G.R. No.

107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly
proved.
1
Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
2
The claimant is duty-
bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages
are borne.
3
A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages
4
as well as hearsay
5
or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
6
Such
are the jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia
XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near
Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this
finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,
7
private respondent sued the
LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan
City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the
legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00).
8
In particular, private respondent prayed for an award of
P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V
Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of thePetroparcel.
9

For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground that the
original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV.
10
Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also
alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the
replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should
be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private
respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would
thereafter be proven.
11

Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a defendant
12
which the
lower court granted in its order of September 16,
1985.
13
After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5, 1987,
the lower court issued a pre-trial order
14
containing, among other things, a stipulations of facts, to
wit:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by
plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its way
to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker "Petroparcel"
causing the former to sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident and
on 21 November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, the Honorable
Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to be the
reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO
"Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in
favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several
tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into an
Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business properties
and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments including the
motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes, without
qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it obtained over the
LSCO "Petroparcel".
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC
was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea accident
of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the latter.
7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry
of National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and
Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel".
8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt.
Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and imprudent
manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo, plaintiff
suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes,
which went down with the ship when it sank the replacement value of which should be
left to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court
15
rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case No.
C-9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the
plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per
annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against
defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private
respondent consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del
Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by private
respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross
tonnage. According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of
assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with the vessel were two cummins
engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and compass. He further added that with the loss of his
flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of
counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for
commencing suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the following
pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V
Maria Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by Delfin
Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of the collision,
the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left side that caused it to
sink with its cargo of 1,050 baerasvalued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler
issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and
Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction
of such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D.
Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195
bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January
20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight
Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno
Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two
units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January
21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope (5" cir. X
300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.),
P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"),
P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong
Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per
appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of
20% of the total amount recovered and that attorney's fee to be awarded by
the court should be given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10,
1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18
3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500
and baera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and
all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were
given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to
offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations
submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates
as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this reason, the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement
value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost
due to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants were not rebutted by
the latter with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo
Lazaro relied heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive
or bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to
substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth
of the credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus
Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's decision contending
that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was
entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than that prayed for in the
second amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had
raised in its memorandum.
16
Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration
expounding on whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the prescribed docket fee.
17

On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit.
18
Apparently not
having received the order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for
leave to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said motion.
19
Hence, on February 12,
1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance
of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and academic.
20

Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992.
21
On petitioner's assertion that the
award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the
Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because
as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and
determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the
documentary evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals,
trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the
trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to
be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather
than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 13, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial
courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which
crystallized through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in
the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it
is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter
found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or
ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31, 1950; cited in
Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by
appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that
petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness,
admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations)
appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of
appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and
which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended
complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended
complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to conform with the
evidence presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within
the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in Sun
Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion,
22
the additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still owing the
court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as
actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not
base such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2)
there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the
replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the
prices quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private
respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its claim for unrealized profit and business
opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to prove the extent and actual value of damages
sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels.
23

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural
justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury
inflicted and not to impose a penalty.
24
In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages
include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
25
There are
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses
(dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained
to him (lucro cesante).
26
Thus:
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled
to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he
would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a
proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other
words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the
chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at
least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, .
. .
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain
of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters
actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On
the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements
and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to
the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it
was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value
of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual
circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too
remote at the time of the loss.
27
[Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available.
28
The burden of proof is on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other.
29
In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making
an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.
30

In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general
manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the
1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the collision happened, the
pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or
approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits
in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same
pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the
witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither
was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
31
Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits,
the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of
P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private respondent
did not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations
that became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the
testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents
of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one
who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of
P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare
assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of
private respondent corporation
32
whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the
lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes
loaded on the vessel should be given credence
33
considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do
not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth.
34
We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence
presented to support Del Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that
the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses.
35
Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
36
On this point, we believe that the exhibits do
not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
37

It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like"
under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals
considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however, that these exhibits
should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial
court."
38
Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would show that the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list,
register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of
persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the
same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H
39
are not
"commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published compilations" under
Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
40
The exhibits mentioned are mere price
quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment
similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or
quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or
periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation."
41
These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for
example Exhibit D which reads:
January 20, 1987
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
Navotas, Metro Manila
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
Gentlemen:
In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine Engine, to
wit.
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195
bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, natural
aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, 855 cu. In.
displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting coupled with Twin-
Disc Marine gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction ratio,
includes oil cooler, companion flange, manual and standard
accessories as per attached sheet.
Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit
Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00
TERMS : CASH
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
Very truly yours,
POWER SYSTEMS,
INC.
(Sgd.)
E. D. Daclan
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the
general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary evidence.
42
Hence, in one
case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering an allowance for an automobile
upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a "price current" or
"commercial list" within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of the
article specified therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though
the clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the letter in due course of business upon
instructions of the dealer.
43

But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters
or communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent," evidence
should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or technical grounds,"
44
the same pieces
of evidence, however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to
point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to considered at all.
45
On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
46
Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence.
Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the
litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without
objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without objection, the same
may be considered as any other properly admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is
entitled to no more consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that
although the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first time on
appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and should be disregarded
whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made" quoting Jones on Evidence "it
(hearsay) becomes evidence by reason of the want of such objection even though its
admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and
quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the
mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always
prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence,
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter alios acta, or his
failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
47

Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
48

Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private
respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German Airlines v.
Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is
"entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."
[Emphasis supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts
or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been
invaded.
50
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall
preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties
to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they
are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.
51
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of
such damages.
52
The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special
reasons extant in the case.
53

Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's
vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount of
P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value
of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it
claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should
diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that
such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes
that such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a
fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of
action.
54
Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent
paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket
fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
55
the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment
even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its
amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the
ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court
after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,
56
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging
the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint
on April 16, 1985,
57
petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on
December 29, 1989
58
when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that
petitioner raised the question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby
MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the
fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not
adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe
that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
59
in favor of private respondent as and for nominal
damages is in order. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 190521 January 12, 2011
LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, and MARY JANE TAN, MARY
LYN TAN, CELEDONIO TAN, JR., MARY JOY TAN, and MARK ALLAN TAN, represented herein by their
mother, LETICIA TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
OMC CARRIERS, INC. and BONIFACIO ARAMBALA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration
1
filed by Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina, Marilou Spooner,
Rosalinda Tan, Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan, and Mark Allan Tan
(petitioners), all heirs of the late Celedonio Tan asking us to reverse and set aside our Resolution of
February 17, 2010.
2
We denied in this Resolution their petition for review on certiorari for failing to
show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision of June 22, 2009
3
sufficient
to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The CA decision, in turn, affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-186, finding the respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. (OMC) and
Bonifacio Arambala guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to the petitioners.
THE FACTS
On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against OMC and
Bonifacio Arambala.
4
The complaint states that on November 24, 1995, at around 6:15 a.m.,
Arambala was driving a truck
5
with a trailer
6
owned by OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa
City. When Arambala noticed that the truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to
jump out. Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck
rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her husband
Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the doorway of the house at the time.
7

The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMCs gross negligence in not properly
maintaining the truck, and to Arambalas recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck. Thus,
they claimed that the respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages
that they suffered, which include the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred
for Celedonio Tans burial, as well as the loss of his earning capacity. The petitioners also asked for
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
8

The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the damage to the
petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the slippery condition of
the road caused by spilled motor oil.
9

THE RTC DECISION
After trial, the RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the petitioners for
damages.
10
Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held that it was unusual for a truck to
suddenly lose its brakes; the fact that the truck rammed into the petitioners house raised the
presumption of negligence on the part of the respondents. These, the respondents failed to refute.
11

The RTC did not agree with the respondents claim of a fortuitous event, pointing out that even with
oil on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any precautionary measure to prevent the truck
from skidding off the road. The alleged oil on the road did not also explain why the truck lost its
brakes. Had OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its use, the defective brake could
have been discovered. The RTC, thus, held OMC jointly and severally liable with Arambala for the
damage caused to the petitioners, based on the principle of vicarious liability embodied in Article
2180
12
of the Civil Code.
13

The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants ordering:
1. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of Celedonio Tan;
2. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 for the
loss of earning capacity of Celedonio Tan, plus interest thereon from the date of death of
Celedonio Tan;
3. The defendants to pay the plaintiff Leticia Tan jointly and severally the amount
of P355,895.00 as actual damages;
4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 as
moral damages;
5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and
6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the amount of P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
14

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings on the issues of the respondents negligence and
liability for damages. However, the CA modified the damages awarded to the petitioners by reducing
the actual damages award from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The CA observed that only the latter
amount was duly supported by official receipts.
15

The CA also deleted the RTCs award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained that the
petitioners failed to substantiate Celedonio Tans claimed earning capacity with reasonable certainty;
no documentary evidence was ever presented on this point. Instead, the RTC merely relied on Leticia
Tans testimony regarding Celedonio Tans income. The CA characterized this testimony as self-
serving.
16

The CA further reduced the exemplary damages from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00, and deleted the
award of attorneys fees because the RTC merely included the award in the dispositive portion of the
decision without discussing its legal basis.
17

THE PETITION
In the petition for review on certiorari before us,
18
the petitioners assert that the CA erred when it
modified the RTCs awarded damages. The petitioners submit the reasons outlined below.
First, the CA erred when it reduced the RTCs award of actual damages from P355,895.00
to P72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they sought compensation for the damage done to
petitioner Leticia Tans house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, as well as other household
appliances. Since the damages primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property, and not the
cost of repairing or replacing them, the value cannot be evidenced by receipts. Accordingly, the RTC
correctly relied on petitioner Leticia Tans testimony and the documentary evidence presented,
consisting of pictures of the damaged property, to prove their right to recover actual damages for the
destroyed property.
Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of Celedonio Tans earning
capacity. While they admit that they did not submit any documentary evidence to substantiate this
claim, the petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan was undisputably a self-employed tailor who
owned a small tailor shop; in his line of work, no documentary evidence is available.
Third, the petitioners maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 because the RTC and the CA consistently found that the collision was caused by the
respondents gross negligence. Moreover, the respondents acted with bad faith when they fabricated
the "oil slick on the road" story to avoid paying damages to the petitioners. As observed by the CA,
the Traffic Accident Investigation Report did not mention any motor oil on the road at the time of the
accident. SPO4 Armando Alambro, the Investigation Officer, likewise testified that there was no oil on
the road at the time of the accident. For the public good and to serve as an example, the respondents
should be made to pay P500,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Lastly, the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code which
provides, among others, that attorneys fees can be recovered when exemplary damages are
awarded, and when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
We initially denied the petition in our Resolution of February 17, 2010, for the petitioners failure to
show any reversible error in the CA decision sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. In our Resolution of August 11, 2010, we reinstated the petition on the basis of
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
OUR RULING
Finding merit in the petitioners arguments, we partly grant the petition.
Procedural Issue
As both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents gross negligence led to the death of
Celedonio Tan, as well as to the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring shop, we see no
reason to disturb this factual finding. We, thus, concentrate on the sole issue of what damages the
petitioners are entitled to.
We are generally precluded from resolving a Rule 45 petition that solely raises the issue of damages,
an essentially factual question, because Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
In light, however of the RTCs and the CAs conflicting findings on the kind and amount of damages
suffered which must be compensated, we are compelled to consider the case as one of the recognized
exceptions.
19
We look into the parties presented evidence to resolve this appeal.
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
We begin by discussing the petitioners claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on
petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and
various household appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be
pleading and proof of actual damages suffered.
20
As we explained in Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Delos Santos:
21

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages,
there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts.
22

The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for actual
damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring shop when the
truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tans
house and tailoring shop can be awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.
23
As defined in Article 2224 of the Civil Code:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,
24
we disallowed the award of actual damages
arising from breach of contract, where the respondent merely alleged that it was entitled to actual
damages and failed to adduce proof to support its plea. In its place, we awarded temperate damages,
in recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered.
The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the
house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners appliances and equipment.
25
Irrefutably, this damage
was directly attributable to Arambalas gross negligence in handling OMCs truck. Unfortunately,
these photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the
attendant circumstances and given the property destroyed,
26
we find the amount of P200,000.00 as a
fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages.
Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity.
Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which
states that:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by
the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death[.]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning
capacity.
27
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed
as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
28

According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned
approximatelyP156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At the time of his death in 1995, the
prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00,
29
or P3,770.00 per month, provided the wage earner
had only one rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop
normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary
evidence of the income it earns, Celedonios alleged monthly income ofP13,000.00 greatly exceeded
the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply.
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the
allegation of the injured partys actual income.
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,
30
we sustained the award of temperate damages in the amount
of P200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity because the plaintiffs income
was not sufficiently proven.
We did the same in People v. Singh,
31
and People v. Almedilla,
32
granting temperate damages in place
of actual damages for the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of the deceaseds
income.
Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,
33
we deleted the award of damages for loss of earning
capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss. Nevertheless, because the
income-earning capacity lost was clearly established, we awarded the heirs P500,000.00 as
temperate damages.
In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed. Petitioners
Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at
the time the petition was filed on February 4, 2010,
34
and they all relied mainly on the income earned
by their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance and support. Under these facts and
taking into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the petitioners are
entitled to temperate damages in the amount ofP300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross income for two
(2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.
Reduction of exemplary damages proper
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
35
In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
36

Celedonio Tans death and the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring shop were
unquestionably caused by the respondents gross negligence. The law allows the grant of exemplary
damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the pubic and as a deterrent against the
repetition of this kind of deleterious actions.
37
The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not
intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CAs
reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 to
be proper.
Attorneys fees in order
In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners attorney's
fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code.
38
We find the award of attorneys fees,
equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the
circumstances.
Interests due
Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
39
which held that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts

is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII
on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.lavvphil
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum.

No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts to run from
May 14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the time this judgment becomes final
and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment amount and the interest
earned up to that date, until the judgment is wholly satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The June 22, 2009 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 84733, which modified the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No. 96-186, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As
modified, respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala are ordered to jointly and severally
pay the petitioners the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Celedonio Tan;
(2) P72,295.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses;
(3) P200,000.00 as temperate damages for the damage done to petitioner Leticias house,
tailoring shop, household appliances and shop equipment;
(4) P300,000.00 as damages for the loss of Celedonio Tans earning capacity;
(5) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
(6) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(7) 10% of the total amount as attorneys fees; and costs of suit.
In addition, the total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from May 14,
2003, and at the rate of 12% per annum, from the finality of this Resolution on the balance and
interest due, until fully paid.
G.R. No. 94590 July 29, 1992
CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL J. OCAMPO, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Manuel J. Ocampo bought, through the Ultraman Travel Agency, a round-trip
ticket for Manila-San Francisco-Manila from petitioner China Airlines Limited ("CAL"). The ticket
purchased was a GV-10, or a Group Tour, ticket for which Ocampo paid a special discounted
(reduced) price of P6,063.00. A Group Tour ticket is issued to members of a group of at least ten (10)
passengers travelling for a minimum of fourteen (14) days and for a maximum of thirty-five (35)
days. It is a condition of a Group Tour ticket that the holder thereof must stay in the place of
destination (in this case, the United States), for at least fourteen (14) but not exceeding thirty-five
(35) days. The portion of the ticket covering the return trip may be used only after expiration of
fourteen (14) days counted from the date of arrival at the place of destination; beyond the thirty-five
(35) allowable days, the return trip ticket is no longer valid.
The ticket purchased by respondent Ocampo bore the following schedule and status:
Date Time Status
Manila-Taipei 09 May 1030 RQ
Taipei-S.F. 09 May 1525 RQ
S.F.-Honolulu 24 May 2350 RQ
Honolulu-Tokyo 30 May 0405 RQ
Tokyo-Taipei 02 June 1545 RQ
Taipei-Manila 09 June 1120 RQ
1

It will be noted from the above schedule that respondent Ocampo's return flight from San
Francisco to Manila was scheduled for 24 May 1979, i.e., the 15th day after arrival in San
Francisco. Respondent Ocampo, however, wanted to leave for Manila earlier than 24 May 1979
because he had several business meetings scheduled to be held here prior to 24 May 1979 and
because of his desire to attend to his wife's and son's forthcoming departure for Europe
scheduled on 24 May 1979.
2

Notwithstanding the limitations on his discounted GV-10 ticket, therefore, respondent Ocampo
sought to make special arrangements, through Ultraman Travel Agency, with CAL Manila for a change
in schedule. The travel agency was, according to respondent Ocampo, assured that the necessary
adjustments would be made and that Mr. Ocampo could definitely take the CAL flight from San
Francisco on 18 May 1979. Not satisfied, respondent Ocampo sent his private secretary to the office
of CAL Manila to have the ticket changed. There, the secretary was handed a typewritten note
purporting to show a revised schedule for the different sectors of the return trip from San Francisco
to Manila with the corresponding flight numbers. The revised schedule was as follows:
CI001 flight number
dep San Francisco 11:50 p.m. May 18
arr Honolulu 1:55 a.m. May 19
C1007 flight number
dep Honolulu 4:05 a.m. May 20
arr Taipei 10:25 a.m. May 21
C1811 flight number
dep Taipei 11:20 a.m. May 21
arr Manila 1:10 p.m. May 21
3

Respondent Ocampo was asked to reconfirm his return flight with CAL San Francisco which would
alter the ticket by attaching a sticker on it showing the adjusted flights and departure dates. The
revised schedule was also entered into respondent Ocampo's reservation card on file in the office of
CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo left Manila for San Francisco's on 9 May 1979 and arrived in San Francisco also
on the same day, San Francisco local time. Next day, he proceeded to CAL San Francisco' office to
confirm his revised return flight schedule. CAL San Francisco, however, declined to confirm his
return flight, since the date indicated on the ticket was not 18 May 1979 but rather 24 May 1979. Mr.
Ocampo, however, apprised CAL San Francisco about the special arrangement that he had requested
from CAL Manila. CAL San Francisco contacted CAL Manila by telex requesting verification of the
revised schedule for respondent Ocampo. CAL San Francisco, however, received a negative reply
from CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo persisted in his efforts to book himself on the CAL San Francisco-Honolulu flight
on 18 May 1979. By telephone, he contacted his private secretary in Manila to make the necessary
inquiry and verification at CAL Manila. His secretary later telephoned back to inform him that CAL
Manila would forthwith send a communication to CAL San Francisco to correct the situation. With
that information, respondent Ocampo proceeded once more to CAL San Francisco and left his
telephone number and address where he could be contacted upon receipt of confirmation from CAL
Manila.
CAL San Francisco never sent any notice to private respondent. On the morning of 18 May 1979,
respondent Ocampo went to CAL San Francisco's office to check again on the status of his return
flight; there he was apparently informed that CAL Manila had not responded. Respondent Ocampo
was accordingly constrained to take a Philippine Airlines flight which left San Francisco on 20 May
1979, the earliest available return flight which respondent Ocampo could secure after 18 May 1979.
4

Upon arrival in Manila, respondent Ocampo demanded an explanation from CAL Manila. He was told
candidly that a mistake had been committed by an employee of CAL Manila who had sent a negative
reply to CAL San Francisco's request for confirmation without first consulting Ocampo's passenger
reservation card. Another employee or representative of CAL Manila offered private respondent
compensation for actual expenses incurred by him due to his inability to board the CAL 18 May 1979
flight from San Francisco. Private respondent asked that the offer be reduced to writing; however,
nothing in writing emanated from CAL Manila and nothing further happened.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila. He asked for P200,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 23 May 1983, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which read as follows:
In View of the Foregoing Considerations, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that
when the plaintiff tried to return to Manila from San Francisco, a date different from the
scheduled date of his departure from San Francisco as contained in his plane ticket, the
plaintiff is considered as a chance passenger and could only board the defendant's plane,
on his departure on May 18, 1979 depending upon the volume of passengers and plane
load on May 18, 1979 and defendant had not violated any provisions of the plane ticket
issued to the plaintiff which is the contract between plaintiff and the defendant; the
complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of cause of action. On principles of equity and
justice, defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse the plaintiff the sum of $601.00 or its
equivalent value in Philippine Currency at the rate then existing on May 18, 1979. The
counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed as tin same had not been fully
established, without special pronouncement as to cost.
So ordered.
5

On appeal by private respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The Court
of Appeals found petitioner CAL guilt of bad faith in not allowing respondent Ocampo to board the 18
May 1979 CAL flight in San Francisco despite messages from CAL Manila confirming the change in
schedule and the availability of seats for the different sectors of the flight from San Francisco to
Manila. The Court of Appeals awarded, in addition to the US$601 that the trial court had ordered CAL
to pay to private respondent, the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages, another P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of P50,000.00.
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner CAL argues that:
1. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner [was] liable to the
private respondent on the basis that he had a confirmed reservation contrary to the
express finding of the lower court.
2. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner was guilty of bad
faith.
3. The respondent Court erred when it awarded damages not warranted by the evidence
and which are excessive.
6

We note that while the ticket, held by private respondent himself, showed on its face a 24 May 1979
departure from San Francisco to Honolulu and a "RQ" [Request] status, the evidence of record
showed that private respondent had indeed requested CAL Manila for an earlier return flight, to
which request CAL Manila eventually agreed. The record shows a stream of telexes between the
several offices of petitioner CAL involved in respondent's trip, disclosing the following salient facts:
1. On 7 May 1979 at 2:54 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent telexes to CAL Taipei and CAL San
Francisco informing the two (2) offices that respondent Ocampo had a sold seat for the sector San
Francisco-Honolulu on 18 May 1979, but that the status of the sector Honolulu-Taipei for 20 May
1979 and the sector Taipei-Manila for 21 May 1979, was only "wait listed."
2. On 7 May 1979 at 4:44 p.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco sent a reply to CAL Manila to
confirm the San Francisco-Honolulu sector scheduled for 18 May 1979 as well as the Honolulu-Taipei
sector for 20 May 1979.
3. On 8 May 1979, at 10:10 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent another telex to CAL Taipei, urging the
latter to do everything possible to confirm the Taipei-Manila sector of the flight scheduled for 21 May
1979.
4. On 14 May 1979 at 8:06 a.m., Taipei time, CAL Taipei telexed CAL Manila confirming the Taipei-
Manila sector as earlier requested.
5. On 17 May 1979 at 1:10 P.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco, which by then had learned
about the confirmed status of all segments of the flight San Francisco-Manila, reiterated its request to
CAL Manila for an early departure authority, i.e., as an exception to the regular conditions of a GV-10
ticket, so that respondent Ocampo may be allowed to board the 18 May 1979 flight leaving San
Francisco for Honolulu.
6. On 17 May 1979 at 2:28 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila instructed CAL San Francisco to inform
respondent Ocampo of the confirmed status of the different sectors of his return flight, and to accept
private respondent for carriage by reason of a prior arrangement made with CAL Manila.
7. On 18 May 1979 at 9:32 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent an urgent message to CAL San
Francisco substantially reiterating the instructions in CAL Manila's telex of 17 May 1979 sent at 2:28
p.m. For some reason not clear in the record, the last two (2) telexes received in CAL San Francisco
from CAL Manila apparently did not get to the attention of, and were not acted upon by, the right
person or persons in CAL San Francisco.
Because CAL Taipei had confirmed as early as 14 May 1979 the Taipei-Manila sector of Private
respondent's return trip, public respondent Court of Appeals considered CAL San Francisco's refusal
to board private respondent as an act of bad faith, and awarded private respondent the large
amounts he sought by way of moral and exemplary damages totalling P400,000.00.
We consider that private respondent was able to show that petitioner CAL had indeed confirmed a
seat for Mr. Ocampo on the 18 May 1979 flight from San Francisco-Honolulu (and all the way to
Manila). We agree, therefore, with the Court of Appeals that petitioner CAL had breached its contract
of carriage with private respondent by such failure or refusal to board him on that flight.
We are not, however, persuaded that that breach of contractual obligation had been attended by bad
faith or malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. To the contrary, it appears to the Court
that petitioner CAL had exercised diligent efforts to effect the change of schedule which it apparently
had earlier stated to private respondent (prior to his departure from Manila) it would carry out.
There was clearly a concerted effort among the involved CAL offices as shown by the flow of telexes
from one to the others. If at the outset, petitioner CAL simply did not intend to comply with its
promise to private respondent that it would accommodate his requested change of schedule, it would
not have taken the trouble of composing and transmitting all those telexes between its several
offices.
CAL San Francisco was obviously aware of the limitations on a GV-10 CAL ticket and its employee(s)
who bad refused to accede summarily to respondent Ocampo's request for confirmation of his
revised schedule, cannot be held guilty of bad faith; the procedure adopted of seeking verification
from CAL Manila was one taken in the usual course of business and was not in itself unreasonable or
arbitrary.
7
There responsible officer(s) of CAL Manila admitted that it had initially sent an erroneous
message to CAL San Francisco concerning authorization for early departure of private respondent
from San Francisco. While the CAL Manila employee who had sent a mistaken telex message was
negligent, there was no evidence either of deliberate malice or of gross negligence. The last two (2)
telexes sent by CAL Manila to CAL San Francisco on 17 May and 18 May 1979 were presumably
received by CAL San Francisco in time to have relayed to respondent Ocampo his acceptance as a
passenger on the CAL flight out of San Francisco scheduled for 18 May 1979. Again, however, we do
not believe that respondent Ocampo had convincingly shown that the employees of petitioner CAL
were motivated by personal malice or bad faith, or that there was patently negligence so gross as to
amount to bad faith. Bad faith under the law is not presumed; it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. 8 Private respondent has not adduced that kind of evidence in the instant case.
There was no pretense that any of the employee of any of the CAL offices involved knew respondent
Ocampo from Adam.
Under Article 2201 of the Civil Code, the measure of recoverable damages for breach of contract
varies according to the circumstances attending that breach. Article 2201 provides:
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach
of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen
at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude the obligor shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2220 is also pertinent:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the law distinguishes a contractual breach effected in good faith from one attended by
bad faith. Where in breaching the contract, the defendant is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties had foreseen or could
reasonably have foreseen; and in that case, such liability would not include liability for moral
and exemplary damages.
9
Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in a contractual or quasi-
contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted
in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." We are unable to so
characterize the behavior here shown of the employees of CAL Manila and of CAL San
Francisco. Thus, we believe and so hold that the damages recoverable by respondent Ocampo
are limited to the peso value of the Philippine Airlines ticket it had purchased for his return
flight from San Francisco; and reasonable expenses occasioned to private respondent by
reason of the delay in his return San Francisco-Manila trip exercising the Court's discretion,
we believe that for such expenses, US$1,500.00 would be a reasonable amount
plus attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00, considering that respondent Ocampo was
ultimately compelled to litigate his claim against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 July 1990 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring petitioner to pay private respondent Ocampo
the Philippine Peso equivalent of US$2,101.00, at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
payment thereof, as reasonable compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees in the amount of
P15,000.00 and costs. Petitioner's counterclaim before the trial court is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-12306 October 22, 1918
SIMONA MANZANARES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
RAFAEL MORETA, defendant-appellant.
Sanz & Luzuriaga for appellant.
Jose C. Zulueta for appellee.

TORRES, J.:
In the case which is brought for the recovery of the damages resulting from the death of the child
Salvador Bona, of from 8 to 9 years of age, who had been run over by an automobile driven and
managed by the defendant on the morning of March 5, 1916, a judgment was rendered on August 3,
1916, whereby the said defendant was sentenced to pay the sum of P1,000 as indemnity child, and to
pay the costs. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by the defendant after his motion for a new
trial had been overruled, and the case is now before this court by bill of exceptions.
The statement of facts is at once admitted, and we find no reason for disturbing the findings made by
the trail judge in his judgement appealed from, wherein the defendant was found liable for the
accident which occurred to the said child on Solana Street on the morning of said day, and
consequently, the defendant, as the one who had cause the accident, is bound to indemnify the
mother of the deceased child in the amount of P1,000, which was deemed by the trial judge to be the
value of the damages occasioned to the mother for the loss and death of a member of her family.
To the reasons given by the trail judge as grounds for his decision, we deem pertinent to add the
following:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his
auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter
street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana street, it is to be believed that, when
he against stated to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully
crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was
run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred,
if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of
crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left; and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and
the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a
distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana
Street form Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the
child would not have occurred.
In view of the foregoing considerations as well as those contained in the judgment of the trial court,
which, we believe that he errors assigned by the appellant are thereby refuted and that therefore the
judgment appealed from, should be, as it hereby is, affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The facts are few and simple. A male child, 8 or 9 years of age, was killed through the negligence of
the defendant in driving his automobile. The mother of the dead boy is a widow, a poor
washerwoman. She brings action against the defendant to recover damages for her loss in the
amount of P5,000. Without there having been tendered any special proof of the amount of damages
suffered, the trial court found the defendant responsible and condemned him to pay to plaintiff the
sum of P1,000. The decision of this Court handed down by Justice Torres, affirms the judgment of the
Court of First Instance. If necessary, the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of
Burvant vs. Wolfe [1910], 126 La., 787), could be cited as corroborative authority.
The principles of law which measure the pecuniary responsibility of the defendant, not discussed in
the main opinion, are more difficult. Since the time of Grotius and even before, lawyers and publicists
have speculated as to whether the loss of a human life should be compensated in money, and if so, as
to the amount which should be allowed.
At Common Law no civil action lies for damages caused by the death of a human being by the
wrongful or negligent act of another. The maxim is actio personalis moritur cum persona. (Mobile Life
Ins. Co. vs. Brame [1878], 95 U.S., 754; Baker vs. Bolton, 1 Campb., 493.) Two different modes of
reasoning have arrived at this result. The first and older theory was the merger of the private right in
the public wrong. (The E.B. Ward, Jr. [1883], 16 Fed., 255.) The second and younger theory was that
the death of a human being cannot be complained of as a civil injury. under the latter doctrine, it has
been repeatedly held that a civil action by a parent for the death of a minor child cannot be
maintained. (Kramer vs. San Francisco market Street R. Co. [1864], 25 Cal., 434; Jackson vs. Pittsburg,
C.C. & St. L. R. Co. [1894], 140 Ind., 241; Wilson vs. Bumstead [1881], 12 Neb., 1; Sullivan vs. Union P.
R. Co. 1880], 2 Fed., 447; Osborn vs. Gillett [1873], L.R. 8 Exch., 88; Weems vs.Mathieson, 4 macq. H.L.
Cas. 215; Gulf, C. & S.F. ry. Co. vs. Beall [1897], 91 Tex., 310. See 41 L.R.A., 807, Note.)1awph!l.net
By the Civil Law, particularly as existing in Spain, France, Porto Rico, and Louisiana, the true principle
is somewhat beclouded. Thus, in Louisiana, a State favored by French and Spanish antecedents, the
exact question of whether an action for damages caused by the homicide of a human being can be
maintained, was presented by able counsel for the opinion of distinguished jurists. and it was held in
a decision, later expressly affirmed, that, under the Civil Law, the action could not be maintained by
the surviving wife or children. (Hubgh vs. new Orlenas & Carrollton R.R. Co. [1851], 6 La. Ann., 495;
Hermann vs. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co. [1856], 11 La Ann., 5; 24 Porthier Pandectes, p. 279;
law 13; 7 Partida, title 15, law 3.)
The same question has arisen in Porto Rico. It has there been held that by the civil law in force in
Porto Rico a civil action lies for negligence resulting in death. (Borrero vs. cia. Anonyma dela Luz
Electrica de Ponce [1903], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 144; Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit co. [1911], 17
Porto Rico, 64.) The right to sue for death from negligence of a defendant, by persons entitled to
support by the deceased has not been changed by the new civil Code of Porto Rico. (Torres vs. Ponce
Railway & Light Co. [1903], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 476.)
In Spain, from which both the Civil Law of Porto Rico and the Philippines were derived, it has been
decided that such an action could be maintained. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of
December 14, 1894.) In France, the highest court has interpreted the Code Napoleon as sanctioning
actions by those damaged by the death of another against persons by whose fault the death
happened. (Chavoix vs. Enfants Duport [1853], 1 Journal du Palais 614; Rollond's case, 19 Sirey, 269.)
That even in those jurisdictions in which the Common Law has force, the observance of the principle
has been resisted, is disclosed by the action of Hawaii in holding that there can be a recovery for
death by wrongful act. (The Schooner Robert Lewers Co. vs. Kekauoha [1902], 114 Fed., 849.) That
the impropriety of the judge-made rule was early disclosed, is shown by the numerous statutes,
beginning with Lord Campbell's Act, which were enacted to cover the deficiency by permitting of a
right by the Civil Law, because of a statute, an action will now lie for pecuniary and other damages
caused by death. (McCubbin vs. Hastings [1875], 27 La. Ann., 713.) And finally, that eminent
authorities recognize liability in case of death by negligence is disclosed by the mere mention of such
names as Grotius, Puffendorf, and Domat,. For instance, Grotius in his Rights of War and Peace said:
Exemplo haec sint. Homicida injustus, tenetur solvere impensas, si quae factae sunt in medicos,
et iis quos occisus alere exofficio solebat, puta parentibus, uxoribus liberis dare tantum,
quantum illa spes alimentorum, ratione habita aetatis occissi, valebat sicuti Hercules legitur
Iphiti a se occissi leberis mulctam pependissi, quo facilius expiaretur. Michael Ephesius ad
quintum Nocomachiorum Aristotillis; Alla kai o Phoenuthies elabe tropon tine O gare e gune
e oi paides, e oi suggenies tou phoneuthentos elabe tropon tine ekeino dedotai. Sed et qui
occisus est accipit aliquo modo. quae enim uxor ejus et liberi et cognati accipiunt, ipse
quodommodo accipit. Loquimur de homicida injusto, id est, qui non habuit jus id faciendi unde
mors sequitur. quare si quis jus haburit sed in caritatem peccavirit ut qui furgere nolout, non
tenebitur.
Vetae autem in libero homine aestimatio non fit, secus in servo qui vendi potuit. [11 La. Ann.,
5.]
The following may be for example: Any man slaying another, unjustly, is bound to discharge
the expenses, if any are contracted, for physicians, and to give to those whom the slain was in
duty accustomed to maintain-such as parents, wives, children-as much as that hope of
maintenance-regard being had to the age of the deceased-was worth: thus, Hercules is said to
have made reparation (paid a fine) to the Children of Iphitus, slain by him, in order that
expiation might more easily be made.
Michael, the Ephesian, says upon the 5th of the Nicomachii of Aristotle: "but also the person
slain receives, in some sort, for what the wife or children or relations of the person slain
receive is, in some sort given him." We are speaking of an unjust manslayer: that is, one who
had not the right of doing that from whence death follows.
Wherefore, if any one may have had the right, but has sinned against charity, as when one
(being assaulted) has been unwilling to flee, he shall not be bound. but of life, in case of a free
man, no valuation is made, otherwise, in case of a slave who can be sold.
Both because of the civil origin of the applicable law in the Philippines, because we re not fettered b
the harsh common law rule on the subject, because it is the modern and more equitable principle,
and because reason and natural justice are eloquent advocates, we hold that an action for damages
can be maintained in this jurisdiction for the death of a person by wrongful act. It can be admitted,
since objection has not been made, that the primary right of action is in the parent.
The second phase of our inquiry, pertaining to the amount of compensation for the loss of a human
life, must now be settled.
"Damage" has been defined by Escriche as the detriment, injury, or loss which are occasioned by
reason of fault of another in the property or person." (Escriche, Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, vol. 2, p. 597.) Of whatsoever nature the damage be, and from whatsoever cause it
may proceed, the person who has done the injury ought to repair it by an indemnity proportionate to
his fault and to the loss caused thereby. (Cushing, Domat's Civil Law, p. 741.) Damnum (dao or a
loss) must be shown to sustain an action for damages.
Philippine law as found in the well known article 1902 of the Civil Code, derived from Partida VII,
Title V, is to this effect. In order to give rise to the obligation imposed by this article of the Civil Code,
the coincidence of two distinct requisites is necessary, vis: (1) That there exist an injury or damage
not originating in acts or omissions of the prejudiced person demanding indemnification therefore;
(2) that said injury or damage be caused by the fault or negligence of a person other than the
sufferer. (12 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 604.)
Those seeking to recoup damages must ordinarily establish their pecuniary loss by satisfactory proof.
(Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, December 14, 1894; November 13 and 26, 1895; December
7, 1896; September 30, 1898, and December 16, 1903; Sanz vs. Lavin [1906], 6 Phil., 299; to Guioc-
Co vs. Del Rosario [1907], 8 Phil., 546; Diaz vs. San Juan Light and Transit Co. [1911], 17 Porto Rico,
64.) The customary elements of damages must be shown. But in certain cases, the law presumes a
loss because of the impossibility of exact proof and computation in respect to the amount of the loss
sustained. In other words, the loss can be proved either by evidence or by presumption. For instance,
where the elation of husband and wife or parent and child exist, provided the child is shown to be a
minor, the law presumes a pecuniary loss to the survivor from the fact of death, and it is not
necessary to submit proof as to such loss. (Chicago vs. Scholten [1874], 75 III., 468; Rockford, etc. R.
col. vs. Delaney [1876]; Atrops vs. Costello [1894], 8 Wash., 149; Mason vs. Southern R. Co [1900], 58
S. C. 70; McKechney vs. Redmond, 94 III. App., 470; Joliet vs. Weston, 22 III. Appl., 225;
Kelly vs. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 14 N.Y. St., 699; Dunhene vs. Ohio L. Ins. etc. co., 1 Disn., 257;
Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit Co. supra.)
In one of the cited cases, (City of Chicago vs. Hesing) on an action to recover damages resulting to the
parents, laboring people, by the death of their child four years old through negligence on the part of
the City of Chicago, the court said:
Only pecuniary damages can be recovered in such actions as this. Nothing can be given as
solace or for bereavement suffered. Under instructions declaring the true rule for estimating
the damages, the jury found for plaintiff, in the sum of $800, but one of the errors assigned is,
the amount found is excessive. As a matter of law, we cannot so declare, and as a matter of fact,
how can we know the amount is in excess of the pecuniary damages sustained? When proof is
made of the age an relationship of the deceased to next of kin, the jury may estimate the
pecuniary damages from the facts proven, in connection with their own knowledge and
experiences in relation to matters of common observation. It is not indispensable there should
be proof of actual services of pecuniary value rendered to next of kind, nor that any witness
should express an opinion as to the value of services that may have been or might be rendered.
Where the deceased was a minor, and left a father who would have been entitle dot his
services had he lived, the law implies a pecuniary loss, for which compensation, under the
statute, may be given.
The discretion of a jury, where there is a jury, or of the trial court, where the court possesses such
faculty, in fixing the amount of damages, will not be interfered with by the appellate court unless this
discretion has been palpably abused. Since in the very nature of things the value of a human life
cannot be exactly estimated in money, and since the elements which go to make up any value are
personal to each case, much must depend on the good sense and sound judgment of the jury or judge.
The rule has been applied to the death of minor children where there was nothing to show passion,
prejudice, or ignorance on the part of the jury. (See 13 Cyc., 375-377.)
The right of action for death and the presumption in favor of compensation begin admitted, the
difficulty of estimating in money the worth of a life should not keep a court from judicially
compensating the injured party as nearly as may be possible for the wrong. True, man is incapable of
measuring exactly in the delicate scales of justice the value of a human life. True, the feelings of a
mother on seeing her little son torn and mangled expiring dead could never be assuaged
with money. True, all the treasure in nature's vaults could not being to compensate a parent for the
loss of a beloved child. Nevertheless, within the bounds of human powers, the negligent should make
reparation for the loss.
Attempts at approximation in money for death have been made. Many American statutes have
arbitrarily limited the amounts that could e recovered to five thousand dollars or ten thousand
dollars. The federal Courst have intimated that these statutory limits should only be taken as a guide
to the permissible amount of damages. (Cheatham vs. Red River Line [1893], 56 Fed., 248; The
Oceanic [1894], 61 Fed., 338; Farmers' L. & t. co. vs.Toledo A.A. & N.M. Ry. co. [1895], 67 Fed. 73.) In
Louisiana, $2,500 & $3,000, $4,000, and $6,000 were allowed in the respective cases for the death of
a child. In Porto Rico, $1,000 and $1,500 has been allowed for such a loss. In the Philippines, the rule
has been in criminal cases to allow as a matter of course P1,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased.
The foregoing is believed to be a fair statement of the pertinent general principles. Before closing,
notice should be taken of the leading decisions of the supreme court of Spain and the supreme court
of Porto Rico. The first is the decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 14, 1894.
Eulogio Santa Maria died in Madrid in 1891, in consequence of a fall from the wall of the racket
known as "Jai-alai," which he was climbing for the purpose of placing the customary flags to
announce the opening of the game. The facts were investigated through criminal proceedings which
were discontinued, and then the widow of the deceased, in her own behalf and on behalf of her infant
daughter, Teodora, instituted a civil action in the proper court, alleging that "the cause of the fatal
accident resided in the fault and omission of the owners of the racket, because, as they knew and saw,
neither the place for the raising of the flags nor the road that had to be gone over to reach it were in a
condition to insure safety;" that at his death her husband had left two children, one named Anastasio,
of 14 years, had by his first marriage, and another named Teodora, of 3 years had by his second
marriage with the plaintiff; that the damages caused and for which the defendants should be held
responsible were of a twofold character that is, one having reference to affection and the other to
the loss of the modest pay which, capitalized at 5 per cent and added to the sum demandable for the
first mentioned consideration, amounted to 21,425 pesetas. The defendants alleged that the death of
the plaintiff's husband could not be ascribed to any fault, omission, or negligence on their part, etc.,
and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. After hearing the case the court rendered judgment
condemning the defendants to pay the sum of 5,000 pesetas to the heirs of the ceased as
indemnification for the latter's death. An appeal from said judgment having been taken by the
plaintiff, the defendants joined in said appeal and the "Audiencia territorial," in deciding the case,
adjudged the defendants to pay the plaintiff in her own right and as representative of her daughter,
Teodora, 5,000 pesetas, as indemnification for the death of her husband, affirming in these terms, the
judgment appealed form, and reserving to the other child of the deceased, who was not a party in this
case, his right likewise to demand indemnification. The defendants then took an appeal for
annulment of judgment to the supreme court, alleging that various laws had been violated and,
among other particulars, that the judgment did not state the amount at which the court valued the
life of Santa Maria nor was anything allowed the plaintiffs on the score of affection or for damages,
nor was the principle mentioned upon which the court had acted to fix the sum of 5,000pesetas.
The supreme court of Spain affirmed the judgment appealed from in its opinion of December 14,
1894, the grounds whereof are the following:
As to the ground the court had for concluding, in view of the evidence, that the death of the
unfortunate Eulogio Santa Maria was due to the omission on the part of the appellants, owners,
and managers of the racket (ball game) known as "Jai-Alai," of such precautions as were called
for to forestall the dangers attending the placing and removal of the streamers, which the
deceased had been doing with their knowledge and consent, and for their benefit, we find that
said court has correctly applied articles 1093, 1902, and 1903, and that it has not violated
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code, because, according to the first-mentioned
article, obligations arising from acts or omissions, in which faults or negligence, not punished
by law, occur, are subject to the provisions of said articles 1902 and 1903, and, according to
the latter, indemnification for the damage done lies whenever the act or omission has been the
cause of the damage and all the diligence of a good father of a family has not been observed,
either when the act or omission is personal with the party, or when it has reference to persons
for whom he should be responsible; and because the provisions of articles 1101, 1103, and
1104 are of a general character and applicable to all kinds of obligations and do not come in
conflict with the special provisions of articles 1902 and 1903;
The indemnification corresponding to the damage caused by a guilty act or omission, not
constituting a crime, should be declared, as are all indemnifications, in every suit, in
accordance with the particular damage caused to the claimants, and as in the judgment this has
been done with respect to Juana Alonzo Celada and her daughter, the only plaintiffs, by fixing
the sum due them, said judgment does not violate article 1902 of the code, and much less does
it violate article 360 of the Law of Civil Procedure;
The amount of the indemnification adjudged is based on the evidence taken and on the facts
admitted by both parties in their pleadings at the trial, wherefore there has been no violation
of article 1214, though lack of proof, as alleged.
As has heretofore been intimated, the Civil Las in Porto Rico, derived from the same source as that of
the Philippines, can well be looked to for persuasive authority. Thus, as disclosed by the facts in the
decision coming from the pen of Justice Del Toro, one Diaz brought a suit against the San Juan Light &
Transit Co. to recover the sum of $6,000 as damages. The district court of San Juan rendered
judgment declaring that the facts and the law were in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
and decreeing that the former should obtain from the latter the sum of $3,000 as damages. The
supreme court of Porto Rico said the issue was, that inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to produce any
evidence of the amount of damage sustained, judgment should not be rendered in this form. After
setting forth the decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 14, 1894, hereinbefore
described, and other authorities, the court said:
Applying the foregoing principles and those contained in section 1804 of the Revised Civil
Code to the specific case under consideration, we find that in the complaint it is alleged that the
complainant sustained damages which he estimates of $6,000, and that the immediate and
natural cause of said damages was the careless act of one of the employees of the defendant,
who was in its service and while in the discharge of his duties.
The evidence taken does not show that the complainant failed to earn, as a result of the injuries
received, a stated sum of money, or that he had to pay the physician who attended him another
stated sum, etc.; but it does show that the complainant, a man of 51 years of age, who worked
as a farmer and hawked about his products, supporting himself and his family with his labor,
while stepping out of one of the electric cars of the defendant, at Stop 71/2 of the San Juan-Rio
Piedras line, fell to the ground owing to the carelessness and inattention of the motorman in
starting the car before it was time; that he received a severe blow which rendered him
unconscious for some moments, fractured his lower jaw, and caused abrasions on his legs and
other parts of his body; that he remained at the hospital, having his injuries nursed, for more
or less one month, and that, on being examined at the trial-that is, one year and five months
after his fall-he presented on the right side of his face, as a consequence of the fracture, a
contraction which means paralysis, and could speak, but hardly masticate, and only with
difficulty could open and close his mouth. It does not appear from the evidence that he
complainant has been disabled, but it does appear that at the time the evidence was taken he
was suffering from nervous illness, according to the opinion of Dr. Stahl, one of the experts
who testified at the trial.
Under these circumstances the judge, in accordance with the law and jurisprudence, had to
estimate for himself the damage caused and determine the amount of indemnification which
the defendant should pay the complainant. And is so doing the curt did not commit the errors
attributed to it by the appellant.
The question in the present case is not one of punitive or exemplary damages, but of
compensation for damages sustained. In order to allow such compensation it is not necessary
that the complainant should prove his loss in terms of dollars and cents, it being sufficient, in
cases of this nature to prove that the plaintiff, through the fault or negligence of the defendant
and not through his own fault and negligence, had sustained a real damage, consisting of
physical pains, loss of work, confinement in a hospital, mental suffering, etc.
The indemnification in this case was fixed by the lower court of $2,000, and although it could
perhaps have been calculated at less, we do not find that it is immoderately inadequate, and
this being so we should not alter it. (Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit co., supra.)
In another case, that of Gonzalez vs. The San Juan Light & Transit co. [1911], Porto Rico, 115)
recovery for damages was not permitted. In the latter case, it was said:
This is an appeal from the first section of the district court of San Juan seeking to reverse a
judgment therein rendered on December 1, 1909, in favor of the defendant. This suit was
initiated in the district court of San Juan through a complaint presented by Ramon Gonzalez
Soto, alleging therein that the defendant company, the San Juan Light and Transit Co., had
negligently caused the death of Juan Cordova Soto, son of the plaintiff, in the ward of Santurce,
between stops 21 and 22, on the trolley line of defendant, about December 2, 1904, the father
of the deceased not appearing also as a complainant on account of his death having occurred
after that of his son but previous to the filing of the complaint.
We have stated said first ground alleged for reversal in the form in which it has been expressed
by counsel for the defendant; but possibly it might also have been set forth more clearly as
follows: "Even supposing that the plaintiff had shown that the death of her son had been
caused through the negligence of the defendant company, could damages be awarded her
without showing by proof their existence and the amount thereof?"
Our Civil Code now in force, in section 1803, reads as follows:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another, when there is fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
So that the claim of the plaintiff herein is sustained by this precept of the law which establishes
her right to be indemnified by the defendant for the damage caused her on account of the
death of her son, if said death was brought about by any act or omission of said company,
through its fault or negligence.
This is our substantive law in the matter of damages and it is in accordance with its provisions,
as interpreted by the ruling jurisprudence, that courts should decide questions submitted to
them for decision, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled, in cases where there may exist fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant company, to recover from the defendant company the
damages that may have been actually caused to her, whatever they may be.
x x x x x x x x x
As may be seen, this jurisprudence (of Spain) is in accordance with the legal precept of the
code that only those damages actually caused may be awarded, and, therefore, to enable the
court to decide what damages have been caused, it is necessary to prove the real existence of
the damages and the corresponding facts from which the court can deduce the amount thereof.
Of course, the plaintiff makes a claim only for herself for pecuniary loss sustained by her on
account of the death of her son, and the boy himself does not make any claim because he did
not live to do so; hence the mother would never have been entitled to any other damages than
those arising out of the loss of the services of her son, and never to those damages which he
himself might have been entitled to claim had he not died, or arising from the injuries that he
himself might have suffered on account of the accident. The damages which would give the
plaintiff in this case a right to recovery against the defendant are only the loss of support, or
contributions thereto, which the son was accustomed to make to his mother from his earnings
and of which she may have been deprived by his death. But does the evidence introduced by
the plaintiff support her claim to recover such damages? We are of the opinion that it does not,
because she has not proven that her son was really earning the amount alleged in the
complaint, nor any other sum whatever, no alleged in the complaint, nor any other sum
whatever, nor alleged in the complaint, nor any other sum whatever, no how much money he
was earning by his work either in Arecibo or in San Juan during the days immediately
preceding his death or at any time. And we are of the opinion that this is a necessary requisite,
because, as the Civil Code declares that recovery may be had for the damage caused, the
damages accruing to the plaintiff must be shown so that the trial judge may have data on which
to base his decision.
In this action no evidence whatever has been produced in this respect. The only fact proven in
regard to this point is that Juan Cordova Soto was killed by a collision with the trolley car; that
he was earning something when he was previously in Arecibo. It is not shown what occupation
he had, nor how much money he earned while he was there nor while he was in San Juan, nor
is it shown that his mother derived any benefit from his wages; and from this evidence the
court cannot consider as proven he amount of the damages, nor even their existence. It has not
been show that the death of her son caused any material or pecuniary damages to his mother,
the plaintiff herein, nor the amount thereof.
Therefore, an essential requisite for a judgment against the defendant company is lacking, and
even supposing that she had an action for damages through negligence of the company in the
death of the boy, we could not find a judgment against the defendant company, for lack of
evidence in regard to the existence of the pecuniary damages sustained and facts from which
to infer the amount thereof. Therefore, the defendant's motion for a judgment in its favor on
this first ground was properly sustained.
As will be readily perceived, having dug out the applicable authorities, and having set them before us,
our task still is far from complete. On the one hand, the obvious conclusion would be that, inasmuch
as plaintiff has failed to prove her pecuniary loss, she cannot recover, or, for the same reason, to
return the case to the lower court for further evidence. This is the obvious way. To one trained in the
Common Law, and inculcated with all the doctrines of the American law of damages, it is the logical
way. Is it the just and natural way?
The first reply would be that the civil law authorities are, like the common law cases, against
recovery without proof of loss. If necessary, however, the three decisions just described, could be
differentiated from the present facts. The decision of the supreme court of Spain, it is to be
remembered, involved an action for the death of a man of mature years. The first decision of the
supreme court of Porto Rico recognizes the principle of presumptive recovery. The second decision
of the supreme court of recovery. The second decision of the supreme court of Porto Rico concerned
an action for the death of a son of sufficient age to have an earning capacity. None of these is our case.
Here present is the case of a young child, whose death is caused by wrongful act, leaving a poor
mother to be the loser.
To answer in a different way, let us make a comparison. The facts before us, and the facts before the
supreme court of Illinois in analogous cases, are substantially identical. We have proof of the age of
the deceased, proof of the name of the next of kin, and proof that the mother is a laboring woman.
Under both the Common Law and the Civil Law, plaintiff's damage, broadly speaking, is for the loss of
the services of the deceased, or for support by the deceased. Plaintiff having shown that the deceased
was her son and that he was 8 or 9 years of age at the time of death, it was neither necessary nor
possible to prove loss of services or support, or to prove special damage as if the object of the loss
had been a horse or other animal. No doubt the damage could be greatly enhanced by showing the
personal characteristics of the deceased. Outside of this, however, the pecuniary loss may be
estimated from the facts at hand with reference to the general knowledge which all possess.
To force the plaintiff to prove her loss exactly would be to ask the impossible would be in effect to
return to the old common law rule which prohibits a recovery. Physical and gross criteria, as the
hewing of wood and carrying of water, are indeed no standards at all. Even if the case was to be
reopened, the plaintiff could with extreme difficulty present any better evidence than that now
before us. As we have the basis of satisfactory facts from which to infer the amount of damage, as the
law presumes a pecuniary loss because of the death, and as the trial judge has made an intelligent
computation, we should rest here, with knowledge that, within the ken of human wisdom, justice has
been done.
On a careful consideration of the entire field of the law on the subject of damages, we come to the
conclusion that the amount, in the nature of an indemnity allowed by the trial court, is neither
excessive nor immoderately inadequate, and should stand.
Judgment, therefore, should be affirmed.
G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A.
QUINTOS,respondents.
Laurea and Pison for petitioner.
Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said
decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus
owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and driven
by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers
was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side
of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was nearing the northern
approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with
hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the
cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end
of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through
the glass windshield and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the
impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye
and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds
and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A
La Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando,
Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino
Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the
scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other
injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to
the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance.
Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same
day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries.
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants.
Said respondents herein brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as
owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the
contract of carriage between said petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the
aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner defendant in
the court of first instance contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this
pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the
accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom
petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His Honor,
the trial Judge:
The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or emergency but
was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The defendant
must, therefore, respond for damages resulting from its breach of contract for carriage.
As the complaint alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00 although as elsewhere
shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial expenses, loss of income, death
of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the aggregate of P79,615.95, this Court finds it just
that said damages be assessed at total of only P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs'
amended complaint.
The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage
resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for
review oncertiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents
herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the
number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the
losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed.
The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was concurred in by the Court of
Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years he
being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his
demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the
other hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in not
acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro
1
in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year
basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death, and had a life
expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the parties
had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the
non-inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's employer,
had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the profits earned less than two (2)
months before the accident that resulted in his death. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum
awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous years, based upon the increases
given, in that fourth year, to other employees of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor said
claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby
laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. On the contrary, it
declared:
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has
therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral
and material damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact or
uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot
be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on
the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or
of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other
factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25
C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of service (25 C.J.S.
1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of
beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses (26 C.J.S.,
1254-1260)."
2

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing the amount
recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said
amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at
bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not
erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio
Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the decision
appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas
most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This argument is basically true,
and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed
basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the
same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment
of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the
liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual
salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the
Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner
relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity
to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to
have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering
the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income
level of officers and employees
therein much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the determination of the
losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support,
they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of
petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been
consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the
necessary expense for his own living.
3
Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the
entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have
received.
4
In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered
5
that is, the total
of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income
6
and less living
and other incidental expenses.
7

All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living
and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and
that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or
P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following
should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court;
8
(b) P1,727.95, actually
spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed
by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the
Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words,
the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of
P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the
promulgation of the decision of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-28512 February 28, 1973
PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant.
Dizon, De Guzman and Vitug and Pedro R. Davila for plaintiffs-appellants.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
In Civil Case No. 5728 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Pedro R. Davila and Preciosa C. Tirol,
plaintiffs, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant) judgment was rendered ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiffs various sums of money, as follows:
(1) For the death of Pedro T. Davila, Jr. the amount of P6,000.00;
(2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased at the rate of P12,000.00 per
annum for five (5) years in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos. (P60,000.00);
(3) For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(4) For exemplary damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(5) For actual damages the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) broken down to
as follows: A rolex watch valued at P600.00; a pistol worth P300.00; burial expenses
P600.00; for the lot and the mausoleum P3,500.00;
(6) For Attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a total
amount of One Hundred and One Thousand Pesos (P101,000.00)
To pay the costs of this proceedings.
Both parties appealed directly to this Court in view of the aggregate of the amounts awarded, the
judgment having been rendered before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 5440. In this appeal the
plaintiffs seek an increase in said amounts, and the defendant, complete exoneration from, or at least
mitigation of, liability.
The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant which took the lives of all
its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a DC-3 type of aircraft, manufactured
in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill-
fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao
Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board, including the plane's complement. It did
not reach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after take-
off. A massive search was undertaken by the defendant and by other parties as soon as it was
realized that the plane's arrival in Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr.,
who was one of the passengers, had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting what
information they could only from conflicting newspaper reports, until they received, on December
19, 1960, a letter of condolence from the defendant's president Andres Soriano, informing them that
their son had died in the crash. And it was only on December 29 that his body was recovered an
taken back to Iloilo.
The issues before the trial court, and now before Us in this appeal, are whether or not the defendant
is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for how much. The provisions of the Civil
Code on this substantive question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common
carriers, "from the nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, ... to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance ... for the safety of the passengers transported by them
according to all the circumstances of each case." Article 1755 establishes the standard of care
required of a common carrier, which is, "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by providing that "in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety
of passengers ... cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the flight of plane PI-C113 in the
afternoon of November 23, 1960 was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, the latter stage, denominated as airway
"Amber I," being a straight lane from Romblon to Manila. The prescribed elevation of the flight was
6,000 ft. The plane reported its position after take-off and again when it was abeam the Roxas homer.
However, it did not intercept airway "Amber I" over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and the pilot
did not give his position then although Romblon was a compulsory checking point. The fact was that
the plane had deviated from the prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco.
The reading of the altimeter of the plane when its wreckage was found was 6,800 ft.
There is a suggestion that in the course of the flight between Romblon and Mindoro the aircraft was
drifted westward by the cross-winds then blowing in the region. The defendant, however, has not
given a definite explanation as to why, if such was the case, the pilot failed to make the necessary
correction in his flight to compensate for the drift. According to the defendant's witness, Maj. Mijares,
Chief of the Aviation Safety Division of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Chairman of the CAA
Investigating Committee, there was a navigational error, to which several factors contributed: "the
weather observation at that time from the Weather Bureau was not so good between Mt. Baco and
Romblon and the wind aloft was quite strong, which would be also one of the causes for the drifting
of the aircraft; and the other strong probability, I would say, would be the malfunction of the
aircraft's navigational instrument." He further explained that "a cross-wind can drift the plane if the
pilot will not make the necessary correction, if his navigational instrument is malfunctioning and the
visual reference outside the aircraft could not make the necessary corrections."
There is nothing in the testimony of Maj. Mijares to show just how strong the cross-winds were in the
region at the time, although in the investigation of the accident by the Senate Committee on
transportation there was testimony that the cross-winds had a velocity of either 20 to 25 knots or 25
to 35 knots an hour. Considering the relatively short distance from Romblon to Mt. Baco and the brief
span of time it would take to fly that distance, cross-winds with the velocity stated could not have
possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles.
The defendant points out that the navigational instrument on board the plane consisted of two (2)
sets of automatic direction finders (ADF) which, when found after the crash, showed a reading that
the aircraft was heading north, which was the proper flight direction. This point, however, is of no
vital significance in this case since it does not explain why the aircraft was 32 miles off its prescribed
route in the first place. It is suggested that the pilot did not notice the drift of his plane because of
poor visibility due to thick clouds, which prevented him from making the corresponding correction
on the basis of visual references to the terrain outside. But according to Maj. Mijares himself the
report from the Weather Bureau at the time showed that visibility was 15 miles between Romblon
and Mt. Baco and that the clouds from 2,700 to 7,000 ft. elevation were "scattered." And the profile of
the probable weather cross-section along airway "Amber I" during the flight (Exh. 33-A) shows that
at 6,000 ft. the airlane was clear and free of clouds. The suggestion therefore that the pilot was
practically flying blind and consequently failed to notice the drift of the aircraft is not justified by the
evidence. Indeed even the investigating team of the defendant under the chairmanship of Capt. Jaime
Manzano concluded in its report that "based on the limited evidences available, the board is of the
opinion that the probable cause was the inability of the pilot to intersect airway "Amber I" over
Romblon and to maintain track within its designated airway lane for reasons unknown."
What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight, at
least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where he was supposed to
intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the most reasonable conclusion is that his failure
to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a
violation of air-craft traffic rules to which, under the circumstances, the accident may be directly
attributable.
In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to how and why the
accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code.
The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs, parents
of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in the amount of P6,000.00.
Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should be increased to P12,000.00.
1

The deceased was employed as manager of a radio station
2
, from which he was earning P8,400.00 a
year, consisting of a monthly salary of P600.00 and allowance of P100.00. As a lawyer and junior
partner of his father in the law office, he had an annual income of P3,600.00. From farming he was
getting an average of P3,000.00. All in all therefore the deceased had gross earnings of P15,000.00 a
year.
According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liable for the loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." This
Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or quasi-delict," is expressly made
applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier."
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age one's normal
life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted by this Court in the
case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
3
on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the
deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had complained of and
been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and occasional feelings of tiredness. It is
reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of this case, a
reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.
In the same case of Villa Revenue Transit this Court stated:
"... earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is
necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, less the necessary expense for
his own living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earnings, but rather
the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words,
only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses."
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources,
namely from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses incidental
to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together
with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us
reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or
P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect.
Actual losses sustained consist of the following, as found by the trial court: "Rolex Watch P600.00;
pistol P300.00; Burial Expenses P600.00; and cost of cemetery lot and mausoleum - P3,500.00."
Under Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the Civil Code, the parents of the deceased are
entitled to moral damages for their mental anguish. The trial court awarded P10,000.00 in this
concept, and We find no justification to change the award, considering the long period of uncertainty
and suffering the plaintiffs underwent from November 23, when the plane crash occurred, to
December 19, when they received a letter from the defendant's president confirming the death of
their son, and again to the following December 29, when his body was finally recovered and taken
back to them.
With respect to the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, it is Our opinion that the same
should be eliminated. According to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-contracts the
court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. The failure of the defendant here to exercise extraordinary
diligence, as required by law, does not amount to anyone of the circumstances contemplated in the
said provision.
The trial court has awarded attorney's fees of P10,000.00. We do not find this award groundless or
the amount thereof unreasonable.
The total of the different items above enumerated is P232,000.00. The judgment of the court a quo is
therefore modified accordingly and the defendant is ordered to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs,
with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against the defendant.
G.R. No. 164266 July 23, 2008
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
1
dated February 26,
2004 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
2
(RTC) Decision
3
dated October 26, 2001. Likewise
assailed is the appellate courts Resolution
4
dated July 6, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and the
victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuiga family, including Mary Ann
and the petitioner were living together at 550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their residence had three
bedrooms one for the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the last for Mary Ann
and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the
wake of Ernestos mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at their
Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time, asked permission to attend a birthday party.
5

At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to get
some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the party and
stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They
opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to the
room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already
dead. After seeing Arlenes body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the
petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room, petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He
was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.
6

At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry into
the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes
room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioners underwear (briefs), gray t-
shirt and short pants.
7
They further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of evidence
were brought to the laboratory for examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy of the deceased.
8
He found that Arlene suffered 21 stab
wounds produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp like a balisong or a kitchen
knife. He further declared the possibility that Arlene struggled with the assailant before she died.
9

The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioners briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found that
the briefs and shirt were positive of type "O" human blood, Arlenes blood type.
10
The NBI Forensic
Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA Analysis on the following specimens:
1. One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
2. One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
3. Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
4. Buccal swabs taken from the following:
a. ERNESTO ZUIGA (victims father)
b. MARGARITA ZUIGA (victims mother)
c. NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)
11

The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of human DNA; while
specimen nos. 2, 3, and 4 a-c, yielded positive results.
12

Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information dated April 8, 1998, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1997, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and stab one ARLENE ZUIGA, hitting on the different parts of her body, which led to the
death of said Arlene Zuiga.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
13

The aforementioned facts were established during the prosecutions presentation of evidence. It was
further testified to by the witnesses that petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as balisong,
which he usually brought every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by petitioners previous act
of peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two occasions while she was taking a bath
and while she was inside the room with Marianne.
For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of the accusations against him.
On October 26, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, without any attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The accused is further sentence (sic) to indemnify Spouses Ernesto and Margarita
Zuiga the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Arlene Zuiga and another amount ofP50,000.00 as
moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The accused is further
sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
14

The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish petitioners guilt:
(1) The perpetrator did not use any force or destroy any portion of the house to get inside the
house. This implies that the perpetrator is an occupant of the house. The accused was, during
the time material to this case, residing with his in-laws. The allegation of the accused that the
main door of the house was open when he returned to get the tape is difficult to believe. It is
unthinkable that the remaining occupants of the house, namely, Arlene and Mary Ann, who are
both female, would not take the necessary precaution for their own protection such as locking
the door of the house. It is as difficult to suppose that the perpetrator of the crime would go to
the house where his intended victim was sleeping without being sure that he could gain entry
to the house or have the necessary instruments to open the door.
(2) There were no personal belongings missing in the house. This shows that the person who
entered the room of the victim had no intention to steal. This fact can better be appreciated if
we consider the evidence that the accused was caught many times peeping at Arlene during
her lifetime; and that [bloodstains] were found not in the short pants of the accused but in his
Hanford brief and T-shirt.
(3) The absence of [bloodstains] or spots in any other part of the house except the room of the
victim. This indicates that the assailant must have cleaned the traces of blood inside the house.
The facility and time to clean the area is more available to an assailant who was an occupant of
the house or a member of the household.
(4) Prior to and up to the date of the commission of the crime on September 20 or 21, 1997[,]
the accused was seen by his parents-in-law Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga and her sister-in-law
Marianne and his friend Dondy Hiponia in many occasions to have in [his] possession a
balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve." A "balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve" is the tagalong name for
a knife with folding blade. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the testimonies of said
witnesses. Being close relatives and friend of the accused[,] they have no motive to fabricate a
story against the accused or to implicate him to the commission of the crime charged. The
claim of the accused that his father-in-law Ernesto Zuiga is trying to implicate him [for] the
killing of Arlene because his father-in-law disapproved his marrying Mary Ann, and that he
accompanied his mother-in-law to the house of the mistress of his father-in-law is not
supported by the facts of the case. The accused was allowed to stay in the house of the Zuigas,
an indication that he was acceptable to the family. The alleged mistress of Ernesto was not
shown to exist, nor her supposed address revealed by the accused. The disappearance of said
bladed weapon and the denial by the accused that he ever owned the same are intriguing
because, according to expert testimony, the stab wounds sustained by the victim were
produced by a pointed instrument one side of which is sharp like a "balisong" or "beinte (sic)
nueve."
(5) The presence of human blood with type "O" in the t-shirt and brief of the accused, the
finding that the blood type of the victim belongs to groupd (sic) "O," and the circumstance that
the accused had suffered no scratches or wound from which to come blood to stain his T-shirt
and brief are revealing and could only lead to the conclusion that the victim was the source of
the blood found in the T-shirt and brief of the accused.
(6) The conclusion arrived at by Magsipoc that the DNA Profile of the [bloodstain] in the light
gray t-shirt and the DNA Profile on the hair strands could come from the accused and the
victim.
(7) The unusual behavior of the accused after the discovery of the dead body of Arlene
betrayed the accused. Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga testified that soon after the discovery of
the death of Arlene[,] they immediately went to the room of the accused and his wife Mary
Ann; that it took Margarita a hard time to awaken the accused; and that upon being awakened,
the accused did not get (sic) inside the room where Arlene was and instead stayed and cried in
the sala telling his wife that he was innocent even if nobody yet at that time was pointing to
him as the suspect. The actuation of the accused then was that of a perpetrator of the crime
with troubled conscience.
15

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction.
16
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS THE RESULT OF
THE DNA ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE NBI FORENSIC CHEMIST.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT BY MEANS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IT WAS PROVEN AND
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE ONE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARLENE ZUIGA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF HOMICIDE.
17

The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result
in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.
18

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
19

All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
20

In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of evidence in finding
petitioners guilt: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the scene of the crime; 2) no missing
personal belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room;
4) petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in stabbing the victim; 5) the presence
of type "O" human blood on petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive result of the DNA analysis
using the bloodstains found in petitioners shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after
the discovery of the victims lifeless body.
21

In his appeal before the CA and likewise in this present petition, petitioner questions the sufficiency
of each and every circumstance enumerated above. He specifically points out the inconsistent
findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist and those of the NBI Forensic Biologist.
22
As to the circumstance
that there was no forcible entry to the house, he insists that the main door was not locked; and he, in
fact, faults Arlene for not locking the door to her bedroom.
23
Petitioner adds that the connection
between the alleged "peeping incident" and intent to kill was so remote; and thus insufficient to
convict him.
24
He also persuades this Court to give credence to his testimony that he owned a
samurai (double-bladed knife) and not a balisong (single-bladed) which thus negates his authorship
of the crime, since it would be contrary to the medico-legals findings that the weapon used was an
instrument one side of which was sharp.
25
Petitioner further asserts that the absence of scratches,
wounds and bruises on his body were more consistent with his innocence rather than his guilt, if we
follow the courts conclusion that Arlene had a chance to struggle with him prior to his
death.
26
Lastly, petitioner claims that if we were to believe the prosecutions version, it would be
hard to imagine that Mary Ann (petitioners wife), who was then in the other room, was not
awakened.
27

Prior to the fateful night when Arlenes lifeless body was discovered, several witnesses saw
petitioner in possession of a balisong. The NBI autopsy report, in turn, stated that the wounds
sustained by Arlene were inflicted with the use of a weapon only one side of which was sharp (such
as a balisong). After the discovery of the crime, the balisong was nowhere to be found. Hence, the
trial court was correct in its conclusion that the balisong previously seen in petitioners possession
was the very weapon used in stabbing the victim. While petitioner admitted owning a different kind
of weapon, he failed to produce it in court. As such, it remained a self-serving allegation that cannot
be considered to exonerate him from liability.
As to petitioners shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as affirmed by the appellate
court), they were found to be stained with type "O" blood (the victims blood type). Instead of
questioning the absence of proof that he was not of the same blood type as the victim, petitioner
should have presented evidence that he indeed has type "O" blood. The fact remains that petitioner
offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs contained bloodstains. It is, therefore, correct to
conclude that they were stained with the victims blood.
Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioners body parts does not negate the trial
courts conclusion that the victim had the chance to struggle with the petitioner. This is so because, at
the time the petitioner attacked the victim between 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, she was most
likely asleep and was only awakened by the petitioner; she was, therefore, not in a position to offer
strong resistance. This explains why such struggle produced no bruises and scratches.
The presence of petitioners wife inside the house at that time does not likewise negate the
commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was a nursing mother who definitely had
sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of everything that happened outside her
room.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative to
the "peeping incident." Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual advances, such
incident manifested petitioners evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which
his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
28
Motive and intent may be considered one
and the same, in some instances, as in the present case.
Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the
crime.1avvphi1 Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances discussed
earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the author
of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like to emphasize at
this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which, when
put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime.
29

The prosecutions evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the victims
relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such relationship. The Court notes that petitioner himself
is a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the victims sister. It is unnatural
for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real
culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free.
30
Where there is nothing to indicate that
witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made
under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.
31

We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of
respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present
case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to review
whether the trial courts conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws.
32
The
credibility given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts unique opportunity to observe the witnesses,
particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by
counsels.
33

In view of the foregoing, petitioner was correctly convicted of homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty,
absent any modifying circumstances, shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor and the
maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.
34
Specifically, the
indeterminate penalty that should be imposed is within the range of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Hence, a modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court is in order.
Instead of 8 years, 8 months and 1 day, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor;
35
while the maximum term shall be that imposed by the trial court.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then becomes the duty
of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not included in the
assignment of errors.
36

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuiga spouses. When death
occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for
death without need of any evidence or proof of damages.
37
The court likewise correctly
awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages because of their mental anguish and moral suffering caused
by Arlenes death.
The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the victims heirs
failed to present proof of the expenses they incurred. However, it has been repeatedly held by this
Court that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of
receipts to prove the same, temperate damages may be fixed at P25,000.00.
38

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26048 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to civil indemnity and moral
damages, petitioner is ordered to pay spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the sum of P25,000.00
as temperate damages.
G.R. No. 156302 April 7, 2009
THE HEIRS OF GEORGE Y. POE, Petitioners,
vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Review under Rule 45
1
of the Rules of Court assails the Decision
2
dated 26
June 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, which granted the Petition for Certiorari
of respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICI) and recalled and set aside the Order
3
dated 6
September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, of Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 93-
2705. The RTC, in its recalled Order, denied the Notice of Appeal of MICI and granted the Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe. The present Petition
also challenges the Resolution
4
dated 29 November 2002 of the appellate court denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Records show that on 26 January 1996 at about 4:45 a.m., George Y. Poe (George) while waiting for a
ride to work in front of Capital Garments Corporation, Ortigas Avenue Extension, Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal, was run over by a ten-wheeler Isuzu hauler truck with Plate No. PMH-858 owned by
Rhoda Santos (Rhoda), and then being driven by Willie Labrador (Willie).
5
The said truck was
insured with respondent MICI under Policy No. CV-293-007446-8.
To seek redress for Georges untimely death, his heirs and herein petitioners, namely, his widow
Emercelinda, and their children Flerida and Fernando, filed with the RTC a Complaint for damages
against Rhoda and respondent MICI, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-2705.
6
Petitioners identified
Rhoda and respondent MICI, as follows:
Defendant RHODA SANTOS is likewise of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Real Street, Pamplona,
Las Pias, Metro Manila where she may be served with summons and other court processes.
[Herein respondent] MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter "[MICI]" for brevity) is a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law with address at Yuchengco Bldg., 484
Q. Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila where it may be served with summons and other processes of this
Honorable Court;
Defendant Rhoda Santos, who is engaged in the business, among others, of selling gravel and sand is
the registered owner of one Isuzu Truck, with Plate No. PMH-858 and is the employer of Willie
Labrador the authorized driver of the aforesaid truck.
[Respondent MICI] on the other hand is the insurer of Rhoda Santos under a valid and existing
insurance policy duly issued by said [MICI], Policy No. CV-293-007446-8 over the subject vehicle
owned by Rhoda Santos, Truck-Hauler Isuzu 10 wheeler with plate no. PMH-858, serial no. SRZ451-
1928340 and motor no. 10PA1-403803. Under said insurance policy, [MICI] binds itself, among
others, to be liable for damages as well as any bodily injury to third persons which may be caused by
the operation of the insured vehicle.
7

And prayed that:
[J]udgment issue in favor of [herein petitioners] ordering [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] jointly
and solidarily to pay the [petitioners] the following:
1. Actual damages in the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND (P36,000.00) PESOS for
funeral and burial expenses;
2. Actual damages in the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY FOUR (P805,984.00) PESOS as loss of earnings and financial support given by the
deceased by reason of his income and employment;
3. Moral damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and litigation
expense in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS for each court
appearance;
6. The costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
8

Rhoda and respondent MICI made the following admissions in their Joint Answer
9
:
That [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the
complaint;
That [Rhoda and respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint that the
cargo truck is insured with [respondent] Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. [(MICI)] however, the
liability of the insured company attached only if there is a judicial pronouncement that the insured
and her driver are liable and moreover, the liability of the insurance company is subject to the
limitations set forth in the insurance policy.
10

Rhoda and respondent MICI denied liability for Georges death averring, among other defenses, that:
a) the accident was caused by the negligent act of the victim George, who surreptitiously and
unexpectedly crossed the road, catching the driver Willie by surprise, and despite the latters effort to
swerve the truck to the right, the said vehicle still came into contact with the victim; b) the liability of
respondent MICI, if any, would attach only upon a judicial pronouncement that the insured Rhoda
and her driver Willie are liable; c) the liability of MICI should be based on the extent of the insurance
coverage as embodied in Rhodas policy; and d) Rhoda had always exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of her driver Willie.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners introduced and offered evidence in support of their claims for damages against MICI, and
then rested their case. Thereafter, the hearings for the reception of the evidence of Rhoda and
respondent MICI were scheduled, but they failed to adduce their evidence despite several
postponements granted by the trial court. Thus, during the hearing on 9 June 1995, the RTC, upon
motion of petitioners counsel, issued an Order
11
declaring that Rhoda and respondent MICI had
waived their right to present evidence, and ordering the parties to already submit their respective
Memorandum within 15 days, after which, the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.1avvphi1.zw+
Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Motion for Reconsideration
12
of the Order dated 9 June 1995, but
it was denied by the RTC in another Order dated 11 August 1995.
13

Consequently, Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus,
14
Prohibition
and Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
assailing the Orders dated 9 June 1995 and 11 August 1995 of the RTC foreclosing their right to
adduce evidence in support of their defense. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38948.
The Court of Appeals, through its Third Division, promulgated a Decision
15
on 29 April 1996, denying
due course to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 38948. Rhoda and respondent MICI elevated the matter
to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari,
16
docketed as G.R. No. 126244. This Court likewise
dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 126244 in a Resolution dated 30 September 1996.
17
Entry of
Judgment was made in G.R. No. 126244 on 8 November 1996.
18

On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 93-2705, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] are hereby ordered to pay jointly and solidarily to
the [herein petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P805,984.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500 per court appearance; and
6. Cost of suit.
19

Rhoda and respondent MICI received their copy of the foregoing RTC Decision on 14 March
2000.
20
On 22 March 2000, respondent MICI and Rhoda filed a Motion for Reconsideration
21
of said
Decision, averring therein that the RTC erred in ruling that the obligation of Rhoda and respondent
MICI to petitioners was solidary or joint and several; in computing Georges loss of earning capacity
not in accord with established jurisprudence; and in awarding moral damages although it was not
buttressed by evidence.
Resolving the Motion of respondent MICI and Rhoda, the RTC issued an Order
22
on 24 January 2001
modifying and amending its Decision dated 28 February 2000, and dismissing the case against
respondent MICI.
The RTC held that:
After a careful evaluation of the issues at hand, the contention of the [herein respondent MICI] as far
as the solidary liability of the insurance company with the other defendant [Rhoda] is meritorious.
However, the assailed Decision can be modified or amended to correct the same honest inadvertence
without necessarily reversing it and set aside to conform with the evidence on hand.
The RTC also re-computed Georges loss of earning capacity, as follows:
The computation of actual damages for loss of earning capacity was determined by applying the
formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality applied in x x x Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA
521). Moral damages is awarded in accordance with Article 2206 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines. While death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically awarded in cases
where the victim had died (People v. Sison, September 14, 1990 [189 SCRA 643]).
23

In the end, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision of this Court dated 28 February
2000 is hereby amended or modified. Said Decision should read as follows:
"Wherefore, defendant Rhoda Santos is hereby ordered to pay to the [herein petitioners] the
following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P102,106.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500.00 per court appearance;
6. Costs of the suit.
The case against Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby dismissed."
24

It was petitioners turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration
25
of the 24 January 2001 Order, to which
respondent MICI filed a "Vigorous Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration."
26

On 15 June 2001, the RTC issued an Order reinstating its Decision dated 28 February 2000, relevant
portions of which state:
Finding the arguments raised by the [herein petitioners] in their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of this Court dated January 24, 2001 to be more meritorious to [herein respondents] Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) arguments in its vigorous opposition thereto, said motion is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Order under consideration is hereby reconsidered and set aside. The decision of this
Court dated February 28, 2000 is hereby reinstated.
Notify parties herein.
27

Respondent MICI received a copy of the 15 June 2001 Order of the RTC on 27 June 2001.
Aggrieved by the latest turn of events, respondent MICI filed on 9 July 2001 a Notice of Appeal
28
of
the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC, reinstated by the 15 June 2001 Resolution of the same
court. Rhoda did not join respondent MICI in its Notice of Appeal.
29

Petitioners filed their Opposition
30
to the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI, with a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution.
After considering the recent pleadings of the parties, the RTC, in its Order dated 6 September 2001,
denied the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and granted petitioners Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Execution. The RTC reasoned in its Order:
The records disclosed that on February 28, 2000 this Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
[herein petitioners] and against [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI]. The Decision was said to have
been received by MICI on March 14, 2000. Eight days after or on March 22, 2000, MICI mailed its
Motion for Reconsideration to this Court and granted the same in the Order dated January 24, 2001.
From this Order, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 21, 2001 to which MICI
filed a vigorous opposition. On June 15, 2001 this Court granted [petitioners] motion reinstating the
Decision dated February 28, 2000. According to MICI, the June 15, 2001 order was received by it on
June 27, 2001. MICI filed a Notice of Appeal on July 9, 2001 or twelve (12) days from receipt of said
Order.
[Petitioners] contend that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time while [respondent] MICI
opposes, arguing otherwise. The latter interposed that the Order dated June 15, 2001 is in reality a
new Decision thereby giving it a fresh fifteen (15) days within which to file notice of appeal.
[Respondent] MICIs contention is not meritorious. The fifteen (15) day period within which to file a
notice of appeal should be reckoned from the date it received the Decision on March 14, 2000. So that
when MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2000, eight (8) days had already
lapsed, MICI has remaining seven (7) days to file a notice of appeal. However, when it received the
last Order of this Court it took [respondent] MICI twelve (12) days to file the same. Needless to say,
MICIs Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. The Court cannot countenance the argument of MICI
that a resolution to a motion for a final order or judgment will have the effect of giving a fresh
reglementary period. This would be contrary to what was provided in the rules of procedure.
31

Accordingly, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein respondent] MICIs Notice of Appeal is hereby Denied for
having filed out of time making the Decision of this Court dated February 28, 2000 as final and
executory. Accordingly, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by [herein petitioners] is
hereby Granted.
Notify parties herein.
32

Respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari
33
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court
of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67297. The Petition assailed, for having been
rendered by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
following: (1) the Order dated 6 September 2001, denying the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI
and granting petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution; (2) the Decision dated 28
February 2000, holding Rhoda and respondent MICI jointly and severally liable for Georges death;
and (3) the Order dated 15 June 2001, reinstating the Decision dated 28 February 2000.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondent MICI in a Decision dated 26
June 2000, ratiocinating thus:
Prescinding therefrom, we hold that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal must be reckoned from the
time the [herein respondent] Malayan received the order dated 15 June 2001 reversing in toto the
order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating in full the Decision dated 28 February 2000.
Thus, [respondent] Malayan had until 12 July 2001 within which to file its notice of appeal.
Therefore, when [respondent] Malayan filed its notice of appeal on 09 July 2001, it was well within
the reglementary period and should have been given due course by the public respondent court.
It was therefore, an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent court when it reckoned
the [respondent] Malayans period to appeal on the date it received on 14 March 2000 the formers
decision dated 28 February 2000. As earlier expostulated, the said decision was completely vacated
insofar as the [respondent] Malayan is concerned when the public respondent court in its order
dated 24 January 2001 dismissed the case against the former. Thus, to reckon the fifteen (15) days to
appeal from the day the [respondent] Malayan received the said decision on 14 March 2000, is the
height of absurdity because there was nothing for the [respondent] Malayan to appeal inasmuch as
the public respondent court vacated the said decision in favor of the former.
The aforesaid conclusion finds support in Sta. Romana vs. Lacson (104 SCRA 93), where the court,
relying on the case of Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA 334, held that where the court of
origin made a thoroughly (sic) restudy of the original judgment and rendered the amended and
clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues, the amended and clarified
decision was an entirely new decision which superseded (sic). For all intents and purposes, the court
concluded the trial court rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned.
In the instant case, what is involved is not merely a substantial amendment or modification of the
original decision, but the total reversal thereof in the order dated 24 January 2000. Given the
rationale in the aforecited cases, it is only logical that the period of appeal be counted from 27 June
2001, the date that [respondent] Malayan received the order dated 15 June 2001 reversing in toto
the order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating the Decision dated 28 February 2000.
34
(Emphasis
supplied.)
The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the petition for certiorari is partially
GRANTED. Accordingly, the public respondent courts order dated 06 September 2001 is hereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
Public respondent court is hereby directed to approve the petitioner Malayans notice of appeal and
to refrain from executing the writ of execution granted on 06 September 2001.
35

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 29
November 2002.
Understandably distraught, petitioners come before this Court in this Petition for Review, which
raise the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that private respondent could file a Petition for Certiorari even though its Motion for Reconsideration
was still pending resolution with the lower court.
II.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that the private respondent had filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court within the reglementary
period.
36

The Court first turns its attention to the primary issue for its resolution: whether the Notice of
Appeal filed by respondent MICI before the RTC was filed out of time.
The period for filing a Notice of Appeal is set by Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellants shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order. x x x.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
It is clear under the Rules that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from.
37
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
38

Propitious to petitioners is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
39
which the Court promulgated on 14
September 2005, and wherein it laid down the fresh period rule:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. (Emphases ours.)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error
of judgment.
40
With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy
of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the
denial of that motion.
41

The Court has accentuated that the fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies.
42
Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final
order in the case.
Applying the fresh period rule, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and holds that respondent
MICI seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC on 9 July 2001, just 12 days from 27 June
2001, when it received the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 June 2001 Resolution
reinstating the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC.
The fresh period rule may be applied to the case of respondent MICI, although the events which
transpired concerning its Notice of Appeal took place in June and July 2001, inasmuch as rules of
procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. The Court notes that Neypes was promulgated on 14 September 2005, while the instant
Petition was still pending before this Court.
Reference may be made to Republic v. Court of Appeals,
43
involving the retroactive application of A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC which provided that the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. In
said case, the Court declared that rules of procedure "may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure."
Hence, the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes was applied by the Court in resolving the
subsequent cases ofSumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc.,
44
Elbia v. Ceniza,
45
First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands,
46
even though the antecedent facts giving rise to said cases transpired
before the promulgation of Neypes.
In De los Santos v. Vda de Mangubat,
47
particularly, the Court applied the fresh period rule,
elucidating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statutes. The fresh period rule is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the
appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made
applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of violating anyone elses rights.
Since the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent MICI filed its Notice of
Appeal with the RTC within the reglementary period, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the RTC so that the RTC could approve
the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and respondent MICI could already file its appeal with the
Court of Appeals.
However, considering that the case at bar has been pending for almost sixteen years,
48
and the
records of the same are already before this Court, remand is no longer necessary.
Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court does not follow if, in the interest of
justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it. As a rule,
remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be subserved
by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the
trial court has already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is
in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits.
49
In Lao v. People,
50
the
Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it had taken for the controversy therein to reach it,
concluded that remand of the case to a lower court was no longer the more expeditious and practical
route to follow, and it then decided the said case based on the evidentiary record before it.
The consistent stand of the Court has always been that a case should be decided in its totality,
resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and to end the litigation
once and for all. Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.
51
Where the public interest
so demands, the court will broaden its inquiry into a case and decide the same on the merits rather
than merely resolve the procedural question raised.
52
Such rule obtains in this case.
The Court is convinced that the non-remanding of the case at bar is absolutely justified. Petitioners
have already suffered from the tragic loss of a loved one, and must not be made to endure more pain
and uncertainty brought about by the continued pendency of their claims against those liable. The
case has been dragging on for almost 16 years now without the petitioners having been fully
compensated for their loss. The Court cannot countenance such a glaring indifference to petitioners
cry for justice. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than full compensation to give effect to their
substantive rights.
53

The complete records of the present case have been elevated to this Court, and the pleadings and
evidence therein could fully support its factual adjudication. Indeed, after painstakingly going over
the records, the Court finds that the material and decisive facts are beyond dispute: George was killed
when he was hit by the truck driven by Willie, an employee of Rhoda; and the truck is insured with
respondent MICI. The only issue left for the Court to resolve is the extent of the liability of Rhoda and
respondent MICI for Georges death and the appropriate amount of the damages to be awarded to
petitioners.
The Court now turns to the issue of who is liable for damages for the death of George.
Respondent MICI does not deny that it is the insurer of the truck. Nevertheless, it asserts that its
liability is limited, and it should not be held solidarily liable with Rhoda for all the damages awarded
to petitioners.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a joint obligation, each
obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the
correlative rights. Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred.
There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or
when the nature of the obligation so requires.
54

It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third
persons, the liability of the insurer is direct and such third persons can directly sue the insurer. The
direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean,
however, that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties
found at fault, since they are being held liable under different obligations. The liability of the insured
carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code;
55
while
that of the insurer arises from contract, particularly, the insurance policy. The third-party liability of
the insurer is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and that required by law; and it cannot be
held solidarily liable for anything beyond that amount.
56
Any award beyond the insurance coverage
would already be the sole liability of the insured and/or the other parties at fault.
57

In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion,
58
it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for third-
party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it
cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. According to respondent MICI, its liability as
insurer of Rhodas truck is limited. Following Vda. de Maglana, petitioners would have had the option
either (1) to claim the amount awarded to them from respondent MICI, up to the extent of the
insurance coverage, and the balance from Rhoda; or (2) to enforce the entire judgment against
Rhoda, subject to reimbursement from respondent MICI to the extent of the insurance coverage. The
Court, though, is precluded from applying its ruling in Vda. de Maglana by the difference in one vital
detail between the said case and the one at bar. The insurer was able to sufficiently establish its
limited liability in Vda. de Maglana, while the same cannot be said for respondent MICI herein.
The Court highlights that in this case, the insurance policy between Rhoda and respondent MICI,
covering the truck involved in the accident which killed George, was never presented. There is no
means, therefore, for this Court to ascertain the supposed limited liability of respondent MICI under
said policy. Without the presentation of the insurance policy, the Court cannot determine the
existence of any limitation on the liability of respondent MICI under said policy, and the extent or
amount of such limitation.
It should be remembered that respondent MICI readily admits that it is the insurer of the truck that
hit and killed George, except that it insists that its liability under the insurance policy is limited. As
the party asserting its limited liability, respondent MICI then has the burden of evidence to establish
its claim. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Burden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to prove its claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.
59
Regrettably, respondent MICI failed to discharge this
burden.
60
The Court cannot rely on mere allegations of limited liability sans proof.
The failure of respondent MICI to present the insurance policy which, understandably, is not in
petitioners possession, but in the custody and absolute control of respondent MICI as the insurer
and/or Rhoda as the insured gives rise to the presumption that its presentation is prejudicial to the
cause of respondent MICI.
61
When the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a
liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which, from its very nature, must
overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice and
support the case of his adversary.
62

Respondent MICI had all the opportunity to prove before the RTC that its liability under the
insurance policy it issued to Rhoda, was limited; yet, respondent MICI failed to do so. The failure of
respondent MICI to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive, and stiff
opposition from it created an adverse inference that either the controverting evidence to be
presented by respondent MICI would only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence of
petitioners indeed speaks of the truth. And such adverse inference, recognized and adhered to by
courts in judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of proceedings, surely is not without basis its
rationale and effect rest on sound, logical and practical considerations, viz:
The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his obvious advantage, if he possesses the
means, supplies a most important test for judging of the comparative weight of evidence x x x If, on
the supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded, the party against whom it is made has evidence
within his reach by which he may repel that which is offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so
supplies a strong presumption that the charge or claim is well founded; it would be contrary to every
principle of reason, and to all experience of human conduct, to form any other conclusion." (Starkie
on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
x x x x
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to
divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and
infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party." (Societe,
etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 815, 817, 33 C.C.A. 282, per Taft, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561).
63

The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's sake, that the solidary liability of
respondent MICI with Rhoda is improbable, for it has likewise been said that:
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the party against whom it is put in, in not showing
by means within the easy control of that party that the conclusion drawn from such evidence is
untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 676, 681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572).
64

Given the admission of respondent MICI that it is the insurer of the truck involved in the accident that
killed George, and in the utter absence of proof to establish both the existence and the extent/amount
of the alleged limited liability of respondent MICI as insurer, the Court could only conclude that
respondent MICI had agreed to fully indemnify third-party liabilities. Consequently, there is no more
difference in the amounts of damages which petitioners can recover from Rhoda or respondent MICI;
petitioners can recover the said amounts in full from either of them, thus, making their liabilities
solidary or joint and several.
The Court now comes to the issue of the amounts of the damages awarded.
In its Decision dated 22 February 2000, the RTC awarded petitioners moral and actual damages, as
well as funeral expenses and attorneys fees. Subsequently, in its Order dated 24 January 2001, the
RTC reduced the amount of actual damages from P805,984.00 to P102,106.00, but additionally
awarded death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. Its award of moral damages and funeral
expenses as well as attorneys fees remained constant in its 28 February 2000 decision and was
carried over to its 24 January 2001 Order.
The Court shall now proceed to scrutinize said award of damages.
As regards the award of actual damages, Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]xcept as
provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved x x x."
The RTC awarded P36,000.00 for burial expenses. The award of P36,000.00 for burial expenses is
duly supported by receipts evidencing that petitioners did incur this expense. The petitioners held a
wake for two days at their residence and another two days at the Loyola Memorial Park.
65
The
amount covered the expenses by petitioners for the wake, funeral and burial of George.
66

As to compensation for loss of earning capacity, the RTC initially awarded P805,984.00 in its 28
February 2000 Decision, which it later reduced to P102,106.00 on 24 January 2001.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, x x x." Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. Hence, it is proper that compensation
for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to the petitioners in accordance with the formula
established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity, to wit:
The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income -reasonable and necessary
living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]
67

Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, shall be computed by applying the
formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased,
i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less
living and other incidental expenses. The loss is not equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased,
but only such portion that he would have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence, the Court
deducts from his gross earnings the necessary expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his
own needs. The Court explained in Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals
68
:
[The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is] concerned with the determination of the losses
or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased,
and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support they received
or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's
agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own
living," which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning
capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net
earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less necessary expense for his own living." Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is not the loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that
portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings,
and not gross earnings are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary
in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses."
Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in the computation of the amount of award for
damages set out in Villa Rey, the Court computes the award for the loss of Georges earning capacity
as follows:
Life expectancy = 2/3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]
2/3 x [80 56]
2/3 x [24]
FORMULA NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)
If:
Age at time of death of George Poe = 58
69

Monthly Income at time of death = P6,946
70

Gross Annual Income (GAI) = [(6,946) (12)] = P83,352
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) = 50%
71
of GAI = P41,676
NEC = [2/3 (80-58)] [83,352-41,676]
= [2/3 (22)] [41,676]
= [14.67] [41,676]
= P611,386.92
Therefore, Georges lost net earning capacity is equivalent to P611,386.92
The RTC awarded moral damages
72
in the amount of P100,000.00. With respect to moral damages,
the same are awarded under the following circumstances:
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the
award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.
In the instant case, petitioners testimonies reveal the intense suffering which they continue to
experience as a result of Georges death.
73
It is not difficult to comprehend that the sudden and
unexpected loss of a husband and father would cause mental anguish and serious anxiety in the wife
and children he left behind. Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are proper for Georges
death.
74
1avvphi1.zw+
The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity which the Court shall not disturb. The award
of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court.
75

Finally, the RTC awarded attorneys fees to petitioners. Petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees.
Under Article 2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be granted when a party is compelled to
litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
76
In
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
77
the Court held that an award of P50,000.00
as attorneys fees was reasonable. Hence, petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees in that amount.
78

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Court
AFFIRMS the Decision, dated 26 June 2002, and Resolution, dated 29 November 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, granting the Petition for Certiorari of respondent Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc., the Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of the speedy
administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to the
present Petition and decide the same on its merits.
Rhoda Santos and respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe the following:
(1) Funeral expenses P36,000.00;
(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity P611,386.92;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorneys fees P50,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per court appearance. No costs.

G.R. No. 97412 July 12, 1994
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Alojada & Garcia and Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza for petitoner.
Zapa Law Office for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The issues, albeit not completely novel, are: (a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a
shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre
operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed
from is rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent
(12%) or six percent (6%).
The findings of the court a quo, adopted by the Court of Appeals, on the antecedent and undisputed
facts that have led to the controversy are hereunder reproduced:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-
forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by
the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan
for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines
under Bill of Lading
No. YMA-8 (Exh. B). The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy
No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38.
Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto
the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said
to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment from
defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per "Request for
Bad Order Survey." Exh. D).
On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of
the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which
contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake (per "Bad Order
Waybill" No. 10649, Exh. E).
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee
suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants. Claims
were presented against defendants who failed and refused to pay the same (Exhs. H, I, J,
K, L).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee
P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated
to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants (per "Form of
Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check, Exhs. M, N, and O). (pp. 85-86, Rollo.)
There were, to be sure, other factual issues that confronted both courts. Here, the appellate court
said:
Defendants filed their respective answers, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint contending that: As for defendant Eastern Shipping it alleged that the
shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody of Metro Port
Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was incurred after the
shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability (p. 17, Record);
Metroport averred that although subject shipment was discharged unto its custody,
portion of the same was already in bad order (p. 11, Record); Allied Brokerage alleged
that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not having negligent or at fault for the
shipment was already in damage and bad order condition when received by it, but
nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary care and diligence in the handling/delivery
of the cargo to consignee in the same condition shipment was received by it.
From the evidence the court found the following:
The issues are:
1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages;
2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the
custody of defendants (in whose respective custody, if determinable);
3. Whether or not defendant(s) should be held liable for the losses/damages
(see plaintiff's pre-Trial Brief, Records, p. 34; Allied's pre-Trial Brief,
adopting plaintiff's Records, p. 38).
As to the first issue, there can be no doubt that the shipment sustained
losses/damages. The two drums were shipped in good order and condition,
as clearly shown by the Bill of Lading and Commercial Invoice which do not
indicate any damages drum that was shipped (Exhs. B and C). But when on
December 12, 1981 the shipment was delivered to defendant Metro Port
Service, Inc., it excepted to one drum in bad order.
Correspondingly, as to the second issue, it follows that the losses/damages
were sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and
possession of defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port)
and broker (Allied Brokerage). This becomes evident when the Marine
Cargo Survey Report (Exh. G), with its "Additional Survey Notes", are
considered. In the latter notes, it is stated that when the shipment was
"landed on vessel" to dock of Pier # 15, South Harbor, Manila on December
12, 1981, it was observed that "one (1) fiber drum (was) in damaged
condition, covered by the vessel's Agent's Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 86427."
The report further states that when defendant Allied Brokerage withdrew
the shipment from defendant arrastre operator's custody on January 7,
1982, one drum was found opened without seal, cello bag partly torn but
contents intact. Net unrecovered spillages was
15 kgs. The report went on to state that when the drums reached the
consignee, one drum was found with adulterated/faked contents. It is
obvious, therefore, that these losses/damages occurred before the shipment
reached the consignee while under the successive custodies of defendants.
Under Art. 1737 of the New Civil Code, the common carrier's duty to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance of goods remains in full
force and effect even if the goods are temporarily unloaded and stored in
transit in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the
consignee has been advised and has had reasonable opportunity to remove
or dispose of the goods (Art. 1738, NCC). Defendant Eastern Shipping's own
exhibit, the "Turn-Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes" (Exhs. 3-Eastern)
states that on December 12, 1981 one drum was found "open".
and thus held:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:
1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of 12% per
annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully
paid (the liability of defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed
US$500 per case or the CIF value of the loss, whichever is lesser, while the
liability of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. shall be to the extent of the
actual invoice value of each package, crate box or container in no case to
exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section 6.01 of the Management
Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
3. Costs.
B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of
defendant/cross-claimant Allied Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED. (p. 207, Record).
Dissatisfied, defendant's recourse to US.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. We find that the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct. As there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage
while in the successive possession of appellants, and therefore they are liable to the
appellee, as subrogee for the amount it paid to the consignee. (pp. 87-89, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto the judgment of the court
a quo.
In this petition, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the common carrier, attributes error and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court when
I. IT HELD PETITIONER CARRIER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
ARRASTRE OPERATOR AND CUSTOMS BROKER FOR THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AS GRANTED IN THE QUESTIONED DECISION;
II. IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF INTEREST ON THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AT THE
RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT PER ANNUM INSTEAD OF FROM THE DATE OF THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ONLY AT THE RATE OF SIX PERCENT PER
ANNUM, PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM BEING INDISPUTABLY UNLIQUIDATED.
The petition is, in part, granted.
In this decision, we have begun by saying that the questions raised by petitioner carrier are not all
that novel. Indeed, we do have a fairly good number of previous decisions this Court can merely tack
to.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the
time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by,
the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their
acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of
Appeals, 161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped
either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure
to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art.
1735, Civil Code; Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service
vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption
of fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734
1
of the Civil Code, are exclusive,
not one of which can be applied to this case.
The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the obligation of properly
delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the Court. In Fireman's Fund
Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455), we have explained, in holding the carrier and the
arrastre operator liable in solidum,thus:
The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of
a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5 [1967]. The
relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar to that of the
consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil.
253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that are
in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility
also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore
charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the customs
broker are themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that
attendant facts in a given case may not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by
Eastern Shipping Lines, which, being the carrier and not having been able to rebut the presumption
of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of both the court a
quo and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is sufficient evidence that the shipment
sustained damage while in the successive possession of appellants" (the herein petitioner among
them). Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this
case, is inevitable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it.
It is over the issue of legal interest adjudged by the appellate court that deserves more than just a
passing remark.
Let us first see a chronological recitation of the major rulings of this Court:
The early case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Manila Port
Service,
2
decided
3
on 15 May 1969, involved a suit for recovery of money arising out of short deliveries
and pilferage of goods. In this case, appellee Malayan Insurance (the plaintiff in the lower court)
averred in its complaint that the total amount of its claim for the value of the undelivered goods
amounted to P3,947.20. This demand, however, was neither established in its totality nor definitely
ascertained. In the stipulation of facts later entered into by the parties, in lieu of proof, the amount of
P1,447.51 was agreed upon. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the appellants (defendants)
Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company to pay appellee Malayan Insurance the sum of
P1,447.51 with legal interest thereon from the date the complaint was filed on 28 December 1962 until
full payment thereof. The appellants then assailed, inter alia, the award of legal interest. In sustaining
the appellants, this Court ruled:
Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a stipulation, is
the legal rate. Such interest normally is allowable from the date of demand, judicial or
extrajudicial. The trial court opted for judicial demand as the starting point.
But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty." And as was held by this Court in Rivera
vs. Perez,
4
L-6998, February 29, 1956, if the suit were for damages, "unliquidated and not
known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof
(Montilla c. Corporacion de P.P. Agustinos, 25 Phil. 447; Lichauco v. Guzman,
38 Phil. 302)," then, interest "should be from the date of the decision." (Emphasis supplied)
The case of Reformina vs. Tomol,
5
rendered on 11 October 1985, was for "Recovery of Damages for
Injury to Person and Loss of Property." After trial, the lower court decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and third party
defendants and against the defendants and third party plaintiffs as follows:
Ordering defendants and third party plaintiffs Shell and Michael, Incorporated to pay
jointly and severally the following persons:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Plaintiffs Pacita F. Reformina and Francisco Reformina the sum of P131,084.00 which
is the value of the boat F B Pacita III together with its accessories, fishing gear and
equipment minus P80,000.00 which is the value of the insurance recovered and the
amount of P10,000.00 a month as the estimated monthly loss suffered by them as a
result of the fire of May 6, 1969 up to the time they are actually paid or already the total
sum of P370,000.00 as of June 4, 1972 with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until paid and to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 with costs against defendants and third
party plaintiffs. (Emphasis supplied.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the amount of damages awarded but
sustained the trial court in adjudging legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid. When the appellate court's decision became final, the case was remanded to the lower
court for execution, and this was when the trial court issued its assailed resolution which
applied the 6% interest per annum prescribed in Article 2209 of the Civil Code. In their petition
for review on certiorari, the petitioners contended that Central Bank Circular
No. 416, providing thus
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended,
Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the
rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be twelve (12%) percent per annum. This Circular shall take effect immediately.
(Emphasis found in the text)
should have, instead, been applied. This Court
6
ruled:
The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment which
has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is not within the ambit of
the authority granted to the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one rendered in
an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and does not involve
any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or credits. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, the law applicable to the said case is Article 2209 of the New
Civil Code which reads
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money,
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per
annum.
The above rule was reiterated in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., v. Cruz,
7
promulgated on 28 July
1986. The case was for damages occasioned by an injury to person and loss of property. The trial
court awarded private respondent Pedro Manabat actual and compensatory damages in the amount
of P72,500.00 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Relying on
the Reformina v. Tomol case, this Court
8
modified the interest award from 12% to 6% interest per
annum but sustained the time computation thereof, i.e., from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
In Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals,
9
the trial court, in an action for the recovery of damages
arising from the collapse of a building, ordered,
inter alia, the "defendant United Construction Co., Inc. (one of the petitioners)
. . . to pay the plaintiff, . . . , the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate from November 29,
1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment . . . ." Save from the modification of the
amount granted by the lower court, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's decision. When
taken to this Court for review, the case, on 03 October 1986, was decided, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the
special and environmental circumstances of this case, we deem it reasonable to render a
decision imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the third-party
defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil
Code, Supra.
p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception to attorney's fees)
occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) and an
additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees,
the total sum being payable upon the finality of this decision. Upon failure to pay on such
finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be imposed upon aforementioned
amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against the defendant and third-party
defendants (Except Roman Ozaeta). (Emphasis supplied)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by United Construction, contending that "the interest of
twelve (12%) per cent per annum imposed on the total amount of the monetary award was in
contravention of law." The Court
10
ruled out the applicability of the Reformina and Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines cases and, in its resolution of 15 April 1988, it explained:
There should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to Central Bank
Circular No. 416 . . . is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2) forbearance of any
money, goods or credit; and
(3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments involving loans
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Cruz,
143 SCRA 160-161 [1986]; Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 [1985]). It is true that
in the instant case, there is neither a loan or a forbearance, but then no interest is actually
imposed provided the sums referred to in the judgment are paid upon the finality of the
judgment. It is delay in the payment of such final judgment, that will cause the imposition
of the interest.
It will be noted that in the cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is imposed on
the total sum, from the filing of the complaint until paid; in other words, as part of the
judgment for damages. Clearly, they are not applicable to the instant case. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The subsequent case of American Express International, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
11
was a
petition for review on certiorari from the decision, dated 27 February 1985, of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, to
P240,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, and its resolution, dated 29 April 1985, restoring the
amount of damages awarded by the trial court, i.e., P2,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P400,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest thereon at 12% per annum from notice of
judgment, plus costs of suit. In a decision of 09 November 1988, this Court, while recognizing the
right of the private respondent to recover damages, held the award, however, for moral damages by
the trial court, later sustained by the IAC, to be inconceivably large. The Court
12
thus set aside the
decision of the appellate court and rendered a new one, "ordering the petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with
six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this decision until paid. (Emphasis
supplied)
Reformina came into fore again in the 21 February 1989 case of Florendo v. Ruiz
13
which arose from
a breach of employment contract. For having been illegally dismissed, the petitioner was awarded by
the trial court moral and exemplary damages without, however, providing any legal interest thereon.
When the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held:
WHEREFORE, except as modified hereinabove the decision of the CFI of Negros Oriental
dated October 31, 1972 is affirmed in all respects, with the modification that defendants-
appellants, except defendant-appellant Merton Munn, are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the amounts stated in the dispositive portion of the decision, including the
sum of P1,400.00 in concept of compensatory damages, with interest at the legal rate
from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid(Emphasis supplied.)
The petition for review to this Court was denied. The records were thereupon transmitted to
the trial court, and an entry of judgment was made. The writ of execution issued by the trial
court directed that only compensatory damages should earn interest at 6% per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge, a petition for certiorari assailed the said order. This Court said:
. . . , it is to be noted that the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of interest "at the
legal rate" from the time of the filing of the complaint. . . Said circular [Central Bank
Circular No. 416] does not apply to actions based on a breach of employment contract
like the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated that the 6% interest per annum on the damages should be computed from
the time the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid.
Quite recently, the Court had another occasion to rule on the matter. National Power Corporation
vs. Angas,
14
decided on 08 May 1992, involved the expropriation of certain parcels of land. After
conducting a hearing on the complaints for eminent domain, the trial court ordered the petitioner to
pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands so
expropriated "with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid." Again, in applying the 6% legal
interest per annum under the Civil Code, the Court
15
declared:
. . . , (T)he transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of
which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial
court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on
the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the
form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the
kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced
in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc.
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in the above holdings. The cases can perhaps be
classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues involved and the corresponding
rulings rendered by the court. The "first group" would consist of the cases of Reformina
v. Tomol (1985), Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Cruz(1986), Florendo v. Ruiz (1989)
and National Power Corporation v. Angas (1992). In the "second group" would be Malayan Insurance
Company v.Manila Port Service (1969), Nakpil and Sons v. Court of Appeals (1988), and American
Express International v.Intermediate Appellate Court (1988).
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the 6% (under the Civil Code)
or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum. It is easily discernible in these cases
that there has been a consistent holding that the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per
annum applies only to loans or forbearance
16
of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the
Civil Code governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of
damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general. Observe, too,
that in these cases, a common time frame in the computation of the 6% interest per annum has been
applied, i.e., from the time the complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6% or 12%
interest per annum,
17
depending on whether or not the amount involved is a loan or forbearance, on
the one hand, or one of indemnity for damage, on the other hand. Unlike, however, the "first group"
which remained consistent in holding that the running of the legal interest should be from the time of
the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the "second group" varied on the commencement of the
running of the legal interest.
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of the decision of the
court a quo,explaining that "if the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until definitely
ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,' then, interest 'should be from the
date of the decision.'" American Express International v. IAC, introduced a different time frame for
reckoning the 6% interest by ordering it to be "computed from the finality of (the) decision until paid."
The Nakpil and Sons case ruled that 12% interest per annum should be imposed from the finality of
the decision until the judgment amount is paid.
The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have called for
different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the
equities of each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of
clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts
18
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
19
The provisions under Title
XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
20

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing.
21
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded.
22
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169
23
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
24
at the rate of 6% per
annum.
25
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
26
Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed
from the decision, dated
03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT
(6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment thereof.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007
departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets,
petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent
TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach
was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was
a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under
the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is
allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for
a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an
hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the
number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on
the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were
listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The
two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were,
those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr.
Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while
his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr.
Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another
flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen
($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As
aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision
1
dated January 9, 1989 the
dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the
following amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of
the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them
to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of
Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50,
Philippine Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral
damages for all the plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
2

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage
suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is
a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the
United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was
overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on
an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the
circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-
eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted
tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
3
dated October 25, 1991
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby
MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is
eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price
of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price
of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and
alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT
FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.
5

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners
to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.
6
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate
that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office.
7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent,
in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed
by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case
at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline.
8
Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case
would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,
9
where
passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that
when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight
and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of
carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an
award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
10
where private respondent was not allowed
to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the
allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed
ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in
violating private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the
injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts
to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
11
where a would-be
passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and
unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet
was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's
finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
12
This is so, for a contract
of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty a duty to provide public service and
convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was
also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were
only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller
planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts
to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages.
13

Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not
informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations
on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that
the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another
airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the
name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An
examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the
purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for
flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and
held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before
departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets.
The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding
priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue
raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were
incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to
show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to
show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a
hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to
rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their
tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so
inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-
interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by
respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's
ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court.
Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to
use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to
establish that they did not accede to said agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both
petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets
purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira
and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they
"opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not
accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked.
14
The purchase of the
American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's
unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201,
New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals,
15
this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed
for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of
their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which
ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the
unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New
York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code
which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to
incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary
damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea
were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00
exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to
petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets
bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
G.R. No. 127569 July 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SENEN PRADES, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court for automatic review is the August 13, 1996 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. IR-3666, finding accused-appellant Senen Prades guilty of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The judgment likewise ordered
appellant to pay private complainant P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, as well as the costs.
1

The information in Criminal Case No. IR-3666 alleges:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1994, at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, at San
Vicente Ogbon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said Emmie R. Rosales against the latter's
will, and that the accused perpetrated the offense charged at the dwelling of herein
complainant and with the use of a firearm in threatening complainant, to the latter's
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court.
2

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
3
The
defense waived the pre-trial
4
and the case proceeded to trial in due course.
The private complainant and the physician who conducted a medical examination on her were
presented in the trial court to establih the case for the People. After the physician had testified as the
first witness, appellant absconded. The records of the case reveal that appellant escaped from his
escort guard while he was being transported from a hearing at the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City
to the Tinangis Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur on March 29, 1995
5
Trial accordingly continued in
absentia.
Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly outrage befell
her on March 24, 1994. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room
in their house and were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who lived with
them, was in the hospital at that time.
6

At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down upon her.
She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to
shout when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise or he would kill her.
7

Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of the room,
enabling complainant to see the intruder.
8
She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her barrio
mate. It appears that he had gained entry into the house through a passageway in the kitchen.
9

Appellant attempted to remove complainant's pants and underwear even as he continued to jab the
gun at her neck. Complainant resisted him and struggled for twenty to thirty minutes until she was
overcome by his strength.
10
He knelt on her knees and succeeded in removing her clothing.
11
He then
spread her legs apart, forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina,
12
and bodily pinned her down. He
fondled her breasts and private parts and made push and pull movements with his genital organ for
about two minutes.
13
Complainant was resultantly in pain as she felt blood ooze out of her
vagina.
14
She continued to struggle against appellant but to no avail.
After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled away from complainant and once again nudged her with the
gun. He warned her not to tell anyone about the event or he would kill her and her
family.
15
Appellant left complainant stunned and in tears. She did not inform anyone about the
incident.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant.
16
She saw appellant hand the
first letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her.
17
The other letter was given by appellant to
complainant through the latter's sister.
18
Aggrieved by all these circumstances, complainant decided
to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault that transpired on March 24.
Complainant and her grandfather forthwith reported the matter to the Barangay Captain who
advised them to proceed to the police headquarters of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
19
After filing a report
with the police, complainant underwent physical examination at a rural health center in Sto.
Domingo.
20
She then instituted a complaint for rape against appellant.
Pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua, Camarines
Sur,
21
appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Nabua. He filed a motion for bail
but the same was denied by the lower court.
22
Trial commenced in Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court on December 14, 1994.
Dr. Stephen A. Beltran,
23
the Rural Health Physician of Nabua, Camarines Sur, testified that he
conducted a physical examination on complainant on April 8, 1994 and found indications of sexual
intercourse.
24
The medical certificate issued by said physician revealed the following:
FINDINGS: VAGINAL EXAMINATION
(+) Hymenal laceration scar at
6:00 o'clock
(-) Gross blood
(-) (S)eminal fluid
IMPRESSION: VAGINAL PENETRATION, COMPLETE.
25

As earlier noted, appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had completed the
presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued for his apprehension and it was
ordered that he be included in the list of wanted criminals.
26
Appellant, however, has not been
recaptured up to now.
Fearing for her life and for the safety of her family members, complainant left her home in San
Vicente, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and moved to Naga City.
27
All she hoped for was to begin a new life,
away from the stigma created by the crime on her name and her family, and away from the dread of
possibly being killed by appellant who was at large and, perhaps, lurking in the shadows.
After the presentation of its evidence, the prosecution rested its case. Because appellant had taken
flight, he was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence hence counsel for the defense was
unable to introduce evidence to dispute the charge.
28

In its decision dated August 13, 1996, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling, and imposed upon him the
penalty of death. The lower court issued another warrant of arrest for the capture of appellant.
29
It
has not been served to date as he remains at large, a fugitive from justice. Because appellant was
condemned to suffer the principal penalty of death, his conviction is now before the Court on
automatic review.
As its lone assignment of error, the defense alleges that the court below erred in finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It is contended that the testimony of
complainant on the identity of appellant as the author of the crime is doubtful not only because there
was insufficient lighting in the room of complainant, where the alleged act of rape took place, but also
because complainant had never been face to face with appellant prior to the incident.
30

The Court has exhaustively reviewed and objectively analyzed the records of this case, especially so
because a capital offense is involved, and sees no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
conclusions of the court below. We consequently affirm the conviction of appellant.
The contention that the identity of appellant has not been established deserves exiguous
consideration because it is undisputed that appellant was known to the victim long before the
assault. They lived in the same barrio
31
and the wife of appellant was the goddaughter of
complainant's grandmother.
32
Appellant also used to periodically pass by the house of
complainant.
33

The defense adverts to the fact that on the night of the occurrence, there were no lights in the room
where the rape took place. It is further claimed that it was impossible for moonlight to penetrate
the sawali door and enable complainant to identify her assailant because the spaces in
the sawali were "as small as the diameter of a mungo bean . . . (a)nd these small spaces are set wide
apart between the slats."
34

This contention must fail. The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total darkness. As
already stated, complainant was able to identify appellant because the room was lit by moonlight
that filtered through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of the sawali door. The amount of light emitted
by the moon is relative. While there are evenings of pitch darkness, there are moonlit nights when
the brightness of the moon is sufficient to enable one to see distinct details of objects.
In addition to this consideration, the house of complainant was a typical provincial home made of
bamboo,
35
usually consisting of bamboo stilts, interwoven slats of bamboo forming walls of sawali,
and similar materials. Such constructional pattern naturally allowed light to penetrate into the house
and this fact reasonably induces the conclusion that complainant was truthful in claiming that there
was sufficient illumination in the room which permitted her to identify her aggressor.
Furthermore, complainant had an extended and adequate look at the features of appellant during the
assault, with ample opportunity to recognize him. As this Court has repeatedly held, a man and a
woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.
36
Not surprisingly,
therefore, complainant readily and positively identified appellant in court during the trial as the man
who raped her on March 24, 1994.
Doctrinally, the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in the instant case, she has no
motive to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely
suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive.
37
We are thus convincingly assured that
the lower court prudently fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor and a legal adjudicator. We
accordingly give due respect to the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the complaining
witness.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by, inter alia, force or intimidation. The
degree of the force or intimidation required is relative. It need not be overpowering or irresistible
because all that is necessary is that it is sufficient to consummate the purpose which appellant had in
mind.
38

It is indubitable that complainant put up a struggle when appellant forced himself upon her. She was
inevitably subdued by his strength and she ultimately succumbed to his venery. Even
assuming arguendo that complainant did not repel the physical aggression of appellant, this does not
preclude a finding that she was raped. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.
39

In the case now before us, although complainant had a companion who was asleep in the room when
she was attacked by appellant, she could not have dared risk her life by screaming for help because
appellant pressed a handgun at her neck and threatened to kill her and her family if she would resist
him or report the incident. The evidence establishes that the sexual intercourse between appellant
and complainant was consummated through force and intimidation and ineluctably constituted the
crime of rape. The fact that it was committed in a room where there was another occupant does not
rule out the crime.
40

In addition, and virtually foreclosing further chicanery by appellant, it is conceded that after the rape,
he sent complainant two letters in which he implored her forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so
that he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by admitting his crime under the seal
of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through
mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
41
For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that a complaint be first filed by
the victim because all that is required is that after committing the crime, appellant or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
42

Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.
43
The letters of appellant
containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an implied admission of
his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in evidence by the
prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus confirming his culpability.
If appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of March 24, 1994, complainant may
possibly have accepted appellant's offer to live with her. At the very least, she would not have
revealed her misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue. That complainant chose to
divulge the incident and subject herself to the disgrace of public scrutiny and scandal buttresses the
charge that she had been criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this affirmation of guilt
derived from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open to question.
The letters thus bolster and corroborate complainant's testimony on the identity and guilty of
appellant.
44

Another factor supporting appellant's conviction is his flight. By escaping from confinement during
trial and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and despite the
standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from justice.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid
arrest, detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.
45
It is considered an
indication of guilt.
46
A "fugitive from justice," on the other hand, is one who flees after conviction to
avoid punishment, as well as one who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.
47
By his flight
and thereafter becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence and consequently
denied himself the opportunity to dispute the charge against him.
It is a fundamental rule that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness or, as in this case, the absence of evidence of the defense. We
emphasize that the flight of appellant, by itself, does not sustain his conviction because the law
requires therefor no less than the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case before us,
however, complainant's testimony and positive identification of appellant were sufficiently
corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined her, the medico-legal report, and the
letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his guilt and sought complainant's mercy. These
considerations convince the Court that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. His flight and
status as a fugitive from the law merely dispel any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt.
Incidentally, to obviate any question as to the propriety of the course of action we have taken in this
case, that is, of subjecting the judgment of conviction of the trial court to automatic appellate review
despite the fact that appellant was partially tried and convicted by said court in absentia, and is and
has been a fugitive from justice since then and up to the present, we draw upon our ruling in People
vs. Esparas, et al.
48
which declared:
. . . On August 20, 1996, we issued an extended resolution upholding the power of this
Court to review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from
confinement prior to the judgment of the trial court, thus:
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence
mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of
the convict and regardless of the will of the court. . . . . Ours is not only the
power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can
repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. . . . .
On the question as to whether or not the Court can validly promulgate this judgment in the case at
bar, the answer is in the affirmative. As graphically elucidated in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.:
49

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 * is a new provision introduced by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of judgment in
absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment was
intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial process could be
subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. In
explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented:
Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would be set
at naught and, where the civil liability ex-delicto was instituted with the
criminal action, the offended party could not enforce either the primary
liability of the accused or any subsidiary liability, where proper and
involved in the case, as no judgment could be promulgated. Since both the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions only require prior arraignment as an
indispensable requisite and the trial may thereafter proceed in the absence
of the accused, the judgment in this case being merely the procedural
culmination of the trial, the promulgation thereof can justifiably be made in
absentia in the manner set out in this section (II Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 369, [6th ed., 1989]).
If, for any reason, it should be claimed that the provision under discussion is intended to be the
procedure in the trial courts, the simple rejoinder is that there is no reason why, on considerations of
its rationale and procedural expediency, the same should not apply to the same factual situation in
the appellate courts. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the judgment is promulgated by
merely filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies of the same to be
served upon the parties,
50
hence the appearance of the accused is not even required there as his
presence is necessary only in the promulgation of the judgments of trial courts.
51
Thereafter, when
the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory, the records of the case together with a
certified copy of the appellate court judgment are returned to the court a quo for execution of the
judgment.
52
On this issue, however, one member of this Court has submitted a separate opinion.
At this juncture, we also note that when the rape was committed the governing law was Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4111 and 7659,
53
under which the use
of a deadly weapon in committing the felony of rape was, as it still is, punished by reclusion
perpetua to death.
Reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the rules for their application, one of which, pertinent to this case, is that when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied.
Two aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, namely, nocturnity and dwelling.
We agree with the court below that nocturnity cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in this case because although the crime was committed late that night, the evidence does not
positively establish that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was especially
sought by the offender to ensure its commission, or that the offender took advantage thereof for
impunity. It cannot, therefore, be considered herein under either the so-called objective or subjective
tests for determining the existence of this circumstance.
It is clear, however, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant in the commission of
the crime. Article 14(5) of the Revised Penal Code provides that this circumstance aggravates a
felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. In the instant case, the aforesaid circumstance of dwelling was definitely present in the
commission of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon. From all the foregoing
considerations, the presence of this aggravating circumstance mandates that the supreme penalty of
death be imposed.
The lower court, however, erred in classifying the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being
in the character of moral damages. Jurisprudence has elucidated that the award authorized by the
criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law
54
For that matter, the civil liability ex delicto provided by the
Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation and indemnification,
55
all correspond to actual or
compensatory damages in the Civil Code,
56
since the other damages provided therein are moral,
nominal, temperate or moderate, liquidated, and exemplary or corrective damages
57
which have
altogether different concepts and fundaments.
We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is
distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
58
Evidently, therefore, the
lower court actually intended the award of P50,000.00 as indemnification to be paid to the victim.
On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court. The recent judicial
prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00
if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.
59
Applying the foregoing policy, the
civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party in the case at bar is and should be P75,000.00.
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present disposition. The
Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
Indeed the conventional requirement ofallegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil
cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included
therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages
60
are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony
on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial
charade.
The People having established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction and the
penalty imposed by the court a quo is correct and must consequently be affirmed. Withal, four
Members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of lriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No.
IR-3666 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Senen Prades is
ordered to indemnify the offended party. Emmie R. Rosales, in the amount of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs in all instances.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

Appellant Senen Prades absconded before the prosecution finished presenting its evidence in the
trial court. But trial proceeded and judgment was rendered in his absence.
In People v. Esparas,* the accused after her arraignment escaped from jail. Like the present appellant,
she was tried in absentia, found guilty as charged and sentenced to the death penalty. Before
requiring appellant to file an appeal brief, this Court was confronted with the issue of "whether or
not it will proceed to authomatically review her death sentence."
Affirmative votes were cast by six (6) justices; namely, JJ. Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Hermosisima, and J. Puno who wrote that existing jurisprudence mandates a review of all death
penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement. Two (2) other justices, JJ.
Vitug and Panganiban, joined only in the result, explaining that while the Court should not dismiss an
appeal from a decision imposing the death penalty due to the escape of the accused, it cannot at the
same time render judgment on him until after he is rearrested and thus becomes subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. Six (6) other justices CJ. Narvasa and JJ. Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Mendoza
and Torres dissented, with J. Padilla stressing in his written dissent that when an appellant
escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal, the dismissal of such appeal is authorized under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
While an escapee mocks the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary, and while
his appeal should not be automatically dismissed merely for that reason, still I believe that the
Supreme Court should not deliberate on the appeal of the accused, much less render judgment
thereon, until after he or she is rearrested or voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Court.
In the present case, I therefore vote that the Court should not deliberate nor render judgment on the
appeal until after the appellant is within the Court's jurisdiction.

# Separate Opinions

Appellant Senen Prades absconded before the prosecution finished presenting its evidence in the
trial court. But trial proceeded and judgment was rendered in his absence.
In People v. Esparas,* the accused after her arraignment escaped from jail. Like the present appellant,
she was tried in absentia, found guilty as charged and sentenced to the death penalty. Before
requiring appellant to file an appeal brief, this Court was confronted with the issue of "whether or
not it will proceed to authomatically review her death sentence."
Affirmative votes were cast by six (6) justices; namely, JJ. Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Hermosisima, and J. Puno who wrote that existing jurisprudence mandates a review of all death
penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement. Two (2) other justices, JJ.
Vitug and Panganiban, joined only in the result, explaining that while the Court should not dismiss an
appeal from a decision imposing the death penalty due to the escape of the accused, it cannot at the
same time render judgment on him until after he is rearrested and thus becomes subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. Six (6) other justices CJ. Narvasa and JJ. Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Mendoza
and Torres dissented, with J. Padilla stressing in his written dissent that when an appellant
escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal, the dismissal of such appeal is authorized under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
While an escapee mocks the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary, and while
his appeal should not be automatically dismissed merely for that reason, still I believe that the
Supreme Court should not deliberate on the appeal of the accused, much less render judgment
thereon, until after he or she is rearrested or voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Court.
In the present case, I therefore vote that the Court should not deliberate nor render judgment on the
appeal until after the appellant is within the Court's jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 88561 April 20, 1990
DR. HERMAN ARMOVIT, DORA ARMOVIT and JACQUELINE ARMOVIT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

GANGAYCO, J.:
This is a case which involves a Filipino physician and his family residing in the United States who
came home to the Philippines on a Christmas visit. They were bumped off at the Manila International
Airport on their return flight to the U.S. because of an erroneous entry in their plane tickets relating
to their time of departure.
In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends
in the Philippines, so they purchased from private respondent, (Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3)
round trip airline tickets from the U.S. to Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the
children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting
of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to Tokyo
portion of the return flight:
from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status, OK.
1

On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982, petitioner arrived at the
check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning,
which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time
recited in their tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated
inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30 A.M. flight time
entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.
Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through their
representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the private
respondent's Roxas Boulevard office.
2
The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was
not changed when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and
confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.
3

Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not
be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered anguish, wounded
feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when
they were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the flight that day.
Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the petitioners for
compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport
contracts,
4
petitioners were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered on July 2, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages, plus
attorney's fees, as follows:
a) Actual damages in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit in the sum of P1,300.00,
with interest at the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
b) Moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, and
nominal damages of P100,000.00 in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit;
c) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00, and
nominal damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
d) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00, and
nominal damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
e) Attorney's fees of 5% of the total awards under the above paragraphs.
plus costs of suit.
5

Not satisfied therewith, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in
due course a decision was rendered on June 20, 1989, the relevant portion and dispositive part of
which read as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees had complied with the "72-hour reconfirmation rule." They had
obtained reconfirmation from defendant-appellant of the time and date of their flight, as
indicated in their tickets. The trial court said so and We find nothing significance to
warrant a disturbance of such finding.
On the allowance of damages, the trial court has discretion to grant and fix the amounts
to be paid the prevailing party. In this case, there was gross negligence on the part of
defendant-appellant in reconfirming the time and date of departure of Flight No. 002 as
indicated in the three (3) tickets (Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2). And, as admitted by
defendant-appellant, plaintiffs-appellees had arrived at the airport at 9:15 A.M. or one
(1) hour before departure time of 10:30 A.M.
Appellees' actual damages in the amount of P1,300.00 is maintained for being
unrebutted by the Appellant.
However, We modify the allowance of the other awards made by the trial court.
The moral damages of P900,000.00 awarded to Appellees must be eliminated
considering the following:
1. That the appellees did not take the witness stand to testify on their "social humiliation,
wounded feelings and anxiety" and the breach of contract was not malicious or
fraudulent. (Art. 2220, Civil Code). It has been held that:
Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on
account of the plaintiffs failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because
a breach of contract like that of defendant not being malicious or fraudulent, does not
warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code (Ventilla vs.
Centeno, L-14333, 28 Jan. 1961; Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163; 4 March 1959 Francisco vs.
GSIS, 7 SCRA 577).
2. Furthermore, moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (San Andres vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA
85). In a later case, the Supreme Court held that moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant (R & B Surety vs. IAC,
129 SCRA 745) citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino, Jr. 94 SCRA 966).
However, there is no question that appellant acted with negligence in not informing
appellees about the change of hour of departure. To provide an example or correction
for the public good, therefore, the award of exemplary damages is proper (Art. 2229 &
2231 Civil Code; Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431; Prudenciado vs.
Alliance Transport, 148 SCRA 440). Nonetheless, the awards granted by the trial court
are far too exhorbitant and excessive compared to the actual loss of P1,300.00. The
authority of the Court of Appeals to modify or change the amounts of awards has been
upheld in a long line of decisions. We reduce the award of exemplary damages from
P500,000.00 to P100,000.00 in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit, from P500,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit; and from P300,000.00 to P20,000.00 in favor
of Miss Jacqueline Armovit. (Gellada vs. Warner Barnes, 57 O.G. (4) 7347, Sadie vs.
Bachrach, 57 O.G. (4) 636, Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport, supra). The award of
nominal damages has to be eliminated since we are already awarding actual loss.
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages (Vda. de
Medina, et al. v. Cresencia, et al., 99 Phil. 506).
The award of 5% of the total damages as attorney's fees is reasonable.
3. WHEREFORE, with the above modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
6

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated May
29, 1989.
7

Both petitioners and private respondent elevated the matter to this Court for review by certiorari.
The petition of private respondent was docketed as G.R. No. 86776. It was denied in a resolution of
this Court dated July 10, 1989, and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution
dated September 6, 1989. On October 12, 1989 this Court ordered the entry of judgment in this case
and for the records to be remanded to the court of origin for prompt execution of the judgment.
In the herein petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner they claim that the questioned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals should be struck down as an unlawful, unjust and
reasonless departure from the decisions of this Court as far as the award for moral damages and the
drastic reduction of the exemplary damages are concerned.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The appellate court observed that private respondent was guilty of gross negligence not only in the
issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure and without changing or
correcting the error when the said three (3) tickets were presented for re-confirmation. Nevertheless
it deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not take the witness stand
to testify on "their social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the breach of contract
was not malicious or fraudulent."
8

We disagree.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso,
9
Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways,
10
and Zulueta vs. Pan American
World Airways,
11
this Court awarded damages for the gross negligence of the airline which amounted
to malice and bad faith and which tainted the breach of air transportation contract.
Thus in Air France, this Court observed:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with
the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have the right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
12

The gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with entries as
to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which
petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad
faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners
to moral damages.
The appellate court observed that the petitioners failed to take the witness stand and testify on the
matter. It overlooked however, that the failure of the petitioner to appear in court to testify was
explained by them. The assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 following the
year they were bumped off caused a turmoil in the country. This turmoil spilled over to the year 1984
when they were scheduled to testify. However, the violent demonstrations in the country were
sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were advised to refrain from returning to the
Philippines at the time.
Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of petitioner Dr. Armovit, took the witness stand as he
was with the petitioners from the time they checked in up to the time of their ultimate departure. He
was a witness when the check-in officer rudely informed the petitioners that their flight had already
taken off, while petitioner Dr. Armovit remonstrated that their tickets reflected their flight time to be
10:30 A.M.; that in anger and frustration, Dr. Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be
accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his appointments in the U.S.; that
petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not being able to report for work at the
expiration of her leave of absence; that while petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for
hotel accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and wait for their
flight out of Manila the following day, petitioners did not use their meal coupons supplied because of
the limitations thereon so they had to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300.00
while waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the
medical appointments he missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight; that the petitioners
were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982, but were assured of this flight only on the
very morning of that day, so that they experienced anxiety until they were assured seats for that
flight.
13

No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having been bumped
off. However, considering the circumstances of this case whereby the private respondent attended to
the plight of the petitioners, taking care of their accommodations while waiting and boarding them in
the flight back to the U.S. the following day, the Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each.
By the same token to provide an example for the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also
proper.
14
The award of the appellate court is adequate.
Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is
an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory
damages.
15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
modified such that private respondent shall pay the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of P1,300.00 with interest at the
legal rate from January 17, 1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000.00 and exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in favor of
Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 in favor of
Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards under the above paragraphs, plus the cost of
suit.
G.R. No. L-22425 August 31, 1965
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NICOLAS L. CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION), respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Bengzon, Villegas and Zarraga for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an action for damages for alleged breach of contract. After appropriate proceedings the Court
of First Instance of Manila, in which the case was originally filed, rendered judgment sentencing
defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. hereinafter referred to as petitioner to pay to plaintiff
Cuenca hereinafter referred to as respondent the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, together
with the sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing
of complaint," December 12, 1959, "until fully paid, plus the further sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation." On appeal taken by petitioner, said decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except as to the P5,000.00 exemplary damages, which was eliminated, and the P20,000.00
award for moral damages, which was converted into nominal damages. The case is now before us on
petition for review by certiorari filed by petitioner, upon the ground that the lower court has erred:
(1) in holding that the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929, relative to transportation by air is
not in force in the Philippines; (2) in not holding that respondent has no cause of action; and (3) in
awarding P20,000 as nominal damages.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error because the same is the basis of
the second assignment of error, and the latter is devoid of merit, even if we assumed the former to be
well-taken. Indeed the second assignment of error is predicated upon Articles 17, 18 and 19 of said
Convention, reading:
ART. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
ART. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or
loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage, or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the
damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph shall comprise
the period during which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in any place
whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land, by
sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such transportation takes place in
the performance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery, or
transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the
result of an event which took place during the transportation by air.
ART. 19. The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation by air
of passengers, baggage, or goods.
Petitioner argues that pursuant to those provisions, an air "carrier is liable only" in the event of death
of a passenger or injury suffered by him, or of destruction or loss of, or damage to any checked
baggage or any goods, or of delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods. This
pretense is not borne out by the language of said Articles. The same merely declare the carrier liable
for damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. Neither said
provisions nor others in the aforementioned Convention regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier. Under petitioner's theory, an air carrier would be exempt from
any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of
carriage, which is absurd.
The third assignment of error is based upon Medina vs. Cresencia (52 Off. Gaz. 4606), and Quijano vs.
Philippine Air Lines (CA-G.R. No. 21804-R). Neither case is, however, in point, aside from the fact that
the latter is not controlling upon us. In the first case, this Court eliminated a P10,000 award for
nominal damages, because the aggrieved party had already been awarded P6,000 as compensatory
damages, P30,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages, and "nominal damages
cannot co-exist with compensatory damages." In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals has adjudicated
no such compensatory, moral and exemplary damages to respondent herein.
Moreover, there are special reasons why the P20,000.00 award in favor of respondent herein is
justified, even if said award were characterized as nominal damages. When his contract of carriage
was violated by the petitioner, respondent held the office of Commissioner of Public Highways of the
Republic of the Philippines. Having boarded petitioner's plane in Manila with a first class ticket to
Tokyo, he was, upon arrival at Okinawa, transferred to the tourist class compartment. Although he
revealed that he was traveling in his official capacity as official delegate of the Republic to a
conference in Tokyo, an agent of petitioner rudely compelled him in the presence of other passengers
to move, over his objection, to the tourist class, under threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa. In
order to reach the conference on time, respondent had no choice but to obey.
It is true that said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was not called thereto. Much
less was he advised that "W/L" meant "wait listed." Upon the other hand, having paid the first class
fare in full and having been given first class accommodation as he took petitioner's plane in Manila,
respondent was entitled to believe that this was a confirmation of his first class reservation and that
he would keep the same until his ultimate destination, Tokyo. Then, too, petitioner has not tried to
explain or even alleged that the person to whom respondent's first class seat was given had a better
right thereto. In other words, since the offense had been committed with full knowledge of the fact
that respondent was an official representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P20,000
awarded as damages may well be considered as merely nominal. At any rate, considering that
petitioner's agent had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, said award may also be
considered as one for exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. 85161 September 9, 1991
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION and ENRIQUE SY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, respondents.
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioners.
Augusta Gatmaytan for OVEC.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
Petitioners seek a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09504
"Enrique Sy and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises
Corporation" affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch XXV,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint of the plaintiff Enrique F. Sy is dismissed, and on the
counterclaim of the defendant O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring as lawful, the cancellation and termination of the Lease Agreement (Exh. A)
and the defendant's re-entry and repossession of the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol
theaters under lease on February 11, 1980;
2. Declaring as lawful, the forfeiture clause under paragraph 12 of the Id Lease
Agreement, and confirming the forfeiture of the plaintiffs remaining cash deposit of
P290,000.00 in favor of the defendant thereunder, as of February 11, 1980;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P289,534.78, representing
arrears in rentals, unremitted amounts for amusement tax delinquency and accrued
interest thereon, with further interest on said amounts at the rate of 12% per annum
(per lease agreement) from December 1, 1980 until the same is fully paid;
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00, representing
the P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease rental which were not deducted from the
cash deposit of the plaintiff from February to November, 1980, after the forfeiture of the
said cash deposit on February 11, 1980, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum on each of the said monthly amounts of P10,000.00 from the time the same
became due until it is paid;
5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant through the injunction bond, the sum of
P100,000.00, representing the P10,000.00 monthly increase in rentals which the
defendant failed to realize from February to November 1980 result from the injunction,
with legal interest thereon from the finality of this decision until fully paid;
6. Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum equivalent to ten per centum
(10%) of the above-mentioned amounts of P289,534.78, P100,000.00 and P100,000.00,
as and for attorney's fees; and
7. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs. (pp. 94-95, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation (OVEC), as lessor, and the petitioner Enrique F.
Sy, as lessee, entered into a lease agreement over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters and
the land on which they are situated in Cabanatuan City, including their air-conditioning systems,
projectors and accessories needed for showing the films or motion pictures. The term of the lease
was for six (6) years commencing from June 13, 1977 and ending June 12,1983. After more than two
(2) years of operation of the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters, the lessor OVEC made demands
for the repossession of the said leased properties in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and
non-payment of amusement taxes. On August 8,1979, OVEC and Sy had a conference and by reason of
Sy's request for reconsideration of OVECs demand for repossession of the three (3) theaters, the
former was allowed to continue operating the leased premises upon his conformity to certain
conditions imposed by the latter in a supplemental agreement dated August 13, 1979.
In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental in the amount of P125,455.76 (as of July
31, 1979) was reduced to P71,028.91 as of December 31, 1979. However, the accrued amusement tax
liability of the three (3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City had accumulated to
P84,000.00 despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of P4,000.00 from his monthly
rental with the obligation to remit the said deductions to the city government. Hence, letters of
demand dated January 7, 1980 and February 3, 1980 were sent to Sy demanding payment of the
arrears in rentals and amusement tax delinquency. The latter demand was with warning that OVEC
will re-enter and repossess the Avenue, Broadway and Capital Theaters on February 11, 1980 in
pursuance of the pertinent provisions of their lease contract of June 11, 1977 and their supplemental
letter-agreement of August 13, 1979. But notwithstanding the said demands and warnings SY failed
to pay the above-mentioned amounts in full Consequently, OVEC padlocked the gates of the three
theaters under lease and took possession thereof in the morning of February 11, 1980 by posting its
men around the premises of the Id movie houses and preventing the lessee's employees from
entering the same.
Sy, through his counsel, filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement, damages and
injunction late in the afternoon of the same day. And by virtue of a restraining order dated February
12, 1980 followed by an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction issued in said
case, Sy regained possession and operation of the Avenue, Broadway and Capital theaters.
As first cause of action, Sy alleged that the amount of deposit P600,000.00 as agreed upon,
P300,000.00 of which was to be paid on June 13, 1977 and the balance on December 13, 1977 was
too big; and that OVEC had assured him that said forfeiture will not come to pass. By way of second
cause of action, Sy sought to recover from OVEC the sums of P100,000.00 which Sy allegedly spent in
making "major repairs" on Broadway Theater and the application of which to Sy's due rentals; (2)
P48,000.00 covering the cost of electrical current allegedly used by OVEC in its alleged "illegal
connection" to Capitol Theater and (3) P31,000.00 also for the cost of electrical current allegedly
used by OVEC for its alleged "illegal connection" to Broadway Theater and for damages suffered by
Sy as a result of such connection. Under the third cause of action, it is alleged in the complaint that on
February 11, 1980, OVEC had the three theaters padlocked with the use of force, and that as a result,
Sy suffered damages at the rate of P5,000.00 a day, in view of his failure to go thru the contracts he
had entered into with movie and booking companies for the showing of movies at ABC. As fourth
cause of action, Sy prayed for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction to enjoin
OVEC and all persons employed by it from entering and taking possession of the three theaters,
conditioned upon Sy's filing of a P500,000.00 bond supplied by Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (CBISCO).
OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of counterclaims, that by reason of Sy's
violation of the terms of the subject lease agreement, OVEC became authorized to enter and possess
the three theaters in question and to terminate said agreement and the balance of the deposits given
by Sy to OVEC had thus become forfeited; that OVEC would be losing P50,000.00 for every month
that the possession and operation of said three theaters remain with Sy and that OVEC incurred
P500,000.00 for attorney's service.
The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease
agreement; that the repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after the cancellation and
termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation of the parties in the said agreement
and the law applicable thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash deposit in favor of
OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease agreement. The trial court further concluded that
Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after the commencement
of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may have
suffered by reason of the injunction.
On the counterclaim of OVEC the trial court found that the said lessor was deprived of the possession
and enjoyment of the leased premises and also suffered damages as a result of the filing of the case
by Sy and his violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. Hence, it held that OVEC is
entitled to recover the said damages in addition to the arrears in rentals and amusement tax
delinquency of Sy and the accrued interest thereon. From the evidence presented, it found that as of
the end of November, 1980, when OVEC finally regained the possession of the three (3) theaters
under lease, Sy's unpaid rentals and amusement tax liability amounted to P289,534.78. In addition, it
held that Sy was under obligation to pay P10,000.00 every month from February to November, 1980
or the total amount of P100,000.00 with interest on each amount of P10,000.00 from the time the
same became due. This P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease rental was supposed to come from
the remaining cash deposit of Sy but with the consequent forfeiture of the remaining cash deposit of
P290,000.00, there was no more cash deposit from which said amount could be deducted. Further, it
adjudged Sy to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts above-mentioned.
Finally, the trial court held Sy through the injunction bond liable to pay the sum of P10,000.00 every
month from February to November, 1980. The amount represents the supposed increase in rental
from P50,000.00 to P60,000.00 in view of the offer of one RTG Productions, Inc. to lease the three
theaters involved for P60,000.00 a month.
From this decision of the trial court, Sy and (CBISCO) appealed the decision in toto while OVEC
appealed insofar as the decision failed to hold the injunction bond liable for an damages awarded by
the trial court.
The respondent Court of Appeals found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease agreement. It held
that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should be respected and enforced as the
law between the parties. It held that the cancellation or termination of the agreement prior to its
expiration period is justified as it was brought about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the
terms of the agreement and not "motivated by fraud or greed." It also affirmed the award to OVEC of
the amount of P100,000.00 chargeable against the injunction bond posted by CBISCO which was
soundly and amply justified by the trial court.
The respondent Court likewise found no merit in OVECS appeal and held that the trial court did not
err in not charging and holding the injunction bond posted by Sy liable for all the awards as the
undertaking of CBISCO under the bond referred only to damages which OVEC may suffer as a result
of the injunction.
From this decision, CBISCO and Sy filed this instant petition on the following grounds:
A
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO UNJUSTLY ENRICH OR BE
BENEFITTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONERS.
B
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CO D SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN NOT SETTING OFF THE P100,000.00 SUPPOSED DAMAGE
RESULTING FROM THE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE P290,000.00 REMAINING CASH
DEPOSIT OF PETITIONER ENRIQUE SY.
C
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE NECESSARY DOCKET FEE. (p. 10, Rollo)
We find no merit in petitioners' argument that the forfeiture clause stipulated in the lease agreement
would unjustly enrich the respondent OVEC at the expense of Sy and CBISCO contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the
remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still
owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee's
violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is a penal clause that may be validly
entered into. A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal
obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special
presentation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not
fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. (Eduardo P. Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil
Law, Vol. IV, First Edition, pp. 199-200) As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the
penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-
compliance. This is specifically provided for in Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code. In such case,
proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be
demanded (Article 1228, New Civil Code). However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty
shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance
with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a stipulation to the contrary; second, when
the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penalty; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud
(Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code). It is evident that in all said cases, the purpose of the penalty is
to punish the obligor. Therefore, the obligee can recover from the obligor not only the penalty but
also the damages resulting from the non-fulfillment or defective performance of the principal
obligation.
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the forfeiture clause provides that the deposit shall be deemed
forfeited, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing by the lessee to the lessor, the penalty
cannot substitute for the P100,000.00 supposed damage resulting from the issuance of the injunction
against the P290,000.00 remaining cash deposit. This supposed damage suffered by OVEC was the
alleged P10,000.00 a month increase in rental from P50,000.00 to P60,000,00), which OVEC failed to
realize for ten months from February to November, 1980 in the total sum of P100,000.00. This
opportunity cost which was duly proven before the trial court, was correctly made chargeable by the
said court against the injunction bond posted by CBISCO. The undertaking assumed by CBISCO under
subject injunction refers to "all such damages as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction if
the Court should finally decide that the Plaintiff was/were not entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 101) Thus,
the respondent Court correctly sustained the trial court in holding that the bond shall and may
answer only for damages which OVEC may suffer as a result of the injunction. The arrears in rental,
the unmeritted amounts of the amusement tax delinquency, the amount of P100,000.00 (P10,000.00
portions of each monthly rental which were not deducted from plaintiffs cash deposit from February
to November, 1980 after the forfeiture of said cash deposit on February 11, 1980) and attorney's fees
which were all charged against Sy were correctly considered by the respondent Court as damages
which OVEC sustained not as a result of the injunction.
There is likewise no merit to the claim of petitioners that respondent Court committed serious error
of law and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's counterclaim for failure
to pay the necessary docket fee, which is an issue raised for the first time in this petition. Petitioners
rely on the rule in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7,
1987, 149 SCRA 562 to the effect that all the proceedings held in connection with a case where the
correct docket fees are not paid should be peremptorily be considered null and void because, for all
legal purposes, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case. It should be remembered
however, that in Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Dinopol, G.R. 75195, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA
748, this Court took note of the fact that the assailed order of the trial court was issued prior to the
resolution in the Manchester case and held that its strict application to the case at bar would
therefore be unduly harsh. Thus, We allowed the amendment of the complaint by specifying the
amount of damages within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice and the re-
assessment of the filing fees. Then, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. 79937-38, February
3, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, We held that where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglemen tary period.
Nevertheless, OVEC's counterclaims are compulsory so no docket fees are required as the following
circumstances are present: (a) they arise out of or are necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) they do not require for their
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the
court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim (see Javier v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 75379,
March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 605). Whether the respective claims asserted by the parties arise out of
the same contract or transaction within the limitation on counterclaims imposed by the statutes
depends on a consideration of all the facts brought forth by the parties and on a determination of
whether there is some legal or equitable relationship between the ground of recovery alleged in the
counterclaim and the matters alleged as the cause of action by the plaintiff (80 C.J.S. 48). As the
counterclaims of OVEC arise from or are necessarily connected with the facts alleged in the complaint
for reformation of instrument of Sy, it is clear that said counterclaims are compulsory.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the grounds relied upon by petitioners in their petition, the same
is hereby DENIED and the decision dated June 15, 1988 and the resolution dated September 21,
1988, both of the respondent Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and
charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act,
1
an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself.
The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn within
her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in the mystery of
life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a married woman. She
was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when tragedy struck. She was
sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.
She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint
2
filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.
Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has been
committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused should be
held for trial.
3
Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest
4
and fixed his bail bond at
P17,000.00.
5
The accused was arrested but was later released on bail.
6
Thereafter, the court
increased the amount of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the
accused.
7
Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere to be found.
On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is apprehended."
8
Almost a year after, or
specifically on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the
Provincial Fiscal for proper disposition.
9

On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information
10
charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of rape
committed as follows:
That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986 in
Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat
and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the latter.
That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in uninhabited
place attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the said court.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned unserved,
an alias warrant of arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also returned unserved. The
trial court then ordered the archival of the case and the arrest of the accused.
11

It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and detained at the
provincial jail.
12
On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Manifestation for the revival
of the case,
13
which the court favorably acted upon.
14

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician who conducted a
medical examination on her, Dr. Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The defense presented the accused Rogelio
Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo Manzano, who is married to the accused's cousin, Emilia
Manzano. Being merely corroborative to the testimonies of the first two defense witnesses that at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime the accused was hired by the Manzano spouses to plow
their field,
15
the testimony of Mrs. Emilia Manzano was admitted by the prosecution to expedite the
disposition of the case.
16

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San Dionisio I, Maddela,
Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to wash her family's clothes. She was alone. At around
midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00 and after accomplishing her task, she decided to take a
bath in the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck from behind and thereafter
forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her attacker, the accused Rogelio
Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, but Rogelio caught up with her and delivered
two fistblows to her stomach. Not content with this, Rogelio, while viciously holding her hair, pressed
down Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio then took her three meters away from the creek and
forcibly laid her down on the ground. Because of her weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not
struggle any further. Rogelio removed her clothes and panties. He then went on top of her, inserted
his private organ into hers, and succeeded in satisfying his lust on her.
17
Afterwhich, he slapped and
threatened Cherry with death if she would talk.
18

The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told her husband of what
had happened to her. Her husband accompanied her to the police station of Maddela, Quirino, to
report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for medical examination.
19

Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous border at 2:00
and chemoses at 3:00 at the vaginal os.
20
On the witness stand, Dr. Erni-Reta confirmed these
findings.
21
She added that, upon internal examination, she found seminal fluid in the vaginal canal
which must have been there for no longer than twenty-four hours.
22

The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of the prosecution:
On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo and Emilia
Manzano located in Salay, San Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at 7:00 a.m. and went with
Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00 a.m.. Emilia was with them for lunch. The
three of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He went home thereafter, attended to his children, and then
brought out his carabao to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200 meters away from
his house.
23
Then he went to the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was at Melchor's house, a
policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the crime of rape and brought him to
Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently taken to the 166th PC Detachment in San Dionisio,
Maddela, Quirino, where he was interrogated and where he spent the night. In the morning, he was
brought to the municipal court to face the charges filed against him.
24

In its decision
25
dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry Tamayo of having been
accosted from behind, knocked to the ground, boxed, submerged in water, taken three meters from
the creek, and raped.
26
In view of her positive identification of the accused, it disregarded the defense
of alibi set up by the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled that for the defense of alibi to
prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. The accused was within three kilometers only from Bilala Creek where the rape was
committed. Such distance is near enough to cover by walking in a matter of thirty minutes.
27
It was
not, therefore, physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time the crime was
committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him on the basis of the
private complainant's inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving due weight to his defense of alibi.
28

The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with modification
of the award for moral damages, which should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
29

Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It has long
been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
30
It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on
the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record
will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if
the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity
that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or
in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these
and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
31

This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case.
32
None of these exceptions exists in this case.
It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
33

Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In fact, in
his answer to the court's questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge between him
and the complainant.
34
Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive
why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
35

Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to
public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of
being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolved to face the ordeal
and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so simply to obtain
justice.
To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the
testimony of the complainant. He points out that at first, the complainant said that her panties were
removed by the accused while she was already lying down, but later she said that it was before she
was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The accused failed to
elevate this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of credibility.
Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant's
credibility rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests spontaneity and lack of
scheming.
36

As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule alibi is a weak
defense, it gained strength in this case in the light of the aforementioned inconsistency in the
complainant's testimony. We are not persuaded. Since, as discussed above, such inconsistency does
not pierce the complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has therefore no leg to stand on.
The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.
37
The accused's testimony placing himself somewhere else was
corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to establish physical
impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the crime was
committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.
For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition
then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for
correction for the public good
38
is warranted.
39
We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.
Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be
increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL
of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing modifications. As modified, the award of
moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further ordered to
pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Costs against the accused.
G.R. No. L-31931 August 31, 1988
FORTUNATO DE LEON & JUANA F. GONZALES-DE LEON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division composed of Justices Concepcion, Serrano & San
Diego) DR. CORNELIO S. TANTOCO and JUAN BRIONES represented by Administratrix MAGDALENA
BERNARDO, respondents-appellees.
Fortunato de Leon, Celso B. Jamora and Guillermo B. Ilagan for petitioners-appellants.
Jose B. Puerto for respondent-appellee Juan Briones.
Diogracias T. Reyes & Associates and Jose M. Luison for respondent-appellee Cornelio S. Tantoco.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) in C.A., G.R.
No. 40201-R promulgated on February 21, 1970 affirming the judgment ** of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, with modification of the amount of moral and exemplary damages from
P100,000.00 to P60,000.00 and the amount of attorney's fees from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00 the
dispositive portion of which appellate court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as above indicated
respecting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. The
rest are hereby affirmed with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. (pp. 6-7, Decision of the
Court of Appeals; pp. 61-62, Rollo)
The facts of the case as drawn by respondent court from the evidence on record are quoted as
follows:
The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo were the
former registered owners of the fishpond situated at San Roque, Paombong, Bulcacan,
which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exhibit 2). This fishpond
was the subject of a deed of mortgage executed by the spouses Briones on January 22,
1954, in favor of Hermogenes Tantoco involving the consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh.
2), which amount was later assigned by the mortgagee to his father herein defendant
and thirdparty plaintiff Dr. Cornelio S. Tantoco (Exh. 10). Apart from this first mortgage,
the spouses Briones likewise executed a deed of second mortgage for P68,824.00 with
10% interest per annum in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco dated May 26, 1959 (Exh. 1).
Both mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
and duly annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exh. 2) of the
Briones. While these two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses sold the
fishpond, which is the subject matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff spouses
Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales de Leon in the amount of P120,000.00 (Exh. 5).
Of the amount of P120,000.00, the Briones spouses actually received only the amount of
P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of P89,000.00 was withheld by the plaintiff
de Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage indebtedness of the Briones to the
Tantocos (Exhs. 3, 3-a, 3-a-1 to 3-b). After the sale plaintiffs de Leon satisfied the
mortgage loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes Tantoco
who then accordingly executed a deed of discharge of mortgage (Exhs. Z & Z-1), but the
mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the amount of P68,824 was not satisfied. On
February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the defendant Cornelio
Tantocos." (Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 23).
In his letter to private respondent Cornelio Tantoco dated February 5, 1962, petitioner Fortunato de
Leon made it clear that he was tendering the sum of P29,382.50, represented by PNB Cashier's Check
No. 119874 in full discharge of the legitimate obligation of his clients, the spouses Juan Briones and
Magdalena Bernardo. He requested acknowledgment of the receipt of his letter and the execution of
the necessary document (Exhibits, p. 103). Through counsel private respondent, trying to set the
records straight for petitioners, made the clarification that the principal obligation of the Briones as
of May 25, 1959 was P68,824.00 and on January 26, 1962 when a letter of demand was sent to them
their total obligation including the agreed interest amounted to P88,888.98. Hence the above
mentioned PNB check will be held in abeyance pending remittance of the total obligation after which
the necessary document will be executed (Exhibits, p. 105).
On April 5, 1962 Juan Briones executed an affidavit denying ever having hired petitioner Fortunato
de Leon as counsel nor having authorized petitioner to pay any obligation of his to private
respondent for as a matter of fact all obligations he had with private respondent had been assumed
by petitioner in a document executed by petitioner himself in his own handwriting (Exhibits, p. 108).
On May 8, 1962 the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. de Leon, petitioners herein, filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco,
respondent herein, Civil Case No. 2554, for discharge of mortgage (Record on Appeal, p. 4). On May
31, 1962 defendant filed his answer with counterclaim and third party complaint against the Briones
spouses with petition for leave to file third party complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 7). He alleged by
way of special and affirmative defenses, among others, that the true and real amount of obligation of
the Briones spouses is the sum of P68,824.00, Philippine currency, with 10% interest secured by a
second mortgage in favor of defendant, executed and signed by the Briones spouses on May 26,1959,
which deed of second mortgage was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos,
Bulacan on May 27, 1959 and properly annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
28296 issued in the names of Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo; that the amount of P29,382.50
sent by plaintiff as alleged counsel of the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo was
accepted by the said defendant as part payment or partial extinguishment of the mortgage loan of
P68,824.00 with 10% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1959, and plaintiffs have been
informed of the tenor of said acceptance and application thereof as partial payment of the mortgage
obligation in question; and, that defendant did not accede to the demand of the plaintiff to have the
mortgage lien on the property in question cancelled or discharged because the full amount of the
mortgage debt of P68,824.00 plus the 10% interest thereon from May 22, 1959 has not yet been fully
paid either by the plaintiffs or by the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo. Defendant
prayed under the counterclaim that plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendant the following amounts:
(1) P62,245.04 plus lO% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1962 until the full
amount thereon has been paid in the event that the assumption of obligation (Annex "2")
is found by the Court to be true, valid and binding between the parties thereto;
(2) P100,000.00 for moral damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of the filing
of the counterclaim until full payment thereof;
(3) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof; and
(4) P5,000.00 for attorney's fee with 6% interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the counterclaim until full payment thereof."
On June 8, 1962 plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, by way of counterclaim to the
counterclaim and praying for judgment (Record on Appeal, p. 24) as follows:
A. Dismissing defendants' counterclaim with costs against them;
B. Sentencing defendants to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P200,00o.oo by way of
moral damages with legal interest thereon from date hereof;
C. Sentencing defendants to pay not less than P20,000.00 to Plaintiffs by way of
exemplary damages with legal interest from date hereof;
D. Sentencing defendants to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of actual
damages;
E. Declaring the lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25079 of plaintiffs duly
discharged;
F. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to execute the covering Release and Discharge
of Mortgage;
G. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to return his mortgagee's copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25079 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;
H. Sentencing defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees;
I. Plaintiffs further pray for such additional relief just and proper in the premises.
On June 22, 1962, long before defendant's third party complaint was admitted, the Briones spouses
filed an answer to the third-party complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 32) which was stricken out by
order of the trial court dated September 3, 1962 (Record on Appeal, p. 35) on petition of plaintiffs
dated July 18, 1962 (Record on Appeal, p. 33). Third-party defendants filed their second answer to
third-party complaint on October 6, 1962, virtually confessing judgment in behalf of third-party
plaintiff (Record on Appeal, p. 35). They alleged by way of special and affirmative defense that
plaintiff Fortunato de Leon at the time of the sale knew of the obligations of herein third-party
defendants to third-party plaintiff and as a matter of fact said plaintiff assumed said obligations.
On July 29,1963 Magdalena Bernardo Vda. de Briones was substituted third-party defendant as
administratrix of the estate of Juan Briones who died in the course of the proceedings, upon petition
of defendant Tantoco (Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On September 16, 1963 plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to intervene in defendant's third-party
complaint, with their answer in intervention, which was granted by the Court on October 14, 1963
(Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On May 16, 1967 the trial court rendered its decision on the case (Record on Appeal, p. 74) the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: the dismissal of the complaint;
payment by its plaintiffs to the defendant Third-party plaintiff by way of counterclaim
the sum of P64,921.00 wth interest thereon at 10% per annum from February 5, 1962
until fully paid; payment by plaintiff to defendant the sum of P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and the further sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; payment of
costs of plaintiff.
On appeal respondent Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification respecting the
award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. Petitioner spouses filed on March
7, 1970 their motion for reconsideration of the decision of respondent court which motion was
denied on April 20, 1970. On April 23, 1979 petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration.
On July 5, 1970, barely two days before the expiration date of the period of appeal with their motion
still unacted upon, petitioners filed with this Court their motion for extension of time to file petition
for certiorari by way of appeal (Rollo, p. 1) which motion was granted in the Resolution of May 8,
1970 (Rollo, p. 2). The motion to file a second motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
Court on May 15, 1970 (Rollo, p. 53).
The instant petition for certiorari by way of appeal with preliminary injunction was filed with this
Court on May 20, 1970 (Rollo, P. 7).
In the resolution of June 8, 1970 the petition was given due course solely on the issue of the propriety
of the award made by the respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco in "the amount of P60,000 in the concept of
moral and exemplary damages" (Rollo, p. 75).
On June 20, 1970 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated June 8,
1979 (Rollo, p. 82), to include other issues.
On the same date private respondent Corn elio Tantoco moved for the issuance of partial entry of
final judgment with respect to the portion of the decision appealed from which is not the subject of
the instant appeal by certiorari (Rollo, p. 102).
On June 25, 1970 the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the aforementioned
motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 101). Said comment was filed on July 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 109).
On July 8, 1970 petitioner spouses filed a consolidated opposition to private respondent Tantoco
motion for partial entry of final judgment and reply to his manifestation-motion (Rollo, p. 121) and
on July 9, 1970 filed a reply to respondent Tantoco's motion to dismiss appeal (Rollo, p. 128).
On July 20, 1970 the Court resolved among others to deny: (1) respondent Tantoco's motion to
dismiss appeal; (2) petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of June 8, 1970;
and (3) respondent Tantoco's motion for partial entry of judgment insofar as the portion of the
decision appealed from which is not the subject of the instant appeal by certiorari is concerned,
without prejudice to respondent's presenting the same motion to respondent Court of Appeals for
consideration and action at the proper time (Rollo, p. 133).
Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco filed with this Court on July 21, 1970 reply to consolidated
opposition and rejoinder to reply to respondent Tantoco's motion to dismiss appeal (Rollo, p. 134).
Brief for petitioners was filed on August 5, 1970 (Rollo, p. 159); brief for respondents was filed on
October 28, 1970 (Rollo, p. 187).
On November 14,1970 petitioners filed an "Urgent Petition ex-parte For Issuance of Restraining
Order and To Declare Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco Guilty of Contempt of Court" stating that
respondent Tantoco filed with the Court of Appeals on August 14, 1970 the same motion for partial
entry of judgment which was filed with this Court and denied in the resolution of July 20, 1970 but
which was granted by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of October 31, 1970 over petitioners-
appellants' objection (Rollo, p. 192). On November 18, 1970 respondents were required to comment
thereon (Rollo, p. 197) and the required comment was filed by private respondent on November 26,
1970 (Rollo, p. 200).
On December 2, 1970 a partial remanding of the records of this case to the Court of Appeals was
made in compliance with Section 11 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court (Rollo, P. 220).
The Reply brief of the petitioners was filed on December 3, 1970 (Rollo, p. 210). On the same date
petitioners-appellants' "Urgent Petition for Issuance of Restraining Order and To Declare
Respondent Cornelio's Tantoco Guilty of Contempt of Court" was denied. (Rollo, p. 212).
On February 12, 1971 petitioners spouses again filed a petition for issuance of a restraining order
(Rollo, p. 227) and private respondent was required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 233). Said
comment was filed on February 23, 1971 (Rollo, p. 236).
On February 24, 1971 petitioner spouses filed an urgent manifestation informing the Court of the
urgency of the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction because the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan had presumably granted respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco's motion for
partial execution of judgment in an order dated February 11, 1971 which petitioners had not yet
received, notwithstanding petitioners' urgent motion to postpone hearing of same scheduled for
February 15, 1971 because of the pendency of petitioner's motion before this Court for issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunctions filed on February 11, 1971 (Rollo, p. 241). In the
resolution of February 26, 1971 private respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco was required to comment
thereon (Rollo, p. 248) and said comment was filed by respondent on March 6, 1971 (Rollo, p. 251).
In the resolution of March 10, 1971 petitioners' petition for issuance of a restraining order was
denied (Rollo, p. 265).
Petitioners assign the following errors (Brief for Petitioners, p. 1):
I.
The respondent Court erred in awarding in favor of respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P60,000.00 in the absence of supporting
evidence and reasons notwithstanding that no actual and compensatory damages have
been allegedly proved and awarded in respondent's favor.
II.
The respondent Court erred in awarding P5,000.00 attorney's fees in favor of
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco and in sentencing petitioners de Leons to pay same;
instead of awarding the latter (Petitioners) reasonable attorney's fees as prayed for in
their complaint.
III.
The respondent Court erred in sentencing herein petitioners de Leons to pay respondent
Tantoco P60,000.00 moral and exemplary damages and P5,000.00 attorney's fees when
there exist no contractual or juridical relations whatsoever between them.
IV.
That the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 21, 1970 and its adverse
Resolutions of April 20, 1970 and of May 15, 1970 are all nullities.
In accordance with the Resolution of the Court dated June 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 75) the sole issue that
has to be resolved by the Court is the question of whether or not the award of P60,000.00 in the
concept of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 625 [1984]; Bagumbayan
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 132 SCRA 441 [1984]; Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 576 [1985]); (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). On the
other hand, jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded, to wit:
(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (2) the claimant
must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and (3) the
wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty
party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolant manner (Octot v. Ybaez, III
SCRA 79 [1982]); Sweet Lines, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769 [19831); Dee Hua Liong
Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713 [1985]); Tan Kapoc v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231
[1985]). It may be awarded for breach of contract or quasicontract as when a telegraph company
personnel transmitted the wrong telegram (Radio Communication of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 103 SCRA 359 [1981].
Respondent Court found malice in petitioners'refusal to satisfy respondent Tantocos lawful claim
and in their subsequent filing of the present case against respondent, and took into consideration the
worries and mental anxiety of respondent as a result thereof. In the words of respondent court:
The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellants'refusal to satisfy appellee's lawful claims
clearly amounted to malice on their part when they filed the present case resulting as it
were in worries and mental anxiety of the defendant Tantoco who was dragged to court
to litigate this case for almost 10 years up to now. He was even branded as a money
lender, and accused forgery and of entering into collusion with the end in view of
extracting extra amount ... from the herein plaintiff. All these tried to picture defendant
Cornelio Tantoco with alleged dishonesty who respecting the legitimate obligation of the
Briones to defendant Cornelio Tantoco, thereby blemishing his honor, integrity and
reputation as a prominent doctor and a businessman. With all these extant
circumstances which served as a guidepost for us in determining the reasonable amount
of damages sustained by the defendant-appellee, this Court hereby fixes the amount of
P60,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages and the further sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, which plaintiffs-appellants should pay the defendant-
appellee. (Rollo, p. 61)
As a lawyer in the practice of law since his admission to the Bar in 1929, who has held several
important positions in the government (TSN, April 22, 1965, p. 127) petitioner Fortunato de Leon
could not have missed the import of the annotation at the back of TCT No. 28296 regarding the
second mortgage for the sum of sixty eight thousand eight hundred twenty-four pesos (P68,824.00)
of the property he was buying, in favor of respondent Cornelio Tantoco, entry No. 54835 in the
registry of deeds of Bulacan (Exhibits, p. 93). The same annotation was transferred to TCT No. T-
25079 in the name of petitioner after the sale of the property was effected and entered in the registry
of deeds of Bulacan on June 3, 1959 (Exhibits, p. 102). Furthermore, petitioners cannot deny having
assumed the mortgage debts of the Briones spouses amounting to P89,000.00 in favor of the
Tantocos. The "Patunay" (Exhibits 3-a) executed by the Briones spouses on June 3, 1959 gives the
information that their property, and fishpond, was sold by them to the spouses Fortunato de Leon
and Juana F. Gonzales for the amount of one hundred twenty thousand pesos (Pl20,000.00), payment
made to them, as follows:
Pinanagutan
na aming
pagkakautang
kay

G.
Hermogenes
Tantoco
hanggang
Mayo 1959
P
89,000.00
Cash na
tinanggap
namin PBC
Check No.
57040
11,000.00
Pagare No. 1
Junio 1, 1959
10,000.00
Pagare No. 2
Junio 1, 1959
10,000.00
Kabuuan P
120,000.00
At the bottom of the "Patunay" in the handwriting of petitioner Fortunato de Leon is a statement
signed by him (Exh. 3b) signifying that he was assuming the spouses'debt of P89,000.00 to
respondent Tantoco, in the following words:
Ang pagkautang na P89,000.00 sa mga Tantoco ay aking inaasumihan. (Exhibits, p. 97).
Petitioner retained P89,000.00 out of the P120,000.00, representing the mortgage loan of the Briones
spouses to the Tantocos, including interest. Immediately after the sale of the fishpond was effected
and registered with the registry of deeds of Bulacan petitioner paid the P20,000.00 loan of the
Briones spouses to Hermogenes Tantoco including 10% interest on the loan, covered by a first
mortgage on the property. Accordingly, Hermogenes Tantoco executed a deed of discharge from the
mortgage. Out of the P68,000.00 mortgage loan of the Briones spouses from respondent Cornelio
Tantoco, petitioner, however made only a payment of P29,382.50 but would want respondent to
execute the necessary discharge document. The documents speak for themselves. They are mute but
plain and visible evidence of the deliberate intent of petitioner to defraud respondent of the amount
withheld from the Briones spouses to cover the amount of the mortgage loan in favor of respondent.
The filing of the case against respondent being unfounded and maliciously prosecuted satisfactorily
proves the existence of the factual basis for moral damages and the causal relation to petitioners' acts
(Hawpia v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 535 [1967]; Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 587 [1971]; Enervida
v. de la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231 [1985]). Private respondent
has a good name to protect. He is a surgeon by profession, had been Chief of the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital since 1946 until he put up a hospital of his own, the Rosary General Hospital.He is a member
of the Knights of Columbus, a Cursillista, a member of the Lions, a fellow of the Philippine College of
Surgeons in good standing from 1946 up to the present, a member of the Philippine Medical
Association and of the Bulacan Medical Association. He has been humiliated, embarrassed, maligned
and has been charged in bad faith as a money lender in petitioner's complaint accusing him of
defrauding the Briones spouses (TSN, pp. 227-250).
The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award of exemplary damages is
proper (Bert Osmea & Associates v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 395 [1983]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa, 134
SCRA 231 [1985]).
While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way
of awarding said damages there is no question of respondent's entitlement to moral and exemplary
damage (Tan Kapoe v. Masa, supra). The amount should be reduced, however, for being excessive
compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty of the wrongdoer (San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 85 [1982] cited in
Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra).
Time and again the Court has ruled that "moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action" (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino,
Jr., 94 SCRA 966 [1979]); R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc.,supra).
In the case of Miranda Ribaya v. Bautista (95 SCRA 672 [1980]), this Court considered 25% of the
principal amount as reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found on February 21, 1970
that the outstanding balance of the disputed loan was P64,921.69. Twenty five percent thereof is
P16,230.00 but considering the depreciation of the Philippine peso today, it is believed that the
award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but the aggregate
award of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000.00.
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information
1
that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different
parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab
wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn
Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his
(sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as
the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship,
and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially
paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he
received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her
condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his
employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a
glass of water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year old daughter Issa and
her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-
Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her
employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop
the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie
also heard her employers screams, and locked herself with Issa in the masters bathroom. When she
peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The
latter did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Khos father,
Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium unit.
When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the
floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors
tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He was arrested
soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered eighteen
(18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on
her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the
heart itself. There were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung.
According to the doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that
the incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted while
Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related that
prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges against the
victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked long
hours of the day and served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her
boarding house where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later
he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back,
very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go to the province, his
territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that before the killing,
the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being late, and
being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused
also told him not to get too close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didnt
want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain Phillip
Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that something bad
would happen to him if her husband would learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty.
Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her husband Daniel Kho would be
arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife and stabbed
him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest control of the knife, and with it,
stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed her he was shocked and left the place
using the victims car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the police.
2

On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
severe penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay
the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual, moral,
nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00,
P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 for
the loss of the victims life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this
date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
3

The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,
4
the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals.
5

On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the complete
records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on automatic review,
immediately upon the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from
the crime scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there
were no particulars as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which
qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim,
the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the
information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be
allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The Office
of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other
hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of self-
defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People,
7
we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof
shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.
With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self
defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty.
Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellants alleged use of reasonable
means to repel the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself.
8
We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart
and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows
coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him
but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that was
the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir.
9

Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his
claim of self defense.
10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present.
Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive
and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender.
11
Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself.
12

In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars are
known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that
the killing was perpetrated by treachery.
13

We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the
killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be
established by clear and positive evidence;
14
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
15
The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution, to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
16

Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellants state of mind
and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on
appellants ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit.
Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed
Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times,
despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without
employing physical superiority over the victim. InPeople v. Espina,
17
we have ruled that an attack by
a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance
of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
18
provides that an amendment after the
plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and
such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not
permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
19

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,
20
we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to
invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in
the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
21

Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult
or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or
distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not
adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.
22
Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex.
23
Without any
objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived.
24

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately
intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for
the murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer.
Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a
woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
25
as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
26
prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of
superior strength without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have
been death.
27

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty on June 24, 2006
28
, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in
proper cases.
29

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual
damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of
civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or
loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong
done.
30
To be recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable
degree of certainty.
31
In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25
32
is correct,
considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the
violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an
example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00
for exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt ofMURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper
imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully
paid.
G.R. No. 175924 March 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City pronounced Erland
Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with rape committed against AAA,
1
a 16-year old
domestic helper, and penalized him with reclusion perpetua.
2
On April 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil damages.
3
Hence, Sabadlab
appeals.
Antecedents
Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City,
proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employers son who was studying there. Suddenly, a
man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She
recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal
at 5 oclock am near her employers house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do his
bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did not recognize joined
Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of a parked car, and one of Sabadlabs
cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief. The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty
minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would
remove her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied
her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although
blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was
kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back.
Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To
prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers. The
three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to
Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told
anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She
waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first lied
about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer slapped
and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the rapes. AAA
underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame
Quezon City. The results of the medico-legal examination were embodied in Medico-Legal Report No.
M-797-02 issued by medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P. Gajardo, viz:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the anterior
midline.
2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline.
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior midline.
5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline.
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior midline.
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior midline.
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior midline.
9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior midline.
10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the posterior
midline
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping.
LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between.
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 oclock position and deep fresh lacerations
at 6 and 9 oclock position. Congested.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the examiners
index finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.
CERVIX: Soft and close
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram (-)
diploxocci.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring unforeseen
complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5 days.
4

Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought pandesal to
look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby restaurants and pointed to him. The
policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the station, where he gave his name as Erland
Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her first time to know the name of Sabadlab.
These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge
Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction with rape via the information dated March 13,
2002, alleging:
That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) John Does
whose names and whereabouts are still unknown, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away AAA,
16 years of age, against her will from Dapitan St., Barangay Guadalupe, Makati City and brought her
to an undisclosed place, where accused by means of force, violence and intimidation had carnal
knowledge of complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on March 12, 2002, he
was at Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed there until noon, leaving the place
only to have lunch; and that he returned to Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed there until he was
arrested at 7:00 pm of March 12, 2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel Salvacion corroborated
Sabadlabs alibi.
As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged based on AAAs
positive identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that her physical injuries and fresh
hymenal lacerations were consistent with her account of the rapes, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape charged in this case, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as
MORAL DAMAGES.
SO ORDERED.
6

On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors,
7
to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, holding that the
supposed inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent lapses that did not affect the
credibility of AAA as a witness but were instead badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness
of the material points of her testimony. The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated
October 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00;
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;
3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal
this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.
8

Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is now before the
Court to seek the final review.
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellants brief in the CA, Sabadlab
indicates in his supplemental brief
9
that AAAs version was ambiguous and implausible, and
conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the State did not present
any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to prove that AAA had resisted the sexual
intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d) AAA did not escape despite several opportunities to
do so. He contends, moreover, that the States evidence established only simple seduction.
10

Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAAs recollections. We understand why he
does so, because the credibility of the victims testimony is a primordial consideration in rape.
11
Yet,
because both the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and spontaneous witness,
he has now to present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to reverse both lower courts
determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive reasons that
may warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the credibility of
AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral
matters that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to
their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also
basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should not adversely affect
the substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony.
12
The only inconsistencies
that might have discredited the victims credible testimony were those that affected or related to the
elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of who
of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her confusion did not
alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure to produce
any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the tearing of the
victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime charged. In fact, she did not even
state that her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and
matters that did not detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of
weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
derives while the witnesses testify before him.
13
The demeanor on the witness chair of persons
sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because
it can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their
quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty
blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth.
14
As the
final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to accord the utmost respect
to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account
of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his personal access to the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record.
15

Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the rapists,
particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in identifying
Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had frequently flirted
with her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal for her employers table. As such, the
identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should
diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth had
been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any outcry, and the
second by the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her back.
And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually contrary to
the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of her female
organ.
16
This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer any resistance to
the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with him was
immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two
cohorts.1wphi1 At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced
under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the
degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in
any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him
incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts
punished under Article 266-A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The principal
objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her
to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive acts
of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to
expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck
down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was
seemingly committed,
17
we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape
absorbed the forcible abduction.
18

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
19
respectively define and punish simple
rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
byreclusion perpetua.
xxx
Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the "absence of
aggravating circumstance (sic),"
20
we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability
"when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."
21
The Civil Code
allows such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."
22
Present here was the need for
exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on
account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment that the use of a deadly
weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As fittingly explained in People v. Catubig:
23

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise,
is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the civil
indemnity ofP50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to AAA. Sabadlab is
further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, 2006, with the
MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A and as penalized with
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each of the
amounts reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.