G.R. No.

95026 October 4, 1991

SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA
TELAN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J .:p
This is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals 1 which considered the appeal of the herein petitioner, spouses Pedro and
Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and ANGELINA), ABANDONED and
DISMISSED, for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period,
pursuant to Section I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of the Court.
The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is:
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake
lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence
a lack of due process.
The circumstances under which the case arose are as follows:
The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate
who settled in 1973 on a property abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu,
Isabela. 2
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer
his residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia
where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. 3
Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was
frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing
shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents
Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO,
VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same
lot. 4
On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate
from the Development Bank of the Philippine (DBP). This was followed by a letter from
VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA
had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot
shared by PEDRO and ANGELINA. 5
Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a
suit at the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from
the lot. The case was dismissed.
Meanwhile, on September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a
Certificate of Title in his name over the contested lot. 6
With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses VICENTE and
VIRGINIA filed a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana against the petitioners,
Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA. 7
At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to
defend them in the suit. 8
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in
question to ROBERTO and Souses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN.
PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case,
but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked
another person to sign for them. 9
In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became
acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no
counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their
case. he cosented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees." 10
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was
getting off from a passenger jeepney. On September 5, 1988, unable to withstand the
pain, he went to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment where he was
diagnosed to have a "fractured, closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R)
femur." 11 On the spot, the doctors recommended an operation.
Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from September 5,
1988 up to October 2, 1988, PEDRO was confined a the PGH. He had to go back to
PGH several times for check-up even after was released from the hospital. 12
It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again although still with
much difficulty.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which
considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for
failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1
(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 13
The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to
know about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan
informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer
be found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys
with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No.
389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty.
Palma" was a fake.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on December 28,
1989 (p. 13 rollo). Prior thereto, appellant's counsel received on July 25, 1989 this
Court's letter-notice dated July 14, 1989 requiring him to file the appellants' brief within
forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 185, 1989 of the
brief, non has yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a Resolution
dated October 20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within ten (10) days, why the
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the appellants' brief within the
reglementary period. Hence from July 25, 1989 when appellants' counsel received this
Court's letter-notice to file brief until the JRD's report on December 15, 1989 that no
appellant's brief has been filed, a period of about four (4) months and twenty-three
(23) days have elapsed, thus giving appellants enough to time to file their brief.
Unfortunately, no appellants' brief was ever filed during said period. Let it be stressed
that the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain
proceedings taken are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delay
and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (FJR Garment Industries v.
CA, 130 SCRA 216, 218). 16
On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became final and was
entered on May 24, 1990 in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of
Demolition for the enforcement of the decision. 17
The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990
by the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 18
On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the
Court without giving due course required the respondents to COMMENT within ten
(10) days form notice thereof. At the same time, as prayed for, effective "immediately"
and "continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated
September 12, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279.
In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was given due
course and the parties were ordered to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda. The petitioners filed their memorandum while the private respondents
manifested to adopt their Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after the
filing of the petitioners' memorandum, the private respondents filed on June 10, 1991,
a pleading they denominated asAddendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July
23, 1991, the private respondents filed their memorandum.
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of
law because they lost their to appeal when deprived of the right to counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitutional provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal
cases, 19 specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to
restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the
bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus,
even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the
accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 20
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil
cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty
but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of
losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a
modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers ge tangled in the web of procedure. To demand
as much form ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right
would turn the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be
stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because
he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case
of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way,
with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the
right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse
anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart. 21
Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses
VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and
ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their
counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a
litigation even by the attorney's mistake or negligence in procedural technique. 22 But
how can there be negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer",
"Atty. Palma," turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN,
the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more
than sufficiently establish the existence of an Ernesto Palma who misrepresented
himself as a lawyer. 23
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786
are hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give
DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J .:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC,
INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC.
1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,
2
reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda.
3
The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation
of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it
proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position
papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make
issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the
IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition
to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of
this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice
as aforedescribed.
4

xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition
in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements
have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt
may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering
"legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal
services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And
it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would
have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt
in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought
to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious
that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can
be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding
on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored.
But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by
rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court.
5

2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law
but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies
its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent
are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.
6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but
also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and
punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to
5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and
such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto,
the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."
7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as
an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without
being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising,
it appears in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services.
8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration,
visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The
Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there
are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors
in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose
of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article."
9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to
solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project
that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar.
10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless
he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the
law accurate or inaccurate moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client
to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required
by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that
he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice
or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-
legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably
be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if
the industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The
most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents
of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get
from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing
into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable
class of men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing
law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the practice of the
law. But such is not the fact in the case
before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits the kind of building
the architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may
use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed
is free to accept the employment whether or
not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most
real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and
the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of a contract, or
of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of
the federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of
New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'
here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this
phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher
v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be
involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes
"A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines
on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action
to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a
legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount
to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law.
But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation
of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems,
and does not purport to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation in
their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no
legal impediment under the statute to the sale
of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and
counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder,
348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give
the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available."
11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes
exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this
score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take
into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill.
12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court.
13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights
of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law.
14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law.
15
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law.
16
Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law.
17
One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,
19
after citing the doctrines in several
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of
law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3
[1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services.
20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled
"Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The
Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery
or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or
an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt
with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be
put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there
were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case.
21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-
stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather,
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is
an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would
wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of
law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the
bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide.
25
The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law.
26
The justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.
27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in
the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines.
28
As the concept of the "paralegals"
or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.
29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what
may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf
of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.
30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law.
31
That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state.
32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.
33
He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
34
Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity
to attract legal business.
35
Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
37
The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot
38
an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding,
39
was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising
his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions.
41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented."
42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in
a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession.
43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for
which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,
45
which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state."
46
This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that
being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly
47
with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media
and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances
48
or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
49
Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal
Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern
and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action,
50
after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action
as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics
as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.







G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed
to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled
not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office;
. . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph,
requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which
the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that
prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of
America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to
determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent,
is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required
qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the
bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
1
and to any member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the
question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it
was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country
more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application
for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true
and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26
refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of
a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section
31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent
by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section
34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted,
any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented
article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented
article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms,
or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent
or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public
safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member
of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders
and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and
correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party
to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and
any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme
Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,
the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the
functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents
are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give
authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists
up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent;
and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a
prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460).
(Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination,
even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that
which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a
register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the
names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before
the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall
only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to
practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with
the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
x x x x x x x x x
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice
and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing
on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all
requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service,
and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and
prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic
training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself,
which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents,
or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them
to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the
Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from
further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses
to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to
defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as
the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar
to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules
and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to
and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the
provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations
to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval
of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau
of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision
of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the
law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration
1
submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526
2
of the Court,
and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's]
Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of
the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16,
1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,
3
and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.
4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the
Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality
of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy
with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of
integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the
Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive
and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible
for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of
Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical
judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges
and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased
lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices
and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so
that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education
for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the
profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum
fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-
wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer
owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one
of the most important functions of the State, the administration of
justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through
collective action; but there can be no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such
organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule
of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary
right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only
the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore,
is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the
end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the
people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has
long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation
and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court
to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does
not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has
inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such
an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is
that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that
might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be
opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or
adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice
law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to
understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were
to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment
has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion
of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because
although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation,
it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will
receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge
their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they
have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay
dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because
it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it
is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by
the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the
public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated
Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it
has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness,
energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of
a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while
only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-
commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups
all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of
the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are
non-committal.
5
All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article
VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
____________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City
[1]
and as a result of their marital union, they had four
(4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui.
Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband,
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant
then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she
has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her
and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought
things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met
again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on
August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,
[2]
respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that
during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985
[3]
. Upon their return to Manila,
respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in
their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they
would live together.
[4]

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would
only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal
ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was
surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful
wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days
after she reported to work with the law firm
[5]
she was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to
know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because
they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered
Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a
house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house
was built exclusively from her parents funds.
[6]
By way of counterclaim, respondent
sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless
disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply
[7]
dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with
her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent
went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but
the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence
of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly
discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living
with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part
of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic)
the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie
established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had
failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San
Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement
only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger
(U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in
support of their respective positions on the matter support and
bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
[8]

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed
[9]
on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission
[10]
wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a
supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the
Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage
[11]
duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in
the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant,
the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon
the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.
[12]
It is
the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
183
[13]
and 184
[14]
of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission;
and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and
lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),
[15]
respondent averred
that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same
was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she
relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum
[16]
on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue
of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint
should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner
consistent with the requirement of good moral character
for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that
respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.
[17]

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the
victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was
already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all
her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that
time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much
time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.
[18]

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer
had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her
earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing
the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not
present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of
respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage
with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same
car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing
Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,
[19]
does not prove that
she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her.
The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who
was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the
Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged
[20]
and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice
[21]
to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest
moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and,
that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum
[22]
filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed
for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed
immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth
of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s
because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch
Manager.
[23]
It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui
was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum
[24]
, respondent stated that complainant
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent
had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information
was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted
its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in
July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent
only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find
any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything
else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation.
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a
normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single
girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross
Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully
attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more
severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.
[25]
(Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is
that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of
good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases
to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard
as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may
not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).
[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met
Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him
and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)
children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent
are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms
of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society
today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The
facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more
vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her
to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos
Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never
exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent
and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a
valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.
[27]
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
[28]

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."
[29]
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.
[30]
This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos
Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily
recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially
a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply
stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she haspersonal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with
an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are
called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with
a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________________________________________________
__________________________________
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light
of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we
find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and
references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not
reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of
the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this
Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict
him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as
an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in
facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that
courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct
contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to
convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both
in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the
misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court
and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the
Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required
respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in
respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to
present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the
respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for
this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139
of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139
(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139,
referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not
the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or
suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or
(2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The
procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for
suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another
person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu
proprioproceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an
attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral
is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has
initiated against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor
General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In
the present case, as pointed out in the per curiamResolution of the Court (page 18),
there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not
substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the
statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his
part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
State.
1
It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr.
Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to
impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts
are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US)
Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be
based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or
less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is
indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary
Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary
Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief
Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional
Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb
Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the
First Congress itself no less than nineteen member including
Madison who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights,
had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under
this power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more
explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not
remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of
the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4
Stat 487.
x x x x x x x x x
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this
Court throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this
Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower
federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted
without question. ...
2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather
he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution
and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it,
and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this
Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear
and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was,
more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a
magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels
a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted
method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in
certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and
applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales,
3
this Court, speaking through
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without
limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however,
a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
It would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles
of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is
the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle
"requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis
Supplied)
4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature
and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per
curiamResolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive
evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the
instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order.
5
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme
Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil
of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of
the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far
reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of
misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate
the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so
far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned.
He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not
irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in
his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution,
p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from
an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear
import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g.,
one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply
asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually
acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of
court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt.
We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in
our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law
on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of
this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed
for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition
of indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to
consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of
his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The denial is FINAL.
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE
LARRAZABAL, MAXIMO ABAROQUEZ and ANASTACIA CABIGAS, petitioners-
appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, adverse claimant-appellee.
MAKASIAR, J .:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March
19, 1966 denying the petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the
adverse claimant on the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by
petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a
contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the
subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on
May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his lawyer on a
contingent basis, petitioner, liable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for
his appeal executed a document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might
recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper. The contents of the
document as translated are as follows:
AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, Plaintiff in Case No. R-6573 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, make known through this
agreement that for the services rendered by Atty. Alberto B.
Fernandez who is my lawyer in this case, if the appeal is won up
to the Supreme Court, I Promise and will guarantee that I win give
to said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what I may recover from the estate
of my father in Lots No. 5600 and 5602 which are located at
Bulacao Pardo, City of Cebu. That with respect to any money
which may be adjudged to me from Agripina Abarquez, except
'Attorney's Fees', the same shall pertain to me and not to said
lawyer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumb. mark to
be affixed hereto this 10th of June, 1961, at the City of Cebu.
T
H
U
M
B
M
A
R
K

M
A
X
I
M
O

A
B
A
R
Q
U
E
Z
(p. 5, Petitioner-Appellant's Brief, p. 26, rec.)
The real Property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R6573 was actually the
share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and 5602, which were part of the estate of his
deceased parents and which were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner
Maximo Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in said civil
case.
This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved by the Court which
provided am other that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be divided into three equal
Parts, one third of which shall be given to Maximo Abarquez. However, Agripina
Abarquez the share of her brother stating that the latter executed an instrument
of pacto de retroprior to the partition conveying to her any or all rights in the estate of
their parents. Petitioner discovered later that the claim of his sister over his share was
based on an instrument he was believe all along to be a mere acknowledgment of the
receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for g care of their
father during the latter's illness and never an instrument of pacto de retro. Hence, he
instituted an action to annul the alleged instrument of pacto de retro.
The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963 reversed the
decision of the lower court and annulled the dead of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina
Abarquez filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution
dated January 7, 1964 (p. 66, Record on Appeal; p. 13, Rec.) and the judgment
became final and executory on January 22,1964.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on May 19,1965 in
the name of Maximo Abarquez, married to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged
share in Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters (p. 110,
ROA; p. 13, rec.). These parcels of land later by the subject matter of the adverse
claim filed by the claimant.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse
claimant waited for petitioner to comply with ha obligation under the document
executed by him on June 10, 1961 by delivering the one-half () portion of the said
parcels of land.
Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and
Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse
t claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing with the trial court a
motion to annotate Ins attorney's lien on TCT No. 31841 on June 10, 1965 and by
notifying the prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of
land.
Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it
was not within the purview of Section 37, rule 138 of the Revised Rule of Court, but
before the same was by the trial court, adverse t by an affidavit of adverse claim on
July 19, 1965 with the Register of Deeds of Cebu (p. 14, ROA; p. 13, rec.). By virtue of
the petition of mid affidavit the adverse claim for one-half () of the lots covered by
the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on TCT No. 31841.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouse Maximo
Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965
two-thirds (2/3) of the lands covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan
Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. When the new transfer certificate of title No.
32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841 necessarily had
to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996
became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on
March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (p. 2 ROA; p. 13, rec.). The
adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition to the petition for
cancellation on March 18, 1966 (p. 20, ROA; p. 13 rec.). The trial court resolved the
issue on March 19, 1966, when it declared that:
...the petition to cancel the adverse claim should be denied. The
admission by the petitioners that the lawyers (Attys. Fernandez
and Batiguin) are entitled to only one-third of the lot described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32966 is the best proof of the
authority to maintain said adverse claim (p. 57, ROA; p. 13, rec.).
Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this Court and
correspondingly filed the notice of appeal on April 1, 1966 with the trial court. On April
2, 1966, petitioner-spouses filed the appeal bond and subsequently filed the record on
appeal on April 6, 1966. The records of the case were forwarded to this Court through
the Land Registration Commission of Manila and were received by this Court on May
5, 1966.
Counsel for the petitioner-spouses filed the printed record on appeal on July 12, 1966.
Required to file the appellants' brief, counsel filed one on August 29, 1966 while that
of the appellee was filed on October 1, 1966 after having been granted an extension
to file his brief.
The case was submitted for decision on December 1, 1966. Counsel for the
petitioners filed a motion to expunge appellees' brief on December 8, 1966 for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period, but the same was denied by this Court in a
resolution dated February 13, 1967.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or nullity of the
registration of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of which in turn hinges
on the question of whether or not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest
of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and Canon
13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it
involves an assignment of a property subject of litigation. That article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
petition of another.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior and other o and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession (Emphasis supplied).
This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment
between the lawyer and his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. As WE
have already stated. "The prohibition in said article a only to applies stated: " The
prohibition in said article applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his
client of the property which is the subject of litigation. In other words, for the prohibition
to operate, the sale or t of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
26882, November 21, 1978).
Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to "cases where after
completion of litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest the assets
realized by the litigation" (Drinker, Henry S., Legal Ethics, p. 100 [1953], citing App. A,
280; N.Y. Ciu 714). "There is a clear distraction between such cases and one in which
the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in which he is employed"
(Drinker, supra, p. 100 citing A.B.A. Op. 279).
A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the tranfer or
assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable
judgment. In the instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of
one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots
in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the payment of the
attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in
litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the tranfer actually
takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property in question. Consequently,
the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491.
While Spanish civilists differ in their views on the above issue whether or not a
contingent fee contract (quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491 with
Manresa advancing that it is covered, thus:
Se ha discutido si en la incapacidad de Ion Procumdam y
Abogados asta o el pecto de quota litis. Consiste este, como es
sabido, en la estipulacion de que el Abogado o el Procurador ban
de hacer suyos una parte alicuota de In cona que se li m la son
es favorable. Con es te concepto a la vista, es para nosortros que
el articulo que comentamos no menciona ese pacto; pero como la
incapacidad de los Abogados y Procuradores se extinede al acto
de adquirir por cesion; y la efectividad del pacto dequota
litis implica necesariamente una cesion, estimamos que con solo
el num. 5 del articulo 1459 podria con exito la nulidad de ese
pacto tradicionalmente considerado como ilicito.
xxx xxx xxx
Debe tenerse tambien en cuenta, respecto del ultimo parrafo del
articulo 1459, la sentencia del Tribunal Supreme de 25 Enero de
1902, que delcara que si bien el procurador no puede adquirir
para si los bienes, en cuanto a los cuales tiene incapacidad,
puede adquirirlos para otra persona en quien no concurra
incapacidad alguna (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil
Espaol, Tomo X, p. 110 [4a ed., 1931] emphasis supplied).
Castan, maintaining that it is not covered, opines thus;
C. Prohibiciones impuestas a las personas encargadas, mas o
menos directamente, de la administracion de justicia.El mismo
art. 1,459 del Codigo civil prohibe a los Magistrados, Jueces,
individuos del Minesterio fiscal, Secretarios de Tribunales y
Juzgados y Oficiales de Justicia adquirir por compra (aunque sea
en subasta publica o judicial, por si ni por persona alguna
intermedia). 'Los bienes y derechos que estuviesen en litigio ante
el Tribunal en cuya jurisdicion on teritorio ejercieran sus
respectivas funciones, extendiendo se esta prohibicion al acto de
adquirir por cesion', y siendo tambien extensiva ' Alos Abogados
y Procuradores respecto a los bienes y derecho que fueran objeto
del un litigio en que intervengan pos su profession y oficio.'
El fundamento de esta prohibicion es clarismo. No solo se trata
dice Manresade quitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese,
ademas, el proposito de rodear a las personas que intervienen en
la administracion de justicia de todos los prestigios que necesitan
para ejercer su ministerio, librando los de toda sospecha, que,
aunque fuere infundada, redundaria en descredito de la
institucion.
Por no dor lugar a recelos de ninguna clase, admite el Codigo (en
el apartado penutimo del art. 1.459) algunos casos en que, por
excepcion, no se aplica el pricipio prohibitivo de que venimos
hablando. Tales son los de que se trate de acciones hereditarias
entre coheredero, de cesion en pago de creditos, o de garantia
de los bienes que posean los funcionarios de justicia.
Algunos autores (Goyena, Manresa,
Valverde) creen que en la prohibicion del art.
1.459 esta comprendido el pacto de quota
litis (o sea el convenio por el cual se concede
al Abogado o Procurador, para el caso de
obtener sentencia favorable una parte
alicuota de la cosa o cantidad que se litiga),
porque dicho pacto supone la venta o cesion
de una parte de la cosa o drecho que es
objecto del litigio. Pero Mucius
Scaevola oberva, conrazon, que en el
repetido pacto no hay propiamente caso de
compraventa ni de cesion de derechos, y
bastan para estimario nulo otros preceptos
del Codigo como los relativos a la ilicitud de
la causa (Castan, Derecho Civil Espol,
Tomo 4, pp. 68-69, [9a ed., 1956], emphasis
supplied).
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917, has ruled that
Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply
to a contract for a contingent fee because it is not contrary to morals or to law, holding
that:
... que no es susceptible de aplicarse el precepto contenido en el
num. 5 del art. 1.459 a un contrato en el que se restrigen los
honorarios de un Abogado a un tanto por ciento de lo que se
obtuviera en el litigio, cosa no repudiada por la moral ni por la ley
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V [1959];
Castan, supra; Manresa, supra).
In the Philippines, among the Filipino commentators, only Justice Capistrano ventured
to state his view on the said issue, thus:
The incapacity to purchase or acquire by assignment, which the
law also extends to lawyers with t to the property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession, also covers contracts for professional
services quota litis. Such contracts, however, have been declared
valid by the Supreme Court" (Capistrano, Civil Code of the
Philippines, p. 44, Vol. IV [1951]).
Dr. Tolentino merely restated the views of Castan and Manresa as well as the state of
jurisprudence in Spain, as follows:
Attorneys-at-lawSome writers, like Goyena, Manresa and
Valverde believe that this article covers quota litis agreements,
under which a lawyer is to be given an aliquot part of the property
or amount in litigation if he should win the case for his
client. Scaevola and Castan, however, believe that such a
contract does not involve a sale or assignment of right but it may
be void under other articles of the Code, such as those referring
to illicit cause- On the other hand the Spanish Supreme Court has
held that this article is not applicable to a contract which limits the
fees of a lawyer to a certain percentage of what may be
recovered in litigation, as this is not contrary to moral or to law.
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V [1959];
Castan, supra, Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners her contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates the Canons of
Professional Ethics. this is likewise without merit This posture of petitioners
overlooked Canon 13 of the Canons which expressly contingent fees by way of
exception to Canon 10 upon which petitioners relied. For while Canon 10 prohibits a
lawyer from purchasing ...any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allowed a reasonable contingent fee
contract, thus: "A contract for a con. tangent fee where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the ca including the risk and uncertainty of
the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." As pointed out by an authority on Legal Ethics:
Every lawyer is intensely interested in the successful outcome of
his case, not only as affecting his reputation, but also his
compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits the lawyer to
contract for a con tangent fee which of itself, negatives the
thought that the Canons preclude the lawyer's having a stake in
his litigation. As pointed out by Professor Cheatham on page 170
n. of his Case Book, there is an inescapable conflict of interest
between lawyer and client in the matter of fees. Nor despite some
statements to the con in Committee opinions, is it believed that,
particularly in view of Canon 13, Canon 10 precludes in every
case an arrangement to make the lawyer's fee payable only out of
the results of the litigation. The distinction is between buying an
interest in the litigation as a speculation which Canon 10
condemns and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes
primarily in his professional capacity, to accept his compensation
contingent on the outcome (Drinker, Henry S Legal Ethics, p. 99,
[1953], Emphasis supplied).
These Canons of Professional Ethics have already received "judicial recognition by
being cited and applied by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion"
Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 9 [1949]). And they have likewise been
considered sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association,
through Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons of
Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of professional opinion ABA Op. 37
[1912])" [See footnote 25, Drinker, Legal Ethics, p. 27]. Therefore, the Canons have
some binding effect
Likewise, it must be noted that this Court has already recognized this type of a
contract as early as the case ofUlanday vs. Manila Railroad Co. (45 PhiL 540 [1923]),
where WE held that "contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since
impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the supervision of the court in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges' (Canons of Profession 1 Ethics)". The
same doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co. (97 PhiL
833 [1955]) and Recto vs. Harden (100 PhiL 427 [1956]).
In the 1967 case of Albano vs. Ramos (20 SCRA 171 [19671), the attorney was
allowed to recover in a separate action her attomey's fee of one-third (1/3) of the lands
and damages recovered as stipulated in the contingent fee contract. And this Court in
the recent case of Rosario Vda de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), which
involved a contingent fee of one-half () of the property in question, held than
,contingent fees are recognized in this i jurisdiction (Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine Bar association in 1917 [Appendix B,
Revised Rules of Court)), which contingent fees may be a portion of the property in
litigation."
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor
client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of
action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of
the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949], citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91
S.W. 1046, 1048 [1949]). Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which the
poor and helpless can redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.
Thus:
The reason for allowing compensation for professional services
based on contingent fees is that if a person could not secure
counsel by a promise of large fees in case of success, to be
derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the
poor in such a condition as to amount to a practical denial of
justice. It not infrequently happens that person are injured through
the negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of
poverty are unable to employ counsel to assert their rights. In
such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous service,
which is rarely given, or in their ability to find some one who will
conduct the case for a contingent fee. That relations of this king
are often abused by speculative attorneys or that suits of this
character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by the
lawyer, does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so
poor to employ counsel (id, at p. 293, citing Warvelle, Legal
Ethics, p. 92, Emphasis supplied).
Justice George Malcolm, writing on contingent fees, also stated that:
... the system of contingent compensation has the merit of
affording to certain classes of persons the opportunity to procure
the prosecution of their claims which otherwise would be beyond
their means. In many cases in the United States and the
Philippines, the contingent fee is socially necessary (Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 55 [1949], emphasis supplied).
Stressing further the importance of contingent fees, Professor Max Radin of the
University of California, said that:
The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that
vexatious and unfounded suits will be brought. On the other
hand, it makes possible the enforcement of legitimate claims
which otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty of
the claimants. Of these two possibilities, the social advantage
seems clearly on the side of the contingent fee. It may in fact be
added by way of reply to the first objection that vexations and
unfounded suits have been brought by men who could and did
pay substantial attorney's fees for that purpose (Radin,
Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 587, 589 [1940],
emphasis supplied).
Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with
respect to the stipulated amount and may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event
that there is any undue influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that the
fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court will amply protect
him. As held in the case of Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co., supra, citing the case
of Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra:
Where it is shown that the contract for a contingent fee was
obtained by any undue influence of the attorney over the client, or
by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is so clearly
excessive as to amount to extortion, the court win in a proper
case protect the aggrieved party.
In the present case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted
any undue influence or had Perpetrated fraud on, or had in any manner taken
advantage of his client, Maximo Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of the
lots in question is not excessive nor unconscionable considering the contingent nature
of the attorney's fees.
With these considerations, WE find that the contract for a contingent fee in question is
not violative of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Consequently, both under the
provisions of Article 1491 and Canons 10 and 13 of the Canons of Profession Ethics,
a contract for a contingent fee is valid
In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the adverse
claim, Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. Under
d section, an adverse claim may be registered only by..
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the o
registration ... if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same ...
The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty Fernandez an interest or
right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became
vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because only then did the
assignment of the one-half () portion of the lots in question became effective and
binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an
existing one. There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be registered in favor of
Atty. Fernandez adverse to Mo Abarquez.
Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question arose long
after the original petition which took place many years ago. And, there is no other
provision of the Land Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be
registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof. The interest or claim
cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. The lower court was correct in
denying the motion to annotate the attomey's lien. A charging lien under Section 37,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to
judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the
instant case. Said Section provides that:
Section 37. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into
his oppossession and may retain the same until his lawful fees
and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments, for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client ... (emphasis supplied).
Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate remedy open to Atty.
Fernandez is to register such interest as an adverse claim. Consequently, there being
a substantial compliance with Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse
claim is held to be valid. Being valid, its registration should not be cancelled because
as WE have already stated, "it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration thereof may be cancelled" (Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee Dy Piao 103 Phil.
867 [1958]).
The one-half () interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question should therefore be
respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses, Juan Larrazabal and
Marta C. de Larrazabal. They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in
question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez. The adverse
claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on
the new transfer certificate of title issued to them. As held by this Court:
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice
and warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than
the registered owner thereof (Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
69 SCRA 332 [1976]; Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Le Dy Piao supra).
Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse claim, they are
therefore in bad faith. Consequently, they are estopped from questioning the validity of
the adverse claim.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION
FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN
LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL.
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J .:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina
Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar,
with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in
the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer
and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report
reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to
the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant)
was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered
and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of
the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help
because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as
she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed
her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her
resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to
her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her
family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house.
As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to
a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5,
1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by
the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the
threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's
house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for
him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November
14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with
him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy
medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant
(p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on
August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his
appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati,
Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura
Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine
affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid
criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her
eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958,
after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18.
The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and
sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to
marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-
law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the
complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining
that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him.
(pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
x x x x x x x x x
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under
circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are
convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the
alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the
victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted
Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband
parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because
of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen
years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that
she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis,
then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse
of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he
could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her
husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly
because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age
(she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not
resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a
sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good
moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to
take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954,
or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented
himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing
that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists.
This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and
had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been
permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his
oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a
married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be
sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a
double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
x x x x x x x x x
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,
respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did
not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the
Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report,
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence
and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this
Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his
office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that
"the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint
are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the
complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence,
the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the
additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties
were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed,
alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act
of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent
concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for
admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member
of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and
her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red
Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time
(t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees.
When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single'
(t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's
house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was
married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were
already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and
wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival
thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had
already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left
Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was
better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943),
with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually
agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living
with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962,
pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date,
which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the
respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first
sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was
already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law
wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband,
Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on
October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that
her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that
from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living
together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he
asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married,
and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not
then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could
he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in
1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged
her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live
with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as
he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already
living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her'
(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact
of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he
did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of
the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since
his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character,
and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not
so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he
filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court
Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent
used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with
complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free
from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by
continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955
to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in
his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in
cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April
30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument.
This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with
the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2,
1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are
sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his
illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power
may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a
fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the
Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or
conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules
merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or
rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its
officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734).
In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has
been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which
an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or
non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is
so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In
Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is
most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which
together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the
niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who
looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because
he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18
years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult
to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit
relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer
no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal
liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity
expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling
in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following
portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal
(12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will
be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on
his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the
Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for
membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous
seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing
with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its
eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he
admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify
positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the
law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous
relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law
studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to
abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are
hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in
order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do
so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral
perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him
unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed
therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in
filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it
charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint
of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme
Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the
respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If
the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all
the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and
the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in
the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law
provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to
file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced
during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at
that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly
erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective
reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people
think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him,
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has
been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be
applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely
enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626,
citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447;
In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission
to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person
of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then
or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent,
Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
Atty. Alan S. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009
R E S O L U T I O N
Per Curiam:


This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C.
Belleza against respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical
conduct in connection with the handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their
mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165.
[1]
Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to
respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an
additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both
payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue
any receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son.
Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the
next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case
of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint
[2]
for disbarment against
respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit
[3]
of Chua which read:

I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok
Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in
accordance with law, hereby depose and state:

1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs.
Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a
lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is facing
sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;

2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both
of them, I am the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs.
DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;

3. That as far as I know, I received the following
amount from Mrs. Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan
Macasa:

Date Amount

November 11, 2004 P15,000.00
A week after 10,000.00
November 18,
2004 5,000.00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I
supposed as Attorneys Fees were immediately forwarded by
me to Atty. [Macasa];

5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to
attest to the truth of all the foregoing statements.

x x x x x x x x x
[4]


In a letter dated May 23, 2005,
[5]
the IBP Negros Occidental chapter
transmitted the complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
[6]

In an order dated July 13, 2005,
[7]
the CBD required respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,
[8]
simply brushed aside the
complaint for being baseless, groundless and malicious without, however, offering
any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit
his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions
[9]
for second and third extensions
of time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006,
they were ordered to submit their respective position papers.
[10]


In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,
[11]
the CBD ruled that
respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint
despite several chances to do so.

The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.


It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.


The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he
was unfit and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the
bar. The CBD recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that
repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended
that respondent be ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the
provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to
return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys
fees.
[12]


We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors
but we modify the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.

RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES


Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the
charges against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to
answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing
so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.

Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position
paper. His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and
disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he
was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly
constituted legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to
this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.

Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.
[13]
His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court
orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.
[14]
Respondent should have known that the orders
of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with
promptly and completely.
[15]



RESPONDENT
GROSSLY
NEGLECTED
THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT

Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants
son. Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

x x x x x x x x x

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

x x x x x x x x x

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself
(particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy
thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning,
skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law legally applied.
[16]


A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to
serve his client with competence and diligence.
[17]
He must conscientiously perform his
duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer,
he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite
degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will
exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him;
that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps
necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.
[18]

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of
the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his
client is both unprofessional and unethical.
[19]


If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively
represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and
assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer
who represents an accused in a criminal case.

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the
Constitution.
[20]
However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded
ample legal assistance by his lawyer:

... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle
of due process which basically means that a person must be
heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is
a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding
of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights
of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence.
[21]




[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a
fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself
would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the
accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
[22]


The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.
[23]
Tersely put, it means an effective,
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.
[24]


In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and
receiving his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as
effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent
abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued
inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys
Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to
him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly
impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.



RESPONDENT
FAILED TO
RETURN
HIS
CLIENTS MON
EY

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes
on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
[25]


When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses),
he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use
the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
[26]
His
failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose
of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
[27]


Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.
[28]
His failure to return the clients money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.
[29]
It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
[30]
Indeed, it may border
on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.

Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used
the money for its intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he
unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters
repeated demands.

Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to
the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable
compensation for his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the
client.
[31]
Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to attorneys
fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client,
he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.




RESPONDENT FAILED
TO UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION


For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for.
In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence
in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
[32]
Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[33]


Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using
the money for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client.
[34]
He failed to live up to his
fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he
would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral
principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a
shame to the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not
only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John
Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01,
16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza
the amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is furtherDIRECTED to
submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.
Failure to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement
remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the
candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and once he
becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this
jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent
[1]
to the
practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred.
[2]

In an Affidavit-Complaint
[3]
dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty.
Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of
professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly
engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had
illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he
failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing
complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed
out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his
moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order
[4]
requiring respondent to submit his answer to theAffidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer
[5]
on November 19, 2001. Though admitting
the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent
alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after
complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San
Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after
eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and
their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he
could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for
his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even
after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to
remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the
complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary,
[6]
to
support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that
on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married
[7]
and lived with the
latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law
student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and
relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who
were born on February 20, 1980,
[8]
October 14, 1981
[9]
and August 11,
1983,
[10]
respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by
frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs.
[11]
Sometime in 1983,
she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because
respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant
worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live
separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to
support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that
respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he
did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates
of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,
[12]
all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits
of respondent and his paramour
[13]
to prove the fact that respondent sired three
illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of
complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a
womanizer.
[14]

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his
right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled
hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the
Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the
Records of the Proceedings
[15]
on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because
it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.
[16]
Respondent
was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of
presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position
Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,
[17]
he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the
complaint for support with alimony pendente lite
[18]
filed against him by the
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
[19]
the instant
administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant
its Report
[20]
and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230involving CBD Case No. 01-851.
[21]
The
IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined
as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
[22]
To be the basis of
disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
[23]
or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
[24]

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,
[25]
we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity
to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of
lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.
[26]

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their
good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
[27]
They may be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.
[28]

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two
different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes
grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions.
Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and
immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
[29]

In Toledo vs. Toledo,
[30]
we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife
and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan
vs. Obusan,
[31]
we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with
a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,
[32]
that moral delinquency which
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
[33]
Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.
[34]
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the
Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.






GARRIDO vs GARRIDO

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit
[1]
and a supplemental
affidavit
[2]
for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.
Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The
complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of
our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church,
Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel
Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with
six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our
children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller
talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my
husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But
when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that
sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together
with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able
to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating
among others that the said child is their daughter and that
Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on
1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and
joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence
x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing
to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of
our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.

x x x x

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against
his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not
only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights; x x x


In his Counter-Affidavit,
[3]
Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and
imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as
he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married
Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted
ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his
bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart
over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became
close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved
his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido
denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course.
[4]
Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not
practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he
became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after
the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea
were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,
[5]
Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of
Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido
since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea
knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea
and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings
[6]
in
view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity
[7]
(of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for
lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
[8]
the complaints after
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido
and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of
Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her
complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed
any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and
the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.
[9]


Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed
against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with
Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.
[10]
The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline likewise denied this motion.
[11]


On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
(Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation
for the respondents disbarment.
[12]
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this
recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30,
2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the
degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E.
Garrido is herebyDISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the
case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit of the complaint.


Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January
18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for
review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross
immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian
considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has
kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his
situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her
Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh
considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried
to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage.
Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed
against Atty. Garrido.


THE COURTS RULING


After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP
Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with
respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification
of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination
of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.
[13]
We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
[14]
First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public.
[15]
The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice
law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of
law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her
own;
[16]
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter
to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral
acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and
his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,
[17]
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral
fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.
[18]
Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.
[19]


Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes
the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely
incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of
law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature
of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant
in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance.
We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members
of the community.
[20]
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency.
[21]
We make these distinctions as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.
[22]


In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,
[23]
the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,
[24]
the respondent lawyer married the complainant
while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act
of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified
the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,
[25]
where
the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in
Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his
act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that
warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law
studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other
women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason
for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in
truth he was already married to Constancia.
[26]
This was a misrepresentation given as
an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission,
not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia
while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral
and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on
his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with
Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who
bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty.
Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his
marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered
into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously
cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his
wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than
ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to
Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was
not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an
attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his
second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and
of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the
time of his admission to the Bar.
[27]
As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers
oath,
[28]
Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
[29]
and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
[30]
all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of
the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered
this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and
that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and
selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression
that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to
satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him
from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and
principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[31]
Lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
[32]
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation.
[33]
Needless to state, those whose conduct
both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.
[34]


Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford
them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is
required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private
life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab
initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility
x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality
required of them as members of the Bar.
[35]



Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to
objective reality.
[36]
To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in
which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.
[37]
The
requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect
the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
[38]
Each purpose is as important as
the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a
lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos
admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead,
she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without
being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his
wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was
null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him
six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty.
Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This
scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty.
Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry
Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on
confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we
do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong,
not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of
the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage
a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage
together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid
marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong
[39]
leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards
opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live
and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse
sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias
actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act,
for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with
whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high
degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous
marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family
build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality.
[40]
In Barrientos v. Daarol,
[41]
we held that
lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the
legal profession.
Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.
[42]


We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present
case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral
misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his
act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant
his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and
of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances
are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time
unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we
cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and
without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not
an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant
in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido
and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________

Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:


This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer
for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The Facts and the Case

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of
the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City,
requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request
and sent Abastillas letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also
designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00
assistance for his volleyball team.

Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of
Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement
of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not
Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.
[1]
On November
12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article
172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4
months of prisioncorreccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties
of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his
conviction.
[2]
Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint
against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any
pleading during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-
2010-632, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should
be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

The Courts Ruling

In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin
reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the
falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision
and referral to the IBP was factually infirmed
[3]
and contained factual exaggerations
and patently erroneous observation,
[4]
and was too adventurous.
[5]


To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the
copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was
spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his
possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the
letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger
and therefore guilty of falsification.
[6]


This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and
executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,
[7]
the Court held that in disbarment
cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has
become final. The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed
or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party
to a case without authority so to do.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral
turpitude.
[8]
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
[9]


Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being
the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
[10]
Yet this
Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
[11]


Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has
confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably
established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his
offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
[12]


This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and
professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law.
[13]
The privilege to practice
law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
[14]


WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his
name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.