SEALOADER SHIPPING CORPORATION VS.

GRAND CEMENT MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION
Doctrine:
Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection
Facts:
Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Aggrement with Joyce Launch for the chartering of MT
Viper in order to tow its unpropelled barges for a minimum of 15 days.
Sealoder entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement clinkers and the
delivery thereof to Manila. On March 31, 1994, Sealoders barge arrived at the wharf of Grand
Cement tugged by MT Viper. It was not immediately loaded as the employees of Grand Cement
were loaded another vessel.
On April 4, typhoon Bising struck Cebu area. The barge was still docked at the wharf of Grand
Cement. As it became stronger, MT Viper tried to tow the barge away but it was unsuccessful
because the towing line connecting the vessels snapped since the mooring lines were not cast off,
which is the ultimate cause. Hence, the barge rammed the wharf causing significant damage.
Grand Cement filed a complaint for damages (P2.4M) since Sealoader ignored its demands.
They allege that Sealoader was negligent when it ignored its employees advice to move the
vessels after it had received weather updates. Sealoader filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that Joyce Launch is the one liable since it was the owner of MT Viper, whos employees were
manning the vessel. Sealoader filed a cross-claim against Joyce Launch. Joyce maintains that the
damages were due to force majeure and faulted Grand Cements employees for abandoning the
wharf leaving them helpless and for not warning them early on.

Upon testimonies, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Grand Cement holding the two
companies liable since there was complete disregard of the storm signal, the captain of the vessel
was not present and the vessel was not equipped with a radio or any navigational facility, which
is mandatory. Joyce launch did not appeal.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision but on MR, it partly reversed its decision finding Grand
Cement to be guilty of contributory negligence since it was found that it was still loading the
other vessel at the last minute just before the storm hit, hence Sealodersvessel did not move.
Damages were reduced to 50%. Hence, petition for review to SC.

Issue:
Who should be liable for damage sustained by the wharf of Grand Cement?

Ruling:
Sealoader is liable for its negligence. First because it was not equipped with a radio or a
navigational facility and it failed to monitor the prevailing weather conditions. Second, it cannot
pass the responsibility of casting off the mooring lines because the people at the wharf could not
just cast off the mooring lines without any instructions from the crew of the vessel. It should
have taken the initiative to cast off the mooring lines early on.

With regard to Grand Cements contributory negligence, the court found that it was not guilty
thereof. It had timely informed the barge of the impending typhoon and directed the vessels to
move to a safer place. Sealoader had the responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather
conditions in the areas where its vessel was to sail. It cannot merely rely on other vessels for
weather updates and warnings on approaching storms. For to do so would be to gamble with the
safety of its own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as
running the rick of causing damage to property of third parties for which it would necessarily be
liable.


Ong v. Metropolitan Water District - G.R. No. L-7664 (August 29, 1958)

Torts and Damages Due Diligence as a Defense
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming pool
operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three
proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so
as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards
who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that hell just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of
Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big
pool and notified the lifeguard in attendant (Abao), who immediately dove into the water. The
body was later identified as Dominadors. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of
no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its employees.
During trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other testified that Abao was reading a magazine
and was chatting with a security guard when the incident happened and that he was called a third
time before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming that there was no
negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of Last Clear Chance for
having the last opportunity to save the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.
HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all
of them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were proper
safety measures and precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due
diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper defense in this case. Further, the testimony in
court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the statements they have given to the
investigators when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was
called about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is of no application here. It was not established as to how
Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him
returned not until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance
doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously (how can the
lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to the big pool if he did not
see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

Bustamante V. CA (1991)
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven
by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria,
Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus
jointly by Magtibay and Serrado
before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming
from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the
truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the
driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give
more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the
highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the
collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the
collision making him solely liable
HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered
in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability










Proximate cause vs. contributory negligence.
In the tort-related case of LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 184905, August 28, 2009, the issue for resolution by the Philippine Supreme Court was
whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay
respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a vehicular
collision. It declared the following doctrines on proximate cause and contributory negligence,
thus:

1. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:

Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

2. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.

3. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing
Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law.
Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any
damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

4. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

5. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.

6. Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since
it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate
cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that
Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a
result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not
eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.