but later falls behind a
democratic society. As in so many other respects, the early postcommunist
transition is peculiar. As discussed in Chapter 3, democracy was strongly
positively correlated with all kinds of market reforms and economic growth
until 1998. The explanation is that democracy was the most effective lever
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against the extraordinary rent seeking. From 1999, by contrast, the nega-
tive effects of high taxation, high social transfers, and overregulated labor
markets have kept growth in Central Europe low. In addition, its inability to
accept the rise of oligarchs left the productive capital of old industrial giants
underutilized.
The CIS oligarchies have performed in the opposite fashion. Until 1998,
their economic elites behaved utterly irresponsibly. They attempted to max-
imize their rents, ignoring that their rent seeking caused economic decay
to their countries. The Russian crash of 1998 radically realigned the incen-
tives of the economic elites of the CIS oligarchies. The inationary rents were
gone, andtheir mainrevenues arose fromthe productionof commodities for
export. Suddenly the oligarchs became interested in high economic growth
and low taxes because the resurging state power forced even them to pay
taxes. The oligarchs favor a free labor market because it benets their eco-
nomic interests. They care little about corruption, which they can handle; it
limits entry of newcompetitors, generating rents for the happy incumbents.
For now, the handicaps of the East-Central European democracies appear
more damaging to economic growth than the high corruption of the CIS
oligarchies (slund and Jenish 2006).
Yet the liberal argument for the leveling of the playing eld, the reduction
of corruption, and the facilitation of entry of new entrepreneurs remains
strong and sound. At some stage, this may give the East-Central European
countries the upper hand again in economic growth. Ideally, the CIS oli-
garchies would become democracies after they have exploited the benets of
their current incentive structure fully. Arguably, that is what happens when
successfully developing semiauthoritarian countries become democracies.
Another possibility is that the East-Central European countries succumb to
tax competition, as is currently happening, and slash taxes as well as social
transfers to boost their economic growth. The outcome of this competition
is not obvious, but it is positive in itself.
Today it might sound implausible, but oligarchs can also be combated
througha social democratic approach, withhighprogressive taxation. Brad-
ford DeLong (2002) pointed out that the United States hardly generated any
billionaires from 1930 to 1980, because even there social democracy was
victorious for half a century. The outstanding feature of this period was
high progressive taxation, which exceeded 90 percent for the truly rich after
World War II until 1962 (Steel Gordon 2004). Even under the otherwise
liberal U.S. conditions, the high progressive taxes on the very rich stemmed
the emergence of new billionaires. Would the new U.S. multibillionaires,
who gave birth to the new wave of enterprises in high-tech, nance, and
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trade, such a Microsoft, Intel, and Wal-Mart, have developed, if the United
States had maintained a marginal income tax of more than 90 percent? I
doubt it. Fortunately, such high progressive taxes run counter to the mood
of our time, which cherishes at taxes. Nor are such high taxes likely to harm
the oligarchs, who are likely to avoid them either by buying themselves suf-
cient legislative clout or through emigration. Wealthy aristocrats as well as
the inheritors of the entrepreneurs a century ago persist in many European
countries despite high progressive income taxes, whereas newentrepreneurs
tend to sell out to the old families (Morck et al 2005). But countries with
few entrepreneurs need to cherish them.
Naturally, law must be imposed on the oligarchs. If the state is able to
guarantee property rights to big businesspeople, their need to capture the
state with large political payments will plummet. Then a normal legal sys-
tem, which can discipline the oligarchs, can evolve. In the end, no political
solution is likely to hold if it is not supported by a strong and broad ide-
ological commitment to the sanctity of private property. If people are not
convinced that they need capitalism for their own good, they are not likely
to accept the perseverance of the super-rich.
Oligarchs have proved highly useful economically after the rampant rent
seeking ended. They have evolved as a natural product of large economies of
scale and weak legal security, and very large enterprises can hardly function
without their rm management. A major problem is that oligarchs spend
inordinate amounts to ensure their property rights, which could be cured by
guaranteeing the private property rights of all people, including oligarchs. If
not even the property of the richest is safe, howcan anybody trust his or her
property rights? Such a guarantee of property rights marks the crossing of
the threshold to mature capitalism. Oligarchs may become more palatable
politically if they are charged additional taxes or induced to undertake large-
scale charitable donations. Ultimately, the acceptance of oligarchs is a matter
of ideology. Do we accept the very rich or not? Mature capitalism does, but
lesser systems do not.
Anal observationonoligarchy is that it does not appear very stable. East-
Central Europe has established stable democratic systems, and Belarus,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have reinforced strict dictatorships. The
other nine CIS countries may be called more or less oligarchic political re-
gimes, which are intermediary between democracy and dictatorship. They
can develop in either direction, and they have changed considerably in
recent years. Under Putin, Russia has been transformed from a semidemo-
cratic oligarchy to a centralized police state. With the Orange Revolution in
NovemberDecember 2004, Ukrainetookabigstepintheoppositedirection
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towardfull-edgeddemocracy witha more parliamentary system. The main
question in the region is how these oligarchic regimes will evolve.
Putins Alternative: Centralized Dictatorship
In early 1998, the Russian oligarchy had reached its zenith. A common
view was that the countrys transformation had been completed and that
the oligarchy was to last for the foreseeable future. The oligarchs appeared
to deal with the state as a self-service boutique, but their demise came
faster than anybody expected. All of a sudden, the state was back with an
unquestionedmonopoly of power. Renationalizationreplacedprivatization,
and secret police took over both power and wealth from the oligarchs. The
man embodying this defeat of the oligarchs was Russias President Vladimir
Putin. The oligarchs, who had seemed omnipotent, suddenly surprised with
their weakness.
The nancial crash of August 17, 1998, brought a sudden end to the par-
adise of the oligarchs. They had been big purchasers of domestic treasury
bills, and they had nanced their purchases with large loans in Western
currencies. When the Russian government defaulted, they lost big. Most of
the large oligarchic banks went bankrupt. Only Alfa Bank was left stand-
ing. Incredibly, Viktor Gerashchenko, who had caused so much damage to
Russias economy and had been sacked because of the currency crisis in
October 1994, was reappointed chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. He
secured the state banks dominance, which remains to this day, marginaliz-
ing the oligarchs in the nancial sector.
Thenancial crashforcedPresident Yeltsintoappoint anold-stylegovern-
ment with prominent communist ministers and the former foreign intel-
ligence chief Yevgeny Primakov as prime minister, curtailing the role of
oligarchs in Russian politics. Although a couple of oligarchs assisted in the
nomination of the former KGB lieutenant-colonel Vladimir Putin as prime
minister and president from 2000, his presidency became the defeat of the
oligarchs.
Also the regional governors, who had been major culprits behind the
Russian nancial crash, lost political power. They had refused to allocate
more tax revenues to the federal treasury and they had defrauded the center
through barter schemes and offsets.
The third group to lose out politically was the communists, who had
opposed all the scal measures that had been needed to salvage the Russian
economy as well as market economic legislation. Although the communists
seemed to gain the upper hand through their appointments to Primakovs
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government, they lost badly in the parliamentary elections in December
1999 to Vladimir Putins new centrist party of power, United Russia.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Russian nancial crash led to a remarkable
sanitation of Russias public nances. The government swiftly balanced the
state budget, primarily by slashing enterprise subsidies but also by reduc-
ing real pensions and by centralizing tax revenues. Remarkably, Russia has
maintained very strict macroeconomic policies, leading to ever-larger bud-
get surpluses from 2000. As oil revenues rose with higher world market
prices, they were amassed in a special stabilization fund, and international
currency reserves exceeded $300 billion by the end of 2006 (Owen and
Robinson 2003). Russian society had been so shell-shocked by the crash of
1998 that these strict policies reected a broad consensus.
Putins rst term as president, 20003, was characterized by substantial
market economic reform, such as the adoption of a liberal newtax code with
fewer and lower taxes, the development of the Civil Code and the promul-
gation of a new Customs Code. Considerable deregulation occurred, and
Russia undertook most steps necessary to join the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Privatization proceeded, and corruption declined. Russia seemed to be
completing its market economic transformation (slund 2004a).
An ominous parallel development, however, was a gradual but far-
reaching centralization of political power. Initially, elementary state power
was restored. The regional governors were forced to succumb to federal law.
In the 1990s, regional governors and businesspeople had corrupted courts.
Now, they were brought under the control of the presidential administra-
tion. Initially, Putin intimidated the oligarchs to stay out of politics, but
in October 2003, he had the wealthiest oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
arrestedandeventually sentencedto eight years inlabor camp. By bankrupt-
ing Khodorkovskys oil company, Yukos, through lawless and conscatory
taxation, Putin made a joke of both his tax reform and of judicial reform.
In Putins second term, nearly all the institutional developments were
regressive. Gradually, he let the state or loyal businesspeople take over all
media of signicance. Through a multitude of dirty tricks, elections at all
levels were manipulated. Candidates and parties were declared unt for the
imsiest formal reasons. After the free but unfair parliamentary elections
of December 2003, the Russian parliament was without consequence, and
even partial democracy was over. The political parties were sapped of inde-
pendence and content. The members of upper chamber, the Federation
Council, became appointed and thus without signicance. By naming a fee-
ble prime minister in early 2004, Putin rendered the government equally
irrelevant. Nongovernmental organizations were suffocated with red tape.
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In September 2004, Putin decided that also regional governors would be
appointed rather than elected, losing independence. In this fashion, Putin
systematically deprived all political institutions but the presidency of power
and signicance (Fish 2005).
Putin accomplished an amazing de-institutionalization, leaving the pres-
idency as the only institution of relevance, supported by secret police and
media monopoly. Its main source of legitimacy was the presidents personal
popularity, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian nationalism,
and naked repression did not evoke a wide appeal. The president was left
standing alone in front of the people without any mediating institutions,
much like Russian tsars.
Thehigheconomicgrowthandtheaccompanyingrisingstandardof living
were mitigating factors, but increasingly the economic growth depended on
the high international prices of Russias energy exports and the momentum
of prior market reforms. By 2005 and 2006, the industrial growth, which
may be seen as the underlying growth, had faded to a mere 4 percent a year.
The hallmark of Putins second terms was renationalization, as big, sluggish
state corporations purchased successful private enterprises. Sometimes the
prices were too high, arousing suspicions about substantial kickbacks. In
other cases, the prices were too low, making evident that the sales were not
voluntary. Leading state ofcials, mostly hailing from the KGB, assumed
control over large state corporations to their apparent personal benet.
Transparency International (2006) recordedrisingcorruptioninRussia after
2004, while corruption fell in most of the region. Despite hugely increased
expenditures on law enforcement, Russias murder rate was higher under
Putin than under Yeltsin. It is difcult to escape the impression that a major
goal of the Putin system was the enrichment of the top state ofcials. Rising
political repression and declining transparency facilitated their corruption.
The increasingly aggressive foreign policy was also helpful for this policy of
corruption. Unlike most of the other former Soviet republics, which seemed
steeped in market economic reforms, Russia appeared to have fallen victim
to the oil curse.
The ultimate outcome of the Putin system became majority-state-owned
national champions, such as Gazprom, the Russian Railways, and the
arms export agency Rosoboronexport. Each of them was chaired and man-
aged by a Putin crony, usually from the KGB in St. Petersburg. Ideally, a
national champion was a monopoly. These state corporations were as a
rule less transparent than private, publicly traded companies. They tended
to purchase more assets rather than invest in their prior assets. Asset-
stripping by state ofcials was perceived as legitimate. As a consequence, the
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formation of national champions reduced economic growth and aggravated
corruption.
The post-Soviet space is the stage of a ferocious competition between
democracy, oligarchy, and authoritarianism. In Putins second term, Rus-
sia became a police state, serving the interests of that very police. As the
bureaucrats were let loose, progressive reforms were precluded. Only Rus-
sia recorded a major renationalization (European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development 2006) and a sharp rise in corruption (Transparency
International 2006). In the language of Mancur Olson (2000), Putin may
be described as a rowing bandit, the lowest level of state formation.
Kazakhstan, by contrast, couldmake a claimtobe a modernizing authoritar-
ian state, like Singapore or South Korea at an earlier stage. Olson would call
Kazakhstans President Nazarbayev a stationary bandit, thinking of the
value of his booty in the long term. A similar point could be made about
Armenia andAzerbaijan. Ukraine, by contrast, is far more openandcompet-
itive. It is an oligarchy about to break down into a competitive democracy.
The same might be true of Moldova. From this perspective, competition
and pluralism as well as privatization and deregulation are welcome devel-
opments unlike authoritarian order and centralization.
Joseph Stiglitz (2006, p. 43), on the contrary, sympathized with Putin and
his renationalization: when Vladimir Putin succeeded Yeltsin, he under-
stood that such concentration of wealth was a threat to him and to Russian
democracy, such as it was. . . . it was not hard for Putin to gure out how
to use the power of the state within the rules of the game to recapture
signicant amounts of assets. He went on to laud Putins conscation of
Yukos. Inthe same vein, Marshall Goldman(2003, p. 238) wrote, admittedly
much earlier, sympathetically about Putin, advocating renationalization:
the Russian government should consider creating a state-run mutual fund
which would take over ownership of the remaining shares. The fundamen-
tal dividing line in post-Soviet economic analysis remains whether privati-
zation or the state is perceived as the greatest problem. Those who are not
too worried about the excessive power of the state are not likely to be very
upset about the demise of democracy either.
Regardless of Putins overcentralized dictatorship having produced a high
economic growth rate during its construction, the full-edged model does
not appear to be a very viable system in the long run. It may prove self-
destructing, as it kills the golden geese that lay its eggs. The evil Soviet state
has been revived under the auspices of the KGB. It pampers those in power
with privileges, but it does not provide the citizens with law and order. KGB
alumni exploit state companies to enhance their control and wealth.
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Russias current problems lie in the incompleteness of its reforms. The
KGB should have been abolished and condemned after the abortive coup
in August 1991, and full democratization should have been Yeltsins focus
in 1991. The mass privatization was no mistake but rather the greatest
achievement, but it should have gone further. Gazprom and the railways
should have been broken up and privatized as the oil companies and the
coalmines were. Then these sectors could have been deregulated. And, of
course, a former KGB ofcer should have been disqualied from the post
of president as being professionally too deformed to be able to guarantee
democracy.
At the end of 2006, Russia looked frail because of its overcentralization of
state power. Despite its high growth and large nancial reserves, the state is
petried, possessing little ability to handle social crisis. Institutional com-
parisons are made with Leonid Brezhnevs stagnation. All institutions but
those preserving macroeconomic stability have been undermined. Political
competition has been eliminated. No checks or balances remain. Economic
reforms have ended, and property rights are in limbo. Although President
Putin insists that he will resign in 2008 after his second term as president, it
is difcult to see how he can do so in a state based on extra-legal rules, with
his popularity as the only source of legitimacy.
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11
The Impact of the Outside World
The collapse of communism and the Soviet bloc dominated public dis-
cussion all over the world in 1989. Among the questions raised were the
following: What relation would the postcommunist countries have to the
West? What assistance did they need? What could and should the West do
for them? Which organizations should be used? How much nancing was
needed, and was the West ready?
The Wests desire for the postcommunist countries success as democra-
cies and market economies is often taken for granted, but Western opin-
ion was divided. A broad Western opinion favored democracy and market
economies, even though most protagonists were tacitly doubtful about the
prospects for democracy in the former Soviet Union. The West saw lit-
tle threat from the former Soviet Union but also little gain. An important
countercurrent argued that Russia was a patent menace best kept down and
out. There was no consensus about what the West could or should do. In
effect, the West as a whole adoptedCentral Europe, andScandinavia adopted
the Baltics. Southeast Europe was left in a limbo, and Russia with the rest of
the CIS were left out in the cold.
Most opposed large-scale Western nancial support for the postcom-
munist East for a variety of reasons. At this time, development aid to the
Third World was approaching a nadir, because it had been widely discred-
ited as corrupting rather thanhelping. The old development aid community
looked on the volume of total Western assistance as a zero-sum game, and
they worried that large resources would be diverted from the Third World
to the somewhat wealthier transition countries. Much of the free-market
right, especially in the United States, opposed all government assistance. In
Europe, the left advocated large government transfers both at home and
abroad, but they objected to the right-wing project of building capital-
ism. The fallen rulers were, after all, fellow socialists. Economists of various
281
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convictions doubted the absorptive capacity of the postcommunist coun-
tries. The obvious compromise was to minimize public spending on post-
communist transition. A Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe was never an
option.
Economically, the opening of new countries to capitalism with new ex-
changes of goods, services, capital, and labor offered both opportunities and
threats. Initially, many West European countries were most afraid of receiv-
ing large numbers of refugees, as had been the case after previous upheavals
inEasternEurope Hungary in1956, Czechoslovakia in1968, andPolandin
1968and1981. The collapse of the GermanDemocratic Republic hadstarted
with a mass exodus to West Germany, and the low standard of living in the
East was evident. West Europeans did not welcome immigration because
of their own unemployment and nationalism. Their fear of immigration
inspired a two-pronged approach. The West Europeans wanted to assist
their closest neighbors in their economic development to convince their
people to stay at home, while they desired to keep more distant people away
through strict visa regulations.
In this chapter, section one examines the international role in the suc-
cessful return of East-Central Europe to Europe. Section two turns to the
much less successful international policy on the CIS countries. Section three
scrutinizes trade policy, which reected the same gulf between EU acces-
sion countries and the CIS. The chapter concludes with some judgment on
international assistance.
The Dream of Europe
To Central Europe, the Baltics, and Southeast Europe, the European Union
offered the dream of a return to Europe, or full membership of the EU.
This was a time of European revival. The European Union had just decided
to accept Austria, Sweden, and Finland as full members, and they acceded
in 1995. The question was not if but how and when the EU would expand.
Central Europe and the Baltics were widely perceived as constituent parts
of Europe, and they appeared manageable.
Germany had just seen its dream of reunication fullled, and under
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, it was the driving force for Eastern expansion
of the EU. For centuries, it had been the dominant cultural, economic,
and political power in Central Europe, with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary forming Germanys natural sphere of interest. Predominantly, its
Eastern neighbors sawthis as an opportunity for integration in Europe, and
Germany served as their peer country.
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The Impact of the Outside World 283
The four Nordic countries Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway
felt a great afnity to the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
for historical, geographic, and cultural reasons. They were all small neigh-
boring countries. During the Baltic independence in the interwar period,
regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea had been extensive. Although Lithua-
nias history was connected with Poland, it joined the Nordic-Baltic sphere.
Because only 8 million people lived in the three Baltic countries, the Nordic
countries with about 22 million cared for them as little brothers. A strong
peer relation developed, and the Nordic and Baltic countries came to share
executive directors inthe International Monetary Fund(IMF) andthe World
Bank.
Geographically, Bulgaria and Romania belonged to Europe, but they
attracted little outside interest. Romania was culturally close to France, but
France was scarcely engaged. Besides, Bulgaria and Romania were parts of
the volatile Balkans, where Yugoslavia was exploding in bloody separatist
wars, which further limited external interest. Finally, as their old communist
parties stayed in power, the West felt politically alienated and doubted their
interest in market reforms for good reasons. For years, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia were hanging loose, but after considerable EU hesitation, they became
candidates for EU enlargement, and their course was set.
The East-Central European countries were determined to return to
Europe, and from 1992 to 1993 the EU concluded so-called Europe Agree-
ments with the Central and Southeast European countries (see Table 11.1).
The EU concluded free trade agreements with the Baltic states in 1994 and
Europe Agreements in 1995. The Europe Agreements aimed at a broad inte-
gration of these countries into the EU, not only lowering barriers to trade
but also establishing a framework for political dialogue and the harmoniza-
tion of legislation. The Europe Agreements provided free trade in industrial
goods withintenyears, althoughthe EUagricultural market remainedclosed
until the Central European and Baltic countries became full EU members
in May 2004.
All the East-Central European countries applied for membership of the
EU early on, and in July 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Estonia were invited to negotiate terms for membership. In 1999, this offer
was extended also to Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria.
Their conviction of their future EU membership came to dominate their
outlook. For East-Central Europe, the EU was by far the most important
international community, and its vast market drove the export-oriented
growth of this region. Radical trade liberalization helped the East-Central
European countries to reorient their trade at an extraordinary speed to
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Table 11.1. EU agreement policy and EU accession
EU association
agreement
EU partnership
and cooperation
agreements EU accession
Central Europe
Poland March 1992 May 2004
Czech Republic March 1992 May 2004
Slovakia March 1992 May 2004
Hungary March 1992 May 2004
Southeast Europe
Romania March 1993 Jan. 2007
Bulgaria Jan. 1994 Jan. 2007
Baltics
Estonia June 1995 May 2004
Latvia June 1995 May 2004
Lithuania June 1995 May 2004
CIS
Russia June 1994
Belarus March 1995
Ukraine June 1995
Moldova Nov. 1994
Armenia April 1996
Azerbaijan April 1996
Georgia April 1996
Kazakhstan Jan. 1995
Kyrgyzstan Feb. 1995
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan Nov. 1997
Uzbekistan June 1996
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1997, p. 88).
the European Union, which soon accounted for two-thirds of their trade
(Baldwin 1994; Mizsei and Rudka 1995; Messerlin 2001).
The EU played an all-dominant role in the transition of its future mem-
bers. Its contributions were many and great. It functioned as peer countries
for the applicants, substantiating the dream of a return to Europe. The
EU offered considerable, early market access that greatly helped the acces-
sion countries to undertake their market reforms and return to economic
growth. Its technical assistance was substantial. It did deliver EU member-
ship after 14 years for the most reformist postcommunist countries. The EU
transferred its market economic model by setting legal and administrative
standards. All EU candidate members had to adopt acquis communautaire,
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the common EU body of law of 170,000 pages. Thus, the accession coun-
tries adopted most institutions characteristic of the EU countries, which
resolved many problems of their postcommunist transition, supported by
substantial technical assistance. The EU demanded democracy and assisted
in building it, which might have been its most important contribution, con-
sidering that democracy failed in all the twelve CIS countries. The same is
true of the rule of law. The EUalso provided the newmembers with national
security.
A problem, however, was that the EU exported its model of social welfare
with high taxes, large social transfers, and overregulated labor and agricul-
tural markets, which has delivered little growth both in the old EUand Cen-
tral Europe. Althoughvisa regulations were eased, the oldEUmembers were
reluctant to open their labor market to the applicants. Even when the Cen-
tral European and Baltic countries became full members of the EU in 2004,
only three old EU members the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden
opened their labor markets to the new members immediately, while the
other twelve old EU members insisted on transition periods of varying
length. The resources the EU transferred were not large until the acces-
sion countries actually joined the EU, but considering the poor fate of East
Germany, that may be seen as an advantage.
1
Ironically, East Germany stands out as one of the least successful transition
countries. After aninitial spurt, its growthrate has lingeredaround2 percent
a year (World Bank 2002). Of all the postcommunist countries, it recorded
the highest unemployment peaking early at 35 percent. Although it has
fallen, it has only halved and remains the highest in Europe (Siebert 1992).
Some blame the East German predicament on shock therapy. Over night,
it received the West German mark, acquis communautaire, and the West
Germancourt system. Inationnever became a problem, andWest Germany
took care of its oversize national debt.
East Germanys problems, however, were not connected with shock ther-
apy but the choice of economic model and policy. Although ination was
low, East Germany suffered from poor macroeconomic policies. The fun-
damental problem was that East Germany was priced out of the market and
rendered totally noncompetitive. Two mechanisms reinforced this greatest
social welfare trap of all time. One cause was that West Germany ooded
its new Eastern Laender with money, arising from a new solidarity tax on
1
One of the most balanced and informative eastern assessments of the advantages and
drawbacks of the EU for Russia has been made by two Russian liberals (Mau and Novikov
2002).
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all German incomes. In the years 19917 East Germany received a mind-
boggling average annual transfer of $82 billion, 40 to 60 percent of East
Germanys GDP. By comparison, total World Bank loans and grants to the
transition countries amounted to $19 billion in 19912000 and IMF dis-
bursements to $38 billion in 19909. The inter-German transfer was almost
twice as large as total North-South development assistance, and it received
many times more grant assistance than all other transition countries taken
together (World Bank 2002, pp. 378; slund 2002, p. 426). East Germany
suffered from a Dutch disease as the windfall priced it out of all markets.
Strangely, this costly and harmful transfer remains around $80 billiona year.
Another mechanism that made sure that East Germany was overpriced was
that the West German trade unions and employers associations agreed on
high wages for East German workers, which rendered them noncompeti-
tive. The West German trade unions negotiated for the East Germans, but
they cared only about their own workers, and the West German employers
association had no interest in the competitiveness of East Germany either
(Pickel and Wisenthal 1997).
As if to add insult to injury, East Germans were deprived of any role in the
privatization; enterprises were effectively given away as corporate welfare
to West German corporations in the most expensive of all privatizations,
and real estate was given back to West German emigr es through restitution
(Brada 1996). As a revenge on the West Germans, East Germans have voted
for the maintenance of excessive social welfare and high taxes to nance it.
The poor performance of the East German economy illustrates the futility
of some good institutions, such as West German courts, if macroeconomic
policies are patently awed. The gigantic West German transfer to East
Germany appears one of the greatest public nancial follies of all times.
Western Failure to Act in the East
No country in Eurasia was more important than Russia. Peacefully, it had
let the Eastern European countries and all the Soviet republics become
independent, and it was devastated by economic crisis. Despite its benign
behavior and its economic hardship, fear of Russian expansion lingered.
Until recently, the Soviet Union had sparred with the United States as the
other superpower, and it still possessed 30,000 nuclear warheads. Others
worried about its implosion, but few were comfortable with Russia.
Traditionally, the Soviet Unionhadseenthe UnitedStates as its competitor
and peer, but the gaping economic chasm between the two countries made
this perception implausible. Both the George H. W. Bush and the Clinton
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administrations tried to maintain special bilateral relations with Russia, as
if it were still a superpower.
2
It was difcult to endow this strategic part-
nership with content, however, considering that the ofcial Russian GDP
in 1999 corresponded to as little as 2 percent of the U.S. GDP at the con-
temporary exchange rate. To Europeans, Russia was too big and frightening,
with its population of 145 million, nearly twice as large as united Germany,
although the Russian GDP shrank below that of Switzerland at current
exchange rates. An instant European consensus declared that Russia could
never become a member of the European Union, rendering it an outsider
without peer.
A small but inuential group of American policy thinkers, notably real-
ist geopoliticians Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, regarded Rus-
sia as outside of Western civilization and wanted to keep it down and out.
They still considered Russia a threat to its neighbors, so the weaker Russia
was, the feebler this threat. Kissinger (1994, p. 815) commented on the brief
post-Soviet period: But the dominant geopolitical thrust has been Russias
attempt to restore its pre-eminence in all the territories formerly controlled
from Moscow. Kissinger (2000) reiterated his fear of the success of Russian
economic reform: But if the strengthening of Russia as a result of reform
produces gradual encroachment as, ineffect, all its neighbors fear Russias
quest for domination sooner or later will evoke Cold War reactions. Simi-
larly, Brzezinski (1997) sawas the geopolitical task in the post-Soviet region
to strengthen every state, including China, against Russia. On balance, it is
probable that neither the disappointment nor the weakening of the Russian
westernizers could have been avoided (p. 102). Kissinger discounted the
possibility of Russia becoming a democracy. Yet nobody advocated open
aggression against Russia.
Abroader Westernapprehensionwas that their markets would be ooded
with cheap Eastern goods. Exports of steel and agricultural produce from
Russia, Ukraine, andKazakhstanthreatenedmoribundsteelworks andover-
protected agriculture in the West. The EU and the United States repeatedly
imposed antidumping sanctions against steel and chemical exports from
Russia and Ukraine, and little agricultural produce was allowed to enter.
The East Europeans were defenseless against these protectionist measures
(Messerlin 2001).
To the other CIS countries Russia was the standard bearer, on which they
remained dependent. They enjoyed little international support, and none
2
The outstanding source on U.S. policy on Russia in the 1990s is Goldgeier and McFaul
(2003).
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of them could even hope to be successful if Russia were not. Asia played no
signicant role. Turkey was ambitious, trying to develop multiple links with
the Turkic nations in the region Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but distances were long, and Turkeys nances
were poor. China was passive, preoccupied with the maintenance of stability
in Central Asia out of concern for potential uprisings among its Turkic
minorities in Sinkiang.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, postcommunist
transition was well established. Radical market reform had set the tone for
Eastern Europes transition. The international community had long focused
on market transition in the Soviet Union. The highly political G-7 (com-
posed of the seven big, Western, industrialized countries the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada) replaced
the more economically oriented G-24 that handled the nancing of the
transition programs in Central Europe and the Baltics. At the request of the
G-7, four international economic organizations the IMF, the World Bank,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
undertook a major study of the Soviet economy, its reform and criteria for
Western market economic assistance in 1990. Because of the novel Soviet
openness, the resulting three-volume study contained lots of new informa-
tion. It advocated a radical and comprehensive reform of the Polish type
(IMF et al. 1991).
In June and July 1991, a group of prominent Harvard social scientists and
Russian economists pursued a private project, called the Grand Bargain,
on how to reform the Soviet economy. It advocated a radical economic
reform supported by large Western assistance just before the G-7 meeting
in London in July 1991 (Allison and Yavlinsky 1991). However, in the Soviet
Union, this proposal was never taken seriously or even earnestly promoted,
and President Mikhail Gorbachev failed to make any plausible proposal,
given that his political control was on the wane. The West had no sub-
stantive basis for action. The Grand Bargain attracted considerable Western
media sympathy, but the Western leaders were not interested in offering any
nancial support for Russia (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003).
The leading advocate of international assistance for Russia was Harvard
Professor Jeffrey Sachs. Proposals of early large-scale international assis-
tance were primarily connected with the radical reform program (Lipton
and Sachs 1990a; Sachs 1993, 1994). Sachs emphasized that foreign assis-
tance could be useful only if a country made serious attempts at economic
reform: Of course, foreign aid is not the main factor in economic success.
The reforms themselves were the key. My argument is that foreign aid is
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critical to helping the reforms themselves take hold (Sachs 1994, p. 504).
Most of the postcommunist countries started from a position of depleted
international reserves, excessive debt service, and, insome cases, overwhelm-
ing foreign debt. To give nancial stabilization a chance, a country needed
replenishment of its reserves andpossibly some international assistance with
its foreign debt service. Sachs (1994, p. 504) argued: The market cannot do
it all by itself; international help is critical.
Sachss advocacy (1994, p. 504) was also political: Aid is crucial because
reforms are inherently very fragile at the outset. There is typically little
consensus on what should be done, pessimism is rife, and the reformers
hold on power and on policy is tenuous. He refuted the idea that reformers
succeed by constructing a social consensus, and he underlined the degree
of confusion, anxiety, and conicting opinions at the time of any major
reform. In Poland in 1989, as in Germany in 1948, there was no consensus,
and consensus was no precondition of successful reform. On the contrary,
it arose out of successful reforms. In a similar vein, Andrei Shleifer and
Robert Vishny (1998, p. 13) argued: Foreign aid, if used politically, can
come to the aid of these reformers, and offer them resources that help them
tostay inpower andpursue their goals. These ideas never became a Western
consensus but remained controversial.
The Europeans looked to America on such a big policy issue, and only
the U.S. president could act, but he did nothing. The Bush administration
was tardy in realizing that the Soviet Union was breaking up and wanted to
shore it upuntil its very end. As late as August 1991, President Bushmade his
infamous chicken Kiev speech, admonishing the Ukrainians to stay in the
Soviet Union. Two weeks later, the abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow
sounded the death-knell for the Soviet Union, leaving reform to the soon-
to-be independent states. Russia opted for democracy, with Boris Yeltsin as
democratically elected president. On October 28, 1991, Yeltsin (1991) made
the greatest speech of his life to the Russian parliament, unveiling a com-
prehensive radical economic reform proposal. He also appealed at length
for substantial and manifold Western support, although he was somewhat
vague and refrained from specifying the amount:
We appeal ofcially to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, inviting them to work out
a detailed plan for cooperation and participation in the economic reforms. We
appeal to the developed countries and to international organizations for technical
help and assistance rst and foremost in training of cadres and in the analysis and
working out of recommendations for the key economic, ecological, and regional
issues. . . . Russia conrms its intention to observe the international obligations of
the USSR.
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His reform speech was overwhelmingly approved in a vote by the Rus-
sian parliament. A week later, President Yeltsin undertook a fundamental
government reform, abolishing dozens of branch ministries and cutting
government staff drastically. He appointed a new cabinet, consisting of
young economic reformers, with Yegor Gaidar as deputy prime minister
and reformleader. Rarely has such a great historical opportunity arisen, and
seldom has its coming been so evident. Yeltsins young reform government
was working night and day to prepare their reforms, and a strong informed
Western opinion urged their governments to support Russian reform. The
New York Times (November 12, 1991) editorialized: The challenge for the
West is to encourage Mr. Yeltsins real, radical program by giving attentive
assistance now. On December 17, 1991, the Financial Times concurred:
Now is the rst and, perhaps, the last chance for the west to promote
radical economic reformin the former Soviet Union. Howright they were!
But the leading Western governments revealed no intention to support
Russias market reforms. In mid-November 1991, the new Russian reform
administration received the deputy ministers of nance of the G-7. During
four days of negotiations, theydiscussedonlyone issue, the joint andseveral
responsibility of the soon-to-be former Soviet republics for the Soviet debt.
Although the G-7 representatives were aware of the impending breakup
of the Soviet Union, their only interest was to secure their claims. The
young Russian reformers were shocked and dismayed by the G-7s complete
disinterest in any discussion of their reform plans but kindly signed the
Western proposals.
The next Western initiative was a sheer diversion. A high-level inter-
national conference on humanitarian aid to the former Soviet Union was
convened by the U.S. government in Washington, D.C., in late January 1992,
just after Russia had launched its daring reforms. The U.S. administration
organized this meeting to show that it thought about the former Soviet
Union, but it designed the conference to discuss only humanitarian assis-
tance and avoided all discussion of support for reform. Nobody from the
former Soviet Unionwas eveninvited. The West noisily wastedtime (slund
1995).
The prospect of U.S. presidential elections in November 1992 stalemated
the Bush administration, because it thought international assistance was
unpopular with the voters. The Soviet collapse was so peaceful and demo-
cratic that no action seemed needed. Personally, President Bush favored
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev over Russian President Yeltsin, evi-
dently not concerned that only Yeltsin had been democratically elected.
Gorbachevs aide Grigory Yavlinsky was preferred over Yeltsins reform
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Table 11.2. U.S. peace dividend, 19929
Percentage of Current dollars
GDP (billions)
1992 1.1 69
1993 1.5 98
1994 1.9 132
1995 2.2 160
1996 2.5 192
1997 2.6 211
1998 2.8 238
1999 2.8 259
Total 1,359
Source: U.S. Census Bureau(1999, p. 368; 2000, p. 360).
leader Yegor Gaidar, who was not known in Washington. In February 1992,
the well-informed Washington Post columnist JimHoagland concluded that
the United States did not provide any support to Russia because President
George Bush reckoned Boris Yeltsin was a transitional gure (Washington
Post, February 11, 1992). This was the only big chance for the West to sup-
port reform in Russia, and the responsibility for missing it rests squarely
with President George H. W. Bush.
On April 1, 1992, ve months after his dramatic appeal to the Western
governments, President Yeltsin received an answer of sorts. U.S. President
George Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared their intent
to mobilize a $24 billion Western aid package for Russia. However, their
April fools claim was never substantiated (slund 1995). In early April, the
Russian reformers faced an onslaught by the semidemocratic, and by now
antireformist, parliament. By June 1992, President Yeltsin effectively gave
up on reform and appointed three old-style industrialists, including Viktor
Chernomyrdin, as deputy prime ministers. The spectacular absence of
Western support contributed to the fall of the Russian reform government.
The amounts discussedwere minor incomparisonwiththe potential ben-
ets. The total request for nancial assistance to Russian economic reform
in 1992 was about $25 billion, of which $6 billion was intended for a sta-
bilization fund. Almost all the assistance would have been in the form of
credits. Areasonable bilateral U.S. contribution would have been $3 billion,
yet the United States reaped $69 billion in peace dividend that very year (see
Table 11.2). In comparison, the Marshall Plan comprised 2 percent of the
U.S. GDP at the end of the 1940s, which would have meant $125 billion
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for the United States in 1992 (Milward 1984; U.S. Census Bureau 1999,
p. 459). The West did give Russia credits of more than $12 billion in 1992,
but they were commodity credits, which actually blocked reform because
they became rents to commodity traders and their corrupt conduits. They
were bilateral loans, not conditional on any reform measures and not coor-
dinated with international nancial institutions (slund 1995).
The heart of the matter was that the Soviet military threat was gone. The
West had already cashed in on the collapse of the Soviet Union. It had won
the Cold War and wanted to go home, by radically reducing its military
expenditures. All Westerncountries slashed their defense budgets, especially
the United States. The Reagan administration spent 6.0 percent of U.S. GDP
on defense from 1982 to 1989. In 1998 and 1999, the U.S. defense budget
had plummeted to 3.2 percent of GDP. I dene the peace dividend as the
difference between the Cold War standard defense cost (6.0 percent of GDP)
and the later defense cost as a share of GDP. By this denition, the United
States beneted from a peace dividend of no less than 2.8 percent of GDP,
or $242 billion in current U.S. dollars, in 1999 because the Soviet military
threat had evaporated. The cumulative U.S. peace dividend from 1992 to
1999 amounted to an enormous $1.4 trillion current U.S. dollars (see Table
11.2). As the U.S. budget decit used to be approximately 3 percent of GDP,
the eliminationof the Soviet military threat alone eliminatedthe U.S. budget
decit. This huge gain went largely unnoticed because nobody claimed it.
The Republicans wanted more defense expenditures, and the Democrats
alleged the eradication of the budget decit was a result their sophisticated
economic policy. For the Western governments, the peace dividend was free,
giving them no reason to act. Gratitude is no force in world politics.
Trade Policy: A Gulf Between the EU and the CIS
The liberalization of foreign trade has been considerable, but from the very
beginning, a chasm erupted between the EU accession countries, including
the Baltic states, and the CIS countries. The dividing line was EU policy.
The EU became the savior of East-Central Europe, locking the accession
countries into a standard Western trading system early on.
All countries in East-Central Europe undertook early and radical liber-
alization of their foreign trade regimes. The liberalization of their exports
was complete, nearly all the quantitative barriers to trade were abolished,
and import tariffs were reduced dramatically to the single digits (EBRD
1994). The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) state trading
systemwas eliminated on January 1, 1991. Aliberal foreign trade systemwas
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rmlyestablished. Their trade liberalizationwas cementedbymultiple inter-
national agreements. The Central European countries and Romania were
already members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which became the World Trade Organization (WTO). They had adopted
the international legal norms for trade, and they could turn to the WTO
for protection in international trade disputes. Bulgaria joined the WTO in
1996, and the three Baltic countries were admitted in 19982000.
The CIS countries, on the contrary, had nowhere to turn but to one
another, andweakstates make weakpartners. The EUwas quite protectionist
to the CIS countries. Foreign trade developed very differently in the CIS. In
early 1992, all CIS countries were shocked by nancial collapse and acute
shortages of most goods. Producers desire to secure supplies dominated
trade policy. Governments were preoccupied with state building and short-
term crisis management, having little time for trade policy.
Inthis vacuum, bureaucrats of the oldstate planningsystemseizedcontrol
over intra-CIS trade, turning it intoa Soviet theme park. The oldstate supply
organizations were transformed into monopolies for CIS trade. Although
free trade was evolving domestically, state trade prevailed between the CIS
states. The rst CIS trade agreements were reminiscent of old Soviet trade
agreements within the CMEA, with compulsory deliveries at xed prices for
major products. Old state enterprises continued to deliver unsalable goods
to other CIS countries in exchange for Russian state credit, while valuable
commodities sold to CIS countries at low regulated prices were often reex-
ported illicitly at an enormous cost to the Russian state. The main trade
barrier was the discretionary regulation of exports. CIS exporting compa-
nies had to sell their commodities through a state trading organization,
as in the Soviet Union, at a price far below the world price. Commodity
exports required export licenses and quotas, issued by the national Ministry
of External Economic Relations, which naturally became a pinnacle of cor-
ruption (IMF 1994b; Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994, 1996; Michalopoulos
and Drebentsov 1997; Olcott et al. 1999).
Nor had the CIS countries locked in foreign trade liberalization through
any international agreements. In 1993, the rst CIS countries submitted
their applications to join GATT, soon to become the WTO, but it took years
before anything happened. Unlike the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO
has little staff and does little to facilitate membership applications, which
take six years on average to reach completion. Another peculiarity of the
WTO is that it is easier for small countries with little trade to join than for
big countries whose exports have a greater impact on foreign markets. The
rst to join the WTO were four small CIS countries: Kyrgyzstan in 1998,
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Georgia in 2000, Moldova in 2001, and Armenia in 2003. Unfortunately,
they did not see major changes in their trade conditions as a result of their
accession to the WTO because their big neighbors stayed outside of the
WTO, and WTO rules did not apply to them. A major change is under way
as the three big CIS economies Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan are
about to join the WTO. After their accession, WTO membership should
have greater impact on trade conditions.
The twelve-member Commonwealth of Independent States, which was
set up in December 1991 to replace the Soviet Union, was ambiguous in its
nature. On one hand, it was a means to abolish the Soviet Union. On the
other, it embodied Russian imperial dreams of restoring the Soviet Union.
This ambivalence rendered the CIS pretty dysfunctional, because Russia
pushed for greater integration than any other CIS member desired. Sev-
eral countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia)
wanted close relations with Russia, but others (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) reckoned that distance lends
enchantment. The CIS concluded a large number of agreements on various
topics. The countries close to Russia signed many such agreements, whereas
the others usually refused. Even those countries that signed CIS agreements
rarely ratied them, leaving the CIS littered with hundreds of agreements
that never came into force.
The most important CIS agreement was an Agreement on the Creation
of a Free Trade Zone in 1994, which formed the basis for trade between the
CIS countries. Yet this trade has not been very free. When a company or
industry in one CIS country successfully exported to another CIS country,
the importing country often clamped down with a sudden quota or pro-
hibitive import tariff without any impediment. Because the CIS lacks any
conict-solving mechanism, its members have to settle all trade disputes
in bilateral negotiations. As a consequence of this lack of principles, many
trade conicts are not resolved. Free trade is likely to arise only when most
CIS countries become members of the WTO, because the WTO does pos-
sess such a conict-solving mechanism with its many trade conventions, an
arbitration mechanism, and the option of substantial penalties (Olcott et al.
1999).
Rather than accepting its need for WTO membership and speed up its
accession, Russia has invented one new intergovernmental organization
after another. Arst attempt at deeper integration was a Russian-Belarusian
Union launched in 1993 to renew the ruble zone. In 1994, it was supposed
to become not only a monetary union but also lead to a merger of the
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two countries. Nothing more than a partial customs union has resulted,
however. In 1995, disappointed with the malfunctioning free trade zone,
Russia, Belarus, andKazakhstanlauncheda Customs Union, whichKyrgyzs-
tan and Tajikistan later joined. Again, it never came into fruition because
Russia demanded that the other countries adopted its comparatively high
tariffs (Olcott et al. 1999). After several years of failure, the Customs Union
was renamed the Eurasian Economic Community in 2000, which did not
reinvigorate it, evenif Uzbekistanjoinedfor political reasons in2006. Undis-
couraged by these remarkable failures, in 2003 President Putin proposed a
new Single Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. It
was supposed to be a free trade area, a customs union, and a currency union,
although Putins real purpose was presumably to tie Ukraine more closely
to Russia before the Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004. The Single
Economic Space became as unsuccessful as other CIS trade initiatives, but
as all the other failed intergovernmental CIS organizations, it lingers on.
Meanwhile, theCISstatetradingsystemgraduallyfell apart becauseRussia
was no longer prepared to subsidize it. As a consequence, intra-CIS trade
plunged by some 70 percent from 1991 to 1994, and little new trade could
evolve. Only by 1995 had most CIS countries (apart from Belarus, Uzbek-
istan, and Turkmenistan) liberalized most exports, and intra-CIS trade was
reasonably free, so that newforeign trade could nally evolve (Michalopou-
los and Tarr 1997). Soon, new protectionism gained momentum. Although
formal tariffs remained low, nontariff barriers, such as the certication of
produce and quotas, proliferated. Increasingly, CIS countries undertook
unilateral sanctions against one another. For instance, Russia introduced
strict quotas on imports of vodka and sugar from Ukraine in 1996, and
Kazakhstan levied 200 percent import tariffs on some imports from Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 (Olcott et al. 1999). The usual cause was a
successful expansion of exports, often unleashed by abrupt changes in real
exchange rates.
Remarkably, the CIS countries closest to the EU exported the least to
the EU. The explanation is that especially Ukraine and Moldova primarily
exported so-called sensitive products, subject to particularly severe protec-
tionism. Two-thirds of the exports of Ukraine, consisting of metals, agri-
cultural produce, chemicals, and textiles, are deemed sensitive by the EU.
Moldova faces severe protectionismboth fromthe EUand CIS countries, its
traditional markets, because it exports overwhelmingly agricultural goods,
and it has failed miserably in breaking through these trade barriers. This
protectionism is probably the main reason for Moldova having suffered
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the greatest decline in output and standards of living of all postcommunist
countries. Today, it is by far the poorest country in Europe (Messerlin 2001;
slund and Warner 2004).
The EU has meant little to the CIS countries. It concluded bilateral Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreements with all the CIS countries apart from
Tajikistan from 1994 to 1997 (see Table 11.1). These agreements contained
little of substance, however. It also concluded individual trade agreements
with the CIS countries, but these grant them only limited market access
because most of them are not WTO members. Although the exports of the
East-Central European countries to the EU market skyrocketed from about
half in 1989 to two-thirds of their total exports in 2003, the share of former
Soviet exports going to the EU was stable at about one-third. The absence
of any legal multilateral framework has made the CIS countries suffer from
botheachothers unilateral sanctions andthe absence of legal defense against
antidumping actions in the rest of the world.
In2003, the EUcame upwitha newconcept, the EuropeanNeighborhood
Policy, which was designed for Western CIS and North African countries.
Russia was greatly insulted and turned down the offer, whereas Belarus
was excluded because of its dictatorship. Ukraine and Moldova, however,
acceptedthe offer andconcludedactionplans withthe EUin2005. The three
Transcaucasiancountries, Georgia, Armenia, andAzerbaijan, alsowantedto
become part of the European Neighborhood Policy, which the EU accepted
(Milcher et al., 2007). The EUis trying tooffer a frameworkthat canfacilitate
closer cooperation with CIS countries. It also contains a proposal of bilat-
eral free trade agreements with the respective CIS countries. The European
Neighborhood Policy may lead to a certain bridging between some CIS
countries, but the chasm between the EU and the CIS countries remains
remarkably deep.
Early on, a number of estimates of future trade were made withthe gravity
model, which predicts the volumes of trade a country will have with other
countries on the basis of GDP and mutual distance. They foresaw a drastic
reorientation of the postcommunist countries trade to the West, primarily
to the EU (Collins and Rodrik 1991; Hamilton and Winters 1992). Oleh
Havrylyshyn and Hassan Al-Atrash (1998) found that East-Central Europe
hadundertakensucha reorientationof its commerce as early as 1992, but the
CIS countries continued to trade irrationally too much with one another.
Yet by 2000, only Belarus, Tajikistan, and Moldova pursued most of their
trade with transition countries, reecting considerable structural change.
The differences between the two regions in trade deregulation and pol-
icy are also evident from their total trade volume as a ratio of their GDP
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1990 1998 2004
T
r
a
d
e

a
s

%

o
f

G
D
P
Central and Eastern Europe CIS
Figure 11.1. Openness of the Economy, 1990, 1998, and 2004. Source: World Bank
(2006).
(see Figure 11.1). At the outset of transition, East-Central Europe and the
CIS countries were approximately equally integrated in world trade. From
1990 to 1998, exports of Central and Eastern Europe took off, whereas
trade in the CIS countries lingered. After 1998, exports of both regions have
surged impressively, being the most dynamic exporters in the world, and the
expansion continues (World Bank 2005a, p. 2). Central Europe remains the
most integrated, but even the nonreformers have become highly integrated,
whichis likely toforce themall tofocus onachieving greater competitiveness
(cf. Figure 3.6).
International Assistance: Insufcient but Crucial
The West cannot be described as enthusiastic about helping postcommunist
transformation. It cared about the success of Central Europe and the Baltics,
which it soundly assisted. For the rest, Western support was tardy and hes-
itant, encouraging slowness and indecision also among decision makers in
those transition countries.
The dearth of international institutional development is illustrative. The
end of World War II generated the United Nations, the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, the Marshall Plan, and the OECD. The conclusion of the Cold War
gave birth only to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.
It was not an ordinary regional development bank but an investment bank,
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15
5
5
15
25
35
45
55
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
U
S
$

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Net private capital flows Net official flows
Figure 11.2. Countries in Transition: Net Capital Flows, 199299. Source: International
Monitary Fund (2000, p. 62).
designed to service big private corporations, which did not exist in the early
transition. First, enterprises had to be privatized or grow large. Next, they
needed to have three years of audited accounts by an internationally rec-
ognized auditing company. Therefore, the EBRD could not play any role
in the early transition, only after a country already had well-functioning,
creditworthy companies, and then international assistance was much less of
a need. As a result of this unfortunate design, the EBRD became useful in
a country only after its transition had already succeeded. Instead, the IMF
and the World Bank became the leading international organizations assist-
ing countries in their actual transition. The Western government funding
that went to the EBRD would have made a much greater contribution to
transition if it had been used for the conancing of IMF programs in the
rst undernanced IMF stabilization programs.
Considering that postcommunist transition was the dominant interna-
tional policy issue in the 1990s, large-scale international assistance could
have been expected, but Western nancial support was tiny, and most of it
consisted of credits. Figure 11.2 presents IMF estimates of net capital ows
to countries in transition from1992 to 1999. Incredibly, net ofcial ows,
that is, all governmental or intergovernmental nancing to the transition
countries, were negative from 1993 to 1996. At the height of the hyperina-
tionandthe ensuingstabilizationinthe CIS, the transitioncountries actually
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0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
U
S
$
Figure 11.3. Foreign Direct Investment Inow per Capita, 19932005. Source: EBRD
(various years).
paid more to Western governmental organizations in principal and interest
on old loans to communist governments than they received in credits and
grants. Private inows, by contrast, were substantial already by 1993, as pri-
vate portfolio investments ew into treasury bills and stocks. Surprisingly,
they stayed positive even during the Russian nancial crisis.
Foreign direct investment, which is the true indicator of success, gained
momentum in 1995 and has grown persistently in throughout the region
(see Figure 11.3). Initially, foreign direct investment was concentrated to
Central Europe and the Baltics, but the oil-rich CIS countries Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan also caught up. Surprisingly, transition has been nanced
by the private sector; foreign governments did not even make a positive
contribution. However, international public nancing was vital until 1993
because private nance was not available amid rampant macroeconomic
crisis, and that was when countries most needed international nancial
support. The timing of the nancing was more important than the volume
of nance.
The most important task of Western assistance was to introduce a new
market economic paradigm. Whenever a country needs new thinking, it
turns to outsiders both at home and abroad, because much of the knowl-
edge that is new to an isolated establishment already exists among domes-
tic dissidents or international scholars. Every reforming country utilized
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substantial foreign advice. Chief issues for foreign advice were liberaliza-
tion, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and the drafting of new
laws. The most prominent economic advisors were independent academics.
The most famous was Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs of Harvard University,
who worked primarily in Poland and Russia.
3
Countries and international
organizations were happy to share their knowledge and values, particularly
through their own consultants, because key advisors at the summit of gov-
ernment can be highly inuential. Considering that only a limited number
of foreign advisors can be effective, such assistance is cheap. Macroeco-
nomics required only a few senior advisors, whereas privatization called
for numerous technical experts. All conceivable bilateral and international
organizations have provided technical assistance. Even so the main techni-
cal assistance agencies, the EUs PHARE (EU technical assistance program
for EU accession countries) and TACIS (Technical Assistance for the CIS)
and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) dis-
bursed annually less than $2 billion altogether (slund 2002, tables 10.5
and 10.6). Advice to governments through thousands of consultants was
abundant, but it had extraordinary impact. The whole economic thinking
of the region changed toward normal market economic ideas in a few years,
and the international contribution was signicant. An amazing volume of
legal texts was drafted by foreign experts literally hundreds of laws in every
post-Soviet country.
International advisors to top government ofcials are usually controver-
sial. They are accused of being demons or ineffective, or both. In a com-
pletely new situation, policy makers needed to gain easy access to serious
advice. Given that the old regime had prohibited the study of most of the
relevant questions, foreign advisors were badly needed. Top policy makers
in a time of crisis have extremely little time, so they could not handle more
than a few advisors, whose messages had to be brief and clear. There was
neither time nor need for nuance. Key decisions had to be taken fast to avoid
disaster. Naturally, such advisors must be loyal to the policy maker in ques-
tion and chosen by him or her rather than by a foreign government. Often,
topadvisors were nancedby nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The
IMF and the World Bank were the dominant policy-advising organizations,
and they fullled many of these functions, but governments usually wanted
to have their own reliable counterparts to respond to those organizations.
Foreign advice was controversial because it was effective.
3
Jeffrey Sachs and I worked together as economic advisors to the Russian government from
November 1991 until January 1994.
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Themost urgent andnanciallydemandingeconomictaskwas macroeco-
nomic stabilization, whichis astandardIMFassignment. The IMFconcludes
an agreement with a country in dire nancial straights, usually a one-year
standby agreement. The IMF commits itself to provide certain loans, which
are paid out in tranches, to expand a countrys international reserves. In
return, the recipient country has to commit itself to fulll certain scal
and monetary conditions, primarily to reduce its budget decit. The IMF
received so much public criticism that a cursory newspaper reader might
have got the impression that the IMF is a global government in charge of
postcommunist transformation. This critical publicity reected how active
and effective the IMF was under the leadership of Michel Camdessus and
Stanley Fischer. It acted much faster and more aggressively than any other
international organization. It had highly qualied staff, and its centralized
hierarchy worked swiftly like an army. The IMF also possessed sufcient
funds to make a difference. With its total disbursements of credits to the
transition countries of $38 billion from1990 to 1999, the IMF was by far the
most important provider of nancial support to transition countries, and it
offered large credits early when countries were in their deepest crises. Of this
amount $22 billion went to Russia (slund 2002, Table 10.7). Aproblematic
feature of the IMF, however, is that anonymous ofcials have great power
over economic policy. One midranking missionchief for a country canmake
or break an IMF stabilization program, and few even know about it. The
prominence of the IMF was the choice of the United States and the other
G-7 countries, because the IMF has embodied the Washington Consensus
of conservative scal and monetary policy as well as a pathos of free markets,
and it was widely considered the most competent and professional interna-
tional organization, closely followed by the World Bank (Gould-Davies and
Woods 1999).
Initially, the outcome of the IMFs work inthe regionwas mixedwithearly
successes in Central Europe and the Baltics, but failure in the CIS. The big
black mark on the IMFs work in the transition countries remains its failure
to call for an early breakup of the ruble zone, but ultimately this was a polit-
ical decision taken by its leading member governments. One decade after
transition, however, the record looked much more impressive. All transi-
tion countries had ination under control, and all but the three intransigent
nonreformers had undertaken their stabilizations under the supervision of
the IMF. Today most of these credits have been paid back. In many pro-
grams, the IMF stalled disbursements for some time, for example, in Poland
in 1991 and in Russia in 1998. These controversial decisions showed that the
IMF took its conditions seriously, yet the many renewed IMF agreements
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proved that most countries were anxious to continue their cooperation with
the IMF. It has accomplished its chief aim of bringing ination down, and
the question is only whether this could have been accomplished earlier and
at a lower social cost.
The most important and disputed structural change was privatization
because it determined whether an economy would become capitalist or
not. However privatization was carried out, it was technically complex and
required innovationas well as many skills that had not existed inthe socialist
economies. More foreign consultants were needed for privatization than for
any other reform. The two agencies that assisted the most in privatization
were the World Bank and the USAID. Although privatization inevitably
aroused scandals everywhere, about 65 percent of the economy in the region
was privatized, indicating the impressive impact of Western assistance to
privatization.
Thus, the three fundamental tasks of building a market economy the
paradigm itself, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization were
accomplished with great focus and targeted assistance from the interna-
tional community. The criticism these acts aroused are little but evidence
of their importance and the efcacy of the assistance. Organizations that
did nothing of signicance were not criticized, because they were not taken
seriously.
A novelty in postcommunist transformation was the substantial role
played by international NGOs. The foundations created in the region by
billionaire philanthropist George Soros became the pioneers in interna-
tional support inbuildingcivil society.
4
Inspiredbyphilosopher Karl Popper,
George Soros (1991) aimed at building an open society. Preceding the fall of
communism, he gave grants from his personal fortune to many new NGOs,
startinginHungaryandPoland. He nancedphotocopiers andinternational
exchanges, stimulating the development of local NGOs. As communism
collapsed, Soros expanded the scope of his activities to all postcommu-
nist countries. His foundations became role models for other organizations
and governments, which seemed to be playing follow George. The Soros
approach had many advantages. He was personally deeply involved, travel-
ing extensively in the region with an entrepreneurial outlook. Using his own
money, Soros could offer substantial gifts instantly. His total funding rose
4
As a matter of disclosure: FromAugust 1994tothe endof 1997, I was advising the Ukrainian
government on economic reform nanced by the Open Society Institute (the main Soros
foundation). I am also cochairing the board of trustees of the Kyiv School of Economics,
initiated and supported by George Soros.
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to more than $400 million a year by the late 1990s, making his foundations
the greatest donors to the region after USAID and the EU. By being fast and
nonbureaucratic, Soros responded to the enthusiasm of activists, paying
lower salaries but mobilizing more motivated collaborators than consulting
rms. Spending most of his money on local activism, Soros stimulated the
evolution of permanent local NGOs. He ventured into multiple sensible
activities beyond the pale of others. Increasingly, he has spent his money on
education and democratization. His role has been so great that the history
of postcommunist transformation is to a considerable extent the history of
the Soros foundations.
Manytasks receivedlittle or poor international support, notablythe build-
ing of democracy and legal systems, the combat of corruption, and the
reform of medical care and education. Usually, several causes were com-
bined. First of all, if no prominent policy maker in a country demanded
reform and external support for a particular cause, nothing could be done.
In most transition countries, the judicial system and the whole social sec-
tor were notoriously conservative, demanding more resources, but rarely
attempting to use themmore efciently. Without domestic reformers in key
positions, foreign aid to that sector would inevitably be wasted and often
was. The World Bank has persistently advocated reforms in health care
and education but encountered little policy interest in most countries. In
1998, the World Bank (1998) published the book Assessing Aid: What Works,
What Doesnt and Why. One of its main conclusions was that a government
could not be forced to reform against its will through conditionality, and
this assessment was conrmed by the postcommunist experiences. Another
problem was that in many cases, Western theory was poor, and no useful
set of policy advice was at hand. Moreover, if no international organization
was in charge of an issue, as the IMF was for macroeconomic stabilization,
international coordination was often lacking, and a multitude of foreign
consultants with different foreign employers contradicted one another. By
and large, numerous international donors have provided a quite sufcient
number of consultants of multiple skills. Still much could have been done
in the private sector, but government tended to be oriented to government-
to-government cooperation. Foreign governments have done little to build
new, good, private, educational institutions in the region for the devel-
opment of good education in new capitalist skills, such as economics and
other social sciences, business administration, and law. Similarly, little inter-
national assistance has been devoted to long-term scholarships abroad.
Even if the crucial stages of postcommunist transformation are nowover,
our future viewof it, especially of the role of the outside world, is still onhold
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because it will be determined by the eventual outcome. If peace, democracy,
and sustained economic growth prevail, many will claim the success. If the
outcome is meager or worse, the judgment will be harsh because much more
could have been done in the initial transition. Yet although the West cannot
take toomuchpride inits assistance tothe postcommunist world, it has been
reasonably open and positive, and it has not intimidated these countries.
The main sins were those of omission a lack of interest, nancing, and
understanding.
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9780521865265con CUFX164/Aslund 978 0 521 86526 5 August 8, 2007 10:9
Conclusions: A World Transformed
The changes that have taken place in East-Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union are nothing but extraordinary. At the same time, it is striking
how uneven progress has been. Some countries appear to have done it all,
but others have barely taken the rst steps. Market economic reforms have
been highly successful, whereas democratization has been only partially
auspicious, and the introduction of the rule of law even less so.
To assess how far the region has proceeded, these countries are rst sum-
marized as ve models. Next, major developments in the region are recapit-
ulated, and nally, I try to suggest why certain policies succeeded in certain
countries and not in others.
Five Models
The outcomes of the postcommunist transformation have been remarkably
different. Today these 21 countries that were once so similar have become
rather diverse. Eighteen have become market economies, but three (Belarus,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have not (see Table C.1). The same eighteen
countries have privatized more than half of their economies, but the other
three have not. East-Central Europe has become fully democratic, whereas
the CIS reformers are at best partially democratic but mostly mildly author-
itarian. The nonreformers are all tyrannies. Corruption and the weakness
of the rule of law are worrisome, and the situation is worse where less other
reforms haveoccurred. Inationhas beenbrought under control throughout
the regionin, or close to, single digits. The growthrates were generally lowor
negative in the 1990s, but growth has been splendid since 1999, apart from
in Central Europe, where it has been moderate. The main explanation for
the poor growthperformance of Central Europe appears to be the large pub-
lic expenditures. The clearest dividing line runs between the nine countries
305
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Table C.1. Success of transition, 2005
Baltics CE SEE CIS-9 CIS-3
Market economy
1
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Private share,% of GDP
2
75 79 73 64 32
Democracy
3
Free Free Free Partially free Not free
Corruption
4
5 4 4 3 2
Ination
5
4 3 7 7 9
Unemployment rate,% 8 12 9 7
6
NA
Average GDP growth,%, 20015 8 4 5 9 8
Public expenditures,% of GDP, 2004 35 46 42 27 35
EU membership Yes Yes Soon No No
1. At least 0.70 on the structural reforms index 2005 (see Figure C.1).
2. European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 2005) assessment.
3. Freedom House (2006) assessment.
4. Transparency International (2005) (from 0 = highly corrupt to 10 = highly clean).
5. Average consumer price index, year end.
6. CIS-9 countries with plausible statistics (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine).
Sources: EBRD (2005), Freedom House (2006), Transparency International (2005), United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (2006), and World Bank (2006).
that are, or are about to become, members of the European Union and the
twelve CIS countries. Putting these assessments together, we arrive at ve
groups of countries with different economic, political, and social models.
1. The Baltic states: market economies with private ownership and democ-
racy, low corruption, and high growth thanks to small governments. The three
Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the star performers. They
are full democracies with normal market economies and predominant pri-
vate ownership. They have a steady, high growth rate of around 8 percent a
year. Their corruption is the least. Their ination is low, and their budgets
are close to balance. The Baltic governments are small and well run.
2. Central Europe: democratic market economies but social democratic wel-
fare traps. The four Central EuropeanCountries Poland, the CzechRepub-
lic, Slovakia, and Hungary are still richer than the Baltic states, and they
have evenlarger private shares and lower ination. They are also full democ-
racies withnormal market economies, but their growthrate is only 4 percent
a year, half of the Baltic level, and their corruptionis somewhat higher. Their
crucial shortfalls are high public expenditures, high taxes, large social trans-
fers, and considerable budget decits. Overregulated labor markets have
caused high unemployment. Slovakia might have broken out of this social
welfare trap, but populist politics render swift improvement unlikely in
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
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3. Southeast Europe: following Central Europe or the Baltics? The Southeast
European countries Bulgaria and Romania became EUmembers in January
1997, andthey are democracies andmarket economies. Inmost regards, they
are similar to the Central Europeans, but they have slightly higher ination
and less private enterprise, although more growth and less unemployment.
At present, they are close to the social welfare trap of Central Europe but
they may be steering in the more liberal Baltic direction.
4. The CIS-9: corrupt, partially free market economies with high growth
thanks to low taxes. With some delay, the nine reformist CIS countries have
become market economies based on private enterprise. Unlike the East-
Central European countries, they are partially free or mildly authoritarian,
and their corruption is considerable. Their saving grace is a stellar growth
rate of no less than an average 9 percent from 2000 to 2005, thanks to
their slashing of public expenditures, which are staggeringly 19 percentage
units of GDP lower than in Central Europe. The colored revolutions have
underlined the political instability of these oligarchic states. Some coun-
tries have recently consolidated authoritarian rule (Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Azerbaijan), whereas others are democratizing (especially Ukraine). This is
the most diverse group in terms of political system and level of economic
development.
5. The CIS-3: Soviet-type tyrannies. The three unreformed CIS count-
ries Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are harsh dictatorships with
no market economies. Their private sector remains marginal, and the state
is large and highly corrupt. Even so, these restored Soviet economies have
limitedinationandimpressiveannual growthrates, althoughtheir statistics
are subject toconsiderable doubt. Little canshake these regimes but a violent
overthrow of the despot.
The foremost problems for Central Europe are excessive taxes, large social
transfers, and overregulation, leading to low growth and high unemploy-
ment. The key threat to the CIS reformers is authoritarianism and corrup-
tion, which undermine property rights. The Baltic countries are threatened
by little but overheating.
Achievements and Revelations
Today it is difcult to imagine how great the intellectual confusion was in
the early transition (see Chapter 2). After more than a decade and a half of
transition, most answers are evident. We can list major achievements and
revelations during the postcommunist transformation.
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Amarket economy couldbe built, andthe radical market reformprogram
worked. All its major components were necessary for success. The three
countries that failed to marketize proved that the success of marketization
was not a given.
No country suffered from too radical or early market reform. Slower
reforms caused greater and more long-lasting output decline, higher ina-
tion, greater income differentials, more corruption, and less democracy.
The crucial problem was to overcome the extraordinary initial rent seek-
ing. It was like a seven-headed hydra, and rent seeking abated only after all
the heads had been cut off. Yet rents dissipated over time. The sooner rent
seeking was brought under control, the less harm was done to the economy
and society.
Almost all postcommunist countries saw a sharp initial output slump,
althoughmuchof it was a statistical illusion. Wars andhyperinationcaused
the greatest damage. The abolition of direct and indirect trade subsidies also
had signicant impact. Value detraction and structural distortions had to
go, resulting in both real and illusory output decline.
Aradical initial deregulation was vital for economic success and the com-
bat of corruption. The earlier, the more comprehensive, andthe more abrupt
the deregulation, the fewer the opportunities to develop rents through arbi-
trage.
The inationary pressures were great and manifold. The more rigorous
a macroeconomic stabilization was, the more successful it became. Fiscal
adjustment was key. No stabilization attempt was too severe.
The earlier andfaster privatizationwas, the better its qualityandeconomic
performance. Any privatization was better than none. The most important
aspect of privatization was political acceptance, so that the resulting prop-
erty rights were respected. Private enterprise has been crucial to economic
recovery and structural reforms.
The building of democracies has been mediocre. The only successful
democratization has been the wholesale imitation of European Union insti-
tutions. The dominant political theory was awed, and no relevant set of
policy advice was at hand. Nor did any international organization focus on
the building of democracy. The dearth of input resulted in poor outcomes.
The shortfalls in the building of a legal system were the greatest. Few
lawyers engaged in reforms. No relevant legal theory was apparent. Reform
attempts were partial. No international organization was preoccupied with
legal reform. Little was attempted, and consequently little has been accom-
plished. Corruption has become the bane of the CIS countries because of
their excessive state powers together with very limited state capacity and
their failure to develop a normal legal system. Corruption is best combated
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with freedom, transparency, and democracy. Some harm caused by corrup-
tion has been mitigated by sharp cuts in public expenditures, at and low
taxes, and reduced contact between state ofcials and individuals.
The most outstanding rent seekers became oligarchs. They responded
rationally tothe existing legal andeconomic conditions. As long as rent seek-
ing prevailed, they sought its prolongation. After the establishment of a nor-
mal market economy, they turned highly productive, successfully reviving
big old Soviet factories and driving economic growth. Politically, oligarchic
regimes have proved unstable. Ideally, their competition can breed normal
democracies and market economies, as is happening in Southeast Europe
and possibly in Ukraine. The alternative is the consolidation of authoritar-
ian state power in the hands of a unied political elite, whether a family as
in the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan or a branch of the security
police as in Russia.
Ironically, the weakest part of the communist state turned out to be the
state. Private enterprises have bredall postcommunist successes. State capac-
ity has proved far smaller than anybody but true libertarians presumed, and
especially the post-Soviet states are predatory. After one and a half decades
of transition, market failure is nolonger a big topic. Most of the time, market
failures could be resolved through privatization. State failures, by contrast,
abound, as reforms of the state have turned out to be the most difcult, and
its corruption is the blemish of postcommunist transition. All the regions
greatest shortfalls today are related to state failure: lack of democracy, a weak
judicial system, poor law enforcement, corruption, slow public health care
reform, and tardy public education reform. Either our knowledge of how
to reform the state is too limited or the task is not solvable on this scale.
Whatever the explanation, the obvious conclusion is that a greater reliance
on private enterprise is the best way forward.
Paradoxically, although the state has failed to fulll its positive roles, it
has come back faster than anybody could believe in the early transition as
a power. State security has beaten both the maa and the oligarchs in the
course of a fewyears and reestablished its monopoly on violence. The prob-
lemis that most of the CIS countries do not use this monopoly for the public
good but rather for the personal benets of the ruling elite. Given the evi-
dently mean-spirited nature of the post-Soviet state, post-Soviet people do
not believe in its potential benevolence. Because social democracy is nur-
tured by such a belief, social democratic parties of signicance exist only in
the four Central European countries and in Lithuania.
The European Union has played a great and multifaceted role in post-
communist transformation. In the East, the EU stood for civility, nor-
malcy, the rule of law, democracy, and wealth. Early on, the EU offered
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great market access to East-Central Europe, but not to the CIS countries.
The EUs nest achievement was to induce East-Central Europe to emulate
democracy through institution building as well as systematic peer pressure.
The EU reproduced its own legal and institutional model in East-Central
Europe. The drawback is that Central Europe has fallen into a West Euro-
pean social welfare trap with high taxes, large social transfers, and overreg-
ulation, especially of labor and agricultural markets, which limits economic
growth. Because this is a European dilemma, the EU possesses no solution.
The new EU members have adopted two contrasting attitudes to economic
policy. Central Europe behaves like Greece did as a new EU member in
the 1980s, maintaining large budget decits, while minimizing structural
reforms, trustingthat the EUwill bail themout. The Baltic states, bycontrast,
maintain economic policies as stringent as before. Presumably, the explana-
tion is that the Baltic states, as small, newly independent states, neighboring
on their previous occupier, remain wary.
1
Arguably, Russias hostility to the
Baltic states salvages them from the complacency of the Central Europeans.
Membership inthe CIS has led to muchpoorer initial economic, political,
and other institutional reforms. Until 1999, CIS economic performance was
miserable. The great covariance betweenseveral factors complicates ananal-
ysis of causality, and many alternative explanations have been offered. My
preferred explanation is the devastating effect of hyperination, aggravated
by the maintenance of the ruble zone, which explains why the Baltics could
escape the early CIS doldrums. Another important reason is the combina-
tion of the communist legacy and Gorbachevs nave reforms, which built
one of the most formidable rent-seeking machines the world has ever seen
(slund 1991). The standard suggestion is greater distortions because of
longer time under communism. Richard Pipes (2005) emphasized the great
cultural and historical legacy of tsarist Russia. The oil windfall may also
be a curse for Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (Arendh
2005; Gaddy and Ickes 2005; Tompson 2005), with Russia and Kazakhstan
being less democratic than typical of countries at their level of economic
development. The CIS countries also suffered from poor access to external
markets (slund and Warner 2004). The problems were so monumental
that it would have been unrealistic to expect any reformers, however strong
their popular mandate and intellectual prowess, to solve them within less
than several years.
In the early transition, left-wing Western intellectuals complained that
1989 didnot produce any newideas. East Europeans were tiredof all original
1
A similar argument could be made for Slovenia.
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socialist ideas and aspired to the boring normality of Western Europe, but
nor did the left-wingers like what they heard. Novelties have been forth-
coming. The greatest innovation of postcommunism is mass privatization,
and, belatedly, it works. In the aftermath of the mass privatization, a large
new empirical literature on corporate governance, property rights, and law
and nance has evolved. Another innovation has been at personal income
taxes that might be about to revolutionize the world. The new systematic
study of corruption is to a considerable degree a result of the great prob-
lems it caused in transition. Postcommunist transition has exposed Western
thinking to serious tests. At present, we seem to understand how to build
a market economy, whereas the ignorance of democracy building and the
construction of a legal system are all the more striking. It might be true that
the liberal revolutionaries of 1989 didnot want tobe original, but by keeping
their eyes and minds open, they have produced new original insights.
Many ideas were not conrmed by experiences in the transition. It is dif-
cult to ndany empirical support for gradualism, that is, deliberately under-
taking reforms more slowly than is possible. In deregulation or macroeco-
nomic stabilization, the greater the rigor and speed, the better it was for
other reforms and economic growth. Specically, there is no long-term evi-
dence that slow privatization leads to any higher quality of privatization.
Nor did gradual reforms lead to more institutional and legal reform. All the
pillars of a market economy could be built and they were.
Why Certain Policies Worked and Others Did Not
Finally, we come to the fundamental question of why some policies worked
and others did not. No chain is stronger than its weakest link. A clear
chain goes fromidea, through operative policy formulation, political break-
through, political leadership, expertise, and parliamentary support to mea-
surement. In addition, international standard setting and assistance proved
useful.
First, little canbe accomplishedwithout lucidideas, a tenable theory. John
Maynard Keyness (1936/1973, pp. 3834) concluding words in his General
Theory remain true:
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed
the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual inuences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. . . . I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.
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New ideas are always controversial, rendering a consensus impossible. To
search for an early consensus means refraining from using the best ideas at
hand. The ideas of radical market economic reform stood the test of time,
whereas transitology proved not very helpful for democratization, and no
theory for the building of legal institutions was present. As V aclav Klaus so
well showed in the Czech Republic, ideology could be of great help, but it
was used too little (Appel 2004).
Second, to be relevant, a theory has to be formulated as a set of opera-
tive policy advice. The success of the economists lay in their preparedness to
formulate simpliedpolicy advice for radical market economic reform. Aca-
demics of many other disciplines considered such simplications inappro-
priate or even disqualifying for serious scholars. Reform requires simplicity
and lucidity rather than nuance.
Third, a political breakthrough or discontinuity is needed. The best option
is a regime change leading to democracy, but a nancial crisis that merely
changes the government canalsohelp, as inBulgaria andRomania in1997or
inRussia in1998. Political windows of opportunity or periods of extraordi-
nary politics are as crucial as brief. Path-breaking market reforms occurred
either immediately after democratization or after rent seeking had been
brought under control several years later.
Fourth, political leadership is vital for reform. A top policy maker has to
focus on a problem to solve it. The greatest sins were those of omission.
Fifth, to get anything done, expertise is needed. It can be domestic or
foreign. In the midst of a crisis, surprisingly few politicians accomplish
amazingly much. Many reforms were rightly named after one single policy
maker who stubbornly dragged through a reform (the Balcerowicz, Klaus,
and Gaidar reforms, the Chubais privatization, etc.).
Sixth, parliamentary support is also necessary. Many reformers thought
reforms were best imposed through presidential decrees, but this idea was
disproved. An ordinary parliamentary process, with its checks and balances,
enhances the quality of law, whereas presidential decrees tend to be haphaz-
ard, contradictory, short-lived, and disrespected. In the legislative process,
an elite group is formed in support of the newlegislation. As a consequence,
early parliamentary elections after democratization were important for the
success of reform.
Seventh, measurement is vital for policy focus. Whatever is measured can
be accomplished. Macroeconomic stability beneted fromample measures,
and it was achieved rather soon. For years, corruption was not measured,
but as soonas measurement started, multiple methods were found to reduce
corruption, and it has started declining in numerous countries.
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Eighth, international organizations played a major role in the transition.
Theyset standards, providedrelevant policyadvice, andevaluatedoutcomes.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed macroeconomic stan-
dards with great success, and the EU spread democracy. The World Bank
and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) have
greatly contributed to privatization. No international organization focused
on democracy building or the building the rule of law, and little progress
occurred.
Ninth, international nancing was very limited, but two major positive
effects were achieved. Multiple agencies nanced economic policy advice,
which enlivened the market economic paradigm. The IMF successfully
imposed its standards through conditional aid. Financial stabilization and
subsequent growth are linked to conditional IMF assistance. One single
territory, East Germany, received gigantic international nancing, and this
excessive aid had no positive consequences.
It did not matter whether an idea was foreign or domestic, but it had to
make sense. Initially, most ideas came from abroad because the intellectual
world is global. Good foreign ideas worked, whereas bad ideas repeatedly
failed until they were abandoned and replaced by better domestic ideas. One
forceful idea of domestic origin has been low at income taxes. For years,
they were resistedby the IMF, whicharguedthat a country hadtoimprove its
tax administration rst, but that could only be done after the tax systemhad
been made more rational. The sooner a sensible and viable idea is found, the
better, and the search for new ideas usually starts abroad. Models have been
successfully transplanted fromone country to another when they have been
intelligible and viable. The victorious reformers listened to international
advice and made appropriate choices themselves. By necessity, most reforms
started from above, but to become sustainable, they had to be accepted and
supported from below. No reforms were carried out in consensus, although
majority support was a great advantage for a reform so that vested interests
could be steamrolled.
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314
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P1: KNP
9780521865265ind CUFX164/Aslund 978 0 521 86526 5 August 8, 2007 9:40
Index
Abalkin, Leonid, 45
Abkhazia conict, in Georgia, 236
Acemoglu, Daron, 229, 248, 273274
Afghanistan, 20
Aghion, Phillipe, 41
Agreement on the Creation of a Free Trade
Zone (Russia-CIS), 294
Akaev, Askar, 28, 86, 147, 222
Akhmetov, Rinat, 269
American Bar Association, 246
Anglo-American labor market model,
9495
antimonopoly policies, 87, 89
Antimonopoly Policy and the Promotion of
New Economic Structures Committee
(Russia), 89
Appel, Hillary, 271
Armenia, 26, 27
Asian economic model adoption,
103
constitutional conicts, 226
higher education enrollments, 195
hyperination in, 110
inuence of war, 236
output declines, 60
population decline, 193
poverty levels, 186187
proportional representation, 225
return of growth, 6061
state of democracy/market economic
transformation, 215
unemployment rates, 96
voucher privatization, 157
WTO membership, 293294
arrears crisis, 132133
Asian economic model, 94, 103
authoritarianism
of Belarus/Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 213,
214
vs. democracy, 206207, 210
and income equality, 204
and Russian nancial crash, 221
Azerbaijan, 2627
frozen conict in, 236
inuence of war, 236
oil windfall, 310
output declines, 60
population growth, 194
public health expenditures, 190
Balcerowicz, Leszek, 21, 31, 32, 35, 88, 111,
166, 234
Baltic states. See also Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania
banking development, 121
corruption in, 251
democratization of, 25
EU membership, 283
and exchange rates, 125126
falling infant mortality, 189193
frequently changing government, 227228
income differentiation, 184185
increased social transfers, 197
and ination, 105
lustration efforts, 232
mixed social welfare model, 199, 204
public expenditures, 114116
and restitution, 149
return of growth, 58, 6061
state revenues, 113114
343
P1: KNP
344 Index
Baltic states (cont.)
WTO membership, 293
banking systems development, 121123. See
also monetary policy
Barro, Robert, 210
BEEPS survey. See Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)
Belarus
authoritarianism of, 213, 214
corruption in, 251
declining male life expectancy, 188189
economic restructuring of, 263
output declines, 60
single-mandate constituencies, 225
Soviet social welfare model, 199200,
203204
transformation, 214
Zubr student organization, 223
Belarusian Popular Front, 27
Bentham, Jeremy, 209
Berezovsky, Boris, 264, 266
Berg, Andrew, 68, 72, 73
Berlin wall, 22, 69
Blanchard, Olivier, 41, 4243
Boycko, Maxim, 145
Bretton Woods institutions, 297
Brezhnev, Leonid, 16
doctrine of, 20
holding of power (19641982), 1718
stagnation of, 280
bribery
in higher education, 196
in New York state (1868), 260
private v. sate rms, 251
Brown, Annette, 88
Bruno, Michael, 71
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 287
budget decits, 112113
and hyperination, 33
impact on growth, 71
inuence of IMF, 301
and price liberalization, 4
and proportional elections, 229
of Russia, 135
of Soviet Union, 50
Bulgaria, 2223
electoral path, 219220
EU membership application, 283284
nancial stabilization, 131132
and hyperination, 135
labor market paradigm, 92
199697 nancial crisis, 221
radical structural reforms, 8486
structured parliaments, 225
and unemployment, 92
WTO membership, 293
Bunce, Valerie, 209, 210
Bush, George H. W., 286287, 289
favoring of Gorbachev, 290291
Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys (BEEPS), 8384
Calvo, Guillermo, 72
Capelik, Vladimir, 87
capital ight, 121123
Carnegie, Andrew, 260, 270
Caucasian countries. See also Armenia;
Azerbaijan; Georgia
corruption in, 251
shrinking social transfers, 197
Ceausescu, Nicolae, 16
nepotism of, 23
repayment of Romanian debt, 19
Central Asia, 27. See also Kazakhstan;
Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan
corruption in, 251
shrinking social transfers, 197
Central Bank of Russia (CBR), 110, 120, 121,
276
central banks. See banking systems
development; monetary policy
Central Europe
corruption in, 251
demise of Communism, 2023, 29
economic reform, 39
EU membership, 283
European Union model adoption, 78
P1: KNP
Index 345
increased male life expectancy, 188189
increased social transfers, 197
1993 return to growth, 58
output declines, 59
revolutions of 1989
WTO membership, 293
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative,
246
Central Planning Committee, 12
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 98, 134, 290291
China
Cultural Revolution, 38
gradual reform model, 3840
1978 launch of market reforms, 40
and rent seeking, 39
Christoffersen, Peter, 71
Chubais, Anatoly, 31, 220, 234
CIS. See Commonwealth of the Independent
States (CIS)
civil service, and corruption, 254
civil war
in Caucasus, 26
in Georgia, 208
in Tajikistan, 24, 28, 70, 208
Clinton, Bill, 286287
coal monopoly, of Russia, 99101
Cold War, 7, 217, 292, 297
collectivization, of farmers, 12, 39, 164
colored revolutions, 207, 215, 221, 224,
307
commodity exports, 77, 123, 293
Commonwealth of the Independent States
(CIS). See also Armenia; Azerbaijan;
Belarus; Georgia, Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan;
Moldova; Russia; Tajikistan; Ukraine;
Uzbekistan
agreements with Russia, 294
antimonopoly policies, 89
corruption in, 254
creation of, 2425
dependence on Russia, 287288
East Asian growth model adoption, 78
and foreign trade, 293297
and hyperination, 47, 105, 233
infant mortality rates, 189193
inuence of Russian nancial crisis, 76
and labor market policy, 93
and laggard effect, 7576
mixed electoral system, 225
1997 return to growth, 58
oligarchies of, 274
and police racketeering, 244
presidential power reinforcement, 227
and private transfers, 200
rising growth rate explanations, 7881
slow liberalization, 8687
Communist Party
as above the law, 230
cooperation with oligarchs, 220221
corruption in Belarus, 214
Moldova power consolidation, 221
Nomenklatura system, 12
parliamentary election results, 217220
Politburo of, 12
Yeltsins abolition of, 24
communist state
contraction of revenues, 113114
kleptocratic nature of, 241242
reform of, 230232
communist system
patron-client networks, 12
politicization of, 12
value of education, 14
Competitiveness Index (World Economic
Forum), 84
constitutional choices, 224230
cooperatives, 39, 49, 50. See also Soviet Law on
Cooperatives (1988)
Coricelli, Fabrizio, 72
corruption, 36
causes of, 46
in courts, 247
dened, 249
deregulation vs., 232, 252, 308
and income/openness, 78
inuence on democratization, 237
loans-for-share scheme, 55
and privatization, 47
P1: KNP
346 Index
corruption (cont.)
reduction strategies, 252253
transitional issues, 249255
voter focus on, 217
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), 14, 66
crime, transitional increases, 242245
currencies
devaluations of, 77
establishment of, 108111
Customs Union, 294295
Czechoslovakia. See also: Czech Republic,
Slovakia
demand barriers in, 68
demise of communism, 2122
early election success, 225
and exchange rates, 34, 124125
liberalization/stabilization programs, 111
lustration success, 232
multi-party coalitions, 228
privatization in, 271
social democratic social welfare model, 199,
204
Soviet-led invasion, 20
strict wage controls, 34
Velvet Revolution in, 22
Warsaw Pact invasion of, 16, 22
democratization. See also transitology
vs. authoritarianism, 206207, 210
in Baltic states, 25
correlation with growth, 210
in Czechoslovakia, 22
fast vs. slow, 207
in Georgia, 222223
in Hungary, 21, 22
inuence of corruption, 237
in Kyrgyzstan, 222223
in Latin America, 210
in Latvia, 25
in Lithuania, 25
and market economy transformation, 207,
213215
modernization vs., 208
national vs. union level, 24
vs. Nomenklatura, 209
in Poland, 21
preconditions for, 236
in Soviet Union, 24
in Ukraine, 222223
demographic changes, 193194, 205
deregulation
vs. corruption, 232, 252, 308
dichotomies of, 101102
exports vs. imports, 90
of prices, 33, 45, 72
vs. privatization, 144
and promotion of competition, 32
in Russia, 277
of small enterprises, 167
strategies of, 8389
of trade, 72
Dewatripont, Mathias, 41, 42
Diamond, Larry, 41, 209, 210
Dobbs, Michael, 50
Doyle, Peter, 71
East Germany. See also Berlin wall
economic impact of reunication, 9293
lustration success, 232
transitional problems, 285286
East-Central Europe
import tariff reduction, 292
proportional elections, 225
transformation, 214
Easterly, William, 71
Eastern Europe
Western business interest in, 91
EBRD. See European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD)
Economic Commission for Europe (UN), 44
economic growth theory, 75
economists, of Soviet Union, 46
on hyperination, 45
on price deregulation, 45
P1: KNP
Index 347
education issues, 303
election monitoring, 239
electoral rules, 224225, 230
Elster, Jon, 211213
employee privatization, 158, 161162
Engels, Friedrich, 11
enterprise development, 165168
entrepreneurial banking systems, 121123
Estonia
banking crisis of, 122
corruption reduction in, 251, 255
democratization/reform attempts, 25
governmental reform success, 231
and HIV/AIDS, 194
liberalization/stabilization programs, 111,
128129
WTO membership, 293
EU. See European Union (EU)
Eural Trans Gaz trading company,
99
Eurasian Economic Community, 294
295
Europe
demise of Communism, 2023, 29
fear of Russia, 287
revolutions of 1848
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD)
birth of, 297
Soviet economy study, 288
Structural Reform Index, 84
transition index, 83
European Commission, 233
European Monetary Union, 127
European Neighborhood Policy (EU),
296
European Union (EU), 30
antidumping sanctions against
Russia/Ukraine, 287
defense of ruble zone, 108109
disbursement of nancial aid, 300
Europe Agreements
and legal system reform, 246, 247
multifaceted transitional role, 309310
and pension reform, 202
pressure for raising tariffs, 90
reunication of Germany, 282
social welfare paradigm advocacy, 96
transitional role of, 284285
exchange rates, 123127
in Czechoslovakia, 34, 124125
in Hungary, 125
inuence of Russian nancial crash,
127
in Poland, 34, 100101
unication of, 89
external liberalization, 72, 88, 89
Federov, Boris, 110
nance ministry, reinforcement of, 112
nancial stabilization, 111, 127142. See also
Russian nancial crash
arrears crisis, 132133
of Bulgaria, 131132
of Estonia, 111, 128129
of Poland, 111, 127128
postcommunist stabilization lessons,
138142
of Russia, 129131
Fischer, Stanley, 31, 71
Fish, Steven, 211
ve-year plan, of Stalin, 11
foreign investments, ongoing growth of,
299
foreign trade, liberalization of, 8992,
292297
Fraser Institute, index of economic freedom,
83
free economic zones, 9192
Freedom House index, 215, 217, 239
Friedman, Milton, 149
Gaddy, Clifford, 133, 136
Gaidar, Yegor, 25, 31, 88, 146, 234, 290291
radical economic reform ideas, 44
Gambetta, Diego, 243
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 26
Gazprom gas monopoly (Russia), 9899, 246,
262
Geddes, Barbara, 210
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). See World Trade Organization
P1: KNP
348 Index
Georgia, 2627
civil war, 208
colored revolutions, 215, 221, 224
democratization breakthrough, 222223
inuence of war, 236
Kmara student organization, 223
output declines, 60
Rose Revolution, 221222, 272
transformation, 215
Gerashchenko, Viktor, 44, 51, 110, 120,
276
German Democratic Republic (GDR), 12
Germany, reunication of, 282
Goldman, Marshall, 269
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 38, 147, 189, 288
agricultural reform attempts, 39
Bushs favoring of, 290291
CPSU Secretary General appointment, 18
and democratization, 18, 38
legalization of cooperatives, 39
liberalization policies of, 27, 49
market reform attempts, 17
perestroika initiative of, 17
and rent seeking, 4849, 310
Gordon, John Steele, 260
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, 262263
gradual reform programs, to market economy,
3747
Chinese model, 3840
reform communist opposition, 4447
Western gradualism arguments, 4044
gradualists
on market institution establishment, 44
vs. radical reformers, 35, 37
Grand Bargain project, 288
Grant, Ulysses S., 265, 266
Great Depression, 5, 15, 40, 63
growth theory, economic, 75
Grygorenko, Yegor, 262263
Gusinsky, Vladimir, 264
Habsburg Empire, 237
Havel, V aclav, 22
Havrylyshyn, Oleh, 44, 69, 73
Hayek, Friedrich, 43, 145, 234, 271
health care reforms, 191193
Hellman, Joel, 41, 257
Heritage Foundation, 83
HIV/AIDS, growth of, 194
Hobbes, Thomas, 208
Hungary
banking crashes of, 122
Democratic Forum, 21
democratization in, 22
economic reform experimentation,
39
growth of crime, 242245
output declines, 59
revolt (1956) of, 16
204
Socialists Workers Party, 21
wage ination in, 19
Huntington, Samuel, 208, 211
Hus ak, Gust av
resignation of, 22
hyperination
in Bulgaria, 135
in CIS countries, 47, 233
and nancial stability, 104108
vs. high ination, 106107
and liberalization of energy prices, 45
in Poland, 19
in Russia, 129, 135
in Soviet Union, 19, 20, 24, 40
Ickes, Barry, 88, 133, 136
IFIs. See international nancial institutions
Iliescu, Ion, 23
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
P1: KNP
Index 349
import tarriffs
of Kazakhstan, 295
pressure for raising, 90
reduction in East-Central Europe, 292
reduction of, 292
Index of Economic Freedom (Wall Street
Journal), 83
infant mortality, declines in, 189193
ination. See also hyperination
abatement in Russia, 53
growth through control, 7172
hidden, and raw material prices, 13
high and persistent, 104108
and money supply explosion, 120
and Olivera-Tanzi effect, 114
patterns of, 105106
in Poland and Soviet Union, 19
and shortages, 19
of wages, in Hungary, 19
initial public offerings (IPOs), and
privatization, 158
internal liberalization, 72
international nancial institutions (IFIs),
resistance to free economic zones,
9192
International Labor Organization (ILO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 31, 90,
298
inuence on budget decits, 301
and ruble zone establishment, 109110
and Russian nancial crash, 133, 134
Stiglitz attack on, 54
international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), 239
International Republican Institute, 239
investments. See foreign investments
Je zek, Tom a s, 146, 151
Johnson, Simon, 167, 248
Karimov, Islam, 27, 101
Karl, Terry Lynn, 211
Katz, Barbara G., 42
Kaufmann, Daniel, 8384, 167, 251
Kazakhstan
articial famine, 24
Asian economic model adoption, 103
capital ight of, 123
levying of import tarriffs, 295
oil windfall, 310
oligarchs of, 258259
output declines, 60
radical social welfare reforms, 199, 204
rule through Nomenklatura system, 27
Keane, Michael, 186
Keynes, John Maynard, 311
Khanin, Grigori, 15
Khanna, Tarum, 261
Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 44
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 265, 277
Khrushchev, Nikita
ending of Stalinist terror, 18
and Politburo rule, 17
Kirienko, Sergei, 99, 134, 136
Kissinger, Henry, 287
Klaus, V aclav, 22, 31, 105, 146, 149, 234, 271,
312
kleptocratic nature, of Nomenklatura,
241242
Kmara student organization (Georgia), 223
Kohl, Helmut, 282
Kornai, J anos, 12
economics of shortage, 15
soft budget constraints, 15
Krastev, Ivan, 215
Kremer, Michael, 4243
Krueger, Anne, 48, 261
Kuchma, Leonid, 222, 265
Kunicova, Jana, 229
Kyrgyzstan, 2728
P1: KNP
350 Index
Kyrgyzstan (cont.)
radical social welfare reforms, 199
small enterprise deregulation, 167
small-scale privatization, 155
transformation, 215
strengthening or parliamentary system, 227
Tulip Revolution, 28, 222
La Porta, Rafael, 257
Laar, Mart, 31, 231, 234
labor market policy, 9296. See also
Anglo-American labor market model;
Asian economic model; West European
social democratic models
Lajos Bokros, 31
large-scale privatization, 155164
Latin America, 8, 31, 185, 210, 267, 271
Latvia
late electoral fragmentation, 225226
liberalization/stabilization programs,
111
WTO membership, 293
Law on State Enterprises (1987), 150
lawyers (socialist), as reform impediments,
245
Lazarenko, Pavlo, 266
League of Nations, 109
legal system, building attempts, 245, 249. See
also Central European and Eurasian Law
Initiative
Lenin, Vladimir, 11, 165
liberalism, vs. populism, 271
liberalization, 30
of 1840s, 30
of energy prices, 4, 45
of foreign trade, 8992, 292297
of Gorbachev, 27
importance for growth, 7273
and ination, 104105
of labor markets, 3
of prices, 87
of prices/trade, 36
Lieven, Dominic, 236
life and health issues
declining male life expectancy, 188189,
204205
falling infant mortality rates, 189193
health care reforms, 191193
Linz, Juan, 24
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 237
Lipton, David, 31, 32, 111
Lithuania
liberalization/stabilization programs, 111
WTO membership, 293
Lloyd, John, 54
loans-for-shares privatizations (Russia), 53, 55,
267268
Long, Bradford de, 256, 274275
Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, 257
Lukashenko, Aleksandr, 27, 101, 214
Lvov, Dmitri S., 45
macroeconomic stabilization, 33, 36, 7172
manager privatization, 161162
market economy, transition strategies
Chinese model, 3840
and democracy, 207, 213215
gradual reform programs, 3747
radical reform programs, 3134, 3537,
4447, 5356
Marshall Plan, 297
Marx, Karl, 11
Mau, Vladimir, 38
McFaul, Michael, 209
McKinsey Global Institute, 79
McMillan, John, 167
Medvedchuk, Viktor, 267
Milanovic, Branko, 200
Mill, John Stuart, 30, 209
modernization theory, 208
P1: KNP
Index 351
Moldova, 2526
Communist Party power consolidation,
221
corruption in, 251
inuence of war, 236
output declines, 60
Soviet social welfare model, 199200
transformation, 215
strengthening parliamentary system,
227
monetary policy, 119123
capital ight, 123
entrepreneurial banking systems, 121123
monopolies, 8789. See also antimonopoly
policies; coal monopoly; Gazprom gas
monopoly; transportation monopoly
Nemtsovs attack on, 99
Russian break up of, 96101
World Bank regulation of, 97
Morck, Randall, 257
Murphy, Kevin A., 102
Murrell, Peter, 3940, 43
Myrdal, Gunnar, 208
Nagorny Karabakh conict, in Azerbaijan, 26,
236
Naishul, Vitaly, 149
National Democratic Institute, 239
National Salvation Front, in Romania, 23
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 27, 279
Nemtsov, Boris, 99
Nicholas I (Tsar), 237
Niyazov, Saparmurat, 27, 101
Nomenklatura system
and Brezhnev, 1718
as collective dictator, 17
of Communist Party, 12
vs. democratization, 207, 209
gradual economic transitions, 38
Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan rule
through, 27
kleptocratic nature of, 241242
retention of power, 25
splitting of, 206
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 239,
302303
North, Douglass C., 43
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
30
Offe, Claus, 211213
oligarchies
in CIS countries, 274
economics of, 259264
instability of, 275276
politics of, 264267
vs. state companies, 261262
oligarchs
complaints/criticisms of, 267272
cooperation with communists, 220221
denition, 256257
economic entrenchment by, 264
as homo oeconomicus, 265
identication of, 257259
Kremlin extortion of, 265
organized crime vs., 243244
Putin vs., 265, 273, 276, 280
state enterprises vs., 261262
usefulness of, 275
weakening of, 221
Olivera-Tanzi effect, 114
Olson, Mancur, 3940, 236, 279
Open Society Institute, 239
Orange Revolution, 222, 223, 269, 271
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), 239
Orlowski, Lucjan, 66
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality (Uvarov),
237
Ostanin, Dmytro, 262263
Otpor student organization, Serbia, 223
output
decline and recovery, 5961
exaggeration of slump, 6369
P1: KNP
352 Index
output (cont.)
impact of liberalization, 73
socialist over-reporting vs. capitalist
under-reporting, 63
Owen, Joel, 42
patron-client networks, of communist system,
12
pension reform, 197203
perestroika, of Gorbachev, 17, 19, 24, 54
Persson, Torsten, 229
Pinchuk, Viktor, 267, 269
Pinochet school, of authoritarian
modernization, 209
Pipes, Richard, 237, 310
Poland
coal industry of, 100101
and exchange rates, 34, 100101
nancial stabilization, 111, 127128
and hyperination, 19, 111
open ination problems, 19
output declines, 59
privatization plan (1988), 3234
shock therapy, 8486
204
wage controls, 34
worker uprisings, 16, 1819
Politburo, of Communist Party, 12, 17
political goods
buying court decisions, 266
buying government decisions, 266
buying national parliament legislation,
265266
buying presidential decisions, 265
control of media, 266267
populism, vs. liberalism, 271
Pora student organization (Ukraine), 223
Potanin, Vladimir, 266
poverty, and income differentiation,
186187
Prasad, Eswar, 186
Preuss, Ulrich, 211213
price regulation, 87
and monopolies, 97
Primakov, Yevgeny, 276
private transfers, 200
privatization
achievements of, 168178
and bankruptcy/liquidation, 162164
and capital market creation, 148
choices of, 153154
and corruption, 47, 252
in Czechoslovakia, 271
and depoliticization, 145
vs. deregulation, 144
differing aims of, 144145
and direct sales/investment tenders,
158160
early initiation of, 33
economic objectives, 146148
of employees, 158, 161162
and enterprise restructuring, 147148
fast vs. slow, 30
industry specic problems of, 153
and initial public offerings, 158
and justice, 149150
of land, real estate, housing, 164165
large-scale privatization, 155164
of loans-for-shares, 53, 55, 267268
of managers, 161162
and new enterprise development, 165168
in Poland, 3234
political goals of, 145154
and property rights, 179180
and radical reformers, 34
in Russia, 271
spontaneous privatization, 49, 55, 150153
and stock market evolution, 174175
timing of, 178179
USAID/World Bank assistance, 239, 302,
313
varying views of, 34
of vouchers, 146, 149, 157, 160161
Prizel, Ilya, 26
P1: KNP
Index 353
property rights, 272280
as key legal/political issue, 264
in oligarchic vs. democratic society, 273
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 271
Przeworski, Adam, 4041, 211
public opinion, for reform, 232236
Putin, Vladimir
ascendance to power, 265
central dictatorship alternative of, 276280
destruction of Yukos, 268
monopolistic practices of, 99
vs. oligarchs, 265, 273, 276, 280
vs. Russian political institutions, 278
Pynzenyk, Viktor, 150
radical reform, 6975
and control of ination, 7172
highly reformist countries, 70
intermediary reformist countries, 70
and liberalization, 7273
minimal reformist countries, 70
nonreformist countries, 71
radical reform program, to market economy,
3137
criticism after Russian nancial crash, 5356
importance of speed/comprehensiveness,
3537
opposition to, 4447
Poland privatization plan, 3234
Washington consensus, 3132
radical reformers, 31, 32
desire for speedy privatization, 34
fear of state failure, 35
vs. gradualists, 35, 37
late reformers, 7581
minimization of old state apparatus, 33
post 1998, 7581
vs. rent seekers, 48
Stiglitzs criticism of, 54
Rahmonov, Emomali, 28
Reagan, Ronald, 1617, 292
reform
of communist state, 4447, 230232
and public opinion, 232236
rent seekers
characteristics of, 52
CIS country domination, 48
vs. radical reformers, 48
rent seeking, 36, 4753
arbitrage method, 51, 52
and corruption, 54
and Gorbachev, 4849, 310
and oligarchs, 309
and postcommunist transition (19901998),
53
subsidized imports source, 51
subsidized state credits source, 51
Rep se, Einars, 31, 234
revenue, of states, contraction of, 113114
Rivkin, Jan, 261
robber barons, of United States, 258, 260, 265,
269, 270
Rockefeller, John D., 260
Roland, G erard, 41, 42
Romania
communist coup, 2223
National Salvation Front formation, 23
199697 nancial crisis, 221
output drop (1989) in, 16
WTO membership, 293
Roosevelt, Theodore, 265, 270
Rose Revolution, 221222, 272
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 229
Rostowski, Jacek, 93
Rosugol coal association (Russia), 100
RosUkrEnergo trading company, 99
ruble zone
approaches to, 108109
political implications of, 109110
Russia
abatement of ination, 53
agreements with CIS, 294
billionaires of, 267
budget decits of, 135
corruption in, 251
cost of corruption, 40
democracy/economic reform attempts,
25
P1: KNP
354 Index
Russia (cont.)
nancial stabilization, 129131
and HIV/AIDS, 194
and hyperination, 129, 135
lack of Western support, 290
loans-for-shares privatizations, 53, 55,
267268
McKinsey Global Institute study of,
79
oil windfall, 310
output declines, 60
price liberalization, 85
Sachss advocacy for assistance, 288289
Russian-Belarusian Union, 294295
Russian nancial crash, 5356, 58, 61, 76, 127,
133138
Rustow, Dankwart, 208
Rutskoi, Aleksandr, 44, 45
Ryterman, Randi, 88
Saakashvili, Mikheil, 272
Sachs, Jeffrey, 31, 32, 34, 68, 75, 79, 111, 126,
288289
Schmitter, Philipe, 211
Schumaker, E. F., 166
Schumpeter, Joseph, 57
Selyunin, Vasili, 15
Sen, Amartya, 204
Shapiro, Judith, 189
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 26, 221222
Shkolnikov, Vladimir, 189
Shleifer, Andrei, 56, 102, 145, 167, 232, 257,
289
Sibneft oil company, 268
Single Economic Space (of Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), 294295
Slovakia
social democratic welfare model, 199
social model alternatives, 203205
social safety net
dilemmas of, 198201
reinforcement of, 33
social transfers, 197203
socialism, 1112, 1520
aggravated political illegitimacy, 1819
arms race/information technology
challenges, 1617
autarky of communist countries, 14
bureaucratic centralization, 12
communist ideology delegitimization,
17
deconcentration of power, 1718
excessive foreign debt, 1920
falling growth rates, 16
falling oil prices, 20
hierarchical economical policymaking,
1213
high growth rates, 15
investments in, 14, 68
lack of real money
nationalizing means of production, 12
politicization of communist system, 1112
prices, 13
resource mobilization, 13
rising Soviet scal decits, 19
shortages, 1415
shortages/ination, 19
strengthening military industry, 1314
wages/private consumption vs.
investment/military expenditures, 14
Socialists Workers Party, of Hungary, 21
Soros, George, 239, 302303
South Ossetia conict, in Georgia, 236
Southeast Europe
corruption in, 251
increased male life expectancy, 188189
output declines, 59
P1: KNP
Index 355
Soviet Law on Cooperatives (1988), 19, 20, 24,
49, 50, 121
Soviet Law on State Enterprises (1988), 49
Soviet State Bank, 121
Soviet Union
arms race with U.S., 1617
budget decit explosion (1991), 50
collapse of, 2327, 28
collectivization of farms, 12, 39
constitution of 1977, 226
decline of military threat, 292
economic reform experimentations, 39
falling oil prices, 20
hyperination in, 19, 20, 24, 40
ination problems, 19
invasion of Czechoslovakia, 20
Law on State Enterprises, 150
military expenditures, 67
1985 launch of market reforms, 40
1991 Moscow coup, 289290
output declines, 59
rising scal decits, 19
socialist foreign trade system, 14
value detraction/destruction
manufacturing, 65
war in Afghanistan, 20
spontaneous privatization, 150153
Stalin, Josef, 11, 1314
Stalinist terror, 15, 17, 18
Star Wars initiative, 1617
Stepan, Alfred, 24
Stiglitz, Joseph, 54, 123, 133, 279
stock market evolution, 174175
street traders, 88
Structural Reform Index (EBRD), 84
Summers, Lawrence, 31
Supreme Rada, of Ukraine, 265266
Tabellini, Guido, 229
Tajikistan
civil war (1992), 24, 28, 70, 208
inuence of war, 236
output declines, 60
Tarr, David, 66
tax dumping, 96
tax policy, 116119
Ter-Petrossian, Levon, 26
trade
declines in, 66
foreign trade liberalization, 8992
Soviet distortions, 66
trade unions, 94
transformation models, 305307
transition index, of EBRD/World Bank, 83
transitology, 211213
Transnistria, 26, 236
Transparency International, 251
transportation monopoly, 97
Treisman, Daniel, 56
Tulip Revolution, 28, 222
Turkmenistan, 27
governmental stability, 227228
oil windfall, 310
output declines, 60
transformation, 214
Tymoshenko, Yulia, 269
Ukraine
articial famine, 24
civil servant domination, 266
Communist retention of power, 2526
corruption in, 251
and HIV/AIDS, 194
hyperination in, 110
Orange Revolution, 222, 223, 269, 271
Pora student organization, 223
small enterprise deregulation, 167
transformation, 215
P1: KNP
356 Index
Ukraine (cont.)
strengthening parliamentary system, 227
Supreme Rada of, 265266
under-reform trap, 215221
unemployment, 13, 92, 96, 241
United Nations, 44, 297
United States
antidumping sanctions against
Russia/Ukraine, 287
arms race with Soviet Union, 1617
billionaires of, 267, 274275
Civil War, 259260
collapse of communism opinions, 281282
corruption in, 266
Great Depression, 5, 15, 63
robber barons of, 258, 260, 265, 269, 270
and Russian nancial crisis, 133, 134
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)
disbursement of nancial aid, 300
and legal system reform, 246
and privatization assistance, 302, 313
Urinson, Yakov, 99100
Uvarov, Sergei, 237
Uzbekistan, 27
governmental stability, 227228
output declines, 60
Soviet social welfare model, 199200,
203204
transformation, 214
Veblen, Thorstein, 270
Velvet Revolution, in Czechoslovakia, 22
Vishny, Robert W., 102, 145, 232, 289
Volkov, Vadim, 243, 264
Von Mises, Ludwig, 15, 146
voucher privatization, 146, 149, 157, 160161
wage dumping, 96
wages, 14, 186
Warner, Andrew, 75, 79
Warsaw Pact, 16
Washington Consensus program, 3132, 54
Western countries
collapse of communism opinions, 281282
international assistance by, 297304
lack of support for Russia, 287, 290
Western Europe
social democratic models, 9596
Williamson, John, 3132
Wing Thye Woo, 39
Wolf, Charles, 73
Wolfenzon, Daniel, 257
Woodruff, Christopher, 167
World Bank, 31, 83, 202, 298
BEEPS survey, 8384
and coal industry reform, 99100
health care/education advocacy, 303
judicial system survey, 247
and privatization assistance, 239, 302,
313
and regulation of monopolies, 97
and Russian nancial crash, 134
transition index, 83
World Economic Forum, 84
World Trade Organization (WTO), 90,
293294
World War II, 297
Yanukovych, Viktor, 266
Yasin, Yevgeny, 99100
Yavlinsky, Grigory, 121, 220, 290291
Yeltsin, Boris, 134, 231, 276, 290291
abolishment of Communist Party, 24
coup (1991) attempt, 25
presidential election victory, 24
radical economic reform ideas, 44
Russian parliament speech, 289290
support of coal miners, 99
Yeung, Bernard, 257
Yukos oil company, 257, 265, 268, 277
Yushchenko, Viktor, 266
Zhivkov, Todor
Zubr student organization (Belarus), 223
Zviahilsky, Yukhum, 266

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