Theories of the Policy Process: Contemporary

Scholarship and Future Directions

Evangelia Petridou
The object of policy research is the understanding of the interaction among the machinery of the state,
political actors, and the public. To facilitate this understanding, a number of complementary theories
have developed in the course of more than two decades. This article reviews recent scholarship on the
established theories of the policy process, mostly published in 2011 and 2012. Additionally, scholarship
extending these theories is identied and new theories of policy process are discussed. This review nds
that the established theories have generated substantive scholarship during the period under review and
have also been the springboard for much of the recent thinking in policy research.
KEY WORDS: established theories of policy process, new theories of policy process, policy subsystems,
policy networks, policy entrepreneurs
Introduction
The object of policy research is the understanding of the interactions among the
machinery of the state, political actors, and the public. Being broadly dened, politi-
cal actors can hold formal or informal positions in all governance levels. Their actions
frequently produce pervasive public action; that is, action not solely limited to
legislation, rules and regulations, and executive orders (John, 2012; Theodoulou &
Cahn, 1995). To understand and explain this complex . . . vast, turgid, self-centered,
and highly emotional process (George Kennan quoted in Gaddis, 2011, p. 308),
scholars employ a large number of tools in the form of theories, models, and frame-
works,
1
a great number of which have been developed and rened over the past
three decades. Due to the plethora and complexity of the questions raised, these
tools tend to be more complementary than contending (Peters & Pierre, 2006;
Schlager & Weible, 2013).
The theoretical development and empirical investigation of some of the more
established theories of the policy process have resulted in the renement of frame-
works, theories, and models; the sharpening of dependent and independent vari-
ables; and the broadening of contextual applicability. The prolicacy of the
scholarship produced and the evolution and maturity of new theories over time
necessitates that we pause regularly to map the topography of the literature. This is
bs_bs_banner
The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 42, No. S1, 2014
S12
0190-292X 2014 Policy Studies Organization
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ.
the aim of the current review, which updates Nowlins work (2011) and is guided by
the following questions: rst, what is the character of contemporary research engen-
dered by the established theories of the policy processdoes it remain within the
given theoretical delimitations, does it extend the theory or framework in new
directions, or is it differentiated enough to constitute a new theory? Second, what
constitutes an evolving trend and in what ways are these trends novel?
In order to answer these questions peer-reviewed scholarship published mostly
2
in 2011 and 2012 was surveyed in journals including the American Journal of Political
Science, American Political Science Review, American Review of Public Administration,
European Journal of Public Policy, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Journal of
Politics, Journal of Public Administration Theory and Practice, Journal of Public Policy,
Policy Studies Journal, and Political Research Quarterly. In addition, web searches were
conducted with each of the frameworks and theories as keywords in Wiley Online
Library, Sage, Google Scholar, and Web of Knowledge. Articles were chosen for their
relevance in terms of theory development, because they addressed criticism previ-
ously leveled against the theory or framework such as a narrow scope and limited
spatial applicability, and/or for their innovative methodology. Scholarship from
policy-specic journals
3
emerging from the database searches was used only if it met
the requirements above.
The work reviewed for this article suggests the following: rst, the established
theories of the policy process continue to generate meaningful research in the form
of diverse case studies; there is also ongoing conceptual development through the
investigation of a component of a theory or the synthesis of two or more theories,
even with a comparative purpose. Second, the structure of established theories
allows for theoretical extension either through fusion with other frameworks or by
developing a new theory closely based on an established one. Third, the timing
seems to be ripe to report on new theories of policy process signaled by a 2013
Policy Studies Journal issue. Finally, the vast majority of the work reviewed in this
article, including the new theories, is the result of the collective effort by teams of
researchers.
This article is divided into two sections. First I discuss research pertaining to the
established theories of policy process, namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework,
Institutional Analysis and Development, Social Construction and Design, Punctu-
ated Equilibrium, Policy Diffusion, and Multiple Streams, and eventual conceptual
extensions to these theories. Next I discuss evolving trends in the literature.
Established Theories
Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1988, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) has been used as an analytical
tool in numerous publications (at least 100 by 2007). Its synthetic nature lends itself
to be parsed and studied with a focus on each individual component, including the
rationale behind the formation of coalitions, policy learning, policy change, and the
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S13
role of policy brokers in the policymaking process. ACF-related scholarship pub-
lished in the years 2011 and 2012 fell in two broad types: rst, researchers applied
ACF to diverse spatial and policy area contexts. Second, there was research with
theory development ambitions mostly focusing on one component of the frame-
work. Some drew from other theories to address shortcomings and criticisms, which
is in line with the suggestions Weible et al. (2011) put forth in the introductory article
to the 2011 Policy Studies Journal special issue on the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
Weible et al. (2011) further suggest that future research use ACF in comparative
policy research; investigate further policy-oriented learning; develop the role of
coalition resources; use ACF in conjunction with other theories or frameworks (a
statement supported also by Sotirov & Memmler, 2012); and nally, explore issues
remaining largely unexplored, including coalition defection, public opinion, self-
interest, political opportunity structures, multiple events contributing to policy
change, negotiated agreements, and use the framework as a policy analysis tool.
More specically, Pierce (2011) applies the framework to U.S. foreign policy and
the creation of Israel, a subsystem very different to ones dealing with environmental
or energy issues. He nds that its tenets hold and more specically that certain
heterogeneity of beliefs exists within advocacy coalitions, while belief systems of
advocacy coalitions may converge to share multiple beliefs with a single advocacy
coalition while maintaining their stability (p. 431). This may indicate the kind of
beliefs a future policy change will reect since the entire subsystem moves in one
direction.
4
ACF has recently been applied to understanding policy dynamics in a variety of
country contexts. Maturity of the energy policy advocacy coalition and knowledge
management through policy-oriented learning are suggested to be the drivers
behind climate policy change in China. Nonetheless the inuence of these coalitions
on governmental action is a matter of degree (Stensdal, 2012). Policy learning and the
dynamic interplay between belief systems and resources are shown to inuence
Kenyas biosafety regulatory policy, further broadening the geographies of ACF
applicability (Kingiri, 2011). Conversely, in the Irish context, Adshead (2011) points
out that it is the coupling (p. 77) of internal and external shocks that precipitates
policy change. Adshead also highlights the importance of ACF as a comparative
public policy tool, thus enabling a national context to be considered at the interna-
tional level. Winkel and Sotirov (2011) take this further by comparing the national
forest programs of Germany and Bulgaria in terms of the effect of such programs in
policy core beliefs, policy learning, and the way powerful actors of diverging beliefs
used such programs to gain power.
As mentioned earlier, several research articles take up components of the frame-
work with theory development ambitions. The issue of coalition resources, a hitherto
less developed aspect of the framework, is investigated by Nohrstedt (2011), who
suggests some resources are more important than others thus pointing out the need
for thinking vertically when it comes to resource salience. Nohrstedt also highlights
the instrumentality of policy entrepreneurs in venue shopping and their part in
achieving policy change. Policy entrepreneurs in the form of policy brokers and the
role in policy change are investigated by Ingold and Varone (2011). They nd that
S14 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
policy brokers act as mediators seeking compromise between competing coalitions
(see also Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2011) at times by attempting to prevent coalitions
activating veto points; furthermore, self-interest factors in their calculus if they dont
have strong beliefs regarding a particular policy.
Beliefs are a central theme of ACF. Methodological insights from policy network
research are used to investigate beliefs and their relationship to the formation,
structure, and stability of coalitions. Combining ACF with Resource Dependency
Theory (RDT), Henry (2011a) nds that people prefer to network with people of
similar beliefs while they avoid doing so with people of dissimilar beliefs. However,
it appears that the avoidance effect among actors of divergent beliefs is of greater
salience than the desire to network with actors of similar beliefs (Henry et al., 2011).
Additionally, people do not network with others solely because they seek power, but
also because they enjoy networking with people of the same ideology; nonetheless,
power seems to be a predictor of network formation among coalitions with similar
goals. Matti and Sandstrm (2011) also nd that similarity of beliefs and not the
perception of inuence has a signicant effect on the formation of coalitions.
Individual actors with dissimilar core values experience belief polarization
when information is exchanged between them (biased assimilation) and that con-
tributes to the emergenceand persistence over timeof polarized networks
(Henry, 2011b). What is more, scientists may be more divided than other subsystem
participants (Montpetit, 2011). Indeed, Montpetit argues that the scientic world and
the world of politics are highly interconnected. This is evidenced in the fact that
controversy in a subsystemgenerated scientic uncertainty. But what if the individu-
als fall outside the formal subsystem? In other words, how do, for example, citizen
advocates structure their thinking about policy issues? ACFs focus is on formal
actors and scientists, but Henry and Dietz (2011, p. 248) recognize the importance of
individual actors (the organic gardener, the volunteer wildlife educator . . .) and
use it in conjunction with Values-Beliefs-Norms to investigate how individuals form
environmental cognition.
Understanding the architecture of beliefs and how they affect the structure of
coalitions is a very important aspect of ACF (Ingold 2011), but the interaction among
coalitions is not the only driver of policy change. External shocks can alter the course
of policy. Albright (2011) argues for the adjustment of the framework to allowfor the
combination of external shocks (such as a ood) and internal shocks (such as democ-
ratization in Hungary) to provide the impetus for policy change through policy-
oriented learning.
Institutional Analysis and Development
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has its origins in
the work of Kiser and E. Ostrom (1982) and seeks to understand the inuence of
institutions on the behavior of individuals (E. Ostrom, 2007). More specically, it is a
multi-scalar map (E. Ostrom, 2011), which provides common linguistic components
necessary to facilitate communication across diverse disciplines including political
science, economics, anthropology, geography, law, and social psychology. Additional
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S15
features of the framework include multiple, self-governed decision points intercon-
nected by nestedness; the importance of rules in incentivizing the actions of
individuals; the fallible nature of people and learning through mistakes; and the
centrality of choice in institutional change and policymaking arrangements (E.
Ostrom, 2007, 2011). Considerable IADresearch is devoted to common pool resource
theory but that body of work is not within the scope of this article and therefore only
articles relating to institutions are included in this review.
The issue of trust is central in IAD as it is in ACF and a great deal of research
has already focused on different aspects of it, though Henry (2011c) points out that
most of the extant research on trust in highly complex polycentric arrangements
that concern sustainability issues has been trust in actions. He identies the need
for research in trust in information, a very important feature of sustainability
debates, where trust in scientic information is crucial. Henry draws from the ACF
literature to incorporate research on belief structures in an effort to lay the ground-
work for a more robust theory of trust. Such a coupling of frameworks is in line
with calls for future research by Weible et al. (2011) as well as Blomquist and
deLeon (2011).
Bushouse (2011) asks what is childcare (Blomquist & deLeon, 2011, p. 2) and
with that as a departure point, moves beyond issues of common pool resourcesthe
most frequent application of the IADto examine the delivery of club goods, for
example enterprises providing child-care services. By applying IAD, Bushouse
attempts to disentangle the many and nested decision-making processes; she goes
beyond the sectoral classication (public, private, non-prot) and argues that differ-
ent constitutional-level choice environments constitute different governance struc-
tures. Such a classication is the rst step toward a better understanding of the
delivery of goods (Bushouse, 2011).
Several articles extend the analytical leverage of the IAD by fusing it with other
approaches such as the Local Public Economies (LPE) approach and Social-
Ecological Systems (SES) as well as by developing distinct analytical concepts and
tools rmly based on IAD (McGinnis, 2011a; E. Ostrom & Basurto, 2011).
Extending the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Wilderness is the
basic good provided in one of two recent articles investigating contextual structural
complexity using the IAD in conjunction with an LPE approach. LPE is a research
program preceding the onset of the development of the IAD framework, but is
underpinned by the same inspirations (McGinnis, 2011b), including the concept of
polycentric governance (Oakerson & Parks, 1999; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren,
1961). First, Oakerson and Parks (2011) focus on the complexity of the regional
governance of wilderness areas by conducting a meso-level analysis as an extension
of the micro-level work of the IAD. They posit that the added value of conceptual-
izing protected areas as LPEs is a better understanding of multi-jurisdictional, multi-
organizational arrangements comprising the common pool resource contexts.
Polycentric governance and the logic of LPEs also underpin the article by McGin-
nis (2011a) that introduces the concept of Network of Adjacent Situations (NAAS) as
a means of theoretically extending the IADframework. McGinnis focuses on the core
S16 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
concept of the frameworkthe action situationby exploring the horizontal com-
plexity and interactions among these action situations. In other words, an action
situation affects the workings of another at the same level of analysis thus forming a
network with polycentricity as a main component (McGinnis, 2011a).
Conversely, E. Ostrom and Basurto (2011) develop a diagnostic and measuring
tool to study the evolution of norms and rules. Drawing from the concept of evo-
lution in natural sciences, the authors recognize that change is an integral part of
institutions. This tool creates the language to describe the structure of rules at a
hypothetical time zero and a later point time in order to track the processes and
nature of institutional change. They create a rule classication system based on
IAD and game theory exemplied in the relatively small and well-studied milieu
of Nepalese irrigation systems with the underline assumption that seven compo-
nents comprise all human interactions: actors, positions, actions, control, informa-
tion, outcomes, and costs and benets. E. Ostrom and Basurto point out that
change does not always mean change for the better; understanding how rules
change within an institution through conscious and unconscious processes, trial
and error, and conict might combat the top-down, one-size-ts-all rule structure
imposition to institutions in developing countries, thus addressing the normative
so what question.
Conversely, Heikkila, Schlager, and Davis (2011) contribute to the theoretical
advancement of IAD by investigating cross-scale linkages with data from 14 inter-
state river settings in the United States. They envision these settings as social-
ecological systems (see Anderies, Janssen, & E. Ostrom, 2004; E. Ostrom, 2007, 2009)
and the linkages formed across diverse actors in different levels of analysis are sorted
out, analyzed, and assessed using E. Ostroms design principles (2007). The authors
nd that in basins where states faced more severe challenges the linkages were more
extensive, whereas compacts with fewer challenges invested less in linkages. What is
more, compacts with more constitutional linkages tended to have more linkages
established by collective choice bodies. More quality linkages were identied
around monitoring and collective choice decision-making but less around enforce-
ment and conict resolution. Indeed there are limits as to the applicability of the
Common Pool Resource (CPR) quality criteria in vertical linkages and enforcement
and monitoring linkages usually occur vertically.
Social Construction and Design
Normative aspects of policymaking were addressed by the social construction
of target population and policy design framework, originally by Anne Schneider
and Helen Ingram (1993). Policymakers manipulate, respond to, and perpetuate
social constructions of target groups; that is, portions of the population receiving
benets or being burdened by costs, partially because it reinforces the policy-
makers gains of political capital (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007). A positively
constructed group, for example the military, is deserving of benets, whereas a
welfare queen (single mother, usually of color) is unequivocally undeserving of
benets.
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S17
In a recent article, Schneider (2012) applies social construction to analyze pat-
terns of change of punishment policy in American states from 1890 to 2008, a policy
area which lends itself to the negative construction of a target populationcriminals.
The study found that policy change was synchronous and not convergent, meaning
that states changed their punishment policy toward the same direction but they kept
their relative position vis--vis other states. Change in policy happened roughly at
about the same time triggered by shocks at the federal level, but not all states have
punishment policies of the same level: western and southern states, for example tend
to be the most punitive. States relative position remained the stable over time, which
indicates high levels of feed-forward effects. Finally, policy learning was not based
on rational choices on the bases of policy efcacy, but rather based on the efcacy of
political capital stemming from the increasing incarceration rates of the demonized
population (Schneider, 2012).
Hudson and Gonyea (2012) apply the social construction of target populations to
the aged. They map the shift of the Baby Boomer generation from Dependent to
Advantaged and most recently to Contender status. The authors contend that as the
image of the Baby Boomer generation fractures, the aged will no longer be a singular
political constituency. As the Contenders will continue ght for their benets, the
vulnerability of the Dependents will be reinforced as a group relying on charity for
their well being.
The social construction of groups is used together with ACF to understand
change in intergroup perceptions over time. More specically, Weible, Siddiki, and
Pierce (2011) ask to what extent do intergroup perceptions change as contexts
change from adversarial to collaborative? (p. 500). With questionnaire data from the
Lake Tahoe Basin spanning over two decades, the authors conducted a quantitative
study on social construction of groups, which is part of the added value of this article
as most of the research in this eld tends to be qualitative. They nd that groups will
be perceived more positively and more powerfully in collaborative contexts but
perceptions take at least a decade to change and they change for all groups, not just
the disadvantaged ones. In terms of ACF, the authors nd a decrease in the devil
shift, meaning that the groups are not as vilied as an earlier point in time, but this
is not accompanied by an increase in the angel shift.
Punctuated Equilibrium
Punctuated equilibriumtheory (PET) seeks to explain the observation that politi-
cal processes comprise long periods of stability spiked by points of disequilibrium.
The grounding of PET is that the continuity of institutions creates policy stability
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007), which over
time creates a gap between the status quo and observed policy outcomes. The system
bursts when exogenous shocks (such as newinformation) cause dynamic change and
throw the system into a positive feedback loop creating a new equilibrium (Breunig
& Koski, 2012).
A key question PET seeks to answer is how policymakers prioritize issues they
address (vis--vis preferences in other frameworks) based on the owof information
S18 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
they receive and process. In other words, PET centers on the collective allocation of
attention to disparate aspects of the policy process, and how shifts in attention can
spawn large changes in policymaking (Jones &Baumgartner, 2012, p. 17). In applying
PET to the allocation of presidential attention, Larsen-Price (2012) nds that when
presidents shift their attention toward a specic policy, they often do so using more
than one policy tool available to them, inter alia executive orders, presidential mes-
sages, hearings on proposals, executive orders, and amicus briefs.
PET was developed as a response to the limitations of both the rational and the
incremental models of policymaking. Its essence is a trope inspired by the natural
sciences (paleontology), which provides an explanatory framework on which to
ground empirical observations (Howlett & Migone, 2011; Prindle, 2012). In order to
rid the framework from the pitfalls of the metaphor, Prindle (2012) suggests renam-
ing it punctuated incrementalism; indeed Howlett and Migone (2011) nd incre-
mentalism to be very much a salient component of PET. There is a binary quality in
Punctuated Equilibrium as its space is occupied by either incrementally occurring
change or bursts. Breunig and Koski (2012) explore both in an attempt to extend PET
to state-level decision-making processes. In investigating distributions of state
budgets from 1984 to 2009, they nd that budget categories that received consistent
attention are more likely to show incremental changes, whereas those that are more
punctuated show smaller growth in the long run. At the congressional level, Wolfe
(2012) similarly nds that media attention contributes to stability and slows down
policy-making.
Though theorization and original empirical testing of PET was rooted in Ameri-
can politics, it is increasingly being applied beyond the United States. John and
Bevan (2012) create a three-point typology of punctuation comprising procedural
changes, high and low salience punctuations using the case of the UK from 1911 to
2008, whereas Alexandrova, Carammia, and Timmermans (2012) conrm that PET
applies to the agenda of the European Council. Jensen (2011) integrates it into the
Danish setting by exploring how party competition informs the impact of attention
shifts that lead to punctuations.
Innovation and Policy Diffusion
Innovation and policy diffusion research focuses on the processes through
which a government adopts innovative (new to this particular government) policies.
Diffusion literature recognizes that different policy jurisdictions do not exist in a
vacuum but instead are inuenced by the choices of other jurisdictions. Three main
tenets undergird diffusion: rst, governmental jurisdictions learn from each other
and frompolicies and programs implemented elsewhere. Second, they compete with
each other in adopting policies to gain an economic advantage or avoid being
disadvantaged compared to other governmental jurisdictions. Finally, if all these
jurisdictions are part of a national context, there is pressure on all of them to conform
to national standards (Berry & Berry, 2007). Rather than a single theory, diffusion
comprises a set of theories of government innovation sharing common features with
theories seeking to explain innovative behavior in individuals as well as organiza-
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S19
tional innovation (Berry & Berry, 2007). The related but distinct body of literature on
policy transfer is not taken up in this review.
Building on Berry and Berry (2007), Shipan and Volden (2012) identify several
points regarding diffusion, salient to both scholars and practitioners. In addition to
the claim that governments compete as well as learn from one another, the authors
recognize that diffusion is a function of more than geographical proximity, that
policy diffusion is not always a good thing, that decentralization is crucial, that
politics and government capabilities matter, and that policy diffusion is contingent
on the nature of policies. Recent papers have focused on intergovernmental compe-
tition, policy attributes, and government capabilities.
Assuming a polycentric environment, the question is not whether policies diffuse
through intergovernmental competition, but why. Drawing from Tiebouts (1956)
idea that people vote with their feet, Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel (2011) go beyond the
idea that policies from one state spill over to neighboring states because the latter
assume a defensive posture (i.e., engage in a race to the bottom in welfare policies
to avoid attracting low-income people) by constructing a spatially explicit, strategic
theory of diffusion. This allows for the conceptualization of a more sophisticated,
proactive, and aggressive state competition aiming at attracting the right kind of
resident.
Interestingly, the intergovernmental competition argument can be turned on its
headpolicies with measures not easily observable and not likely to diffuse among
governmental entities with a high degree of competitiveness (van der Heiden &
Strebel, 2012). This leads to an important point in policy diffusion literature, the idea
that what gets diffused matters. In other words, policy attributes are important when
it comes to their adoption by other governmental jurisdictions. Drawing from earlier
work by Rogers (2004), Makse and Volden (2011) explore the following ve attri-
butes in criminal justice policy in the United States: relative advantage, compatibil-
ity, complexity, observability and trialability (p. 110). They nd that policies diffuse
in expected ways contingent to these attributes; policies with high relative advan-
tages, high compatibility, low complexity, high observability, and high trialability all
spread across the states at a higher rate (p. 122).
Similar are the ndings by Taylor, Lewis, Jacobsmeier, and Shapiro (2012) who
argue that the dynamics of diffusion are contingent upon the contents of the policy
at hand. In investigating gay rights policies, they call for special focus to individual
components of complex policies, since they nd inconsistencies in their rate of
adoption. For example, educational components concerning LGBT education were
less adopted than health insurance components, highlighting the need for disaggre-
gated policy analysis. The research of a different kind of morality politics (stem cell
research) further reveals that national government intervention during the agenda-
setting process can increase the salience of the policy at hand, even if the controversy
at the national level remains unresolved (Karch, 2012).
Policy venues and their interaction with policy images are explored by Boushey
(2012), who sets forth a new theoretical perspective about diffusion based on eco-
logical models. Theoretically, he fuses research from punctuated equilibrium to
address the time component of diffusion and to explain processes leading to punc-
S20 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
tuated diffusion dynamics. Methodologically, he draws from management science;
using Basss (1969) mixed inuence diffusion parameters, Boushey does a compara-
tive analysis of internal and external inuences in 81 policies that have spread across
the United States. He nds that [t]he considerable variation in the speed and scope
of diffusion can be explained by the disproportionate allocation of political attention
across policy making institutions in federalism (p. 142). What is more, when issues
which are normally the states prerogative move to the national arena, policy diffu-
sion can take place very rapidly due to federal mandates (Boushey, 2012).
Regardless of the attributes of the policy being diffused, the assumption is, as
mentioned earlier, that it is new to the administrative entity at handan innovation.
Two recent articles investigate the diffusion of innovations, one from a governmental
capabilities angle and the second by examining the privatization of government
services. More specically, Bhatti, Olsen, and Pedersen (2011) nd that a high con-
centration of administrative professionals increases the possibility of adoption of
innovation as evidenced in the case of Danish Citizen Service Centers (CSC). Addi-
tionally, the authors nd that municipalities emulate their neighbors and that the
more afuent the municipality the higher the adoption rate. Evidence also suggests
that the greater the need for an innovation, the greater the possibility for its adoption,
but not that the size of a municipality or ideology play any role.
Innovation as an idea is often associated with market competition. Bouch and
Volden (2011) compare privatized and government-provided foster care services.
They nd that there is innovation in both instances, but in different ways; the
innovation engendered in the private sector by market competition is counterbal-
anced by learning across governmental jurisdictions. Additionally, the authors shed
light on the fact that a mix of public-private arrangements seems to bring about more
innovativeness than any system wholly private or wholly public.
Multiple Streams and the Evolution of Policy Entrepreneurship
Developed by Kingdon (1984) and synthesized by Zahariadis (2007), Multiple
Streams (MS) is based on the garbage-can logic of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). It
seeks to [explain] howpolicies are made by national governments under conditions
of ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 65). The lens as it is mostly referred to by
Zahariadis (2007), has ve structural components: three distinct streams: policy,
problems, and politics; policy entrepreneurs; and policy windows. MS theorizes that
policy change occurs when policy entrepreneurs couple the streams during short-
lived, propitious moments in timepolicy windows.
MS has mostly been applied to U.S. policy making (though see Khayesi &
Amekudzi [2011] for an application in Brazil). A recent article by Ackrill and Kay
(2011) addresses points perceived to have been theoretically underdeveloped when
MS was applied to European policymaking. The authors departure point is the
structure of the Commission, which consists of thematically arranged Directorate
Generals (DGs), in the sense that each DG oversees a particular policy area. Ackrill
and Kay (2011) argue that ambiguity in the EU context is institutional ambiguity that
is, a policymaking environment comprising overlapping institutions lacking a clear
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S21
institutional hierarchy. This overlap is conducive to spillovers; even though each DG
is responsive for a policy area, policy issues spread across areas and thus across
institutional arrangements, DGs in this case. In such an environment the role of
policy entrepreneurs goes beyond the traditional role of the coupler (Kingdon,
1984), because skillful entrepreneurs may use endogenous spillover effects to
further a certain agenda of policy proposal elsewhere (Ackrill &Kay, 2011, p. 76). An
additional innovative contribution of this article regarding the theorizing of policy
entrepreneurs (PEs) is that it explicitly considers them to not only be selling solu-
tions, but also as actors having the power to implement them.
5
The concept of policy
entrepreneurs enables MS to explore the role of ideaswhich policy entrepreneurs
advancein policymaking without altogether discounting the role of self-interest,
which is part of the policy entrepreneurs calculus. There has been an explosion in
interest in policy entrepreneurship, which has resulted in substantial advances in
literature.
The policy entrepreneur emerged as a complementary component of broader
theories of policy change including the ones reviewed in this article (Mintrom &
Norman, 2009). PE has suffered from conceptual imprecision because the term
entrepreneur has traveled across disciplines, because it has been used with many
modiers (policy, public, political etc.), and also because PE is as much about the
individual actor (entrepreneur) as it is for the process (entrepreneurship).
Christopoulos and Ingold (2011) attempt to pinpoint the conceptual differences
between a political broker and a political entrepreneur based on the interactions each
has with its network based on the hypothesis that brokers promote overall stability
whereas entrepreneurs focus on policy outputs.
In most research PE is treated as the independent variable, which means the
focus is on its explanatory role in policy change. However, Blavoukos and
Bourantonis (2011) explore the structural features affecting the entrepreneurial
potential of Chairs in multilateral negotiations in international settings such as the
UN, EU, and the WTO. The authors nd that the political entrepreneurs perform a
cost-benet analysis based on the mandate and the resources they have, as well as
constraints placed upon them.
Two recent articles examine policy entrepreneurship in England and the Neth-
erlands. At the subnational level, Oborn, Barrett, and Exworthy (2011) investigate the
role of the individual expert actor in London heath-care reform. Highlighting the
importance of individual agency, the authors nd that the dominant entrepreneur
forges alliance between actors and policy communities and works with other actors
in multiple levels. One important nding is that though in PE research tends to focus
on the individual, entrepreneurial actions are carried out by teams and not just one
heroic, lonely individual.
Strategies are the focus of Brouwer and Biermann (2011). How do policy entre-
preneurs manage commons resources? Brouwer and Biermann (2011) identify four
types of strategies in their research of Dutch water management: attention and
support seeking strategies, linking strategies, relational management strategies, and
arena (venue) strategies. They argue that use of these strategies by policy entrepre-
neurs at the right timing could inuence the development of policy streams. But
S22 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
what happens when policy entrepreneurs fail? Hays (2012) outlines Reagans failure
to establish school prayer in the United States. Reagan created the Ofce of Legal
Policy and the Committee on Federal Judicial Selection, which prioritized philo-
sophical and ideological issues in the selection of Supreme Court judges ensuring
the appointment of conservative judges. He also established a political deputy in the
Ofce of the Solicitor General thus ensuring greater advocacy before the Supreme
Court (Hays, 2012, p. 412). The author argues that despite these innovations, the
legal system proved too resilient and Reagans intended change did not pass.
Evolving Trends
6
The following articles represent evolving trends in the literature. I use evolv-
ing instead of emergent because these theories have been developing by teams of
researchers for some time. Institutional Grammar is a methodological tool based on
IAD, but versatile enough to be used as an independent method. Adrawback of both
Institutional Grammar and the Narrative Policy Framework is that the methodologi-
cal work is time and labor intensive and requires the reconciliation of the work of
more than one coder. The Collective Learning Framework and the Policy Regimes
Perspective drawon extensive literature to conceptually sharpen policy learning and
policy regimes, respectively. Finally, the Robustness Framework, the Institutional
Collective Action Framework, and The Ecology of Games Framework all dealin
different wayswith complexity and uncertainty in governance.
Institutional Grammar
In order to better understand action situations, Crawford and E. Ostrom (1995)
devised an institutional grammar, which provides the means to partition the
content of regulation into single statements or directives and then, to identify the
major constitutive components of these statements (Siddiki, Basurto, & Weible,
2012, p. 168). Institutional grammar was revised by Basurto, Kingsley, McQueen,
Smith, and Weible (2010) and is the focus of two recent articles. Siddiki, Weible,
Basurto, and Calanni (2011) revise the institutional grammar tool (IGT) to include an
additional coding component, the oBject. This addition helps separate the action
(aIm) from its receiver (oBject). Additionally, in statements where there are two
animate actors, oBject can differentiate the one who is doing the action from the one
to whom the action is directed. Siddiki et al. (2011) also revise the guidelines for
applying the institutional grammar tool and they apply this modied tool to four
Colorado State Aquaculture policies. In a later article, Siddiki et al. (2012) test the
modied grammar tool further using the same four Colorado State Aquaculture
policies seeking to understand regulatory compliance. They nd that levels of com-
pliance vary across the interviewees and also within the same interviewee. Addi-
tional ndings include that compliance levels are inuenced by the actors
perceptions of the appropriateness of regulations, feelings of guilt, and feelings of
social disapproval (Siddiki et al., 2012). An important statement by Siddiki et al.
(2011) regarding the versatility of the IGT was that even though the logic behind it
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S23
stemmed from the IAD framework, as it is developed in its present form it is a
methodological tool and could be utilized in conjunction with other policy process
frameworks and theories, such as ACF.
Narrative Policy Framework
The Narrative Policy Framework is an evolving theory of the policy process
investigating the empirical role of policy narratives in the policy process and
whether policy narratives inuence policy outcomes.
Policy narratives are strategic stories with a plot, villains and good guys, and a
moral lesson (Jones &McBeth, 2010; Shanahan, McBeth, &Hathaway, 2011). They can
also include adjuvant components such as a plot and a causal mechanism (CM), and
narrative strategies, such as the distributions of costs and benets and policy beliefs
(Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, & Lane, 2013). The framework operates at the micro-,
meso-, and macro- levels and has three main assumptions: rst, it recognizes the
centrality of policy narratives on policy processes, especially in light of new media;
second, a broad set of actors generate policy narratives; and third, policies and
programs are translations of beliefs that are communicated through policy narra-
tives, the vehicle for conveying and organizing policy information (Shanahan,
Jones, & McBeth, 2011, p. 540). Though the theoretical underpinnings of NPF are
interdisciplinary and draw heavily from post positivists like Debra Stone as well as
social construction theory, Shanahan, McBeth and Hathaway (2011) move the con-
struct of policy narratives away from post-positivistic researchmethodologically
speakingin asking whether policy narratives inuence public opinion. They
conduct a quantitative study using a quasi-experimental design, the ndings of
which suggest the following: rst, policy narratives can reinforce and galvanize
existing opinions held by coalition members, and second, policy narratives have
enough inuence to convert people who previously held divergent opinions.
ACF has also inuenced the architecture of NPF and the two frameworks are
most congruent at the meso level, though NPF addressed the lack of attention in the
politics of constructing public policy evidenced in the established theories of policy
process (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 455). The beliefs that glue advocacy coalitions
together are embedded in policy narratives (Shanahan, McBeth et al., 2011); what is
more, NPF can identify ways to measure the role of endogenous and exogenous
public opinion on the structure of these policy narratives.
In further developing the framework at the meso level, Shanahan et al. (2013)
investigate the importance of the devil shiftand its opposite narrative strategy, the
angel shiftin the case study of a proposed wind farm off the coast of Nantucket.
The authors set out to investigate interas well as intracoalition differences in the
use of narrative elements, narrative strategies, and policy beliefs. They nd signi-
cant intercoalitional differences between the narrative elements of the competing
policy narratives. Additionally, they found that the winning side used the angel shift
as part of an overall winning policy narrative with prevalent solutions. Whether this
was a psychological effect or a purposive strategy was not clear, and the authors
identify this issue as an avenue for further research.
S24 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
The Collective Learning Framework
In two recent articles, Gerlak and Heikkila (2011) and Heikkila and Gerlak
(2013) build a conceptual approach to dene and understand learning at the collec-
tive level, a concept which remains fuzzy despite the amount of literature devoted to
it. First, Gerlak and Heikkila (2011) used the extreme case of the Everglades resto-
ration program to dene the different aspects of learning in policy making and
unpack the factors which inform it. Their 2013 work renes this approach. Heikkila
and Gerlak (2013) address three main challenges: rst, they dene and distinguish
between the process of learning and the products of learning; second, they investi-
gate the differences between individual and group learning; and third, they identify
factors fostering or inhibiting learning.
The authors recognize that the internal characteristics of a collective environ-
ment, namely the institutional structure, social dynamics, and the technological and
functional domain (all inuenced by rules and norms) in conjunction with indi-
vidual learning and exogenous factors (political, economic, and social changes)
inuence the collective learning process. This process consists of acquiring, translat-
ing and disseminating information and leads to cognitive and/or behavioral learn-
ing products. A decentralized, at structure with open social dynamics featuring
trust would be more conducive to learning than a centralized structure with social
dynamics characterized by suspicion, for example. However, learning in the policy
environment is not a linear process, it does not automatically lead to change and
even if it does, it does not mean that change is good. This is a conceptual framework;
Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) call for more work rening operationalization and devel-
oping tools to measure change.
Beyond Subsystems: Policy Regimes
The regimes approach centers on the interplay between policies and politics
(May & Jochim, 2013) rather than being a tool aimed at measuring (policy) change.
Moving beyond subsystems, policy regimes are conceptualized as the governing
arrangements for addressing policy problems and may include institutional
arrangements, interest alignments, and shared ideas (May & Jochim, 2013, p. 428).
Ideas are the glue that holds the regimes together, much like beliefs are the glue
of subsystems. The policy regimes perspective starts with the policy problem; as a
descriptive lens it works backwards to map the governing arrangements for
addressing this problem. As an analytical lens, the policy regimes proposes that
the stronger the regime, the greater the levels of policy legitimacy, coherence, and
durability.
May, Jochim, and Sapotichne (2011) nd that the homeland security policy
regime is weak, contributing to policy uncertainties and instability. Strength in
boundary spanning (ones crossing traditional subsystems) regimes like this one is
desired, but it has to be noted that strength does not mean good policy in norma-
tive terms, just like policy change is not always good.
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S25
Worsham and Stores (2012) illustrate the exibility of boundary-spanning
regimes. Drawing from PET, subsystem theory, and the policy regimes approach,
they explain the elasticity of the subsystem and its ability to absorb demands giving
the appearance of stability by investigating how the agriculture policy subsystem in
the United States had been able to resist the civil rights policy regime and effectively
discriminate against African American farmers.
Finally it has to be noted that the regimes perspective requires authoritative
(governmental) action and is not an appropriate tool to analyze private governing
arrangements. What is more, at this time it is used in the American policy envi-
ronment and more work is needed to advance methodological aspects of the
framework.
Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems
Anderies and Janssen (2013) ask how we can reconcile a policy process mostly
understood as fairly stable and static over time with constructs such as globalization,
uidity, lack of xity over time and space, and complexity of systems. They argue
that current policy contexts, especially ones related to environmental and common
pool resource (CPR) problems, change far too rapidly. To accommodate this ux,
they develop the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems. This framework builds on
IAD premises and moves SES forward by focusing on the understanding of funda-
mental feedback mechanisms that promote the robustness of a system, thus allowing
it to be exible in order to withstand uncertainty and change. An SES is more robust
when there is a good t between institutional arrangements and ecological
dynamics. This makes the translation of legal rules to rules-in-use more efcient and
alleviates monitoring problems. What is more, comparative analyses of systems
reveal that redundancy of regulatory mechanisms, modularity of a system, and
diversity in agents and connections (all understood in a polycentric governing
arrangement) promotes robustness. Such scalability and atness promotes that idea
of policy experimentationpolicies can be tried rst in a simpler system and if they
succeed can be adopted by a more complex one. What is more, a key lesson from this
framework is that much like when striving for sustainability, there are always trade-
offs; a system cannot be robust in its entirety and making policies to increase
robustness implies that a decision be made about which vulnerabilities to address in
the short or long term.
Institutional Collective Action Framework
Why do overlapping jurisdictions choose (or not) to cooperate and what does
that mean for the efcient provision of public goods? The Institutional Collective
Action framework (ICA) draws heavily from collective action literature and from a
variety of theoretical backgrounds to address the externalities of choice in frag-
mented and overlapping jurisdictions. Without mechanisms facilitating coopera-
tion, local actors will act with their short-term interest in mind and these decisions
will be collectively inefcient. Feiock (2013) maps the relationship between dilem-
S26 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
mas of collective institutional action with the mechanisms that mitigate those
dilemmas and provides a taxonomy of collaborative mechanisms on a scale of how
formally they are structuredsocially embedded, contracts, delegated authority
and in terms of the their institutional scopebilateral, multilateral, collective.
Transaction cost related to entering and exiting collective arrangements are
higher when participation is mandated by a governmental authority and lowest
when participation is voluntary. At the same time, the more encompassing and
authoritative the collaborative mechanism, the more effective it is; ICA argues that
participation incentives are determined by the net expected benets from the
mechanism (Feiock, 2013, p. 408). Recent empirical work in American and inter-
national settings (see for example Andersen & Pierre, 2010; Park, 2012; Tavares &
Cames, 2007) has demonstrated the versatility of the framework including work
on the non-prot and volunteer sectors.
Ecology of Games Framework
Lubell (2013) addresses complexity by tackling more than one policy game
(venue) at the same time. Drawing from Longs (1958) ecology of games concept,
Lubell presents a cumulative, synthetic, hybrid theory extending IAD and LPE and
more broadly the idea of polycentric governance. The Ecology of Games framework
(EG) contributes to the concept of polycentric governance by producing testable
hypotheses, by analyzing the causal mechanisms of institutional change, and by
taking a systems view in the understanding of how different institutional arrange-
ments link to policy outcomes. Similar to ICA, Lubell addresses fragmentation in
governance and externalities imposed on one entity by decisions made by another.
Lubell (2013) highlights the positive aspects of this fragmentation by noting that it
creates an evolutionary niche (p. 547) in which institutions can take advantage of
positive externalities and ameliorate the negative ones.
Conclusions
This article reviewed research relating to established theories of policy process
largely published in 2011 and 2012. It included new theories published in 2013. The
reviewed literature suggests that the established theories of the policy process con-
tinue to generate scholarship moving these theories forward at times by synthesizing
them. It also suggests that the structure of these theories allow for theoretical
and methodological extensions. Finally, most of the trends evolving into new theo-
ries have their intellectual roots in the established theories and are the product of
teamwork.
Evangelia Petridou is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at Mid-Sweden Uni-
versity. Her research interests include theories of the policy process, political entre-
preneurship, and urban governance. Her substantive policy area interests include
economic development and territorial cohesion with a special interest in European
peripheral areas.
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S27
Notes
Special thanks to Michael Mintrom, Jon Pierre, and the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable
comments.
1. Here the terms are used largely interchangeable, notwithstanding the conceptual differences among
them.
2. I included the 2013 PSJ special issue outlining six new theories of the policy process because of its
timing and subject matter even though technically speaking it was outside the time frame of the review.
3. I included a report from a research institute because I judged it to be an interesting application.
4. Pierce touches on social construction theory, but this article is mainly a study of ACF.
5. In the economic literature, McCaffrey and Salerno (2011) argue for an ideal type of political entrepre-
neur who owns the resources instead of mobilizing them; that is, possesses all decision-making
authority.
6. Note that this is not an exclusive list of evolving trends in the literature.
References
Ackrill, Robert, and Adrian Kay. 2011. Multiple Streams in EUPolicy-Making: The Case of the 2005 Sugar
Reform. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (1): 7289.
Adshead, Maura. 2011. An Advocacy Coalition Framework Approach to the Rise and Fall of Social
Partnership. Irish Political Studies 26 (1): 7393.
Albright, Elizabeth A. 2011. Policy Change and Learning in Response to Extreme Events in Hungary: An
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 485511.
Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, and Arco Timmermans. 2012. Policy Punctuations and Issue
Diversity on the European Council Agenda. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 6988.
Anderies, John M., and MarcoA. Janssen. 2013. Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems: Implications for
Public Policy. Policy Studies Journal 41 (3): 51437.
Anderies, John M., Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom. 2004. A Frameowork to Analyze the Robust-
ness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective. Ecology and Society 9 (1):
18.
Andersen, Ose Johan, and Jon Pierre. 2010. Exploring the Strategic Region: Rationality, Context, and
Institutional Collective Action. Urban Affairs Review 44 (3): 378402.
Bass, Frank, M. 1969. A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15:
21527.
Basurto, Xavier, Gordon Kingsley, Kelly McQueen, Mshadoni Smith, and Christopher M. Weible. 2010. A
Systematic Approach to Institutional Analysis: Applying Crawford and Ostroms Grammar. Political
Research Quarterly 63 (3): 52337.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. Journal of
Politics 53: 104474.
. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Baybeck, Brady, William D. Berry, and David A. Siegel. 2011. A Strategic Theory of Policy Diffusion via
Intergovernmental Competition. The Journal of Politics 73 (1): 23247.
Berry, Frances Stokes, and William D. Berry. 2007. Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research.
In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 22360.
Bhatti, Yosef, Asmus L. Olsen, and Lene Holm Pedersen. 2011. Administrative Professionals and the
Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Citizen Service Centres. Public Administration 89 (2): 577
94.
Blavoukos, Spyros, and Dimitris Bourantonis. 2011. Chairs as Policy Entrepreneurs in Multilateral
Organizations. Review of International Studies 37 (2): 65372.
S28 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
Blomquist, William, and Peter deLeon 2011. The Design and Promise of the Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 16.
Bouch, Vanessa, and Craig Volden. 2011. Privatization and the Diffusion of Innovations. The Journal of
Politics 73 (2): 42842.
Boushey, Graeme. 2012. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Diffusion of Innovations. Policy Studies
Journal 40 (1): 12745.
Breunig, Christian, and Chris Koski. 2012. The Tortoise or the Hare? Incrementalism, Punctuations, and
their Consequences. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 4547.
Brouwer, Stijn, and Frank Biermann. 2011. Towards Adaptive Management: Examining the Strategies of
Policy Entrepreneurs in Dutch Water Management. Ecology and Society 16 (4): 5.
Bushouse, Brenda. 2011. Governance Structures: Using IAD to Understand Variation in Service Delivery
for Club Goods with Information Asymmetry. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 10520.
Christopoulos, Dimitrios, and Karin Ingold. 2011. Distinguishing between Political Brokerage and Politi-
cal Entrepreneurship. Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10: 3642.
Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 125.
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. A Grammar of Institutions. American Political Science
Review 89: 582600.
Feiock, Richard, C. 2013. The Institutional Collective Action Framework. Policy Studies Journal 41 (3):
397425.
Gaddis, John Lewis. 2011. George Kennan: An American Life. New York: Penguin.
Gerlak, Andrea K., and Tanya Heikkila. 2011. Building a Theory of Learning in Collaboratives: Evidence
from the Everglades Restoration Program. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21:
61944.
Hays, Bradley D. 2012. The Curious Case of School Prayer: Political Entrepreneurship and the Resilience
of Legal Institutions. Politics and Religion 5: 394418.
Heikkila, Tanya, and Andrea K. Gerlak. 2013. Building a Conceptual Approach to Collective Learning:
Lessons for Public Policy Scholars. Policy Studies Journal 31 (3): 485513.
Heikkila, Tanya, Edella Schlager, and Mark W. Davis. 2011. The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages
in Common Pool Resource Management. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 12145.
Henry, Adam Douglas. 2011a. Ideology, Power, and the Structure of Policy Networks. Policy Studies
Journal 39 (3): 36183.
. 2011b. Belief-Oriented Segregation in Policy Networks. ProcediaSocial and Behavioral Sciences
22: 1425.
. 2011c. Information, Networks, and the Complexity of Trust in Commons Governance. Interna-
tional Journal of the Commons 5 (2): 188212.
Henry, Adam Douglas, and Thomas Dietz. 2011. Understanding Environmental Cognition. Organiza-
tion & Environment 25 (1): 23858.
Henry, Adam Douglas, Mark Lubell, and Michael McCoy. 2011. Belief Systems and Social Capital as
Drivers of Policy Network Structure: The Case of California Regional Planning. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 21: 41944.
Howlett, Michael, and Andrea Migone. 2011. Charles Lindblom Is Alive and Well and Living in Punctu-
ated Equilibrium Land. Policy and Society 30: 5362.
Hudson, Robert B., and Judith G. Gonyea. 2012. Baby Boomers and the Shifting Political Construction of
Old Age. The Gerontologist 52 (2): 27282.
Ingold, Karin. 2011. Network Structures within Policy Processes: Coalitions, Power, and Brokerage in
Swiss Climate Policy. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 43559.
Ingold, Karin, and Frdric Varone. 2011. Treating Policy Brokers Seriously: Evidence from the Climate
Policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22: 31946.
Ingram, Helen, Anne L. Schneider, and Peter deLeon. 2007. Social Construction and Policy Design. In
Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 93126.
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S29
Jenkins-Smith, Hank. 1990. Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis. Pacic Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Jensen, Carsten. 2011. Focusing Events, Policy Dictators and the Dynamics of Reform Policy Studies 32
(2): 14358.
John, Peter. 2012. Analyzing Public Policy (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
John, Peter, and Shaun Bevan. 2012. What Are Policy Punctuations? Large Changes in the Legislative
Agenda of the UK Government, 19112008. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 89107.
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2012. From There to Here: Punctuated Equilibrium to the
General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information Processing. Policy Studies
Journal 40 (1): 119.
Jones, Michael D., and Mark K. McBeth. 2010. A Narrative Policy Framework: Clear Enough to Be
Wrong? Policy Studies Journal 38 (2): 32953.
Karch, Andrew. 2012. Vertical Diffusion and the Policy-Making Process. The Politics of Embryonic Stem
Cell Research. Political Research Quarterly 65 (1): 4861.
Khayesi, Meleckidzedeck, and Adjo A. Amekudzi. 2011. Kingdons Multiple Streams Model and Auto-
mobile Dependence Reversal Path: The Case of Curitiba, Brazil. Journal of Transport Geograpy 19:
154752.
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little and Brown.
Kingiri, Ann N. 2011. Conicting Advocacy Coalitions in an Evolving Modern Biotechnology Regulatory
Subsystem: Policy Learning and Inuencing Kenyas Regulatory Policy Process. Science and Public
Policy 38 (3): 199211.
Kiser, Larry, L., and Elinor Ostrom. 1982. The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of
Institutional Approaches. In Strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Elinor Ostrom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
179222.
Larsen-Price, Heather, A. 2012. The Right Tool for the Job. The Canalization of Presidential Policy
Attention by Policy Instrument. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 14768.
Lubell, Mark. 2013. Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework. Policy
Studies Journal 41 (3): 53860.
Long, Norton E. 1958. The Local Community as an Ecology of Games. The American Journal of Sociology
64: 25161.
Makse, Todd, and Craig Volden. 2011. The Role of Policy Attributes in the Diffusion of Innovations. The
Journal of Politics 73 (1): 10824.
Matti, Simon, and Annica Sandstrm. 2011. The Rationale Determining Advocacy Coalitions: Examining
Coordination Networks and Corresponding Beliefs. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 385410.
May, Peter J., and Ashley E. Jochim. 2013. Policy Regime Perspective: Policies, Politics and Governing.
Policy Studies Journal 41 (3): 42652.
May, Peter J., Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne. 2011. Constructing Homeland Security: An
Anemic Policy Regime. Policy Studies Journal 39 (2): 285305.
McCaffrey, Matthew, and Joseph T. Salerno. 2011. A Theory of Political Entrepreneurship. Modern
Economy 2: 55260.
McGinnis, Michael D. 2011a. Networks of Adjacent Situations in Polycentric Governance. Policy Studies
Journal 39 (1): 5178.
. 2011b. An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to
a Complex Framework. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 16983.
Mintrom, Michael, and Phillipa Norman. 2009. Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change. Policy
Studies Journal 37 (4): 64967.
Montpetit, ric. 2011. Scientic Credibility, Disagreement, and Error Costs in 17 Biotechnology Policy
Subsystems. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 51333.
Nohrstedt, Daniel. 2011. Shifting Resources and Venues Producing Policy Change in Contested Subsys-
tems: A Case Study of Swedish Signals Intelligence Policy. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 46184.
Nowlin, Matthew C. 2011. Theories of the Policy Process: State of the Research and Emerging Trends.
Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 4160.
S30 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1
Oakerson, Ronald J., and Roger B. Parks. 1999. Citizen Voice and Public Entrepreneurship: The Organi-
zational Dynamic of a Complex Metropolitan County. In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies,
ed. Michael D. McGinnins. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 30628.
. 2011. The Study of Local Public Economies: Multi-organizational, Multi-level Institutional Analy-
sis and Development. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 14767.
Oborn, Eivor, Michael Barrett, and Mark Exworthy. 2011. Policy Entrepreneurship in the Development
of Public Sector Strategy: The Case of London Health Reform. Public Administration 89 (2): 32544.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework. In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier Cambridge, MA:
Westview, 2165.
. 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science
325: 41921.
. 2011. Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Policy Studies
Journal 39 (1): 727.
Ostrom, Elinor, and Xavier Basurto. 2011. Crafting Analytical Tools to Study Institutional Change.
Journal of Institutional Economics 7: 31743.
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review 55 (4): 83142.
Park, Jongsun. 2012. Externality, Institutional Collective Action, Competition, Conict. The Korean
Journal of Policy Studies 27 (1): 5785.
Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre. 2006. Introduction. In The Handbook of Public Policy, eds. B. Guy Peters
and Jon Pierre. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 19.
Pierce, Jonathan J. 2011. Coalition Stability and Belief Change: Advocacy Coalitions in U.S. Foreign Policy
and the Creation of Israel, 192244. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 41134.
Prindle, David F. 2012. Importing Concepts from Biology into Political Science: The Case of Punctuated
Equilibrium. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 2143.
Rogers, Everett M. 2004. Diffusion of Innovations (5th ed.). New York: The Free Press.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1988. An Advocacy Coalition Framework Model of Policy
Change and the Role of Policy Orientated Learning Therein. Policy Sciences 21: 12968.
. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Weible. 2007. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and
Clarications. In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Cambridge, MA: Westview:
189220.
Schlager, Edela, and Christopher M. Weible. 2013. New Theories of the Policy Process. Policy Studies
Journal 41 (3): 38996.
Schneider, Anne L. 2012. Punishment Policy in the American States from 1890 to 2008: Convergence,
Divergence, Synchronous Change, and Feed-Forward Effects. Policy Studies Journal 40 (2): 193210.
Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for
Politics and Policy. American Political Science Review 87 (2): 33447.
Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Michael D. Jones, and Mark K. McBeth. 2011. Policy Narratives and Policy
Processes. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 53561.
Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Michael D. Jones, Mark K. McBeth, and Ross R. Lane. 2013. An Angel in the
Wind: How Heroic Policy Narratives Shape Policy Realities. Policy Studies Journal 41 (3): 453
84.
Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Mark K. McBeth, and Paul L. Hathaway. 2011. Narrative Policy Framework: The
Inuence of Media Policy Narratives on Public Opinion. Politics and Policy 39 (3): 373400.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2012. Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitio-
ners. Public Administration Review 72 (6): 78896.
Siddiki, Saba, Xavier Basurto, and Christopher M. Weible. 2012. Using the Institutional Grammar Tool to
Understand Regulatory Compliance: The Case of Colorado Aquaculture. Regulation and Governance
6: 16788.
Petridou: Theories of the Policy Process S31
Siddiki, Saba, Christopher M. Weible, Xavier Basurto, and John Calanni. 2011. Dissecting Policy Designs:
An Application of the Institutional Grammar Tool. Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 79103.
Sotirov, Metodi, and Michael Memmler. 2012. The Advocacy Coalition Framework in Natural Resource
Policy StudiesRecent Experiences and Further Prospects. Forest Policy and Economics 16: 5164.
Stensdal, Iselin. 2012. Chinas Climate-Change Policy 19882011: From Zero to Hero? FNI Report 9/2012.
Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansens Institute.
Tavares, Antnio F., and Pedro J. Cames. 2007. Local Service Delivery Choices in Portugal: A Political
Transactions-Costs Framework. Local Government Studies 33 (4): 53553.
Taylor, Jami K., Daniel C. Lewis, Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, and Brian Shapiro. 2012. Content and Com-
plexity in Policy Reinvention and Diffusion. Gay and Transgender-Inclusive Laws against Discrimi-
nation. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 12 (1): 7598.
Theodoulou, Stella Z., and Matthew A. Cahn. 1995. The Contemporary Language of Public Policy: A
Starting Point. In Public Policy: The Essential Readings, eds. Stella Z. Theodoulou and Matthew A.
Cahn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 119.
Tiebout, Charles. 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64: 41624.
True, James L., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2007. Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory:
Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policy Making. In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A.
Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 15588.
van der Heiden, Nico, and Felix Strebel. 2012. What About Non-diffusion? The Effect of Competitiveness
in Policy-comparative Diffusion Research. Policy Science 45: 34558.
Weible, Christopher M., Paul A. Sabatier, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Daniel Nohrstedt, Adam Douglas
Henry, and Peter deLeon. 2011. A Quarter Century of the Advocacy Coalition Framework: An
Introduction to the Special Issue. Policy Studies Journal 39 (3): 34960.
Weible, Christopher M., Saba N. Siddiki, and Jonathan J. Pierce. 2011. Foes to Friends: Changing Contexts
and Changing Intergroup Perceptions. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 13
(5): 499525.
Winkel, Georg, and Metodi Sotirov. 2011. An Obituary for National Forest Programmes? Analyzing and
Learning from the Strategic Use of New Models of Governance in Germany and Bulgaria. Forest
Policy and Economics 13: 14354.
Wolfe, Michelle. 2012. Putting on the Brakes or Pressing on the Gas? Media Attention and the Speed of
Policymaking. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 10926.
Worsham, Jeff, and Chaun Stores. 2012. Pet Sounds: Subsystems, Regimes, Policy Punctuations, and the
Neglect of African American Farmers, 19352006. Policy Studies Journal 40 (1): 16987.
Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 2007. The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects. In
Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 6592.
S32 Policy Studies Journal, 42:S1