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Case Digest: Tobias v. Abalos

G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994
PONENTE: BIDIN, J.

FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of
Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.
The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing
Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed
violations to the 1987 Constitution Section 26(1) every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of
its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-
subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede
legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the
latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives
may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standard provided in this section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it
was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED


BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(21 SCRA 496, l-28089D 25 OCTOBER 1967
FACTS:
RA 4790 creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao Del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads:
XxxSECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan,Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from
said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Tagalogxxx
Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Commission on Elections citing that the said
law included two barrios from the Municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts and parcel of the Municipality
of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby
changing the boundaries of the two provinces. Since elections are forth
coming, the COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which
still puts the twelve barrios from Cotabato Province under the new
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the
President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of
the statute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correcting
legislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Does the title of RA 4790 conform to the constitutional requirement that
no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill and whether RA
4790 is null and void.


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HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the
constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it is
misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two purposes in
one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of
Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from the Municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan, both of Lanao del Sur, and dismembers two municipalities
of the Province of Cotabato.
2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void


LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR NO. L-280892
Petioner: BARA LIDASAN
Respondent: COMELEC

FACTS
On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill (HB)
1247, now known as Republic Act (RA) 4790An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur
The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur includes:
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos, and Magolatung. It also includes: barrios of Togaig and
Madalum (both situated in Buldon, Cotabato) and barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko,
Colodan, and Kabamawakan (all situated in Parang, Cotabato)
Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementation of RA 4790,
questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING
RA 4790 declared as NULL and VOID
Constitutional requirement foretasted that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill Constitutional provision
contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:
1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, less than one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify
the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the
single subject thereof. It violates the constitutional requirement that
the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.
It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover, It
did not inform the citizens of Buldon and Parangin Cotabato that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and municipalities
and that such will be added to the Province of Lanao del Sur. The
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it
makes the title misleading and deceptive
Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the
municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the valid part
is not independent of the invalid portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.



Arroyo v De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.


Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed


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in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law
violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.


Held: That after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court
finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore dismissed.


Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of
a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its
own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with
a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skulduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and
would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so.
The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made
here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential:
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI,
26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that
they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite numbers of members have agreed to a
particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules:
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous
action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned,
this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it
has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a
debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the


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request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in re-passing a bill
over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to
amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt
which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the
name of popular government.

(In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justifiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case
at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is
no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
G.R. No. L-1123: Mabanag vs Lopez Vito
Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the
required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been
considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result,
the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they
allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at
bar. Whether or not they said resolution was duly enacted by Congress

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The
SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the
law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the
journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness
of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the


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copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say
or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision
that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended
by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated
resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the
contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.



Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)

FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It
sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit
and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioners
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with
the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609.The pertinent portion of
this statute reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board
shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation
of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of
end-users

ISSUE:
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of
the margin fee.

HELD:
The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the
finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and
Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde
which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic
resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the
ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee.


Morales v Subido
G.R. No. L-29658 February 27, 1969.

Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization,
to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure.
It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present
form and substance.

"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an
addition to the phrase 'who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which
the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both
parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law
course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase ["who has served the police
department of a city or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo
amendment was retained."

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of
the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was
the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only


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change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record."

In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified
photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the
various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill
as finally approved by both Houses of Congress.

It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served
the police department of a city or," was still part of the provision, but
according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire
provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of
1966, which Section reads:

"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any
city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher."

The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in
the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs
of the bill, explaining the change in Section 10, thus: "Section 10 was
recast for clarity. (with the consent of Sen. Ganzon &
Congressman Montano)."
Issue: Whether the change an employee, as purportedly was a
rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences, was in truth an alteration of
meaning.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.

The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make
can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning the
immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by
the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree."

In view of Harwood v Wentworth
What the Justice Harlan said in Harwood v. Wentworth: How much
greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a legislative enactment
to be questioned by evidence furnished by the general endorsements
made by clerks upon bills previous to their final passage and
enrolment, endorsements usually so expressed as not to be
intelligible to any one except those who made them, and the scope and
effect of which cannot in many cases be understood unless
supplemented by the recollection of clerks as to what occurred in the
hurry and confusion often attendant upon legislative proceedings."

In view of two foreign landmark cases on enrolled bill doctrine
Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v. Wentworth
involved claims similar to that made by the petitioner in this case. In
both the claims were rejected.

Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended that the Tariff Act of
October 1, 1890 was a nullity because "it is shown by the congressional
records of proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and other
papers printed by authority of Congress, and having reference to
House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in
the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the
respective houses of Congress, and approved by the President."

In rejecting the contention, the United States Supreme Court held
that the signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by
the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by
the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. And
when the bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in


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the archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.

In Harwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of Arizona
"contained, at the time of its final passage, provisions that were omitted
from it without authority of the council or the house, before it was
presented to the governor for his approval." The Court reiterated its
ruling in Marshall Field & Co.

In view of Mabanag v Lopez-Vito & CASCO v Gimenez
It was not until 1947 that the question was presented in Mabanag v.
Lopez-Vito, and we there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts." This court held itself bound by an
authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths
of the members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to
approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually
obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate.

Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever
doubt there might have been as to the status and force of the theory in
the Philippines, in view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag,
was finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. Speaking for the Court, the then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Concepcion said: "Furthermore, it is well settled
that the enrolled bill which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead
of 'urea and formaldehyde' is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961).



Astorga v Villegas
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974.

Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there
passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was
referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.

The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who
should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act
as Mayor.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that
in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the
Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved
by the two Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.


Issue: Whether the so-called RA 4065 became law and that Vice-
Mayor Astorga should exercise any of the powers conferred by RA
4065.
Held: In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied
and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING
THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not
to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio: It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on
"the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which
requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has


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also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts
may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof
of its due enactment.
In view of the enrolled bill theory
The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling
on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect." It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill,
thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should
be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal
and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."
In view of Sec. 313 Act 190 of Rules of Evidence Code of Civil
Procedures
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by
Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve
the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended
by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old
Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis
on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
"The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress
(may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case
of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when
there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof."
In view of neutralization
By the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,
is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in
logic.


In view of the signatures
The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved
by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the
bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words
it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says
that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President."


In view of the need to inquire through the Journal
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and
other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by


9
him.



IN RE SHOOP 42 Phil. 213
MALCOLM; November 29, 1920


FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines
under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for
Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that
he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State
of New York.
- The said rule requires that:
New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without
examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory
affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years
in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But
admission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission
without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several
cases:
1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of
the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the
American Union or in the District of Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law
(ECL).

ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is
established

HELD

- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under
a civil gov't. Established by the Congress
In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the
letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of
those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present
well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such
precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its
present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost
exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippines similar to those privileges accorded by the
rule of this court. - Petition granted. Decision is based on the
interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt establish a precedent with respect
to future Applications.

Reasoning On TERRITORY:
a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US
b. We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the United
States but
c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either
d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are a territory
since the US Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a
form of territorial government, so to that extent we are a territory
according to the US Atty. Gen.
e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word territory"
to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory or it would
have used the more accurate expression.
f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement
since the full phraseology indicates a SWEEPING INTENTION to
include ALL of the territory of the US.
On COMMON LAW jurisdiction:
(On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?)
g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute
law have come to be a very large proportion of the law of the
jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law which
has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the old English
cases.
h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law"
it would seem proper to say that the jurisprudence of a particular
jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that Common Law if its
statute law and its case law to a very large extent includes the science
and application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as
perpetuated and modified by the American cases.
J. Common Law adopted by decision:


10

i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codification and
remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal
metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this
jurisdiction today.

ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a
general sense

iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the
jurisprudence of the courts where practical considerations and the
effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision.

iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo-American
jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the extent that
Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with the LOCALWRITTEN
laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of
sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER
FOREIGN case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is
proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence"
of the Philippines is based on the ECL.

K. IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:

i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law here has not
been definitely decided by the SC. But there is a similarity to the
quotations from the American decisions cited with reference to the
ECL.
ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am jurisprudence only
in "xxxso far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to
local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law; nevertheless,
many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have,
to all intents and purposes, been IMPORTED into this jurisdiction, a
RESULT of the enactment of new laws and the organization of new
institutions by the Congress of the USxxx"
iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with a new one
modelled after the judicial systems of the US. Therefore, those Spanish
doctrines and principles in conflict with the new one were abrogated.
iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and application of the
terms and provisions we borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-Am
precedents, we review the legislative history of such enactments.
v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided by the
doctrines of Common Law. Neither ECL or American Common Law is
in force in this Islandssave only in so far as they are founded on
sound principles applicable to local conditions and aren't in conflict with
existing law."
vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINECOMMON LAW influenced by the
ECL or American Common Law.
vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our jurisdiction is
based upon Anglo-American case law precedents-exclusively in
applying those statutory laws which have been enacted since the
change of sovereignty and which conform more or less to the American
statutes, and-to a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants
of the Spanish codes and written laws.
L. PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW:
i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as follows:
Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal
Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code, Marriage Law,
Mortgage Law, Railway laws, Law of Waters.
ii. There were also special laws having limited application.
iii. The foregoing written laws had acquired the force of statute law by
change of sovereignty.
iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since Spanish
jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of Stare Decisis.
1. Manresas discussion of Art. 6 of the civil shows how far from a case
law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are governed by:
a. First, by written law
b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force because it is the
acknowledged manner on how things are done and not jurisprudence)
c. 3rd, by judicial decision (when in practice, these were considered
last; the development of case law was impeded because the courts
were free to disregard any information or decisions of other courts.)
d. 4th, by general principles of law
M.SPANISH STATUTE LAW
i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately with the
change of sovereignty.
ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property inconsistent with
the Constitution and American principles and institutions were
superseded.
iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines
modelled upon those same Spanish statutes.
M.CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES


11
i. It appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from
Anglo-American sources; derivative in a sense of having been
COPIED, and in the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by
virtue of its authority.
ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are
used and relied upon to a greater or less degree. Although in many
cases, the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the
building up of a very substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case
law.
N.CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES
i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and applying the remnants of
the Spanish statutes thus showing how permanent the hold of the
Anglo-Am Common Law has on our jurisprudence.
ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying the law on
those subjects, which are still governed by the remaining portions of the
Spanish statutes, as exhibited in the groups of cases cited in the
footnotes.
iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of law and in
the large majority of such subjects has formed the sole basis for the
guidance of the Court in developing jurisprudence.
iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law which is
based almost exclusively, except in cases where conflicting with local
customs and institutions, upon Anglo-Am Common Law.
O.COLLATERAL INFLUENCES
i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of Bench
and Bar vs. the abundance of digests/reports/textbooks on English/Am.
courts.
ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authorities in the decisions of the
court, plus, the available sources for study and reference on legal
theories are mostly Anglo-American

iii. Therefore, there has been developed and will continue a common
law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Phil Common Law) based upon the ECL in
its present day form of an Anglo-Am CL, which is effective in all of the
subjects of law in this jurisdiction, in so far as it does not conflict with
the express language of the written law (where the remnants of the
Spanish written law present well- defined civil law theories) or with the
local customs and institutions.




Tolentino versus Secretary of Finance

Facts:
Petitioner seeks re consideration on the on the decision of the Supreme
Court dismissing the cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value-added Tax
Law. Petitioner claimed that the law did not originate exclusively from
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI Sec. 24 of the
Constitution. Though its original version House Bill No. 11197 was filed
in the House of Representatives then sent to the Senate where only
first reading was conducted and then the senate passed another
version of the bill (Senate Bill No. 1630). Tolentino contended that the
Senate should have amended the House Bill No. 11197 by replacing it
with the text of S. No. 1630. In this way, the bill remains a House Bill
and the Senate version becomes only the text of the House Bill.

Issues:
1. Whether the Senates action renders R.A. No. 7716 constitutionally
invalid.
2. Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of its discretion by
passing its own version of the Bill.


Held:
No, R.A. No. 7716 is not unconstitutional. It is not the only instance in
which the senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by
enacting its own version. This has happened twice during the eight
Congress in R.A. No. 7369 and R.A. No. 7549. Petitioners contention
concerns only a matter of form and did not establish any substantial
difference on both Bills.
There was no grave abuse of discretion though Art. VI sec. 24 provides
that all appropriation and revenue bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives; it further provides that the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. It is an accepted practice for the
Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution,
which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of
Representatives.







12
CIR v Court of Tax Appeals
GR No. 47421, May 14, 1990

FACTS:
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who
maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar &
dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they
should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not
for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise
known as "Omnibus Tax Law".
By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and
Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and
also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented
liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December
1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming
the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by
then President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42
was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels,
resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of
hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or
merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or
proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating
places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a
hotel, motel or resthouses.

DECISION:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels,
and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole
section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels,
and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in
themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935
Constitution. The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid
and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable
for the amount assessed against it.