Vs. Rosita Ku: SUMMARY: Litigation Ensued Between Rosita Ku and Equitable. When CA
Vs. Rosita Ku: SUMMARY: Litigation Ensued Between Rosita Ku and Equitable. When CA
Vs. Rosita Ku: SUMMARY: Litigation Ensued Between Rosita Ku and Equitable. When CA
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.
Facts:
There are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities for
particular contracts. It is required for for the validity of the contract; to make
the contract effective as against third parties and; for the purpose of proving
the existence of the contract. A contract of agency to sell on commission basis
does not belong to any of these three categories, hence it is valid and
enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into. FYI: There is only one
type of legal instrument where the law strictly prescribes the location of the
signature which is in notarial wills found in Article 805 NCC.
On October 8, 1987, Rosa Lim who had come from Cebu received from private
respondent Victoria Suarez the following two pieces of jewelry; one 3.35 carat
diamond ring worth P169K and one bracelet worth P170K, to be sold on
commission basis. The agreement was reflected in a receipt.
On December 15, 1987, Lim returned the bracelet to Suarez, but failed to
return the diamond ring or to turn over the proceeds thereof if sold. As a result,
private complainant, aside from making verbal demands, wrote a demand
letter to petitioner asking for the return of said ring or the proceeds of the sale
thereof.
Lims contention: She was not an agent of Suarez. In fact, she was a
prospective buyer of the pieces of jewelry. She told Mrs. Suarez that she would
consider buying the pieces of jewelry for her own use and that she would
inform the private complainant of such decision before she goes back to Cebu.
She cannot be liable for estafa since she never received the jewelries in trust
or on commission basis from Vicky Suarez. The real agreement between her
and the private respondent was a sale on credit with Mrs. Suarez as the ownerseller and petitioner as the buyer, as indicated by the bet that petitioner did
not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of the person receiving
the jewelry but at the upper portion thereof immediately below the description
of the items taken.
Issue:
WON the real transaction between Lim and Suarez was that of sale or that of
contract of agency to sell? Contract of Agency.
Held:
Receipt contains the following provisions:
XXX I received from Vicky Suarez the following jewelries XXX
XXX if I could not sell, I shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned
above; if I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account the
whole proceeds of sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries at his/her
residence XXX
Materiality of the location of Lims signature:
Rosa Lims signature indeed appears on the upper portion of the receipt
immediately below the description of the items taken. This does not have the
effect of altering the terms of the transaction from a contract of agency to sell
on commission basis to a contract of sale. Contracts shall be obligatory in
In the case before us, the parties did not execute a notarial will but a simple
contract of agency to sell on commission basis, thus making the position of
petitioners signature thereto immaterial.
Contention of Lim that Suarez authorized Nadera to receive the ring:
Suarez testified that Aurelia Nadera is highly indebted to her, so if she gave
authority for Nadera to get possession of it she will be exposing herself to a
high risk.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, formerly EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION
vs. ROSITA KU
SUMMARY: Litigation ensued between Rosita Ku and Equitable. When CA
ruled in favor of Rosita, Equitable filed a motion for an extension of 30 days to
file its petition for review as it allegedly received the CA decision on April 25,
2000. However, Rosita argues that the petition is defective because Bank
actually received CA decision on April 24, 2000 when Joel Rosales, an employee
of Banks law firm received it from the Post office and thus Equitable should
have filed motion for extension on May 9, 2000 not May 10. Equitable replied
that Joel is not an agent of the bank as expressly mentioned in his affidavit.
HELD: Bank filed petition beyond reglementary period. There was perfection of
the agency as Joel Rosales averred in his affidavit that on occasions when I
receive mail matters for said law office, it is only to help them receive their
letters promptly, implying that counsel had allowed the practice of Rosales
receiving mail in behalf of the former. There is no showing that counsel had
objected to this practice or took steps to put a stop to it. However, in the
interest of justice, the petition was still given due course.
DOCTRINE:
carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances (Art. 1870).
FACTS:
When Noddy, Inc. failed to pay the loan, Equitable foreclosed the property
extrajudicially and was issued a certificate of sale after winning in the
foreclosure sale. Rosita failed to redeem the property so the Register of
Deeds canceled the TCT in her name and a new one was issued in
Equitables name.
May 10, 89: Equitable instituted an action for ejectment before MeTC QC
against Rositas father Ku GiokHeng.
o
It allowed Ku GiokHeng to remain in the property on the condition
that the latter pay rent. However, Ku GiokHengs failed to pay
rent thus this action.
Ku GiokHeng denied that there was any lease agreement over the
property.
Dec. 20, 94: Instead, he and Rosita Ku, filed an action before RTC QC to
nullify the decision of the MeTC.
RTC (Sept. 13, 99): No merit; Dismissed complaint and ordered the
execution of the MeTC decision.
Rosita filed in CA a special civil action for certiorari assailing the decision
of the RTC as she was not made a party to the ejectment suit and was,
therefore, deprived of due process.
CA (Mar. 31, 2000): Agreed with Rosita. Enjoined the eviction of Rosita
from the premises.
SC: Granted the motion for a 30-day extension counted from the
expiration of the reglementary period and conditioned upon the
timeliness of the filing of the motion for extension.
June 13, 2000: Equitable Bank filed its petition, contending that there was
no need to name Rosita Ku as a party in the action for ejectment since she
was not a resident of the premises nor was she in possession of the
property.
o
FOOTNOTE: The last day to file the petition was on June 9, 2000
but because of the Courts 99 th Anniversary Celebration, business
transactions were suspended on said date per Memorandum
Circular No. 03-2000.
Rosita argues that the petition is defective because of non-compliance
with reglementary period.
o
Bank received CA decision not on April 25, 2000 but on April
24, 2000
o
April 24, 2000 - copy was duly delivered to and received by
Joel Rosales (Authorized Representative) as evidenced by a
Certification issued by the Manila Central Post Office
o
May 10, 2000 When Equitable filed its motion for extension to
file petition for review, it was 1 day beyond the reglementary
period for filing the petition for review OR motion to extend w/c
must be filed on May 9, 2000 - 15 days from the receipt of CA
decision
Banks Reply: Reiterates its honest representation of having received a
copy of CA decision on April 25, 2000. Receipt on April 24, 2000 by Joel
Rosales, who was not an agent of its counsels law office cannot be
considered receipt of the CA Decision by the Bank (or its counsel).
Rosales Affidavit
o
Employee of Unique Industrial & Allied Services, Inc. and assigned
with the Equitable PCI Bank, Mail and Courier Department w/
official duty and responsibility to receive and pick-up from the
Manila Central Post Office the various mails, letters,
correspondence, and other mail matters intended for the banks
various departments and offices at Equitable Bank Building
o
I am not the constituted agent of Curato-Divina-MabilogNedo-Magturo-Pagaduan Law Office for purposes of
receiving their incoming mail matters; neither am I any
such agent of the various other tenants of the said
Building. On occasions when I receive mail matters for
said law office, it is only to help them receive their letters
promptly.
o
April 24, 2000: Received CA Decision together with other mail
matters, and brought them to the Mail and Courier Department;
o
April 25, 2000: After sorting out mail matters, erroneously
recorded them on page 422 of logbook as having been received
on April 25, 2000
o
April 27, 2000: Decision was sent by the Mail and Courier
Department to said Law Office whose receiving clerk opened the
letter and stamped on the Notice of Judgment their actual date
of receipt: April 27, 2000
o
May 8, 2000: Atty. Roland A. Niedo of said law office inquired as to
actual date of receipt of letter, and informed him that based on
logbook, it was received on April 25, 2000.
o
Error was caused by an honest mistake.
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Bank also argues such receipt did not constitute notice to its counsel, as
required by Sec. 2 and 10, Rule 13 of ROC. CA decision actually received
on April 27, 2000.
o
SEC. 2. Filing and service defined. Filing is the act of presenting
the pleading or other paper of the clerk of court. Service is the act
of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper
concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon
him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where
one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled
to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
o
PLDT vs. NLRC: It was only when the Legal Services Division
actually received a copy of the decision that a proper and valid
service may be deemed to have been made.
o
Actual receipt by its counsel was actually on April 27, 2000, not
April 25, 2000. The motion for extension to file the petition for
review was even filed 2 days before the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period
Assuming the motion for extension was indeed one day late, Bank urges
SC to suspend its rules and admit the petition in the interest of justice.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Joel Rosales can be considered the agent of Banks counsel and
thus service to him was considered service to Bank? (YES) [Whether the act of
the law firm in allowing its employee to occasionally receive its mail can be
construed to mean an agency relationship? YES]
2) Whether, in the interest of justice, the rules on reglementary periods can be
suspended in this case? (YES)
3) Whether a person can be evicted by virtue of a decision rendered in an
ejectment case where she was not joined as a party? (YES)
RATIO:
1) Joel Rosales is an agent of Banks counsel.
Although the Affidavit of Joel Rosales states that he is not the constituted
agent of Curato-Divina-Mabilog-Nedo-Magturo-Pagaduan Law Office, an
agency may be express but it may also be implied from the acts of the
principal, from his silence, or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. (Art. 1869)
CASE AT BAR: Joel Rosales averred that on occasions when I receive mail
matters for said law office, it is only to help them receive their letters
promptly, implying that counsel had allowed the practice of
Rosales receiving mail in behalf of the former. There is no showing
that counsel had objected to this practice or took steps to put a
stop to it.
2) Court gives due course to petition in spite of noncompliance with periods in
light of the merits of the petition.
B. H. Macke and W.H. Chandler, partners doing business under thee firm
name of Macke, Chandler And Company, allege that during the months of
February and March 1905, they sold to Jose Camps and delivered at his
place of business, known as the :Washington Caf, various bills of goods
amounting to P351.50; that Camps has only paid on account of said goods
the sum of P174; that there is still due them on account of said goods the
sum of P177.50
Plaintiffs made demand for the payment from defendant and that the
latter failed and refused to pay the said balance or any part of it
Macke, one of the plaintiffs, testified that on the order of one Ricardo
Flores, who represented himself to be the agent of Jose Camps, he shipped
the said goods to the defendant at the Washington Caf; that Flores
(agent) later acknowledged the receipt of the said goods and made
various payments thereon amounting in all to P174; that believes that
Flores is still the agent of Camps; and that when he went to the
Washington Caf for the purpose of collecting his bill he found Flores, in
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