Migration and International Human Rights Law

Migration and
International Human Rights Law

A Practitioners Guide
Updated Edition, 2014
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ISBN 978-92-9037-151-X 6
Composed of 60 eminent judges and lawyers from all regions of the world, the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists promotes and protects human rights through the Rule of
Law, by using its unique legal expertise to develop and strengthen national and interna-
tional justice systems.
Established in 1952 and active on the ve continents, the ICJ aims to ensure the
progressive development and eective implementation of international human rights
and international humanitarian law; secure the realization of civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights; safeguard the separation of powers; and guarantee the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and legal profession.
Migration and International Human Rights Law. Practitioners Guide No. 6
Copyright International Commission of Jurists, 2014
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) permits free reproduction of extracts from
any of its publications provided that due acknowledgment is given and a copy of the
publication carrying the extract is sent to its headquarters at the following address:
International Commission of Jurists
P.O. Box 91
Rue des Bains 33
Geneva
Switzerland
Other Commission Members:
Prof. Kyong-Wahn Ahn, Republic of Korea
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Philippines
Mr Muhannad Al-Hassani, Syria
Dr. Catarina de Albuquerque, Portugal
Mr Abdelaziz Benzakour, Morocco
Justice Ian Binnie, Canada
Justice Sir Nicolas Bratza, UK
Prof. Miguel Carbonell, Mexico
Justice Moses Chinhengo, Zimbabwe
Prof. Andrew Clapham, UK
Justice Radmila Dicic, Serbia
Justice Unity Dow, Botswana
Justice Elisabeth Evatt, Australia
Mr Roberto Garretn, Chile
Prof. Michelo Hansungule, Zambia
Ms Sara Hossain, Bangladesh
Ms Gulnora Ishankanova, Uzbekistan
Mr. Shawan Jabarin, Palestine
Justice Kalthoum Kennou, Tunisia
Prof. David Kretzmer, Israel
Prof. Csar Landa, Peru
Justice Ketil Lund, Norway
Justice Qinisile Mabuza, Swaziland
Justice Jos Antonio Martn Palln, Spain
Justice Charles Mkandawire, Malawi
Mr Kathurima MInoti, Kenya
Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, South Africa
Justice Sanji Monageng, Botswana
Tamara Morschakova, Russia
Prof. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Thailand
Justice Egbert Myjer, Netherlands
Dr Jarna Petman, Finland
Prof. Victor Rodriguez Rescia, Costa Rica
Mr Belisario dos Santos Junior, Brazil
Prof. Marco Sassoli, Italy-Switzerland
Prof. Olivier de Schutter, Belgium
Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, India
Mr Raji Sourani, Palestine
Justice Philippe Texier, France
Justice Stefan Trechsel, Switzerland
Prof. Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Colombia
ICJ Commission Members
September 2014 (for an updated list, please visit www.icj.org/commission)
President:
Prof. Sir Nigel Rodley, United Kingdom
Vice-Presidents:
Prof. Robert Goldman, United States
Justice Michle Rivet, Canada
Executive Committee:
Prof. Carlos Ayala, Venezuela
Justice Azhar Cachalia, South Africa
Prof. Jenny E. Goldschmidt, Netherlands
Ms Imrana Jalal, Fiji
Ms Hina Jilani, Pakistan
Ms Karinna Moskalenko, Russia
Prof. Mnica Pinto, Argentina
Migration and
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 ii
The Guide was researched and written by Massimo Frigo and edited by
Risn Pillay. Legal review was provided by Ian Seiderman. Priyamvada
Yarnell co-ordinated the production of its English version. Additional
contributions were provided by Leah Hoctor, Sandra Ratjen, Allison
Jernow, Mina Baghai and Anne Poulos.
The 2014 update of this Guide was researched and written by Massimo
Frigo and edited by Risn Pillay. Legal review was provided by Ian
Seiderman. Olivier van Bogaert co-ordinated its production.
The ICJ is grateful to a number of external reviewers who provided
exper commentary on drafts of the frst edition of this Guide, including
Alison Harvey, Dr Machteld inge van Dooren, Cecilie Schjatvet, Mark
Manley and Karl Engman. Their advice does not imply endorsement of
the Guides contents however, and responsibility for errors or omissions
remains the ICJs alone.
The ICJ is also grateful to the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, whose
fnancial support made the Guide possible. The 2014 update of this
Guide has been supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | iii
Table of contents
ACRONYMS 1
TABLE OF CASES 3
INTRODUCTION 35
I. Purpose of this Guide 35
II. Migration and Human Rights 36
III. The multifaceted characteristic of the migration
experience 38
IV. The Legal Framework 43
1. Equality and Non-Discrimination 44
2. Beyond International Human Rights Law 47
V. A Guide for Practitioners: limits and benefts 47
VI. A Guide to make rights real 49
CHAPTER 1: ENTRY, STAY AND STATUS
OF MIGRANTS 50
I. Entry and stay on the territory 50
1. Rights to enter and remain 50
2. When someone enters: issues of jurisdiction 50
3. Human rights in the entry process 52
II. Categories and status of migrants 54
1. Refugee status 54
a) When someone is a refugee 56
i) Well-founded fear of persecution 57
ii) Grounds of persecution 58
Box 1. Persecution Based on Sex and
Gender 59
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 iv
iii) Persecution by non-State actors 61
Box 2. Persecution on grounds of sexual
orientation or gender identity 61
b) Refugees rights 63
c) When a refugee is not a refugee: cessation
and exclusion clauses 64
i) Cessation of refugee status 65
ii) Exclusion from refugee status 66
Box 3. The Court of Justice of the
European Union on exclusion clauses
and terrorist acts 68
Box 4. Are victims or potential victims
of human traffcking refugees? 69
d) Procedure for recognition of refugee status 71
i) Fair procedures 72
ii) Non-discrimination and special measures 73
iii) The burden and standard of proof 74
iv) Minors and particular protection for
unaccompanied minors 75
2. Other forms of protection under international law 75
a) Temporary Protection 77
Box 5. Temporary Protection in the European
Union 78
b) Complementary Forms of Protection 79
Box 6. The EU approach:
subsidiary protection 80
c) Discretionary Forms of Protection 83
3. Family reunifcation and the right to respect for
family life 84
a) Family reunifcation in international law 84
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | v
b) The right to respect for family life and family
reunifcation 85
i) What is a family? 87
Box 7. Family reunifcation in EU law 89
c) Particular considerations in family reunifcation
between children and parents 90
d) Unaccompanied minors and family reunifcation 91
i) Discrimination and access to the territory 92
e) Problems linked with family reunifcation:
dependency 93
Box 8. Mandatory residence assignment
for refugees cannot impair their family life 95
4. Victims of Traffcking 95
a) Who is a victim of traffcking 97
b) Obligations of States 97
5. Smuggled persons 100
6. Migrants Rescued at Sea 101
7. Stateless persons 103
CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPEDIMENTS TO
EXPULSION 108
I. The principle of non-refoulement 108
1. Non-refoulement in international refugee law 109
2. Non-refoulement in international human rights law 112
a) General principles 112
Box 9. Women as group at risk for non-
refoulement purposes 113
b) Source of the risk: acts of non-State actors 113
c) Standard of proof: substantial grounds
for belief 114
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 vi
d) Burden of proof 120
e) Absolute rights and the obligation of
non-refoulement 121
f) Diplomatic assurances 122
g) Place of transfer: indirect refoulement and
internal relocation 125
Box 10. The Dublin III Regulation 126
h) Extraterritorial application of the principle
of non-refoulement 130
3. What rights implicate obligations of
non-refoulement? 130
a) Non-refoulement for torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment 131
b) Enforced disappearances 135
c) Extra-judicial executions and the right to life 135
d) Non-refoulement and the death penalty 135
e) The death row phenomenon 137
f) Flagrant denial of justice and of the right to
liberty 138
g) Freedom of religion or belief 140
II. Expulsion as a violation of rights enjoyed in the
sending State 141
1. The right to respect for private and family life 141
a) Expulsion as interference to the right to
respect for family and private life 142
2. Expulsions and rights to Freedom of Religion or
Belief and Freedom of Expression 145
3. Expulsion and the effectiveness of the right to
a remedy 146
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | vii
CHAPTER 3: EXPULSION PROCEDURES 150
I. When is someone expelled? 150
II. What procedural protections apply to expulsion? 151
1. Specifc due process guarantees in expulsion 152
a) Decision in accordance with law 153
b) Right to submit reasons against expulsion 154
c) The right to representation 155
d) Right to appeal 155
e) Non-discriminatory application 156
f) Public order and national security exceptions 157
Box 11. Automatic prohibitions on leaving
ones country 158
2. Expulsion procedures and the right to fair trial 159
Box 12. Deportation and forcible transfer as
a crime under international law 162
3. Procedural rights and collective expulsions 163
Box 13. Repetitive expulsions may breach
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment 166
III. Procedural guarantees in expulsions and the right
to a remedy 166
1. An effective remedy 167
2. The right to an appeal with suspensive effect 169
3. National security 170
IV. Expulsion of refugees 171
1. Voluntary repatriation of refugees 173
CHAPTER 4: MIGRANTS IN DETENTION 175
I. The nature of detention 175
II. Justifcation of detention 178
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 viii
1. Different approaches to justifcation of
immigration detention 178
2. Detention must have a clear legal basis in
national law and procedures 179
3. Detention must not be arbitrary, unnecessary
or disproportionate 180
4. Particular considerations in the detention of
asylum seekers and refugees 184
5. Particular factors in detention on entry or
pending removal 185
a) Detention to prevent unauthorised entry 185
b) Detention pending deportation 187
6. Particular considerations in the detention of
certain groups 188
a) Justifcation of detention of children 190
b) Detention of stateless persons 192
7. Detention of migrants for purposes other than
immigration control 193
a) Administrative detention on grounds of
national security 193
b) Detention by private actors 195
III. Treatment of detainees 196
1. Appropriateness of place of detention 198
a) Place of detention of children and families 199
2. Conditions of detention 200
a) Cumulative effect of poor conditions 201
b) Overcrowding 202
c) Access to healthcare 204
3. Conditions of detention of particular groups 205
a) Mentally ill detainees 205
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | ix
b) People with disabilities 206
c) Survivors of Torture 206
d) Children 207
i) Education in immigration detention 207
e) Women detainees 208
4. Protection from ill-treatment, including violence
in detention 210
a) Violence or ill-treatment during deportation 211
IV. Procedural protection 212
1. Reasons for detention 212
2. Safeguards following detention 215
a) Right of access to a lawyer 215
b) Right of access to medical attention 216
c) Right to inform family members or others of
detention 216
d) Right of access to UNHCR 217
e) Right to consular access 217
3. Judicial review of detention 219
a) Requirements of effective judicial review of
detention 221
b) Effective judicial review in national security
cases 224
4. Reparation for unlawful detention 225
CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS IN MIGRATION 226
I. General Principles 226
1. Duties to Respect, Protect and Fulfl 226
2. Obligations of immediate effect and progressive
realisation 227
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 x
3. Prohibition of retrogressive measures 228
4. Non-discrimination and application to
non-nationals 228
5. Remedies for violations of ESC Rights 231
Box 14. ESC Rights in regional courts 233
a) Means of judicial enforcement 234
Box 15. Destitution, the right to life and
freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment 236
II. Specifc rights of signifcance for migrants 237
1. The right to an adequate standard of living 238
a) The right to water and sanitation 238
b) The right to food 239
c) Right to adequate housing 240
i) Forced evictions 241
ii) Discrimination in housing and equal
application to migrants 243
iii) Protection of the right to housing
through civil and political rights 245
2. Health 247
a) Non-discrimination in healthcare and equal
b) Protection of the right to health through civil
and political rights 250
3. Social Security 252
a) Discrimination in social security and equal
b) Protection of rights to social security through
civil and political rights 255
4. Education 257
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | xi
CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS AND
REFUGEES AT WORK 262
I. Introduction 262
II. The right to work 263
1. Slavery and Servitude 264
2. Forced labour 265
a) What is forced labour? 265
b) State obligations to prevent and investigate
forced labour 268
Box 16. A case of servitude and forced
labour 268
c) Access to a remedy against forced labour 269
Box 17. Human traffcking, forced labour and
the European Court 269
3. Child Labour 271
III. Workplace rights 273
1. Non-discrimination and workplace rights 276
a) ICESCR and ICERD 276
b) ILO Conventions 277
c) ICRMW 278
d) Geneva Refugee Convention 279
e) Inter-American system 279
2. Non-Discrimination and Women Migrant Workers 280
3. Particular Workplace Rights 281
a) Fair remuneration 281
b) The right to rest and leisure 282
c) Termination of employment 283
d) Pregnancy 286
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 xii
IV. Freedom of association in labour rights: the right
to form and join a trade union 286
ANNEX 1: THE CHOICE OF AN INTERNATIONAL
MECHANISM: A CHECKLIST 290
I. Which mechanism you can use 290
a) Applicability of international obligations 290
b) Temporal jurisdiction 290
c) Territorial jurisdiction 290
d) Material jurisdiction 290
e) Standing 290
f) Time-limits 291
II. Choice of mechanism: strategy 291
a) One or more bodies? 291
b) Which body is more convenient? 291
c) Effect in the domestic system 291
ANNEX 2: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REMEDIES
AND THEIR USE 292
I. Using international mechanisms and remedies 292
1. Preliminary requirements 293
a) Jurisdiction (Temporal, material and territorial) 293
i) Temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis) 293
ii) Material jurisdiction (ratione materiae) 294
iii) Territorial jurisdiction (ratione loci) 296
b) Standing 299
i) Standing to bring individual application:
the meaning of victim 299
ii) Mechanisms for individual complaints 300
iii) Mechanisms for collective complaints: ECSR 302
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | xiii
iv) Individual and collective complaints:
the ACHPR 302
v) Mechanisms of indirect access 303
2. Admissibility requirements 304
a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies 304
i) Exceptions to the principle 306
b) Time limitations 308
c) Duplication of procedures or similar
requirements 309
d) Signifcant disadvantage 310
e) Other grounds 311
3. Interim measures 312
4. The effective exercise of the right to petition 314
5. Third party interventions 316
II. Procedures of international mechanisms 318
1. Universal Treaty Bodies 318
a) Preparatory Stage 318
b) Admissibility stage 318
c) Merits 319
d) Friendly Settlement 320
e) Interim Measures 321
2. European Court of Human Rights 321
i) Legal Representation and legal aid 325
3. European Committee on Social Rights 326
4. Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights 327
a) Petitions referring to the American
Convention on Human Rights 327
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 xiv
b) Petitions concerning States that are not
parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights 329
5. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 329
6. African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights 331
7. African Court on Human and Peoples Rights 332
III. What next? Enforcement system and follow-up 334
IV. Reporting procedures 336
1. United Nations Treaty Bodies 336
2. Non-judicial mechanisms taking individual
petitions 337
a) Basic Procedural Standards of Special
Procedures 338
Box 18. Special Procedures most relevant to
migrants and refugees 340
b) The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 342
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | 1
ACRONYMS
Legal instruments
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
ICRMW International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families
CPED International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
ADRDM American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
ArCHR Arab Charter on Human Rights
| PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6 2
International bodies
CCPR Human Rights Committee
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CAT Committee against Torture
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women
CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child
CMW Committee on Migrant Workers
CED Committee on Enforced Disappearances
CRPD Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
ECommHR European Commission on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ACommHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
ACtHPR African Court on Human and Peoples Rights
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
ExCom UNHCR Executive Committee
TABLE OF CASES
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 353
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports
2005, p. 168
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America),
Judgment, 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 12
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007 No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary
Objections, 26 June 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 240
Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo), Judgment,
30 November 2010
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136
LeGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June
2001, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, 2 December 1963, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 15
Human Rights Committee (CCPR)
A. R. J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996**, Views of 11 August
1997
A. v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, Views of 30 April 1997
Adu v. Canada, Communication No. 654/1995, Views of 28 December
1994
Ahani v. Canada, Communication No. 1051/2002, Views of 15 June
2004
Al-Gertani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Communication No. 1955/2010,
Views of 1 November 2013
Alzery v. Sweden, Communication No. 1416/2005, Views of 10 November
2006
Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 580/1994, Views of
19 April 2002
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v. Mauritius,
Communication No. 35/1978, Views of 9 April 1981
Baboeram et al. v. Suriname, Communications Nos. 146/1983148
154/1983, Views of 4 April 1985
Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Communication No. 1069/2002, Views of
6 November 2003
Barbato v. Uruguay, Communication No. 84/1981, Views of 21 October
1982
C. v. Australia, Communication No. 900/1999, Views of 13 November 2002
Cmpora Schweizer v. Uruguay, Communication No. 66/1980, Views of
12 October 1982
Celepli v. Sweden, Communication No. 456/1991, Views of 26 July 1994
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, Views
of 29 July 1981
Conteris v. Uruguay, Communication No. 139/1983, Views of 17 July
1985
Correia de Matos v. Portugal, Communication No. 1123/2002, Views of
18 April 2006
Dadar v. Canada, Communication No. 258/2004, Views of 5 December
2005
Danyal Shafq v. Australia, Communication No. 1324/2004, Views of
13 November 2006
F.K.A.G. v. Australia, Communication No. 2094/2011, Views of 26 July
2013
Faure v. Australia, Communication No. 1036/2001, Views of 23 November
2005
G. T. v. Australia, Communication No. 706/1996**, Views of 4 December
1997
Gobin c. Mauritius, Communication No. 787/1997, Views of 20 August
2001
Hamilton v. Jamaica, Communication No. 616/1995, Views of 23 July
1999
Hammel v. Madagascar, Communication No. 155/1983, Views of 3 April
1987
Jama Warsame v. Canada, Communication No. 1959/2010, Views of
21 July 2011
Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998, Views of 20 October 2003
Kaba and Kaba v. Canada, Communication No. 1465/2006, Views of
25 March 2010
Khalilov v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 973/2001, Views of 13 April
2005
Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991*, Views of
18 November 1993
Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, Communication No. 1442/2005*, Views of
23 November 2009
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R 12/52, Views of 6 June
1979
Love et al. v. Australia, Communication No. 983/2001, Views of
25 March 2003
Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R.6/24, Views of 30 July 1981
M.I. v. Sweden, Communication No. 2149/2012, Views of 25 July 2013
Madafferi and Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No. 1011/2001,
Views of 26 August 2004
Mansaraj and Others v. Sierra Leone, Communications Nos. 839/98
840/98841/98, Views of 16 July 2001
Maroufdou v. Sweden, Communication No. 58/1979, Views of 8 April
1981
Nakrash and Qifen v. Sweden, Communication No. 1540/2007*, Views
of 19 November 2008
Naveed Akram Choudhary v. Canada, Communication No. 1898/2009,
Views of 28 October 2013
Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991*, Views of 7 January 1994
Ngambi and Nbol v. France, Communication No. 1179/2003, Views of
16 July 2004
P.K. v. Canada, Communication No. 1234/2003, Views of 3 April 2007
Piandiong v. the Philippines, Communication No. 869/1999, Views of
19 October 2000
Quinteros Almeida v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, Views of
21 July 1983
Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, Communication No. 1222/2003, Views
of 9 December 2004
Saed Shams and Others v. Australia, Communication No. 1255/2004,
Views of 11 September 2007
Samba Jalloh v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 794/1998, Views
of 15 April 2002
Staselovich and Lyashkevich v. Belarus, Communication No. 887/1999,
Views of 3 April 2003
Surinder Kaur v. Canada, Communication No. 1455/2006*, Views of
18 November 2008
Tarlue v. Canada, Communication No. 1551/2007**, Views of 28 April
2009
Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, Views of 31 March
1994
X.H.L. v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 1564/2007, 22 July 2011
Yin Fong v. Australia, Communication No. 1442/2005, Views of
23 October 2009
Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, Views of 6 August
2003
Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, Communications Nos.
1461146214761477/2006*, Views of 31 July 2008
Zundel v. Canada, Communication No. 1341/2005, Views of 4 April 2007
Committee against Torture (CAT)
A. S. v. Sweden, Communication No. 149/1999, Views of 15 February
2001
A. v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 91/1997, Views of
13 November 1998
A.F. v. Sweden, Communication No. 89/1997, Views of 8 May 1998
Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003 *, Views of 24 May
2005
Ahmad Dar v. Norway, Communication No. 249/2004, Views of 16 May
2007
Arkauz Arana v. France, Communication No. 63/1997, Views of 5 June
2000
Attia v. Sweden, Communication No. 199/2002, Views of 24 November
2003
B.S.S. v. Canada, Communication No. 183/2001, Views of 17 May 2004
Brada v. France, Communication No. 195/2002, Views of 24 May 2005
C. T. and K. M. v. Sweden, Communication No. 279/2005, Views of
22 January 2007
Dadar v. Canada, Communication No. 258/2004, Views of 5 December
2005
Dar v. Norway, Communication No. 249/2004, Views of 16 May 2007
David v. Sweden, Communication No. 220/2002, Views of 17 May 2005
Falcon Ros v. Canada, Communication No. 133/1999, Views of
17 December 2004
G. R. B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, Views of 15 May 1998
H.M.H.I. v. Australia, Communication No. 177/2001, Views of 1 May
2002
Hamayak Korban v. Sweden, Communication No. 88/1997, Views of
16 November 1998
Haydin v. Sweden, Communication No. 101/1997, Views of 16 December
1998
Hussain Khan v. Canada, Communication No. 15/1994, Views of
18 November 1994
J.H.A. v. Spain, Communication No. 323/2007, Views of 21 November
2008
Karoui v. Sweden, Communication No. 185/2001, Views of 25 May 2002
L.M.V.R.G. and M.A.B.C. v. Sweden, Communication No. 64/1997,
Views of 19 November 1997
L.Z.B. v. Canada, Communication No. 304/2006, Views of 15 November
2007
M.P.S. v. Australia, Communication No. 138/1999, Views of 30 April 2002
Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, Communication No. 34/1995, Views of
29 May 1997
Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, Views of 27 April
1994
Nuez Chipana v. Venezuela, Communication No. 110/1998, Views of
16 December 1998
Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, Communication No. 41/1996, Views of 8 May
1996
Pelit v. Azerbaijan, Communication No. 281/2005, Views of 29 May 2007
S.V. et al. v. Canada, Communication No. 49/1996, Views of 15 May
2001
Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, Views of
25 May 1999
Singh Sogi v. Canada, Communication No. 297/2006, Views of
29 November 2007
T.P.S. v. Canada, Communication No. 999/1997, Views of 4 September
2000
Tapia Paez v. Sweden, Communication No. 39/1996, Views of 28 April
1997
Tebourski v. France, Communication No. 300/2006, Views of 11 May
2007
Toirjon Abdussamatov and Others v. Kazakhstan, Communication No.
CAT/C/48/D/444/2010, Views of 1 June 2012
X, Y and Z v. Sweden, Communication No. 61/1996, Views of 6 May
1998
Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD)
D.F. v. Australia, Communication No. 39/2006, Views of 3 March 2008
D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008, Views of 15 September
2009
Yilmaz-Dogan v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 1/1984, Views of
29 September 1988
Z.U.B.S. v. Australia, Communication No. 6/1995, Views of 25 January
2000
Committee on Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)
Yildirim v. Austria, Communication No. 6/2005, Views of 6 August 2007
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
A. and Others v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 3455/05,
Judgment of 19 February 2009
A.A. and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 14499/09, Judgment of
28 June 2012
A.A. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8000/08, Judgment of
20 September 2011
A.B. v. the Netherlands, Application No. 37328/97, Judgment of
29 January 2002
A.W. Khan v. United Kingdom, Application No. 47486/06, Judgment of
12 January 2010
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, Application No. 30471/08, Judgment
of 22 September 2009
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, Plenary, Case
No. 15/1983/71/107109, Judgment of 24 April 1985
Aden Ahmed v. Malta, Application No. 55352/12, Judgment of 23 July
2013
Aerts v. Belgium, Application No. 25357/94, Judgment of 30 July 1998
Agraw v. Switzerland, Application No. 3295/06, Judgment of 29 July
2010
Ahmed v. Austria, Case No. 71/1995/577/663, Judgment of 17 December
1996
Ahmut v. the Netherlands, Case No. 73/1995/579/665, Judgment of
26 October 1996
Ahorugeze v. Sweden, Application No. 37075/09, Judgment of
27 October 2011
Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, Judgment of 9 October 1979
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 21893/93, Judgment
of 16 September 1996
Akman v. Turkey, Application No. 37453/97, Admissibility decision,
26 June 2001
Al-Moayad v. Germany, Application No. 35865/03, Admissibility deci-
sion, 20 February 2007
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, Judgment of 20 June
2002
Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08,
Admissibility decision, 30 June 2009
Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08,
Judgment of 2 March 2010
Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 55721/07,
Judgment of 7 July 2011
Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, Application No. 33538/96, Judgment
of 28 July 2005
Aleksanyan v. Russia, Application No. 46468/06, Judgment of
22 December 2008
Algr v. Turkey, Application No. 32574/96, Judgment of 22 October 2002
Aloumi v. France, Application No. 50278/99, Judgment of 17 January
2006
Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 58419/08, Judgment of
12 February 2013
Amrollahi v. Denmark, Application No. 56811/00, Judgment of 11 July
2002
Amuur v. France, Case No. 17/1995/523/609, Judgment of 20 May 1996
Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 38361/97, Judgment of 13 June
2002
Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8225/78, Judgment of
28 March 1985
Auad v. Bulgaria, Application No. 49390/10, Judgment of 11 October
2011
Ayder and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23656/94, Judgment of
8 January 2004
Aydin v. Turkey, Case No. 57/1996/676/866, Judgment of 25 September
1997
Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, Application No. 13284/04, Judgment of
8 November 2005
Bah v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 56328/07, Judgment of
27 September 2011
Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, Application No. 25894/94, Judgment of
19 February 1998
Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 54131/08, Judgment
of 18 February 2010
Beard v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 24882/94, Judgment of
18 January 2001
Belevitskiy v. Russia, Application No. 72967/01, Judgment of 1 March
2007
Ben Khemais v. Italy, Application No. 246/07, Judgment of 24 February
2009
Benamar v. the Netherlands, Application No. 43786/04, Admissibility
decision, 5 April 2005
Bilgin v. Turkey, Application No. 23819/94, Judgment of 16 November
2000
Bolat v. Russia, Application No. 14139/03, Judgment of 5 October 2006
Bouamar v. Belgium, Application No. 9106/80, Judgment of 29 February
1988
Bouchelkia v. France, Case No. 112/1995/618/708, Judgment of
29 January 1997
Boughanemi v. France, Case No. 16/1995/522/608, Judgment of
24 April 1996
Boultif v. Switzerland, Application No. 54273/00, Judgment of 2 August
2001
Bozano v. France, Application No. 9990/82, Judgment of 18 December
1986
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Applications Nos.
1209/8411234/8411266/8411386/85, Judgment of 29 November
1988
C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 1365/07, Judgment of
24 April 2008
C.N. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4239/08, Judgment of
13 November 2012
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, GC, Application No. 32967/96, Judgment of
17 January 2002
Castells v. Spain, Application No. 11798/85, Judgment of 23 April 1992
Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in
Belgium, Applications Nos. 1474/621677/621691/621769/63
2126/64, Judgment of 23 July 1968
Chahal v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment of
15 November 1996
Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands, Application No. 53102/99,
Admissibility decision, 13 May 2003
Chapman v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 27238/95, Judgment
of 18 January 2001
Charahili v. Turkey, Application No. 46605/07, Judgment of 13 April 2010
Chassagnou and Others v. France, GC, Applications Nos. 25088/94
28331/9528443/95, Judgment of 29 April 1999
Ciliz v. the Netherlands, Application No. 29192/95, Judgment of 11 July
2000
onka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February
2002
Connors v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 66746/01, Judgment
of 27 May 2004
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13134/87,
Coster v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 24876/94, Judgment of
18 January 2001
Cotlet v. Romania, Application No. 38565/97, Judgment of 3 June 2003
Cox v. Turkey, Application No. 2933/03, Judgment of 20 May 2010
Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Plenary, Application No. 15576/89,
Cyprus v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 25781/94, Judgment of 10 May
2001
D. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May
1997
D.N.M. v. Sweden, Application No. 28379/11, Judgment of 27 June 2013
Dbouba v. Turkey, Application No. 15916/09, Judgment of 13 July 2010
De Souza Ribeiro v. France, GC, Application No. 22689/07, Judgment
of 13 December 2012
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, Plenary, Applications Nos.
2832/662835/662899/66, Judgment of 18 June 1971
Demades v. Turkey, Application No. 16219/90, Judgment of 31 October
2003
Demiray v. Turkey, Application No. 27308/95, Judgment of 21 November
2000
Dogan and Others v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 88038811/02
8813/0288158819/02, Judgment of 29 June 2004
Dougoz v. Greece, Application No. 40907/98, Judgment of 6 March 2001
Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Plenary, Application No.
12747/87, 26 June 1992
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 7525/76, Judgment
of 22 October 1981
E.B. v. France, GC, Application No. 43546/02, Judgment of 22 January
2008
Edwards v. United Kingdom, Application No. 46477/99, Judgment of
14 March 2002
Elsholz v. Germany, GC, Application No. 25735/94, Judgment of 13 July
2000
Eminbeyli v. Russia, Application No. 42443/02, Judgment of 26 February
2009
Engel and Others v. Netherlands, Plenary, Applications Nos. 5100/71
5101/715102/715354/725370/72, Judgment of 8 June 1986
Erikson v. Italy, Application No. 37900/97, Admissibility decision,
26 October 1999
Fadeyeva v. Russia, Application No. 55723/00, Judgment of 9 June 2005
Farbthus v. Latvia, Application No. 4672/02, Judgment of 2 December
2004
Filiz Uyan v. Turkey, Application No. 7496/03, Judgment of 8 January
2009
Folgero and Others v. Norway, Application No. 15472/02, Judgment of
29 June 2007
Fox, Campbell and Hartely v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos.
12244/8612245/8612383/86, Judgment of 30 August 1990
Fressoz and Roire v. France, GC, Application No. 29183/95, Judgment
of 21 January 1999
Gafarov v. Russia, Application No. 25404/2009, Judgment of 21 October
2010
Garayev v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 53688/08, Judgment of 10 June
2010
Gaygusuz v. Austria, Application No. 17371/90, Judgment of
16 September 1996
Gebremedhin v. France, Application No. 25389/05, Judgment of 26 April
2007
Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, GC, Application No. 44158/98, Judgment
of 17 February 2004
Guerra and Others v. Italy, GC, Application No. 14967/89, Judgment of
19 February 1998
Gl v. Switzerland, Case No. 53/1995/559/645, Judgment of 19 February
1996
Guzzardi v. Italy, Plenary, Application No. 7367/76, Judgment of
6 November 1980
H. L. R. v. France, GC, Application No. 24573/94, Judgment of 29 April
1997
Hamidovic v. Italy, Application No. 31956/05, Judgment of 4 December
2012
Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands, Application No. 8876/04,
Admissibility decision, 25 October 2005
Henaf v. France, Application No. 65436/01, Judgment of 27 November
2003
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, GC, Application No. 27765, 23 February
2012
Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22341/09,
Judgment of 6 November 2012
Hoffmann v. Germany, Application No. 34045/96, Judgment of
11 October 2001
Hurtado v. Switzerland, Application No. 17549/90, Judgment of
28 January 1994
I. v. Sweden, Application No. 61204/09, Judgment of 5 September 2013
I.M. v. France, Application No. 9152/09, Judgment of 2 February 2012
Iatridis v. Greece, GC, Application No. 31107/96, Judgment of 25 March
1999
Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, GC, Application
No. 48787/99, Judgment of 4 July 2001
Ilascu and Others v. Russia and Moldova, GC, Application No. 48787/99,
Judgment of 8 July 2004
Ireland v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 5310/71, Judgment
of 18 January 1978
Isaak and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 44587/98, Admissibility
decision, 28 September 2006
Isakov v. Russia, Application No. 14049/08, Judgment of 8 July 2010
Isayeva, Vusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Applications Nos. 57947/00
57948/0057949/00, Judgment of 24 February 2005
Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 2947/06, Judgment of
24 April 2008
Issa and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 31821/96, Judgment of
16 November 2004
Istratii v. Moldova, Applications Nos. 8721/058705/058742/05,
Jabari v. Turkey, Application No. 40035/98, Admissibility decision,
28 October 1999
Jabari v. Turkey, Application No. 40035/98, Judgment of 11 July 2000
Johnston and Others v. Ireland, Plenary, Application No. 9697/82,
Judgment of 18 December 1986
K.A.B. v. Sweden, Application No. 886/11, Judgment of 5 September 2013
K.K. v. France, Application No. 18913/11, Judgment of 10 October 2013
Kaboulov v. Ukraine, Application No. 41015/04, Judgment of
19 November 2009
Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 15297/09,
Kantyrev v. Russia, Application No. 37213/02, Judgment of 21 June
2007
Kaprykowski v. Poland, Application No. 23052/05, Judgment of
3 February 2009
Kaya v. Romania, Application No. 33970/05, Judgment of 12 October
2006
Keegan v. Ireland, Application No. 16969/90, Judgment of 26 May 1994
Keenan v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27229/95, Judgment of
3 April 2001
Kerr v. United Kingdom, Application No. 40451/98, Admissibility deci-
sion, 7 December 1999
Keshmiri v. Turkey (No. 2), Application No. 22426/10, Judgment of
17 January 2012
Khodzhayev v. Russia, Application No. 52466/08, Judgment of 12 May
2010
Klass and Others v. Germany, Plenary, Application No. 5029/71,
Judgment of 6 September 1978
Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands, GC, Applications Nos. 39343/98
39651/9843147/9846664/99, Judgment of 6 May 2003
Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, Judgment of 25 May 1993
Kolesnik v. Russia, Application No. 26876/08, Judgment of 17 July 2010
Kolompar v. Belgium, Application No. 11613/85, Judgment of
24 September 1992
Konstatinov v. the Netherlands, Application No. 16351/03, Judgment of
26 April 2007
Kotsaftis v. Greece, Application No. 39780/06, Judgment of 12 June
2008
Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, Application No. 18535/91,
Judgment of 27 October 1994
Kurt v. Turkey, Case No. 15/1997/799/1002, Judgment of 25 May 1998
Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, Application No. 39042/97, Judgment of 29 April
2003
Labzov v. Russia, Application No. 62208/00, Judgment of 16 June 2005
Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Application No. 332/57, Judgment of 1 July
1961
Lebedev v. Russia, Application No. 4493/04, Judgment of 25 October
2007
Lee v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 25289/94, Judgment of
18 January 2001
Liu v. Russia, Application No. 42086/05, Judgment of 6 December 2007
Loizidou and Others v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 15318/89, 23 March
1995
Loizidou v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment of
18 December 1996
Lokpo and Toure v. Hungary, Application No. 10816/10, Judgment of
20 September 2011
Lpez Ostra v. Spain, Application No. 16798/90, Judgment of 9 December
1994
Lupsa v. Romania, Application No. 10337/04, Judgment of 8 June 2006
Lutete Kemevuako v. the Netherlands, Application No. 65938/09,
Admissibility decision, 1 June 2010
M. and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 41416/08, Judgment of
26 July 2011
M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, Application No. 40020/03, Judgment
of 31 July 2012
M.A. v. Cyprus, Application No. 41872/10, Judgment of 23 July 2013
M.B. and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 36009/08, Judgment of
15 June 2010
M.C. v. Bulgaria, Application No. 39272/98, Judgment of 4 December
2003
M.E. v. France, Application No. 50094/10, Judgment of 6 June 2013
M.S. v. Belgium, Application No. 50012/08, Judgment of 31 January
2012
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, GC, Application No. 30696/09, Judgment
of 21 January 2011
Maaouia v. France, GC, Application No. 39652/98, Judgment of
5 October 2000
Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, Application No. 49747/11, 16 October
2012
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, GC, Applications Nos. 46827/99
46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005
Marckx v. Belgium, Plenary, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment of
13 June 1979
Mayeka and Mitunga v. Belgium, Application no 13178/03, Judgment of
12 October 2006
Medvedyev and Others v. France, GC, Application No. 3394/03,
Mengesha Kimfe v. Switzerland, Application No. 24404/05, Judgment
of 29 July 2010
Mentes v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 23186/94, Judgment of
28 November 1997
Mihai Ionescu v. Romania, Application No. 36659/04, Admissibility de-
cision, 1 June 2010
Mikolenko v. Estonia, Application No. 10664.05, Judgment of 8 October
2009
Milosevic v. the Netherlands, Application No. 77631/01, Admissibility
decision, 19 March 2002
Mohammed v. Austria, Application No. 2283/12, Judgment of 6 June
2013
Moldovan and Others (2) v. Romania, Applications Nos. 41138/98
Molotchko v. Ukraine, Application No. 12275/10, Judgment of 26 April
2012
Moreno Gomez v. Spain, Application No. 4143/02, Judgment of
16 November 2004
Mouisel v. France, Application No. 67263/01, Judgment of 14 November
2002
Moustaquim v. Belgium, Application No. 12313/86, Judgment of
18 February 1991
MPP Golub v. Ukraine, Application No. 6778/05, Admissibility decision,
18 October 2005
Muminov v. Russia, Application No. 42502/06, Judgment of 11 December
2008
Musial v. Poland, Application No. 28300/06, Judgment of 20 January
2009
N. v. Finland, Application No. 38885/02, Judgment of 26 July 2005
N. v. Sweden, Application No. 23505/09, Judgment of 20 July 2010
N. v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 26565/05, Judgment of
27 May 2008
Na v. United Kingdom, Application No. 25904/07, Judgment of 17 July
2008
Nacic and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 16567/10, Judgment of
15 May 2012
Nasri v. France, Application No. 19465/92, Judgment of 13 July 1995
Nasrulloyev v. Russia, Application No. 656/06, Judgment of 11 October
2007
Nitecki v. Poland, Application No. 65653/01, Admissibility Decision,
21 March 2002
Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 21878/06, Judgment of
8 April 2008
Nolan and K. v. Russia, Application No. 2512/04, Judgment of
12 February 2009
Norris v. Ireland, Plenary, Application No. 10581/83, Judgment of
26 ctober 1988
calan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 March
2003
calan v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May
2005
Okpisz v. Germany, Application No. 59140/00, Judgment of 25 October
2005
Omojudi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 1820/08, Judgment of
24 November 2009
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 48939/99, Judgment of
30 November 2004
Onur v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27319/07, Judgment of
27 February 2009
Open Door and Well Woman v. Ireland, Plenary, Applications Nos.
14234/8814235/88, Judgment of 29 October 1992
Orchowski v. Poland, Application No. 17885/04, Judgment of 22 October
2009
Osman v. Denmark, Application No. 38058/09, Judgment of 14 June
2011
Osman v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 23452/94, Judgment of
28 October 1998
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09,
Judgment of 17 January 2012
P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, Application No. 18984/02, Judgment of 22 July
2010
Pad and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 60167/00, Admissibility de-
cision, 28 June 2007
Paladi v. Moldova, Application No. 39806/05, Judgment of 10 March
2009
Panaitescu v. Romania, Application No. 30909/06, Judgment of 10 April
2012
Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine, Application No. 70767/01, Judgment of
6 September 2005
Peers v. Greece, Application No. 28524/95, Judgment of 19 April 2001
Pellegrini v. Italy, Application No. 77363/01, Admissibility Decision,
26 May 2005
Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 14462/03,
Admissibility decision, 4 January 2005
Perry v. Latvia, Application No. 30273/03, Judgment of 8 November 2007
Petrovich Korolev v. Russia, Application No. 25551/05, Admissibility de-
cision, 1 July 2010
Piermont v. France, Applications Nos. 15773/8915774/89, Judgment
of 27 April 1995
Poirrez v. France, Application No. 40892/98, Judgment of 30 September
2003
Poleshchuk v. Russia, Application No. 60776/00, Judgment of 7 October
2004
Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, Application No. 5335/05, Judgment of 21 June
2011
Popov v. France, Applications Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, Judgment
of 19 January 2012
Powell v. United Kingdom, Application No. 45305/99, Admissibility de-
cision, 4 May 2000
Price v. United Kingdom, Application No. 33394/96, Judgment of 10 July
2001
Prokopovich v. Russia, Application No. 58255/00, Judgment of
18 November 2004
Quinn v. France, Application No. 18580/91, Judgment of 22 March 1995
R.U. v. Greece, Application No. 2237/08, Judgment of 7 June 2011
Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011
Ramzy v. the Netherlands, Application No. 25424/05, Admissibility de-
cision, 20 July 2010
Raninen v. Finland, Case No. 52/1996/771/972, Judgment of
16 December 1997
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment of
7 January 2010
Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, Applications Nos. 29787/0329810/03,
Ribitsch v. Austria, Application No. 18896/91, Judgment of 4 December
1995
Rinck v. France, Application No. 18774/09, Admissibility decision,
19 October 2010
Rodic and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application No. 22893/05,
Judgment of 27 May 2008
Ryabikin v. Russia, Application No. 8320/04, Judgment of 19 June 2008
S.A. v. Sweden, Application No. 66523/10, Judgment of 27 June 2013
S.D. v. Greece, Application No. 53541/07, Judgment of 11 June 2007
S.F. and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 52077/1, Judgment of
15 May 2012
S.H. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 19956/06, Judgment of 15 June
2010
S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 60367/10, Judgment of
29 January 2013
Saadi v. Italy, GC, Application No. 37201/06, Judgment of 28 February
2008
Saadi v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 13229/03, Judgment of
29 January 2008
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Application No. 1948/04, Judgment
of 11 January 2007
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Application No. 33290/96,
Salman v. Turkey, GC, Application No. 21986/93, Judgment of 27 June
2000
Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, Application No. 71386/10, Judgment of
25 April 2013
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application No. 30141/04, Judgment of
24 June 2010
Schmidt v. Germany, Application No. 13580/88, Judgment of 18 July
1994
Seluk and Asker v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 23184/9423185/94,
Judgment of 21 April 1998
Selvanayagam v. United Kingdom, Application No. 57981/00,
Admissibility decision, 12 December 2002
Sen v. the Netherlands, Application No. 31465/96, Judgment of
21 December 2001
Sentges v. the Netherlands, Application No. 27677/02, Admissibility de-
cision, 8 July 2003
Sezen v. the Netherlands, Application No. 50252/99, Judgment of
31 January 2006
Shakurov v. Russia, Application No. 55822/10, Judgment of 5 June 2012
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Application No. 36378/02,
Judgment of 12 April 2005
Sharif v. Austria, Application No. 60104/08, Judgment of 5 December
2013
Shtukaturov v. Russia, Application No. 44009/05, Judgment of 27 March
2008
Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, Applications Nos. 55480/00 and
Sidikovy v. Russia, Application No. 73455/11, Judgment of 20 June
2013
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, Application No. 16130/90, Judgment of 30 June
1993
Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01, Judgment of 26 July 2005
Slivenko v. Latvia, GC, Application No. 48321/99, Judgment of
09 October 2003
Smirnova and Smirnova v. Russia, Applications Nos. 46133/99
Smith v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 25154/94, Judgment of
18 January 2001
Soering v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 14038/88, 7 July
1989
Soldatenko v. Ukraine, Application No. 2440/07, Judgment of 23 October
2008
Solomou and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 36832/97, Judgment of
24 June 2008
Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, GC, Applications Nos. 52562/99
52620/99, Judgment of 11 January 2006
Stamose v. Bulgaria, Application No. 29713/05, Judgment of
27 November 2012
Storck v. Germany, Application No. 61603/00, Judgment of 16 June
2005
Suf and Elmi v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 8319/07 and
11449/07, Judgment of 28 June 2011
Sultani v. France, Application No. 45223/05, Judgment of 20 July 2007
Suso Musa v. Malta, Application No. 42337/12, Judgment of 23 July
2013
T.W. v. Malta, GC, Application No. 25644/94, Judgment of 29 April 1999
Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, Application No. 26307/95, Judgment of 8 April
2004
Taskin and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46117/99, Judgment of
10 November 2004
Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 32940/0841626/08
43616/08, Judgment of 13 April 2010
Timishev v. Russia, Applications Nos. 55762/0055974/00, Judgment
of 13 December 2005
Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, Application No. 60665/00,
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April
1978
Udeh v. Switzerland, Application No. 12020/09, Judgment of 16 April
2013
ner v. the Netherlands, GC, Application No. 46410/99, Judgment of
18 October 2006
Valasinas v. Lithuania, Application No. 44558/98, Judgment of 24 July
2001
Van der Mussele v. Belgium, Plenary, Application No. 8919/80, Judgment
of 23 November 1983
Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, Application No. 50901/99, Judgment
of 4 February 2003
Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, Plenary, Application No. 7906/77,
Judgment of 24 June 1982
Vasquez v. Switzerland, Application No. 1785/08, Judgment of
26 November 2013
Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 13163/87
13164/8713165/8713447/8713448/87 Judgment of 30 October
1991
Wasilewski v. Poland, Application No. 32734/96, Admissibility decision,
20 April 1999
Weller v. Hungary, Application No. 44399/05, Judgment of 31 March 2009
Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, Application No. 6301/73, Judgment of
24 October 1979
Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, Application No. 31276/05,
Judgment of 3 February 2009
X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, GC, Case No. 75/1995/581/667, Judgment
of 20 March 1997
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, Application No. 46347/99, Judgment of
22 December 2005
Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, Application No. 39473/98,
Admissibility decision, 11 January 2001
Yakubov v. Russia, Application No. 7265/10, Judgment of 8 November
2011
Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, Application No. 10486/10, 20 December
2011
Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application
Nos. 7601/767806/77, Judgment of 13 August 1981
Yyler v. Turkey, Application No. 26973/95, Judgment of 10 May 2001
Yuldashev v. Russia, Application No. 1248/09, Judgment of 8 July 2010
Z and Others v. United Kingdom, GC, Application No. 29392/95,
Judgment of 10 May 2001
Z and T v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27034/05, Admissibility de-
cision, 28 February 2006
Z.N.S. v. Turkey, Application No. 21896/08, Judgment of 19 January 2010
Zarb Adami v. Malta, Application No. 17209/02, Judgment of 20 June 2006
European Commission on Human Rights
(ECommHR)
15 Foreign Students v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 7671/76,
Buckley v. United Kingdom, Application No. 20348/92, Admissibility de-
cision, 3 March 1994
Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 7511/76
7743/76, Report of 16 May 1980
Cyprus v. Turkey, Plenary, Applications Nos. 6780/746950/75, 26 May
1975
East African Asians v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 4403/70
4419/70 and others, Report of 14 December 1973
Freda v. Italy, Plenary, Application No. 8916/80, Admissibility decision,
7 October 1980
Harabi v. the Netherlands, Application No. 10798/84, Admissibility de-
cision, 5 March 1986
Hess v. United Kingdom, Application No. 6231/73, Admissibility deci-
sion, 28 May 1975
Karus v. Italy, Application No. 29043/95, Admissibility decision, 20 May
1998
McFeeley v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 8317/78,
Mller v. Austria, Plenary, Application No. 5849/72, Admissibility deci-
sion, 16 December 1974
National Federation of Self-Employed v. United Kingdom, Plenary,
Application No. 7995/77, Admissibility decision, 11 July 1978
Omkarananada and the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, Application
No. 8118/77, Admissibility decision, 19 March 1981
R. v. Denmark, Plenary, Application No. 10263/83, Admissibility deci-
sion, 11 March 1985
Ramirez v. France, Application No. 28780/95, Admissibility decision,
24 June 1996
Reed v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 7630/76, Admissibility
decision, 6 December 1979
Stigson v. Sweden, Application No. 12264/86, Admissibility decision,
13 July 1988
Szrabjet and Clark v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 27004/95
27011/95, 23 October 1997
T. v. Sweden, Plenary, Application No. 10671/83, Admissibility decision,
4 March 1985
Tanli v. Turkey, Plenary, Application No. 26129/95, Admissibility deci-
sion, 5 March 1996
W. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 9348/81, 28 February 1983
W.M. v. Denmark, Application No. 17392/90, Admissibility decision,
14 October 1992
X and Y v. Switzerland, Applications Nos. 7289/757349/76, Admissibility
decision, 14 July 1977
X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 1611/62, Admissibility
decision, 25 September 1965
X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Plenary, Application No. 6572/74,
4 March 1976
X. v. Germany, Application No. 1151/61, Recuil des decisions, p. 119
(1961)
X. v. Switzerland, Application No. 7601/75, Admissibility decision,
12 July 1976
X. v. the Netherlands, Plenary, Application No. 4130/69, Admissibility
decision, 20 July 1971
X. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7547/76, Admissibility decision,
15 December 1977
X. v. United Kingdom, Plenary, Application No. 5962/72, Admissibility
decision, 13 March 1975
Zamir v. France, Plenary, Application No. 9174/80, Admissibility deci-
sion, 13 July 1982
European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR)
Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, Complaint
No. 69/2011, Merits, 23 October 2012
Defence for Children International v. the Netherlands, Complaint
No. 47/2008, Merits, 20 October 2009
ERRC v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 31/2005, Merits, 18 October 2006
ERRC v. France, Complaint No. 51/2008, Merits, 19 October 2009
ERRC v. Greece, Complaint No. 15/2003, Merits, 8 December 2004
ERRC v. Italy, Complaint No. 27/2004, Merits, 7 December 2005
European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless
v. France, Complaint No. 39/2002, Merits, 5 December 2007
International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Complaint No. 1/1998,
Merits, 10 March 1999
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. France, Complaint
No. 14/2003, Merits, 8 September 2004
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. Greece, Complaint
No. 7/2000, Merits, 5 December 2000
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. Ireland, Complaint
No. 42/2007, Merits, 3 June 2008
International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France, Complaint
No. 33/2006, Merits, 5 December 2007
STTK ry and They ry v. Finland, Complaint No. 10/2000, Merits,
17 October 2001
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2003
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of 2 September 2004
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No. 63, Judgment of 19 November 1999
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Comptroller) v. Peru, Series C, No. 198, Judgment of 1 July 2009
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22 November 2007
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21 November 2007
Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Series C, No. 61, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of 18 November 1999
Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Series C, No. 72, Judgment of 2 February
2001
Blake v. Guatemala, Series C, No. 36, Judgment of 24 January 1998
Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Series C, No. 148, Judgment
of 1 July 2006
Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Series C, No. 140,
Durand and Ugarte, Series C, No. 50, Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of 28 May 1999
Exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Advisory Opinion
OC-11/90, 10 August 1990
Garbi and Corrales v. Honduras, Series C, No. 6, Judgment of 15 March
1989
Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, Series C, No. 5, Judgment of 20 January
1989
Habeas corpus in emergency situations, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87,
30 January 1987
Humberto Snchez v. Honduras, Series C, No. 99, Judgment of 7 June
2003
Judicial guarantees in states of emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87,
6 October 1987
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory
Opinion OC-18/03, 17 September 2003
La Cantuta v. Peru, Series C, No. 162, Judgment of 29 November 2006
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Series C, No. 160, Judgment of
25 November 2006
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Series C, No. 150, Judgment of 5 July 2006
Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Judgment of 24 October
2012
Neira Alegra et al. v. Peru, Series C, No. 20, Judgment of 19 January
1995
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 19 January
1984
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Series C, No. 146,
Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Series C, No. 120, Judgment of
1 March 2005
Servelln-Garca et al. v. Honduras, Series C, No. 152, Judgment of
21 September 2006
Surez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Series C, No. 35, Judgment of 12 November
1997
The Girls Yean and Bosico v. the Dominican Republic, Series C, No. 130,
Judgment of 8 September 2005
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99,
1 October 1999
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Series C, No. 1, Judgment of 29 July
1988
Vlez Loor v. Panama, Series C, No. 218, Judgment of 23 November 2010
Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Series C, No. 149, Judgment of 4 July 2006
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Series C, No. 125,
Judgment of 17 June 2005
Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Series C, No. 180, Judgment of 6 May 2008
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)
Coard et al v. United States, Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, Merits,
29 September 1999
Desmond McKenzie and Others v. Jamaica, Cases 12.02312.044
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4 April 2001
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25 July 2008
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21 July 2011
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Merits, 10 October 2002
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Merits, 20 March 2009
Montoya Gonzlez v. Costa Rica, Case 11.553, Report No. 48/96,
Moreno Ramos v. United States, Case 12.430, Report No. 1/05, Merits,
28 January 2005
National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security
Institute et al. v. Peru, Case No. 12.670, Report No. 38/09, Merits,
27 March 2009
Pensioners of the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA)
v. Guatemala, Petition No. 1380-06, Report No. 102/09, Admissibility
de ci si on, 29 October 2009
Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. USA, Case 9.903, Report No. 51/01, Me-
rits, 4 April 2001
Riebe Star and Others v. Mexico, Case 11.160, Report No. 49/99, Merits,
13 April 1999
Sanchez Villalobos and Others v. Costa Rica, Petition No. 12.361, Report
Tena Colunga et al. v. Mexico, Petition No. 2582/02, Report No. 44/04,
Vlez Loor v. Panama, Case 9204, Report No. 95/06, Admissibility de-
cision, 23 October 2006
Victor Saldao v. Argentina, Petition, Report No. 38/99, Admissibility
de ci sion, 11 March 1999
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(ACommHPR)
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25
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Ordinary Session, May 1999
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Com mu ni-
cation No. 227/1999, 33
rd
Dr. Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, Communication No. 235/2000,
46
th
Ordinary Session, 1125 November 2009
FIDH, National Human Rights Organisation (ONDH) and Rencontre
Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de lHomme v. Senegal, Com mu ni-
ca tion No. 304/2005, 40
th
Ordinary, 1529 November 2006
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Nos. 25/89 47/90 56/91100/93, 19
th
Ordinary Session, March
1996
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th
Ordinary
Session, May 2010
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Republic of
Angola, Communication No. 292/2004, 43
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Ordinary Session, 722 May
2008
International Pen and Others v. Nigeria, Communications Nos. 137/94
139/94154/96161/97, 24
th
Ordinary Session, 31 October 1998
Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, Communication No. 211/98,
29
th
Ordinary Session, 23 April7 May 2001
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, Communications
Nos. 54/9161/9198/93164/97196/97, 27
th
Ordinary Session,
11 May 2000
Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication No. 224/1998,
28
th
Ordinary Session, 23 October6 November 2000
Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, Communication No. 266/2003,
45
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Ordinary Session, 1327 May 2009
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Ordinary Session,
23 October6 November 2000
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Communications Nos. 27/8946/9149/9199/93, 20
th
Ordinary
Session, October 1996
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33
rd
Ordinary Session, 1529 May 2003
Rencontre Africaine pour la Defence des Droits de lHomme v. Zambia,
Communication No. 71/92, 20
th
Ordinary Session, October 1996
Socio-Economic Rights Accountability Project v. Nigeria, Communication
No. 300/2005, 5
th
Extraordinary Session, 21-29 July 2008
Sudan Human Rights Organisations and Others v. Sudan, Communications
Nos. 279/03 and 296/05, 45
th
The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, 30
th

Ordinary Session, 1327 October 2001
Union Inter-Africaine des Droits de lHomme and Others v. Angola,
nd
Ordinary Session, 11 November 1997
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights
and Development (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v. Republic
of Zimbabwe, Communication No. 294/2004, 6
th
Extraordinary Session,
30 March3 April 2009
It is true that we have risked to die. But we were
born in the wrong part of the world. If we do not
risk, we get nothing from this life
Youssef, an undocumented migrant in Italy *
How our societies treat migrants will determine
whether we succeed in building societies based on
justice, democracy, dignity and human security for
all.
Navanethem Pillay,
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights **
* From Fabrizio Gatti, Bilal: Viaggiare, Lavorare, Morire da Clandestini, RCS Libri SpA, Milan,
2007, p. 385 (unoffcial translation).
** Address by Ms Navanethem Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at
the Global Forum on Migration and Development/Civil Society Days, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,
8 November 2010.
Introduction
I. Purpose of this Guide
When people cross their countrys border, they might not know it yet,
but the world no longer sees them as it did before. They have a special
label or status now: they are migrants. And because of this, they will
often fnd themselves in an inferior position to those around them, who
hold the passport of the country in which they live.
Whatever the circumstances in which they travel, those who become
migrants typically move in a new, unfamiliar, and less secure world.
Whether they have entered with an authorisation or they are undoc-
umented, migrants will generally fnd their rights diminished in com-
parison with the citizens of their country of residence. The degree to
which those rights are violated, and the degree to which migrants are
excluded from legal protection or redress, varies widely from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. A legal migrant may face workplace violence or
sub-standard working conditions and a lack of labour rights protection
and be fearful of claiming legal protection because a supervisor threat-
ens dismissal and subsequent loss of a work permit. A refugee may
become caught in the complex, long, and often arbitrary maze of a
refugee qualifcation procedure, during which rights are curtailed and
the applicant is suspended in a legal limbo without identity. Most vul-
nerable will be the undocumented migrant. People fnding themselves in
this situation, while having a nominal entitlement to their human rights,
effectively lack, because of their fear of being identifed and deported,
any opportunity to vindicate those rights, or to access the remedies
which should protect them.
1
They risk exposure to economic or physical
exploitation, to destitution, and to summary return to their country of
origin, where some may face danger to their safety or even to their life.
There is, as will be described, a multitude of reasons to migrate.
2
For
irregular migrants however, who enter a country in an undocumented
fashion or stay there after expiration of a permit, an almost constant
factor is, that the motivation not to be sent back to their country of ori-
gin is so strong they are prepared to accept many hardships and denials

1
Global Group on Migration (GMG), Statement on the Human Rights of Migrants in Irregular
Situation, 30 September 2010, http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/sites/default/fles/
uploads/news/GMG Joint Statement Adopted 30 Sept 2010.pdf. See, footnote No. 4 for a
description of the GMG.

2
IACHR, Second Report of the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families
in the Hemisphere, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 rev., 16 April 2001, para. 61. See
also, General Comment No. 2 on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and
members of their family, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/GC/2, 28 August 2013.
of rights. Whether someone migrates to escape war, famine, persecu-
tion, natural catastrophes, economic depression, or just to fnd a better
chance for a better life, the person often fnds the insecurity, restrictions
and sometimes destitution of their situation in the country of destination
preferable to that at home. Many have no choice but to leave. Those with
some limited choice are prepared to risk losing their rights, for a fghting
chance of thereafter gaining them. This is the human condition that mi-
gration policies and laws struggle with, manage and sometimes exploit.
Migration is a highly charged and contested political issue in most des-
tination States. Control of national borders is seen as an essential as-
pect of the sovereign State. National political debates on migration or
migrants can be a fashpoint for political and social anxieties about se-
curity, national identity, social change and economic uncertainty. These
political battles are also manifested in national law, which sets the
framework within which migrants human rights are threatened. States
adopt increasingly restrictive rules, often fuelled by popular hostility to
immigrants. Such policies and laws, restricting legal migration, often
have the effect of increasing the proportion of undocumented migrants,
whose vulnerability to exploitation and abuse is acute.
3
There are there-
fore essential interests at stake for both the individual and the State.
II. Migration and Human Rights
Human rights, as they are guaranteed in both national and international
law, have an essential role in protecting migrants caught up in these
powerful forces. The Global Migration Group
4
recently recalled that the
fundamental rights of all persons, regardless of their migration status,
include:
The right to life, liberty and security of the person and to be free
from arbitrary arrest or detention, and the right to seek and enjoy
asylum from persecution;
The right to be free from discrimination based on race, sex, lan-
guage, religion, national or social origin, or other status;

3
IACHR, Second Report of the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families
in the Hemisphere, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 rev., 16 April 2001, para. 56. See
also, CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2.

4
The Global Migration Group (GMG) is an inter-agency group bringing together heads of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),
the Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the UN Education, Scientifc, and Cul-
tural Organisation (UNESCO), the UN Population Fund (UNPF), the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Childrens Fund (UNCF), the UN Institute for Training and
Research (UNITR), the UN Offce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank and UN
Regional Commissions.
The right to be protected from abuse and exploitation, to be free
from slavery, and from involuntary servitude, and to be free from
torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment;
The right to a fair trial and to legal redress;
The right to protection of economic, social and cultural rights, in-
cluding the right to health, an adequate standard of living, social
security, adequate housing, education, and just and favourable
conditions of work; and
Other human rights as guaranteed by the international human
rights instruments to which the State is party and by customary
international law.
5
All these rights are human rights to which all persons, without excep-
tion, are entitled. Persons do not acquire them because they are citi-
zens, workers, or on the basis of a particular status. No-one may be
deprived of their human rights because they have entered or remained
in a country in contravention of the domestic immigration rules, just
as no-one may be deprived of them because they look like or are for-
eigners, children, women, or do not speak the local language. This
principle, the universality of human rights, is a particularly valuable one
for migrants.
The reality, however, is that rights are illusory if there is no way to claim
their implementation. A national legal system that can provide effective
access to justice and remedies for violations of human rights is there-
fore essential. The whole apparatus of legal standards, lawyers, judges,
prosecutors, legal practitioners and activists must operate effectively
to provide migrants with legal remedies for violations of their human
rights.
This is where this Guide has a role. Migrants generallyand undocu-
mented migrants especiallydo not have easy, if any, access to an ef-
fective legal remedy for redressing human rights violations. Most of the
time, national legislation will not provide them with a remedy, or will
create many obstacles to its access, such as the threat of an automatic
expulsion or deportation once the migrant contacts the authorities. In
this world, migrants have rights, but no or little way to make use of
them or ask for their respect. They are legally voiceless.
International lawand, in particular, international human rights law and
international refugee lawmay provide an, albeit incomplete, answer to
the problem. States legal systems are becoming increasingly open to

5
GMG, Statement of the Global Migration Group on the Human Rights of Migrants in Irregular
Situation, op. cit., fn. 1.
the infuence of international law. In many countries it is now possible
to invoke, in one way or another, international law in domestic courts in
order to claim the respect and implementation of human rights, including
for migrants. Even in countries where that is not possible, or when the
international human rights law claim has failed in the national system, if
the country is a party to an international or regional human rights treaty,
it is often possible to challenge the State at the international level for its
failure to do so. International law can be a powerful tool for change: ei-
ther for the actual situation of the individual migrant, through redress in
domestic courts, or for the advancement of policy or laws that can amelio-
rate migrants situation, through claims before international mechanisms.
This Guide is intended as a tool for lawyers, judges, public offcials, hu-
man rights defenders, or for migrants themselves, to better understand
the international human rights of migrants and the means to claim
their respect or implementation at the national and international levels.
III. The multifaceted characteristic
of the migration experience
The share of international migrants in the worlds population has re-
mained stable in the past 50 years, at a rate of around three percent of
the world population. Therefore, although particular population move-
ments may be temporary or cyclic, the phenomenon of migration is
constant.
6
In 2009, the total population of international migrants was
estimated at around 214 million people.
7
Forty-eight percent of the to-
tal international migration is composed of women, most of whom now
migrate on their own rather than as family members of other migrants.
8

The ILO has established that around 90% of international migration is
composed of economically active migrants and members of their fam-
ilies. Only seven to eight percent of migrants are refugees and asy-
lum-seekers.
9
In 2009, an estimated 50 million people were living or
working in a foreign country with irregular status.
10

6
See, UNDP, Human Development Report 2009Overcoming barriers: Human Mobility and
Development, 2009, p. 2.

7
See, Ibid., p. 21. See also, Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action,
Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, October 2005, para. 2; Interna-
tional Labour Migration. ARights-based Approach, Geneva, International Labour Offce, 2010,
p. 1.

8
See, Ibid., p. 25. See also, International Labour Migration. A Rights-based Approach, op. cit.,
fn. 7, pp. 1, 3; General Recommendation No. 26 on women migrant workers, CEDAW, UN
Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R, 5 December 2008, para. 8. See also, IACHR, Second Report
of the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families in the Hemisphere,
op. cit., fn. 2, para. 43.

9
See, International Labour Migration. A Rights-based Approach, op. cit., fn. 7, p. 2.

10
See, UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 2.
One of the diffculties for any publication that aims to address problems
of migrationin law or in practiceis the complexity and diversity of the
migration experience. The reasons why people migrate are varied, com-
plex, and subject to change; and the people who migrate are not easily
classifablethey come from a range of circumstances and backgrounds.
11

Generally speaking, migrants are people who move from their country of
usual residence or nationality to another country. A migrant may move
for economic or educational reasons, or in order to escape persecution,
human rights abuses, threats to life or physical integrity, war or civil un-
rest. The distinction between the causes of migration is not straightfor-
ward and the boundaries drawn by international law do not always refect
the reality of migrants lives. A migrant might leave his or her country be-
cause of persecution on grounds of race, for example, or due to extreme
poverty there. In the frst case, he or she will be entitled to claim refugee
status, while the second will be considered a case of economic migration,
attracting no particular international protection, even though the threat
to the individuals life may be just as signifcant as in the frst case. The
same must be said for people who leave their country due to natural ca-
tastrophes caused by climate change, although discussion at a political
level on the existence of climate-change refugees has now begun.
12
As regards entry, or attempted entry, of a migrant to a foreign country,
a number of broad, sometimes overlapping, groups of migrants can be
identifed:
Regular migrants: migrants who enter the State after having ob-
tained an authorisation, whether temporary or not, by the desti-
nation State;
Undocumented migrants: migrants who enter the State in an irreg-
ular fashion, without having the proper documentation; or migrants
who entered in a regular fashion whose authorisation has expired
and who have remained, nonetheless, in the national territory.
This Guide uses the terminology recommended by the UN General
Assembly,
13
by avoiding the term illegal migrant and using un-
documented or irregular migrant as synonyms. It must be stressed
that the term irregular migrant does not express a quality of the
person but a mere reference to his or her situation of entry or stay.

11
See, Gabriela Rodrguez Pizarro, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, Annual
Report 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/85, 27 December 2004, para. 74; and, IACHR, Second
Report of the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families in the Hemi-
sphere, op. cit., fn. 2, para. 61.

12
See, inter alia, the webpage on climate change of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html.

13
General Assembly (GA) resolution 3449(XXX), Measures to ensure the human rights and
dignity of all migrant workers, 9 December 1975, para. 2.
Asylum-seekers or refugees: migrants who enter a country,
whether regularly or irregularly, in order to escape persecution
in their country of origin as defined by Article 1A of the Geneva
Refugee Convention.
Other migrants needing protection: this category includes several
kinds of migrants whose status is not well-defined but who are in
need of international protection, recognised, to varying extents,
by international law. These include stateless persons (whether
or not they are asylum-seekers or refugees), victims of traffick-
ing, unaccompanied children whose status has not been defined,
failed asylum-seekers or undocumented migrants who cannot
be expelled due to principle of non-refoulement (see Chapter 1).
This classifcation is only partially appropriate, since, as was recognised
by the Global Commission on International Migration, an individual
migrant may belong to one or more [. . .] categories at the same time.
She or he may move successfully from one category to another in the
course of the migratory movement, or may seek to be reclassifed from
one category to another, as when an economic migrant submits a claim
to asylum in the hope of gaining the privileges associated with refugee
status.
14

By choice or force of circumstance, the status of a migrant is almost
never stable. An economic migrant might become a refugee while in the
country of destination. A refugee might lose his status and become an
undocumented migrant because the circumstances which led to a fear of
persecution cease to exist in his country of origin. A regular migrant might
become undocumented if she overstays a residence permit term, or might
be regularised, through amnesties, or regular employment. Overstaying
has been identifed as one of the major channels through which a migrant
acquires irregular status. As the UNDP pointed out, in some island states,
such as Australia and Japan, overstaying is practically the only channel
to irregular entry; even in many European countries, overstay appears to
account for about two thirds of unauthorised migration.
15
Factors such as sex and gender, age, race and national origin, also have
a signifcant impact on the migration experience.
Migrants often face discrimination based on their race, national, reli-
gious or ethnic origin or identity. This constitutes a form of discrimi-
nation additional to the xenophobia to which they are often subject for
the mere fact of being non-nationals. As the UN Special Rapporteur
on the right of migrants pointed out, [p]eople whose colour, physical

14
Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action, op. cit., fn. 7, para. 15. See
also, UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 26.

15
UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 26.
appearance, dress, accent or religion are different from those of the
majority in the host country are often subjected to physical violence
and other violations of their rights, independently of their legal status.
The choice of victim and the nature of the abuse do not depend on
whether the persons are refugees, legal immigrants, members of na-
tional minorities or undocumented migrants.
16
She also highlighted the
situations in which some migrants are preferred to others for granting
of authorisations of entry or in the labour market, due to their race,
national or ethnic origin or religious identity.
17
Such discrimination is
prohibited by international human rights law, and, more specifcally, by
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD).
18
The international community has also reject-
ed this discrimination and has strongly held in the Durban Declaration
that policies towards migration should not be based on racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
19
Women migrants often face additional human rights concerns as a result
of their sex and gender. Not only may they confront discrimination as
a result of their status as non-nationals, but in addition a range of sex
or gender-specifc forms of discrimination may arise for them as wom-
en. In the words of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women female migrants often experience intersecting forms
of discrimination, suffering not only sex- and gender-based discrimi-
nation, but also xenophobia and racism. Discrimination based on race,
ethnicity, cultural particularities, nationality, language, religion or oth-
er status may be expressed in sex- and gender-specifc ways.
20
The
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has noted that
there are circumstances in which racial discrimination only or primarily
affects women, or affects women in a different way or to a different
degree than men, and racial discrimination may have consequences
that affect primarily or only women.
21
Women migrants may also be at

16
Gabriela Rodrguez Pizarro, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, Annual Report
1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/82, 6 January 2000, para. 32. See also para. 48.

17
Ibid., para. 54.

18
Article 1, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD). The permission of distinctions between nationals and non-nationals of Article 1.2
ICERD cannot override the prohibition of discrimination based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin. See, General Recommendation No. 30, Discrimination against
Non-citizens, CERD, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 1 October 2004; and, Gabriela
Rodrguez Pizarro, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, Annual Report 2000, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/83 9 January 2001.

19
Declaration of World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Re-
lated Intolerance, 2001, para. 12. See also, paras. 16, 38, 4751, and for asylum-seekers
and refugees, paras. 5255.

20
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 14.

21
General Recommendation No. 25, Gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination, CERD,
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 20 March 2000, para.1.
heightened risk of discrimination on grounds of age, disability, class and
social status.
22
As discussed in Section IV below, such discrimination is
prohibited by international human rights law.
Children also migrate and require a different approach than that re-
served to adults. Again, traditional migration perspectives have been
modelled on the assumption that migrants are adults. Children may mi-
grate with adult family members, or alone. Under international human
rights law, the overriding principle governing the rights of children, is
that in all actions relating to them, the best interests of the child must
be a primary consideration.
23
Unaccompanied minors are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse,
24
but children migrating with their
family, especially where they are undocumented, may also encounter
problems of access to education or healthcare because their parents,
out of fear of being deported upon contact with national authorities, will
not allow their children to have access to those authorities.
25
Many other migrants may also suffer discrimination on a range of other
grounds, including discrimination on the basis of age, class, disability,
economic or social status, marital status, or sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.
26

In this Guide, the term of migrant will be used to include all people
who fnd themselves outside of their country of origin and/or nation-
ality, regardless of their reason to migrate. The term migrant, when
used in this general way, will also include refugees and asylum-seekers.
However, when certain rights or situations apply only to certain catego-

22
General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR,
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 2009, para. 17. See also, General Comment No. 16, The
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights,
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, para. 5. Similarly the Human Rights Com-
mittee has noted that discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination
on other grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. See, General Comment No. 28, Equality
of rights between men and women (article 3), CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10,
29 March 2000, para. 30; General Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures,
CEDAW, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 2004, para. 12.

23
Article 3.1, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (emphasis added).

24
GA resolution No. 50/150, UN Doc. A/RES/50/150, 9 February 1996, Article 3. See also,
GA resolutions No. 51/73, UN Doc. A/RES/51/73, 12 February 1997; No. 52/105, UN Doc.
A/RES/52/105, 11 February 1998; No. 53/122, UN Doc. A/RES/53/122, 10 February 1999;
No. 56/136, UN Doc. A/RES/56/136, 15 February 2002; No. 49/172, UN Doc. A/RES/49/172,
24 February 1995.

25
GMG, Statement of the Global Migration Group on the Human Rights of Migrants in Irregular
Situation, op. cit., fn. 1

26
A useful reference in regard to the latter are the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application
of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identi-
ty, March 2007, available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf (Yog-
yakarta Principles). The Principles were developed by the ICJ and the International Service
for Human Rights, and were unanimously adopted during an expert meeting in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, 69 November 2006.
ries of migrants, these will be referred to by more specifc terms such
as refugees, asylum-seekers or migrant workers.
IV. The Legal Framework
Human rights are rights to which all persons, without exception, are en-
titled. Persons do not acquire them because they are citizens, workers,
or have any other status. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) affrmed in 1948 that all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.
27
The legal framework which this Guide applies is the universal framework of
international human rights law, applicable to all human beings, contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These treaties are sup-
plemented by regional human rights instruments of general breath: the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) and its Protocols and the Revised European Social
Charter (ESCr) in the Council of Europe system; the American Declaration
on Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM), the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR) and its Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), for the Inter-American sys-
tem; the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights for the African
one; and the Arab Charter on Human Rights for the Arab system.
Other specifc human rights treaties further elaborate the framework
for the respect, protection, promotion and fulfllment of the human
rights of specifc categories of people or address specifc human rights,
many of which are of signifcant for some or all migrants. These include,
at a global level, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) and its Protocols; the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the International Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT); and the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED). These treaties are
supplemented by many other global and regional treaties and stan-
dards, considered throughout the Guide.
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) is the hu-
man rights treaty elaborating particular standards addressed to migrant

27
Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
workers and members of their families. It has not yet been widely rat-
ifed, and none from the most developed countries are party to it.
28

These treaties constitute the backbone of the analysis of the specifc
human rights issues which are addressed by the Guide.
A basic principle of international human rights law, which will pervade all
the Chapters of the Guide, is that States have obligations not only to
respect, but also to protect and fulfl human rights. The duty to respect
requires the State not to take action that directly violates a particular right.
The duty to protect requires the State, through legislation, policy and prac-
tice, to ensure the protection of rights, including by taking steps to prevent
third parties from violating rights. The duty to fulfl imposes on a States
obligations to facilitate, provide or promote access to human rights.
29

1. Equality and Non-Discrimination
Of paramount importance for migrants, is the international legal entitle-
ment of all human beings to the enjoyment of human rights on a basis
of equality and free from discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex,
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
30
This fundamental legal
principle is encompassed in a wide range of international and regional

28
At 10 January 2014, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) had 47 State Parties.

29
See, generally, International Commission of Jurists, Courts and Legal Enforcement of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights; Comparative Experiences of Justiciability, ICJ Human
Rights and Rule of Law Series No. 2, Geneva, 2008, pp. 4253. See also a complete descrip-
tion in The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic
and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, Communication No. 155/96, 30
th
Ordinary
Session, 1327 October 2001, paras. 4448; and, General Recommendation No. 24: Women
and Health, CEDAW, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 1999, paras. 1317. See also, Arti-
cle 6, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
2226 January 1997 (Maastricht Guidelines). The Maastricht Guidelines were adopted in an
expert conference held in Maastricht, 2226 January 1997, at the invitation of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on Human
Rights (Cincinnati, Ohio, USA) and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of
Maastricht University (the Netherlands). The instrument has been extensively employed by
the CESCR to interpret the ICESCR).

30
Articles 2.3 and 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 7
ICRMW; Article 14, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (European Convention on Human RightsECHR); Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR;
Articles 1 and 24, American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR); Articles 2 and 3, African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR); Articles 3 and Article 11 Arab Charter on
Human Rights (ArCHR). See also, General Comment No. 15, The position of aliens under the
Covenant, CCPR, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 11 April 1986, paras. 910. Article E of
the Revised European Social Charter (ESC(r)) and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) refer also to the ground of national association
with a national minority; the EU Charter additionally refers to ethnic origin, genetic fea-
tures, disability, age, and sexual orientation; the ACHR (Article 1) and the Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) (Article 3) to economic status; Article 2 ACHPR
and Article 3 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) to eth-
nic group and fortune; Article 3.1 ArCHR to physical or mental disability.
treaties.
31
It is also the subject of dedicated instruments which address
particular forms of discrimination and apply the principles of universal-
ity, non-discrimination and equality in respect of particular groups, for
example, ICERD, CEDAW, CRPD.
32

International and regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have re-
peatedly addressed the obligation on States to respect and ensure the
equal enjoyment of human rights and freedom from discrimination on
prohibited grounds.
33
They have addressed what constitutes a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination, specifying that in addition to the express
grounds listed in the treaties, the other status ground entails a num-
ber of implied grounds, including: age, disability, economic and social
status, health situation, marital status, sexual orientation and gender
identity.
34

They have also addressed the nature of States obligations to ensure
equality and non-discrimination. They have specifed that State actors
must refrain from discriminatory actions that undermine the enjoyment
of rights (duty to respect); prevent and protect against certain forms of
discrimination by private actors (duty to protect); and take positive pro-

31
See, above, fn. 30. See, furthermore, General Comment No. 18, Non-Discrimination, CCPR,
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 11 October 1989; CCPR, General Comment No. 28,
op. cit., fn. 22; CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22; CESCR, General Comment
No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25, op. cit., fn. 22; General
Recommendation No. 28 on Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, 19 October 2010; CERD, General Recommendation No. 25,
op. cit., fn. 21; General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, CAT,
UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008.
32
It has not yet been widely ratifed, and none from the most developed countries are party
to it. See also, at the regional level, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belm do Par);
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons
with Disabilities.

33
See, fn. 31. See also, for example, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocument-
ed Migrants, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 17 September 2003 (Advisory Opin-
ion on Undocumented Migrants); Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, ACommHPR,
th
Ordinary Session, 23 April 7 May 2001; Certain As-
pects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, ECtHR, Applications
Nos. 1474/621677/621691/621769/632126/64, Judgment of 23 July 1968.

34
CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 15. See also, as example, Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, IACtHR, Advi-
sory Opinion OC-4/84, 19 January 1984; Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, ACommHPR,
op. cit., fn. 33; Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, ECtHR, Application No. 33538/96, Judgment
of 28 July 2005; Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 55480/00 and
59330/00, Judgment of 27 July 2004; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, ECtHR, Applica-
tion No. 33290/96, Judgment of 21 December 1999; E.B. v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application
No. 43546/02, 22 January 2008; Young v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 941/2000,
Views of 6 August 2003; Love et al. v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 983/2001, Views
of 25 March 2003. For a thorough explanation and jurisprudence related to the ground of
sexual orientation see, International Commission of Jurists, Sexual Orientation, Gender
Identity and International Human Rights LawPractitioners Guide No. 4, Geneva, 2009.
active steps to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights (obligation
to fulfl).
35
They have affrmed that States must ensure both de facto
and de jure equality,
36
and eliminate both direct and indirect discrim-
ination. This requires that States address and prevent discrimination
in law and practice. It also necessitates that they not only eliminate
plainly discriminatory laws, policies, and practices but also ensure that
seemingly neutral measures do not have a discriminatory effect in real
terms.
37
In certain instances, States will be obliged to take account of
differences and under certain circumstances, different treatment will be
required in order to ensure substantive equality.
38
In order to correct
situations of inequality and discrimination, a State may also be required
to implement temporary special measures deemed necessary in order
to re-establish equality.
39
ICERD defnes racial discrimination as any distinction, exclusion, re-
striction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural or any other feld of public life.
40
Although differences in treat-
ment between nationals and non-nationals are permitted by Article 1.2
ICERD, discrimination in legislation, policy or practice between different
groups of non-nationals based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin would constitute a breach of the treaty.
41

35
CESCR, General Comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 1718, and 21; CESCR, General
Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 8(b); CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25,
op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 4, 78. See also, paras. 2 and 19. See, on the obligation to fulfl,
CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, The meaning and scope of special measures in the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 75
th
session, August
2009, para. 20.

36
CESCR, General Comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 7; CEDAW, General Recommenda-
tion No. 25, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 4; CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, op. cit., fn. 35,
para. 6; CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 8.

37
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 7; CESCR, General Com-
ment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 5, 1213; CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit.,
fn. 22, para. 10; General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of
health, CESCR, Un Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 19; CERD, General Recom-
mendation No. 32, op. cit., fn. 35, para. 7.

38
CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, op. cit., fn. 35, para. 8; CERD, General Recommen-
dation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 4; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25, op. cit.,
fn. 22, para. 8.

39
Article 2.2 ICERD; Article 4, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW). See also, CEDAW, General recommendation No. 25, op. cit.,
fn. 22, and CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, op. cit., fn. 35.

40
Article 1.1 ICERD.

41
See, CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18; and Gabriela Rodrguez Pizarro,
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, Annual Report 2000, op. cit., fn. 18. The
CERD has expanded on the nature of the obligations on States parties to the Conven-
tion in a number of general comments available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=6&DocTypeID=11.
CEDAW defnes discrimination against women as any distinction, ex-
clusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equal-
ity of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other feld.
42
2. Beyond International Human Rights Law
Although international human rights law constitutes the main frame-
work for the Guide, there are other bodies of international law with-
out which a Guide on the human rights of migrants would be incom-
plete. The frst of these is international refugee law embodied in the
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, and
its Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees of 1967 (altogether, the
Geneva Refugee Convention), and supplemented by regional instru-
ments and standards. International refugee law is considered in partic-
ular in Chapter 1 of the Guide.
As violations of labour rights are a common feature of the migration
experience, the Conventions negotiated under the auspices of the
International Labour Organisation are addressed in Chapter 6. Finally,
mention will also be made of other two bodies of law which concern mi-
grants in specifc situations: one is international criminal law related to
traffcking and smuggling, which will be dealt with briefy in Chapter 1.
The other, also addressed in Chapter 1, is international maritime law,
which is of relevance for those migrants who try to reach their destina-
tion by sea.
V. A Guide for Practitioners: limits and benefts
The Guide has admittedly certain limitations. First, it presents a snap-
shot of an area of law in constant and dynamic development. It address-
es some recent developments and principles which are not yet clearly
established in international law, but it does not speculate or make rec-
ommendations on the many points where standards and jurisprudence
may progress further. As the Guide is aimed at practitioners, it presents
the established law and principles which will be of most use in practice
before national or international courts or tribunals, or in making legal
arguments in regard to proposed laws or policies. In setting out the cur-

42
The Committee has expanded on the nature of the obligations on States parties to the Con-
vention in a number of general recommendations available at http://www2.ohchr.org/eng-
lish/bodies/cedaw/comments.htm. See also, Article 3 ICCPR; Article 3, International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); Articles 1 and 2 CEDAW; CESCR,
General Comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 1 and 10; CESCR, General Comment No. 20,
op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 2, 3, 4 and 20.
rent state of international human rights law, it is intended to provide a
tool to further develop national and international law protections of the
human rights of migrants.
Secondly, the Guide focuses on human rights issues and standards that
are generally of most relevance to the migration process and to the
circumstances and treatment of migrants. It by no means addresses all
aspects of the migration experiencewhich can differ signifcantly be-
tween countries or regionsnor does it deal comprehensively with every
human rights violation that migrants may experience. Instead it aims to
synthesise and clarify international standards on key issues, in partic-
ular: the rights and procedures connected to the way migrants enter a
country and their status in the country of destination (Chapter 1); the
human rights and refugee law obstacles to the carrying out of expulsion
of migrants (Chapter 2); the human rights and refugee law rights linked
to expulsion procedures (Chapter 3); the rights and guarantees for ad-
ministrative detention of migrants (Chapter 4); the respect, protection
and promotion of certain economic, social and cultural rights of partic-
ular concern to migrants, such as the right to education, to the highest
attainable standard of health, to adequate housing, to water, to food,
and to social security (Chapter 5); and the rights connected to work and
labour (Chapter 6). Amongst the issues which the Guide does not deal
with, for example, are those of racial and ethnic hatred, hate speech
and xenophobia, and the issue of extradition procedures, which pertain
more to the domain of criminal cooperation, although the principles
presented in Chapter 2 will also be generally applicable to extradition.
The Guide aims to have a global scope, in drawing on the jurispru-
dence of all international and regional human rights systems, although
it is notable that on some issues, there is a preponderance of ECHR
case-law, since many migration matters have been litigated extensively
before the European Court, leading to a very detailed jurisprudence.
However, there are themes, such as that of labour rights, where the
infuences of international labour law and of the Inter-American system
are dominant. It is hoped that jurisprudence from regional systems
should also be useful to practitioners in countries outside that region,
as comparative precedent and in illustrating the development of inter-
national human rights principles.
The Guide does not, for practical reasons, draw on the vast and valuable
comparative national jurisprudence relating to human rights and migra-
tion. Neither is it possible for the Guide to analyse comprehensively the
impact of European Union law, in both protecting and at times restrict-
ing the rights of migrants in EU Member States, although key EU legal
instruments and principles are described. It does not address the par-
ticular situation of citizens of EU Member States, who under the Treaty
on the European Union (TEU) are European citizens, and enjoy freedom
of movement and residence in the EU, without particular procedures
and subject to very few conditions. This notwithstanding, in consider-
ation of the fact that EU law presently binds 28 States, the Guide pro-
vides some summaries of the most relevant EU immigration legislation
applying to nationals of non-EU Member States. This will be of particular
use to those lawyers who have to litigate in a EU Member State, as the
provisions of EU law are directly applicable in those countries.
VI. A Guide to make rights real
Regardless of its limitations, this Guide has been written as a practical
means to enhance the human rights of migrants, to assist in freeing
them from the limbo of legal process. As outlined above, international
law is a powerful tool for change. It is for lawyers, activists, and legal
practitioners to use it to provide tangible rights to migrants. To do this,
they need the best possible understanding of the international human
rights standards relevant to migrants and the means to claim their re-
spect or implementation at the national and international level. This is
what this Guide hopes to provide: a tool to empower migrants and their
representatives to make migrants rights a reality and to create effec-
tive systems of domestic redress for violations of their human rights. It
aims to contribute towards ending that second-class status of migrants
which, in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affr-
mation that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights, cannot be accepted.
CHAPTER 1: ENTRY, STAY AND STATUS
OF MIGRANTS
This Chapter addresses the rights of different categories of migrants
related to entry and stay on the territory of a foreign State. Part I ad-
dresses general principles related to entry of migrants to the jurisdic-
tion. Part II considers specifc statuses or situations which confer rights
to enter or remain on the territory, and/or additional procedural rights
or rights to protection or support.
I. Entry and stay on the territory
1. Rights to enter and remain
As a general principle of international law, it is at the discretion of the
State to grant entry to its territory to non-nationals. However in exer-
cising control of their borders, States must act in conformity with their
international human rights obligations.
43
In certain specifc categories
of cases, States may be required by international law to permit a mi-
grant to enter or remain: where a migrant meets the criteria for refugee
status, or complementary protection; or where entry to the territory
is necessary for purposes of family reunifcation. These categories are
considered below in Section II.
2. When someone enters: issues of jurisdiction
The key to the responsibility of a State to protect the rights of a migrant
(as of any other person) is whether the person is subject to the juris-
diction, i.e. the space or persons over which a State has authority and
for which the State is therefore internationally responsible. This follows
from the basic principle of international human rights law that States
must guarantee, secure and protect the human rights of everyone with-

43
Maurice Kamto, UN Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Third report on
the expulsion of aliens, UN Doc. A/CN.4/581, 19 April 2007 (ILC Third Report), paras. 2 and
7. See also, Boffolo case (Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, 1903), UNRIAA, vol. X,
p. 531; Paquet case (Belgian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, 1903), UNRIAA, vol. IX,
p. 325; Moustaquim v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 12313/86, Judgment of 18 February
1991, para. 43; Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 13163/87
13164/8713165/8713447/8713448/87 Judgment of 30 October 1991, para. 102; Cha-
hal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996,
para. 73; Ahmed v. Austria, ECtHR, Case No. 71/1995/577/663, Judgment of 17 December
1996, para. 38; Boughanemi v. France, ECtHR, Case No. 16/1995/522/608, Judgment of
24 April 1996, para. 41; Bouchelkia v. France, ECtHR, Case No. 112/1995/618/708, Judgment
of 29 January 1997, para. 48; and H. L. R. v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 24573/94,
Judgment of 29 April 1997, para. 33; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom,
ECtHR, Plenary, Case No. 15/1983/71/107109, Judgment of 24 April 1985, para. 67; Union
Inter-Africaine des Droits de lHomme (UIADH) and Others v. Angola, ACommHPR, Communi-
cation No. 159/96, 22
nd
Ordinary Session, 11 November 1997.
in their jurisdiction,
44
irrespective of nationality. Such jurisdiction is not
identifed solely with a States territory. The frst question to be an-
swered when a migrant arrives in a foreign State is therefore whether
they have indeed entered the State. In most cases, this will be clear:
the person will be considered to have entered the State when he or she
accesses its territory. It has also been clearly established that the mi-
grant is within the jurisdiction of the State when he or she is present in
an international zone or zone dattente of an airport.
45
However, the term jurisdiction has a wider reach than the national ter-
ritory of the State. It applies to all persons who fall under the authority
or the effective control of the States authorities or of other people acting
on its behalf, and to all extraterritorial zones, whether of a foreign State
or not, in a range of contexts. These include situations where the State
exercises effective control over all or part of a territory or persons; some
situations where it has effectively extended its jurisdiction by bringing
about forseeable effects in another territority; or where it may be required
by under an international obligation to to so extend its jurisdiction.
46
The
European Court of Human Rights has found that jurisdiction has extra-

44
Article 2.1 ICCPR; Article 2.1 CRC; Article 7 ICRMW; Article 1 ECHR; Article 1.1 ACHR;
Article 3.1 ArCHR.

45
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, Case No. 17/1995/523/609, Judgment of 20 May 1996, paras. 5253.

46
See, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on State Par-
ties to the Covenant, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, paras. 1011;
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, CCPR, Communication No. R 12/52, Views of 6 June 1979; Celiberti
de Casariego v. Uruguay, CCPR, Communication No. 56/1979, Views of 29 July 1981. See also,
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
ICJ, Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, paras. 180 and 216; Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 109; Case Concerning the Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia Montenegro), ICJ, Judgment, 26 February 2007 No. 91 [2007] ICJ 1; Application of
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia
v. Russian Federation), ICJ, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, ICJ Reports 2008,
p. 353; Victor Saldao v. Argentina, IACHR, Petition, Report No. 38/99, Admissibility Decision,
11 March 1999, para. 17; Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States of America, IACHR,
Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Merits, 13 March 1997 (Haitian Interdictions Case); Coard
et al v. United States, IACHR, Case 10.951, Report no 109/99, Merits, 29 September 1999,
para. 37; Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, IACHR, Request for Precautionary Measures,
13 March 2002, para. 532; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda,
ACommHPR, Communication 227/1999, 33
rd
Ordinary Session, May 2003; CAT, General Com-
ment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 31, paras. 7 and 16; Concluding Observations on USA, CAT, UN Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 18 May 2006, para. 15; Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, ECtHR, Ap-
plication No. 39473/98, Admissibility decision, 11 January 2001; Women on Waves and Others
v. Portugal, ECtHR, Application No. 31276/05, Judgment of 3 February 2009; Loizidou v. Tur-
key, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment of 18 December 1996; Issa and Others v.
Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 31821/96, Judgment of 16 November 2004, para. 66; Al-Skeini
and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July
2011, paras. 133142; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 27765,
23 February 2012, paras. 7382. See also, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations
of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29 February 2012, available at
http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Maastricht-ETO-Principles-
ENG- booklet.pdf; and their commentary available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/
wp-content/ uploads/2012/12/HRQMaastricht-Maastricht-Principles-on-ETO.pdf.
territorial reach
47
in a number of distinct situations. This includes cases
where the State exercises effective control of an area outside its borders
(e.g. in the case of military occupation where effective control of an area
can be shown).
48
It also includes situations where agents of the State
acting, either lawfully or unlawfully, outside the States territory, exercise
authority or control over an individualfor example, where someone is
held in detention, or is within fring range of the States forces in a border
zone.
49
Therefore, a State may have obligations to respect and protect
the rights of persons who have not entered the territory, but who have
otherwise entered areas under the authority and control of the State, or
who have been subject to extra-territorial action (such as detention) by a
State agent who has placed them under the control of that State.
Of particular relevance for migrants is the fact that the States jurisdic-
tion may extend in certain situations to international waters. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission)
has found that returning asylum-seekers, intercepted on the high seas, to
their country of origin, suffered a violation of their right to seek asylum in
a foreign country, as protected by the American Declarations of the Rights
and Duties of Man (ADRDM) and the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR).
50
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights has held that measures of interception of boats, including on the
high seas, attract the jurisdiction of the State implementing the intercep-
tion. From the moment of effective control of the boat, all the persons on
it fall within the jurisdiction of the intercepting State, which must secure
and protect their human rights.
51
The same principles apply in the context
of operations of rescue at sea, as will be discussed in Section II.6.
3. Human rights in the entry process
As outlined above, it is a basic principle of human rights law that States
human rights obligations are owed to all within its jurisdiction, regard-

47
See, Issa and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; calan v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Applica-
tion No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005; Illich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, ECommHR,
Application No. 28780/95, Admissibility Decision, 24 June 1996; Pad and Others v. Turkey,
ECtHR, Application No. 60167/00, Admissibility Decision, 28 June 2007; Isaak and Others v.
Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 44587/98, Admissibility decision, 28 September 2006; Xha-
vara and Others v. Italy and Albania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; and, Women on Waves cases,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46,
paras. 133142: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 7382.
48
Loizidou v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
GC, op. cit., fn. 46.

49
Solomou and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 36832/97, Judgment of 24 June
2008, paras. 5051.

50
Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 156, 157 and 163.

51
See, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 7782; Medvedyev
and Others v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 3394/03, Judgment of 29 March 2010,
paras. 6267.
less of nationality. From the moment migrants enter the States juris-
diction, territorial or extraterritorial, the State has a duty to respect all
their human rights and to protect them from impairment of their rights
from third parties that may occur in the entry process, or in the case of
irregular migrants, on their interception on entry to the territory. This
means that, for example, irregular migrants entering or attempting to
enter the territory must not be arbitrarily deprived of life by agents of
the State;
52
and that the State has positive obligations to take measures
within its power to protect migrants from arbitrary deprivation of life or
ill-treatment by third parties, including private actors, on entry to the
territory (for example in cases of traffcking or smuggling). This means
that where irregular migrants are apprehended by the authorities, they
must not be subjected to physical or psychological treatment amounting
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, including the
use of excessive physical restraint, or excessive and inappropriate body
searches, or compulsory medical testing, and that their rights to health
and adequate food while in detention must be guaranteed.
Nevertheless, international human rights law affords limited procedural
protection to migrants entering a country: in particular, the right to a
fair hearing is unlikely to apply to decisions on entry to the territory. It
has been expressly excluded by the European Court of Human Rights
in relation to decisions regarding other aspects of immigration control,
53

while the UN Human Rights Committee has left the question open.
54

Granting of entry must not infringe the protection from discrimination on
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
55
This pro-
tection is enshrined in Article 2.1 ICCPR, read together with Article 13
ICCPR and Article 26 ICCPR (general clause on non-discrimination) as
well as in other universal and regional human rights treaties.
56
Both

52
This also applies to migrants in border zones who have not yet entered the territory but are
close enough to be within its agents authority and control and therefore within its jurisdic-
tione.g. within fring range of border guardssee, Solomou and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 49.

53
Maaouia v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 39652/98, Judgment of 5 October 2000, para. 37.

54
Adu v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 654/1995, Views of 28 December 1994.

55
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30. See, Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other
Mauritian women v. Mauritius, CCPR, Communication No. 35/1978, Views of 9 April 1981
(Mauritian Women Case), on discrimination based on sex.

56
The principle of non-discrimination is enshrined in Article 2.1 UDHR; Articles 2.1 and 26 ICCPR;
Article 2.2 ICESCR; Article 1 ICERD; Article I CEDAW; Article 2.1 CRC; Article 1.1 ICRMW; Arti-
cle 4, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); Article 14 ECHR; Article E,
ESC(r); Article II, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM); Article 1.1
ACHR; Article 3, Protocol of San Salvador; Article 2 ACRWC. However, the principle of non-dis-
crimination does not mean that the State cannot differentiate among different categories of
migrants when there is a reasonable ground of justifcation, e.g. the need to hire people of
a certain expertise instead of others. See further, in relation to discrimination in expulsion,
Chapter 3 section II.1.e., and, CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, paras. 910.
the UN Human Rights Committee
57
and the European Court of Human
Rights
58
have found that legislation which limited the right of free ac-
cess to the destination country and immunity from deportation to the
wives of male citizens, and not the husbands of female citizens, violated
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex (Articles 2 ICCPR
and 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)), and the rights of the countrys
female citizens to family life (Articles 17 ICCPR and 8 ECHR) and to
the equal enjoyment of human rights (Article 3 ICCPR). It is also worth
noting the case of Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, in which the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that laws differentiating between
refugees who had married before leaving their country of origin and
those who had married afterwards, for the purpose of family reunifca-
tion, constituted an unjustifed discrimination and, therefore, violated
Article 14 ECHR in connection with Article 8 ECHR. The Court, in taking
this position, accepted that in permitting refugees to be joined by pre-
fight spouses, the [State] was honouring its international obligations.
However, where a measure results in the different treatment of persons
in analogous positions, the fact that it fulflled the States international
obligation will not in itself justify the difference in treatment.
59

II. Categories and status of migrants
Notwithstanding the right of the State to control its borders, certain sit-
uations or legal statuses confer rights to enter or remain on the territory.
Others, while not leading to a right to enter or remain, confer particular
rights or obligations of protection. This Section describes two types of sta-
tus which migrants may seek to establish in order to secure leave to enter
or remain: refugee status, and the status resulting from family reunifca-
tion with a migrant already present in the destination State. The procedur-
al rights connected with establishing these statuses and the substantive
rights conferred by their establishment are considered. In addition, this
Section addresses situations which are recognised as making migrants
particularly vulnerablein particular, human traffcking and smuggling
and therefore giving rise to some additional rights of protection of migrants.
1. Refugee status
The international right to seek asylum was frst recognised in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which states in Article 14.1 that everyone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from perse-

57
Mauritian Women Case, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 55.

58
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43.

59
Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 22341/09, Judgment of
6 November 2012, para. 55.
cution.
60
While not enshrining a right of asylum, the Geneva Convention
relating to the status of refugees of 1951, read together with its Additional
Protocol of 1967 (Geneva Refugee Convention), contains a set of rights
and entitlements that follow from the recognition of refugee status. The
Convention provides a quasi-universal defnition of refugee in Article 1A.2
according to which a refugee is a person who owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Although the right of asylum is not guaranteed by binding international
human rights law treaties at a global level, the right is protected in sev-
eral regional instruments. The American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man protects the right, in Article XXVII, to seek and receive
asylum. The ACHR, in Article 22.7, protects the right to seek and be
granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation
of the State and international conventions, in the event he is being
pursued for political offenses or related common crimes. Despite the
seemingly more liberal reference to a right to seek and receive or be
granted asylum, the Inter-American Commission has stressed that this
right implies no guarantee that it will be granted.
61
However, it does
assure the right to be heard in presenting the asylum application and
other procedural guarantees discussed below.
62
The Commission has
generally interpreted these provisions in light of the Geneva Refugee
Convention.
63
The meaning of asylum under the American Convention
and Declaration may also include the other forms of asylum recognised
in several Inter-American Conventions on the subject.
64

60
See, Guy S. Goodwin-Gil, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2
nd
Edition,
1998, p. 175; and Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees and The Right To Enjoy Asylum,
17 Intl J. Refugee L. 293 (2005), p. 299. Within the European Union, the right of asylum is en-
shrined in Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter).

61
Report on the situation of human rights of asylum seekers within the Canadian refugee de-
termination system, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev., 28 February 2000 (IACHR,
Report on Canada), para. 60.

62
Ibid.

63
Desmond McKenzie and Others v. Jamaica, IACHR, Cases 12.02312.04412.10712.126
12.146, Report No. 41/00, Merits, 13 April 2000, para. 229; Donnason Knights v. Grenada,
IACHR, Case 12.028, Report No. 47/01, Merits, 4 April 2001, para. 111; Haitian Interdictions
Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 151163.

64
Convention on Territorial Asylum, OAS, A-47, adopted on 28 March 1954; Convention on
Diplomatic Asylum, OAS, A-46, adopted on 28 March 1954; Treaty on Asylum and Political
Refuge, adopted on 4 August 1939; Convention on Political Asylum, OAS, A-37, adopted
on 26 December 1933; Convention on Asylum, adopted on 20 February 1928, at the Sixth
International Conference of American States. Due to the limited number of States and reach
of subject-matter of these conventions, they will not be dealt with in this Guide.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights also recognises the
right of asylum in Article 12.3: Every individual shall have the right,
when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accor-
dance with the law of those countries and international conventions. The
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (African Commission)
has held that this right should be read as including a general protection
of all those who are subject to persecution, that they may seek refuge in
another state.
65
The Commission has not yet offered an interpretation
of the right to obtain asylum contained in the Charter.
Article 28 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ArCHR) recognises only
a right to seek political asylum in another country in order to escape
persecution, while the ECHR contains no mention of the right of asylum.
a) When someone is a refugee
A person falls within the defnition of a refugee from the moment he or
she meets the criteria of Article 1A.2 of the Geneva Refugee Convention.
A determination by the State to grant refugee status is not a deter-
mination of the status, but only its formal recognition.
66
Therefore, a
refugee attains such status even before the State of asylum provides
the refugee with relevant documentation or ensures that the status is
affrmed under domestic laws and procedures, although the protection
of his rights afforded by the Geneva Refugee Convention will be limited
until the State determines whether the refugees situation fulfls the
Conventions defnition. The Geneva Refugee Convention recognises a
range of rights of the refugee, which will be considered in different
chapters of this Guide, and whose protection depends on the recogni-
tion of refugee status.
67

For refugee status to be recognised under the Geneva Refugee
Convention, the following criteria must apply:

65
Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture (OMCT) and Others v. Rwanda, ACommHPR, Com-
munications No. 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, 20
th
Ordinary Session, October 1996.

66
See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNCHR, Geneva, Sep-
tember 1979 (UNHCR Handbook), para. 28. The OAU Convention Governing the Specifc
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee Convention) seems to contrast to this
universal regime as it establishes in its Article 1.6 that it is apt to the State of asylum to
determine whether an applicant is a refugee. Nevertheless, as the Convention declares that
it is complementary to the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees of 1951,
read together with its Additional Protocol of 1967 (Geneva Refugee Convention) (Preamble,
para. 9; Article 8.2), determine must be interpreted as recognition and not as granting of
refugee status.

67
The OAU Refugee Convention generally recognises more limited rights than the Geneva
Refugee Convention. Its protection regime cannot, therefore, substitute that of the older
Convention, apart for those people falling under the defnition of Article 1.2 of the OAU Refu-
gee Convention who are not contemplated by the Geneva Refugee Convention, or for States
which have ratifed the OAU Refugee Convention but not the Geneva Refugee Convention or
its Additional Protocol.
1. a well-founded fear of persecution;
2. the persecution must be for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
3. the person must be outside the country of his or her nationality
or, if stateless, outside the country of his or her former habitual
residence;
4. the person must be unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to
avail him or herself of the protection of that country.
i) Well-founded fear of persecution
The requirement of well-founded fear includes a subjective examination
(that the individual personally has fear) and an objective one (that the
fear is well-founded). The frst criterion will depend on the subjective
situation of the person and therefore will need to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. The second criterion will require an examination
of the factual circumstances alleged and also a consideration of the
individual case and person alleging the fear, as different persons face
different risks depending on their situation, and will have different rea-
sons for a fear to be well-founded.
68
Persecution is an evolving concept under international law. While no
general defnition of persecution is available, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has identifed some general categories of situa-
tions that will amount to persecution (the list is not exhaustive):
a threat to life or liberty on account of one of the listed grounds;
other serious infringements of human rights on account of one of
those grounds;
69
discrimination leading to consequences of a substantially prejudi-
cial nature for the person concerned, such as serious restrictions
on the right to earn his/her living, right to practice his/her religion,
or access to normally available educational facilities;
discriminatory measures not amounting as such to persecution,
but that produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of
apprehension and insecurity as regards his/her future existence;
criminal prosecution or fear of it for one of the grounds enlisted in
the refugee definition or excessive punishment or fear of it for a
criminal offence.
70

68
See, for more detail, UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, paras. 3750.

69
This concept is not defned in international human rights law. The UNHCR Handbook provides
a non-exhaustive list and is likely to develop over time.

70
See, UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, paras. 5160.
ii) Grounds of persecution
Persecution must have a causal link with one of the grounds listed in
the refugee defnition, set out below. As recalled by the UNHCR, it is
suffcient that the Convention ground be a relevant factor contributing
to the persecution; it is not necessary that it be the sole, or even dom-
inant cause.
71
It is possible that different grounds will overlap and that
a refugee might claim asylum based on more than one ground. It is
not necessary that the person actually possesses the characteristics for
which he or she is being persecuted, only that these characteristics are
imputed to them by their persecutors.
Race: this term has to be understood broadly as including not only
strictly race, but also colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.
72

Furthermore, it may entail members of a specifc social group of com-
mon descent forming a minority within a larger population. International
human rights law, in particular ICERD, is based on a similarly broad no-
tion of race, and the Geneva Refugee Convention should be interpreted
in light of this. Racial discrimination is an important element in estab-
lishing persecution.
73

Religion: this term is considered to have three possible different man-
ifestations, which are not cumulative conditions. It includes a belief
(conviction or values about the divine or ultimate reality or the spiritual
destiny of humankind, including atheism); an identity (as membership
of a community that observes or is bound together by common beliefs,
rituals, traditions, ethnicity, nationality or ancestry); or a way of life
(where religion manifests in certain activities as wearing of particular
clothing, observance of particular practice).
74

Nationality: this term is not to be understood merely as citizenship.
It refers also to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group
75
and in-
cludes national origin and statelessness.
Membership of a particular social group: The term social group should
be interpreted as having fuid and evolving content. A social group may
be country specifc or may be defned with reference to international

71
Guidelines on International Protection: The application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Conven-
tion and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to victims of traffcking and
persons at risk of being traffcked, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/06/07, 7 April 2006, para. 29
(UNHCR Guidelines on victims of traffcking).

72
See, Declaration and Action Programme on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, para. 2.

73

74
See, for more information, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based Refugee
Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/04/06, 28 April 2004 (UNHCR Guidelines on
Religion-Based Refugee Claims); see also, UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, paras. 7173.

75
human rights law. To identify a social group, UNHCR adopts the follow-
ing standard: a particular social group is a group of persons who share
a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or
who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be
one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental
to identity, conscience or the exercise of ones human rights.
76
As out-
lined in more detail below in Box No. 1, women, who face persecution
related to their sex or gender, will constitute a particular social group for
the purposes of refugee status. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
individuals who face discrimination on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity will also qualify as members of a particular social
group. The size of the group is not a relevant element.
77
Political opinion: The individual must hold an opinion that either has
been expressed, has come to the attention of the authorities, or in re-
spect of which there there is a reasonable possibility that the authorities
will become aware, nonetheless.
78
It might also be that the person is
persecuted because perceived by the authorities to hold a certain po-
litical opinion.
Box 1. Persecution Based on Sex and Gender
Women not only face persecution, as men do, on grounds of
race, religion, nationality and political opinion, but such perse-
cution may also give rise to sex or gender specifc impacts or
may disproportionately affect women. Women may also suffer
forms of persecution because they are women i.e. persecution
because of sex or gender.
Such persecution may arise from State laws, policies and
practices that discriminate against women, and violate their
human rights. Examples include: legal guardianship regimes
marked by lack of equal legal status; national laws that crimi-
nalise sex outside marriage and/or adultery; laws which crim-
inalise certain female dress or conduct; discriminatory laws
regarding child custody and employment; coercive sexual and
reproductive health policies and practices (e.g. forced abor-
tions and sterilisation); and criminalisation of health-care in-
terventions only women need. In addition, women may face

76
Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of a particular social group within the
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, 7 May 2002 (UNHCR Guidelines on Member-
ship of a particular social group), para. 11.

77
See for more, ibid. See also, UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, paras. 7779.

78
See, ibid., paras. 8086.
gender or sex-specifc persecution as a result of the actions
of non-State actors and the failure of a State to effectively
prohibit and prevent such conduct. Examples include harmful
practices against women and girls, sexual violence; domestic
violence; honour crimes; workplace violence and harassment
and deprivation of liberty.
Sex-specifc or gender-based persecution is not an ex-
plicit ground for refugee status under the Geneva Refugee
Convention. However it is clear that persecution of a woman
related to her sex or gender may, if the other criteria are
met, entitle her to refugee status under the Convention. The
UNCHR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution explore this
matter in depth and set out the ways in which treatment or
circumstances faced by women or which has gender-specifc
consequences will constitute persecution for the purposes of
the Convention.
79
As noted above, where a woman faces per-
secution as a result of her sex or gender, she will constitute
a member of a particular social group (i.e. women) for the
purposes of the Convention. The size of the group or a lack of
cohesion are irrelevant. Moreover, the risk of the persecution
in question does not need to exist for all members.
In gender related claims, the persecution feared could be for
one or more of the Convention grounds. For example, per-
secution on the basis of religion would arise where a woman
risks certain consequences as a result of her failure to adhere
to religious views which ascribe particular roles to men and
women, or entrench gender stereotypes.
80
Where conduct of a non-State actor is the source of the perse-
cution concerned, any assessment of the ability or willingness
of a State to offer effective protection and/or of the person
concerned to receive the protection must take sex or gender

79
Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution with the context of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees, UNHCR, UN Doc, HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002 (UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Re-
lated Persecution). The box is a short summary of the UNHCR Guidelines. See also, Conclu-
sion No. 73 (XLIV) Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, Executive Committee, UNHCR,
44
th
Session, 1993, para. (d); Conclusion No. 77 (XLVI) General, Executive Committee,
UNHCR, 46
th
Session, 1995, para. (g); Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII) General, Executive Com-
mittee, UNHCR, 47
th
Session, 1996, para. (o); Conclusion No. 105 (LVII) Women and Girls at
Risk, ExCom, UNHCR, 57
th
Session, 2006, para. (n)(iv); Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) Refugee
Women and International Protection, ExCom, UNHCR, 36
th
Session, 1985. See also, Recom-
mendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection
of women against violence, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
(CMCE) on 30 April 2002 at the 794
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Appendix, Article 72.

80
Ibid., paras. 2326.
specifc factors into account. For example, internal relocation
alternative must not be applied in a manner that fails to take
account of gender or sex specifc factors.
81
iii) Persecution by non-State actors
Persecution may originate not only from State action, but also from that
of non-State actors under circumstances indicating that the State was
unwilling or unable to offer protection against the threatened perse-
cution.
82
In the case of non-State actors, in particular, the causal link
must satisfy one of these two tests:
There is a real risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-
State actor for reasons which are related to one of the Convention
grounds, whether or not the failure of the State to protect the
claimant is Convention related; or
The risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is
unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwilling-
ness of the State to offer protection is for Convention reasons.
83
Box 2. Persecution on grounds of sexual orientation or
gender identity
Sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI)
84
may be rele-
vant to a refugee claim when the person concerned fears per-
secutory harm on account of it. Guidance on the determination
of asylum claims based on these grounds are to be found in
the UNCHR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution,
85
and,
more extensively, in the UNHCR Guidelines on International
Protection on Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual
Orientation and/or Gender Identity and the UNHCR Guidance

81
For detailed information on this concept see: Guidelines on International Protection: Internal
Flight or Relocation Alternative within the Context of Article 1.A.2 of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04,
23 July 2003 (UNHCR Guideleins on Internal Flight and Relocation Alternative).

82
UNHCR, Agents of Persecution, UNHCR Position, 14 March 2005, para. 4. See also, UNHCR
Handbook, op. cit., fn., para. 66; Concluding Observations on France, CCPR, Report
of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, 52
nd
Session, Vol. I, UN Doc.
A/52/40 (1997), para. 408; Recommendation 1440 (2000) Restrictions on asylum in the
Member States of the Council of Europe and the European Union, Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE), para. 6.

83
See, UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a particular social group, op. cit., fn. 76, para. 23.

84
The defnition of sexual orientation and gender identity may be found in the Yogyakarta
Principles, op. cit., fn. 26.

85
UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, op. cit., fn. 79.
Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity.
86
Discrimination, lack of protection or direct repression of people
on grounds of their sexual orientation may amount to persecu-
tion, when this comes from the State or the State is unable or
unwilling to protect against it. The fear of persecution may result
from criminal laws prohibiting, directly or indirectly, same-sex
consensual relationships. The law may be persecutory per se
when it is not in conformity with international human rights stan-
dards.
87
Penalisation may also be disguised through targeted
prosecutions for other criminal offences. If the well-founded fear
arose sur place, for example because the concerned person has
come out in the foreign country, that person might qualify for
refugee status if he or she can demonstrate a well-founded fear
of future persecution in the country of origin. Furthermore, if
LGBT persons are consistently denied access to normally avail-
able services, such as education, welfare, health, court, etc., or
if they feel forced to conceal their own orientation for fear of
reprisals, this may give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution.

86
UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection no. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual
Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09,
23 October 2012 (UNHCR Guidelines on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity); and UNHCR
Guidance on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, UNHCR Protec-
tion Policy and Legal Advice Section, Division of International Protection Services, 21 November
2008 (UNHCR Guidance on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity).

87
M.I. v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 2149/2012, Views of 25 July 2013, para. 7.5: the
existence of such law [criminalizing homosexual acts] by itself fosters the stigmatization of
LGTB-individuals and constitutes an obstacle to the investigation and sanction of acts of perse-
cution aginst these persons. The Court of Justice of the European Union, however, took, a di-
vergent position, in relation to the granting of refugee status in X, Y and Z v. Minister voor Im-
migratie en Asiel, CJEU, C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, Judgment of 7 November 2013:
1. Article 10(1)(d) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for
the qualifcation and status of third-country nationals or Stateless persons as refugees or as
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted
must be interpreted as meaning that the existence of criminal laws, such as those at issue in
each of the cases in the main proceedings, which specifcally target homosexuals, supports
the fnding that those persons must be regarded as forming a particular social group. 2. Arti-
cle 9(1) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 9(2)(c) thereof, must be interpreted
as meaning that the criminalisation of homosexual acts per se does not constitute an act of
persecution. However, a term of imprisonment which sanctions homosexual acts and which is
actually applied in the country of origin which adopted such legislation must be regarded as
being a punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory and thus constitutes an act of
persecution. 3. Article 10(1)(d) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 2(c) thereof,
must be interpreted as meaning that only homosexual acts which are criminal in accordance
with the national law of the Member States are excluded from its scope. When assessing an
application for refugee status, the competent authorities cannot reasonably expect, in order
to avoid the risk of persecution, the applicant for asylum to conceal his homosexuality in his
country of origin or to exercise reserve in the expression of his sexual orientation, The In-
ternational Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International have criticized the ruling of the
Luxembourg court. See, http://www.icj.org/eu-court-ruling-a-setback-for-refugees/.
It is important to stress that claims for asylum cannot be dis-
missed on the basis that the applicant could avoid persecution
by changing or concealing his or her sexual orientation or gen-
der identity.
Convention Grounds. Asylum claims based on sexual orien-
tation or gender identity are generally considered under the
membership of a particular social group ground.
88
The same
claims have also been found to be able to fall in certain cir-
cumstances under the grounds of political opinion, particu-
larly in countries where, for example, same sex relationships
are viewed as contrary to the core of the countrys policy, and
religion where the attitude of religious authorities towards
LGBT people is hostile or discriminatory or where being LGBT
is seen as an affront to religious belief.
b) Refugees rights
The Geneva Refugee Convention guarantees a certain number of rights,
which refect human rights law protections, whose applicability differs
according to the situation of the refugee in the territory, his or her legal
presence or recognition of refugee status. It is important to stress, as
will be seen throughout this Guide, that international human rights law
grants protection of the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees wider
than that of the Geneva Refugee Convention. Furthermore, whenever
international human rights law affords wider protection, it should pre-
vail, and the provisions of the Geneva Refugee Convention should be
interpreted in light of rights under international human rights law.
The Convention recognises for all refugees present on the States terri-
tory, regardless of means of entry or status, the prohibition of non-dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion or country of origin in the ap-
plication of the Convention (Article 3); the freedom to practice religion
and freedom as regards the religious education of children equal to that
accorded to the States nationals (Article 4); the State obligation to
issue an identity paper (Article 27); and the protection of the principle
of non-refoulement (Article 33). To the same group of people apply the
right to equal participation in rationing systems (Article 20), and the
right to primary education (Article 22.1) on an equal basis with nation-
als of the State; and property rights (Article 13) and the right to access
secondary and tertiary education (Article 22.2) which are equated to
the level of protection afforded to non-nationals.

88
See, UNHCR Guidance on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, op. cit., fn. 86,
paras. 4050; and UNHCR Guidance on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, op. cit.,
fn. 86 para. 32.
A limited number of rights under the Convention are accorded to refu-
gees who are lawfully present on the States territory, albeit not neces-
sarily resident or with a durable status, such as might be the case for
students or visitors. These are the right to self-employment (Article 18)
and the right to freedom of movement (Article 26), which are enjoyed
on an equal basis with foreign nationals; and expulsion procedural
rights (Article 32), which apply to the refugee.
The majority of rights recognised by the Convention are applicable
to refugees who are lawfully staying in the State of refugee, or, in
the French version, rsident(s) rgulirement. This implies a situ-
ation of stable and durable residence. These rights are the right to
travel documents (Article 27), which is a right specifc for refugees;
and the right to equal treatment as nationals for the right to public
relief and assistance (Article 23) and labour and social security rights
(Article 24). Furthermore, the following rights are to be enjoyed on an
equal basis with foreign nationals: the right of association, which is
limited to non-political and non-proft making associations and trade
unions (Article 15); the right to engage in wage-earning employment
(Article 17) and in liberal professions (Article 19); and the right to hous-
ing (Article 21).
The right to access to courts (Article 16) and artistic and industrial
property rights (Article 14) have a peculiar dimension as they must be
respected by all Contracting States to the Geneva Refugee Convention.
Their enjoyment must therefore be guaranteed on an equal footing with
nationals by the country of habitual residence, while all other States
must respect them in the same way as they would do with nationals
of the country of habitual residence of the refugee. The defnition
of the term habitual residence is not clear. It has been interpreted
as signifying more than a stay of short duration, but was apparently
not intended necessarily to imply permanent residence or domicile.
89

However, the fact that it has been used residually only in these articles
suggests that it does not require lawful presence onto the territory.
However, it will be diffcult to demonstrate habitual residence without
lawful presence.
c) When a refugee is not a refugee: cessation and exclusion
clauses
International refugee law provides for conditions and situations under
which a person ceases to be recognised as a refugee or because of
which it is forbidden to recognise someone as a refugee. These are
called respectively cessation and exclusion clauses.

89
Goodwin-Gil, The Refugee in International Law, op. cit., fn. 60, p. 310.
i) Cessation of refugee status
According to Article 1C of the Geneva Refugee Convention, the
Convention ceases to apply when:
The refugee has voluntarily re-availed him or herself of the pro-
tection of the country of his nationality; or
Having lost his or her nationality, the refugee has voluntarily re-
acquired it; or
The refugee has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the pro-
tection of the country of his or her new nationality; or
The refugee has voluntarily re-established him or herself in the
country which he or she left or outside which he or she remained
owing to fear of persecution; or
The refugee can no longer, because the circumstances in connec-
tion with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have
ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail of the protection of the
country of his or her nationality or residence, unless there are com-
pelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to
avail of the protection of the country of nationality or residence.
90

While the application of the cessation clauses rests with the State,
91
the
UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom) has set forth strict conditions
which it considers must apply to their application:
Changes in the country of origin or nationality must be of fundamental
character, stable and durable, i.e. of such a profound and enduring na-
ture that international protection becomes uncalled for;
92
The fundamental character must be established objectively and in a
verifable way and must include the general human rights situation, as
well as the particular cause of fear of persecution;
93
The decision of cessation must be on the individual case. All refugees af-
fected by group or class decisions must have the possibility to have the
application of cessation clauses in their cases reconsidered on grounds
relevant to their individual case.
94

90
The OAU Refugee Convention includes two other reason for cessation of refugee status, tak-
en from the exclusion clauses, which are: (f) he has committed a serious non-political crime
outside his country of refuge after his admission to that country as a refugee, or (g) he has
seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of this Convention (Article 1.4, OAU Refugee
Convention).

91
Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII) Cessation of Status, ExCom, UNHCR, 43
rd
Session, 1992, Pream-
ble, para. 2.

92
Conclusion No. 65 (XLII) General, ExCom, UNHCR, 42
nd
Session, 1991, para. (q).

93
Conclusion No. 69, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 91, para. (a).

94
Ibid., para. (d). See also, paras. (b) and (c).
The UNHCR documents and the ExCom conclusions and recommenda-
tions, although they do carry binding force, provide the only comprehen-
sive and authoritative guidance on refugee status determination proce-
dures (RSDPs), and have been followed in State practice and by national
courts, in particular considering that UNHCR has a duty to supervise
the application of the Geneva Refugee Convention under its Article 35.
95

ii) Exclusion from refugee status
Article 1F of the Geneva Refugee Convention lists grounds for automatic
exclusion from recognition of refugee status. These occur when there
are serious reasons for considering that:
The person seeking refugee status has committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect
of such crimes (Article 1F(a));
96
He or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge prior to admission to that country as a refugee
(Article 1F(b));
He or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations (Article 1F(c)).
97
Although national practice increasingly tends to widen the circum-
stances in which these criteria apply (a tendency strengthened in the
European Union (EU), for example, by Article 12.2 of the EU Qualifcation
Directive
98
; see, Box No. 3 below) it is well established in international
standards that the exclusion clauses must be applied restrictively.
99

95
Cecilie Schjatvet, The making of UNHCRs guidance and its implementation in the national
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden, Hestenes og Dramer & Co.,
Research report for the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, 2010, Chapter 3.

96
See, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on
9 December 1948; the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War
and the two 1977 Additional Protocols; the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribu-
nal (the London Charter), and most recently the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal
Court which entered into force on 1 July 2002 (Rome Statute).

97
The OAU Refugee Convention adds the exclusion clause of when he has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organisation of African Unity (Article 1.5(c)).

98
Directive 2011/95/EC of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualifcation of third country
nationals or stateless persons as benefciaries of international protection, for a uniform status
for refugees and for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the pro-
tection granted (recast), EU, Offcial Journal L 337/9, 20/12/2011 (EU Qualifcation Directive).

99
UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 149. See also, Guidelines on International Protection:
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003 (UNHCR Guidelines
on Application of the Exclusion Clauses), para. 2; Recommendation Rec(2005)6 of the Commit-
tee of Ministers to Member States on exclusion from refugee status in the context of Article 1 F
of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, adopted by the CMCE on
23 March 2005 at the 920
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, paras.1 (a), (b) and (g), and 2.
On the particular exclusion clause of non political crime, the UNHCR
clarifed that, [i]n determining whether an offence is non-political or
is, on the contrary, a political crime, regard should be given in the frst
place to its nature and purpose i.e. whether it has been committed out
of genuine political motives and not merely for personal reasons or gain.
There should also be a close and direct causal link between the crime
committed and its alleged political purpose and object. The political
element of the offence should also outweigh its common-law charac-
ter. This would not be the case if the acts committed are grossly out of
proportion to the alleged objective. The political nature of the offence is
also more diffcult to accept if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.
100

It is also important to recall that, [f]or a crime to be regarded as polit-
ical in nature, the political objectives should be consistent with human
rights principles.
101

On a procedural level, exclusion decisions should in principle be consid-
ered during the regular refugee status determination procedure and not
at the admissibility stage or in accelerated procedures. They should be
part of a full factual and legal assessment of the whole individual case.
The UNHCR has established the rule that inclusion should generally be
considered before exclusion.
102
There may be exceptions to the rule
when there is an indictment by an international criminal tribunal; when
there is apparent and readily available evidence pointing strongly to-
wards the asylum-seekers involvement in particularly serious crimes;
or in the appeal stage where the application of the exclusion clauses
is the issue to be considered.
103
UNHCR has recalled that [e]xclusion
should not be based on sensitive evidence that cannot be challenged by
the individual concerned.
104
Finally, it must be recalled that people who have been denied refugee
status under an exclusion clause or whose status has ceased can always
avail themselves of the protection from expulsion assured by the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement under the Geneva Refugee Convention and
international human rights law (see, Chapter 2).

100
UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 152. See also, UNHCR Guidelines on Application of
the Exclusion Clauses, op. cit., fn. 99, paras. 1416; Recommendation Rec(2005)6, CMCE,
op. cit., fn. 99, para. 1 (d). For the defnition of group subject to persecution see, Recom-
mendation Rec(2004)9 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the concept of
membership of a particular social group (MPSG) in the context of the 1951 Convention re-
lating to the status of refugees, adopted by the CMCE on 30 June 2004, at the 890
th
meeting
of the Ministers Deputies.

101
See, UNHCR Guidelines on Application of the Exclusion Clauses, op. cit., fn. 99, para. 15.

102
Ibid., para. 31.

103
Ibid., para. 31.

104
Ibid., para. 36 (emphasis in the original text).
Box 3. The Court of Justice of the European Union on
exclusion clauses and terrorist acts
In European Union (EU) law, the Directive 2011/95/EU
of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualifcation of
third-country nationals or stateless persons as benefciaries of
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees and
for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the con-
tent of the protection granted (the Qualifcation Directive),
like its predecessor Council Directive 2004/83/EC, contains
the same grounds for exclusion from refugee status as the
Geneva Refugee Convention.
105
The Directive, however, ex-
pands the exclusion ground of serious non-political crimes,
by specifying that particularly cruel actions, even if commit-
ted with an allegedly political objective, may be classifed as
serious non-political crimes.
106
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held
that terrorist acts are to be regarded as serious non-polit-
ical crimes and as acts contrary to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations, hence excluding from refugee
status people implicated in these acts.
107
The case concerned
a question by a German Court asking whether a person who
had been a member of an organisation included in the UN
Terrorists List, under Security Council resolution 1267(1999),
was to be considered as automatically falling within the exclu-
sion clauses for refugee status. The Court held that the mere
fact of membership does not automatically constitute a seri-
ous reason for considering that that person has committed a
serious non-political crime or acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
108
The Court has furthermore specifed that, while the exclusion
from refugee status is not conditional on the person con-
cerned representing a present danger
109
to the hosting State,
the authorities must undertake an assessment on a case-
by-case basis of the specifc facts, with a view to determining
whether the acts committed by the organisation concerned
meet the conditions laid down [in the exclusion provisions]

105
Article 12, EU Qualifcation Directive, op. cit., fn. 98.
106
Article 12.2(b), ibid.
107
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), GC,
Joined cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Judgment of 9 November 2010, paras. 8186.

108
Ibid., para. 1.

109
Ibid., para. 2.
and whether individual responsibility for carrying out those
acts can be attributed to the person concerned.
110
Finally, the Court held that, in this assessment, the authorities
must, inter alia, assess the true role played by the person
concerned in the perpetration of the acts in question; his po-
sition within the organisation; the extent of the knowledge he
had, or was deemed to have, of its activities; any pressure to
which he was exposed; or other factors likely to have infu-
enced his conduct.
111
Box 4. Are victims or potential victims of human
traffcking refugees?
Victims or potential victims of human traffcking are not en-
titled to refugee status solely on the grounds that they have
been traffcked. In certain cases, however, the fear of traf-
fcking or re-traffcking once returned to ones country of ori-
gin might be grounds to claim protection as a refugee, when
this fear is linked with one of the Geneva Refugee Convention
grounds. The principles related to victims or potential victims
of traffcking and refugee status are described in the UNCHR
Guidelines on victims of traffcking.
112

Human traffcking often involves forms of forced labour, ser-
vitude or slavery, and exploitation which would amount to
persecution including the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude
or the removal of organs.
113
In addition a traffcked person
might fear reprisals by traffckers or re-traffcking if returned
to his or her country of origin, which might amount to perse-
cution if it involves certain human rights violations or abuses.
Traffcked persons might also fear ostracism, discrimination or
punishment by their family or the local community or State
authorities upon return. A victims family members might also

110
Ibid., para. 1.

111
Ibid., para. 97.

112
UNHCR Guidelines on victims of traffcking, op. cit., fn. 71.

113
See, Article 3(a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffcking in Persons Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, adopted and opened for signature, ratifcation and accession by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 (UN Traffcking Protocol); and Article 4,
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Traffcking in Human Beings, adopted on
16 May 2005 (Council of Europe Traffcking Convention).
be subject to reprisals, making the victims fear of reprisal
well-founded.
Important in the case of victims or potential victims of traf-
fcking is the place of persecution. To fulfl the refugee def-
nition of the Geneva Refugee Convention, the well-founded
fear of persecution must be demonstrated with regard to the
country of nationality or habitual residence. This may be es-
tablished when someone has been, or fears to be, traffcked in
that country. However, even in cases in which a persons pre-
vious experience of traffcking occurred wholly outside of the
country of nationality or habitual residence, the structure of
the traffcking experience and organisation might mean that
their fear of traffcking would also extend to their country of
origin.
As traffcking is predominantly a commercial enterprise, the
diffculty will lie in establishing a causal link with a Convention
ground, as the primary motive for the traffcking will be proft.
However, it must be recalled that the Convention ground must
not necessarily be the sole or the dominant contributing factor
to persecution and a causal link will often be established. For
example in some situations:
Race, Religion, Nationality, Political opinion: risks of
traffcking, re-traffcking and/or reprisals, or a lack of relevant
State protection, may arise because a person is a member of
a particular racial, ethnic, religious or national group, or holds
or is perceived to hold certain political opinions.
Membership of a particular social group: Certain kinds of
traffcking might target particular social groups. For example
in certain societies, some groups, such as, for example, sin-
gle women, widows, divorced women, separated and unac-
companied children, orphans or street children, may face an
increased risk of traffcking as they are easier targets, while
often women may be at risk of traffcking for the purposes of
sexual exploitation because of their status as women. Former
victims of traffcking may also constitute a social group. In
this last case it is the past traffcking experience which would
constitute one of the elements defning the group, and not the
threat or fear of future persecutions.
114

114
See UNHCR Guidelines on victims of traffcking, op. cit., fn. 71, paras. 3839.
d) Procedure for recognition of refugee status
The Geneva Refugee Convention does not contain explicit protections
for procedural rights in the recognition of refugee status. Such stan-
dards are set out in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook)
115

and in conclusions and recommendations of the UNHCR ExCom.
International human rights law imposes few binding obligations in re-
lation to procedures for the determination of refugee status, with the
exception of obligations of non-discrimination in such procedures. The
procedural human rights protections attaching to decisions to remove
from the territory, which may be consequent on refusals of refugee
status, are considered in Chapter 3. However, it should also be noted
that failure to apply fair procedures in the consideration of an asylum
application may lead to violations of the right of non-refoulement and
the right to an effective remedy in respect of that right. In Jabari v.
Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights held that the automatic
application of a fve-day time limit for registering a claim for asylum,
which denied the applicant any scrutiny of her fear of ill-treatment fol-
lowing expulsion, and the subsequent failure of the appeal court to con-
sider the substance of those fears, meant that her deportation would
violate Article 3 ECHR, as well as the right to an effective remedy under
Article 13 ECHR.
116

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stressed the
need for predictable procedures and consistency in decision-making at
each stage of the process. It has recognised the right to a hearing to
determine whether an asylum seeker meets the criteria for refugee sta-
tus, and the right to appeal of the frst asylum decision.
117
Furthermore,
the Commission held, in the case of John Doe and Others v. Canada,
that to guarantee the right to seek asylum enshrined in the American
Declaration (Article XXVII) every Member State has the obligation to
ensure that every refugee claimant has the right to seek asylum in
foreign territory, whether it be in its own territory or a third country
to which the Member State removes the refugee claimant. To the ex-
tent that the third countrys refugee laws contain legal bars to seeking
asylum for a particular claimant, the Member State may not remove
that claimant to the third country. To ensure that a refugee claimants

115
UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66.

116
Jabari v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 40035/98, Judgment of 11 July 2000, paras. 3942.

117
IACHR, Report on Canada, op. cit., fn. 61, para. 52. See, on the right to have a hearing or
interview, ibid., para. 109; Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 153;
John Doe et al. v. Canada, IACHR, Case 12.586, Report No. 78/11, Merits, 21 July 2011,
para. 92: it is the act of hearing the person that implements the most fundamental element
of the right to seek asylum.
right to seek asylum under Article XXVII is preserved, before removing
a refugee claimant to a third country, the Member State must conduct
an individualized assessment of a refugee claimants case, taking into
account all the known facts of the claim in light of the third countrys
refugee laws. If there is any doubt as to the refugee claimants ability
to seek asylum in the third country, then the Member State may not
remove the refugee claimant to that third country.
118
The Council of Europe Guidelines on human rights protection in the
context of accelerated asylum procedures, set out comprehensive
standards that apply where both procedural and substantive rights are
particularly likely to be jeopardised by fast-track procedures.
119
The
Guidelines stipulate that throughout the proceedings, decisions must
be taken with due diligence (Guideline VIII) and provide that even in
accelerated procedures, asylum seekers must have a reasonable time
to lodge their application, and there must be suffcient time to allow for
a full and fair examination of the case (Guideline IX).
i) Fair procedures
UNHCR guidance prescribes that all requests for asylum be dealt with
objectively and impartially, that the confdential character of asylum
requests should be respected. It stipulates that cases should be de-
cided on the merits: failure to comply with formal requirements of the
procedure, such as time limits, should not in itself lead to an asylum
request being excluded from consideration.
120
Applicants should receive
necessary information and guidance on the refugee recognition pro-
cedure;
121
and should be informed of their right to legal advice and,
where necessary, interpretation.
122
All facilities necessary for submit-
ting the applicants case to the authorities should be provided, including
interpretation and the opportunity, of which applicants should be duly
informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR.
123
The applicant should
be given a personal interview by a fully qualifed offcial and, whenever
possible, by an offcial of the authority competent to determine refugee

118
John Doe et al. v. Canada, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 117, para. 94.

119
Guidelines on human rights protection in the context of accelerated asylum procedures, adopt-
ed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 1 July 2009 at the 1062
nd
meet-
ing of the Ministers Deputies (European Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures).

120
Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) Refugees Without an Asylum Country, ExCom, UNHCR, 30
th
Ses-
sion, 1979, para. (i).

121
Conclusion No. 8 (XXVIII) Determination of Refugee Status, ExCom, UNHCR, 28
th
Session,
1977, para. (e)(ii); UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 192(ii). See also, Concluding
Observations on Croatia, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/3, 11 June 2004, para. 9(i); European
Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline IV.1.c.

122
Conclusion No. 8, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 121, para. (e)(ii); European Guidelines on accelerated
asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guidelines IV and VIII.3.

123
Ibid., para. (e)(iv); UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 192(iv). See also, European
Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline XIV.
status.
124
A basic principle in the UNHCR guidance is that, whatever re-
strictive measures States might implement, for example to discourage
abusive use of asylum procedures, these should not serve to defeat the
purpose of the asylum procedure.
125

Once a frst instance decision is taken, if the asylum seeker is rec-
ognised as a refugee, he or she should be informed accordingly and is-
sued with documentation certifying his or her refugee status.
126
UNHCR
guidance states that an appeal to an administrative or judicial authority
of a refusal of refugee status should be available, that there should be
adequate time to lodge such an appeal, and that the applicant should
be permitted to remain in the country while the appeal is pending.
127

This latter requirement is refected in international human rights law re-
quirements that appeals against removals from the jurisdiction should
have suspensive effect (see, Chapter 3).
ii) Non-discrimination and special measures
Both international refugee law (Article 3, Geneva Refugee Convention)
and international human rights law require that the procedure for status
determination should not be discriminatory. For example, the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has found unreasonable dif-
ferential treatment in decisions on refugee status as regards persons
of different nationalities to be in violation of ICERD.
128
Obligations of
non-discrimination and equality, not only require the State refrain from
direct discrimination, but also take proactive steps to ensure substan-
tive equality in status determination. As a result procedures must be
designed to take account of, and respond to, factors such as the sex,
age, and circumstances of particular individuals. For example, as out-
lined in the UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, particu-
lar safeguards must be put in place for women asylum seekers. These
include among other things: separate interviews from family members;

124
Conclusion No. 30 (XXXIV) The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications
for Refugee Status or Asylum, ExCom, UNHCR, 34
th
Session, 1983, para. (e)(i); UNHCR
Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 190. See also, European Guidelines on accelerated asylum
procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline IV.1.d; Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR,
op. cit., fn. 46, para. 155.

125
Conclusion No. 79, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 79, para. (l).

126
Conclusion No. 8, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 121, para. (e)(v); UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66,
para. 192(v).

127
Ibid., para. (e)(vi) and (vii); UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 192(vi) and (vii).

128
See, Concluding Observations on Costa Rica, CERD, Report of the Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly, 57
th
Session, UN Doc. A/57/18 (2002),
p. 21, para. 79; Concluding Observations on Lithuania, CERD, Report of the Committee
on Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly, 57
th
Session, UN Doc.
A/57/18 (2002), p. 35, para. 175; Concluding Observations on Sudan, CERD, Report of the
Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly, 56
th
Session,
UN Doc. A/56/18 (2001), p. 41, para. 215; Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46,
paras. 177178.
the ability to make separate claims for refugee status; the availability of
female interviewers and staff; assurances of confdentiality; open-end-
ed questioning that enables gender or sex-specifc issues to emerge;
gender-sensitive assessment of credibility and risk; recourse to exter-
nal and objective expertise and evidence.
129

The Council of Europe Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in the
Context of Accelerated Asylum Procedures recommend that vulnerabili-
ties related to age, disability or experience of torture, sexual violence or
traffcking should be taken into account in deciding whether to impose
accelerated asylum procedures, and if they are applied, should condi-
tion the manner of their application.
130
UNHCR Guidance states that
in procedures for the determination of refugee status, asylum-seekers
who may have suffered sexual violence must be treated with particular
sensitivity.
131
iii) The burden and standard of proof
Generally, in an asylum procedure, the burden of proof is discharged
by the applicant rendering a truthful account of facts relevant to the
asylum claim.
132
However, the UNHCR has pointed out that while the
burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain
and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and
the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to
use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in
support of the application.
133

As to the standard of proof, UNHCR guidance states that the author-
ities need to decide if, based on the evidence provided as well as the
veracity of the applicants statements, it is likely that the claim of that
applicant is credible.
134
To establish well-foundedness of a fear of
persecution, persecution must be proved to be reasonably possible.
135

129
Similar recommendations have been made by the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women in Concluding Observations on Belgium, CEDAW, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/BEL/CO/6, 7 November 2008, para. 37. CEDAW has underlined in its General
Comment No. 30 that female asylum seekers from confict- affected areas can face gen-
dered barriers to asylum, as their narrative may not ft the traditional patterns of persecu-
tion, which have been largely articulated from a male perspective, General Recommenda-
tion No. 30 on women in confict prevention, confict and post-confict situations, CEDAW,
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30, 18 October 2013, para. 56.

130
European Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guide-
line III.

131
Conclusion No. 73, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 79, para. (g).

132
Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, UNHCR, Geneva, 16 December
1998, para. 6.

133
UNHCR Handbook, op. cit., fn. 66, para. 196.

134
Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 132, para. 8.

135
Ibid., paras. 1617.
The authorities should undertake an analysis of the situation in the
country of origin in order to determine the well-foundedness of the fear
of persecution. The UNHCR Excom considers that the situation must be
assessed on an individual level, and that the use of safe countries lists
must not be blind and automatic.
136

iv) Minors and particular protection for unaccompanied minors
The CRC is the only universal human rights treaty expressly addressing
questions of refugee protection. Under Article 22 of the Convention,
States must take particular measures to ensure that asylum procedures
provide appropriate protection to children.
137
The Convention recognis-
es the principle of the best interests of the child (Article 3) which must
be the primary consideration in any measure which affects or might
affect a childs human rights. Unaccompanied minors, in particular, are
unlikely to spontaneously fle an application for asylum, and procedures
must therefore ensure that as soon as it becomes known that the child
may have a well-founded fear or be at risk of persecution, they are
referred to an asylum procedure.
138
The unaccompanied or separated
child will need the assistance of an appointed adult familiar with his
or her background who is competent and able to represent the childs
best interests (a guardian or legal representative), and should be given
access to a qualifed legal representative free of charge.
139
Applications
by unaccompanied or separated children must be given priority and
decisions must be rendered promptly and fairly. The procedure must
take into consideration the need of the child to express his or her views
freely (Article 12), and always keep as the principal standard of con-
sideration the best interest of the child (Article 3).
140
The Committee
on the Rights of the Child has published a detailed General Comment
on States obligations towards unaccompanied or separated children.
141
2. Other forms of protection under international law
Many States or regional inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) have
established, since the adoption of the Geneva Refugee Convention, an
array of other forms of protection conceived for people who do not sat-

136
Conclusion No. 87 (L) General, ExCom, UNHCR, 50
th
Session, 1999, para. (j).

137
An equivalent obligation is contained in Article 23 ACRWC.

138
General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside of
Their Country of Origin, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 September 2005, para. 66. See,
also, General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interest taken
as primary consideration, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013; and, Unaccompanied
children in Europe: issues of arrival, stay and return, PACE, Resolution No. 1810 (2011),
adopted on 15 April 2011.

139
Ibid., para. 69.

140

141
See, ibid.
isfy the defnition of refugee under that Convention, or for people who
wish to apply for or are potentially able to qualify for asylum, but for
whom the circumstances of entry to the State of refuge does not allow
them to access immediately the ordinary Refugee Status Determination
Procedure (RSDP), as in the case of a mass-infux of asylum-seekers.
In situations of mass infux, the additional protection is necessary, not
because of a defciency of refugee protection, but due to factual cir-
cumstances, which may prevent the State from providing immediate
access to the ordinary procedure for asylum. In these situations, the
principle of non-refoulement in both refugee and international human
rights law (see, Chapter 2) obliges the State to grant some form of
temporary protection, until the persons concerned can access the
refugee status determination procedure.
In some cases, persons are excluded from protection as refugees not by
the Geneva Refugee Convention itself, but by restrictive interpretation
of the Convention in the legislation or practice of the country of ref-
uge.
142
In these cases, the UNHCR ExCom has held that people should
be recognised as refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention and
that complementary forms of protection should not be used to under-
mine the Convention protection.
143
There are, however, other circumstances where persons in need of
protection fall outside the defnition of refugee in the Geneva Refugee
Convention.
144
These include people who are victims of the indiscrimi-
nate effects of violence in confict situations,
145
or persons who cannot
be expelled from the country of destination in light of the international
human rights law principle of non-refoulement (see, Chapter 2), but
who do not fall within the refugee defnition. The UNHCR ExCom defnes
protection offered to people in these situations as complementary
forms of protection.
146

There are situations where neither international human rights law nor
the Geneva Refugee Convention requires protection, but where the
State has devised systems of protection for humanitarian or com-
passionate reasons, such as serious health risks or destitution by ex-

142
See, Complementary Forms of Protection: Their Nature and Relationship to the International
Refugee Protection Regime, UNHCR, Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.18, 9 June 2000, paras. 79. See
also, Ruma Mandal, Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (Complemen-
tary Protection), in UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Department of
International Protection, UNCHR, UN Doc. PPLA/2005/02, June 2005, paras. 1920, pp. 89.

143
See, Conclusion No. 103 (LVI) Provision on International Protection Including Through Com-
plementary Forms of Protection, ExCom, UNHCR, 56
th
Session, 2005, paras. (b) and (k).

144
Ibid., para. 2.

145
See Complementary Forms of Protection: Their Nature and Relationship to the International
Refugee Protection Regime, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 142, paras. 1011.

146
See, Conclusion No. 103, UNCHR, op. cit., fn. 143.
treme poverty in case of return. Although varied terminology is used in
national legislation, these will be referred to as discretionary forms
of protection. These forms of protection, although sometimes in-
spired by international human rights law, are in general not mandated
by it and remain at the discretion of the State. However, the existence
of crises such as famine, or natural disasters, which have an impact
on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, might trigger
the obligations of all States to provide international cooperation for de-
velopment and thus for the realisation of economic, social and cultural
rights
147
which includes providing assistance to refugees and internally
displaced persons.
148
These situations might, in certain circumstances,
oblige the State to grant some form of temporary protection to the
persons affected.
a) Temporary Protection
Temporary protection constitutes, in the words of UNCHR, a specifc
provisional protection response to situations of mass infux providing
immediate emergency protection from refoulement,
149
without formal-
ly according refugee status. The term temporary protection is used in
certain States to describe legal regimes including other forms of pro-
tection, such as in cases of people feeing war or other crises. In this
Guide, the defnitions provided by the UNHCR will be adopted, but the
principles described here may also apply to different domestic regimes.
The need for States to apply this protection comes from the obligation of
non-refoulement both under international refugee law and international
human rights law (see, Chapter 2). It is not a complementary form of
protection to the Geneva Refugee Convention. It is a kind of interim
protection for people who may prima facie qualify as refugees, but
whose conditions of arrival mean that they cannot proceed immediately
through an ordinary RSDP.
In these situations, the ExCom has established that persons seeking
asylum should always receive at least temporary refuge,
150
and [t]hey
should be admitted without any discrimination as to race, religion, po-
litical opinion, nationality, country of origin or physical incapacity.
151

147
See, General Comment No. 3, The nature of States Parties obligations, CESCR, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 14 December 1990, para. 14.

148
See, inter alia, General Comment No. 12, The right to adequate food, CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 38; General comment No. 15, The right to water,
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para. 34; CESCR, General Comment
No. 14, op. cit., fn. 37, para. 40.

149
Conclusion No. 103, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 143, para. l.

150
Conclusion No. 15, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 120, para. (f).

151
Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situation of Large-Scale Infux,
ExCom, UNHCR, 32
nd
Session, 1981, para. (II-A-1).
In particular, they should not be penalized or exposed to any unfavour-
able treatment solely on the ground that their presence in the country
is considered unlawful; they should not be subjected to restrictions on
their movements other than those which are necessary in the interest
of public health and public order.
152
Box 5. Temporary Protection in the European Union
The Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on mini-
mum standards for giving temporary protection in the event
of a mass infux of displaced persons and on measures pro-
moting a balance of efforts between Member States in re-
ceiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof
(the Temporary Protection Directive) sets out procedures to
provide immediate and temporary protection, in the event of a
mass infux or imminent mass infux of displaced persons from
third countries who are unable to return to their country of or-
igin. In particular, the procedure will be triggered when there
is a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this
infux without an adverse effect on its effcient operation, in
the interests of the person concerned and other persons re-
questing protection.
153
The benefciaries of this protection are displaced persons, i.e.
third country nationals or stateless persons who had to leave
their country or region of origin or have been evacuated, in
particular in response to an appeal by international organisa-
tions, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions
because of the situation prevailing in that country and who
may fall within the scope of Art. 1A of the Geneva Convention
or other international or national instruments giving interna-
tional protection.
154
This defnition includes, amongst others,
persons who have fed areas of armed confict or endemic
violence and persons at serious risk of, or who have been the
victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human
rights.
155

152
Ibid., para. (II-B-2(a)).

153
See, Article 2(a), Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards
for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass infux of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons
and bearing the consequences thereof, EU, Offcial Journal L 212, 07/08/2001 p. 00120023
(EU Temporary Protection Directive).

154
Article 2(c), ibid.

155
Article 2(c), ibid.
It is the EU institutions, in particular the Council of the
European Union, which decides whether a situation of mass
infux exists and, by so doing, introduces the obligation for
the Member States to grant temporary protection.
156
Once the
decision is issued, Member States may grant this protection
to additional categories of displaced persons where they are
displaced for the same reasons and from the same country or
region of origin.
157
Temporary protection lasts for one year and may be extended
automatically by six monthly periods for a maximum of one
year unless it is terminated before.
158
The Council can extend
the period by up to one more year.
159
This protection provides
the same exclusion clauses as apply to refugee status.
160
b) Complementary Forms of Protection
Several instruments, all of regional scope, provide a defnition of refu-
gee wider than that in the Geneva Refugee Convention and therefore
offer protection which is complementary to that of the Convention.
Article 1(2) of the OAU Convention Governing the Specifc Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee Convention) extends refugee
protection to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupa-
tion, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in
either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is com-
pelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
In the Americas region, the Cartagena Declaration includes in the refu-
gee defnition persons who have fed their country because their lives,
safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, for-
eign aggression, internal conficts, massive violation of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.
161
The
Declaration, while not refecting treaty obligations, has been endorsed

156
Under the Directive, temporary protection is to be applied to a particular situation following
a decision of the Council when it determines, by Qualifed Majority, on the proposal of the
Commission, that a situation of mass infux exists: Article 5, ibid.

157
Article 7, ibid.

158
Article 4.1, ibid.

159
Article 4.2, ibid.

160
See, Article 28, ibid.

161
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protec-
tion of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, at Cartagena, Colombia, 1922
November 1984, para. III.3.
and implemented in national legislation by many Latin American States.
It has been endorsed by the Organisation of American States (OAS),
by UNHCRs Excom and by the Conference of the States Parties to the
Geneva Refugee Convention.
162
Certain Asian and African countries,
which are parties to the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation,
may derive elements of their legislation from the Revised Bangkok
Declaration which includes within its defnition of refugee every person,
who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitu-
al residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country
of origin or nationality.
163
In EU law, the EU Qualifcation Directive (see,
Box No. 6) grants complementary protection (known in the Directive as
subsidiary protection) to people facing serious and individual threat
to a civilians life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situ-
ations of international or internal armed confict.
164
Finally, some people, who cannot return to their country because of
non-refoulement concerns under human rights law, are nonetheless left
unprotected by the Geneva Refugee Convention or the regional instru-
ments described above. In these situations, certain regional organisa-
tions, like the EU, as well as national laws have afforded them other
complementary forms of protection.
Box 6. The EU approach: subsidiary protection
Within the European Union, the Directive 2011/95/EC of
13 December 2011 on standards for the qualifcation of third
country nationals or stateless persons as benefciaries of in-
ternational protection, for a uniform status for refugees and
for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the con-
tent of the protection granted (recast) (the EU Qualifcation
Directive) establishes that international protection be granted
not only to refugees but also to persons eligible for subsidiary
protection. Subsidiary protection is granted to third country
nationals or stateless persons not qualifying for refugee sta-
tus but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to
his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless per-

162
See, OAS General Assembly Resolution 1273 (XXIV0/94) of 10 June 1994; Conclusion
No. 77, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 79; 2001 Ministerial Declaration of States Parties to the 1951
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol.

163
1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees, adopted on 24 June 2001 at
the Aalcos 40
th
session, New Delhi, Article I.2 (Revised Bangkok Declaration).

164
Article 15, EU Qualifcation Directive, op. cit., fn. 98.
son, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would
face a real risk of suffering serious harm [. . .], and is unable,
or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of that country.
165
Under the Directive, serious
harm includes, frst, sentencing to the death penalty or exe-
cution; second, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in the country of origin; and third, serious and
individual threat to a civilians life or person by reason of in-
discriminate violence in situations of international or internal
armed confict.
166
The frst two grounds for subsidiary protection correspond to
traditional grounds for non-refoulement according to interna-
tional human rights law, although the limitation of subsidiary
protection for torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment to refoulement to the country of origin, and not
also to third countries where the individual may be at risk,
means that it falls short of the protection offered by inter-
national law (see, Chapter 3). The third ground corresponds
to the grounds for refugee protection provided by the OAU
Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration (see, su-
pra). It has been interpreted by the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Justice as meaning that the existence of
a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an ap-
plicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condi-
tion that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specif-
cally targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal
circumstances.
167
Furthermore, the Court has specifed that
the existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered
to be established where the degree of indiscriminate violence
characterising the armed confict taking placeassessed by
the competent national authorities before which an applica-
tion for subsidiary protection is made, or by the courts of a
Member State to which a decision refusing such an application
is referredreaches such a high level that substantial grounds
are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant
country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would,
solely on account of his presence on the territory of that coun-
try or region, face a real risk of being subject to that threat.
168

165
Article 2(f), ibid.

166
Article 15, ibid.

167
Meki and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECJ, GC, Case C-465/07, Judgment
of 17 February 2009.

168
Ibid.
It is important to stress that there are many situations in which people
who in practice are granted complementary forms of protection by na-
tional authorities would actually fall within the defnition of refugee of
the Geneva Refugee Convention, as properly understood. The UNHCR
has given at least three examples:
Persons who fear persecution by non-State actors and who are
asylum-seekers in countries which do not recognise refugee sta-
tus for this kind of persecution;
Persons who flee persecution from conflict areas and are treated
as victims of indiscriminate violence when in reality the conflict or
the violence is rooted in one of the Conventions grounds;
Persons who suffer gender-related or sexual orientation based
persecution where the State does not recognise such grounds as
valid under the Convention.
169
This list is not exhaustive, but demonstrates that in many cases comple-
mentary protection may be used or abused to bypass the States obliga-
tions under the Geneva Refugee Convention. In these cases, the UNHCR
ExCom has held that people should be recognised as refugees under
the Geneva Refugee Convention and that complementary forms of pro-
tection should not be used to undermine the Convention protection.
170

Indeed, if a State does not recognise as a refugee a person who would
satisfy the requirements for refugee status according to the Geneva
Refugee Convention and the UNHCR guidance, but instead grants him
or her only a complementary form of protection, failure to afford that
person the same rights and guarantees provided to recognised refu-
gees, would lead to a breach of the Geneva Refugee Convention.
Furthermore, in such situations, where complementary forms of protec-
tion are applied instead of Geneva Refugee Convention protection in cas-
es of gender or sex specifc forms of persecution or other persecution
which predominantly affects women (such as persecution originating from
non-State actors), the acknowledgment of weaker protection to those
afforded complementary protection, may violate the principle of non-dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of the right of asylum
171
and the right of
equal protection of the law
172
under international human rights law.

169
See, Complementary Forms of Protection: Their Nature and Relationship to the International
Refugee Protection Regime, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 142, para. 8.

170
See, Conclusion No. 103, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 143, paras. (b) and (k).

171
Article II read together with Article XXVII ADRDM; Article 1.1 read together with Article 22.7
ACHR; Article 2 read together with Article 12.3 ACHPR; Article 4.2(g), Protocol to the ACHRP
on the Rights of Women in Africa.

172
Article 26 ICCPR; Article 15.1 CEDAW; Article 24 ACHR; Article 3 ACHPR; Article 8, Protocol
to the ACHRP on the Rights of Women in Africa; Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR (ratifed by
only 18 States at 9 February 2011)
Persons granted complementary protection must beneft from guaran-
tees under international human rights law applicable to non-nation-
als.
173
In this regard, the UNHCR ExCom has encouraged States, in
granting complementary forms of protection to those persons in need
of it, to provide for the highest degree of stability and certainty by en-
suring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of such persons
without discrimination, taking into account the relevant international
instruments and giving due regard to the best interest of the child and
family unity principles.
174

As to the procedure to determine whether someone is entitled to com-
plementary protection, the UNCHR ExCom has recommended establish-
ing a comprehensive procedure to assess both refugee status and other
international protection needs, so that refugee protection would not be
undermined by the granting of complementary protection.
175
Regarding
the cessation of complementary protection, the same body recommend-
ed that States draw guidance from the refugee criteria, and adopt cri-
teria which are objective and clearly and publicly enunciated.
176
c) Discretionary Forms of Protection
Some States have provisions allowing them to grant in a discretion-
ary way protection for humanitarian or compassionate reasons.
In certain cases they may arise from the obligations of States under
Article 1(C)(5) of the Geneva Refugee Convention which excludes the
cessation of the application of the Convention for a refugee [. . .] who
is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution
for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nation-
ality.
177
In other cases, they are used by the State as systems of pro-
tection for those situations of impossibility of expulsion or rejection of
the person on international human rights law grounds (see, Chapter 2,
Section III), when those situations are not expressly considered by the
domestic system of complementary protection. Finally, these forms of
protection are also used to cover situations which generally do not rely
on an international law obligation for their application. In such cases,
the need for protection might be inspired by international human rights
law, but the granting is at the discretion of the State. These last situa-
tions may occur, for example, in cases of serious threats to the health
of the person.

173
See, Conclusion No. 103, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 143, para. n. See also Ruma Mandal, op. cit.,
fn. 142, p. xiii.

174
Ibid., para. m.

175
Ibid., para. q.

176
Ibid., para. o.

177
Article 1C(5), Geneva Refugee Convention.
Under international law, these kinds of protection cannot be used by
States to bypass or provide a substitute for refugee, supplementary,
or complementary protections. This principle is particularly important
since humanitarian or compassionate protection is generally at the
discretion of the national authorities and does not offer the same guar-
antees against its cessation as other forms of protection.
178

3. Family reunifcation and the right to respect for
family life
When a migrant reaches a relatively stable condition of residence in
a foreign State, he or she may wish to bring family members to that
State. Migration of family members raises issues of the right to respect
for family life and family reunifcation. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) provides that the family is entitled to protection
by society and the State.
179

a) Family reunifcation in international law
Express obligations of international legal protection for family re-
unifcation in the destination State are relatively scant. The Geneva
Refugee Convention does not specifcally recognise a right of refugees
to family reunifcation, although the Final Act of the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries which adopted the Convention proclaimed that the
unity of the family, the natural and fundamental group unit of society, is
an essential right of the refugee.
180

178
See, Conclusion No. 103, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 143, para. j.

179
Article 16.3 UDHR; The same principle of human rights law is enshrined in Article 23.1
ICCPR; Article 10.1 ICESCR; Article 44.1 ICRMW; Paragraph X, Preamble, CRPD; Article 16
ESC(r); Article 17.1 ACHR; Article 15.1, Protocol of San Salvador; Article 18.1 ACHPR;
Articles 18.1 and 25 ACRWC. The principle is also recognised by the UN General Assembly
in, inter alia, resolutions No. 49/182, UN Doc. A/RES/49/182, 2 March 1995, Article 2;
No. 50/175, UN Doc. A/RES/50/175, 27 February 1996, Article 2; No. 51/89, UN Doc.
A/RES/51/89, 7 February 1997, Article 2; No. 52/121, UN Doc. A/RES/52/121, 23 February
1998, Article 2; No. 53/143, UN Doc. A/RES/53/143, 8 March 1999, Article 2; No. 57/227,
UN Doc. A/RES/57/227, 26 February 2003; No. 59/203, UN Doc. A/RES/59/203, 23 March
2005, Article 2; No. 61/162, UN Doc. A/RES/61/162, 21 February 2007, Article 2. As for
the Council of Europe, the principle was recognized by the Committee of Ministers in Rec-
ommendation Rec(2002)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the legal
status of persons admitted for family reunifcation, adopted by the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe on 26 March 2002 at the 790
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies,
Preamble; and by Recommendation R(1999)23 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Family Reunion for Refugees and Other Persons in Need of International Protection,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 December 1999 at
the 692
nd
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Preamble; Resolution (78) 33 on the Reunion
of Families of Migrant Workers in Council of Europe Member States, adopted at by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 8 June 1978 at the 289
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Preamble.

180
Family Unity has been considered as a fundamental principle of international refugee law by
the UNHCR Executive Committee in, inter alia, its Conclusion No. 1 (XXVI) Establishment of
the Subcommittee and General, ExCom, UNHCR, 26
th
Session, 1975, para. (f); Conclusion
No. 7 (XXVIII) Expulsion, ExCom, UNHCR, 28
th
Session, 1977, para. (a); Conclusion No. 24
(XXXII) Family Reunifcation, ExCom, UNHCR, 32
nd
Session, 1981, para. 1.
With regard to migrant workers in a regular situation, ICRMW establish-
es that States Parties shall take measures that they deem appropriate
and that fall within their competence to facilitate the reunifcation of mi-
grant workers [in a regular situation] with their spouses or persons who
have with the migrant worker a relationship that, according to applica-
ble law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well as with their
minor dependent unmarried children. In the European human rights
system, according to the European Social Charter (revised) (ESC(r)),
Member States, which accept to be bound by Article 19 of the Charter,
have an obligation to facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the
family of a foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the terri-
tory.
181
This obligation must include at least the workers spouse and
unmarried children, as long as the latter are considered to be minors by
the receiving State and are dependent on the migrant worker.
182

Declarations also provide guidance for some measures of family reuni-
fcation, in particular for people who have been granted internation-
al protection. The UNHCR ExCom recommended that States facilitate
the admission to their territory of the spouse or dependent children of
persons granted temporary refuge or durable asylum.
183
The ExCom,
along with the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Council
of Europe Committee of Ministers, has also recommended that these
persons should be granted the same legal status and facilities as the
principal refugee.
184
In the case of requests of family reunion by family
members of refugees or persons in need of international protection,
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommended that
applications be treated in a positive, humane and expeditious manner
and stipulated that [w]here applications for family reunion by such
persons are rejected, independent and impartial review of such deci-
sions should be available.
185
b) The right to respect for family life and family reunifcation
In international human rights law, the right to respect for family life
186

will sometimes require States to allow members of migrants fami-

181
Article 19.6 ESC(r).

182
Appendix to the ESC(r), Part II. See also, Scope, Articles 2 and 3.

183
Conclusion No. 15, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 120, para. (e); Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX) Internation-
al Protection, ExCom, UNHCR, 49
th
Session, 1998, para. (w).

184
See, Conclusion No. 24, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 180, para. 8; Conclusion No. 88 (L) Protection of
the Refugees Family, ExCom, UNHCR, 50
th
Session, 1999, para. (b)(iii); Concluding Observa-
tions on Estonia, CRC, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on its 32
nd
Session,
UN Doc. CRC/C/124, 23 June 2003, para. 56. Recommendation Rec(2002)4, CMCE, op. cit.,
fn. 179, Article II; Recommendation R(1999)23, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 179, Article 3.

185
Recommendation R(1999)23, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 179, Article 4.

186
Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR; Article 9 CRC; Article 8 ECHR; Article 11 ACHR; Article V ADRDM;
Article 18 ACHPR; Articles 21 and 33 ArCHR.
liesa category which is broadly defned (see below)to enter and re-
main in the destination country, irrespective of refugee or other status.
The circumstances in which this will be the case have been considered
most comprehensively
187
by the European Court of Human Rights, ap-
plying the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8
ECHR.
188
The obligation arises only in limited circumstances, in light of
the principle of State control of entry to its territory, and the Court has
emphasised that Article 8 does not require States to respect choice of
matrimonial residence or authorise family reunion in their territory.
189

Under Article 8 there will however be a positive obligation on the State
of destination to facilitate family reunifcation on its territory where
there is an insurmountable objective obstacle preventing the mi-
grant already with its jurisdiction from realising his or her family life
rights in any other place.
190

The Court will take into consideration the reasons why one family mem-
ber left his or her State of origin or residence without other members
of the family. Fleeing war and/or seeking asylum might be strong argu-
ments that hinder the development of family life outside of the country
of destination.
191
As between two adults, it will be diffcult to plead the
existence of an insurmountable obstacle against living together in the

187
Gl v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Case No. 53/1995/559/645, Judgment of 19 February 1996,
para. 38. See also, Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application
No. 60665/00, Judgment of 1 December 2005, para. 42; Sen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR,
Application No. 31465/96, Judgment of 21 December 2001, para. 31; Abdulaziz, Cabales
and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43; Ahmut v. the Netherlands, ECtHR,
Case No. 73/1995/579/665, Judgment of 26 October 1996, para. 64; Hode and Abdi v.
the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 59; Osman v. Denmark, ECtHR, Application No.
38058/09, Judgment of 14 June 2011; Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR,
Application No. 8876/04, Admissibility Decision, 25 October 2005, The Law; Benamar v. the
Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 43786/04, Admissibility Decision, 5 April 2005, The
Law; Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 53102/99, Admissibil-
ity Decision, 13 May 2003, The Law.

188
Although it has not decided on this situation, the Human Rights Committee has found that
the right of family reunifcation was protected under Article 23 ICCPR in Ngambi and Nbol v.
France, CCPR, Communication No. 1179/2003, Views of 16 July 2004, para. 6.4. Concerns
about family reunifcation have been also raised by the Concluding Observations on Den-
mark, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.102, 14 December 2004, paras. 16 and 24; Concluding
Observations on Hungary, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/HUN/CO/3, 16 January 2008, paras. 21
and 44; Concluding Observations on Austria, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4, 30 Octo-
ber 2007, para. 19; Concluding Observations on France, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4,
31 July 2008, para. 21.

189
Gl v. Switzerland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, para. 38. See also, Tuquabo-Tekle and Others
v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, para. 43; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.
United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 68; Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, The Law; Benamar and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 187, The Law; Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187.

190
See, Benamar and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, The Law. See also,
Gl v. Switzerland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, paras. 3842; Sen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 187, para. 31.

191
See, Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, para. 47.
country of origin, unless the person in the country of destination is
there as a refugee or benefciary of international protection.
192

Obstacles to or conditions for family reunifcation will violate the right
to respect for family life where they can be shown to be unreasonable.
The Court did not consider unreasonable a requirement of demonstrat-
ing suffcient independent and lasting income, not being welfare bene-
fts, to provide for the basic costs of subsistence of the family members
with whom reunion is sought.
193

Finally, a rule that discriminates as to family reunifcation (whether det-
rimentally or preferentially) based on the gender of the person settled
in the country of destination, whether a marriage between a refugee
and his or her spouse took place before or after feeing the country of
origin, or presumably other prohibited grounds, would breach the pro-
hibition of discrimination in connection with the right to family life.
194
i) What is a family?
For the purposes of the right to respect for family life and in cases where
family reunifcation is sought, how is family defned? The European
Courts defnition is a broad one, which has developed over time in ac-
cordance with changing ideas of family, and is likely to continue to do
so in light of evolving social attitudes.
195
The Court has addressed two
broad categories of relationships: relationships between children and
their parents; and partnerships between adults.
196

In the context of relationships between minor children and their par-
ents, family life will always be considered to exist between a child and

192
See, on the negative outcome, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 6669.

193
Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, The Law. Also previously
held by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Resolution (78) 33, CMCE,
op. cit., fn. 179, Article B.1(b)(iii). See, Concluding Observations on Switzerland, CCPR,
Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, 52
nd
Session, Vol. I,
UN Doc. A/52/40 (1997), paras. 103 and 114: the Human Rights Committee found that a
rule prohibiting family reunifcation for foreign workers until 18 months after the obtaining
of a temporary residence permit was not in compliance with Article 23 ICCPR (childrens
rights), as the possibility of reunifcation should be given shortly after obtaining the
permit. The Committee of Ministers in 1978 stressed that the waiting period should be
reduced to a minimum and not exceed twelve months: Resolution (78) 33, CMCE, op. cit.,
fn. 179, Article B.1(b)(i).

194
See, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43,
paras. 7483. See also, Mauritian Women Case, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 55. On the question of
time of marriage in relation to family reunifaction as a prohibited ground of discrimination,
see, Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 59, paras. 4256.

195
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, ECtHR, Application No. 30141/04, Judgment of 24 June 2010,
paras. 9395.

196
See restatement of the Courts jurisprudence in Onur v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application
No. 27319/07, Judgment of 27 February 2009, paras. 4345. See also, Konstatinov v. the
Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 16351/03, Judgment of 26 April 2007, para. 52.
the parent(s) with whom the child cohabits. Where a childs parents
are married or cohabiting, this family relationship will continue to exist
even where, due to parental separation, the child ceases to live with
one of the parents.
197
Where a childs parents have never been married
or cohabiting, other factors may serve to demonstrate that the childs
relationship with the parent with whom the child does not live, amounts
to a family relationship. These factors will include the nature and du-
ration of the parents relationship prior to the birth of the child, and
in particular whether they had planned to have a child, contributions
made to the childs care and upbringing, and the quality and regularity
of contact. In a case concerning migration, the European Court held
that for adult parents and adult children, an additional element of de-
pendence is normally required to give rise to the protection of the right
to a family life.
198
In the context of adult partnerships, family life will be held to exist in
relation to both opposite-sex and same-sex
199
marital relationships and
stable and committed cohabiting non-marital relationships.
200
When de-
ciding whether a relationship amounts to family life, a number of factors
may be relevant, including whether the couple live together, the length
of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their commit-
ment to each other by having children together or by any other means.
201
The Human Rights Committee has affrmed that the term family, for
purposes of the Covenant, must be understood broadly to include all
those comprising a family as understood in the society concerned. The
protection of such family is not obviated by the absence of formal mar-
riage bonds, especially where there is a local practice of customary or
common-law marriage. Nor is the right to protection of family life nec-
essarily displaced by geographical separation, infdelity, or the absence
of conjugal relations. However, there must frst be a family bond to
protect.
202

197
Ciliz v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 29192/95, Judgment of 11 July 2000,
para. 59. See also, Boughanemi v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 35.

198
The dependency must be a strong one: A.W. Khan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application
No. 47486/06, Judgment of 12 January 2010, para. 32; Osman v. Denmark, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 187, para. 55.

199
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 195, para. 94; P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, ECtHR,
Application No. 18984/02, Judgment of 22 July 2010, para. 30.

200
Elsholz v. Germany, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 25735/94, Judgment of 13 July 2000,
para. 43; Hoffmann v. Germany, ECtHR, Application No. 34045/96, Judgment of 11 October
2001, para. 34. See also, Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 6833/74, Judg-
ment of 13 June 1979, p. 14, para. 31; Keegan v. Ireland, ECtHR, Application No. 16969/90,
Judgment of 26 May 1994, p. 17, para. 44; Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR,
Application No. 18535/91, Judgment of 27 October 1994, pp. 5556, para. 30.

201
X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, case No. 75/1995/581/667, Judgment of 20 March
1997, para. 36.

202
Ngambi and Nbol v. France, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 188, para. 6.4.
Box 7. Family reunifcation in EU law
The Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the
right to family reunifcation recognised such rights for the spouse
of a third country national residing lawfully in a Member State,
as well as for the minor, unmarried children, including adopted,
of the non-national and of the spouse; and those of the non-na-
tional only and those of the spouse only, including adopted.
203

The Directive, furthermore, allows, but does not oblige, Member
States to extend this right in their legislation to frst-degree
relatives in the direct ascending line of the third country na-
tional or of the spouse, where they are dependent on them
and do not enjoy proper family support in the country of or-
igin. The same applies for adult unmarried children, where
they are objectively unable to provide for their own needs on
account of their state of health.
204
States also may, but are not required to, apply the protec-
tion of the Directive to the unmarried partner, being a third
country national, with whom the primary migrant is in a duly
attested stable long-term relationship, or to a third country
national who is bound to him or her by a registered partner-
ship, and to the children of these partnerships, on the same
conditions as outlined above.
205
In case of polygamous marriages, the Directive allows for the
reunifcation with only one spouse, and the choice on whether
to admit the children of the other spouse is at discretion of the
Member State.
206
The same regime applies for family reunifcation when the pri-
mary migrant is a refugee, except that in cases of refugees
the State has no discretion to impose conditions for integra-
tion on the entry of children over 12 years old. In addition, the
State may authorise family reunifcation of refugees for a wid-
er range of family members than those listed in the Directive,
if they are dependant on the refugee.
207
It is notable that the scope of application of the Directive is
considerably narrower than the defnition of family as it has

203
Article 4.1, Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reuni-
fcation, EU, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 1218 (EU Family Reunifcation Directive).

204
Article 4.2, ibid.

205
Article 4.3, ibid.

206
Article 4.4, ibid.

207
Article 10, ibid.
evolved in international human rights law, although the pre-
amble refers to Article 8 ECHR and states that the Directive
should be applied without discrimination on the basis of [. . .]
sexual orientation.
208
In order to comply with their interna-
tional human rights law obligations, EU Member States would
need to interpret and apply the provisions of the Directive in
accordance with the broader meaning of family life established
by the European Court of Human Rights, considered above.
c) Particular considerations in family reunifcation between
children and parents
The CRC was the frst international human rights treaty to recognise spe-
cifc rights connected to family reunifcation, which applies in both asy-
lum and other migration situations. Article 9.1 CRC provides that States
Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her par-
ents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judi-
cial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures,
that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Thus,
in any decision making process regarding expulsion of a childs parent(s),
the principle of the best interests of that child must be paramount.
In terms of an application to enter a country for the purposes of family
reunifcation, Article 10.1 CRC spells out the States obligations:
applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a
State Party for the purpose of family reunification must be dealt
with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious
manner;
States Parties must further ensure that the submission of such a re-
quest shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for
the members of their family.
209

208
Preamble, paras. 2 and 5, ibid.

209
The Committee on the Rights of the Child repeatedly reminded States of this obligation in its
Concluding Observations, in particular concerning the length of the family reunifcation pro-
cedure. See, inter alia, Concluding Observations on Belgium, CRC, Report of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child to the General Assembly, 51
st
Session, UN Doc. A/51/41 (1996),
p. 86, para. 595; Concluding Observations on Estonia, CRC, op. cit., fn. 184, paras. 5657;
Concluding Observations on Finland, CRC, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
on its 25
th
Session, UN Doc. CRC/C/100, 14 November 2000, p. 8, paras. 6162; Concluding
Observations on France, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.240, 30 June 2004, paras. 3132;
Concluding Observations on Sweden, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.248, 20 March 2005,
paras. 4142; Concluding Observations on Ireland, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/IRL/CO/2,
29 September 2006, paras. 3031; Concluding Observations on Sweden, CRC, UN Doc.
CRC/C/SWE/CO/4, 12 June 2009, paras. 6465.
In deciding whether there is a positive obligation of the State under
Article 8 ECHR with regard to family reunifcation between adults and
their children, the European Court will have regard to the age of the
children concerned, their situation in their country of origin and the ex-
tent to which they are dependent on their parents.
210
In one case, the
European Court of Human Rights found that an insurmountable ob-
stacle to living a family life outside of the country of residence existed
because the mother seeking family reunifcation with her child who had
been left in the country of origin, also had a second child in the country
of destination who had grown up there. In this case, the Court found
that the reunifcation in the country of destination would have been the
most adequate solution to develop a family life, considering the diff-
culties that a resettlement of the whole family in the country of origin
would have caused to the second child.
211
d) Unaccompanied minors and family reunifcation
The CRC obliges States to provide, as they consider appropriate,
co-operation in any efforts by the United Nations and other competent
intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental organizations
co-operating with the United Nations to protect and assist a refugee
child and to trace the parents or other members of the family of any
refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunifcation
with his or her family. In cases where no parents or other members
of the family can be found, the child shall be accorded the same pro-
tection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his
or her family environment for any reason, as set forth in the present
Convention.
212
As the Committee on the Rights of the Child has clar-
ifed, tracing is an essential component of any search for a durable
solution and should be prioritized except where the act of tracing, or
the way in which the tracing is conducted, would be contrary to the best
interest of the child or jeopardize fundamental rights of those being
traced. In any case, in conducting tracing activities, no reference should
be made to the status of the child as an asylum-seeker or refugee.
213

The UNHCR Executive Committee also found that every effort should
be made to trace the parents or other close relatives of unaccompanied
minors.
214
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

210
See, Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, paras. 4450;
Sen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, para. 37;

211
See, Sen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 187, paras. 4041.

212
Article 22.2 CRC.

213
CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 80.

214
Conclusion No. 24, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 180, para. 7; Conclusion No. 84 (XLVIII) on Refugee
Children and Adolescent, ExCom, UNHCR, 48
th
session, 1997, para. (b)(i). See also, Guide-
lines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum,
UNHCR, February 1997.
also requires States to cooperate with international organisations in
their efforts to protect and assist the child and to trace the childs par-
ents or other relatives.
215
In respect of tracking, the use of DNA tracking systems should not
create additional obstacles to family reunifcation, should require prior
informed consent of the applicant, and should be used only when nec-
essary.
216
Even when the family is identifed through tracking, or in any other case
of family reunifcation, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
warned that family reunifcation in the country of origin is not in the
best interest of the child and should therefore not be pursued where
there is a reasonable risk that such a return would lead to the viola-
tion of fundamental human rights of the child. Such risk is indisputably
documented in the granting of refugee status or in a decision of the
competent authorities on the applicability of non-refoulement obliga-
tions [. . .]. Where the circumstances in the country of origin contain
lower level risks and there is concern, for example, of the child being
affected by the indiscriminate effects of generalised violence, such risks
must be given full attention and balanced against other rights-based
considerations, including the consequences of further separation.
217
i) Discrimination and access to the territory
The situation of unaccompanied minors, whether seeking asylum or not,
warrants special consideration, due both to their vulnerability to ex-
ploitation and abuse and to their incapacity to cope with systems and
institutions designed to address adult migration. Under the CRC, chil-
dren enjoy particular protection against discrimination. The CRC pro-
vides that childrens rights must be protected without discrimination of
any kind,
218
including discrimination due to their nationality, immigra-
tion status or statelessness.
219
Furthermore, States Parties shall take
all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activ-
ities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the childs parents, legal guard-

215
Article 23.2 ACRWC.

216
See, Concluding Observations on Denmark, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/70/DNK, 15 November
2000, para. 15; Concluding Observations on France, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 188, para. 21.

217
CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, paras. 8283. The General Comment pro-
vides with even more detailed information on considerations and procedural requirements
towards unaccompanied children.

218
Article 2.1 CRC.

219
See CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, paras. 12, 16 and 18. See also, Offce
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on challenges and best
practices in the implementation of the international framework for the protection of the
rights of the child in the context of migration, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/29, 5 July 2010 (OHCHR
Study), paras. 2122.
ians, or family members.
220
A child should, therefore, not be discrimi-
nated against on the basis, for example, of his or her parents irregular
entry onto the national territory.
In any decision concerning children the primary consideration must be
the best interests of the child.
221
The Committee on the Rights of the
Child has affrmed that this overarching consideration as to what is the
best interest of a child requires a clear and comprehensive assessment
of the childs identity, including nationality, upbringing, ethnic, cultur-
al and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and protection
needs, allowing the child access to the territory is a prerequisite to this
initial assessment process.
222
The Committee identifes an obligation to
appoint a competent guardian and, if needed, to provide legal represen-
tation.
223
In relation to entry, therefore, unaccompanied or separated
children
224
are always to be granted access under the best interests
principle.
Further authoritative guidance on these principles is set out in the
Committee on the Rights of the Childs General Comment No. 6 (2005):
Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside of Their
Country of Origin.
225
e) Problems linked with family reunifcation: dependency
In many countries the residence permit of a person who enters a coun-
try for the purposes of family reunifcation is premised on either (a) the
existence and validity of the permit, whether for work or international
protection reasons, of a primary permit holder, i.e. usually someone who
migrated there frst, or (b) his or her family relationship with a citizen
of the country. In both cases the migrants residence will depend on the
stability of the relationship with that person. In some countries, those
who migrate for purposes of family reunion have no right to work, and
the fact that their residence in the destination State is so strongly linked
to the person holding the primary permit or the national family member
may lead them to a situation of dependency, where they are unable to
exercise or claim protection for their human rights. In case of divorce
or separation from the principal residence permit holder, they may fnd
themselves at risk of deportation or, in the absence of a valid residence

220
Article 2.2 CRC. See also, OHCHR Study, op. cit., fn. 219, paras. 2122.

221
Article 3.1 CRC.

222
See, CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 20 (emphasis added).

223
See, ibid., para. 21.

224
Unaccompanied children are children who have been separated from their parents and
other relatives and are not cared for by an adult responsible, by law or custom, for them.
A separated child is separated from the parents or any legal or customary caregiver, but not
necessarily from other relatives. Defnitions provided for by the CRC in ibid., paras. 7 and 8.

225
See, ibid.
permit, face increased vulnerability to exploitation. These situations can
give rise to a range of human rights issues for those concerned, and
in particular women migrants who enter the country for purposes of
marriage or family reunifcation.
226
For example, they may be unable or
unwilling to seek protection from domestic violence or to leave abusive
relationships because their legal right to remain in a country is pre-
mised on the relationship concerned. The limited rights often associat-
ed with family-reunifcation permits signifcantly can limit the ability of
holders to seek educational and/or employment opportunities, which in
the case of women who migrate for family reunifcation can perpetuate
stereotyped gender-roles and give rise to integration diffculties. On the
other hand, women who are the primary permit-holder may be at risk of
particular violence if they seek to end relationships with partners whose
residency rights are wholly connected with the relationship.
227

As discussed at greater length in Chapter 6, similar risks can arise for
migrants whose residency permit is linked to a particular employer, and
who may face heightened risks of violence and abuse at work and/or
may be unable or unwilling to seek legal protection. Indeed, CEDAW
provides in Article 2(f) that when residency permits of women migrant
workers are premised on sponsorship of an employer or spouse, States
parties should enact provisions relating to independent residency sta-
tus. Regulations should be made to allow for the legal stay of a woman
who fees her abusive employer or spouse or is fred for complaining
about abuse.
228
As for the family members of a migrant worker, Article 50 ICRMW es-
tablishes that, [i]n the case of death of a migrant worker or dissolution
of marriage, the State of employment [of the migrant worker] shall
favourably consider granting family members of that migrant worker
residing in that State on the basis of family reunion an authorization to
stay; the State of employment shall take into account the length of time
they have already resided in that State.
In recognition of the particular risks of human rights violations and
abuses which may arise in these contexts, the Council of Europe, the
Committee of Ministers has recommended to Member States that, after
a period of four years of legal residence, adult family members should
be granted an autonomous residence permit independent of that of the
principal, and that, in the case of divorce, separation or death of the
principal, a family member having been legally resident for at least one
year may apply for an autonomous residence permit. Member States

226
See, CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 22.

227
E.g. see facts of Yildirim v. Austria, CEDAW, Communication No. 6/2005, Views of 6 August
2007.

228
See CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(f).
should give due consideration to such applications. In their decision,
the best interest of the children concerned shall be a primary consider-
ation.
229
Dependency on a principal resident permit holder may also hinder the
access of the migrant to an effective remedy to prevent, or to seek
reparation for, of a human rights violation committed by their sponsor,
relative or spouse. This is problematic, as States may infringe their
obligation to provide individuals with an effective remedy for human
rights violations (see, Chapter 2, Section 4). On the particular situation
of women migrant victims of violence, the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe has recommended that States ensure that all
services and legal remedies available for victims of domestic violence
are provided to immigrant women upon their request
230
and that they
should consider, where needed, granting immigrant women who have
been/are victims of domestic violence an independent right to residence
in order to enable them to leave their violent husbands without having
to leave the host country.
231
Box 8. Mandatory residence assignment for refugees
cannot impair their family life
The European Court of Human Rights has recently held that
an asylum programme which assigns mandatory residence in
one particular region of the country, thereby making very dif-
fcult the maintenance of family links between two refugees,
is in breach of their right to family life under Article 8 ECHR,
as no legitimate reason of equitable distribution of refugees
within the country for economic reason can override the refu-
gees right to family life. The case originated in the practice of
Switzerland to assign refugees to a particular canton outside
of which they cannot reside.
232
4. Victims of Traffcking
Each year many people are traffcked by organisations that by use of
force or other forms of coercion, deception or abuse, gain control over
them and arrange their transfer abroad, for various exploitative purpos-

229
Recommendation Rec(2002)4, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 179, Article III.

230
Recommendation Rec(2002)5, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 79, Article 24.

231
Ibid., Article 59.

232
Mengesha Kimfe v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 24404/05, Judgment of 29 July
2010.
es including forced labour. Migrants may fall victim to traffckers either
in their country of origin, often under the promise of transport and work,
or in the course of their journey to the destination State. Under cer-
tain treaties, victims of traffcking have rights to some protective mea-
sures in light of their situation. While many of the additional protections
granted to them by international instruments are related to their role
as witnesses in related prosecutions, some are also designed to protect
their human rights.
233
Human Traffcking is a crime under international law
234
and both the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffcking in Persons Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Traffcking Protocol) and the
Council of Europe Convention on Traffcking in Human Beings (Council
of Europe Traffcking Convention) require States Parties to criminalise
the practice in national law. Depending on the circumstances, human
traffcking may involve several international crimes, including crimes
against humanity and, in armed confict, war crimes.
235
Traffcking can
entail multiple violations of the human rights of traffcked persons, in-
cluding the prohibition on slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory
labour, and the right to liberty. The European Court of Human Rights
has recognised that all human traffcking falls within the prohibition of
slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour.
236

Under both the UN Traffcking Protocol and the Council of Europe
Traffcking Convention, States must take steps to prevent and combat
traffcking, through the civil and criminal law and law enforcement.
237

In addition, the European Court has found that there is a duty to inves-
tigate allegations of violation of the prohibition on slavery, servitude or
forced labour, as a result of traffcking, as well as obligations to establish
and enforce both criminal and civil law measures to counter traffcking
and to protect the rights of victims of traffcking.
238
This should include
regulating businesses often used as a cover for human traffcking and

233
See, inter alia, Kristina Touzenis, Traffcking in Human Beings, Human rights and transna-
tional criminal law, developments in law and practices, UNESCO, Migration Studies 3, 2010,
France; Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence,
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, 2010.

234
See, fn. 113.

235
See, Articles 7.1(c), 7.1(g), 7.2(c), and 8.2(xxii), Rome Statute, which refer to enslave-
ment, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution under war crimes and crimes against
humanity.

236
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January
2010, para. 282.

237
Articles 5 and 911, UN Traffcking Protocol; Chapters II and IV, Council of Europe Traffck-
ing Convention. See also, Article 6 CEDAW; Articles 34 and 35 CRC; General Recommenda-
tion No. 19, Violence Against Women, CEDAW, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 1989,
paras. 1316 and 24(g).

238
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 284.
addressing concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance
of traffcking in immigration rules.
239
a) Who is a victim of traffcking
A traffcked person is someone who has been recruited, transported,
transferred, harboured or received, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or re-
ceiving of payments or benefts to achieve the consent of a person hav-
ing control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
240
The
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child
for the purpose of exploitation is considered human traffcking even
if this does not involve any of the means previously listed.
241
Under
both the UN Traffcking Protocol and the Council of Europe Traffcking
Convention, exploitation includes, but is not limited to sexual exploita-
tion, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs.
242

b) Obligations of States
The general duty of States to combat traffcking of human beings
is well established in international human rights law treaties.
243

Connected to this, States may also have particular treaty or human
rights law obligations related to the victims or potential victims of
human traffcking.

239
Ibid., para. 284.

240
Human traffcking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud,
of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefts to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation, Article 3, UN Traffcking Protocol; Article 4, Council
of Europe Traffcking Convention: Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; The consent of
a victim of traffcking in persons to the intended exploitation [. . .] shall be irrelevant where
any of the means described in the defnition have been used. The Human Rights Com-
mittee fnds that human traffcking is a violation of Articles 3 (gender equality), 8 (forced
labour) and 24 (children rights) ICCPR: Concluding Observations on Greece, CCPR, UN Doc.
CCPR/CO/83/GRC, 25 April 2005, para. 10. The Committee against Torture fnds that hu-
man traffcking for the purpose of sexual and labour exploitation falls under the practices
prohibited by Article 16 (cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT): Concluding Observations on Spain, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/ESP/CO/5, 9 December 2009,
para. 28. See also, Conclusion No. 90 (LII) General, ExCom, UNHCR, 52
nd
session, 2001,
para. (s).

241
Article 3(c), UN Traffcking Protocol; Article 4(c), Council of Europe Traffcking Convention.

242
Article 3(a), UN Traffcking Protocol; and Article 4(a), Council of Europe Traffcking Conven-
tion.

243
Article 6 CEDAW; Article 35 CRC; Article 6.1 ACHR; Article 2, Convention of Belem do Para;
Article 29 ACRWC; Article 4.2(g), Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa.
States must protect an individual at risk of being traffcked or
subject to forced or compulsory labour. The European Court has
found that such a duty arises if the authorities are aware, or ought to
be aware, of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an
identifed individual has been, or is at real and immediate risk of being,
traffcked or exploited, or subject to slavery, servitude or forced or com-
pulsory labour.
244
The duties to protect and to investigate apply to all
States through which the traffcking occurs, from the country of origin
to the destination State. Where a State is unable or unwilling to protect
those at risk of traffcking, the protections of the Refugee Convention or
principle of non-refoulement may apply (see, above, Box No. 4).
In some cases, international law requires States to allow vic-
tims of traffcking to remain in the territory. According to the UN
Traffcking Protocol, to protect against traffcking, States should consid-
er adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims
of traffcking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or perma-
nently, in appropriate cases.
245
The Council of Europe Convention on

244
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 284. See also, Concluding
Observations on Republic of Korea, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/KOR/CO/3, 20 November 2009,
para. 23; Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CEDAW, Report of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the General Assembly, 53
rd
Session, UN Doc.
A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998), para. 75; Concluding Observations on Bangladesh, CEDAW, Report of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to the General Assembly,
52
nd
Session, UN Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (1997), para. 457; Concluding Observations on the
Netherlands, CEDAW, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women to the General Assembly, 56
th
Session, UN Doc. A/56/38 (2001), para. 212; Concluding
Observations on Lebanon, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/3, 8 April 2008, paras. 2829;
Concluding Observations on Spain, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/CO/5, 7 July 2004,
para. 337; Concluding Observations on Singapore, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/3,
10 August 2007, paras. 2122; Concluding Observations on Guatemala, CEDAW, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/GUA/CO/7, 10 February 2009, paras. 2324; Concluding Observations on Spain,
CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/CO/6, 7 August 2009, paras. 2122; Concluding Observa-
tions on Switzerland; CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/3, 7 August 2009, paras. 2930;
Concluding Observations on Greece, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 240, para. 10; Concluding Obser-
vations on Thailand, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/84/THA, 8 July 2005, para. 20; Concluding
Observations on Spain, CAT, op. cit., fn. 240, para. 28; Principle 1 of the OHCHR Rec-
ommended Principles on Human Rights and Human Traffcking, adopted on 20 May 2002,
UN Doc. E/2002/68/Add.1 (OHCHR Traffcking Principles).

245
Article 7.1, UN Traffcking Protocol. This position is reiterated by the CEDAW in Concluding
Observations on Spain, CEDAW, 2004, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 337; Concluding Observations
on Pakistan, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3, 11 June 2007, para. 30 (victims of
traffcking should be shielded from prosecutions on illegal migration); Concluding Obser-
vations on Singapore, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2122; Concluding Observations on
Lebanon, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2829; Concluding Observations on Denmark,
CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/CO/7, 7 August 2009, paras. 3233. See Principles 3 and 7
of the OHCHR Traffcking Principles, op. cit., fn. 244: 3. Anti-traffcking measures shall not
adversely affect the human rights and dignity of persons, in particular the rights of those
who have been traffcked, and of migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees and asy-
lum-seekers; 7. Traffcked persons shall not be detained, charged or prosecuted for the
illegality of their entry into or residence in countries of transit and destination, or for their in-
volvement in unlawful activities to the extent that such involvement is a direct consequence
of their situation as traffcked persons.
Traffcking provides that when the authorities have reasonable grounds
to believe that a person may be a victim of traffcking, the person must
not be removed from the territory until there has been a process to de-
termine whether the person is a victim, and pending the conclusion of
that process, must be afforded measures of protection and support.
246

Furthermore, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
person concerned is a victim, they have the right to an additional period
of 30 days, to recover and refect, in order to escape from the infuence
of the traffckers. During this period, no expulsion can be enforced.
247

States must provide social and psychological assistance for vic-
tims. The UN Traffcking Protocol provides that States parties shall con-
sider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological
and social recovery of victims of traffcking in persons and, in particular,
the provision of appropriate housing; counseling and information, in par-
ticular as regards their legal rights, in a language that the victims of traf-
fcking in persons can understand; medical, psychological and material
assistance; and employment, educational and training opportunities.
248

The Council of Europe Traffcking Convention includes a direct obligation
to adopt legislative or other measures as may be necessary to assist
victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery.
249
In addition,
States must provide necessary medical or other assistance to victims
lawfully resident within its territory who do not have adequate resources
and need such help;
250
and adopt rules under which such victims may
have access to the labour market, to vocational training and education.
251

Finally, States Parties must ensure that assistance to a victim is not made
conditional on his or her willingness to act as a witness.
252

246
Article 10.2, Council of Europe Traffcking Convention.

247
Article 13, Council of Europe Traffcking Convention.

248
Article 6.3, UN Traffcking Protocol. See also Article 39 CRC; General Comment No. 4: Ado-
lescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
CRC, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4, 1 July 2003, para. 37; General comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS
and the rights of the child, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, para. 36.

249
Article 12.1, Council of Europe Traffcking Convention. See also, Recommendation R(1991)11
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning Sexual Exploitation, Pornogra-
phy and Prostitution of, and Traffcking in, Children and Young Adults, adopted by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 9 September 1991 at the 461
st
Article D(3); Recommendation Rec(2001)16 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States
on the protection of children against sexual exploitation, adopted by the Committee of Min-
isters on 31 October 2001 at the 771
st
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Article 34; Recom-
men da tion R(2000)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on action against
traffcking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation, adopted by the Commit-
tee of Ministers on 19 May 2000, at the 710
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies, Appendix,
Articles II(2), and V(34) and (35); Recommendation 1325(1997) on traffc in women and
forced prostitution in Council of Europe Member States, PACE, Article 6(v); Recommendation
1545 (2002) Campaign against traffcking in women, PACE, Article 10(ix)(g).

250
Article 12.3, Council of Europe Traffcking Convention.

251
Article 12.4, ibid.

252
Article 12.6, ibid.
5. Smuggled persons
An even higher number of migrants attempting of reach a destination
State are forced to make use of smuggling organisations.
Under the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air (Smuggling Protocol), smuggling means the procurement, in order
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a fnancial or other material beneft, of
the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not
a national or a permanent resident.
253
Smuggled persons are distin-
guished from traffcked persons in that their participation in the illegal
entry process is voluntary, though they may nevertheless in the course
of the process be subjected to coercion, ill-treatment or other violations
of their human rights. In contrast to traffcking, smuggling involves at
least a moment in which the migrant undertakes an informed and vol-
untary decision to participate.
Given their particular vulnerability, obligations under human rights law
to take measures to protect individuals who the authorities know or
ought to know will be at risk of violations of their human rights, are of
particular relevance to smuggled persons. As regards specifc protec-
tion, since smuggled persons are not perceived as victims of crime in
the same way as traffcked persons, but as willing participants, such
limited special protection as they enjoy arises from international crimi-
nal law, and is aimed at facilitating their collaboration with the prosecu-
torial system in order to arrest, prosecute and dismantle the smuggling
network.
Under the Smuggling Protocol, States have the obligation to preserve
and protect the rights of persons who have been the object of [human
smuggling] as accorded under applicable international law, in particu-
lar the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
254
They must
afford migrants appropriate protection against violence that may be
inficted upon them, whether by individuals or groups, by reason of
being the object of human smuggling, and must provide appropriate
assistance to migrants whose lives or safety are endangered by rea-
son of being the object of human smuggling.
255
In particular, States
Parties shall take into account the special needs of women and chil-
dren.
256

253
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Adopted and opened for signa-
ture, ratifcation and accession by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000,
Article 3(a) (UN Smuggling Protocol).

254
Article 16.1, UN Smuggling Protocol.

255
Article 16.2-3, ibid.

256
Article 16.4, ibid.
Finally, the Smuggling Protocol provides that [m]igrants shall not be-
come liable to criminal prosecution [. . .] for the fact of having been the
object of [smuggling].
257
6. Migrants Rescued at Sea
Every year thousands of migrants try to reach their country of desti-
nation by sea,
258
many losing their lives in the process as they often,
or almost exclusively, travel on boats that are not ft for the amount of
people that they are transporting. The international law of the sea, as
well as international human rights law and refugee law, provide relevant
frameworks for the rescue, protection and status of such migrants.
Article 98 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
codifes into law a long-observed principle of maritime tradition: the
obligation of shipmasters to render assistance to any person found at
sea in danger of being lost and to proceed to the rescue of persons in
distress, if informed of their need of assistance.
259
This obligation of
rescue was also provided for by the 1974 International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
260

While shipmasters have an obligation of immediate assistance, coastal
States have the obligation to promote the establishment, operation
and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue ser-
vice regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstanc-
es so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate
with neighbouring States for this purpose.
261
The 1979 International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) obliges States to
[. . .] ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at
sea [. . .] regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the
circumstances in which the person is found.
262
In order to implement
this obligation, States parties to the Convention have established in
common agreements search and rescue zones (SAR zones).
263

257
Article 5, ibid.

258
See UNHCR website, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html.

259
Article 98.1, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted on 10 December
1982 (UNCLOS): 1. Every State shall require the master of a ship fying its fag, in so far as
he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:(a) to render
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;(b) to proceed with all possible
speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far
as such action may reasonably be expected of him;(c) after a collision, to render assistance
to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship
of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call..

260
See Chapter V, Regulation 33.1 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974 (SOLAS).

261
See, Article 98.2 UNCLOS. The same obligation is recalled in Chapter V, Regulation 7 SOLAS.

262
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR), Chapter 2.1.10.

263
See, Chapter 2.1.4-8 SAR.
Under international human rights law, the duty to search and rescue
people in distress at sea may be derived from States positive obliga-
tions to protect the life of those subject to their jurisdiction. In territorial
waters, the State has jurisdiction and is plainly obliged by international
human rights law to take steps to protect the lives of those present there.
In the high seas, under international law, jurisdiction will attach to the
State of the fag, i.e. the State where the rescuing boat is registered.
264

In addition, the State responsible for a particular SAR zone has obliga-
tion to rescue or co-ordinate rescue and protection measures.
265
Under
international human rights law, a boat will in addition be within the
jurisdiction of the State where the States authorities exercise effective
control or have authority over the boat (at minimum from the moment
of interception or rescue and arguably from the moment when rescue is
possible), or the zone of the sea concerned.
266

The Facilitation Committee of the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) has issued a set of principles aimed at fostering the respect of
human rights and refugee law in rescue operations.
267
They stress that,
[i]f a person rescued expresses a wish to apply for asylum, great con-
sideration must be given to the security of the asylum seeker. When
communicating this information, it should therefore not be shared with
his or her country of origin or any other country in which he or she may
face threat.
268
The Committee specifed the need to avoid disembar-
kation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a
well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration
in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea.
269

264
Article 92 with 94 UNCLOS. See also, Medvedyev v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 51, para. 65.

265
Article 3, Principles relating to administrative procedures for disembarking persons rescued
at sea, adopted on 22 January 2009, Doc. No. FAL.3/Circ.194 (Disembarking Principles). See
also, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, Maritime Safety Committee,
IMO, Resolution MSC.167(78) (IMO Rescued Guidelines), adopted on 20 May 2004; and,
Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of Stowa-
way Cases, IMO Assembly, Resolution A.871(20), adopted on 27 November 1997 (IMO Stow-
away Guidelines). See also, The interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers, refugees
and irregular migrants, PACE, Resolution No. 1821(2011), approved on 21 June 2011; Report
to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 to
31 July 2009, CPT, Doc. No. CPT/Inf (2010) 14, 28 April 2010, para. 34.

266
See J.H.A. v. Spain, CAT, Communication No. 323/2007, Views of 21 November 2008,
para. 8.2; Xhavara and Fifteen Others v. Italy and Albania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; Med-
vedyev v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 51, paras. 6667; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy,
ECtHR, GC, op. cit. fn. 46, paras. 77-82.

267
See fn. 265.

268
Article 2, Disembarking Principles. See also, IMO Rescued Guidelines; and, IMO Stowaway
Guidelines.

269
IMO Rescued Guidelines, para. 6.17. See also, IMO Stowaway Guidelines. See also, Report
to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from
27 to 31 July 2009, CPT, op. cit., fn. 265, para. 36.
The UNHCR ExCom has also stated that States have an obligation to
ensure that masters of vessels sailing under their fag scrupulously ob-
served established rules regarding rescue at sea, and to take all nec-
essary action to rescue refugees and displaced persons leaving their
country of origin on boats in order to seek asylum and who are in dis-
tress.
270
Furthermore, [i]t is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal
States to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters and to
grant asylum, or at least temporary refuge, to persons on board wishing
to seek asylum.
271
The ExCom guidance states that interception mea-
sures should not result in asylum-seekers and refugees being denied
access to international protection, or result in those in need of interna-
tional protection being returned, directly or indirectly, to the frontiers of
territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on account
of a Convention ground, or where the person has other grounds for
protection based on international law.
272
In cases of large-scale infux,
asylum-seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted, at least on
a temporary basis. States should assist in facilitating their disembarka-
tion by acting in accordance with the principles of international solidari-
ty and burden-sharing in granting resettlement opportunities.
273
7. Stateless persons
Persons who lack any national status as provided by internationally rec-
ognised States are known as stateless persons. The UNHCR estimates
that there are 12 million such people, although it is impossible to pro-
vide accurate statistics.
274
Not all stateless persons are migrants, but
those migrants that are stateless face particular diffculties in accessing
their rights (see, for example in relation to detention, Chapter 4).
The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954
(Statelessness Convention) defnes as stateless a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.
275

This defnition has arguably attained the status of customary interna-

270
Conclusion No. 14 (XXX) General, ExCom, UNHCR, 30
th
Session, 1979, para. (d). See also,
Practical Guidelines for Shipowners, Their Agents and Shipmasters Relating to Stowaways
Asylum-Seekers, UNHCR, January 1992 (UNHCR Stowaways Guidelines).

271
Conclusion No. 15, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 120, para. (c). See also, Conclusion No. 23 (XXXII)
Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, ExCom, UNHCR,
32
nd
Session, 1981, para. (1); Conclusion No. 38 (XXXVI) Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Dis-
tress at Sea, ExCom, UNHCR, 36
th
Session, 1985, para. (a).

272
See, Conclusion No. 97 (LIV) Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures, ExCom,
UNHCR, 54
th
Session, 2003, para. (a)(iv).

273
Conclusion No. 23, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 271, para. (3).

274
UNHCR Webpage at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html (last visited on
11 October 2010).

275
Article 1.1, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted on 28 September
1954 (Statelessness Convention).
tional law.
276
Persons falling within this defnition are commonly referred
to as de jure stateless persons. The defnition of statelessness includes
persons either outside or within their country of habitual residence or
origin
277
as well as refugees who have been deprived of nationality in
their country of origin, and to whom the Geneva Refugee Convention
applies.
278
While the defnition seems to require verifcation that an in-
dividual lacks the nationality of any State, in fact it is only required that
such checks be made as regards States with which the individual enjoys
a relevant link (in particular birth on the territory, descent, marriage or
habitual residence).
279
Failing these, he or she should be recognised as
a stateless person.
The Statelessness Convention provides the stateless person with some
specifc rights which States Parties must guarantee, and that are,
for the most part, identical to those included in the Geneva Refugee
Convention. Most of the rights establish an equality of treatment to
aliens, such as the right to property (Article 13), the right of associ-
ation (Article 15), the right to wage-earning employment (Article 17),
the right to self-employment (Article 18), the right to practice liberal
professions (Article 19), the right to housing (Article 21), the right to
education other than elementary (Article 22.2), the right to freedom
of movement (Article 26). For other rights, the enjoyment by stateless
persons is equated with that of nationals: the right to freedom of religion
(Article 4), the right to artistic rights and industrial property (Article 14),
the right of access to courts (Article 16), the right to equal treatment
to nationals in rationing systems (Article 20), the right to elementary
education (Article 22.1), the right to public relief (Article 23), the right
to healthy and fair working conditions and the right to social security
(Article 24), the right to equal treatment to nationals in the imposi-
tion of fscal charges (Article 29). Finally, the Statelessness Convention
guarantees stateless persons some specifc rights: a particular right
of non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion or country of origin
(Article 3), the right to a personal status (Article 12), the right to iden-
tity papers and to travel documents (Articles 27 and 28), and specifc
rights and guarantees connected to expulsion procedures (Article 31).
However, the Statelessness Convention has been at present ratifed by
only 65 States, thereby limiting the universal effect of its provisions.

276
The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law, Summary Conclusions of the
Expert Meeting organised by the Offce of the UNHCR, Prato, Italy, 2728 May 2010, para. 2.
Report of the International Law Commission, Text of the draft articles on diplomatic protection
adopted by the Commission on frst reading: commentary on article 8, General Assembly,
Fifty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), 2004, at p. 46.

277
Ibid., para. 4.

278
Ibid., para. 5.

279
Ibid., paras. 14 and 22.
As noted above, the defnition of statelessness has customary interna-
tional law status, thus binding all States, regardless of whether they
are parties to the Statelessness Convention. While the same is not es-
tablished in respect of the obligations on treatment of stateless persons
arising from the same Convention, stateless persons are entitled to the
broad range of rights enshrined under international human rights law
which fow from presence in the States jurisdiction, without discrimina-
tion as to status, rather than on nationality.
At the time of the creation of the refugee and statelessness protection
regimes, people who were typically not granted external (diplomatic
or consular) protection by their country of nationality were referred
to as de facto stateless. Subsequently, the notion has been applied
more widely. As outlined in the conclusions of an expert meeting on
the subject, while there is some disagreement on the question, the no-
tion of de facto statelessness refers to a person who does not possess
the effective nationality of any State and is unable or for valid rea-
sons unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of any State.
Persons who are stateless de facto but not de jure are not covered by
the Statelessness Convention defnition of statelessness. The Final Act
of the Convention on Reduction of Statelessness of 1961 nevertheless
recommended that persons who are stateless de facto should as far as
possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an
effective nationality.
280
The problem is that there is no binding inter-
national law obligation to do so and that a defnition of statelessness
has not yet been provided in international law.
281
It is important for the
practitioner to keep in mind that this classifcation is not yet agreed
internationally and it may also be contested domestically. Where a do-
mestic system recognises some protection for stateless persons, it is
however useful to put forward these principles. It should also be borne
in mind that the rights of persons who are de facto stateless, though

280
Article I, Final Act of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted on 30 Au-
gust 1961.

281
The most authoritative defnition, at present, is that of a UNHCR Expert Meeting which de-
fned de facto stateless persons as persons outside the country of their nationality who are
unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.
Protection in this sense refers to the right of diplomatic protection exercised by a State of na-
tionality in order to remedy an internationally wrongful act against one of its nationals, as well
as diplomatic and consular protection and assistance generally, including in relation to return
to the State of nationality. The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law, op. cit.,
fn. 276, para. II(2). However, this defnition is controversial in that it restricts the defnition
of de facto statelessness to those outside the country of their nationality: Equal Rights Trust,
Unravelling Anomaly: Detention, Discrimination and the Protection Needs of Stateless Persons,
London, July 2010, pp. 6364. See also, Recommendation Rec(2009)13 on the Nationality of
Children, CMCE, Doc. CM/Rec(2009)13, paras. 78; and, Explanatory Memorandum to Rec-
ommendation on the Nationality of Children, CMCE, principle 7, para. 21. The Inter-American
Court adopted the approach of the effective nationality in The Girls Yean and Bosico v. the
Dominican Republic, IACtHR, Series C No. 130, Judgment of 8 September 2005 (Yean and
Bosico Case), para. 142.
they are not subject to any specifc international law protection, are
protected by international human rights law. Of particular relevance are
obligations of non-discrimination, and the principle that rights must be
guaranteed in ways that are practical and effective.
282

The UNHCR expert meeting also recognised that irregular migrants
who are without identity documentation may or may not be unable or
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the country of their
nationality.
283
As a rule there should have been a request by the mi-
grant for protection and a refusal by the State of nationality, before he
or she can be declared de facto stateless. However, prolonged non-co-
operation by the country of nationality in the identifcation procedure or
other proceedings can also be considered a refusal of protection, thus
making the migrant de facto stateless.
284
Similarly, this condition may
also be satisfed in a situation where a country is unable to exercise
diplomatic or consular protection.
Several treaties impose obligations on States aimed at reducing state-
lessness, refecting the right to nationality, enshrined in Article 15
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
285
These are the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the European Convention
on Nationality, and the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the avoid-
ance of statelessness in relation to State succession.
286
An important
safeguard concerning children is set out in Article 7 CRC which requires
that a child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents
[. . .] in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
287
Of
particular interest to the situation of migrants is Article 7 of the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which deal with obliga-

282
See, for example, CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 10; and Article 2.3
ICESCR, which prohibits at least developed States from discriminating between nationals
and non-nationals.

283
The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law, op. cit., fn. 276, para. II(10).

284
See, also, an analysis of Statelessness as lack of effective nationality in the Equal Rights Trust,
Unravelling Anomaly, op. cit., fn. 281; and Hugh Massey, UNHCR and de facto statelessness,
in UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Department of International Protection,
UNHCR, UN Doc. LPPR/2010/01, April 2010.

285
See also, Article 7 CRC and Article 24.3 ICCPR.

286
The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, (Statelessness Convention) provides
specifc obligations on States in order to prevent statelessness as a result of the circumstances
of a persons birth (Articles 14); in cases of marriage, termination of marriage, legitimation
or adoption, (Article 56); or due to loss or renunciation of nationality, or naturalisation proce-
dures, departure, residence abroad, failure to register or any other similar ground (Article 7) or
in cases of transfer of State territory to another State (Article 10). It provides that no person
or group may be deprived of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds
(Article 9).

287
Article 7 CRC. The obligation is refected also in Article 6 ACRWC; Article 20 ACHR, Article XIX
ADRDM, Article 2, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961.
tions to prevent statelessness in case of loss, change or deprivation of
nationality. It provides that a national of a Contracting State shall not
lose his nationality, so as to become stateless, on the ground of depar-
ture, residence abroad, failure to register or on any similar ground.
288

Finally, it is important to note that both the Geneva Refugee Convention
and the Statelessness Convention provide that a State shall as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees [and
of stateless persons]. They shall in particular make every effort to ex-
pedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the
charges and costs of such proceedings.
289

288
Article 7.3, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961. Exceptions to this principle
apply under Article 7.4 to a naturalized person on account of residence abroad for a period,
not less than seven consecutive years, specifed by the law of the Contracting State con-
cerned if he fails to declare to the appropriate authority his intention to retain his nationality.

289
Article 35, Geneva Refugee Convention; and Article 32, Statelessness Convention.
CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPEDIMENTS TO EXPULSION
This Chapter analyses the limitations set by international human rights
and refugee law to the general rule, which derives from the principle
of territorial sovereignty, that a State has a right to expel non-nation-
als from its territory.
290
International human rights law has developed
powerful tools to constrain the exercise of States discretion in expul-
sions. These include both procedural rules (which will be considered in
Chapter 3) and substantive limitations, addressed in this Chapter.
Human rights law can in certain circumstances be used to pre-empt or
overturn any order for the removal of a non-national (or indeed a national)
from the territory. This can apply to any type of involuntary transfer from
the territory, however the transfer is described in the national system,
whether as a deportation, removal, extradition, or in any other terms.
Human rights law may place substantive limitations on expulsion in two
types of situations:
1. Where there is a risk of human rights violations following return
(the principle of non-refoulement). The principle of non-re-
foulement prohibits the transfer of a person to a country where
he or she faces a real risk of a serious violation of human rights,
or of further transfer to a third state where there would be a real
risk of such violations. Although responsibility for the potential
violation lies with the sending State, the focus is on the human
rights situation of the receiving country and the potential for vio-
lation of rights following return there.
2. Where the removal from the sending state would itself violate
rights enjoyed in that state. The removal from the sending state
may also be challenged as violating rights which the individual
enjoys in that State. Here, the human rights situation in the re-
ceiving country is secondary to the issue of whether the expulsion
itself irreversibly prejudices the expellees rights.
I. The principle of non-refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement, prohibiting States to transfer anyone
to a country where he or she faces a real risk of persecution or serious
violations of human rights, is a fundamental principle of international law
and one of the strongest limitations on the right of States to control entry
into their territory and to expel aliens as an expression of their sovereignty.
290
See, fn. 43.
It has its origin in international refugee law
291
and international regula-
tions on extradition.
292
In refugee law, the principle has existed since 1933
and it is now clearly a provision of customary international law binding all
States.
293
In international human rights law, the legal basis of the principle
of non-refoulement lies in the obligation of all States to recognise, secure
and protect the human rights of all people present within their jurisdic-
tion,
294
and in the requirement that a human rights treaty be interpreted
and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.
295

1. Non-refoulement in international refugee law
Regarding refugees, whether a formal determination of refugee status
has been made by the destination country, or whether they are still in
the determination process, or intending to apply for asylum, Article 33.1
of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951
prohibits the State to expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion.
296
This principle

291
Article 33, Geneva Refugee Convention; and Article II.3, OAU Refugee Convention.

292
See, among others, Article 9, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
adopted on 17 December 1979 by G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), UN GAOR, 34
th
Session, Supp.
No. 46, UN Doc. A/34/46; Article 3, European Convention on Extradition, adopted on 13 July
1957; Article 5 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted on
27 January 1977; Article 4, Inter-American Convention on Extradition, adopted on 25 Feb-
ruary 1981; and Article 3, UN Model Treaty on Extradition.

293
See, Article 3, Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, League of Nations,
adopted on 28 October 1933, Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663; Article 4, Provisional Arrange-
ment concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany of 4 July 1938; Article 5, Con-
vention concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany, League of Nations, adopted
on 10 February 1938. On the customary nature of non-refoulement see, UNHCR, The Principle of
Non-refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed
to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases
2 BvR 1938/93, 2 Bvr 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, 31 January 1994; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion
on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, para. 15. See also,
Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII) Non-refoulement, ExCom, UNHCR, 28
th
Session, 1977, para. (a).

294
See, Article 1 ECHR, Article 2 ICCPR, Article 1 ACHPR, and Article 1 ACHR. The Convention
against Torture expressly provides for the principle of non-refoulement in its Article 3.

295
See, for example, Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 14038/88,
7 July 1989, para. 87; Ahorugeze v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application No. 37075/09, Judgment of
27 October 2011, para. 85: [i]t would hardly be compatible with the common heritage of
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law to which the Preamble refers, were
a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a person to another State where there were
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subject to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

296
See Conclusion No. 79, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 79, para. (j). See also, Conclusion No. 81 (XLVIII)
General, ExCom, UNHCR, 48
th
Session, 1997, para. (i); Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII) on Safe-
guarding Asylum, ExCom, UNHCR, 48
th
Session, 1997, para. (di). See also, Concluding
Observations on Portugal, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/PRT, 17 September 2003, para. 83.12.
The OAU Refugee Convention refers to threat to physical integrity or liberty for all the refu-
gees falling in the extended defnition it provides. See, Article 2.3, OAU Refugee Convention.
The OAU Refugee Convention does not admit exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement.
has also been upheld by several international law instruments.
297
It is
not subject to derogation.
298
The refugee law principle of non-refoulement applies both to refugees
present on the territory of the State and as well as at the border.
299
The
principle of non-refoulement also applies to extradition procedures
300

and it must be observed in all situations of large-scale infux.
301
This
fows from the same wording of Article 33.1 which refers to refoulement
in any manner whatsoever, thereby including all forms of transfer of
a person from the territory of asylum or where asylum is sought. The
principle of non-refoulement also bears consequences for temporary or
discretionary protections (see, Chapter 1).
The defnition of refoulement of Article 33.1, unlike the defnition of ref-
ugee, refers to risks arising in any country where the person concerned
might be sent, and not necessarily in the country of origin or habitual
residence. This includes third States which might transfer the person
to an unsafe country (indirect refoulement). The threat to life or free-
dom is also broader than, and includes, the refugee defnition. It has,
indeed, been read as encompassing circumstances of generalised vio-
lence which pose a threat to the life or freedom of the person but which
do not give rise to persecution.
302
Nevertheless, the Geneva Refugee Convention provides for a restriction
on the principle which may not be claimed by a refugee whom there
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a fnal
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.
303

297
See, Articles III and V, Revised Bangkok Declaration; Article 3, Declaration on Territorial
Asylum of 1967, UNGA resolution 2132(XXII), 14 December 1967; Article II.3, OAU Refugee
Convention; Article 22.8 ACHR; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Section III, para. 5.

298
Conclusion No. 79, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 79, para. (i). See also, UNGA resolution 51/75, UN
Doc. A/RES/51/75, 12 February 1997, para. 3.

299
Conclusion No. 6, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 293, para. (c). See also, Conclusion No. 17 (XXXI)
Problems of Extradition Affecting Refugees, ExCom, UNHCR, 31
st
Session, 1980, para. (b).
The need to admit refugees into the territories of States includes no rejection at frontiers
without fair and effective procedures for determining status and protection needs: see, Con-
clusion No. 82, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 296, para. (d-iii).

300
See, Conclusion No. 17, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 299, paras. (c) and (d).

301
See Conclusion No. 19 (XXXI) Temporary Refuge, ExCom, UNHCR, 31
st
Session, 1980,
para. (a); Conclusion No. 22, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 151, para. (II-A-2).

302
See UNHCR, Note on Non-refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner), UN Doc.
EC/SCP/2, 23 August 1977, para. 4; and, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The
Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion, 20 June 2001, pp. 124125,
paras. 128133.

303
Article 33.2, Geneva Refugee Convention. The OAU Refugee Convention does not provide
with exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement which is therefore absolute in Africa.
The restriction to the refugee law principle of non-refoulement focus-
es, therefore, on the refugee representing a danger to the security
or to the community of the country. This is a higher threshold than
that of Article 1F for exclusion from refugee status, as in this case it is
limited only to future threats coming from the person and not to past
activities.
The frst restrictionthe danger to national securitymust concern a
danger in the future and not be only based on past conduct. It must be
a danger to the country of refuge. While the authorities have a certain
discretionary latitude in identifying the danger, they must conduct an
individual assessment on whether there are reasonable grounds for
considering the refugee a danger to national security, based on the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality. In this regard, the authorities
will have to consider: the seriousness of the danger for national secu-
rity; the likelihood of the realisation of the danger and its imminence;
whether the danger to the security would be diminished signifcantly or
eliminated by the removal of the individual; the nature and seriousness
of the risks to the individual from refoulement; and whether other av-
enues may be found whether in the country of refuge or in a third safe
country.
304
The second restriction refers to a danger to the community, which is
to be considered as the safety and well-being of the population in gen-
eral, unlike national security which refers to the interests of the State.
305

The requirement of having been convicted by a fnal judgement of a
particularly serious crime must be read consistently with the exclu-
sion clause in Article 1F(b) which applies to those having committed a
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to their
admission in the country as a refugee. It follows that, in order not to
repeat the provision of exclusion, Article 33.2 necessarily refers only to
particularly serious crimes committed subsequent to the admission as
a refugee.
Contrary to the Geneva Refugee Convention, EU Directive 2011/95/EC
(Qualifcation Directive) confates the restriction grounds of the refugee
law principle of non-refoulement with the exclusion clauses for refu-
gee status, by including among the grounds for revocation, ending or
refusal to grant or renew refugee status
306
and among the exclusion
clauses for subsidiary protection
307
persons constituting a danger to the
community or the security of the State of refuge or of protection. This
difference suggests a rather extensive interpretation of these grounds

304
See, Lauterpacht/Bethlehem, op. cit., fn. 302, pp. 137138, para. 178.

305
See, ibid., p. 140, para. 192.

306
Article 14.45, EU Qualifcation Directive, op. cit., fn. 98.

307
Article 17.1(d), ibid.
for exclusion from refugee status, which would not necessarily be in line
with the Geneva Refugee Convention.
2. Non-refoulement in international human rights law
a) General principles
The principle of non-refoulement is now well established in interna-
tional human rights law, where it applies to all transfers of nationals
or non-nationals, including migrants, whatever their status, as well as
refugees. While only the Convention against Torture explicitly states
the principle, it is implicit in the obligation of States to protect certain
rights of people within their jurisdiction which will otherwise be violated
in another jurisdiction.
308
For the principle of non-refoulement to apply,
the risk faced on return must be real, i.e. be a foreseeable consequence
of the transfer, and personal, i.e. it must concern the individual person
claiming the non-refoulement protection.
309
To date, the principle of non-refoulement has been found by interna-
tional courts and tribunals to apply to risks of violations of the prohibi-
tion of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; of violations of the right to life; and of fagrant denial of justice
and of the right to liberty. It is also likely that the prohibition applies
to other serious violations of other human rights. The Human Rights
Committee has found that non-refoulement covers risk of human rights
violations, including, but not limited to, violations of the right to life or
the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.
310
The European Court of Human Rights has held
that non-refoulement protects the fundamental values of democratic
societies
311
amongst which it has included the prohibition of torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the

308
See, for example, Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, paras. 87 and 90.
The European Court has derived the principle of non-refoulement from the obligation of
States to secure human rights to all people subject to their jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR).
In particular, the Court considered the ECHRs special character as a treaty for the col-
lective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the requirement that
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and
effective.

309
CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 12; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
Application No. 25904/07, Judgment of 17 July 2008, paras. 109, 113; Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR,
GC, Application No. 37201/06, Judgment of 28 February 2008, para. 125; Nnyanzi v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 21878/06, Judgment of 8 April 2008, para. 51; Cruz Varas
and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 15576/89, Judgment of 20 March
1991, para. 69; Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 74; Soering v. Unit-
ed Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, paras. 8591.

310
Ibid., para. 12.

311
Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 127; Chahal v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 43, para. 79.
right to life,
312
and fundamental aspects of the rights to a fair trial
313

and to liberty.
314
The jurisprudence on non-refoulement has been developed most thor-
oughly in the context of refoulement to torture and to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. However, a number of general
principles can be identifed, which apply to all non-refoulement cases,
regardless of whether they involve risks of torture or CIDT. These are
considered below.
Box 9. Women as group at risk for non-refoulement
purposes
The European Court of Human Rights held in a recent case
that the expulsion of an Afghan woman to her native coun-
try would have violated the principle of non-refoulement on
grounds of ill-treatment. The Court found that women are at
particular risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan if perceived as
not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by so-
ciety, tradition and even the legal system.
315
The Court con-
sidered that even the fact of having lived for almost six years
in Sweden, added to the fact that she had tried to divorce her
husband, would expose her to various cumulative risks of
reprisals which fall under Article 3 of the Convention from her
husband X, his family, her own family and from the Afghan
society.
316
b) Source of the risk: acts of non-State actors
In many cases, persons threatened with deportation may face risks on
their return from non-State actorsincluding family members, crimi-
nals, business enterprises or armed groupsrather than from the State.
It is widely accepted that the risk of serious human rights abuses does
not necessarily have to come from State agents in order to trigger the

312
Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application No. 13284/04, Judgment of 8 November
2005, para. 48 (fnding that deportation of the applicant to face execution would violate
Article 2 ECHR as well as Article 3 ECHR).

313
See, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 8139/09, Judg-
ment of 17 January 2012; Al-Moayad v. Germany, ECtHR, Application No. 35865/03, Admis-
sibility Decision, 20 February 2007, paras. 100102.

314
See, for example, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 313;
Z and T v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 27034/05, Admissibility Decision, 28 Feb-
ruary 2006, The Law.

315
N. v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application No. 23505/09, Judgment of 20 July 2010, para. 55.

316
Ibid., para. 62.
protection of non-refoulement, it can also originate from non-State ac-
tors when the State is unwilling or unable to protect the person at risk.
This fows from the importance of the rights at stake
317
and from the
principles applicable in international refugee law.
318
The Committee against Torture is the only international human rights
body which has distanced itself from this principle, due to the limit-
ed defnition of torture provided for by the Convention against Torture,
which excludes the conduct of non-state actors.
319
However, even in this
context, the Committee accepted that in cases of war-torn countries,
where non-State factions have the control of a part of the territory, the
risk of being subject to torture by these non-State actors, who exercise
a quasi-governmental function, can trigger the protection of the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement.
320
The Committee construes this exemption
strictly and it must be considered exceptionally applicable to failed
States.
321

c) Standard of proof: substantial grounds for belief
To demonstrate that a risk to an individual subject to transfer is real,
the standard of proof is that substantial grounds have been shown
for believing
322
that the person risks being subject to a serious vi-
olation of his or her human rights. This must be assessed on grounds

317
Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 110. See also H.L.R. v. France, ECtHR, op.
cit., fn. 43, para. 40; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 1948/04, Judg-
ment of 11 January 2007, paras. 137, 147; N. v. Finland, ECtHR, Application No. 38885/02,
Judgment of 26 July 2005, paras. 163165; M.E. v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 50094/10,
Judgment of 6 June 2013, paras. 4753; Auad v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 49390/10,
Judgment of 11 October 2011, para. 98: What is relevant in this context is whether the ap-
plicant is able to obtain protection against and seek redress for the acts perpetrated against
him or her.

318
UNHCR, Agents of Persecution, op. cit., fn. 82, para. 4. See also, UNHCR Handbook,
op. cit., fn. 66, para. 65; Naveed Akram Choudhary v. Canada, CCPR, Communication
No. 1898/2009, Views of 28 October 2013, paras. 9.79.8; Concluding Observations on
France, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 82, para. 408; Recommendation 1440 (2000), PACE, op. cit.,
fn. 82, para. 6.

319
G.R.B. v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 83/1997, Views of 15 May 1998, para. 6.5.
See also, M.P.S. v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 138/1999, Views of 30 April 2002,
para. 7.4; S.V. et al. v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 49/1996, Views of 15 May 2001,
para. 9.5.

320
Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 120/1998, Views of 25 May 1999,
para. 6.5.

321
H.M.H.I. v. Australia, CAT, Communication No. 177/2001, Views of 1 May 2002, paras. 6.46.6.

322
Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 109, 113; Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 309, para. 125; Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 51;
Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 69; Chahal v. the United
Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 74; Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 295, paras. 8591. See also, Haydin v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 101/1997,
Views of 16 December 1998, para. 6.5; C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT, Communication
No. 279/2005, Views of 22 January 2007, para. 7.3; and A.R.J. v. Australia, CCPR, Commu-
nication No. 692/1996**, Views of 11 August 1997, para. 6.14.
that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. More precisely, the risk need
not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present.
323
To establish that the risk following transfer is personal it must be
shown that the applicant risks as an individual to be subject to a serious
violation of his or her human rights if transferred. However, the person
does not have to demonstrate that he or she is being individually tar-
geted. While the demonstration of the individual risk per se might be
very onerous, there are two types of situations where the risk will be
easier to prove.
Where it can be shown that the State to which the person is to be trans-
ferred violates the rights of (or fails to protect from such violations) oth-
er people in similar circumstances, e.g. members of the same religion,
ethnic minority, political party or association, suspected terrorists, de-
tainees (if he or she risks being subject to detention once repatriated),
or persons who applied for asylum in other States. In such cases, it will
be necessary to demonstrate a widespread or general practice against
the group and a link between the person to be expelled and the group.
The link must be close. Mere membership of a group at risk might not
be suffcient, if only certain categories of members of the group are
generally targeted, e.g. senior members of an opposition political par-
ty.
324
However, risk may sometimes be identifed in respect of large or
general groups, for example, all those detained and accused of criminal
offences,
325
or all those facing a prison sentence.
326

In addition, international human rights bodies may, in exceptional cir-
cumstances, recognise non-refoulement protection for mere general
situations of violence in the country of destination. This will occur only
where there is a real risk simply by virtue of an individual being exposed

323
Haydin v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 322, para. 6.5. See also, C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT,
op. cit., fn. 322, para. 7.3. This is in contrast, for example, with the practice followed in the
USA of applying a more likely than not standard in non-refoulement procedures, which the
Human Rights Committee considered not to be in compliance with the principle of non-re-
foulement under Article 7 ICCPR. See, Concluding Observations on USA, CCPR, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, 15 September 2006.

324
Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, Communications Nos. 1461, 1462,
1476 & 1477/2006*, Views of 31 July 2008, para. 12.5; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 116117. See also, Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 132.
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 148; Isakov v. Russia,
ECtHR, Application No. 14049/08, Judgment of 8 July 2010, para. 109; Yuldashev v. Russia,
ECtHR, Application No. 1248/09, 8 July 2010, para. 83 (detainees); S.H. v. United King-
dom, ECtHR, Application No. 19956/06, Judgment of 15 June 2010 (where the Court found
that the closeness of the Bhutanese Government in addition with policies of discrimination
against the Nepalese ethnicity would be suffcient to enhance the non-refoulement protec-
tion); M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 30696/09, Judgment of
21 January 2011, paras. 296297.

325
Khodzhayev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 52466/08, Judgment of 12 May 2010.

326
Kolesnik v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 26876/08, Judgment of 17 July 2010, para. 72.
to such violence on return.
327
In the case of Suf and Elmi v. the United
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that the threshold
of Article 3 ECHR may, in exceptional circumstances, be attained in
consequence of a situation of general violence of such intensity that any
person being returned to the region in question would be at risk simply
on account of their presence there.
328
The Court in the specifc case
identifed the following non-exhaustive criteria to establish a situation
of general violence: frst, whether the parties to the confict were either
employing methods and tactics of warfare which increased the risk of
civilian casualties or directly targeting civilians; secondly, whether the
use of such methods and/or tactics was widespread among the par-
ties to the confict; thirdly, whether the fghting was localised or wide-
spread; and fnally, the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced
as a result of the fghting.
329
In considering the individuals situation in cases of torture or ill-treat-
ment, evidence of previous human rights violations suffered by the ap-
plicant will reinforce the case for non-refoulement, in particular when
they are relatively recent. International human rights bodies will take
into consideration medical reports to assess whether the applicant suf-
fered post-traumatic stress or mental disorders due to such practices.
330

The substantial grounds for believing that return or expulsion would
expose the applicant to the risk of serious violations of his or her human
rights may be based not only on acts committed in the country of origin,

327
Suf and Elmi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, Judgment
of 28 June 2011, para. 218; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 115, and see
paras. 113114; K.A.B. v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application No. 886/11, Judgment of 5 September
2013, paras. 7291 ; Haydin v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 322, para. 6.3. See also, inter alia, C.T.
and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 322, para. 7.2; G.R.B. v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 319,
para. 6.3; Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, CAT, Communication No. 34/1995, Views of 29 May
1997, para. 9.4.

328
Ibid., para. 226.

329
Ibid., para. 241.

330
See B.S.S. v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 183/2001, Views of 17 May 2004, para. 11.4,
where the Committee that even if it were assumed that the complainant was tortured by the
Punjabi police, it does not automatically follow that, thirteen years after the alleged events
occurred, he would still be at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to India. However,
also see, Dadar v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 258/2004, Views of 5 December 2005,
para. 8.6, where the Committee did not exclude the risk of torture for the fact that the appli-
cants detention occurred between 1979 and 1987, because the applicant was still active in
the opposition movements to the Government of Iran. See, A.F. v. Sweden, CAT, Communi-
cation No. 89/1997, Views of 8 May 1998, para. 6.5. The mere demonstration of instances of
past torture or ill-treatment may, however, not be suffcient: I. v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application
No. 61204/09, Judgment of 5 September 2013, para. 62: the Court considers that where an
asylum seeker, like the frst applicant, invokes that he or she has previously been subjected to
ill-treatment, whether undisputed or supported by evidence, it may nevertheless be expected
that he or she indicates that there are substantial and concrete grounds for believing that upon
return to the home country he or she would be exposed to a risk of such treatment again, for
example because of the asylum seekers political activities, membership of a group in respect
of which reliable sources confrm a continuing pattern of ill-treatment on the part of the author-
ities, a pending arrest order, or other concrete diffculties with the authorities concerned.
in other words before his fight from the country, but also on activities
undertaken by him in the receiving country.
331
The risk posed to the person awaiting transferral, as regards both the
general and the specifc situation he or she may encounter in the State
of destination, is to be assessed according to what was known, or
should have been known, to the State Partys authorities at the time
of the complainants removal.
332
However, if the removal has not been
carried out at the time the international human rights body is exam-
ining the dispute, the situation in the country of expulsion will be as-
sessed in light of the information available at the time of the dispute.
333
While international human rights bodies generally leave to the national
courts the evaluation of facts, in the case of non-refoulement they will
verify whether the national authorities properly evaluated the evidence
brought before them to claim the non-refoulement protection.
334
All the
relevant evidence will be taken into consideration, that which concerns
the personal risk of the individual and evidence supporting a general
situation of violence or the fact that the group of which the applicant is a
member is subject to serious violations of their human rights, including if
the State is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from such viola-
tions.
335
The assessment must be comprehensive and not only analytic.
336

The State cannot rely simply on the evaluation of its own national au-
thorities, without addressing the allegations brought by the applicant.
In particular, the State must demonstrate that the authorities decid-
ed the case by fully and independently considering all the elements
which might demonstrate the risk. Cases which have been dismissed on
mere procedural grounds or on blind reliance of governmental assess-

331
Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, CAT, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 9.5. In S.F. and Others v. Sweden,
ECtHR, Application No. 52077/1, Judgment of 15 May 2012, the European Court of Human
Rights held that the country of return (in this case Iran) had the technology and practice
(internet surveillance) to identify the applicants and their political activities and that this
gave rise to substantial grounds to believe that a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment upon return existed (see, paras. 6871).

332
Agiza v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 233/2003*, Views of 24 May 2005, para. 13.4;
Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 56; Vilvarajah and Others v.
United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 107; Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v.
Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 12.4.

333
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 136; Na v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 112; Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 133; Cruz
Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 76.

334
Nakrash and Qifen v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 1540/2007*, Views of 19 Novem-
ber 2008, para. 7.3. See also, Tarlue v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1551/2007**,
Views of 28 April 2009, para. 7.4; Dadar v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 330, para. 8.8. See
also, Singh Sogi v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 297/2006, Views of 29 November 2007,
para. 10.3; Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, CCPR, Communication No. 1222/2003, Views of
9 December 2004, para. 110.

335
Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 12.4.

336
Na v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 130.
ment of the risk will most probably fail to provide an effective defence
for the State to demonstrate that it fully complied with its obligations
of non-refoulement.
337
In this regard, the European Court of Human
Rights has acknowledged that, owing to the special situation in which
asylum seekers often fnd themselves, it is frequently necessary to give
them the beneft of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility
of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof.
However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to
question the veracity of an asylum seekers submissions, the individual
must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies.
338
In order to assess other relevant factors, such as the general situation
of the country, the exposure to the risk of a particular group or the in-
existence of State protection, reference will be made to other State par-
ties reports, judicial decisions, international organisations and agencies,
such as the UNHCR, international human rights bodies and reliable NGO
reports.
339
The European Court of Human Rights has explained that, in
relying on country information in non-refoulement cases, consideration
must be given to its source, in particular its independence, reliability and
objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation of the au-
thor, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were
compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by
other sources are all relevant considerations. [. . .] [C]onsideration must
[also] be given to the presence and reporting capacities of the author of
the material in the country in question.
340
In their assessment, interna-
tional human rights bodies will consider the material put before them by
the parties but will also obtain information proprio motu if necessary.
341

337
Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 334, paras. 11.211.4; Hussain Khan
v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 15/1994, Views of 18 November 1994, para. 12.3;
Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, CAT, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 9.8: In the present case, the
refusal of the competent Swiss authorities to take up the authors request for review, based
on reasoning of a procedural nature, does not appear justifed in the light of article 3 of the
Convention.

338
S.A. v. Sweden, ECtHR, Application No. 66523/10, Judgment of 27 June 2013, para. 43;
K.A.B. v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 70; A.A. and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR,
Application No. 14499/09, Judgment of 28 June 2012, para. 73.

339
Arkauz Arana v. France, CAT, Communication No. 63/1997, Views of 5 June 2000,
para. 11.4; Mutombo v. Switzerland, CAT, Communication No. 13/1993, Views of 27 April
1994, para. 9.5. See also, Karoui v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 185/2001, Views of
25 May 2002, para. 9; Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland, CAT, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 9.9; Paku
Kisoki v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 41/1996, Views of 8 May 1996, para. 9.5; Pelit
v. Azerbaijan, CAT Communication No. 281/2005, Views of 29 May 2007 para. 11; X, Y and
Z v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 61/1996, Views of 6 May 1998, para. 11.5; Na v.
The United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 119, 122; Dbouba v. Turkey, ECtHR,
Application No. 15916/09, Judgment of 13 July 2010, paras. 4243; M.B. and Others v.
Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 36009/08, Judgment of 15 June 2010, paras. 3233.

340
Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 120121.

341
Ibid., para. 119. Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 52; Saadi v. Italy,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 128130.
International jurisprudence on torture has established the principle that
non-ratifcation or signature of international instruments protecting against
or preventing the violation of the particular right at risk of violation in the
destination country may reinforce the existence of such risk, when a risk
for the applicant has been established.
342
However, even where domestic
laws exist or the State has ratifed international instruments protecting
human rights this will not be suffcient if reports demonstrate resort to or
tolerance of these human rights violations by the national authorities.
343

In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that the existence of domestic laws and the ratifca-
tion of international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights
are not in themselves suffcient to ensure adequate protection against the
risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present case, reliable sources have
reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are
manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention.
344
Furthermore,
the Court held that a State cannot evade its own responsibility by rely-
ing on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements with [the return
State]. Even if it were to be assumed that those agreements made express
provision for the return to [the State of return] of migrants intercepted on
the high seas, the Contracting States responsibility continues even after
their having entered into treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into
force of the Convention or its Protocols in respect of these States.
345
The fact that the expulsion or asylum case received wide publicity
might be a corroborating factor of the need to prevent refoulement, if
there is evidence that this publicity would trigger the anger of State
agents or private actors, in particular where the applicants have not
themselves been the main means of generating the publicity.
346
In the particular case of establishing the risk of the death penalty in the
receiving country, the Human Rights Committee has recalled that it is
not necessary to prove, as suggested by the State Party, that the au-
thor will be sentenced to death [. . .] but that there is a real risk that
the death penalty will be imposed on her. It does not accept the State
Partys apparent assumption that a person would have to be sentenced
to death to prove a real risk of a violation of the right to life.
347
It has

342
Mutombo v. Switzerland, CAT, op. cit., fn. 339, para. 12.5.

343
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 42502/06, Judgment of 11 December 2008,
para. 96; Saadi v. Italy, op. cit., fn. 309 para. 147; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 324, para. 353; Yakubov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 7265/10, Judgment
of 8 November 2011, para. 93.

344
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 128.

345
Ibid., para. 129.

346
Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, CAT, op. cit., fn. 320, para. 6.8; N. v. Finland, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 317, para. 165.

347
Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 1442/2005*, Views of 23 November
2009; para. 9.6.
also specifed that, particularly in cases not involving extradition, a real
risk is to be deducted from the intent of the country to which the per-
son concerned is to be deported, as well as from the pattern of conduct
shown by the country in similar cases.
348
d) Burden of proof
As is common in international human rights mechanisms, the burden to
present an arguable case is on the individual applicant. However, once
the applicant has submitted suffcient information that could have been
verifed by the authorities, the burden shifts to the State Party to ex-
plain the refusal of the non-refoulement protection.
349
It must be kept in mind that the burden of proof is linked to the stan-
dard of proof. An applicant will therefore have to present suffcient in-
formation demonstrating the existence of a risk that is probablereal,
personal and foreseeable. It will then be up to the State to refute the
evidence presented or adduce new information supporting the inappli-
cability of the non-refoulement protection. When the receiving State
has previously granted refugee status and has subsequently withdrawn
it, it will be for the State to demonstrate that the original well-founded
fear of persecution has ceased to exist.
350

Furthermore, if the risk that the transferred person might be exposed
to serious violations of his or her human rights is known or ought to be
known by the State, the fact that the person did not voice such concern
is no excuse not to examine whether the principle of non-refoulement
is applicable.
351
Indeed, in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy,
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that,
despite the allegations by Italy that the migrants intercepted in the high
seas did not formulate a request for international protection, it was for
the national authorities, faced with a situation in which human rights
were being systematically violated [. . .] to fnd out about the treat-
ment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return [. . .].
Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the fact that the parties
concerned had failed to expressly request asylum did not exempt Italy
from fulflling its obligations under Article 3.
352

348
G.T. v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 706/1996**, Views of 4 December 1997,
para. 8.4.

349
A.S. v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 149/1999, Views of 15 February 2001, para. 8.6;
Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 110 and 111.

350
C. v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 900/1999, Views of 13 November 2002, para. 8.5.

351
See, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 346359.
352
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 133. See also, Report to
the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 to
31 July 2009, CPT, op. cit., fn. 265, para. 32.
e) Absolute rights and the obligation of non-refoulement
It is well-established that, where the right which may be violated follow-
ing transfer is an absolute right (such as freedom from torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), the principle of
non-refoulement is equally absolute and is not subject to any excep-
tions, whether in law or in practice.
353
This rule applies to all expulsions,
regardless of considerations of national security, or other strong public
interests, economic pressures or heightened infux of migrants.
354
In
this the protection of the human rights principle of non-refoulement
is broader than that of its refugee law equivalent.
355
There is no hu-
man rights law equivalent to the limitations contained in Article 33.2
of the Geneva Refugee Convention, excluding from protection persons
who are a security threat or who have committed a serious crime (see,
above, Section 1). Consequently, if the expulsion proceedings address
only whether the applicant can claim to be a victim of persecution ac-
cording to the Geneva Refugee Convention, this will not be suffcient for
the purposes of international human rights law, as the national authori-
ties must directly address the issue of real risk of serious human rights
violations in the country of destination, regardless of the potential refu-
gee status of the applicant.
356
As is also clear from the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, what matters are not the reasons
for expulsion, but only the risk of serious violations of human rights
in the country of destination.
357
The Court held in Saadi v. Italy that,
consistently with the absolute nature of Article 3 rights, protection of

353
Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 12.4; Tapia
Paez v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No. 39/1996, Views of 28 April 1997, para. 14.5; Te-
bourski v. France, CAT, Communication No. 300/2006, Views of 11 May 2007, paras. 8.2 and
8.3: Once this person alludes to a risk of torture under the conditions laid down in article 3,
the State Party can no longer cite domestic concerns as grounds for failing in its obligation
under the Convention to guarantee protection to anyone in its jurisdiction who fears that he
is in serious danger of being tortured if he is returned to another country. See also, Dadar
v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 330, para. 8.8; and Concluding Observations on Slovenia, CAT,
Report of the Committee against Torture to the General Assembly, 55
th
Session, UN Doc.
CAT A/55/44, p. 34 (2000), para. 206; Toirjon Abdussamatov and Others v. Kazakhstan,
CAT, Communication no. CAT/C/48/D/444/2010, Views of 1 June 2012, para. 13.7; Saadi v.
Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 127; Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43,
para. 79.

354
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 223224.

355
Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 138; Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 43, para. 80.

356
Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 8320/04, Judgment of 19 June 2008,. para. 120;
Sidikovy v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 73455/11, Judgment of 20 June 2013, para. 149
(the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention is in any event broader than that pro-
vided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees); Toirjon Abdussamatov and Others v. Kazakhstan, CAT, op. cit., fn. 353, pa-
ras. 13.713.9 where the Committee held that an examination by national courts under the
Geneva Refugee Convention was insuffcient to satisfy the States obligations under Article 3
CAT.

357
Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para.138
national security could not justify a more ready acceptance of a risk of
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.
358

f) Diplomatic assurances
A State will sometimes seem to circumvent its obligations of non-re-
foulement by the use of diplomatic assurances, through which the ex-
pelling State requests and receives written guarantees by the author-
ities of the destination State that the person to be sent will not be
subject to certain practices. They range from simple undertakings by
the receiving State that the individual concerned will not be subjected
to torture or ill-treatment or to other violations of human rights, to
more elaborate agreements including arrangements for the monitoring
of the transferred person in custody. Diplomatic assurances are often
regarded as an acceptable means to avert a risk of imposition of the
death penalty, where they are verifable and provided by a reliable gov-
ernment authority. However, such assurances are considerably more
problematic where they are used to justify deportation or extradition
to countries where there is a risk of torture or other ill-treatment, giv-
en that torture is almost always an illicit and clandestine practice. The
effcacy of these assurances must also be called into question by the
fact that they are never enforceable, as they do not typically have legal
effect and are not justiciable. They are normally sought from States
which necessarily disregard even binding legal obligations to prevent
torture and ill-treatment.
359

Jurisprudence of the international human rights courts, treaty bodies
and expert mechanisms establishes that the existence of such assur-
ances cannot bypass the non-refoulement principle and cannot au-

358
Ibid., para.140. This was further underlined by the Court in subsequent cases including
Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 2947/06, Judgment of 24 April 2008,
para. 126; and Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 54131/08, Judg-
ment of 18 February 2010, para. 51; Auad v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 101.

359
See, Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Annual Report to the General
Assembly, UN Doc. A/60/316, 30 August 2005 (Nowak Report 2005); UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, Statement to the Council of Europes Group of Experts
on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, 2931 May 2006; EU Network of
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, The Human Rights Responsibilities of the EU
Member States in the Context of the CIA Activities in Europe (Extraordinary Renditions),
Opinion No. 3-2006, Doc. No. CFR-CDF.Opinion3.2006, 25 May 2006; European Parliament,
Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and
illegal detention of prisoners, 14 February 2007, Resolution no P6_TA (2007)0032; Opinion on
the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret
Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, Council of Europes European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No. 363/2005, CoE
Doc. CDL-AD(2006)009, 17 March 2006; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,
Thomas Hammarberg, Viewpoint: The protection against torture must be strengthened,
18 February 2008; CPT, 15
th
General Report, 22 September 2005, paras. 38-40.
tomatically permit a transfer which would otherwise be prohibited.
360

Whether the assurances are effective and suffcient to permit a trans-
fer is to be assessed on the facts of each particular case. However,
as the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly held, such
assurances are highly unlikely to be suffcient to allow a transfer to
countries where there are reliable reports that the authorities resort
to or tolerate torture or other ill-treatment or when they are not given
by an authority of the destination State empowered to provide them
and the destination State does not have an effective system of torture
prevention.
361
In the case Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, the European
Court of Human Rights for the frst time provided precise indications as
to the highly restrictive conditions that must be satisfed for the accep-
tance of diplomatic assurances in cases of risk of torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court clarifed that, when
considering the reliability of diplomatic assurances, it will assess frst,
the quality of assurances given and, second, whether, in light of the re-
ceiving States practices they can be relied upon. In doing so, the Court
will have regard, inter alia, to the following factors:
(i) whether the terms of the assurances have been disclosed to the
Court [. . .];
(ii) whether the assurances are specifc or are general and vague
[. . .];
(iii) who has given the assurances and whether that person can bind
the receiving State [. . .];

360
Concluding Observations on France, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 188, para. 20; Concluding Obser-
vations on Russia, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, 24 November 2009, para. 17. The
Committee against Torture has categorically stated that under no circumstances must dip-
lomatic guarantees be used as a safeguard against torture or ill-treatment where there are
substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture or ill-treatment upon return, Concluding Observations on Spain, CAT, op. cit., fn. 240,
para. 13; Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras.147148; M.S.S. v. Belgium and
Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 353354; Sidikovy v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 356,
para. 150.

361
Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 147148; Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 356, para. 119; Gafarov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 25404/2009, Judgment of
21 October 2010; Ben Khemais v. Italy, ECtHR, Application No. 246/07, Judgment of 24 Feb-
ruary 2009, para. 61; Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, ECTHR, op. cit., fn. 358, para. 127;
Soldatenko v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 2440/07, Judgment of 23 October 2008,
para. 74; Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 356, para. 119; Makhmudzhan Ergashev
v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 49747/11, 16 October 2012, paras. 7476. However, the
Court specifed in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 313,
para. 193 that the Court has never laid down an absolute rule that a State which does not
comply with multilateral obligations cannot be relied on to comply with bilateral assuranc-
es; the extent to which a State has failed to comply with its multilateral obligations is, at
most, a factor in determining whether its bilateral assurances are suffcient. Equally, there
is no prohibition on seeking assurances when there is a systematic problem of torture and
ill-treatment in the receiving State.
(iv) if the assurances have been issued by the central government of
the receiving State, whether local authorities can be expected to
abide by them [. . .];
(v) whether the assurances concerns treatment which is legal or ille-
gal in the receiving State [. . .]
(vi) whether they have been given by a Contracting State [. . .];
(vii) the length and strength of bilateral relations between the send-
ing and receiving States, including the receiving States record in
abiding by similar assurances [. . .];
(viii) whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively veri-
fed through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, includ-
ing providing unfettered access to the applicants lawyers [. . .];
(ix) whether there is an effective system of protection against torture
in the receiving State, including whether it is willing to cooperate
with international monitoring mechanisms (including internation-
al human rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate
allegations of torture and to punish those responsible [. . .];
(x) whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the re-
ceiving State [. . .]; and
(xi) whether the reliability of the assurances has been examined by
the domestic courts of the sending/Contracting State [. . .].
362
To date, no UN treaty body has approved a transfer on the basis of diplo-
matic assurances against torture, including where elaborate monitoring
mechanisms are purported to be in place.
363
However, they have not in
principle ruled out that such assurances could be suffcient, when it can
be assured that there is a concrete mechanism for monitoring their en-
forcement and arrangements to assure their effective implementation
are present. The Human Rights Committee, in rejecting diplomatic as-
surances with monitoring mechanisms in cases before it, have indicated
that to be acceptable, a monitoring mechanism would, at a minimum,
have to begin to function promptly after the arrival of the concerned
person in the destination State, allow private access to the detainee
by an independent monitor, and allow independent forensic and medi-

362
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 313, para. 189

363
In only one case, Attia v. Sweden, CAT, Communication No.199/2002, Views of 24 Novem-
ber 2003, the Committee against Torture found diplomatic assurances subject to monitoring
to be suffcient to protect against ill-treatment; however in the later related case of Agiza
v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 332, the Committee found that its decision in Attia had been
based on incomplete information, and that the assurances considered in that case had not
in fact prevented the torture of the applicant in Agiza. In Agiza the CAT found that the
procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their
enforcement, did not suffce to protect against this manifest risk [of ill-treatment].
cal expertise, available at any moment.
364
The monitoring undertaken
would have to be, in fact and in the concerned persons perception,
objective, impartial and suffciently trustworthy.
365
Even where such
high levels of safeguards do apply, the former UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture affrmed that diplomatic assurances with regard to torture are
nothing but attempts to circumvent the absolute prohibition of torture
and refoulement.
366

g) Place of transfer: indirect refoulement and internal
relocation
The principle of non-refoulement applies both to transfers to a State
where the person will be at risk (direct refoulement), and to transfers to
States where there is a risk of further transfer to a third country where
the person will be at risk (indirect refoulement).
367
The Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.
Italy, clarifed that the sending State must ensure that the interme-
diary country offers suffcient guarantees to prevent the person con-
cerned being removed to his country of origin without an assessment of
the risks faced.
368
The Court stressed that, including in cases of indirect
refoulement, the State is not exempt from complying with its obliga-
tions under Article 3 of the Convention because the applicants failed to
ask for asylum or to describe the risks faced as a result of the lack of
an asylum system in [the intermediary country of return]. It reiterates
that the [State] authorities [should ascertain] how the [intermediary
country] authorities fulflled their international obligations in relation to
the protection of refugees.
369
In considering whether there is a breach of the principle of non-re-
foulement, the exact location within a country to which the person is to
be transferred may be important. If a person can be safely relocated in
one part of the country, without incurring the risk of violation, the obli-
gation of non-refoulement will not be violated.
370
The federal or unitary

364
Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 1416/2005, Views of 10 November 2006,
para. 11.5; Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324,
paras. 12.512.6; Concluding Observations on Denmark, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5,

365
Pelit v. Azerbaijan, CAT, op. cit., fn. 339, para. 11.

366
Nowak, Report 2005, op. cit., fn. 359, para. 32.

367
CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 12; General Comment No. 1: Imple-
mentation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, CAT, UN Doc. A/53/44,
annex IX, 21 November 1997, para. 2; Hamayak Korban v. Sweden, CAT, Communica-
tion No. 88/1997, Views of 16 November 1998, para. 7; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 141; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324,
para. 342.

368
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 147.

369
Ibid., para. 157.

370
B.S.S. v. Canada, CAT, op. cit., fn. 330, para. 11.5.
character of the State of destination and whether the actors from whom
the violation is feared are under the control of the central government
or of the federated States are points to be taken into consideration.
However, the transfer to one safe zone of the country must not in itself
put the person at risk of being subject to such treatment. If the person
cannot travel to the area concerned, gain admittance and settle there,
without being free from the risk of violations or ending up in a part of
the country where he could be subject to them, the non-refoulement
concern will persist.
371
In the case Suf and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights established a set of criteria to assess when internal relo-
cation would comply with the principle of non-refoulement: as a precon-
dition of relying on an internal fight alternative, certain guarantees have
to be in place: the person to be expelled must be able to travel to the
area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing which an issue
under Article 3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of such guaran-
tees there is a possibility of his ending up in a part of the country of origin
where he may be subjected to ill-treatment [. . .].
372
In a case of reloca-
tion within Iraq, the Court underlined that [o]ne factor possibly weighing
against the reasonableness of internal relocation is that a person is per-
secuted by a powerful clan or tribe with infuence at governmental level.
However, if the clan or tribe in question is not particularly infuential, an
internal fight alternative might be reasonable in many cases.
373
Box 10. The Dublin III Regulation
The European Union Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin III
Regulation), which replaced Regulation 343/2003 (Dublin II
Regulation), holds that only one Member State may examine
the application for international protection of a third country
national. The Regulation sets for a number of criteria to be
used to identify which Member State is responsible for such
protection. By way of exception, a State retains the discretion
to examine an application lodged with it, regardless of the
regulations criteria, and, in this case, becomes the State re-
sponsible for the application.
374

371
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 141.

372
Suf and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 266; D.N.M. v. Sweden,
ECtHR, Application No. 28379/11, Judgment of 27 June 2013, para. 54.

373
S.A. v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit. fn. 338, para. 53.

374
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless
person (recast), EU, OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013, Article 17 (EU Dublin Regulation).
The Regulation provides a hierarchy of criteria for determining
the Member State responsible for the examination of the ap-
plication for international protection, which must be assessed
on the basis of the situation when the application was frst
lodged.
375
The hierarchy is the following:
1. Family members presence: the State where a family
member of the applicant is already a benefciary of or an
applicant for international protection is responsible.
376
2. State of visa or residence document: the State which
gave the applicant for international protection one of
these documents is responsible.
377
3. Irregular entry: the State where the applicant for in-
ternational protection entered irregularly is responsible
until 12 months after the entry took place.
378
4. Five months stay or longer: if the applicant for inter-
national protection has lived for at least fve months in
a State, that State is responsible. If the applicant has
lived in more than one Member state, the last State
where the applicant lived for more than fve months is
responsible.
379
5. Entry with visa waiver: the State which allowed entry
with a visa waiver is responsible.
380
6. Application in airports international transit area: the
State which has jurisdiction in the area is responsible.
381
7. First State of application: where none of the other cri-
teria apply, the State in which the application was frst
lodged is responsible.
382
For unaccompanied minors, the criterion which overrides all
others in determining the Member State responsible for ex-
amining the application is where a State hosts a sibling or a
relative, who is, legally present in that State, that State will
be responsible, provided it is in the best interest of the minor.

375
Ibid., Article 7(2).

376
Ibid., Article 9 and 10.

377
Ibid., Article 12.

378

379

380
Ibid., Article 14.

381
Ibid., Article 15.

382
In the absence of a family member, a sibling or a relative, the
Member State responsible is that where the minor has lodged
his or her application for international protection.
383
The new
Dublin III Regulation also includes an exception for vulner-
able persons who are dependent on the assistance of their
child, sibling or parent legally resident in one Member State,
in which case that Member State becomes responsible for the
application for international protection.
384
The exception also
extends to the case in which his or her child, sibling or parent
legally resident in one of the Member States is dependent on
the assistance of the applicant.
385
The country responsible must take charge of the applicant and
the asylum application, and take back the applicant for inter-
national protection, if he or she is present in another Member
State.
386

The European Court of Human Rights held in the case M.S.S. v.
Belgium and Greece that States may not avoid their interna-
tional responsibility under the principle of non-refoulement sim-
ply by relying on the requirements of the Dublin II Regulation.
The Court ruled that, whenever an automatic transfer to a third
country in implementation of the Dublin Regulation might risk
breach of the principle of non-refoulement, States must avail
themselves of the sovereignity clause of then Article 3.2 of
the Regulation (currently Article 17) in order to avoid breach-
ing their obligations under the European Convention of Human
Rights.
387
The Court stressed that [w]hen they apply the Dublin
Regulation [. . .] the States must make sure that the interme-
diary countrys asylum procedure affords suffcient guarantees
to avoid an asylum seeker being removed, directly or indirectly,
to his country of origin without any evaluation of the risks he
faces
388
of being subjected to a serious violation of human rights.
In a line of subsequent cases, the Court of Justice of the
European Union has held that pursuant to Article 4 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, prohibiting of inhuman and
degrading treatment Member States, including the nation-

383
Ibid., Article 8.

384
Ibid., Article 16.

385
Ibid., Article 16.

386
Ibid., Article 18 and following.

387

388
Ibid., para. 342. See also, Mohammed v. Austria, ECtHR, Application No. 2283/12, Judgment
of 6 June 2013, para. 93; Sharif v. Austria, ECtHR, Application No. 60104/08, Judgment of
5 December 2013.
al courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member
State responsible [. . .] where they cannot be unaware that sys-
temic defciencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception
conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to
substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would
face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading
treatment within the meaning of that provision. Subject to the
right itself to examine the application [. . .], the fnding that it
is impossible to transfer an applicant to another Member State,
where that State is identifed as the Member State responsible
in accordance with the criteria set out in [the Dublin Regulation],
entails that the Member State which should carry out that trans-
fer must continue to examine the criteria set out in that chapter
in order to establish whether one of the following criteria en-
ables another Member State to be identifed as responsible for
the examination of the asylum application. The Member State
in which the asylum seeker is present must ensure that it does
not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of that ap-
plicant have been infringed by using a procedure for determin-
ing the Member State responsible which takes an unreasonable
length of time. If necessary, the frst mentioned Member State
must itself examine the application [. . .].
389
The new Dublin III Regulation has incorporated this approach
in Article 3(2): Where it is impossible to transfer an appli-
cant to the Member State primarily designated as responsi-
ble because there are substantial grounds for believing that
there are systemic faws in the asylum procedure and in the
reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, re-
sulting in the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within
the meaning of Artice 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, the determining Member State shall
continue to examine the [other] criteria [] in order to es-
tablish whether another Member State can be designated as
responsible. Where the transfer cannot be made pursuant to

389
N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v. Refugee Applica-
tions Commissioner and Minister of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, CJEU, Cases C-411/10
and C-493/10, Judgment of 21 December 2011, ruling, para. 2. See also, Migrationsverket v.
Nurije Kastrati and Others, CJEU, Case C-620/10, Judgment of 3 May 2012; Bundesrepublik
Deutschland v. Kaveh Puid, CJEU, Case C-4/11, Judgment of 14 November 2013; CIMADE
and GISTI v. Ministre de lInterieur, de lOutre-mer, des Collectivits territoriales e de lIm-
migration, CJEU, Case C-179/11, Judgment of 27 September 2012; K v. Bundesasylamt,
CJEU, Case C-245/11, Judgment of 6 November 2012; Zuheyr Frayeh Halaf v. Darzhavna
agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet, CJEU, Case C-528/11, Judgment of 30 May
2013; MA, BT and DA v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CJEU, Case C-648/11,
Judgment of 6 June 2013; Shamso Abdullahi v. Bundesasylamt, CJEU, Case C-394/12, Judg-
ment of 10 December 2013.
this paragraph to any Member State designated on the basis
of the criteria [. . .] or to the frst Member State with which the
application was lodged, the determining Member State shall
become the Member State responsible.
390
h) Extraterritorial application of the principle of
non-refoulement
The obligation of non-refoulement applies in unmodifed form to a State
exercising extra-territorial jurisdictionfor example, an occupying pow-
er, a military base abroad or a state operating an extra-territorial deten-
tion centreas has been authoritatively affrmed regarding obligations
under CAT, the ICCPR, and the ECHR,
391
and the Refugee Convention
392

as well as by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
393
For a
general analysis of extra-territorial jurisdiction, see Chapter 1.
3. What rights implicate obligations of
non-refoulement?
As noted above, the range of rights, the risk of whose violation may
entail an obligation on States not to return someone, is not fully settled.
A risk of the most serious violations of a wide range of human rights
has the potential to impose obligations of non-refoulement. The rights
in relation to which such obligations have to date been indicated by in-
ternational courts and tribunals are analysed below. However, the juris-
prudence regarding the range of rights and situations where non-re-
foulement applies continues to develop, and, in practice, the principle
of non-refoulement could have a wide application.

390
The EU Dublin Regulation, Article 3(2).

391
See, inter alia, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; Al-Sadoon and Mufti
v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 61498/08, Admissibility Decision, 30 June 2009;
Concluding Observations on USA, CAT, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 20; Concluding Observations
on USA, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 323. Consider also CAT, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 31,
paras. 7, 16 and 19; Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture. A Commentary, New York City: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 129,
para. 4; p. 147, para. 72 and p. 199, para. 180-1; and the approach adopted by the Human
Rights Committee in its CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 1011;
Concluding Observations on United Kingdom, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3, 10 December 2004,
paras. 4(b) and 5(e). See also, Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried
out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009, CPT, op. cit., fn. 265, para. 40.

392
Lauterpacht/Bethlehem, op. cit., fn. 302, paras. 6267, concludes that: the principle of
non-refoulement will apply to the conduct of State offcials or those acting on behalf of the
State wherever this occurs, whether beyond the national territory of the State in question, at
border posts or other points of entry, in international zones, at transit points, etc. See also,
ibid., para. 242. See further UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application,
op. cit., fn. 293.

393
See, Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 163, 168 and 171.
a) Non-refoulement for torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment
No State can expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another
country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.
394
All
treaties containing this norm and their jurisprudence affrm the abso-
lute nature of this principle, and jurisprudence supports an equal pro-
hibition on expulsion to face cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, as to face torture.
395
The Human Rights Committee has
stated that the principle of non-refoulement applies to all treatment
prohibited by Article 7 ICCPR.
396
The Convention against Torture makes
explicit the obligation of non-refoulement only for torture as defned in
Article 1 of CAT. However, the Committee against Torture has not ad-
dressed refoulement to face a risk of other ill-treatment prohibited by
Article 16 CAT.
397
The danger of torture and ill-treatment can also arise
394
Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 334, para. 11.2; General Comment
No. 20 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment, CCPR, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 10 March 1992, para. 9.
395
Article 7 ICCPR; Article 5(b) ICERD; Article 3 ECHR; Article 5 ACHPR; Article I ADRDM;
Article 5 ACHR; Article 8 ArCHR. For jurisprudence see, inter alia, Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 309, paras. 69, 127; Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 74
and 79; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 109; Nnyanzi v. United King-
dom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 51; Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 309, para. 69; Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, paras. 8591; Rafael
Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. USA, IACHR, Case 9.903, Report No. 51/01, Merits, 4 April 2001,
para. 177; Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 168 and 171; Insti-
tute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) v. Republic of Angola, ACom-
mHPR, Communication No. 292/2004, 43
rd
Ordinary Session, 722 May 2008, paras. 79
and 84; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the Institute for Human Rights
and Development (IHRD) (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v. Republic of Zimbabwe,
ACommHPR, Communication No. 294/2004, 6
th
Extraordinary Session, 30

March3 April 2009,
p. 34, para. 93; Concluding Observations on Argentina, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/65/CO/1,
10 December 2004, para. 13; Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, CERD, UN Doc.
CERD/C/64/CO/7, 10 May 2004, para. 14; Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CERD,
UN Doc. CERD/C/AZE/CO/4, 14 April 2005, para. 13; Concluding Observations on Georgia,
CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/GEO/CO/3, 27 March 2007, para. 17; Concluding Observations on
Lithuania, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/LTU/CO/3, 11 April 2006, para. 14; Concluding Observa-
tions on Uzbekistan, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/UZB/CO/5, 4 April 2006, para. 14; Concluding
Observations on Tanzania, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/TZA/CO/16, 27 March 2007, para. 17;
Concluding Observations on Kazakhstan, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/65/CO/3, 10 December
2004, para. 15.

396
CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para.12

397
Article 3 CAT. The Committee against Torture has not addressed the question whether the
transfer of a person to a country could put the person at a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, according to Article 16 of the Convention. The Committee has
dealt with the issue of whether the decision of the transfer would in itself constitute an act
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In its jurisprudence the Commit-
tee found that neither the aggravation of the complainants state of health possibly caused
by his deportation, nor the fact that the complainants deportation to [the State of destina-
tion] may give rise to subjective fears amount to the type of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. See, B.S.S. v. Canada, CAT, op. cit., fn. 330, para. 10.2; David v. Sweden, CAT,
Communication No. 220/2002, Views of 17 May 2005, para. 7.2.
through practices linked to the imposition of the death penalty, which
will be addressed below.
Within the threshold of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment fall not only acts that cause severe physical
pain or actual bodily injury but also acts that cause intense mental suf-
fering, fear, anguish or feelings of inferiority to the victims, or humiliate
or debase them.
398
Whether the threshold for conduct that amounts to
such treatment or punishment has been passed may depend on the
sex, age or health of the victim.
399
In addition to physical ill-treatment
during arrest or interrogation,
400
examples of acts which international
human rights mechanisms have found to amount to such treatment
include:
corporal punishment
401
or other cruel punishment
402
whether im-
posed as a result of a judicial order or not;
acts of sexual violence, including but not limited to rape;
403

prolonged incommunicado detention;
404
harmful practices against women and girls such as female genital
mutilation;
405

unnecessarily prolonged or repeated solitary confinement;
406
very poor prison conditions or prison overcrowding, or failure to
provide adequate medical attention in detention, having regard

398
Raninen v. Finland, ECtHR, Case No. 52/1996/771/972, Judgment of 16 December 1997,
para. 167; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 219; CCPR, General
Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 394, para. 5.

399
Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 134.

400
Ribitsch v. Austria, ECtHR, Application No. 18896/91, Judgment of 4 December 1995, para. 38.

401
CCPR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 394, para. 5; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
Application No. 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978; Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, Application No. 13134/87, Judgment of 25 March 1993.

402
Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 356, para. 121; Jabari v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 116, paras. 4142.

403
C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 322, para. 7.5; M.C. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Ap-
plication No. 39272/98, Judgment of 4 December 2003; Aydin v. Turkey, ECtHR, Case
No. 57/1996/676/866, Judgment of 25 September 1997, paras. 8386.

404
Concluding Observations on USA, CAT, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 17; General Comment No. 20,
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 394, para. 6; Theo Van Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report
on the Special Rappoerteurs visit to Spain, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2, 6 February
2004, para. 34.

405
Kaba and Kaba v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1465/2006, Views of 25 March 2010,
para. 10.1.

406
CCPR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 394, para. 6; Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, ECtHR,
Application No. 39042/97, Judgment of 29 April 2003; R. v. Denmark, ECommHR, Plenary,
Application No. 10263/83, Admissibility Decision, 11 March 1985; McFeeley v. United King-
dom, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 8317/78, Admissibility Decision, 15 May 1980.
to the cumulative effects of the conditions, and to the length of
detention (see, further, Chapter 4 on detention);
407

repeated or unnecessarily intrusive strip searches;
408
domestic violence;
409
the most severe forms of race discrimination.
410
time spent on death row awaiting execution (see below).
This is by no means an exhaustive list. For example, the European Court
of Human Rights has held in the landmark case D v. United Kingdom
that the expulsion of a non-national diagnosed in the terminal phase
of AIDS would have amounted to inhuman treatment, as he would not
have had access to the medical and palliative treatment available in the
UK in the receiving country.
411
Nevertheless, the Court has cautioned
that such cases should be viewed as exceptional. The principle must
apply in relation to the expulsion of any person afficted with any seri-
ous, naturally occurring physical or mental illness which may cause suf-
fering, pain and reduced life expectancy and require specialised med-
ical treatment which may not be so readily available in the applicants
country of origin or which may be available only at substantial cost.
412

407
Peers v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 28524/95, Judgment of 19 April 2001, paras. 6775;
Ilascu and Others v. Russia and Moldova, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 48787/99, Judgment
of 8 July 2004; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 366368;
Conteris v. Uruguay, CCPR, Communication No. 139/1983, Views of 17 July 1985.

408
Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No 50901/99, Judgment of 4 February
2003; Valasinas v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Application No. 44558/98, Judgment of 24 July 2001.

409
Z and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 29392/95, Judgment of 10 May
2001.

410
Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 25781/94, Judgment of 10 May 2001; East
African Asians v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Applications nos 4403/70-4419/70 and others,
Report of 14 December 1973.

411
D. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997, paras. 4954.

412
N. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 26565/05, Judgment of 27 May 2008, para.
45; Ahorugeze v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit. fn. 295, paras. 8895: Nacic and Others v. Sweden,
ECtHR, Application No. 16567/10, Judgment of 15 May 2012, paras. 4956, S.H.H. v. the
United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 60367/10, Judgment of 29 January 2013 (where a
case of disability of a returnee to Afghanistan did not meet the threshold of Article 3 ECHR).
In Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 10486/10, 20 December 2011,
paras. 8286, a majority of the judges appended a partially concurring opinion stating that
un seuil de gravit aussi extrmetre quasi-mourantest diffcilement compatible avec la
lettre et lesprit de larticle 3, un droit absolu qui fait partie des droits les plus fondamentaux
de la Convention et qui concerne lintgrit et la dignit de la personne. A cet gard, la dif-
frence entre une personne qui est sur son lit de mort ou dont on sait quelle est condamne
bref dlai nous parat infme en termes dhumanit. Nous esprons que la Cour puisse un
jour revoir sa jurisprudence sur ce point, partially concurring opinion, para. 6. See also,
CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, para. 50: In the view of the Committee, this
principle covers the risk of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
including inhumane and degrading conditions of detention for migrants or lack of necessary
medical treatment in the country of return, as well as the risk to the right to life.
In the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court held that a sit-
uation in which a State, through its inaction, leads an asylum-seeker
to live in the street for several months, with no resources or access
to sanitary facilities and without means to provide for his or her es-
sential needs, combined with a prolonged uncertainty on the outcome
of the asylum procedure, attains the level of inhuman or degrading
treatment.
413
It also held that a State expelling a person to a country
where he or she risks to be subject to this situation would breach its
obligations under the principle of non-refoulement.
414
In the case of
Suf and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, in assessing whether situations
of humanitarian crisis could reach the threshold of inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment for the application of the principle non-refoulement, the
Court applied the M.S.S. test, which requires it to have regard to an
applicants ability to cater for his most basic needs, such as food, hy-
giene and shelter, his vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of
his situation improving within a reasonable time-frame.
415
The Court
decided to apply this test because it was clear that, while drought has
contributed to the humanitarian crisis, that crisis is predominantly due
to the direct and indirect actions of the parties to the confict
416
in the
country of return. However, it also warned that, if the dire humanitari-
an conditions in Somalia were solely or even predominantly attributable
to poverty or to the States lack of resources to deal with a naturally
occurring phenomenon, such as a drought, the more stringest test
in N. v. the United Kingdom may well have been considered to be the
appropriate one.
417
The Human Rights Committee found, in the case of X.H.L. v. the
Netherlands, that, in respect of an unaccompanied minor, State au-
thorities had breached the childs rights to protection (Article 24 ICCPR)
linked with the right not to be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment (Article 7 ICCPR) because they had failed to take into con-
sideration, before returning him to his country of origin, of the best
interest of the child. [W]ithout a thorough examination of the potential
treatment that [he] may have been subjected to as a child with no iden-
tifed relatives and no confrmed registration,
418
he would be impeded
from prov[ing] his identity or access any social assistance services
419

in the country of origin.

413
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 263.

414
Ibid., paras. 366368.

415
Suf and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 327, para. 283.

416
Ibid., para. 282.

417
Ibid..

418
X.H.L. v. the Netherlands, CCPR, Communication No. 1564/2007, 22 July 2011, para. 10.3.

419
Ibid., para. 10.2.
b) Enforced disappearances
The principle of non-refoulement also applies when there is a risk of en-
forced disappearance
420
since this practice in itself constitutes a grave
and fagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
421

and an offence to human dignity.
422
c) Extra-judicial executions and the right to life
Extrajudicial executions constitute a serious violation of the absolute and
non-derogable right to life to which the principle of non-refoulement ap-
plies, as has been clearly affrmed by the Human Rights Committee
423
and
in the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
424
Article 5 of which states that
no one shall be involuntarily returned or extradited to a country where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she may become
a victim of extra-legal, arbitrary or summary execution in that country.
d) Non-refoulement and the death penalty
Under international human rights law, the transfer of a person to a
country where there is a risk of subjection to the death penalty may
entail violations of the right to life and/or the freedom from torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The Human Rights Committee has found that [f]or countries that have
abolished the death penalty, there is an obligation not to expose a per-
son to the real risk of its application [. . .] if it may be reasonably an-
ticipated that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that
the death sentence would not be carried out.
425
This obligation arises
irrespective of whether the expelling State has entered into internation-
al treaties prohibiting the death penalty, but merely from the fact that
the State has abolished the death penalty domestically.
426
However, the

420
Article 16, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, adopted on 20 December 2006 (CPED); Article 8, UN Declaration on the Protec-
tion of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992, A/RES/47/133.

421
Article 1, UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

422
Ibid.

423
Baboeram et al. v. Suriname, CCPR, Communications Nos. 146/1983 and 148154/1983,
Views of 4 April 1985; Naveed Akram Choudhary v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 318,
paras. 9.79.8; General Comment No. 6, The Rights to Life, CCPR, 30 April 1982, para. 3.

424
See, ECOSOC Resolution No. 1989/65, Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal,
arbitrary and summary executions, 15
th
Plenary meeting, 24 May 1989.

425
Judge v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 829/1998, Views of 20 October 2003, para. 10.4;
reconfrmed in Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 347, para. 9.4.

426
This decision constituted a change of jurisprudence of the Committee which had previously not
found this obligation to arise. See, Kindler v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 470/1991*,
Views of 18 November 1993; Ng v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 469/1991*, Views of
7 January 1994; A.R.J. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 322.
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
can also enter into play in cases of transfer with risk of imposition of the
death penalty as the imposition of a death sentence on a person after
an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he/
she will be executed in violation of article 7 [ICCPR].
427
Furthermore,
the Committee has found that execution by gas asphyxiation did not
meet the test of least possible physical and mental suffering, and was
in violation of Article 7 ICCPR.
428
The European Court of Human Rights has regularly found violations of
Article 3 ECHR (freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment) in cases of refoulement to face the death penal-
ty, especially where the penalty would be preceded by time on death
row.
429
However, it has also considered such expulsions a violation of
the right to life, enshrined in Article 2 ECHR. Thus, it has stated that in
circumstances where there are substantial grounds to believe that the
person in question, if extradited, would face a real risk of being liable
to capital punishment in the receiving country, Article 2 implies an obli-
gation not to extradite the individual.
430
Even more strongly, the Court
has considered that, if an extraditing State knowingly puts the person
concerned at such high risk of losing his life as for the outcome to
be near certainty, such an extradition may be regarded as intentional
deprivation of life, prohibited by Article 2 of the Convention.
431
The European Court has recently stated that, in respect of those States
which are bound by it, the right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 not to
be subjected to the death penalty, which admits of no derogation and
applies in all circumstances, ranks along with the rights in Articles 2
and 3 as a fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values of the
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
432
Moreover, the
Court has suggested that the high level of ratifcation of Protocol 13, as
well as State Practice in observing the moratorium on capital punish-
ment are strongly indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to
prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances.
433

As to when the death penalty will involve inhuman and degrading treat-
ment or punishment, the European Court has specifed that [t]he man-

427
Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 347, para. 9.4.

428
Ng v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 426, para. 16.4.

429
Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 391, para. 137.

430
Kaboulov v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 41015/04, Judgment of 19 November 2009.

431
Ibid., para. 99.

432
Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 391, para. 118. 42 of the 47 Coun-
cil of Europe Member States have ratifed Protocol 13, and another three have signed it thereby
engaging not to act in a way that defeats the object and purpose of the treaty until ratifcation
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna, 23 May 1969, Article 18).

433
Ibid., para. 120.
ner in which [the death penalty] is imposed or executed, the personal
circumstances of the condemned person and a disproportionality to the
gravity of the crime committed, as well as the conditions of detention
while awaiting execution, are examples of factors capable of bringing
the treatment or punishment received by the condemned person within
the proscription under Article 3 [. . .] as a general principle, the youth of
the person concerned is a circumstance which is liable, with others, to
put in question the compatibility with Article 3 of measures connected
with a death sentence [. . .].
434
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that sending
back asylum-seekers to face a risk of being killed subsequent to their
attempt to seek asylum abroad constituted a violation of their right to
life under Article I of the American Declaration on Rights and Duties
of Man.
435
This principle also applies to migrants, who are not asy-
lum-seekers stricto sensu, but who risk summary, arbitrary or extra-
judicial execution in their country of destination. The obligation also
arises when the person to be sent has been intercepted on the high
seas and returned to the country of departure.
436
e) The death row phenomenon
On the death row phenomenon, the Human Rights Committee has
stated that prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial
regime on death row cannot generally be considered to constitute cru-
el, inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely
availing himself of appellate remedies.
437
In each particular case, the
Committee will have regard to the relevant personal factors regard-
ing the author, the specifc conditions of detention on death row, and
whether the proposed method of execution is particularly abhorrent.
438

In Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
defned its view on the death row phenomenon: having regard to the
very long period of time spent on death row in such extreme conditions,
with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of
the death penalty, and to the personal circumstances of the applicant,
especially his age and mental state at the time of the offence, the ap-
plicants extradition to the United States would expose him to a real
risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. A further
consideration of relevance is that in the particular instance the legiti-

434
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 36378/02, Judgment
of 12 April 2005, para. 333.

435
Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 168.

436
Ibid., para. 169.

437
Kindler v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 426, para. 15.2.

438
Ibid., para. 15.3; See also, Ng v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 426, para. 16.1.
mate purpose of extradition could be achieved by another means which
would not involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration.
439
f) Flagrant denial of justice and of the right to liberty
Both the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human
Rights have held that certain violations of the right to fair trial in the
country of destination can trigger the protection of non-refoulement.
The Human Rights Committee has implied that in certain cases an ex-
pulsion could not be carried out if a violation of the right to fair trial
under Article 14 ICCPR of the person to be transferred would be a fore-
seeable consequence of the deportation.
440

After having repeatedly suggested in its jurispduence that a violation
of Article 6 ECHR may arise in cases of extradition or expulsion,
441
the
European Court of Human Rights ruled for the frst time that this pro-
vision had been breached because of the existence of a risk of suffer-
ing a fagrant denial of justice in the requesting country, in the case
of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom.
442
The Court clarifed
that the term fagrant denial of justice has been synonymous with
a trial which is manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the
principles embodied therein
443
and pointed out to a non-exhaustive
list of examples where this violation may occur: conviction in absen-
tia with no possibility subsequently to obtain a fresh determination of
the merits of the charge [. . .]; a trial which is summary in nature and
conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the defence [. . .];
detention without any access to an independent and impartial tribu-
nal to have the legality the detention reviewed [. . .]; deliberate and
systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for an individual
detained in a foreign country [. . .].
444
The Court held in this case that
the admission of torture evidence in criminal proceedings constitut-
ed a fagrant denial of justice for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR and
did not exclude that similar considerations may apply in respect of

439
Soering v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, para. 111. See also, Ilascu and
Others v. Russia and Moldova, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 406, paras. 429432; Al-Sadoon and
Mufti v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010,
paras. 123145.

440
A.R.J. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 322, para. 6.15; Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, op. cit.,
fn. 364, para. 11.9.

441
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 130; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,
ECtHR, GC, Applications Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005, para.
90; Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 358, para. 61; Al-Sadoon and Mufti
v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 439, paras. 149150; and, Soering v. United King-
dom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, para. 113; Z and T v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 314,
The Law.

442
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 313, para. 258.

443
Ibid., para. 259.

444
Ibid.
evidence obtained by other forms of ill-treatment which fall short of
torture.
445
The European Court stressed that the test of fagrant denial of justice
is a stringent test of unfairness. A fagrant denial of justice goes be-
yond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures
such as might result in a breach of Article 6 if occurring within the
Contracting State itself. What is required is a breach of the principles of
fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 which is so fundamental as to amount
to a nullifcation, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guar-
anteed by that Article. In assessing whether this test has been met, the
Court considers that the same standard and burden of proof should
apply as in Article 3 expulsion cases. Therefore, it is for the applicant to
adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds
for believing that, if he is removed from a Contracting State, he would
be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a fagrant denial of jus-
tice.
446
With regard to the right to liberty, the Human Rights Committee has
suggested that the foreseeable risk of being subject to arbitrary deten-
tion in the country of destination as a consequence of the transfer might
amount to a violation of Article 9 ICCPR.
447

After having addressed this principle only superfcially in the past,
448
the
European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada)
v. the United Kingdom, although it did not fnd on the facts a breach of
the right to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) in regard to non-refoulement, made
clear that it would be illogical if an applicant who faced imprisonment
in a receiving State after a fagrantly unfair trial could rely on Article 6
to prevent his expulsion to that State but an applicant who faced im-
prisonment without any trial whatsoever could not rely on Article 5 to
prevent his expulsion. Equally, there may well be a situation where
an applicant has already been convicted in the receiving State after a
fagrantly unfair trial and is to be extradited to that State to serve a
sentence of imprisonment. If there were no possibility of those crim-
inal proceedings being reopened on his return, he could not rely on
Article 6 because he would not be at risk of a further fagrant denial of

445
Ibid., para. 267: the Court considers that the admission of torture evidence is manifestly
contrary, not just to the provisions of Article 6, but to the most basic international standards
of a fair trial. It would make the whole trial not only immoral and illegal, but also entirely
unreliable in its outcome. It would, therefore, be a fagrant denial of justice if such evidence
were admitted in a criminal trial. The Court does not exclude that similar considerations
may apply in respect of evidence obtained by other forms of ill-treatment which fall short of
torture.

446
Ibid., paras. 260261. For a recent case where no violation of Article 6 ECHR was found,
applying this test, see Ahorugeze v. Sweden, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 295, paras. 113129.

447
G.T. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 348, para. 8.7.

448
Z and T v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 314.
justice. It would be unreasonable if that applicant could not then rely on
Article 5 to prevent his extradition.
449
More specifcally, the Court indicated that a Contracting State would be
in violation of Article 5 if it removed an applicant to a State where he
or she was at real risk of a fagrant breach of that Article. However, as
with Article 6, a high threshold must apply.
450
g) Freedom of religion or belief
The expulsion of a person to a country where he or she would be at risk
of a fagrant denial of his or her freedom of religion is also prohibited.
Freedom of religion or belief guarantees both a right to hold a religiousor
equivalent non-religious beliefand a freedom to manifest ones religion
or belief not only in community with other people, in public and within
the circle of fellow believers, but also alone and in private.
451
However,
the right to manifest ones religion or belief, unlike the right to hold a
belief or religion, is not an absolute one, and can be restricted, in com-
pliance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality, only
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
452

The European Court of Human Rights has stated that not all cases in
which the freedom to manifest ones religion would not be respected
in the receiving country can fall under the protection of the non-re-
foulement principle. The Court has found two situations in which this
protection would apply:
where there is a substantiated claim that they will either suffer
persecution for, inter alia, religious reasons or will be at risk of
death or serious ill-treatment, and possibly flagrant denial of a fair
trial or arbitrary detention, because of their religious affiliation;
in exceptional circumstances, where there was a real risk of fla-
grant violation of freedom of religion or belief in the receiving
State. The Court has, however, noted that it would be difficult to
think of a case in which this situation would not also amount to
non-refoulement for reasons of torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
453

449
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., fn. 313, para. 232.

450
Ibid., para. 233. In the case at stake, ffty days detention fell short of the length of deten-
tion required for a fagrant breach of Article 5, para. 235

451
Z and T v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 314, The Law; Kokkinakis v. Greece, ECtHR,
Application No. 14307/88, Judgment of 25 May 1993, p. 17, para. 31.

452
Article 9.2 ECHR; Article 18.3 ICCPR; Article 12.3 ACHR; Article 8 ACHPR allows for restric-
tions on the basis of law and order; Article 30.2 ArCHR.

453
Z and T v. United Kingdom, EctHR, op. cit., fn. 314.
II. Expulsion as a violation of rights enjoyed in
the sending State
In addition to non-refoulement, human rights law imposes a second
type of limitation on the States ability to transfer non-nationals: where
the removal from the country of refuge would in itself, irrespective of
where the individual is sent, represent an unjustifable interference with
certain human rights. Although a range of rights could in principle be
affected by a removal, the principle has to date primarily been applied
by international human rights authorities in relation to the right to re-
spect for family life, the right to respect for private life,
454
and to the
right to freedom of religion or belief. In relation to those rights, an in-
terference with rights resulting from a removal will be considered to be
justifed where it is prescribed by law, necessary and proportionate to
a legitimate aim.
1. The right to respect for private and family life
The right to respect for private and family life is enshrined in a number
of human rights treaties.
455
This right, unlike the prohibition of torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, can be sub-
ject to derogation in times of emergency and it allows for restrictions
to its enjoyment where they are in accordance with the law; pursue a
legitimate aim, are necessary in a democratic society, are proportionate
to the aim pursued, and are non-discriminatory.
The meaning of family for the purposes of the right to respect for fam-
ily life is a broad one, which has been progressively extended by the
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, refecting changing
social values, and may continue to develop in the future. The defnition
is set out in detail in Chapter 1, Section 3. Even where a relationship
is found not to amount to family life, however, the right to respect for
private life may apply to prevent the removal of a migrant from the
jurisdiction. The right to respect for private life extends to protection
of personal and social relationships. The European Court has noted
that it protects the right to establish and develop relationships with
other human beings and the outside world [. . .] and can sometimes
embrace aspects of an individuals social identity [and that] it must be
accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and
the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of

454
Slivenko v. Latvia, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 48321/99, Judgment of 9 October 2003,
para. 95; ner v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 46410/99, Judgment of
18 October 2006, para. 59; Onur v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 195, para. 46; A.W.
Khan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 198, para. 31.

455
Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR; Article 9 CRC; Article 8 ECHR; Article 11 ACHR; Article V ADRDM;
Article 18 ACHPR; Articles 21 and 33 ArCHR.
private life within the meaning of Article 8.
456
Therefore, expulsion
of a settled migrant, even where he or she has not developed a family
life in the jurisdiction, may constitute an interference with his or her
private life.
a) Expulsion as interference to the right to respect for family
and private life
As noted above, expulsion, as an interference with the right to private
and family life, must be in accordance with the law. This requires
that it must:
have a basis in domestic law;
be accessible to the persons concerned;
be sufficiently precise to enable those concerned to foresee, to a
degree that is reasonable and if necessary with appropriate ad-
vicethe consequences of their actions.
457
The expulsion must also pursue a legitimate aim. The maintenance
and enforcement of immigration control is considered by itself to con-
stitute a legitimate aim for restrictions to the rights of family and pri-
vate life,
458
as are reasons of national security and public order. Merely
claiming that these aims are pursued is not suffcient, however: the
action must be shown to truly advance the aim and be necessary to
reach it.
459
The decision to expel must also be necessary in a democratic so-
ciety, which requires that it be justifed by a pressing social need,
and proportionate to the aim pursued. The requirement of propor-
tionality means that there must be relevant and suffcient reasons for
the measure, that no less restrictive measure is feasible; that ade-
quate safeguards against abuse should be in place; and that the mea-
sure should be imposed by way of a fair procedure. The Human Rights
Committee has found that in cases where one part of a family must
leave the territory of the State Party while the other part would be en-
titled to remain, the relevant criteria for assessing whether or not the
specifc interference with family life can be objectively justifed must
be considered, on the one hand, in light of the signifcance of the State
Partys reasons for the removal of the person concerned and, on the

456
ner v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 454, para. 59; Onur v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 196, para. 46; A.W. Khan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 198, para. 31;
Vasquez v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 1785/08, Judgment of 26 November 2013,
para. 37.

457
Onur v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 196, para. 48.

458
Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 76.

459
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 78.
other, the degree of hardship the family and its members would en-
counter as a consequence of such removal.
460
In this regard, for example, conviction for drug-related offences or
for offences carrying a considerable prison sentence will more often
incline the Committee to fnd expulsions reasonable, even when that
would cause considerable hardship for the applicants family, in partic-
ular when the rest of the family did not join the applicant in the com-
munication before the Committee.
461
However, the decision would be
disproportionate if it was de facto impossible [. . .] to continue family
life outside of the expelling country.
462
In addition, the European Court
of Human Rights has held that, when the children are remaining in the
expelling country and the expellee has a proven family relationship with
them, the childrens best interest must be taken into account.
463
Finally,
it is important to stress that an expulsion following criminal conviction
does not run afoul of the principle of prohibition of double jeopardy, as
it is to be considered a measure which is preventive rather than punitive
in nature.
464
In cases where the person is to be expelled as a consequence of com-
mitting a criminal offence, the European Court of Human Rights has
established guiding criteria to be considered in evaluating whether a
measure of expulsion that interferes with private or family life, is nec-
essary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued:
465
1. the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the app-
licant;
2. the length of the applicants stay in the country from which he or
she is to be expelled;

460
Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 334, para. 11.7; Madafferi and Madafferi v.
Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 1011/2001, Views of 26 August 2004, para. 9.8; Omo-
judi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No.1820/08, Judgment of 24 November 2009.

461
Ibid., para. 11.8.

462
Amrollahi v. Denmark, ECtHR, Application No. 56811/00, Judgment of 11 July 2002, paras.
3644; Sezen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 50252/99, Judgment of 31 January
2006; Jama Warsame v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1959/2010, Views of 21 July
2011, para. 8.10.

463
Udeh v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 12020/09, Judgment of 16 April 2013, paras.
5254.

464
ner v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 454, paras. 5458; Vasquez v. Switzerland,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 456, para. 50 (the duration of the exclusion from the territory is part of
the proportionality assessment of the measure).

465
Boultif v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 54273/00, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para.
48. See also, Hamidovic v. Italy, ECtHR, Application No. 31956/05, Judgment of 4 December
2012. [T]he factors to be examined in order to assess the proportionality of the deporta-
tion measure are the same regardless of whether family or private life is engaged, A.A. v.
the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 8000/08, Judgment of 20 September 2011,
para. 49.
3. the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the appli-
cants conduct during that period;
4. the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
5. the applicants family situation, such as the length of the mar-
riage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couples
family life;
6. whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he
or she entered into a family relationship;
7. whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age;
8. the seriousness of the diffculties which the spouse is likely to
encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled;
9. the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the
seriousness of the diffculties which any children of the applicant
are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to
be expelled; and
10. the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country
and with the country of destination.
466
Concerning the length of stay, the Court considers that the longer a
person has been residing in a particular country, the stronger his or her
ties with that country and the weaker the ties with the country of his or
her nationality will be.
467
Special consideration should be given to situ-
ations where non-nationals have spent most, if not all, of their childhood
in the host country, were brought up and received education there.
468

The Court has also found a violation of Article 8 when the combined ef-
fect of expulsion and custody and access proceedings and the failure to
coordinate them have prevented family ties from developing.
469
The African Commission, moreover, held that a person subject to an ex-
pulsion measure who would be separated from family members must be

466
Numbers are added. There is no hierarchy implied. On the early application of some of these
principles, see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43.

467
ner v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 454, para. 58; Konstatinov v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 196, para. 49.

468
In the case of an Algerian national convicted of criminal offences to be expelled by France to
his home country, the Court found the decision not proportional, as the applicant was deaf
and dumb and capable of achieving a minimum psychological equilibrium only within his
family whose members were French nationals with no ties to Algeria: Nasri v. France, ECtHR,
Application No. 19465/92, Judgment of 13 July 1995, paras. 41 and 46.

469
Ciliz v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 197. The African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples Rights has also found that an unlawful deportation infringed the State duty to protect
and assist the family: see, Amnesty International v. Zambia, ACommHPR, Communication
No. 212/98, 25
th
Ordinary Session, May 1999, para. 51; Modise v. Botswana, ACommHPR,
th
Ordinary Session, 23 October6 November 2000, para. 92.
given a reasonable time to make arrangements for the departure and
for continued contact with the other members of the family. In the case
Kenneth Good v. Republic of Botswana, the Commission found that the
time of 56 hours given to a father who had to leave behind his daughter
was clearly inadequate to make suffcient family arrangements and
therefore contrary to family life rights under Article 18 ACHPR.
470
2. Expulsions and rights to Freedom of Religion or
Belief and Freedom of Expression
The right to freedom of religion or belief, protected under the ICCPR as
well as regional human rights treaties
471
may prevent the removal of
an individual from the country of refuge where the removal itself would
violate rights of freedom of religion or belief. As noted above, both the
right to hold a religious or other equivalent beliefwhich is an abso-
lute rightand the right to manifest ones religion in community with
other people, in public and within the circle of fellow believers, as well
as alone and in private, are protected by international human rights
law.
472
Freedom of religion includes the right to proselytise.
473
However,
the right to manifest ones religion, unlike the right to hold a thought,
belief or religion, is not an absolute right, and can be restricted where
prescribed by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim and in compliance with
the principles of necessity and proportionality.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that deportation does
not [. . .] as such constitute an interference with the rights guaranteed
by Article 9 [freedom of religion or belief], unless it can be established
that the measure was designated to repress the exercise of such rights
and stife the spreading of the religion or philosophy of the followers.
474
As with interferences with the right to respect for family life, measures
affecting freedom of religion, including expulsion, must be provided for
by law. The law must be accessible, foreseeable, suffciently precise and
must provide a remedy against the arbitrary use by public authorities
of such restriction.
475

470
Good v. Republic of Botswana, ACommHPR, Communication No. 313/05, 47
th
Ordinary Ses-
sion, May 2010, para. 213.

471
Article 18 ICCPR; Article 9 ECHR; Article 12 ACHR; Article III ADRDM; Article 8 ACHPR;
Article 30 ArCHR.

472
Z and T v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 314, The Law; Kokkinakis v. Greece, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 451, para. 31. See also, Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 2512/04,
Judgment of 12 February 2009, para. 61.

473
Perry v. Latvia, ECtHR, Application No. 30273/03, Judgment of 8 November 2007, para. 52.

474
Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 62; Omkarananada and the Divine
Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, ECommHR, Application No. 8118/77, Admissibility Decision,
19 March 1981, p. 118, para. 5.

475
Perry v. Latvia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 473, para. 62.
Furthermore, the expulsion must be ordered for one of the aims listed
in the human rights treaty and must be necessary and proportionate to
that aim. Under the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, legitimate aims are limited
to the interests of public safety, the protection of public order, health
or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
476

No human rights treaty allows for a restriction on the right to freedom
of religion or belief or of manifesting ones religion or belief on grounds
of national security.
477
In a limited but signifcant line of case-law, the European Court of Human
Rights and the African Commission have also held that when someone
is prevented from entering a country or expelled merely on grounds of
past expressed opinions, and as a result is impaired in imparting infor-
mation and ideas within that country, this may violate his or her right
to freedom of expression.
478
In one case, the African Commission found
an expulsion based on grounds of opinion to be a fagrant violation
of the freedom of expression.
479
The same principles that apply to the
right to freedom of religion and belief also apply in this situation, except
that the right to freedom of expression can be restricted on grounds of
national security and public order.
3. Expulsion and the effectiveness of the right to a
remedy
Widely recognised under general principles of law and by major human
rights treaties, where an individuals rights have allegedly been violated,
he or she has the right to an effective remedy at the national level.
480

The remedys purpose is to enforce the substance of the [human rights
treaty] rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to

476
Article 9.2 ECHR; Article 18.3 ICCPR; Article 12.3 ACHR; Article 8 ACHPR allows for restric-
tions on the basis of law and order; Article 30.2 ArCHR.

477
Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 73.

478
Cox v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 2933/03, Judgment of 20 May 2010; Women on
Waves and Others v. Portugal, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; and, Piermont v. France, ECtHR,
Applications No. 15773/89 and 15774/89, Judgment of 27 April 1995; Good v. Republic of
Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, p. 66, paras. 196200.

479
Good v. Republic of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, p. 66, paras. 196200.

480
Article 8 UDHR, Article 2.3 ICCPR, Article 8.2 CPED, Article 83 ICRMW, Article 13 ECHR,
Article 25 ACHR, Article 25 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article
23 ArCHR. See further, UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the Commission on Human Rights,
Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 of 19 April 2005 and by the General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/60/147 of 16 December 2005 by consensus. A thorough analysis of the right to a
remedy is to be found in International Commission of Jurists, The Right to a Remedy and to
Reparation for Gross Human Rights ViolationsA Practitioners Guide, Geneva, December
2006 (ICJ Practitioners Guide No. 2).
be secured in the domestic legal order.
481
International human rights
bodies agree that the remedy must be prompt, effective, accessible,
impartial and independent, must be enforceable, and lead to cessation
of or reparation for the human rights violation concerned.
482
In certain
cases, the remedy must be provided by a judicial body,
483
but, even if
it is not, it must fulfl the requirements of effectiveness and indepen-
dence, set out above. The remedy must be effective in practice as well
as in law, and must not be unjustifably hindered by the acts of State
authorities.
484

The right to a remedy has procedural implications for the expulsion
processaddressed in the next Chapter. In addition, however, where
a migrant, who is alleged to have suffered human rights violations in
the country in which he or she is resident as a non-national, is to be
expelled, such expulsion or the threat of it may hinder his or her access
to a remedy for that human rights violation. A migrant might, for exam-
ple, have been subject to violations of his or her labour rights, right to
education or other economic, social or cultural rights. They might have
been subject to ill-treatment, forced labour or situations of arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, as may be the case for example for domestic
workers.
485
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stressed the
importance of the right to a remedy for undocumented migrant work-
ers, noting that it is impermissible to take measures denying them the
possibility of fling a complaint about violations of their rights before the
competent authority.
486

The ICRMW establishes a general principle that expulsion from the
State of employment shall not in itself prejudice any rights of a migrant
worker or a member of his or her family acquired in accordance with
the law of that State, including the right to receive wages and other
entitlements due to him or her.
487
However, such provision is limited to
migrant workers and members of the family and, moreover, speaks only
of rights acquired under the law of the State, narrowing the scope of
the protection. The Committee on Migrant Workers has held that, where
a migrant worker is to be expelled, States parties should, whenever

481
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 50963/99, Judgment of 20 June 2002, para. 132.
See also, Omkarananada and the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, ECommHR, op. cit.,
fn. 474, p. 118, para. 9.

482
See, generally, ICJ, Practitioners Guide No. 2, op. cit., fn. 480, pp. 4654.

483
Ibid., pp. 4954.

484
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 100; Isakov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 324, para. 136; Yuldashev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 110111; Garayev v.
Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Application No. 53688/08, Judgment of 10 June 2010, paras. 82 and 84.

485
See, General Comment No. 1 on migrant domestic workers, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/GC/1,
23 February 2011, para. 17.

486
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, para. 170.

487
Article 22.9 ICRMW. See, on labour rights, Article 25.3 ICRMW.
possible, grant migrant workers and their family members a reason-
able period of time prior to their expulsion to claim wages and benefts.
States parties should also consider time-bound or expedited legal pro-
ceedings to address such claims by migrant workers. In addition, States
parties should conclude bilateral agreements so that migrant workers
who return to their State of origin may have access to justice in the
State of employment to fle complaints about abuse and to claim unpaid
wages and benefts.
488

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has
repeatedly held that, under the CEDAW, States must provide migrant
workers with easily accessible avenues of redress against abuse by em-
ployers and permit them to stay in the country while seeking redress.
489

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has stated
that States must ensure the right of all migrant workers, regardless
of their status, to obtain effective protection and remedies in case[s]
of violation of their human rights.
490
Similar observations have been
made by the CMW.
491
CEDAW is the treaty monitoring body that has dealt most extensively
with the issue of access to a remedy. It has addressed this in the specif-
ic context of undocumented women migrant workers, recognising that
such women face particular diffculties in access to justice for violations
of their human rights due to fear of denunciation and subsequent de-
portation.
492
CEDAW has repeatedly held that States must provide mi-
grant workers with easily accessible avenues of redress against abuse
by employers and permit them to stay in the country while seeking
redress.
493
This implies that States have to [r]epeal or amend laws
on loss of work permit, which results in loss of earnings and possible
deportation by immigration authorities when a worker fles a complaint
of exploitation or abuse and while pending investigation.
494
The analysis of CEDAW can also be applied to all other categories of
migrants. According to this approach, expulsion has both direct and
indirect effects on migrants right to a remedy:

488
CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, para. 55.

489
Concluding Observations on Malaysia, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 31 May 2006,
paras. 2526; Concluding Observations on China, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6,
25 August 2006, paras. 4142; Concluding Observations on Bhutan, CEDAW, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/7, 7 August 2009, paras. 2930.

490
Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/KOR/CO/14, 17 Au-
gust 2007, para. 18.

491
Concluding Observations on Mexico, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/MEX/CO/1, 20 December 2006,
paras. 3334.

492
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, paras. 2122.

493
See, fn. 489.

494
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(f)(ii).
Direct effect: the expulsion, once carried out, can render the
remedy meaningless or ineffective, as the person, once expelled,
may not have access to it, or access to it might be impracticable
due to the situation in the country to which they have been ex-
pelled. In this case, an important factor will be whether the State
provides the migrant with effective mechanisms to claim his or
her remedy once abroad.
Indirect effect: The threat of expulsion constitutes a powerful
deterrent for migrants to decide to access a remedy against their
human rights violations. As all rights must be interpreted so as
to make their protection meaningful and effective, States must
create conditions for both regular and undocumented migrants to
avail themselves of a remedy, without fear of expulsion.
CHAPTER 3: EXPULSION PROCEDURES
This Chapter considers the procedural protection afforded by interna-
tional human rights law to persons threatened with expulsion. These
standards have become particularly signifcant in recent years, as more
countries introduce expedited or simplifed expulsion procedures which
may undermine procedural safeguards normally available under nation-
al law. They often provide insuffcient time for migrants to prepare their
case, and allow only for non-suspensive appeals of decisions to expel,
meaning that the decision can only be challenged after the expulsion
has taken place. An additional and growing concern in recent years has
been the use of special procedures in expulsion cases where issues of
national security arise, allowing insuffcient disclosure or limiting ju-
dicial scrutiny of the reasons for expulsion. Human rights obligations
place constraints on the application of all such special procedures.
Human rights procedural guarantees in expulsion vary as between inter-
national and regional human rights bodies, in contrast to the universally
strong and relatively consistent protections of substantive human rights
in expulsion, considered in Chapter 2. This Chapter, after considering
the international law defnition of expulsion, addresses the safeguards
that international human rights law attaches to all expulsion proce-
dures, irrespective of the substantive rights engaged. It then analyses
the procedural guarantees linked to the right to a remedy, and, fnally,
procedural rights under the Geneva Refugee Convention.
I. When is someone expelled?
The notion of expulsion in international law is an autonomous concept
which is independent of any defnition contained in domestic legisla-
tion [. . .]. With the exception of extradition, any measure compelling
an aliens departure from the territory where he was lawfully resident
constitutes an expulsion.
495
Expulsion includes rejection at the border,
withdrawal of the visa of a lawful resident who seeks re-entry to his or
her country of residence,
496
and any other form of transfer, deportation,
removal, exclusion, or return. Extradition proceedings, which are often
covered by specifc provisions contained in multilateral and bilateral ex-
tradition agreements, and may concern nationals as well as non-nation-

495
Nolan and K. v. Russia, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 112. See also, Bolat v. Russia, ECtHR, Ap-
plication No. 14139/03, Judgment of 5 October 2006, para. 79. The Human Rights Com-
mittee also includes as expulsions all procedures aimed at the obligatory departure of an
alien, whether described in national law as expulsion or otherwise, CCPR, General Comment
No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, para. 9. See also, Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 117, para. 10.

496
Ibid.
als, are beyond the scope of this Guide. However, it should be noted that
the substantive human rights obligations considered in Chapter 2 apply
to extradition in the same way as to any other removal from the territory.
As noted by the ILC Special Rapporteur on expulsion of aliens, Maurice
Kamto, expulsion does not necessarily presuppose a formal measure,
but it can also derive from the conduct of a State which makes life in its
territory so diffcult that the alien has no choice other than to leave the
country.
497
As will be seen below, practices of harassment, incentives
or any other practice of the authorities which leave the alien with no
other choice but to leave the country, amount to expulsion.
II. What procedural protections apply to
expulsion?
In international human rights law, the general procedural protection
applicable to expulsion procedures varies considerably depending on
the human rights treaty. There are two approaches. The ICCPR and the
ECHR omit the applicability of general fair hearing protection to expul-
sion proceedings, but provide specifc procedural guarantees to non-na-
tionals lawfully in the territory of a State Party, leaving undocumented
migrants relatively unprotected (ICCPR, ECHR Protocol 7). Article 26.2
of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ArCHR) also provides procedural
guarantees for non-nationals lawfully on the territory of a State Party.
The African and the Inter-American systems provide that expulsion pro-
cedures must observe the guarantees provided for by the right to a
fair trial to all those potentially subject to expulsion measures (ACHR,
IADRDM, ACHPR). Even where fair hearing standards are not applicable,
however, some procedural rights may be derived from the principle of
non-refoulement, the right to respect for family life, or other substan-
tive rights that may be engaged by the expulsion, as well as from the
right to an effective remedy.
A common principle is that expulsions must not discriminate in purpose
or effect on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
498

Under international human rights treaties, the obligation derives from
the principle of non-discrimination read together with the guarantees of

497
Maurice Kamto, UN Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Sixth report on
the expulsion of aliens, UN Doc. A/CN.4/625, 19 March 2010 (ILC Sixth Report), para. 37.
See also, paras. 3839, and fn. 23 and 24, citing international arbitral awards of the Iran-
USA Claims Tribunal and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission upholding this defnition of
expulsion.

498
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, paras. 910.
procedural rights in expulsion procedures.
499
Articles 5(a) and 6 ICERD
prohibit discrimination in expulsion proceedings on grounds of race, co-
lour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
500
Discrimination on grounds
of sex is specifcally prohibited by Article 3 ICCPR read together with
Article 13, and Article 15.1 CEDAW; and discrimination on grounds of
disability by Article 5 CRPD.
501

In addition, Articles 22 and 23 of the International Convention on the
Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families (ICRMW) provide univer-
sal and detailed rights in expulsion procedures and apply to both reg-
ular and undocumented migrant workers. These provisions have been
applied regularly in the observations of the Committee on the Rights
of Migrant Workers.
502
However, it should be noted that at the time of
writing only 47 States were parties to the Convention and that few of
the more developed countries most likely to be destination States for
migrants have acceded to it.
1. Specifc due process guarantees in expulsion
As noted in the previous paragraphs, the Human Rights Committee
503

and the European Court of Human Rights
504
have explicitly rejected ar-
guments that expulsion procedures are subject to the full protection of
the right to fair trial and its consequent guarantees. However, Article 13
of the ICCPR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
505
,

499
Under the ICCPR it derives from the right to equal protection of the law enshrined in
Article 2.3 ICCPR read together with Article 13 ICCPR, and Article 26 ICCPR; Article 7 read
together with Article 22 ICRMW; Article 14 ECHR, read together with Article 1 of Protocol 7
ECHR, and, separately, Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR, which enshrines a free-standing right
to non-discrimination but to date has been ratifed only by 18 States (9 February 2011). Arti-
cle 1 ACHR read together with Article 22.6 ACHR and Article 24 ACHR; Article 2 read together
with Article 12.4 ACHPR and Article 3 ACHPR; and Articles 3 read together with Article 26.2
ArCHR, and Article 11.

500
Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/DOM/CO/12,
16 May 2008, para. 13.

501
Article 6 of the Convention enshrines specifc protection against discrimination for women
with disabilities and Article 7 for children with disabilities.

502
See, CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, paras. 4958; Concluding Observations
on Mexico, CMW, op. cit., fn. 491, para. 13; Concluding Observations on Ecuador, CMW,
UN Doc. CMW/C/ECU/CO/1, 5 December 2007, para. 26; Concluding Observations on Boli-
via, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/BOL/CO/1, 29 April 2008, para. 30; Concluding Observations on
Colombia, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/COL/CO/1, 22 May 2009, para. 28.

503
See Zundel v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1341/2005, Views of 4 April 2007, para. 6.8.
See also, Ahani v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1051/2002, Views of 15 June 2004,
para. 10.9; Surinder Kaur v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No.1455/2006*, Views of
18 November 2008, paras. 7.47.5; P.K. v. Canada, CCPR, Communication No. 1234/2003,
Views of 3 April 2007, paras. 7.47.5.

504
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 126; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 441, para. 82; Maaouia v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 53, paras. 3940.

505
Only Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom are not parties to Protocol
7 ECHR (as of 10 January 2014).
respectively, guarantee procedural rights in expulsion proceedings in
terms similar to Article 32 of the Geneva Refugee Convention. They
require that a non-national lawfully in the territory of a State (ICCPR)
or lawfully resident there (Protocol 7 ECHR) may be expelled only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law. In addition,
the non-national must be allowed, prior to expulsion, to submit rea-
sons against expulsion and to have his or her case reviewed by, and
be represented before, the competent authority or a person or persons
especially designated by the competent authority. Exceptions to these
guarantees are provided in case of national security or public order, as
described in Section II.1.f below.
Protection under Article 13 ICCPR, Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR and
Article 26.2 ArCHR excludes migrants unlawfully present on the territo-
ry. Article 13 ICCPR applies to non-nationals lawfully in the territory
of the State Party. The term lawfully must be interpreted according to
the national law concerning the requirements for entry and stay [. . .],
and [. . .] illegal entrants and aliens who have stayed longer than the
law or their permits allow, in particular, are not covered by its provi-
sions.
506
However, when the legality of a non-nationals presence on
the territory is in dispute, Article 13 applies.
507

Rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 ECHR, apply only to non-na-
tionals lawfully resident in the territory of the State Party. The notion
of lawful residence is broader than that of physical presence on the
States territory. As the European Court of Human Rights held, the word
resident operates to exclude those aliens who have not been admitted
to the territory or have only been admitted for non-residential purposes
[. . .]. These exceptions are obviously inapplicable to someone who [. . .]
had continuously resided in the country for many years. [. . .] The notion
of residence is [. . .] not limited to physical presence but depends on
the existence of suffcient and continuous links with a specifc place.
508

In this particular case, the applicant was trying to re-enter his country
of residence when his entry was refused because his visa had been arbi-
trarily withdrawn. This situation did not make him an unlawful resident.
509
a) Decision in accordance with law
The frst of the conditions for a permissible expulsion under Article 13
ICCPR, Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR, and Article 26.2 ArCHR is that

506
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, para. 9. See also, Kindler v. Canada, CCPR,
op. cit., fn. 426, para. 6.6; Nolan and K v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 472.

507
Ibid., para. 9.

508
Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 110. See also, Explanatory Report ETS
No. 117, op. cit., fn. 495, para. 9; Bolat v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 495, paras. 7680.

509
Ibid.
the decision to expel must be reached in accordance with law. The
European Court of Human Rights has held that this term should be
interpreted, as elsewhere in the Convention, to include the need to
provide for the measure in domestic law as well as for the law to be ac-
cessible, foreseeable, and afford protection against arbitrary action by
public authorities.
510
According to the European Court and the Human
Rights Committee, to be in accordance with law, the expulsion must
comply with both the substantive and the procedural requirements of
the law
511
which must be interpreted and applied in good faith.
512

b) Right to submit reasons against expulsion
Under Article 13 ICCPR, Article 1.1(a) Protocol 7, and Article 26.2 ArCHR
the person subject to expulsion has the right to make submissions
against the expulsion. As this right must be interpreted in a way that
guarantees that it is practical and effective, it is essential that the rea-
sons for expulsion be communicated to the person to be expelled, to a
degree of specifcity suffcient to allow for effective submissions against
expulsion. Where migrants are given no indications of the case against
them, or are given insuffcient information regarding the hearing of their
case or insuffcient time to prepare submissions, the European Court of
Human Rights has found violations of Article 1.1(a) Protocol 7.
513
The
Human Rights Committee has also stressed that an alien must be giv-
en full facilities for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that this
right will in all the circumstances of his case be an effective one.
514
At the European level, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
whose recommendations have no binding force but are highly authoritative,
has recommended that the removal order should be addressed in writing
to the individual concerned either directly or through his/her authorised
representative [and] shall indicate the legal and factual grounds on which it
is based [and] the remedies available, whether or not they have suspensive
effect, and the deadlines within which such remedies can be exercised.
515

510
Lupsa v. Romania, ECtHR, Application No. 10337/04, Judgment of 8 June 2006, para. 55;
Kaya v. Romania, ECtHR, Application No. 33970/05, Judgment of 12 October 2006, para. 55;
C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 1365/07, Judgment of 24 April 2008,
para. 73. See also, Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, adopted by the Committee of Min-
isters of the Council of Europe on 4 May 2005 at the 925
th
Guideline 2.

511
Maroufdou v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 58/1979, Views of 8 April 1981, para. 9.3;
Bolat v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 495, para. 81. See also, Lupsa v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 510, paras. 5661; Kaya v. Romania, op. cit., fn. 510, paras. 5661; Good v. Republic of
Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, para. 204.

512
Ibid., para. 10.1.

513
Lupsa v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, paras. 5960; Kaya v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 510, paras. 5960; Nolan and K. v. Russia, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 115.

514
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, para. 10.

515
Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, op. cit., fn. 510, Guideline 4.1.
c) The right to representation
The right to representation before the authority competent to decide
on the expulsion is specifcally guaranteed under Article 13 ICCPR and
Article 1.1(c) of Protocol 7 ECHR.
The Human Rights Committee has recommended that, in accordance
with Article 13 ICCPR, States should grant free legal assistance to
asylum-seekers during all asylum procedures, whether ordinary or ex-
traordinary.
516
It has also affrmed that States should ensure that all
asylum-seekers have access to counsel, legal aid and an interpreter.
517
The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the procedural
guarantees of Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR where the decision on the
applicants exclusion had not been communicated to him for more than
three months and [. . .] he had not been allowed to submit reasons
against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed with the participa-
tion of his counsel.
518
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe also declared in its
Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return that the time-limits for exercising
a remedy against expulsion must not be unreasonably short, and that
the remedy shall be accessible, which implies in particular that, where
the subject of the removal order does not have suffcient means to
pay for necessary legal assistance, he/she should be given it free of
charge, in accordance with the relevant national rules regarding legal
aid.
519
The guidelines are a declaratory instrument of the European
human rights system. However, the Committee of Ministers considered
this particular provision as embodying already existing obligations of
Member States of the Council of Europe.
520
d) Right to appeal
While human rights treaty bodies and the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe have stopped short of recognising the right to a judi-
cial appeal, they have insisted on guaranteeing the access to an appeal
against expulsion decisions before an independent authority.
The Human Rights Committee, applying Article 13 ICCPR, has found that
[a]n alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against

516
Concluding Observations on Switzerland, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHE/CO/3, 29 October
2009, para. 18; Concluding Observations on Ireland, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3,
30 July 2008, para. 19.

517
Concluding Observations on Japan, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5, 18 December 2008,
para. 25.

518
Nolan and K. v. Russia, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 115.

519

520
Ibid., Preamble 2(a).
expulsion so that this right will in all the circumstances of his case be an
effective one. [These] principles [. . .] relating to appeal against expul-
sion and the entitlement to review by a competent authority may only
be departed from when compelling reasons of national security so re-
quire. Discrimination may not be made between different categories of
aliens in the application of [the procedural rights in expulsion proceed-
ings].
521
Concluding observations of both the Human Rights Committee
and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have also
affrmed that there must be equal access to an independent appeals
procedure to review all immigration-related decisions and that pursu-
ing such a procedure, as well as resorting to judicial review of adverse
decisions, must have a suspensive effect upon the expulsion decision.
522
Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR provides for the right to have the expul-
sion decision reviewed in light of the reasons against expulsion submit-
ted by the person concerned.
523
The Council of Europes Committee of
Ministers has specifedin provisions considered to be declaratory of
existing international law obligations of Member Statesthat the sub-
ject of the removal order shall be afforded an effective remedy before a
competent authority or body composed of members who are impartial
and who enjoy safeguards of independence. The competent authority
or body shall have the power to review the removal order, including the
possibility of temporarily suspending its execution.
524
The Committee
of Ministers also stated that the time-limits to exercise the remedy must
not be unreasonably short; the remedy must be accessible, with the
possibility of granting legal aid and legal representation.
525
e) Non-discriminatory application
It is clear that the procedure of expulsion must not discriminate in law,
and must not be applied in a discriminatory way, for example, by arbi-
trarily targeting particular categories of non-nationals, or by applying
divergent procedures to migrants of different nationalities without ob-
jective justifcation, or to different ethnic groups, or failing to ensure
equal procedural protection to women. These practices would violate

521
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, para. 10. See also, Hammel v. Madagascar,
CCPR, Communication No. 155/1983, Views of 3 April 1987, paras. 19.219.3; Concluding
Observations on Sweden, CCPR, Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General
Assembly, 51
st
Session, Vol. I, UN Doc. A/51/40 (1996), paras. 88 and 96; Concluding Ob-
servations on Syrian Arab Republic, CCPR, Report of the Human Rights Committee to the
General Assembly, 56
th
Session, UN Doc. A/56/40 (2001).

522
Concluding Observations on Ireland, CCPR, 2008, op. cit., fn. 516, para. 19; Concluding
Observations on Dominican Republic, CERD, 2008, op. cit., fn. 500, para. 13.

523
Explanatory Report, ETS No. 117, op. cit., fn. 495 para. 13.2. See also, Europes boat peo-
ple: mixed migration fows by sea into southern Europe, PACE Resolution No. 1637 (2008),
para. 9.10.4.

524

525
Ibid., Guideline 5.2.
Article 2.1, read together with Article 13 ICCPR, Article 26 ICCPR (gen-
eral clause on non-discrimination), which prohibits discrimination based
on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
526
The
same is true for the European human rights system under Article 14
ECHR, read together with Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR, and Article 1 of
Protocol 12 ECHR;
527
the Inter-American system under Article 1 read
together with Article 22.6 ACHR and Article 24 ACHR (right to equal
protection of the law); the African system under Article 2 read together
with Article 12.4 ACHPR and Article 3 ACHPR (right to equal protection
of the law); and in the Arab system under Article 3 read together with
Article 26.2 ArCHR, and Article 11 (right to equal protection of the law).
Specifc treaty protections against discrimination on the basis of race,
gender and disability (see Introduction), are also relevant.
f) Public order and national security exceptions
As noted above, both Article 13 ICCPR and Article 1 Protocol 7 ECHR
provide exceptions to the procedural guarantees in expulsion proceed-
ings where compelling reasons of national security require otherwise.
Article 13 ICCPR provides an exemption from the procedural protection
of that article where required by compelling reasons of national secu-
rity. Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR does not, at least in theory, permit
States to entirely deprive non-nationals of rights under that Article on
grounds of national security or public order, but where an expulsion is
necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of
national security, it allows a non-national to be expelled before the
exercise of these rights, without undermining his or her entitlement to
exercise these rights after the expulsion.
528
In practice, however, such
non-suspensive rights of review are unlikely to provide effective pro-
tection.
When these exceptions are claimed, the State must provide evidence
capable of corroborating its claim that the interests of national security
or public order are at stake.
529
The State must demonstrate that the de-
cision is adequately prescribed by law (i.e. that it has an accessible and
foreseeable basis in national law), that it is taken pursuant to a legiti-
mate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society and proportionate
to the aim pursued.
530

526
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, paras. 910.

527
To date Protocol 12 has been ratifed only by 18 States (10 January 2014).

528
Explanatory Report, ETS No. 117, op. cit., fn. 495, para. 15.

529
Nolan and K. v. Russia, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 115; Explanatory Report, ETS No. 117, op. cit.,
fn. 495, para. 15.

530
See, C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, para. 78.
Box 11. Automatic prohibitions on leaving ones
country
The right to leave any country, including ones own, is en-
shrined in Article 12.2 ICCPR, Article 2.2 of Protocol 2 ECHR,
Article 22.2 ACHR, Article 12.2 of the African Charter. It is not
an absolute right as, it can be limited for the pursuance of a
legitimate aim and only by measures which are prescribed by
law, necessary and proportionate.
A particular refection of this human rightwhich is rare-
ly claimed before international human rights bodiesis to
be found in the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in the case Stamose v. Bulgaria. The case concerned a
Bulgarian citizen whose passport was seized by the Bulgarian
authorities and who was subject to a travel ban of two years
for breach of the immigration laws of the USA. The scope of
this measure was to discourage and prevent breaches of the
immigration laws of other States, and thus reduce the likeli-
hood of those States refusing other Bulgarian nationals entry
to their territory, or toughening or refusing to relax their visa
regime in respect of Bulgarian nationals.
531
The law on which
the measure was based was enacted and subsequently tight-
ened [. . .] as part of a package of measures designed to allay
the fears of, amongst others, the then Member States of the
European Union in respect of illegal emigration from Bulgaria,
and that it played a part in the Unions decision in March 2001
to exempt Bulgarian nationals from a visa requirement for
short-term stays [. . .].
532

The European Court held that the fact that the prohibition to
leave his country derived from a EU agreement did not fore-
close the examination of its compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights. On the matter of the dispute,
the Court found it quite draconian for the Bulgarian State
which could not be regarded as directly affected by the appli-
cants infringementto have also prevented him from travel-
ling to any other foreign country for a period of two years.
533

It fnally ruled that, [a]lthough the Court might be prepared
to accept that a prohibition on leaving ones own country im-
posed in relation to breaches of the immigration laws of an-

531
Stamose v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 29713/05, Judgment of 27 November 2012,
para. 32.

532
Ibid., para. 36.

533
Ibid., para. 34.
other State may in certain compelling situations be regarded
as justifed, it does not consider that the automatic imposition
of such a measure without any regard to the individual cir-
cumstances of the person concerned may be characterised as
necessary in a democratic society.
534
2. Expulsion procedures and the right to fair trial
Unlike the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human
Rights, which, as noted, have rejected the application of the right
to a fair hearing in expulsion cases,
535
one regional court, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and two regional human rights bod-
ies, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, have recognised that fair
trial guarantees apply in expulsion proceedings.
536

In the Inter-American system, the Inter-American Court and the Inter-
American Commission have determined that Article 8 (right to a fair
trial) and Article 25 (right to judicial protection) ACHR and Article XVIII
(right to a fair trial) of the American Declaration apply also to expul-
sion and deportation proceedings.
537
The Commission has clarifed that,
while the application of the right to a fair trial to these proceedings
may not require the presence of all the guarantees required for a fair
trial in the criminal sphere, a minimum threshold of due process guar-
antees should be provided.
538
In particular, the following guarantees
have been affrmed by these bodies:

534
Ibid., para. 36.

535
See, fn. 503 and 504 under section II.1.

536
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, paras. 124127; Vlez
Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, Series C No. 218, Judgment of 23 November 2010, para. 146;
Riebe Star and Others v. Mexico, IACHR, Case 11.160, Report No. 49/99, 13 April 1999,
Merits, 13 April 1999, para. 71. See also, Habal and son v. Argentina, IACHR, Case 11.691,
Report No. 64/08, Merits, 25 July 2008, para. 53; IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., 22 October 2002, paras. 401 and
409. For the African system see, OMCT and Others v. Rwanda, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 65,
pp. 49, 52; Rencontre Africaine pour la Defence des Droits de lHomme (RADDH) v. Zam-
bia, ACommHPR, Communication No. 71/92, 20
th
Ordinary Session, October 1996, p. 60,
para. 29; UIADH and Others v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 1920; Amnes-
ty International v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469, paras. 38, 42 and 53; IHRDA v.
Republic of Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 59; ZLHR and IHRD v. Republic of
Zimbabwe, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 106109; Good v. Republic of Botswana,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 161163, 179180.

537
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, paras. 124127;
Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, Judgment of 24 October 2012,
para. 159; IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 398403;
Habal and son v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 54; Riebe Star and Others v.
Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 71; John Doe et al. v. Canada, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 117.

538
IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 403.
the right to a public hearing;
539
the right to be given an adequate opportunity to exercise the right
of defense;
540
the right to be assisted by a lawyer and have access to free legal
aid;
541
the right to sufficient time to ascertain the charge against them;
542
the right to reasonable time in which to prepare and formalise a
response, and to seek and adduce responding evidence;
543
the right to receive prior communication of the reasons for expul-
sion;
544
the right to appeal a decision before a superior judge or court;
545
the right to prior notification.
546
The Inter-American Commission has also held that the failure to respect
of the right to a fair trial; the right to due legal process; and the right to
effective legal counsel constitute violations of Article 22.6 ACHR which
states that [a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this
Convention may be expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached
in accordance with law.
547
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has found ap-
plicable the right to a fair trial (Article 7 ACHPR),
548
and the right to re-
ceive information (Article 9.1 ACHPR)
549
to expulsion procedures. Under
these provisions, the Commission has determined that non-nationals,
regardless of their status, have the right to challenge an expulsion deci-

539
Ibid., para. 403; Riebe Star and Others v. Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 71.

540
Ibid., para. 403.

541
Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 146; Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Domin-
ican Republic, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 537, para. 164; IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 403; Riebe Star and Others v. Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536,
para. 71.

542
IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 403; Riebe Star and
Others v. Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 71.

543
Ibid., para. 403; Riebe Star and Others v. Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 71.

544
Habal and son v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 55.

545
Ibid., para. 55.

546
Ibid., para. 55.

547
Article 22.6 ACHR. See, Habal and son v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 58; Riebe
Star and Others v. Mexico, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 107.

548
OMCT and Others v. Rwanda, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 65, pp. 49, 52; RADDH v. Zambia,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 536, p. 60, para. 29; UIADH and Others v. Angola, ACommHPR, op.
cit., fn. 43, paras. 1920; Amnesty International v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469,
paras. 46 and 61; IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 59.

549
Amnesty International v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469, para. 41; Good v. Republic
of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 194195.
sion before a national judicial authority,
550
and the right to be provided
with the reasons for deportation.
551
The African Commission has held that, when the government expels a
citizen or a non-national on grounds of national security, it must bring
evidence against the person before the courts. The Commission stressed
that the right to be informed of the reasons for expulsion is an inher-
ent part of the right to a fair trial and may not be abrogated in times of
emergency. It found that failure to provide reasons for expulsion violates
the right to fair trial (Article 7), to an independent judiciary (Article 26)
and of the right to access to information (Article 9) of the African Charter.
The Commission warned that an expulsion without providing reasons for
expulsion would constitute a mockery of justice and the rule of law.
552
The African Commission has established that expelling an individual
without providing for the opportunity to plead before the competent
national courts also constitutes a violation of Article 12.4 of the African
Charter, stating that [a] non-national legally admitted in a territory of
a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by
virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.
553
Both the Inter-American and the African Commission have established
that a lack or denial of access to a judicial remedy, a failure to im-
plement judicial decisions against expulsion, or a lack of due process
guarantees violate not only the right to a fair trial, but also the right to
expulsion proceedings in accordance with the law (Articles 22 ACHR and
12.4 ACHPR),
554
the right to an independent judiciary in the African sys-
tem (Article 26 ACHRP),
555
and, in the case of the Inter-American sys-
tem, the right to an effective judicial remedy (Article 25 ACHR).
556
They

550
OMCT and Others v. Rwanda, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 65, pp. 49, 52; Amnesty Interna-
tional v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469, p. 76, paras. 46 and 61; IHRDA v. Angola,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 59; RADDH v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 536,
para. 29; UIADH and Others v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 1920.

551
Amnesty International v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469, para. 41; Good v. Republic
of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 194195.

552
Good v. Republic of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 193, 194 and 177.

553
Article 12.4 ACHPR. See, UIADH and Others v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 14
and 20; IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 6365; ZLHR and Oth-
ers v. Zimbabwe, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 114; Good v. Republic of Botswana,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, para. 205.

554
IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 6365; ZLHR and Others v. Zimba-
bwe, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 114. For the Inter-American system, Habal and
son v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 58; IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 402.

555
ZLHR and Others v. Zimbabwe, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 118120; Good v. Re-
public of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 179180.

556
IACHR, Situations of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, in Annual Report 1991, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81, Doc. 6 rev. 1, Chapter V, 14 February 1992 (IACHR, Situations of
Haitians), Chapter V; Habal and son v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 53.
have held that fair trial guarantees and the right of access to courts to
vindicate rights cannot be restricted in expulsion proceedings even in
cases of national security, public order or public health.
557
Box 12. Deportation and forcible transfer as a crime
under international law
In situations of armed confict, international humanitarian law
prohibits the deportation or forcible transfer by an Occupying
Power, whether a State or an armed group, of the civilian popu-
lation of an occupied territory, unless the security of the popula-
tion or imperative military reasons so demand. This rule applies
to all conficts whether of an international or a non-internation-
al character,
558
and is a norm of customary international law.
559

The Geneva Conventions characterise the infringement of this
obligation as a grave breach of the Conventions.
560

Deportation or forcible transfer of civilians for reasons not
permitted by international law also constitutes a crime against
humanity, when committed as a part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against any civilian population, and a war crime,
when committed in the context of an international or non-in-
ternational armed confict.
561
The defnition of deportation or forcible transfer of population in
treaty law is provided by the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which refers to it as the forced displacement of
the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from

557
IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 84. See, mutatis mutandis, Habeas
corpus in emergency situations, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, 30 January 1987; Good
v. Republic of Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 470, paras. 161163, 179180.

558
Article 49, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Ge-
neva, 12 August 1949 (IV Geneva Convention); Article 17, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Internation-
al Armed Conficts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 (APII to the Geneva Conventions).

559
Rule 129, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise
Doswald-Beck, ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Vol I (Rules), 2009.

560
Article 147, IV Geneva Convention; Article 85(4)(a), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conficts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (API to the Geneva Conventions).

561
Articles 2(g) and 5(d), Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, September 2009 (ICTY Statute); Article 3(d), Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, 31 January 2010 (ICTR Statute); Articles 7.1(d), 7.2(d), 8.2(a)(vii),
8.2(b)(viii) and 8.2(e)(viii), Rome Statute. See also, Article 6(c), Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter); Article 5(c), Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East; Principle VI(b) (War Crimes) and (c) (Crimes against Humanity), In-
ternational Law Commissions Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, ILC, in Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 97.
the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds
permitted under international law.
562
The defnition is provid-
ed in the context of crimes against humanity. The requirement
of being lawfully present does not encompass deportation or
forcible transfer committed as a war crime, as it appears clear-
ly from the ICC Elements of Crimes.
563
Deportation or forcible
transfer have also been held by the ICTY to constitute a crime
of persecution, if committed with a discriminatory intent.
564
3. Procedural rights and collective expulsions
Collective expulsion is prohibited in an absolute way by all major hu-
man rights treaties and this prohibition is considered to have assumed
the status of customary international law
565
therefore binding all States,
regardless of their being party to a treaty expressing such prohibition.
Treaty prohibitions on collective expulsions are contained in Article 4 of
Protocol 4 to the ECHR,
566
Article 12.5 of the African Charter, Article 22.9
ACHR, Article 26.2 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and Article 22.1
ICRMW. Although no express ICCPR provision prohibits collective expul-
sions, the Human Rights Committee has been clear that laws or deci-
sions providing for collective or mass expulsions would entail a violation
of Article 13 ICCPR.
567
Furthermore, the Committee has affrmed in its
General Comment No. 29 that deportation and forcible transfer of popu-
lation without grounds permitted under international law, as defned by
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (see, Box No. 11)
is a measure which cannot be adopted even under state of emergency
and that no derogation from a Covenant right, even if it is permitted per
se, can justify implementation of such measures.
568
The Committee for
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) found that
collective expulsions violate Article 5(a) and 6 of the ICERD.
569

562
Article 7.2(d), Rome Statute.

563
See, Articles 7.1(d), 8.2(a)(vii), 8.2(b)(viii), 8.2(e)(viii) of the Elements of Crimes, ICC, Doc.
ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B), adopted on 9 September 2002. See also, Prosecutor v. Milomir Sta-
kic, ICTY, Appeal Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-97-24-A, 22 March 2006, paras. 276300
and 317; and, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, ICTY, Appeal Chamber Judgment, Case
No. IT-97-25-A, 17 September 2003, paras. 218229.

564
See, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, ICTY, Appeal Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25-A,
17 September 2003, paras. 218-222.

565
The ILC Special Rapporteur on the expulsion of aliens held that the prohibition of collective
expulsion assumed the status of a general principle of international law recognised by civi-
lised nations; See, ILC Third Report, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 115.

566
See also, Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, op. cit., fn. 510, Guideline 3.

567
CCPR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 30, para. 10.

568
General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11,
31 August 2001, para. 13(d).

569
Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic, CERD, op. cit., fn. 500, para. 13.
At the heart of the prohibition on collective expulsion is a requirement
that individual, fair and objective consideration be given to each case.
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that collective expul-
sion [. . .] is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a
group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the
basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case
of each individual alien of the group.
570
The expulsion procedure must
afford suffcient guarantees demonstrating that the personal circum-
stances of each of those concerned have been genuinely and individually
taken into account.
571
Where individual expulsion decisions do not make
suffcient reference to the particular circumstances of each of a group
of migrants in similar circumstances, and where the procedures and
timing of the expulsion of members of the group are similar, this may
be grounds for a fnding of collective expulsion in violation of Article 4 of
Protocol 4 ECHR.
572
However, the Court warned that [t]he fact, however,
that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does not in itself
lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion if each person
concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his
expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis.
573
In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the prohibition of col-
lective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol 4 applies extraterritorially.
The Court held that the removal of aliens carried out in the context
of interceptions on the high seas by the authorities of a State in the
exercise of their sovereign authority, the effect of which is to prevent
migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push them
back to another State, constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention which engages the responsibility
of the State in question under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.
574

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights upheld a similar defnition
of collective expulsion than that of the European Court: the collective
nature of an expulsion involves a decision that does not make an objec-

570
onka v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002, para. 59. See
also, Sultani v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 45223/05, Judgment of 20 July 2007, para. 81.

571
Ibid., para. 63. Sultani v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570, para. 81; Hirsi Jamaa and Others
v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 184186.

572
Ibid., paras. 6163.

573
M.A. v. Cyprus, ECtHR, Application No. 41872/10, Judgment of 23 July 2013, para. 246. See
also, para. 254.
574
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 180. The case of Hirsi
equates the practice of push-backs in the high seas to collective expulsions. Even beyond
the human rights violations entailed in the practice, the Court stressed that none of the
provisions of international law cited by the Government justifed the applicants being pushed
back to Libya, in so far as the rules for the rescue of persons at sea and those governing the
fght against people traffcking impose on States the obligation to fulfl the obligations arising
out of international refugee law, including the non-refoulement principle (para. 134).
tive analysis of the individual circumstances of each alien and, conse-
quently, incurs in arbitrariness.
575
The Inter-American Court also ruled
that a proceeding that may result in expulsion or deportation of an
alien, must be individual, so as to evaluate the personal circumstances
of each subject and comply with the prohibition of collective expulsions.
Furthermore, this proceeding should not discriminate on grounds of
nationality, color, race, sex, language, religion, political opinion, social
origin or other status, and must observe the following minimum guar-
antees with regard to the alien:
i) To be expressly and formally informed of the charges against him
or her and of the reasons for the expulsion or deportation. This no-
tifcation must include information about his or her rights, such as:
a. The possibility of stating his or her case and contesting the
charges against him or her;
b. The possibility of requesting and receiving consular assistance,
legal assistance and, if appropriate, translation or interpretation;
ii) In case of an unfavorable decision, the alien must be entitled to
have his or her case reviewed by the competent authority and
appear before this authority for that purpose, and
iii) The eventual expulsion may only take effect following a reasoned
decision in keeping with the law that is duly notifed.
576

The Inter-American Commission has considered that [a]n expulsion
becomes collective when the decision to expel is not based on individual
cases but on group considerations, even if the group in question is not
large.
577
The African Commission has ruled repeatedly that [m]ass
expulsions of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nation-
ality, religion, ethnic, racial or other considerations, constitute special
violation of human rights
578
and a fagrant violation of the Charter.
579

The Commission affrmed that collective expulsion may entail many vi-
olations of human rights such as the right to property, to work, to edu-
cation, to family, and to non-discrimination.
580

575
Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 537, para. 171.

576
Ibid., para. 175.

577

578
IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 69. See also, RADDH v. Zambia,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 19; African Institute for Human Rights and Development
(AIHRD) (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v. Republic of Guinea, ACommHPR,
th
Ordinary Session, 23 November7 December 2004,
Annex IV, p. 131, para. 69; OMCT and Others v. Rwanda, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 65.

579
RADDH v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 31.

580
UIADH v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 1418.
Box 13. Repetitive expulsions may breach prohibition
of inhuman and degrading treatment
The European Commission of Human Rights held in the case
A.H. v. the Netherlands that the repeated expulsion of an
individual, whose identity was impossible to establish, to a
country where his admission is not guaranteed, may raise an
issue under Article 3 of the Convention [. . .]. Such an issue
may arise, a fortiori, if an alien is over a long period of time
deported repeatedly from one country to another without any
country taking measures to regularise his situation.
581
Article
3 ECHR enshrines the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. The African Commission
on Human and Peoples Rights also held in the case John K.
Modise v. Botswana that repetitive deportations and constant
threats of deportations amounted to a violation of the right to
freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under
Article 5 ACHPR.
582
III. Procedural guarantees in expulsions and the
right to a remedy
As widely recognised by major human rights treaties, where there is an
arguable case that an individuals rights have been violated, he or she
has the right to an effective remedy at the national level.
583
The right
to a remedy means that, where there is an arguable complaint that a
substantive human right will be violated by an expulsion (see, Chapter
2) additional procedural guarantees necessary to ensure an effective
remedy against the violation or potential violation will apply and will
require a stricter than usual scrutiny of the process of the expulsion.
584

The right to an effective remedy will apply even if it is later determined
that no violation of the substantive human right occurred. The objective
of a remedy is to enforce the substance of the [international human
rights treaty] rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen
to be secured in the domestic legal order.
585
581
Harabi v. the Netherlands, ECommHR, Application No. 10798/84, Admissibility Decision,
5 March 1986, para. 1.

582
Modise v. Botswana, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 469, para. 91.

583
Article 8 UDHR; Article 2.3 ICCPR; Article 8.2 CPED; Article 13 ECHR; Article 25 ACHR;
Article 25 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa.

584
Ahani v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 503, paras. 10.610.8.

585
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, para. 132. See also, Omkarananada and the
Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, ECommHR, op. cit., fn. 474, para. 9.
1. An effective remedy
Where an individual is threatened with expulsion that gives rise to an
arguable case of violation of human rights, there is a right to a remedy
that is effective, impartial and independent and be capable to review and
overturn the decision to expel.
586
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations
of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law (the Principles) affrm that States have an obliga-
tion to provide available, adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate
remedies to victims of violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, including reparation.
587
The Principles,
which were approved by all members of the UN General Assembly, re-
call that this obligation arises from the general obligation to respect,
ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, enshrined in treaty law and customary
international law.
588
An effective remedy should be provided by a judi-
cial body, but, if it is not, it must fulfl the requirements set out above,
of effectivenessi.e. the power to bring about cessation of the violation
and appropriate reparation, including, where relevant, to overturn the
expulsion orderof impartiality and independence.
589
The remedy must
be prompt and effective in practice as well as in law, and must not be
unjustifably hindered by the acts of State authorities.
590
In cases of
non-refoulement to face a risk of torture or ill-treatment, the absolute
nature of the rights engaged further strengthens the right to an effec-
tive remedy
591
and means that the decision to expel must be subject to
close and rigorous scrutiny.
592
586
Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 364, para. 11.8. In the same case, the Committee did
not fnd a violation of Article 13 ICCPR, therefore demonstrating the more extended guar-
antees provided to by the principle of non-refoulement. See also, Zhakhongir Maksudov and
Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 12.7; Agiza v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit.,
fn. 332, para. 13.7; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434,
para. 460; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 293; C.G. and Oth-
ers v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, para. 56 (Right to a remedy where right to respect
for family life under Article 8 ECHR was in issue); onka v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570,
paras. 7785 (right to a remedy in case of alleged collective expulsion under Article 4 Pro-
tocol 4 ECHR). For the Inter-American system, inter alia, Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, IACtHR,
Series C No. 149, Judgment of 4 July 2006, para. 175. A thorough analysis of the right to a
remedy is to be found in, ICJ, Practitioners Guide No. 2, op. cit., fn. 480.

587
Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and rep-
aration.

588
Article 1 of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation.

589
See, ICJ, Practitioners Guide No.2, op. cit., fn. 480, pp. 4954.

590
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 100; Isakov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 324, para. 136; Yuldashev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 110111; Garayev
v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 484, paras. 82 and 84.

591
Agiza v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 332, para. 13.8.

592
Jabari v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 116, para. 39.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that, in order to comply
with the right to a remedy, a person threatened with an expulsion which
arguably violates another Convention right must have:
access to relevant documents and accessible information on the
legal procedures to be followed in his or her case;
where necessary, translated material and interpretation;
effective access to legal advice, if necessary by provision of legal
aid;
593

the right to participate in adversarial proceedings;
reasons for the decision to expel (a stereotyped decision that does
not reflect the individual case will be unlikely to be sufficient) and
a fair and reasonable opportunity to dispute the factual basis for
the expulsion.
594

Where the State authorities fail to communicate effectively with the
person threatened with expulsion concerning the legal proceedings in
his or her case, the State cannot justify a removal on the grounds of the
individuals failure to comply with the formalities of the proceedings.
595
The European Court of Human Rights has addressed, in the case of I.M.
v. France, the compatibility of accelerated asylum procedures with the
right to a remedy under Article 13 ECHR in connection with the principle
of non-refoulement. While the Court has recognized that these special
procedures can facilitate the examination of clearly abusive or mani-
festly unfounded applications,
596
it stressed that they cannot be used at
the expense of the effectiveness of the essential procedural guarantees
for the protection of the applicant from an arbitrary refoulement.
597
In
the case of I.M., the resort to an accelerated asylum procedure to ex-
amine the frst application of an asylum seeker resulted in excessively
short time limits for the asylum seeker to present his arguments, lack
of access to legal and linguistic assistance, and a series of material and
procedural diffculties, exacerbated by the asylum seekers detention,
which rendered the legal guarantees afforded to him merely theoretical,
in breach of Article 13 ECHR.
598

593

594
Ibid., para. 302; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, paras. 5665. See
also, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 202204.

595
Ibid., para. 312.

596
I.M. v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 9152/09, Judgment of 2 February 2012, para. 142.
In K.K. v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 18913/11, Judgment of 10 October 2013,
paras. 6271, the Court has upheld the use of an accelerated asylum procedure in the
specifc case. See also, Mohammed v. Austria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 388, para. 79.

597
Ibid., para. 147.

598
Ibid., para. 150154.
2. The right to an appeal with suspensive effect
The right to an effective remedy also requires review of a decision to
expel, by an independent and impartial appeals authority, which has
competence to assess the substantive human rights issues raised by
the case, to review the decision to expel on both substantive and proce-
dural grounds, and to quash the decision if appropriate. The European
Court has held that judicial review constitutes, in principle, an effective
remedy, provided that it fulflls these criteria.
599
The appeal procedure
must be accessible in practice, must provide a means for the individual
to obtain legal advice, and must allow a real possibility of lodging an
appeal within prescribed time limits.
600
In non-refoulement cases, an
unduly lengthy appeal process may render the remedy ineffective, in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the matters at stake.
601
To provide an effective remedy, the appeal must be suspensive of the
expulsion measure from the moment the appeal is fled, since the no-
tion of an effective remedy requires that the national authorities give
full consideration to the compatibility of a measure with human rights
standards, before the measure is executed.
602
A system where stays of

599
Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 99; Isakov v. Rus-
sia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 137; Yuldashev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324,
para. 110111; Garayev v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 484, paras. 82 and 84; Al-Nashif
v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, para. 133. See also, C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 510, para. 56.

600

601
Ibid., para. 320.

602
Jabari v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 116, para. 50; onka v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570,
para. 79; Gebremedhin v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 25389/05, Judgment of 26 April
2007, paras. 58, 66; Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 101; Concluding
Observations on France, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, 3 April 2006, para. 7; Concluding
Observations on Belgium, CCPR, UN Doc CCPR/CO/81/BEL, 8 December 2004, para. 21;
Concluding Observations on Morocco, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/MAR, 1 December 2004,
para. 13; Concluding Observations on Uzbekistan, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/83/UZB, 26 April
2005, para. 12; Concluding Observations on Thailand, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 17;
Concluding Observations on Ukraine, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6, 28 November
2006, para. 9; Concluding Observations on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CCPR, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/LBY/CO/4, 15 November 2007, para. 18; Concluding Observations on Belgium, CAT,
UN Doc. CAT/C/BEL/CO/2, 19 January 2009, para. 9; Concluding Observations on Yemen,
CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/YEM/CO/2, 19 November 2009, para. 22; Concluding Observations on
Belgium, CAT, Report of the Committee against Torture to the General Assembly, 58
th
Session,
UN Doc. A/58/44 (2003), p. 49, paras. 129 and 131: the Committee expressed concern at
the non-suspensive nature of appeals fled with the Council of State by persons in respect
of whom an expulsion order has been issued. The Council of States in Belgium is the Su-
preme Court in administrative matters. See also, Concluding Observations on Cameroon, CAT,
UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/31/6, 5 February 2004, para. 9(g); Concluding Observations on Monaco,
CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/1, 28 May 2004, paras. 4(c) and 5(c); Concluding Observations
on Mexico, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/MEX/CO/4, 6 February 2007, para. 17; Concluding Obser-
vations on South Africa, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1, 7 December 2006, para. 15; Con-
cluding Observations on Australia, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/AUS/CO/3, 22 May 2008, para. 17;
Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/AZE/CO/3, 8 December 2009,
para. 22; Concluding Observations on Canada, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005,
para. 5(c). See also, C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, para. 62.
execution of the expulsion order are at the discretion of a court or other
body are not suffcient to protect the right to an effective remedy, even
where the risk that a stay will be refused is minimal.
603

The European Court of Human Rights has held that, to be effective, a
remedy must have automatic suspensive effect whenever there is a po-
tential breach of the principle of non-refoulement, at least with regard
to the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, or the prohibition of collective expulsions,
in light of the absolute nature of these human rights obligations.
604

Conversely, where expulsions are challenged on the basis of alleged
interference with private and family life, it is not imperative, in order
for a remedy to be effective, that it should have automatic suspensive
effect. Nevertheless, in immigration matters, where there is an argu-
able claim that expulsion threatens to interfere with the aliens right
to respect for his private and family life, Article 13 in conjunction with
Article 8 of the Convention requires that States must make available to
the individual concerned the effective possibility of challenging the de-
portation or refusal of residence order and of having the relevant issues
examined with suffcient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an
appropriate domestic forum offering adequate guarantees of indepen-
dence and impartiality.
605
3. National security
Where national security considerations are the basis for the expulsion,
the right to an effective remedy nevertheless requires an independent
hearing and the possibility to access documents and reasons for expul-
sion and to contest them.
606
Where cases involve the use of classifed
information, it must be in some way accessible to the applicant if that
information was determinative in the expulsion decision.
607
Executive
claims of national security do not qualify or limit the obligation to ensure
that the competent independent appeals authority must be informed of
the reasons grounding the deportation decision, even if such reasons

603
onka v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570, paras. 8185.

604
De Souza Ribeiro v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 22689/07, Judgment of 13 Decem-
ber 2012, para. 82 ; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 206;
Mohammed v. Austria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 388, para. 80.

605
Ibid., para. 83.

606
Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 364, para. 11.8; Al-Gertani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, CCPR,
Communication No. 1955/2010, Views of 1 November 2013, paras. 10.810.10. See, M. and
Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 41416/08, Judgment of 26 July 2011, para. 129: By
choosing to rely on national security in a deportation order the authorities cannot do away with
effective remedies. See also, Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information
(Tshwane Principles), 12 June 2013, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/fles/global-principles-national-security-10232013.pdf.

607
Liu v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 42086/05, Judgment of 6 December 2007, paras.
6263.
are not publicly available. The European Court has emphasised that
[t]he authority must be competent to reject the executives assertion
that there is a threat to national security where it fnds it arbitrary or
unreasonable. There must be some form of adversarial proceedings, if
need be through a special representative after a security clearance.
608

The Court stressed that the individual must be able to challenge the ex-
ecutives assertion that national security is at stake before an indepen-
dent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and rele-
vant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the
use of classifed information.
609
In addition, the decision or judgment of
the authority in charge of the remedy must be public, at least in part.
610

IV. Expulsion of refugees
Under international refugee law, as noted in Chapter 2, Article 32 of the
Geneva Refugee Convention permits expulsion of refugees exclusively
on grounds of national security or public order. The decision of expul-
sion must be reached in accordance with due process of law. Because
of the similarity between Article 32 of the Refugee Convention and
the provisions on expulsion procedural rights of the ICCPR and ECHR,
rights and guarantees developed by the Human Rights Committee and
the European Court of Human Rights must be applied together with
those included under Article 32 of the Geneva Refugee Convention (see,
above, Section 1).
Under the Refugee Convention, where a refugee is expelled in accor-
dance with Article 32, he or she must have the right to submit evidence
to counter the grounds for expulsion, to appeal and to be represented
before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated
by the competent authority.
611
These procedural rights may, under cer-
tain conditions, be limited on national security grounds. International

608
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, para. 137. See also, C.G. and Others v. Bul-
garia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, para. 57; M. and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 606,
para. 100; Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 58419/08, Judgment of
12 February 2013, para. 92.

609
Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 472, para. 71. See also, Liu v. Russia, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 607; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, paras. 123124 and 137
(on Article 8 ECHR); and Lupsa v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 510, paras. 3334; M. and
Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 606, para. 101.

610
Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 608, para. 99: the publicity of judicial deci-
sions aims to ensure scrutiny of the judiciary by the public and constitutes a basic safeguard
against arbitrariness. The Court has already had occasion to observe that other countries
have, in the same context, chosen to keep secret only those parts of their courts decisions
whose disclosure would compromise national security or the safety of others, thus illustrat-
ing that there exist techniques that can accommodate legitimate security concerns without
fully negating fundamental procedural guarantees such as the publicity of judicial decisions.

611
Article 32.2, Geneva Refugee Convention.
human rights law requires that any such limitations must pursue a le-
gitimate aim, be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate
to the aim pursued.
612

Finally, and regardless of national security or public order consider-
ations, the State must allow the refugee a reasonable period within
which to seek legal admission into another country.
613
In the interim the
State is authorised to apply such internal measures as they may deem
necessary, which might include limitations to freedom of movement or
detention (see, Chapter 4).
The UNHCR Executive Committee has made clear that, under Article 32
of the Geneva Refugee Convention, refugees may be expelled only in
very exceptional cases and after due consideration of all the circum-
stances, including the possibility for the refugee to be admitted to a
country other than his or her country of origin.
614
In particular, as
regards the return to a third country of an asylum-seeker whose claim
has yet to be determined from the territory of the country where the
claim has been submitted, including pursuant to bilateral or multilateral
readmission agreements, it should be established that the third country
will treat the asylum-seeker (asylum-seekers) in accordance with ac-
cepted international standards, will ensure effective protection against
refoulement, and will provide the asylum-seeker (asylum-seekers)
with the possibility to seek and enjoy asylum.
615
This recommendation
also encompasses the obligations of the country under the principle of
non-refoulement (see, Chapter 2).
Article 31 of the Geneva Refugee Convention also bears consequences
in the case of expulsion proceedings. The provision states that the
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1
[defnition of refugee], enter or are present in their territory without
authorisation, provided they present themselves without delay to the
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
616

In the particular situation of asylum-seekers or refugees who move
irregularly to a third country which has not granted them protection,
the Executive Committee considers that they may be returned to the
country of refuge if they are protected there against refoulement and
they are permitted to remain there and to be treated in accordance

612
Although this last criterium is not explicit in the Geneva Refugee Convention, the interpreta-
tion of Article 32 in light of international human rights principle leads to such conclusion.

613

614
Conclusion No. 7, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 180, para. (c).

615
Conclusion No. 85, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 183, para. (aa).

616
with recognised basic human standards until a durable solution is found
for them.
617
However, there may be exceptional cases in which a ref-
ugee or asylum seeker may justifably claim that he has reason to fear
persecution or that his physical safety or freedom are endangered in
a country where he previously found protection. Such cases should be
given favourable consideration by the authorities of the State where he
requests asylum.
618

1. Voluntary repatriation of refugees
The OAU Convention Governing the Specifc Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa is the only Convention expressly regulating voluntary repatria-
tion of refugees. Its Article V(1) stresses that the essentially voluntary
character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee
shall be repatriated against his will.
As for the regime applicable under the Geneva Refugee Convention,
the UNHCR Executive Committee has clarifed that, in cases of vol-
untary repatriation, refugees should be provided with the necessary
information regarding conditions in their country of origin in order to
facilitate their decision to repatriate; recognized further that visits by
individual refugees or refugee representatives to their country of origin
to inform themselves of the situation therewithout such visits auto-
matically involving loss of refugee statuscould also be of assistance in
this regard.
619
The Committee stressed [t]he repatriation of refugees
should only take place at their freely expressed wish; the voluntary and
individual character of repatriation of refugees and the need for it to be
carried out under conditions of absolute safety, preferably to the place
of residence of the refugee in his country of origin, should always be
respected.
620
The free choice of the refugee to repatriate is therefore paramount for
the legitimacy of this procedure. In practice, the ILC Special Rapporteur
on expulsion of aliens has documented practices of disguised expul-
sion, where what had been called voluntary repatriations were indeed
expulsions. Disguised expulsions may occur after groundless confsca-
tion or invalidation of an aliens legal residence permit, can be based on

617
Conclusion No. 58 (XL) Problem of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers Who Move in an Irregu-
lar Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, ExCom, UNHCR,
40
th
Session, 1989, para. (f).

618
Ibid., para. (g).

619
Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI) Voluntary Repatriation, ExCom, UNHCR, 31
st
Session, 1980,
para. (e). See also, for more details on procedures, Conclusion No. 101 (LV) on Legal Safety
Issues in the Context of Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees, ExCom, UNHCR, 55
th
Session,
2004.

620
Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI) Voluntary Repatriation, ExCom, UNHCR, 36
th
Session, 1985,
para. (b).
incentive measures for a return that is allegedly voluntary but that
in fact leaves the alien with no choice (see the defnition of expulsion in
Section I), or can result from the hostile conduct of the State towards
a non-national.
621
These practices do not constitute voluntary repatri-
ations and are, in fact, expulsions, which must observe the procedural
and substantive rules of international refugee and human rights law.
The Special Rapporteur emphasised that, disguised expulsion is by its
nature contrary to international law. First, it violates the rights of per-
sons expelled and hence the substantive rules pertaining to expulsion,
which link a States right of expulsion with the obligation to respect the
human rights of the expelled person. Second, it violates the relevant
procedural rules which gave expelled persons an opportunity to defend
their rights.
622

621
ILC Sixth Report, op. cit., fn. 497, paras. 3134.
622
Ibid., para. 41.
CHAPTER 4: MIGRANTS IN DETENTION
Under international human rights law, detention of asylum seekers or
undocumented migrants, either on entry to the country or pending de-
portation, must not be arbitrary and must be carried out pursuant to a
legal basis.
623
International standards establish that, in immigration con-
trol, detention should be the exception rather than the rule, and should
be a measure of last resort,
624
to be imposed only where other less re-
strictive alternatives, such as reporting requirements or restrictions on
residence, are not feasible in the individual case. European Convention
standards are in some respects less exacting, however, and have been
held to permit short-term detention for purposes of immigration control
without individualised consideration of alternative measures.
625
This Chapter explains how international human rights standards apply
to detention for the purposes of immigration control, increasingly used
by government as a means of both processing entrants to the country
and of facilitating deportations. It assesses when individuals will be con-
sidered by international law to be deprived of their liberty; justifcation
for detention in accordance with principles of necessity, proportionali-
ty, and protection against arbitrary conduct; procedural safeguards, in
particular judicial review of detention and reparation for unjustifed de-
tention. It also considers standards on the treatment of detainees and
conditions of detention, and the implications of overcrowded or unsuit-
able conditions for detainees, increasingly a feature of over-burdened
immigration detention systems in many countries.
I. The nature of detention
626
Whether individuals are in fact deprived of their liberty in a way that
engages protection of Article 9 ICCPR, Article 5 ECHR, Article 6 ACHPR,

623
Article 9 ICCPR, Article 5 ECHR, Article 6 ACHPR, Article 7 ACHR, Articles I and XXV ADRDM,
Article 14 ArCHR. Further information can be found in CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit.,
fn. 2, paras. 2348. As the General Comment mostly reiterates or essentially affrms the
other international jurisprudence described in this Guide, we will not refer to it extensively.

624
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Annual Report 2008, UN Doc.
A/HRC/10/21, 16 February 2009, paras. 67 and 82; European Guidelines on accelerat-
ed asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, principle XI.1. See also, Conclusion No. 7,
UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 180, para. e: an expulsion order should only be combined with custody
or detention if absolutely necessary for reasons of national security or public order and that
such custody or detention should not be unduly prolonged. See also, Conclusion No. 44
(XXXVII) Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, ExCom, UNHCR, 37
th
Session, 1986,
para. B; Concluding Observations on Bahamas, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/64/CO/1, 28 April
2004, para. 17; Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, Series C No. 180, Judgment of 6 May 2008,
para. 90; lvarez and Iiguez v. Ecuador, IACtHR, Series C No. 170, Judgment of 21 Novem-
ber 2007, para. 53; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 116, 166171.
625
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 13229/03, Judgment of 29 January
2008, paras. 7074.

626
The term detention will be used throughout the Guide as a shorthand for deprivation of liberty.
Article 7 ACHR or Article 14 ArCHR, or are merely subject to restrictions
on their freedom of movement, will not always be clear. In international
human rights law, a deprivation of liberty is not defned with reference to
the classifcation imposed by national law, but rather takes into account
the reality of the restrictions imposed on the individual concerned.
627

Since classifcation in national law is not determinative, persons accom-
modated at a facility classifed as a reception, holding or accommo-
dation centre and ostensibly not imposing detention, may, depending
on the nature of the restrictions on their freedom of movement, and
their cumulative impact, be considered under international human rights
law to be deprived of their liberty.
628
Holding centres in international
zones at airports or other points of entry have also been found to impose
restrictions amounting to deprivation of liberty.
629
In assessing whether
restrictions on liberty amount to deprivation of liberty under internation-
al human rights law, relevant factors will include the type of restrictions
imposed; their duration; their effects on the individual; and the manner
of implementation of the measure.
630
There is no clear line between
restrictions on freedom of movement and deprivation of liberty: the dif-
ference is one of degree or intensity, not one of nature or substance.
631
A series of restrictions, which in themselves would not cross the thresh-
old of deprivation of liberty, may cumulatively amount to such depriva-
tion. The European Court of Human Rights found this to be the case, for
example, in Guzzardi v. Italy,
632
where the applicant was confned on
a small island and subject to a curfew, reporting requirements, restric-
tions on movement and communications.
633

627
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45, para. 42; Nolan and K. v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 472, paras. 9396; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 30471/08,
Judgment of 22 September 2009, paras. 125127; Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
Application No. 8225/78, Judgment of 28 March 1985, para. 42.

628
Abdolkhai and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, para. 127, fnding that detention
at an accommodation centre, although not classifed as detention in national law, did in fact
amount to a deprivation of liberty.

629
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45; The CPT Standards, European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), CoE Doc.
CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1Rev. 2010, Strasbourg, December 2010 (CPT Standards), pp. 5354.

630
Engel and Others v. Netherlands, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 5100/71; 5101/71;
5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, Judgment of 8 June 1986, para. 59; Guzzardi v. Italy, ECtHR,
Plenary, Application No.7367/76, Judgment of 6 November 1980, para. 92.

631
Guzzardi v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 630, para. 93.

632
Ibid., para. 93.

633
See, by contrast, Engel and Others v. Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 630, para. 61, where
there was found to be no deprivation of liberty involved in military disciplinary measures of
light arrest and aggravated arrest involving restrictions on movement whilst off duty, but
where the applicants were not locked up and continued to perform their normal work duties,
remaining more or less, within the ordinary framework of their army life. The Guidelines on
the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alter-
natives to Detention, UNHCR, 2012 (UNHCR Guidelines on Detention), also acknowledge
that the cumulative impact of restrictions on freedom of movement may amount to detention.
Restrictions on liberty, imposed for a short time at points of entry to
the country, to address practical necessities such as checking identity or
processing of asylum applications, and which if applied for a short pe-
riod only would not usually amount to detention, will do so where they
are excessively prolonged.
634
For example, it was held by the European
Court of Human Rights, in Amuur v. France, that enforced confne-
ment to an international zone of an airport, involving restrictions on
movement and close police surveillance, for 20 days, did amount to
deprivation of liberty. It was also relevant to this fnding that the appli-
cants were not provided with legal or social assistance by public author-
ities, and that they had no access to judicial review of the restrictions
imposed on them.
635
The European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture has stated that [p]ersons being transferred onto [State] ves-
sels or otherwise in the custody of [State] offcials, pending delivery,
contrary to their wishes, to the authorities of another State, must be
considered as deprived of their liberty by the [State] authorities for the
duration of their transfer/custody.
636
The mere fact that a detained migrant is free to leave a place of deten-
tion by agreeing to depart from the country does not mean that the de-
tention is not a deprivation of liberty. This was affrmed by the European
Court of Human Rights in Amuur v. France,
637
the Court noting that the
possibility to leave the country would in many cases be theoretical if
no other country could be relied on to receive the individual or to pro-
vide protection if the individual is under threat. The UNHCR Guidelines
on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (UNCHR Guidelines on
Detention) take the same approach.
638
Less severe restrictions, that do not amount to deprivation of liberty,
should be considered in relation to rights to freedom of movement, pro-
tected under Article 12 ICCPR, Article 2 of Protocol 4 ECHR, Article 22
ACHR, Article 12 ACHPR and Article 26 ArCHR. In Celipli v. Sweden,
639

for example, the Human Rights Committee held that the confnement
to a single municipality of a non-national subject to a deportation or-
der, with a requirement to report three times weekly, did not amount
to deprivation of liberty, but did raise issues under Article 12 ICCPR.
Restrictions on residence may also raise issues in regard to the right

634
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45, para. 43.

635
Ibid., para. 43.

636
Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
from 27 to 31 July 2009, CPT, op. cit., fn. 265, para. 39.

637

638
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Terminology, para. 7.

639
Celepli v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 456/1991, Views of 26 July 1994.
to respect for family life, where they serve to separate members of a
family.
640
II. Justifcation of detention
1. Different approaches to justifcation of immigration
detention
The right to liberty and security of the person under international human
rights law requires that deprivation of liberty, to be justifed, must be in
accordance with law, and must not be arbitrary.
641
Deprivation of liberty
may be arbitrary either because it is not based on a legitimate basis
for detention or because it does not follow procedural requirements. In
this Section, it is the frst dimension of arbitrariness of deprivation of
liberty which is addressed.
Neither the ICCPR nor the ACHR, the ACHPR or the ArCHR make further
express provision for the circumstances in which deprivation of liberty
is permitted. They generally prohibit detention that is arbitrary. The
ECHR, by contrast, provides for the lawfulness of detention on a series
of specifed grounds. In relation to immigration detention, it permits
detention in two specifc situations: to prevent unauthorised entry to
the country, and pending deportation or extradition (Article 5.1(f)). The
scheme of Article 5 ECHR differs from that of the ICCPR, ACHR, ArCHR
and ACHPR in that detention that cannot be justifed on one of the
specifed grounds will always be considered arbitrary. Conversely, how-
ever, if detention can be shown to be necessary for a listed purpose,
such as prevention of unauthorised entry, it will not be considered to
be arbitrary, without the need for further justifcation related to the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. The protection offered by the ECHR
is therefore potentially narrower than that of instruments such as the
ICCPR, as will be considered further below.
Detention of asylum seekers and refugees is also regulated by Article
31 of the Geneva Refugee Convention and associated standards and
guidance, (considered further below) which establishes a presumption
against detention, and the principle that detention must be justifed as
necessary in a particular case.

640
Agraw v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 3295/06, Judgment of 29 July 2010.

641
Adequate prescription by law and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty are require-
ments of the right to security of the person as well as the right to liberty. See, Zamir v.
France, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No.9174/80, Admissibility Decision, 13 July 1982,
holding that it is implicit in the said right [to security of the person] that an individual ought
to be able to foresee with a reasonable degree of certainty the circumstances in which he is
liable to be arrested and detained. It is further implicit in the right to security of person that
there shall be adequate judicial control of arrest and detention.
2. Detention must have a clear legal basis in national
law and procedures
An essential safeguard against arbitrary detention is that all detentions
must be adequately prescribed by law. This refects the general hu-
man rights law principle of legal certainty, by which individuals should
be able to foresee, to the greatest extent possible, the consequences
which the law may have for them. The need for legal certainty is regard-
ed as particularly vital in cases where individual liberty is at stake.
642

The principle of prescription by law has two essential aspects:
that detention be in accordance with national law and procedures;
that national law and procedures should be of sufficient quality to
protect the individual from arbitrariness.
643
For detention to have a suffcient basis in national law, the national
law must clearly provide for deprivation of liberty. In Abdolkhani and
Karimnia v. Turkey,
644
the European Court of Human Rights held that
a law that required non-nationals without valid travel documents to
reside at designated places did not provide suffcient legal basis for
their detention pending deportation. Laws imposing deprivation of
liberty must be accessible and precise.
645
Its consequences must be
foreseeable to the individuals it affects. The law must provide for time
limits that apply to detention, and for clear procedures for imposing,
reviewing and extending detention.
646
Furthermore, there must be a
clear record regarding the arrest or bringing into custody of the individ-
ual.
647
Legislation which allows wide executive discretion in authorising
or reviewing detention is likely to be considered an insuffciently pre-
cise basis for deprivation of liberty.
648
The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights has stressed that [t]he grounds and procedures by
which non-nationals may be deprived of their liberty should defne with

642
Medvedyev v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 51, para. 80.

643
onka v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570, para. 39; Amuur v. France, op. cit., fn. 45,
para. 51. See also, Servelln-Garca et al. v. Honduras, IACtHR, Series C No. 152, Judg-
ment of 21 September 2006, paras. 8889; Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624,
para. 98. See also, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Annual Report 1998,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63, 18 December 1998, para. 69, Guarantee 2; WGAD, Annual Report
1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4, 28 December 1999, Annex II, Deliberation No. 5 Situations
regarding immigrants and asylum-seekers, Principle 6; WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit.,
fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82.

644
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, para. 133.

645
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45, para. 51

646
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR,
op. cit., fn. 536, para. 117.

647
Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08,
Judgment of 13 April 2010; Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 537, para. 131.

648
Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. USA, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 222 and 226.
suffcient detail the basis for such action, and the State should always
bear the burden of justifying a detention. Moreover, authorities have a
very narrow and limited margin of discretion, and guarantees for the
revision of the detention should be available at a minimum in reason-
able intervals.
649
The requirement that the law governing detention must be accessible,
precise and foreseeable has particular implications in the case of mi-
grants, faced with an unfamiliar legal system, often in an unfamiliar
language. The authorities are required to take steps to ensure that
suffcient information is available to detained persons in a language
they understand, regarding the nature of their detention, the reasons
for it, the process for reviewing or challenging the decision to detain.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the absence of
elaborate reasoning for [a] deprivation of liberty renders that measure
incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness inherent in Article 5 of
the Convention.
650
For the information to be accessible, it must also
be presented in a form that takes account of the individuals level of
education, and legal advice may be required for the individual to fully
understand his or her circumstances.
651

3. Detention must not be arbitrary, unnecessary or
disproportionate
The European Court of Human Rights has held that, in order to avoid ar-
bitrariness, detention must, in addition to complying with national law:
be carried out in good faith and not involve deception on the part
of the authorities;
be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised
entry of the person to the country or deportation;
the place and conditions of detention must be appropriate, bear-
ing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have
committed criminal offences but to people who have fled from
their own country, often in fear of their lives;

649

650
Lokpo and Toure v. Hungary, ECtHR, Application No. 10816/10, Judgment of 20 September
2011, para. 24.

651
Nasrulloyev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 656/06, Judgment of 11 October 2007,
para. 77; Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 118; Saadi v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, para. 74; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, EctHR,
op. cit., fn. 627, paras. 131135; Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45; Soldatenko v.
Ukraine, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 361. See also, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536,
paras. 116, 180; WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69, Guarantees 1
and 5; WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principles 1 and 8; WGAD, Annual
Report 2008, op. cit., fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82.
the length of the detention must not exceed that reasonably re-
quired for the purpose pursued.
652
The European Court of Human Rights, applying Article 5.1(f) ECHR, has
found that, provided that these tests are met and that the detention can
be shown to be for the purposes of preventing unauthorised entry or
with a view to deportation, it is not necessary to show further that the
detention of the individual is reasonable, necessary or proportionate,
for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an of-
fence or feeing.
653
In Saadi v. United Kingdom, the Court therefore held
that short-term detention, in appropriate conditions, for the purposes
of effcient processing of cases under accelerated asylum procedures,
was permissible in circumstances where the respondent State faced
an escalating fow of asylum seekers.
654
The approach of the Court to
Article 5.1(f) is in contrast to justifcation of detention on certain other
grounds under Article 5.1(b), (d) and (e), under which there must be
an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the detention in
the circumstances of the individual case, and detention must be used
only as a last resort.
655

By contrast, under Article 9 of the ICCPR, as well as in international
refugee law in regard to asylum seekers, the State must show that the
detention was reasonable, necessary and proportionate in the circum-
stances of the individual case, in order to establish that detention is not
arbitrary.
656
To establish the necessity and proportionality of detention,
it must be shown that other less intrusive measures have been con-
sidered and found to be insuffcient. In C. v. Australia,
657
the Human

652
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, para. 74.

653
Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 112; Saadi v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, para. 72. This is in contrast to justifcation of detention under Arti-
cle 5.1(b), (d) and (e), under which there must be an assessment of the necessity and pro-
portionality of the detention in the circumstances of the individual case, and detention must
be used only as a last resort: Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, para. 70.

654
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, paras. 7580

655
Ibid., para. 70.

656
A. v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No. 560/1993, Views of 30 April 1997, para. 9.3: The
State must provide more than general reasons to justify detention: in order to avoid arbi-
trariness, the State must advance reasons for detention particular to the individual case. It
must also show that, in the light of the authors particular circumstances, there were no less
invasive means of achieving the same ends. Saed Shams and Others v. Australia, Commu-
nication No.1255/2004, 11 September 2007; Samba Jalloh v. the Netherlands, CCPR, Com-
munication No. 794/1998, Views of 15 April 2002: arbitrariness must be interpreted more
broadly than against the law to include elements of unreasonableness; F.K.A.G. v. Australia,
CCPR, Communication No. 2094/2011, Views of 26 July 2013, para. 9.3. In that case was not
unreasonable to detain considering the risk of escape, as had previously fed from open facil-
ity. See, Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624, para. 98, containing a restatement
of the Inter-American Court jurisprudence on necessity and proportionality.

657
C. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 350. See also, Al-Gertani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, CCPR,
op. cit., fn. 606, para. 10.4.
Rights Committee found a violation of Article 9.1 on the basis that the
State did not consider less intrusive means, such as the imposition
of reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions which would take
account of the authors deteriorating condition. In these circumstances,
whatever the reasons for the original detention, continuance of immi-
gration detention for over two years without individual justifcation and
without any chance of substantive judicial review was . . . arbitrary and
constituted a violation of Article 9.1.
In F.K.A.G. v Australia, the Human Rights Committee reaffrmed its
general approach on arbitrariness of detention. It held that detention
must be justifed as reasonable, necessary and proportionate in light
of the circumstances and reassessed as it extends in time. Asylum-
seekers who unlawfully enter a State partys territory may be de-
tained for a brief initial period in order to document their entry, record
their claims, and determine their identity if it is in doubt. To detain
them further while their claims are being resolved would be arbitrary
absent particular reasons specifc to the individual, such as an indi-
vidualized likelihood of absconding, danger of crimes against others,
or risk of acts against national security. The decision must consider
relevant factors case-by-case, and not be based on a mandatory rule
for a broad category; must take into account less invasive means of
achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties, or
other conditions to prevent absconding; and must be subject to pe-
riodic re-evaluation and judicial review. The decision must also take
into account the needs of children and the mental health condition
of those detained. Individuals must not be detained indefnitely on
immigration control grounds if the State party is unable to carry out
their expulsion.
658
Both the ICCPR and the ECHR require that the length of detention must
be as short as possible, and the more detention is prolonged, the more
it is likely to become arbitrary.
659
Excessive length of detention, or un-
certainty as to its duration, may also raise issues of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, and the Committee against Torture has repeated-
ly warned against the use of prolonged or indefnite detention in the im-
migration context.
660
Prolonged detention of minors calls for particularly

658
F.K.A.G. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 9.3.

659
See, WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69, Guarantee 10; WGAD, Annual
Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principle 7; WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit., fn. 624,
paras. 67 and 82.

660
Concluding Observations on Sweden, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/SWE/CO/2, 4 June 2008, para.
12: detention should be for the shortest possible time; Concluding Observations on Costa
Rica, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/CRI/CO/2, 7 July 2008, para. 10 expressed concern at failure to
limit the length of administrative detention of non-nationals. CAT recommended: the State
Party should set a maximum legal period for detention pending deportation, which should in
no circumstances be indefnite.
strict scrutiny and may violate obligations under the CRC (Articles 3
and 37) as well as Article 24 ICCPR.
661
Where a national court orders the release of a detainee, delay in im-
plementing the Courts order may lead to arbitrary detention. The
European Court has held that although some delay in implementing
a decision to release a detainee is understandable and often inevitable
in view of practical considerations relating to the running of the courts
and the observance of particular formalities . . . the national authorities
must attempt to keep it to a minimum . . . formalities connected with re-
lease cannot justify a delay of more than a few hours.
662
In Eminbeyli
v. Russia,
663
three days to communicate a decision and to release the
applicant was found to lead to a violation of Article 5.1(f).
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also makes an assessment
as to the legitimate aim of the detention, and its adequacy, necessity
and proportionality to the legitimate aim.
664
The Court has held in Vlez
Loor v. Panama that automatic detention following irregular presence
is arbitrary as any decision on detention must assess the individual
circumstances of the case.
665
Preventive detention may be a legitimate
means to assure the implementation of a deportation,
666
however the
aim of imposing a punitive measure on the migrant who re-enters irreg-
ularly the country after a previous deportation order does not constitute
a legitimate aim under the [American] Convention.
667
Finally, the Court
held that it is essential that States have at their disposal a catalogue
of alternative measures [to detention] that may be effective to reach
the pursued aims. Accordingly, migration policies whose central axis is
the mandatory detention of irregular migrants will be arbitrary, if the
competent authorities do not verify case-by-case, and individually, the
possibility of using less restrictive measures that are effective to reach
those aims.
668
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has highlighted four
instances in which detention of migrants or asylum-seekers may be
arbitrary:

661
Concluding Observations on Czech Republic, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2, 9 August
2007, para. 15: the committee expressed concern at legislation permitting the detention of
those under the age of 18 for up to 90 days, in light of obligations under Articles 10 and 24
ICCPR, and recommended that this period should be reduced.

662
Eminbeyli v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 42443/02, Judgment of 26 February 2009,
para. 49.

663
Ibid., para. 49.

664
Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 166.

665
Ibid., para. 118.

666
Ibid., para. 169.

667
Ibid., para. 169 (our translation).

668
Ibid., para. 171 (our translation).
when they fail to define with sufficient particularity the grounds upon
which the concerned persons have been deprived of their liberty;
when the procedures place the onus upon the detainee to justify
his or her release;
when they are subjected to a degree of discretion on the part of
officials that exceeds reasonable limits;
and when they fail to provide for detention review at reasonable
intervals.
669
4. Particular considerations in the detention of asylum
seekers and refugees
Under international refugee law, detention of asylum seekers is permit-
ted, but is constrained by Article 31 of the Convention on the Status
of Refugees which prohibits States from imposing penalties on those
entering the State without authorisation, where they come directly from
a State feeing persecution provided they present themselves without
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence. More specifcally, Article 31.2 prohibits restrictions on the
movement of such persons other than those which are necessary, and
requires that they be imposed only until the individuals status is regu-
larised or they obtain admission into another country. Based on these
provisions, UNHCR Guidelines on Detention,
670
and the Conclusions ad-
opted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of
Refugees,
671
establish a presumption against detention, and the need
to justify individual detentions as necessary for specifed purposes.
672

Detention must therefore never be automatic, should be used only as a
last resort where there is evidence that other lesser restrictions would
be inadequate in the particular circumstances of the case, and should
never be used as a punishment. Where detention is imposed, it should
be seen as an exceptional measure, and must last for the shortest pos-
sible period.
673
The Executive Committee Conclusions (endorsed by the
Guidelines, Guideline 3) stipulate that detention may only be resorted
to where necessary on grounds prescribed by law:
" to verify identity;
to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status or
asylum is based;

669
Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. USA, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 221.

670
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 2.

671
Conclusion No. 44, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 624.

672
Ibid.

673
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guidelines 3 and 6.
to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have de-
stroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have used
fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the
State in which they intend to claim asylum; or
to protect national security or public order.
674

Guideline 4.1 of the UNHCR Guidelines on Detention further specifes
the grounds allowing for detention of asylum-seekers:
to protect public order:
to prevent absconding and/or in cases of likelihood of non-co-
operation;
in connection with accelerated procedures for manifestly un-
founded or clearly abusive claims;
for initial identity and/or security verifcation;
in order to record, within the context of a preliminary interview,
the elements on which the application for international protection
is based, which could not be obtained in the absence of detention;
to protect public health;
to protect national security.
675
The Guidelines stipulate that detention of asylum-seekers for other
purposes, such as to deter future asylum-seekers, or to dissuade asy-
lum-seekers from pursuing their claims, or for punitive or disciplinary
reasons, is contrary to the norms of refugee law.
676
Guideline 4.3 pro-
vides that States must demonstrate that they have considered alternative
measures to detention as this ensures that detention of asylum-seekers
is a measure of last, rather than frst, resort. It must be shown that in
light of the asylum-seekers particular circumstances, there were not less
invasive or coercive means of achieving the same ends. Thus, consider-
ation of the availability, effectiveness and appropriateness of alternatives
to detention in each individual case needs to be undertaken.
677

5. Particular factors in detention on entry or pending
removal
a) Detention to prevent unauthorised entry
The European Court of Human Rights has determined that Article 5.1(f)
ECHR permits relatively wide powers to detain for the purposes of pre-

674
Conclusion No. 44, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 624. Reaffrmed in Conclusion No. 85, UNHCR,
op. cit., fn. 183. See also UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 4.1.

675
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 4.1.

676
Ibid., Guideline 4.1.4.

677
Ibid., Guideline 4.3.
venting unauthorised entry. In Saadi v. United Kingdom it held that
Article 5.1(f) could not be interpreted as permitting detention only of
persons attempting to evade entry restrictions, but also applied to other
entrants, since until a State has authorised entry, any entry is unautho-
rised.
678
Nevertheless, the State must show that detention of those seek-
ing entry to the country is reasonably justifed. Factors such as the num-
bers of asylum seekers seeking entry to the country, and administrative
diffculties, may contribute to the reasonableness of detention. In Saadi v.
United Kingdom, these factors, and the fact that the UK authorities were
using detention in good faith as a way of speedily processing asylum
seekers through accelerated procedures, helped to justify seven days
detention in suitable conditions.
679
The conditions of detention are also
important when considering the maximum length possible of a detention
to prevent unauthorized entry. The Court has found a detention to be ar-
bitrary, where the periods of detention amounted to three months or six
months in inappropriate conditions while a determination was pending in
respect of the migrants entitlement to stay on the territory.
680
Nevertheless, laws and procedures must ensure that detention on entry
does not adversely affect rights under international refugee law to gain
effective access to procedures for claiming refugee status.
681
The UN Human Rights Committee conducts a more individualised assess-
ment of the necessity and proportionality of detention of those seeking
entry to the country. Although it accepts in principle that detention on the
basis of illegal entry to the country may be permissible and not necessarily
arbitrary,
682
it requires that such detention be shown to be necessary in the
circumstances of the particular case.
683
In A. v. Australia
684
the Committee
stressed that there must be reasonable justifcation for a particular deten-
tion, and that the detention must not last beyond the period for which this
justifcation applies. The Committee has also found that detention on entry
may be justifed for the purposes of verifcation of identity, although such
detention may become arbitrary if it is unduly prolonged.
685

678
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, paras. 6466.

679
Ibid., paras. 7680.

680
Suso Musa v. Malta, ECtHR, Application No. 42337/12, Judgment of 23 July 2013, paras.
100103 ; Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 15297/09, Judg-
ment of 13 December 2011, paras. 9495.

681

682
A. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 9.3.

683
Madafferi and Madafferi v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 460, para. 9.2: although the deten-
tion of unauthorised arrivals is not per se arbitrary, remand in custody could be considered
arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case: the element of propor-
tionality becomes relevant.

684
A. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, paras. 9.39.4.

685
Bakhtiyari v. Australia, CCPR, Communication No.1069/2002, Views of 6 November 2003,
paras. 9.29.3; F.K.A.G. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 9.3.
b) Detention pending deportation
Under the ECHR, unlike the ICCPR, the specifc terms of Article 5.1(f)
narrow the scrutiny which will be applied to detentions pending deporta-
tion. In such cases, it is suffcient for the State to show that action is be-
ing taken with a view to deportation. It is not necessary to show that the
substance of the decision to deport is justifed under national law; nor is
it necessary to show that other factors, such as the propensity to escape,
or the risk of commission of a criminal offence, warrant detention.
686
This
is in contrast to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee apply-
ing the ICCPR, by which, if the decision is not to be arbitrary, individual
circumstances that justify detention must be established in each case.
687
In order for detention to be justifed, the State must establish that
deportation is being pursued with due diligence.
688
Longer periods of
detention may be justifed by the complexity of a case or where the
actions of the applicant have led to delays.
689

However, where proceedings have been suspended for a signifcant peri-
od,
690
or where deportation is no longer being actively pursued or is ex-
cessively delayed, then detention will no longer be justifed.
691
Equally,
if the authorities are unable to pursue a deportation because sending
the person to the country of origin would be in breach of the principle of
non-refoulement (see, Chapter 2), detention pending deportation can no
longer be justifed.
692
The same applies when other legal or practical ob-
stacles impede the deportation, such as the fact that the concerned per-
son is stateless and there is no other State willing to accept him or her.
693

686
onka v. Belgium, ECtHR op. cit., fn. 570, para. 38: Article 5.1(f) does not require that
the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be
reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fee-
ing . . . all that is required under sub-paragraph (f) is that action is being taken with a view
to deportation. Soldatenko v. Ukraine, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 361, para. 109.

687
Samba Jalloh v. the Netherlands, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 8; Danyal Shafq v. Australia,
CCPR, Communication No. 1324/2004, Views of 13 November 2006, paras. 7.27.3.

688
Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 113: any deprivation of liberty un-
der Article 5.1(f) will be justifed only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress.
If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be
permissible. See, Lokpo and Toure v. Hungary, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 650, para. 22, where
a fve month detention with a view to expulsion that never materialized contributed to the
declaration of unlawfulness of the detention.

689
Kolompar v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 11613/85, Judgment of 24 September 1992,
paras. 4043.

690
Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 356, para. 131, in the context of extradition proceed-
ings, which were suspended for more than a year.

691
Quinn v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 18580/91, Judgment of 22 March 1995; A. and
Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February
2009, para. 164. See also, WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit., fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82.

692
Mikolenko v. Estonia, ECtHR, Application No. 10664.05, Judgment of 8 October 2009,
para. 65. See also, WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit., fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82.

693
A. and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 691, para. 167.
One consequence of this is that, where the Court has ordered interim
measures (see, Annex 2) to prevent a deportation pending full consider-
ation of the case by the Court, and deportation proceedings are therefore
suspended, detention may, in certain circumstances, no longer be justi-
fed.
694
The European Court has held that, as a general principle, the fact
that expulsion proceedings are provisionally suspended as a result of the
application of an interim measure does not in itself render the detention
of the person concerned unlawful, provided that the authorities still en-
visage expulsion at a later stage, so that action is being taken although
the proceedings are suspended, and on condition that that the detention
must not be unreasonably prolonged.
695
However, this does not suspend
consideration of the suitability of the detention measures in view of de-
portation. In the case of Keshmiri v. Turkey (No. 2), the Court found the
detention unreasonably prolongued and, therefore, in breach of Article 5.1
ECHR, because it continued for many months after the interim measure
was applied and during that time no steps were taken to fnd alternative
solutions,
696
including the possibility of sending the returnee to a different
country than his country of origin, where the principle of non-refoulement
did not allow for his transfer. However, the Court has also stressed that
an interim measure [. . .] preventing a persons extradition or deportation
does not require or form a basis for the persons detention pending a de-
cision on his or her extradition or deportation.
697
A further requirement is that detention must be genuinely for the pur-
poses of expulsion. The European Court of Human Rights has held that
where the real purpose of the detention is transfer for prosecution and
trial in another State, then the detention will amount to a disguised ex-
tradition and will be arbitrary and contrary to Article 5.1(f) as well as to
the right to security of the person protected by Article 5.1.
698
The same
reasoning applies when the detention is ordered solely for reasons of
national security even when deportation is not possible.
699
6. Particular considerations in the detention of certain
groups
Detention of persons rendered vulnerable by their age, state of health
or past experiences may, depending on the individual circumstances
of the case, amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. This

694
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, para. 134.

695
Keshmiri v. Turkey (No. 2), ECtHR, Application No. 22426/10, Judgment of 17 January 2012,
para. 34.

696
Ibid., para. 34.

697
Molotchko v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 12275/10, Judgment of 26 April 2012, para. 174.

698
Bozano v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 9990/82, Judgment of 18 December 1986, para. 60.

699
M.S. v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 50012/08, Judgment of 31 January 2012,
paras. 155156.
principle can be particularly signifcant in relation to detention of asy-
lum seekers, who may have suffered torture or ill-treatment or other
traumatic experiences, sometimes with physical or mental health im-
plications. In regard to all detained persons, particular concerns arise
in relation to survivors of torture or traffcking; children and elderly
persons; or persons suffering from serious illness or disability. For ex-
ample, in Farbtuhs v. Latvia,
700
the European Court held that detention
of a 79 year old disabled man violated Article 3 ECHR.
The UNHCR Guidelines on Detention (Guideline 9) recommend that es-
pecially active consideration should be given to alternatives to detention,
for persons for whom detention is likely to have a particularly serious
effect on psychological well-being. Such persons may include unaccom-
panied elderly persons, survivors of torture or other trauma, and per-
sons with a mental or physical disability. The UNHCR Guidelines recom-
mend that such persons only be detained following medical certifcation
that detention will not adversely affect their health or well-being.
701

Where such persons are detained, then in order to ensure compliance
with freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, particular
care will need to be taken in relation to conditions of detention, provi-
sion of healthcare, etc (considered further below in Section 2).
In C. v. Australia,
702
the Human Rights Committee found a violation
of Article 9.1 on the basis that the State Party has not demonstrated
that, in the light of the authors particular circumstances [a psychiatric
illness], there were not less invasive means of achieving the same ends,
that is to say, compliance with the State Partys immigration policies.
The European Court of Human Rights has, in practice, begun to tem-
per its previously infexible approach to alternatives to detention (see,
above, section II.5.b.), with regard to migrants in situations of vulner-
ability. For instance, the Court has ruled that the best interest of the
child (Article 3 CRC) and the provisions of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on detention (Article 37 CRC) require that State authorities
consider any alternatives to detention before resorting to this measure
in order to satisfy its lawfulness under Article 5.1(f) ECHR.
703
This ap-
proach also applies when children are accompanied by their family. In
Popov v. France, the European Court ruled that, in spite of the fact that
they were accompanied by their parents, and even though the deten-

700
Farbthus v. Latvia, ECtHR, Application No. 4672/02, Judgment of 2 December 2004.

701
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 9: Because of the serious con-
sequences of detention, initial and periodic assessments of detainees physical and mental
state are required, carried out by qualifed medical practitioners. Appropriate treatment
needs to be provided to such persons, and medical reports presented at periodic reviews of
their detention.

702
C. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 350.

703
Rahimi v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011, paras. 108109.
tion centre had a special wing for the accommodation of families, the
childrens particular situation was not examined and the authorities did
not verify that the placement in administrative detention was a mea-
sure of last resort for which no alternative was available. The Court thus
[found] that the [. . .] system did not suffciently protect their right to
liberty.
704
In the case Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, the Court found
that the detention of a woman affected by AIDS that did not present
particular risks of fight was arbitrary because the authorities had not
contemplated the resort to less intrusive alternatives to detention, such
as a temporary residence permit.
705
a) Justifcation of detention of children
Detention of children raises particular considerations under the CRC, as
well as under international refugee law and international human rights
law generally.
The CRC provides in Article 37(b) that detention of a child should be only
as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. Article 37
should be read in light of other provisions of the CRC which affect deci-
sion-making regarding migrant children. Of signifcance in all cases where
detention of child migrants is considered is Article 3.1 CRC which requires
that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in
all actions concerning children. Under Article 22.1 CRC, States must take
all appropriate measures to ensure that a child refugee or asylum seeker
shall receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance, a pro-
vision which could have consequences for decisions on whether to detain
a child. For child migrants who accompany their parents or other adults,
and who may risk imprisonment as a result, Article 2.2 CRC is relevant.
It provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure
that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punish-
ment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs
of the childs parents, legal guardians, or family members. Similar pro-
vision is made in Article 24 ICCPR, and Article 19 ACHR. Also of potential
signifcance is Article 39 CRC, which requires States to take measures to
ensure the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration
of child victims of armed confict, torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, neglect, exploitation or abuse.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in General Comment
No. 6 (2005)
706
has provided guidance on the application of Article 37(b)
CRC to migrant children.

704
Popov v. France, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, Judgment of 19 January
2012, para. 91.

705
Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 412, para. 124.

706
The Committee has stated that unaccompanied or separated children
should not, as a general rule, be detained. Detention cannot be justifed
solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or
on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof. Where detention
is exceptionally justifed for other reasons, it shall . . . only be used as a
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.
In consequence, all efforts, including acceleration of relevant processes,
should be made to allow for the immediate release of unaccompanied or
separated children from detention and their placement in other forms of
appropriate accommodation.
707
Where children are held in immigration detention contrary to their best
interests, the Human Rights Committee has considered that such de-
tention may be arbitrary in violation of Article 9.1 ICCPR. It may also
violate Article 24 ICCPR, which guarantees the rights of the child to
measures of protection required by his or her status as a minor, with-
out discrimination. In Bakhtiyari v. Australia, the Committee held that
mandatory immigration detention of an Afghan refugee with fve chil-
dren for two years and eight months constituted arbitrary detention
708

as well as a violation of Article 24.1 ICCPR since the measures had not
been guided by the best interests of the children.
709
However, deten-
tion of a minor does not necessarily violate Article 24 of the Covenant,
and may be justifed in exceptional circumstances. In Samba Jalloh
v. the Netherlands the Committee held that detention of a minor was
justifed where there were doubts as to the authors identity, where
he had attempted to evade expulsion before, where there were reason-
able prospects for his expulsion, and where an identity investigation
was still ongoing.
710

The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that States must take
into account their obligations under Articles 3 and 37 CRC in the im-
plementation of their duties under the European Convention on Human
Rights. Following this line, the Court has determined that, when de-
cisions on detention involve children, the best interest of the child
(Article 3 CRC) and the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on detention (Article 37 CRC) require that State authorities con-
sider any alternatives to detention before resorting to this measure in

707
Ibid., para. 61. See also, Concluding Observations on Australia, CRC, UN Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.268, 20 October 2005: the Committee remains concerned that children who
are unlawfully in Australian territory are still automatically placed in administrative deten-
tionof whatever formuntil their situation is assessed. [. . .] the Committee is seriously
concerned that [. . .] administrative detention is not always used as a measure of last resort
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.

708
Bakhtiyari v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 685, para. 9.3.

709
Ibid., para. 9.6.

710
Samba Jalloh v. the Netherlands, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 8.2.
order to satisfy its lawfulness under Article 5.1(f) ECHR.
711
Furthermore,
in regard to the right to respect for family life, the Court held that the
childs best interests cannot be confned to keeping the family together
and that the authorities have to take all the necessary steps to limit,
as far as possible, the detention of families accompanied by children
and effectively preserve the right to family life.
712
The Court therefore
found a violation of the right to family life of children and parents held in
immigration detention for ffteen days without any indication that they
would abscond, where no alternatives to detention were considered.
In regard to the detention of asylum seekers or refugees, the UNHCR
Guidelines on Detention,
713
as well as the UNHCR Guidelines on Refugee
Children, state that child asylum seekers should not be detained. They
reaffrm the principle in Article 37 CRC that detention of children should
be a measure of last resort, and for the shortest possible period of time;
and specify that where children accompany their parents, they should be
detained only where detention is the only means of maintaining family
unity.
714
Similarly, the Council of Europe Guidelines on human rights pro-
tection in the context of accelerated asylum proceedings state that chil-
dren, including unaccompanied minors should, as a rule, not be placed
in detention. In those exceptional cases where children are detained,
they should be provided with special supervision and assistance.
715
Where children are in fact detained, then the UNHCR guidelines as well
as other international standards require that it should be in places and
conditions appropriate to their age (see, further below, Sections III.1.a
and III.3.a).
b) Detention of stateless persons
Particular issues arise in regard to the detention of persons who are
stateless (see, Chapter 1). In the case of stateless persons, it will be
particularly diffcult to return them to their country of origin or to fnd
alternative places of resettlement. This can mean that stateless persons
are held for unusually long periods in detention, ostensibly awaiting
deportation. The general principle described above concerning the need
to establish that deportation is being actively pursued, in order for de-
tention to be justifed, is therefore of particular relevance to stateless
persons. Their detention will not be justifed if there is no active or real-
istic progress towards transfer to another State. The UNHCR Guidelines

711
Rahimi v. Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 703, paras. 108109; Popov v. France, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 704, para. 91.

712
Popov v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 704, para. 116.

713

714
UNHCR Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children, op. cit., fn. 214, paras. 7.67.8.

715
European Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, principle XI.2.
on Detention apply equally to stateless persons who are seeking asy-
lum, although they do not specifcally cover the situation of non-asy-
lum-seeking stateless persons, persons found not to be in need of inter-
national protection or other migrants, although many of the standards
detailed herein may apply to them mutatis mutandis. This is particularly
true with regard to non-refugee stateless persons in the migratory con-
text who face a heightened risk of arbitrary detention.
716
7. Detention of migrants for purposes other than
immigration control
Although the focus of this Chapter is on detention for the purposes of
immigration control, it should be noted that migrants, like others, may
also be detained on other legitimate or illegitimate grounds. While the
majority of human rights treaties do not expressly specify the grounds on
which detention is permitted, under the ECHR, in addition to detention for
the purposes of immigration control, permissible detention is limited to:
detention following conviction by a criminal court;
detention for failure to comply with an order of a court or to se-
cure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law;
detention following arrest on suspicion of committing an offence
or in order to prevent an offence being committed;
detention of minors for educational purposes;
detention where strictly necessary for the prevention of the spread
of infectious diseases;
detention of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts or
vagrants, where necessary for their own protection or the protec-
tion of the public.
All such detentions are subject to safeguards against arbitrariness simi-
lar to those that apply to immigration detention. It should also be noted
that such powers of detention are subject to the principle of non-dis-
crimination, including on grounds of nationality, and must therefore not
be exclusively or disproportionately imposed on non-nationals except
where the difference in treatment can be objectively and reasonably
justifed in the circumstances.
717
a) Administrative detention on grounds of national security
Administrative detention for reasons of national security, although dis-
tinct from detention for the purposes of immigration control, may nev-
ertheless disproportionately affect non-nationals. Although, under the

716
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Scope, para. 4.

717
A. and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 691.
ICCPR, administrative detention without trial is permitted in exceptional
circumstances, to the extent that it can be shown not to be arbitrary,
and to be in accordance with principles of necessity, proportionality and
non-discrimination and based on grounds and procedures established by
law,
718
in practice such detention is unlikely to be permissible where there
is not a derogation from Article 9 ICCPR in a declared state of emergen-
cy.
719
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has held the practice
of preventive detention to be generally incompatible with international
human rights law. In 2009, the Working Group declared administrative
detention to be inadmissible in relation to persons suspected of terror-
ism-related conduct.
720
Previously, in 1993, the Working Group examined
the use of administrative detention and concluded that it is arbitrary on
procedural grounds if fair trial standards are violated. The Working Group
also found that administrative detention was inherently arbitrary where
it was, de jure or de facto, of an indefnite nature.
721

The European Convention system imposes strict limitations on the use
of administrative detention. Under the ECHR, administrative detention
without trial is not a specifed ground for which detention is permitted
under Article 5 ECHR and therefore can only be legitimately imposed
where the State derogates from its Article 5 obligations in a time of public
emergency threatening the life of the nation (under Article 15 ECHR) and
where the use of administrative detention can be shown to be strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation and necessary, proportionate
and non-discriminatory in the context of the particular emergency situa-
tion that prevails.
722
Measures which impose security-related administra-

718
General Comment No. 8, Right to Liberty and Security of the Person, CCPR, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 30 June 1982, para. 4. See also, Concluding Observations on
Jordan, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.35, 10 August 1994, paras. 226244; Concluding
Observations on Morocco, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.44, 23 November 1994, para. 21;
and, Concluding Observations on Zambia, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.62, 3 April 1996,
para. 14. See, generally, International Commission of Jurists, Memorandum on International
Legal Framework on Administrative Detention and Counter-Terrorism, March 2006.

719
The Committee has also emphasised that the totality of ICCPR Article 9 safeguards apply
even when there is a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be contained in any
other manner except through preventive detention. See, Cmpora Schweizer v. Uruguay,
CCPR, Communication No. 66/1980, Views of 12 October 1982, para. 18.1.

720
WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit., fn. 624, para.54. The Working Group states that:
(a) Terrorist activities carried out by individuals shall be considered as punishable criminal
offences, which shall be sanctioned by applying current and relevant penal and criminal
procedure laws according to the different legal systems; (b) resort to administrative deten-
tion against suspects of such criminal activities is inadmissible; (c) the detention of persons
who are suspected of terrorist activities shall be accompanied by concrete charges [. . .].

721
WGAD, Annual Report 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/24, 12 January 1993, Deliberation No. 4,
Conclusions at III.B. See also, WGAD, Report on the visit to the Peoples Republic of China,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.2, 22 December 1997, paras. 8099 and 109.

722
Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), ECtHR, Application No. 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961,
paras. 13 and 14; Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 5310/71,
18 January 1978, paras. 194196 and 212213; A. and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 691, para. 172.
tive detention exclusively on those subject to immigration control, in cir-
cumstances where others may also pose similar security risks, have been
found to discriminate unjustifably between nationals and non-nationals
and therefore to amount to disproportionate measures of derogation in
violation of Article 5 ECHR.
723
Issues of judicial review of security-related
detentions, whether characterised as immigration law measures or as
administrative detention, are considered further at Section IV.3.b.
b) Detention by private actors
As a general principle, international law requires States to take steps to
ensure that the conduct of non-state actors does not impair the enjoy-
ment of human rights. The right to liberty under international human
rights law also prohibits arbitrary detention by private, non-state actors.
In regard to such detention, it imposes positive obligations on the State
to take measures to prevent and punish such detentions. This will often
be relevant in the immigration context in cases of traffcking and ex-
ploitative labour practices. Such private sphere restrictions on liberty will
often involve imprisonment in the workplace or home alongside confs-
cation of passports and other travel documents, as well as other substan-
tial restrictions on liberty amounting to detention. Such situations are
also likely to raise issues of the right to freedom from slavery, servitude
or forced labour (see, further, Chapter 6). As noted above (Section I)
even where they do not involve situations of private-sphere detention,
they may nonetheless raise issues in relation to freedom of movement.
In accordance with the right to liberty, the State has a duty to provide
an adequate legal framework which criminalises unauthorised deten-
tion by private actors; to take all appropriate measures to enforce the
criminal law effectively, to establish prompt, thorough and independent
investigations into credible allegations of detention by private actors;
and to provide other appropriate reparations to victims. Where the au-
thorities are aware of concerns that a particular individual is being held
in violation of the right to liberty, they must take all reasonable mea-
sures to prevent and end the violation.
724

A different situation arises when non-state actors, including private ac-
tors, exercise elements of governmental authority in place of State or-

723
A. and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 691, para. 190. In light of this fnding
the Grand Chamber found it unnecessary to consider whether the measure also violated
Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 5.

724
CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 8, 15, and 18; Article 2 CPED; Storck
v. Germany, ECtHR, Application No. 61603/00, Judgment of 16 June 2005; Kurt v. Turkey,
ECtHR, Case No. 15/1997/799/1002, Judgment of 25 May 1998, para. 124; Venice Commis-
sion, Opinion 363/2005, op. cit., fn. 352, para. 53: Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities of the territorial State to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into a substantial claim that
a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.
gans, as it is the case for privately-run detention centres for migrants
or asylum-seekers. In this situation, the State is directly internationally
responsible for international wrongful acts, including breaches of in-
ternational human rights law, caused by acts or omissions of private
or non-state actors.
725
International human rights law obligations and
standards on treatment of detainees and conditions of detention apply
irrespective of whether detention facilities are operated by State au-
thorities, or by private companies on behalf of the State. This derives
from the principle that a State cannot absolve itself from responsibility
for its human rights obligations by delegating its responsibilities to a
private entity.
726
III. Treatment of detainees
Even where detention of migrants can be justifed on the basis of the stan-
dards discussed above, international human rights law imposes further
constraints on the place and regime of detention, the conditions of deten-
tion, and the social and medical services available to detainees. In addition,
it imposes obligations to protect detainees from violence in detention. The
most relevant standard for the treatment of detainees is the prohibition on
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 16 CAT, Article 7 ICCPR,
Article 3 ECHR, Article 5 ACHR, Article 5 ACHPR). The Convention against
Torture establishes that States have obligations to take effective measures
to prevent acts of torture
727
and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment
728
including to keep under systematic review arrangements
for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of deten-
tion with a view to preventing torture and ill-treatment.
729
Article 10.1 ICCPR makes specifc provision for the right of detained
persons to be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity, a
more specifc application of the general right under Article 7 ICCPR to
freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. Article 5.2 ACHR, Article 5 ACHPR and Article 20 ArCHR
also make similar specifc provision for the treatment of persons de-

725
Article 5, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopt-
ed by the International Law Commission at its 53
rd
session in 2001, in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two (ILC Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility). See also, Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53
rd
session in
2001, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, on Article 5,
pp. 4243 (ILC State Responsibility Commentary).

726
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 401, para. 27; Ximenes-Lopes v.
Brazil, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 586.

727
Article 2.1 CAT.

728
Article 16.1 CAT.

729
Article 11 read together with Article 16.1 CAT.
prived of their liberty. It has been suggested that Article 10 ICCPR may
extend to treatment less harsh than that covered by Article 7 ICCPR,
since the Human Rights Committee has found violations of Article 10
in many cases where it has found no violation of Article 7.
730
In addi-
tion, provisions of other international instruments may be relevant in
terms of protecting the human rights of certain categories of detained
migrants (CEDAW, CRPD, and Article 37 CRC).
Detailed standards on conditions of detention are set out in the UN
Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners;
731
the Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment;
732
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty;
733
and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment
of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders as
well as, at a European level, the CPT standards. These standards pro-
vide comprehensive recommendations on conditions and facilities to be
provided in all forms of detention, including immigration detention. As
regards asylum seekers, the UNHCR Guidelines on Detention provide that
[c]onditions of detention must be humane and dignifed. They emphasise
in particular that detained asylum seekers should have the opportunity to
have contact with the outside world and to receive visits; the opportunity
for exercise and indoor and outdoor recreation; the opportunity to contin-
ue their education; the opportunity to exercise their religion; and access
to basic necessities i.e. beds, shower facilities, basic toiletries etc.
734
The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and,
in the European system, the European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ECPT)
have established independent committees of expertsrespectively the
UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) and the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)with mandates to visit
detention facilities of State parties without limitations and to issue rec-
ommendations.
735
The OPCAT also requires State Parties to establish

730
Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Commentary, 2
nd
Revised Edition,
N.P. Engel Publisher, 2005 (Nowak, ICCPR Commentary), pp. 245250.

731
UN Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted in 1955, approved
by the Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and
2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977.

732
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988.

733
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/113 of 14 December 1990.

734
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 8.

735
The mandate and powers of visit of the SPT are to be found in Articles 4, 11.1, 12, and
14 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT); and of the CPT in Articles 2 and 7 of the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (ECPT).
one or more independent national mechanisms for the prevention of
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment with
powers of access to detention centres.
736
1. Appropriateness of place of detention
International guidance stipulates that, except for short periods, detained
migrants should be held in specifcally designed centres in conditions
tailored to their legal status and catering for their particular needs.
737

Under the particular scheme of Article 5 ECHR, holding a detainee in
a facility which is inappropriate in light of the grounds on which he or
she is held (for example for the prevention of unlawful entry or pending
deportation under Article 5.1(f)) may also violate the right to liberty.
738

So for example, it has been held that holding a child asylum seeker with
adults in a facility not adapted to her needs, violated the right to liber-
ty.
739
A similar rationale would be likely to apply to the long-term use of
prisons or police cells for immigration detention.
In general, under international human rights law, the detention of mi-
grants in unsuitable locations, including police stations or prisons, may
lead or contribute to violations of freedom from torture or cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment.
740
In relation to particular classes of
migrants, it may also violate other international standards, including, in
the case of minors, requirements to act in the best interests of the child
under the CRC. International and regional standards as well as con-
clusions of UN treaty bodies and the UNHCR consistently recommend
that asylum seekers or other migrants should not be detained in police
or prison custody. The length of time for which someone is held in a
detention facility is often relevant to whether the detention amounts to
ill-treatment. For example, while detention of a migrant at an airport
may be acceptable for a short period of a few hours on arrival, more
prolonged detention without appropriate facilities for sleeping, eating
or hygiene could amount to ill-treatment.
741
This has been recognised

736
See, Articles 3, 1722, OPCAT.

737
CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, p. 54, Extract from 7
th
General Report [CPT/Inf (97) 10],
para. 29; European Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119,
Principle XI.7: detained asylum seekers should normally be accommodated within the
shortest possible time in facilities specifcally designated for that purpose, offering material
conditions and a regime appropriate to their legal and factual situation and staffed by suita-
bly qualifed personnel. Detained families should be provided with separate accommodation
guaranteeing adequate privacy. See also, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536,
para. 209.

738
Aerts v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 25357/94, Judgment of 30 July 1998, para. 46.

739
Mayeka and Mitunga v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application no 13178/03, Judgment of 12 October
2006.

740
Under Article 7 and 10.1 ICCPR; Article 3 ECHR; Article 5 ACHR; Article 5 ACHPR.

741
CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, p. 54.
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which has
emphasised that, although immigration detainees may have to spend
some time in ordinary police detention facilities, given that the condi-
tions in such places may generally be inadequate for prolonged periods
of detention, the time they spend there should be kept to the abso-
lute minimum.
742
In Charahili v. Turkey, the European Court of Human
Rights found that prolonged detention of the applicant in the basement
of a police station, in poor conditions, violated Article 3 ECHR.
743
In R.U.
v. Greece, the Court found that the detention of an asylum seeker, who
because of his status as an asylum seeker was considered by the Court
to be a member of a vulnerable group, for more than two months in
inappropriate conditions of detention, constituted degrading treatment
prohibited by Article 3 ECHR.
744
The UN Human Rights Committee has
also expressed concern at detention of those awaiting deportation in
police custody for lengthy periods.
745
International standards also consistently reject detention of asylum
seekers or other migrants in prisons, requiring that other facilities
should be put in place or, at a minimum, that in any case asylum seek-
ers and migrants should be kept separate from convicted persons or
persons detained pending trial.
746

a) Place of detention of children and families
International standards require that, in those exceptional cases where
children are detained, they should be held in facilities and condi-
tions appropriate to their age. This general principle is established by
Article 37.c CRC, which states that [e]very child deprived of liberty
shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs
of persons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty
shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the childs best
interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with
742
Ibid., p. 54.

743
Charahili v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 46605/07, Judgment of 13 April 2010.

744
R.U. v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 2237/08, Judgment of 7 June 2011, para. 63.

745
Concluding Observations on Austria, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 188, para. 17. The Committee ex-
pressed concern that asylum seekers awaiting deportation were frequently detained for
up to several months in police detention facilities and recommended that the State Party
review its detention policy with regard to asylum seekers [. . .] and take immediate and
effective measures to ensure that all asylum seekers who are detained pending deportation
are held in centres specifcally designed for that purpose [. . .].

746
Concluding Observations on Ireland, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 516, para. 21; Vlez Loor v. Panama,
IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 207208. See also, Concluding Observations on Sweden,
CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6, 2 April 2009, para. 17; Concluding Observations on New
Zealand, CAT, UN Doc. CAT/C/NZL/CO/5, 14 May 2009, para. 6: The Committee notes with
concern that asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants continue to be detained in low
security and correctional facilities.; Conclusion No. 44, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 624, para. 10.
his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in excep-
tional circumstances . . .. Detailed rules for the exceptional situation of
detention of children are provided by the United Nations Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.
747
Other international tribunals have found that detention of children
in inappropriate facilities may in certain circumstances lead to viola-
tions of the freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium,
748
for example,
the European Court found that detention of a fve year old unaccom-
panied asylum seeker in an adult detention centre without proper ar-
rangements for her care violated Article 3 ECHR, since the conditions
of detention were not adapted to her position of extreme vulnerability;
the Court also found a violation of her mothers Article 3 rights because
of anxiety and uncertainty in relation to her daughters detention. The
Court has also found a violation of Article 3 ECHR for children detained
in a similar situation but accompanied by their mother, considering that
the central test is that of the best interest of the child
749
and that the
the childs extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes prece-
dence over considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant.
750

Conversely, the Court failed to fnd that the situation of the mother
reached the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment, because she
was detained with her children and their presence may have alleviat-
ed her feelings of anguish and frustration.
751
The Inter-American Court
established that Article 19 ACHR requires higher standards of care and
responsibility on the State when detention of a child is involved.
752
2. Conditions of detention
Facilities where migrants are detained must provide conditions that are
suffciently clean, safe, and healthy to be compatible with freedom from
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (ill-treatment)
and the right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the in-
herent dignity of the human person (Article 10 ICCPR, Article 5.2 ACHR,
Article 5 ACHPR and Article 20 ArCHR). In the context of increasing use

747
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, adopted on
December 14, 1990 by General Assembly resolution 45/113.

748
Mayeka and Mitunga v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 739. See also, Rahimi v. Greece, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 703, para. 86.

749
Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 680, paras. 6169.

750
Popov v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 704, para. 64. In this case the detention for ffteen days
of two children (a three year old and a baby) with their parents in an adult detention envi-
ronment with a strong police presence, without any childrens activities and taking account
of the parents distress, led to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.

751
Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 680, paras. 7072.

752
Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, IACtHR, Series C No. 112, Judgment of 2 Sep-
tember 2004, paras. 143, 160162.
of immigration detention and the holding of ever-larger numbers of
migrants, often in overcrowded facilities,
753
poor or overcrowded con-
ditions of detention for migrants have regularly been found by inter-
national courts and human rights bodies to violate the right to be free
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Although detention by its
nature imposes a certain level of hardship, the general principle to be
applied is that conditions of detention should be compatible with human
dignity and not subject detainees to a level of suffering beyond that in-
herent in detention.
754
Furthermore, economic pressures or diffculties
caused by an increased infux of migrants cannot justify a failure to
comply with the prohibition on torture or other ill-treatment, given its
absolute nature.
755

a) Cumulative effect of poor conditions
The cumulative effect of a number of poor conditions may lead to viola-
tion of the prohibition on ill-treatment.
756
Furthermore, the longer the
period of detention, the more likely that poor conditions will cross the
threshold of ill-treatment. The test is an objective one, and can be met
irrespective of whether there had been any intent on the part of the
authorities to humiliate or degrade.
757
The prohibition on cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment places an obligation on State authorities to
ensure that those whom they deprive of liberty are held in humane con-
ditions; the onus cannot be placed on detainees themselves to take the
initiative to seek access to adequate conditions.
758
Whether conditions
are cruel, inhuman or degrading must also be seen in the context of the
individualit may depend on the sex, age or health of the individual
detainee. For those held in immigration detention, it is also relevant
that they are not charged with or convicted of any crime, which should
be refected in the conditions of detention and facilities at the detention
centre.
759

753
CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, Safeguards for Irregular Migrants Deprived of their Liberty,
Extract from the 19
th
General Report [CPT/Inf (2009) 27], p. 61, paras. 8589.

754
S.D. v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 53541/07, Judgment of 11 June 2007, para. 45;
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, para. 221. See also, Juvenile Reed-
ucation Institute v. Paraguay, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 752, paras. 151155.

755

756
Dougoz v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 40907/98, Judgment of 6 March 2001; Z.N.S.
v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 21896/08, Judgment of 19 January 2010; Charahili v.
Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 743; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324,
paras. 230233.

757
Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, Judgment of
24 January 2008, para. 107.

758
Ibid., para.103.

759
See CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, Safeguards for Irregular Migrants Deprived of their Lib-
erty, Extract from the 19
th
General Report [CPT/Inf (2009) 27], p. 61, paras. 8589; M.S.S.
v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 231233.
For example, detention of asylum seekers for two months in a prefab-
ricated building with poor conditions of hygiene, restricted access to
the open air and no access to phones, was found in one case to violate
Article 3 ECHR, in particular given that the applicants suffered from
health and psychological problems following torture in their country of
origin.
760
The Inter-American Court equally ruled that poor physical
and sanitary conditions existing in detention centers, as well as the lack
of adequate lightning and ventilation, are per se violations to Article 5 of
the American Convention, depending on their intensity, length of deten-
tion and personal features of the inmate, since they can cause hardship
that exceeds the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention,
and because they involve humiliation and a feeling of inferiority.
761

Inadequate provision for migrants held at entry points can also lead
to violations. In Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, for example, the European
Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR where the applicants had been
held for more than 10 days in an airport transit zone without any legal
or social assistance, no means of subsistence, shelter, sleeping or wash-
ing facilities and no means of communication with the outside world.
Although there was a reception centre at the airport, the applicants
were not informed about it for some time. The Court found that this
failure to ensure the essential needs of persons deprived of their liberty
amounted to a violation of Article 3.
762
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has held that
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article
5 ACHPR extends to the widest possible protection against abuses,
whether physical or mental, [. . .] referring to any act ranging from de-
nial of contact with ones family and refusing to inform the family of
where the individual is being held, to conditions of overcrowded prisons
and beatings and other forms of physical torture, such as deprivation of
light, insuffcient food and lack of access to medicine or medical care.
763
b) Overcrowding
Severe overcrowding has regularly been determined by international
tribunals to amount to a violation of freedom from cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. The European Court of Human Rights has found

760
S.D. v. Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 754, paras. 5253.

761
Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, IACtHR, Series C No. 150,
Judgment of 5 July 2006, para. 97; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras.
215216 (on access to water in detention).

762
Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 757, paras. 103106.

763
IHRDA and Others v. Republic of Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 52; Media
Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, Communication No. 224/1998, 28
th
Ordinary Ses-
sion, 23 October6 November 2000, para. 71; Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan,
ACommHPR, Communications Nos. 48/1990, 50/1991, 52/1991 and 89/1993, para. 54.
that less than three square metres of personal space per detainee is a
strong indication that conditions are degrading so as to violate Article 3
ECHR.
764
The Court has ruled, in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta, that,
in deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article 3 on
account of the lack of personal space, the Court has to have regard to
the following three elements:
(a) each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell;
(b) each detainee must dispose of at least three square metres of
foor space; and
(c) the overall surface area of the cell must be such as to allow the
detainees to move freely between the furniture items.
The absence of any of the above elements creates in itself a strong
presumption that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading
treatment and were in breach of Article 3.
(d) Other aspects [. . .].
765
Where overcrowding is less severe, it may nevertheless lead to vio-
lations of freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment when
considered in conjunction with other conditions of detention, including
poor ventilation or access to natural light or air, poor heating, inad-
equate food, poor sanitation or lack of a minimum of privacy.
766
The
Inter-American Court has also held that severe overcrowding amounts
per se to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to the dig-
nity inherent to human beings and, therefore, a violation to Article 5.2
of the American Convention.
767
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment has held that one of the most fre-
quent obstacles to the respect of the human dignity and to the prohi-
bition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in places of detention
is overcrowding [and that] [t]his is particularly applicable in cases of
pre-trial detention and detention of children, asylum-seekers and ref-
ugees.
768

764
Kantyrev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 37213/02, Judgment of 21 June 2007, paras.
5051; Labzov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 62208/00, Judgment of 16 June 2005,
para. 44; Orchowski v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 17885/04, Judgment of 22 October
2009, para. 122.

765
Aden Ahmed v. Malta, ECtHR, Application No. 55352/12, Judgment of 23 July 2013, para. 87.

766
Orchowski v. Poland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 764, para. 122123; Peers v. Greece, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 406, paras. 7072; Belevitskiy v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 72967/01, Judgment of
1 March 2007, paras. 7379; Aden Ahmed v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 765, para. 88.

767
Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 761,
para. 91.

768
Theo Van Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Annual Report to the Commission on
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/56, 23 December 2003, para. 49.
c) Access to healthcare
Inadequate healthcare or access to essential medicines for detainees
may also violate the freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment,
either on its own or in conjunction with other factors. Although there
is no general obligation to release detainees on health grounds, there
is an obligation to protect their physical and mental wellbeing while
in detention, by providing medical care and medicines appropriate
to the health condition of a detainee.
769
For example, failure to pro-
vide medical supervision and drugs necessary to detainees with HIV,
or with severe epilepsy, leading to exacerbation of their conditions,
can undermine the dignity of the detainee, and cause anguish and
hardship beyond that normally inherent in detention, in violation of
Article 3 ECHR.
770
Such a violation may occur even in the absence of
demonstrated deterioration of the health condition of a detainee.
771

The Inter-American Court has found that lack of adequate medical
assistance in detention could constitute a violation of Article 5 ACHR
depending on the specifc circumstances of the person, the type of
disease or ailment, the time spent without medical attention and its
cumulative effects.
772
CPT standards set out the principle that medical care available in deten-
tion should be of an equivalent standard to that available to the general
public.
773
Guideline 10 (v) of the UNHCR revised guidelines on detention
of asylum seekers provides that detained asylum seekers should have
the opportunity to receive appropriate medical treatment, and psycho-
logical counselling where appropriate. Other international standards,
including the Standard Minimum rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(Rules 22 to 25) Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons un-
der Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Principles 22 to 26), the
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their

769
Hurtado v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 17549/90, Judgment of 28 January 1994;
Mouisel v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 67263/01, Judgment of 14 November 2002,
para. 40; Keenan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 27229/95, Judgment of 3 April
2001, para. 111; Aleksanyan v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 46468/06, Judgment of

770
Kaprykowski v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 23052/05, Judgment of 3 February 2009;
Kotsaftis v. Greece, ECtHR, Application No. 39780/06, Judgment of 12 June 2008. See also,
Mouisel v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 769, paras. 4042.

771
Kotsaftis v. Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 770.

772
Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 761,
para. 103. See also, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 220, 225, 227.

773
CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, Extract from the 3
rd
General Report [CPT/Inf (93) 12], p. 27,
para. 31. Although the European Court of Human Rights has sometimes accepted a lower
standard of healthcare for prisoners than that available in the community, this has been in
regard to convicted prisoners only, and the Court has expressly drawn a distinction between
convicted prisoners and other detainees in this regard: Aleksanyan v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 769, para. 139.
Liberty (Section H), and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of
Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders
(the Bangkok Rules) set out detailed guidelines regarding appropriate
medical care in detention.
Security measures applied during medical treatment must also be de-
signed so far as possible to respect the dignity of the detainee. Issues
in this regard may be raised by the use of handcuffs or the imposition
of other restraints during treatment.
774

It should also be borne in mind that, as will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 5, under international law and standards enshrining the right
to health, all persons, irrespective of their nationality, residency or im-
migration status, are entitled to primary and emergency health care, a
right which also applies in the context of detention.
775

3. Conditions of detention of particular groups
a) Mentally ill detainees
Detainees who are mentally ill or who are disturbed as a result of
traumatic experiences require particular consideration where they are
held in immigration detention. Their detention raises questions as to
(a) whether the person should be detained at all or whether more suit-
able alternatives can be found (see, Section 6); and, if detention is war-
ranted, (b) the appropriate form of detention, conditions of detention,
and provision of medical care.
Where the mental health condition of a detainee is caused or exac-
erbated by his or her detention, and where the authorities are aware
of such conditions, continued detention may amount to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment. In C. v. Australia, the Human Rights
Committee found a violation of Article 7 ICCPR as a result of the
prolonged detention of a person with serious psychiatric illness which
the authorities knew had come about as the result of his detention
and which by the time of his eventual release, was so serious as to
be irreversible.
776

Even where the detention of a mentally ill person is justifable, consid-
eration should be given to the appropriate place of detention: whether
the person should be held in a specialist psychiatric facility; or whether

774
Henaf v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 65436/01, Judgment of 27 November 2003,
paras. 4960.

775
CESCR, General Comment No. 14, op. cit., fn. 37, para. 34: In particular, States are under
the obligation to respect the right to health by, inter alia, refraining from denying or limiting
equal access for all persons, including prisoners or detainees, minorities, asylum seekers
and illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and palliative health services.

776
C. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 350, para. 8.4.
the person should be accommodated in a specialist psychiatric ward in
a detention centre.
777

Irrespective of the place of detention, inadequate mental healthcare,
alone or in combination with other inappropriate conditions of detention,
can constitute or lead to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
778
In
assessing whether detention or conditions of detention of a mentally ill
person amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, account must
be taken of such persons vulnerability, and their inability, in some cas-
es, to complain coherently or effectively about how they are affected.
779

b) People with disabilities
Both ICCPR Article 10 and ECHR Article 3 have been found to require
that, where disabled people are detained, measures are taken to ensure
that conditions of detention are appropriate to their level of disability.
780

Under Article 14 CRPD, States parties must ensure that if persons with
disabilities are deprived of their liberty they are, on an equal basis with
others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human
rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and
principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable ac-
commodation. Article 2 of that Convention defnes reasonable accom-
modation as all means necessary and appropriate modifcation and
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where
needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
c) Survivors of Torture
Given that detained asylum seekers include those who have been vic-
tims of torture, international standards recommend that the authorities
should screen detainees at the outset of their detention to identify vic-
tims of torture or other trauma, whose situation may warrant accom-
modation outside of detention (see, above, Section 6), or where they

777
Recommendation R(1998)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning the
ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 8 April 1998 at the 627
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies: prisoners suffering
from serious mental disturbance should be kept and cared for in a hospital facility which is
adequately equipped and possesses appropriately trained staff.

778
Musial v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 28300/06, Judgment of 20 January 2009, para. 96;
Madafferi and Madafferi v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 460, where the applicant was re-
turned to immigration detention against the advice of doctors and psychiatrists, found that
the decision was not based on a proper assessment of the circumstances of the case and
was in violation of Article 10.1 ICCPR.

779
Ibid., para. 87.

780
Price v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 33394/96, Judgment of 10 July 2001, paras.
2530; Farbthus v. Latvia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 700, para. 56; Hamilton v. Jamaica, CCPR,
Communication No. 616/1995, Views of 23 July 1999.
are detained, may require a different type of detention facility, or par-
ticular services or healthcare.
781
Such screening will assist in ensuring
that the authorities meet international human rights law obligations
to provide appropriate conditions of detention or accommodation, and
physical and mental healthcare for such persons.
d) Children
In any exceptional cases where children are detained (see, Section 6.a,
above, in relation to appropriateness of detention), whether they are
unaccompanied or with their families, the conditions of detention must
be appropriate and the best interests of the child must guide all de-
cisions concerning the detention.
782
The Committee on the Rights of
the Childs General Comment on the Treatment of Unaccompanied and
Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin
783
states that in the
exceptional case of detention, conditions of detention must be governed
by the best interests of the child . . . Special arrangements must be made
for living quarters that are suitable for children and that separate them
from adults, unless it is considered in the childs best interests not to do
so. . . . Facilities should not be located in isolated areas where culturally
appropriate community resources and access to legal aid are unavail-
able. Children should have the opportunity to make regular contact and
receive visits from friends, relatives, religious, social and legal counsel
and their guardian. They should also be provided with the opportunity
to receive all basic necessities as well as appropriate medical treatment
and psychological counselling where necessary. . . . In order to effec-
tively secure the rights provided by article 37(d) of the Convention,
unaccompanied or separated children deprived of their liberty shall be
provided with prompt and free access to legal and other appropriate
assistance, including the assignment of a legal representative.
784

i) Education in immigration detention
Children detained for immigration purposes continue to enjoy a right
to education, which must be provided to them on an equal basis with
children who are at liberty, and without discrimination on grounds of

781
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 10(i); Recommendation
R(1998)7, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 777, para. 12: asylum seekers should be screened at the
outset of their detention to identify torture victims and traumatised persons among them so
that appropriate treatment and conditions can be provided for them. See also, European
Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline XI.3 in
those cases where other vulnerable persons are detained, they should be provided with
adequate assistance and support.

782
Article 3(a) CRC.

783

784
See also, Concluding Observations on Cyprus, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/CYP/CO/5, 12 June
2009, para. 22, expressing concern at inadequate conditions for children in immigration de-
tention; Concluding Observations on Australia, CRC, op. cit., fn. 707, paras. 62(b) and 64(c).
race, nationality or religion.
785
The UNHCR Guidelines on Detention and
the Committee on the Rights of the Childs General Comment No. 6
recognise that children have a right to education while in detention,
that education should take place outside of detention premises and that
provision should be made for the childrens recreation and play.
786
The UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty fur-
ther add that such education should be provided in community schools
wherever possible and, in any case, by qualifed teachers through pro-
grammes integrated with the education system of the country so that,
after release, juveniles may continue their education without diffculty
[and that] [s]pecial attention should be given by the administration of
the detention facilities to the education of juveniles of foreign origin or
with particular cultural or ethnic needs. [Furthermore] Juveniles who
are illiterate or have cognitive or learning diffculties should have the
right to special education.
787
Finally the UN Rules specify that [j]uve-
niles above compulsory school age who wish to continue their education
should be permitted and encouraged to do so, and every effort should
be made to provide them with access to appropriate educational pro-
grammes.
788

e) Women detainees
Women held in immigration detention often face particular diffculties.
These may include instances of gender-based violence or harassment,
including sexual violence and abuse, perpetrated by both State actors
and detainees (see, Section 4, below); absence of childcare; inade-
quate and inappropriate provision of healthcare, goods and services
needed by women; as well as other forms of gender discrimination.
International law and standards require States to take certain specif-
ic measures to address these problems. They emphasise the need to
provide separate accommodation for women in detention, to ensure
women are attended and supervised by women offcials and to ensure
body searches on women are only conducted by women.
789
For exam-

785
Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR; Article 28 CRC; Article 5(e)(v) ICERD; Article 13 ICESCR; General
Comment No. 13, The right to education, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December
1999, para. 34: confrms that the principle of non-discrimination extends to all persons of
school age residing in the territory of a State Party, including non-nationals, and irrespective
of their legal status.

786
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 9.2; and CRC, General Comment
No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 63.

787
UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, Rule 38.

788
Ibid., Rule 39.

789
Rules 8 and 53, Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; Principles XIX, XX, XXI, Prin-
ciples and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas;
Rule 19, United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial
Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).
ple, the Human Rights Committee has highlighted that in respect of
compliance with Articles 3, 7 and 10 of the ICCPR, an important con-
sideration will be whether men and women are separated in prisons
and whether women are guarded only by female guards.
790
It has also
specifed that, persons being subjected to body search by State off-
cials, or medical personnel acting at the request of the State, should
only be examined by persons of the same sex.
791
The European Court
of Human Rights has held that a situation of prolonged detention of a
woman migrant, who had undergone a miscarriage in a facility that
lacked female staff and otherwise inappropriate conditions of detention,
were insuffcient conditions taken individually, to reach the threshold of
an Article 3 ECHR violation. In combination, however, they diminished
[her] human dignity and aroused in her feelings of anguish and inferi-
ority capable of humiliating and debasing her and possibly breaking her
physical or moral resistance and, thus, constituted a degrading treat-
ment prohibited by Article 3 ECHR.
792
International law and standards on ill-treatment, the right to health,
and non-discrimination, require that migrants in detention be ensured
appropriate and adequate access to healthcare, goods and services
(see, Section 2.c, above). These standards require that women detain-
ees have access to the healthcare and hygiene facilities they may need
as women, including sexual and reproductive healthcare, goods and
services. In addition they require that treatment be provided to de-
tained women in an acceptable and appropriate manner. For example,
the European Committee on the Prevention of Torture considers that
shackling and restraining pregnant women during delivery or examina-
tion amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment,
793
and the European
Court of Human Rights has held that it was inhuman and degrading to
require a woman detainee to undergo a gynaecological examination
whilst handcuffed and in the presence of male staff.
794
These international legal requirements apply to all female detainees,
including women migrants. In addition, certain bodies have explicitly
addressed the situation of women migrants in detention. For exam-
ple, CEDAW has provided that: States parties should ensure that
women migrant workers who are in detention do not suffer discrimi-
nation or gender-based violence, and that pregnant and breastfeed-

790
CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 15 (Article 3).

791
General Comment No. 16, The right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence,
and protection of honour and reputation, CCPR, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 8 April
1988, para. 8.

792
Aden Ahmed v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 765, para. 91100.

793
th
p. 81, para. 27.

794
Filiz Uyan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 7496/03, Judgment of 8 January 2009.
ing mothers as well as women in ill health have access to appropriate
services.
795

The UNHCR Guidelines on Detention also emphasise that where women
asylum-seekers are detained, they should be held separately from men,
except where they are close family relatives. The guidelines recom-
mend the use of female staff in detention facilities for women, and note
the need for additional healthcare facilities.
796
4. Protection from ill-treatment, including violence
in detention
Physical or sexual assaults, or excessive or inappropriate use of phys-
ical restraint techniquesmay violate rights including the right to life
and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
and rights to physical integrity. Where a person is unlawfully killed or
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment while in detention,
there is a presumption that State agents are responsible, and the onus
is on the State to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation to
the contrary.
797
In addition, where the State authorities know or ought to know that
particular individuals held in detention face a real or immediate threat
from private actors to their life, freedom from cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment, or physical integrity, there is an obligation to take
all reasonable measures to prevent or end the situation.
798
This arises
as part of the general positive obligations on States to exercise due
diligence and take reasonable measures to prevent, protect against
and investigate acts of private persons in violation of these rights.
799

Obligations to protect are heightened for persons held in detention, in
respect of whom the State has a special duty of care.
800

795
CEDAW, General recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(j).

796

797
Anguelova v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 38361/97, Judgment of 13 June 2002,
paras. 110111; Salman v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 21986/93, Judgment of
27 June 2000, para. 100; Demiray v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 27308/95, Judgment
of 21 November 2000.

798
See, Osman v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 23452/94, Judgment of
28 October 1998; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 797; Pueblo Bello Massacre
v. Colombia, IACtHR, Series C No. 140, Judgment of 31 January 2006, para. 123. On obli-
gations to protect against inter-prisoner violence in detention: Edwards v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, Application No. 46477/99, Judgment of 14 March 2002.

799
CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 8; Osman v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 798; CAT, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 31, para. 18; CEDAW, Gener-
al Recommendation No. 19, op. cit., fn. 237, para. 9; Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,
IACtHR, Series C No. 1, Judgment of 29 July 1988, para. 172; Pueblo Bello Massacre v.
Colombia, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 798, para. 120.

800
Salman v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 797.
In situations where there is clear potential for gender or ethnic violence
in detention, for example, appropriate preventive and security mea-
sures must be put in place. In Rodic v. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ECtHR
held that two Serb prisoners held in open, crowded conditions in an
ethnic Bosnian dominated prison, and subjected to violence by fellow
prisoners, without any adequate security measures being taken by the
authorities, suffered mental anxiety as a result of the threat and antici-
pation of violence that amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
801
The
Inter-American Court has also held that the State has an obligation
to guarantee the right to life and the right to humane treatment of the
inmates interned in its penal institutions [and within it] a duty to cre-
ate the conditions necessary to avoid, to the maximum extent possible,
fghting among inmates.
802

In addition to protection from the acts of offcials or fellow detain-
ees, the State also has an obligation to take reasonable measures
within its power to protect detained persons from acts of self-harm
or suicide.
803
Women in detention may face particular risks of sexual or gender-based
violence, either from offcials or from private actors. States are required
to take measures to prevent and protect detainees from all sexual vi-
olence in detention, including by making it a criminal offence, and en-
forcing the criminal law. Certain forms of sexual violence in detention,
such as rape, amount to torture.
804
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has held, that arbitrary vaginal searches of female detainees by
State offcials amount to rape and therefore to torture;
805
and that a sit-
uation where women detainees were held naked and guarded by armed
men also amounted to sexual violence and violated the right to humane
treatment in Article 5.2 ACHR.
806

a) Violence or ill-treatment during deportation
Forced expulsions, during which migrants remain in detention, may also
involve the use of physical force or ill-treatment. As long as an individ-
ual being deported remains within the authority or control of agents
of the Statefor example while being escorted on an aircraft that has

801
Rodic and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR, Application No. 22893/05, Judgment of
27 May 2008, para. 73.

802
Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 752, paras. 184.

803
Keenan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 769, paras. 92101; Barbato v. Uruguay,
CCPR, Communication No. 84/1981, Views of 21 October 1982, para. 9.2.

804
Aydin v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 403, paras. 8386; C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, CAT,
op. cit., fn. 322, para. 7.5.

805
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, IACtHR, Series C No. 160, Judgment of 25 November
2006, paras. 306313.

806
Ibid.
left the territory of the Statehe or she remains within the jurisdiction
of the State for the purposes of international human rights law (see,
Chapter 1, Section I.2). Unjustifable use of force or violence by State
offcials or private agents involved in a deportation, including excessive
or inappropriate use of physical restraints, may violate the right to life,
freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
or rights to respect for physical integrity.
807
Since persons undergoing
forced expulsion are deprived of their liberty, the heightened responsi-
bility of the State to respect and protect the rights of those in detention,
applies. Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture on the Deportation of foreign nationals by air
808
note the high
risk of inhuman and degrading treatment involved in such deportations
and provide guidelines to ensure that use of force during deportation
is no more than reasonably necessary and that the risk involved in
particular restraint techniques is adequately assessed and taken into
account.
809

IV. Procedural protection
1. Reasons for detention
A person detained for any reason, including for purposes of immi-
gration control, has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons
for detention. This right is protected by Article 5.2 ECHR, Article 9.2
ICCPR, Article 7 and 8 ACHR, and Article 14.3 ArCHR. Although
Article 5.2 ECHR refers expressly only to the provision of reasons for
arrest, the European Court of Human Rights has held that this obli-
gation applies equally to all persons deprived of their liberty through
detention, including immigration detention, as an integral part of
protection of the right to liberty.
810
The Inter-American Court has
held that information on the reasons for detention must be provided

807
See, Raninen v. Finland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 398, para. 56; calan v. Turkey, ECtHR, Appli-
cation No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 March 2003, paras. 182184, both fnding that hand-
cuffng during transportation of prisoners did not normally violate Article 3 where it did not
entail the use of force or public exposure beyond what was reasonably necessary, including
to prevent absconding.

808
CPT Standards, op. cit., fn. 629, Deportation of foreign nationals by air, Extract from the
13
th
General Report [CPT/Inf (2003) 35], p. 66.

809
On the use of restraints, see also, Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners,
principles 33 and 34; UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,
paras. 6364.

810
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, paras. 136137. Shamayev and
Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, paras. 413414. The Court reasoned
that since Article 5.4 and Article 5.2 are closely linked, with knowledge of the reasons for
deprivation of liberty being essential to challenge that detention under Article 5.4, and since
Article 5.4 makes no distinction between deprivation of liberty for the purposes of arrest or
for other purposes, the right to reasons for detention applies in all cases of detention.
when the detention takes place, [which] constitutes a mechanism to
avoid unlawful or arbitrary detentions from the very instant of depri-
vation of liberty and, also, guarantees the right to defense of the
individual detained.
811
The Human Rights Committee has stressed
that one major purpose of requiring that all arrested persons be
informed of the reasons for the arrest is to enable them to seek re-
lease if they believe that the reasons given are invalid or unfounded;
and that the reasons must include not only the general basis of the
arrest, but enough factual specifcs to indicate the substance of the
complaint,
812
bearing consequences for the respect of the detainees
right to habeas corpus.
The right to be informed of reasons for detention is also affrmed by
international standards and guidelines relating to the detention of mi-
grants and asylum seekers. The Body of Principles for the Protection
of all persons deprived of their liberty provides in Principle 11.2 that:
a detained person and his counsel, if any, shall receive prompt and full
communication of any order of detention, together with the reasons
therefor. Principle 13 provides that at the commencement of detention,
or promptly thereafter, a detained person should be provided with in-
formation on and an explanation of his or her rights and how to avail
himself of such rights.
813

The UNHCR Guidelines on Detention and the Council of Europe Guidelines
on Human Rights Protection in the Context of Accelerated Asylum pro-
vide that, if detained, asylum-seekers are entitled to receive prompt
and full communication of the legal and factual reasons of detention,
including detention orders, and of their rights and available remedies,
in a language and in terms that they understand.
814
Information provided on the reasons for detention must be in simple,
non-technical language that can be easily understood, and must include
the essential legal and factual grounds for the detentionincluding the
detention orderand information concerning the remedies available to
the detainee. The information provided must be suffciently comprehen-
sive and precise to allow the detainee to challenge his or her detention

811
Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624, para. 105; Humberto Snchez v. Honduras,
IACtHR, Series C No. 99, Judgment of 7 June 2003, para. 82.; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR,
op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 116, 180; Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR,
op. cit., fn. 537, para. 132.

812
Al-Gertani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 606, para. 10.5; F.K.A.G. v. Aus-
tralia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 9.5.

813
See also, WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69, Guarantees 1 and 5; WGAD,
Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principles 1 and 8.

814
See, UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 7; Twenty Guidelines on
Forced Return, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 510, Guideline 6; and, European Guidelines on accelerated
asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Principle XI.5.
judicially.
815
The principle that the information must be provided in a
form that is accessible, may require, in the case of migrants, that it be
translated.
816
Reasons for detention must be provided promptly. Although whether
information is conveyed suffciently promptly will depend on the indi-
vidual circumstances of each case, they should in general be provided
within hours of detention.
817
The right to be provided with reasons for
detention has been found to have been violated, for example, where
reasons were provided only after 76 hours.
818
It is not essential however
that the information be provided at the very moment in which someone
is taken into detention.
819

A bare indication of the legal basis for the detention is not suffcient;
in addition, there must also be some indication of the factual basis for
the detention.
820
The responsibility of the State to inform the detainee
of the grounds for detention is not discharged where the detainee has
managed to infer from the circumstances or various sources, the basis
for the detention. In such circumstances, there remains an obligation
on the State to provide the information.
821

For asylum seekers who are subject to accelerated asylum procedures,
and who are detained pending expulsion in accordance with those proce-
dures, the right to reasons for detention applies without qualifcation. At
a regional European level, this right is affrmed in the Council of Europe
Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in the Context of Accelerated
Asylum Procedures, Guideline XI.5 of which states that [d]etained asy-
lum seekers shall be informed promptly, in a language which they un-
derstand, of the legal and factual reasons for their detention, and the
available remedies.

815
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, paras. 136137; Shamayev and
Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, paras. 413414. See, Yvon Neptune
v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624, paras. 106107; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 536, para. 116.

816
Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons deprived of their liberty, Principle 14:
a person who does not adequately speak the language used by the authorities, is entitled to
receive this information in a language he understands. See also, Rahimi v. Greece, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 703, para. 120, where the information sheet on remedies was in Arabic when the
applicant spoke only Farsi. The Court found that this led to a violation of the right to habeas
corpus under Article 5.4 ECHR.

817
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, paras. 413416; Fox,
Campbell and Hartely v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 12244/86; 12245/86;
12383/86, Judgment of 30 August 1990, para. 42; Kerr v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Applica-
tion No. 40451/98, Admissibility Decision, 7 December 1999.

818
Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 625, paras. 8185.

819
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, paras. 413416.

820
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 817, para. 41; Vlez Loor
v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 116.

821
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, para. 425.
2. Safeguards following detention
a) Right of access to a lawyer
Migrants brought into detention have the right to prompt access to a
lawyer, and must be promptly informed of this right.
822
International
standards and guidelines also state that detainees should have access
to legal advice and facilities for confdential consultation with their law-
yer at regular intervals thereafter. Where necessary, free legal assis-
tance should be provided.
823
Translation of key legal documents, as well
as interpretation during consultations with the lawyer, should be pro-
vided where necessary. Facilities for consultation with lawyers should
respect the confdentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
824

Although Article 5 ECHR does not expressly provide for the right of
detainees to have access to a lawyer, the European Court of Human
Rights has held that failure to provide any or adequate access to a
lawyer, or measures taken by the State to obstruct such access, may
violate Article 5.4 ECHR where they prevent the detainee from effec-
tively challenging the lawfulness of detention.
825
Interference with the
confdentiality of lawyer/client discussions in detention has also been
found to violate the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention under
Article 5.4.
826
In the case of Suso Musa v. Malta, the European Court
held that, although the authorities are not obliged to provide free legal
aid in the context of detention proceedings [. . .], the lack thereof, par-
ticularly where legal representation is required in the domestic context
for the purposes of Article 5, 4, may raise an issue as to the accessi-
bility of such a remedy.
827

822
Concluding Observations on Australia, CCPR, Report of the Human Rights Committee to the
General Assembly, 55
th
Session, Vol. I, UN Doc. A/55/40 (2000), para. 526, where the Com-
mittee expressed concern at the State Partys policy, in this context of mandatory detention,
of not informing the detainees of their right to seek legal advice and of not allowing access of
non-governmental human rights organisations to the detainees in order to inform them of this
right. See also, Article 17.2(d), CPED; WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69,
Guarantees 6 and 7; WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principle 2; European
Guidelines on Accelerated Asylum Procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline XI.5 and 6.

823
Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 132133, 146. The IACtHR has
held that the provision of legal assistance is an obligation inherent to Article 7.6 (right
to habeas corpus) and Article 8 (due process), and that in cases involving detention
free legal assistance is an imperative interest of justice (para. 146, our translation).

824
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 7(ii): Free legal assistance
should be provided where it is also available to nationals similarly situated, and should be
available as soon as possible after arrest or detention to help the detainee understand his/
her rights; Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons deprived of their liberty, Prin-
ciple 18.

825
calan v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 807, para. 72, endorsed by the judgment of the Grand
Chamber, op. cit., fn. 47, para. 70.

826
Istratii v. Moldova, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05, Judgment of
27 March 2007, paras. 87101.

827
Suso Musa v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 680, para. 61.
b) Right of access to medical attention
On frst entering into detention, there is also a right of prompt access to
a doctor of ones choice, who can assess for physical health conditions
as well as mental health issues which may affect justifcation of any
detention, place of detention, or medical treatment or psychological
support required during detention.
828
Standards relating to adequacy
of healthcare are discussed above in regard to conditions of detention.
c) Right to inform family members or others of detention
The possibility to notify a family member, friend, or other person with
a legitimate interest in the information, of the fact and place of deten-
tion, and of any subsequent transfer, is an essential safeguard against
arbitrary detention, consistently protected by international standards.
829

Article 18.1 of the Convention on the Protection of all Persons from
Enforced Disappearance provides that any person with a legitimate in-
terest, such as relatives of the person deprived of liberty, their repre-
sentatives or their counsel, have the right of access to at least informa-
tion on the authority that ordered the deprivation of liberty; the date,
time and place where the person was deprived of liberty and admitted
to detention; the authority responsible for supervising the detention;
the whereabouts of the person, including, in the event of a transfer,
the destination and the authority responsible for the transfer; the date,
time and place of release; information relating to the state of health
of the person; and in the event of their death during detention, the
circumstances and cause of death and the destination of the remains.
This right is of general application and applies, therefore, also to detention of
migrants and asylum-seekers. The Council of Europe Guidelines on Human
Rights Protection in the Context of Accelerated Asylum Procedures also af-
frm the importance of this right in the immigration detention context.
830

828
Algr v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 32574/96, Judgment of 22 October 2002, para. 44;
Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 220, 225, 227 (the right to medical
assistance is derived by the right to physical, mental and moral integrity, to human dignity
and not to be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment of
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 ACHR); Article 14.4 ArCHR; Second General Report on the CPTs activi-
ties covering the period 1 January to 31 December 1991, CPT, CoE Doc. Ref.: CPT/Inf (92) 3,
13 April 1992, para. 36; Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons deprived of
their liberty, Principle 24: A proper medical examination shall be offered to a detained or
imprisoned person as promptly as possible after his admission to the place of detention
or imprisonment, and thereafter medical care and treatment shall be provided whenever
necessary. This care and treatment shall be provided free of charge. See also, Europe-
an Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Guideline XI.5.

829
Article 17.2(d) CPED; Article 10.2, UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance; Principle 16, Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons
deprived of their liberty; CPT, 2
nd
General Report, op. cit., fn. 828, para. 36; WGAD, Annual
Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69, Guarantee 6; WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit.,
fn. 643, Principle 2.

830
European Guidelines on Accelerated Asylum Procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Principle XI.5.
d) Right of access to UNHCR
Persons seeking asylum have the right, following detention, to contact
and be contacted by the local UNHCR Offce, available national refugee
bodies or other agencies and an advocate. The right to communicate
with these representatives in private, and the means to make such con-
tact should be made available.
831
They should be informed of this right
promptly following detention, as it is established by the UN Body of
Principles for the Protection of all Persons Deprived of their liberty.
832
The
Council of Europe Guidelines on Accelerated Asylum Procedures also af-
frm that this right must be applied in accelerated asylum procedures.
833
e) Right to consular access
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963
(VCCA) provides for the right of non-nationals to consular access while
held in any form of detention. It protects:
the right to communicate freely and have access to consular
officers;
834
the right of a detainee to have the fact of his or her detention
or arrest communicated to the consular officers, if he or she so
requests;
the right to have their communication forwarded to them without
delay;
the right to be informed of his or her rights of communication with
consular officers without delay;
835
the right to refuse action or assistance by consular officers.
836
The International Court of Justice has held that, despite the fact that the
Convention deals with obligations between States, the right to consular
access is a right of the individual.
837
The Court has ruled that the duty

831
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 7(vii). See, WGAD, Annual
Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, Guarantee 14; WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643,
Principle 10, which include also the International Committee of the Red Cross and special-
ized NGOs.

832
Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Deprived of their Liberty, Principle 16.2.

833
European Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures, CMCE, op. cit., fn. 119, Princi-
ple XIV.

834
See this rights also in WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, para. 69, Guarantee 6;
WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principle 2.

835
Article 36.1(b), Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) (contains all the last three
rights).

836
Article 36.1(c) VCCR.

837
LeGrand (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ, Judgment, 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports
2001, p. 466, p. 494, para. 77.
upon the detaining authority to give [. . .] information to the individual [on
the right to contact and communicate with the consular authority] aris-
es once it is realised that the person is a foreign national, or once there
are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national.
838

It has recently reiterated that [i]t is for the authorities of the State which
proceeded with the arrest to inform on their own initiative the arrested
person of his right to ask for his consulate to be notifed; the fact that the
person did not make such a request not only fails to justify non-compli-
ance with the obligation to inform which is incumbent on the arresting
State, but could also be explained in some cases precisely by the fact
that the person had not been informed of his rights in that respect [. . .].
Moreover, the fact that the consular authorities of the national State of the
arrested person have learned of the arrest through other channels does
not remove any violation that may have been committed of the obligation
to inform that person of his rights without delay.
839
However, the ICJ has
held that the requirement to provide information without delay cannot
be interpreted to signify that the provision of such information must nec-
essarily precede any interrogation, so that the commencement of interro-
gation before the information is given would be a breach of Article 36.
840
In international human rights law the right to consular access is refected
in Articles 16.7 and 23 of the International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. This
right applies regardless of the regular or irregular status of the migrant.
The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance provides for the right to consular access in
Article 17.2(d). In non-treaty sources, it is affrmed in Article 38 of the
Standard Minimum Rules of the Treatment of Prisoners,
841
Article 16.2
of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention and Imprisonment,
842
and Article 10 of the Declaration on
the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country
in which They Live.
843
In the Inter-American system, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has directly interpreted the provisions of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Assistance. The Court recognised, as did the

838
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ, Judgment,
31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 12, p. 43, para. 63, and p. 49, para. 88.

839
Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo), ICJ, Judgment, 30 November
2010, para. 95.

840
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, ICJ, op. cit., fn. 838, p. 43, para. 63, and p. 49, para. 87.

841
Standard Minimum Rules of the Treatment of Prisoners.

842
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention and Impris-
onment.

843
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in
which They Live, adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/144 of 13 December 1985,
A/RES/40/144.
ICJ, the individual nature of the right to consular access under the
VCCA.
844
It found that, under this right, it is imperative that the State
advises the detainee of his rights if he is an alien, just as it advises
him of the other rights accorded to every person deprived of his free-
dom.
845
Unlike for the ICJ, notifcation must be made at the time the
[non-national] is deprived of his freedom, or at least before he makes
his frst statement before the authorities.
846
Furthermore, the Court
has held that the right to consular access must be recognised and
counted among the minimum guarantees essential to providing foreign
nationals the opportunity to adequately prepare their defence and re-
ceive a fair trial.
847
A violation of this right has been interpreted to en-
tail a violation of Article 7.4 (habeas corpus) and Article 8 ACHR (right
to a fair trial)
848
and Articles XVIII and XXVI ADRDM.
849
At a European level, there is no legally binding right to consular access,
but the right is enshrined in Article 44 of the European Prison Rules
850

and in the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture.
851
3. Judicial review of detention
The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention judicially, protected
by Article 9.4 ICCPR, Article 5.4 ECHR, Article 7.6 ACHR and Article 14.6
ArCHR,
852
is a fundamental protection against arbitrary detention, as

844
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the
Due Process of Law, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, para. 84.

845
Ibid., para. 96.

846
Ibid., para. 106.

847
Ibid., para. 122.

848
Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 151160.

849
Moreno Ramos v. United States, IACHR, Case 12.430, Report No. 1/05, Merits, 28 January
2005, para. 59; Martinez Villareal v. United States, IACHR, Case 11.753, Report No. 52/02,
Merits, 10 October 2002, paras. 6377.

850
Recommendation R(87)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European
Prison Rules, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 February 1987 at the 404
th
meet-
ing of the Ministers Deputies.

851
th
p. 61, para. 83.

852
See also Article 37(d) CRC: Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right
to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to chal-
lenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other compe-
tent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action;
and Article 17.2(f) CPED. See, WGAD, Annual Report 1998, op. cit., fn. 643, Guarantees 3
and 4; WGAD, Annual Report 1999, op. cit., fn. 643, Principle 3; WGAD, Annual Report
2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3, 15 December 2003, para. 86; WGAD, Annual Report 2008,
op. cit., fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82. The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
has derived the right to judicial review of detention under the right to access to a court and
fair trial (Article 7 ACHPR): IHRDA and Others v. Republic of Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit.,
fn. 395, paras. 5860; RADDH v. Zambia, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 30.
well as against torture or ill-treatment in detention.
853
This right is of
vital importance to detained migrants, in particular where no clear in-
dividualised grounds for detention have been disclosed to the detainee
or to his or her lawyer. Since the right to judicial review of detention
must be real and effective rather than merely formal, its consequence
is that systems of mandatory detention of migrants or classes of mi-
grants are necessarily incompatible with international human rights
standards.
854
The right to judicial review of detention applies to persons subject to
any form of deprivation of liberty, whether lawful or unlawful, and re-
quires that they should have effective access to an independent court or
tribunal to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, and that they or
their representative should have the opportunity to be heard before the
court.
855
The right requires that there be prompt access to court when
a person is frst detained, but also that thereafter there are regular
judicial reviews of the lawfulness of the detention.
856
Particular public
interest concerns, such as national security, are not grounds to restrict
the right to judicial review of detention, in the absence of derogation.
857

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that writs of
habeas corpus and of amparo are among those judicial remedies that
are essential for the protection of various rights whose derogation is
prohibited by Article 27.2 and that serve, moreover, to preserve legality
in a democratic society.
858

The right to review of the lawfulness of the detention is designed to
protect against arbitrariness: it is therefore a right to review not only of
the detentions compliance with national law, but also of its compliance
with principles of human rights law, including freedom from arbitrary
detention.
859
As the European Court of Human Rights recognised in Kurt
v. Turkey, [w]hat is at stake is both the protection of the physical lib-
erty of individuals as well as their personal security in a context which,

853
Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624, para. 115; Neira Alegra et al. v. Per,
IACtHR, Series C No. 20, Judgment of 19 January 1995, para. 82; La Cantuta v. Peru,
IACtHR, Series C No. 162, Judgment of 29 November 2006, para. 111; Serrano Cruz Sisters
v. El Salvador, IACtHR, Series C No. 120, Judgment of 1 March 2005, para. 79. See also,
Habeas corpus in emergency situations, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 557, para. 35.

854
Article 9.4 ICCPR. Nowak states that: Mandatory detention systems seem to be incompat-
ible with the right to habeas corpus, referring to Australian cases: Nowak, CCPR Commen-
tary, op. cit., fn. 730, p. 236.

855
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, para. 92; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Bel-
gium, ECtHR, Plenary, Applications Nos. 2832/66; 2835/66; 2899/66, Judgment of 18 June
1971, para. 73; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 6301/73, Judgment
of 24 October 1979; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 124.

856
See, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 107109.

857
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 481, para. 94.

858
Habeas corpus in emergency situations, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 557, para. 42.

859
in the absence of safeguards, could result in a subversion of the rule
of law and place detainees beyond the reach of the most rudimentary
forms of legal protection.
860
Judicial review of detention must provide a
practical, effective and accessible means of challenging detention. The
principle of accessibility implies that the State must ensure that the
detainee has a realistic possibility of using the remedy, in practice as
well as in theory.
861
This may require provision of information, legal
assistance or translation.
It should be noted that these international human rights standards refer
only to remedies that must be made available during detention. They
do not address the need for remedies to review the lawfulness of a de-
tention which has already ended.
862
In the latter case, it is the right to
an effective remedy which will be relevant.
The right to judicial review of detention protected by international hu-
man rights law is also refected in international refugee law. UNHCR
guidelines require both automatic review of detention and regular au-
tomatic periodic reviews thereafter, and a right to challenge deten-
tion.
863
a) Requirements of effective judicial review of detention
For a judicial review to meet international human rights law, it must
fulfl a number of requirements.

860
Kurt v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 724, para. 123.

861
Nasrulloyev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 651, para. 86. The need for accessibility is em-
phasised in the Council of Europe Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in the context of
accelerated asylum procedures, op. cit., fn. 119, which state in Principle XI.6 that detained
asylum seekers shall have ready access to an effective remedy against the decision to detain
them, including legal assistance. See also, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536,
para. 129.

862
Slivenko v. Latvia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 454, paras. 158159.

863
UNHCR Guidelines on Detention, op. cit., fn. 633, Guideline 7: (iii) to be brought promptly
before a judicial or other independent authority to have the detention decision reviewed. This
review should ideally be automatic, and take place in the frst instance within 2448 hours
of the initial decision to hold the asylum-seeker. The reviewing body must be independent of
the initial detaining authority, and possess the power to order release or to vary any condi-
tions of release. (iv) following the initial review of detention, regular periodic reviews of the
necessity for the continuation of detention before a court or an independent body must be
in place, which the asylum-seeker and his/her representative would have the right to attend.
Good practice indicates that following an initial judicial confrmation of the right to detain,
review would take place every seven days until the one month mark and thereafter every
month until the maximum period set by law is reached. (v) irrespective of the reviews in (iii)
and (iv), either personally or through a representative, the right to challenge the lawfulness
of detention before a court of law at any time needs to be respected. The burden of proof to
establish the lawfulness of the detention rests on the authorities in question. As highlighted
in Guideline 4, the authorities need to establish that there is a legal basis for the detention
in question, that the detention is justifed according to the principles of necessity, reason-
ableness and proportionality, and that other, less instrusive means of achieving the same
objectives have been considered in the individual case.
The review must be clearly prescribed by law. Both the law
permitting detention, and the procedure for its review must be
sufficiently certain, in theory and in practice, to allow a court to
exercise effective judicial review of the permissibility of the de-
tention under national law, and to ensure that the review process
is accessible.
864
The review of detention must be accessible to
all persons detained, including children. In Popov v. France, the
European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 5.4
ECHR in respect of children detained in an immigration centre
with their parents because the law [did] not provide for the pos-
sibility of placing minors in administrative detention. As a result,
children accompanying their parents [found] themselves in a le-
gal vacuum, preventing them from using any remedies available
to their parents.
865
In addition to establishing when detention is
permissible, the law must prescribe a specific legal process for re-
view of the legality of detention, separate from the legal process
leading to a decision to deport. In the absence of such a separate
procedure, there will be no means of redress for an initially legit-
imate detention that becomes illegitimate, for example where a
deportation is initially being pursued but is later suspended.
866
The review must be by an independent and impartial judi-
cial body. This reflects the general standard of the right to a fair
hearing, which is given more specific expression in guarantees
relating to judicial review of detention.
867
The review must be of sufficient scope and have sufficient
powers to be effective. The scope of the judicial review required
will differ according to the circumstances of the case and to the
kind of deprivation of liberty involved.
868
The European Court of
Human Rights has held that the review should, however, be wide
enough to consider the conditions which are essential for lawful
detention.
869
The review must be by a body which is more than
merely advisory, and which has power to issue legally binding
judgments capable of leading, where appropriate, to release.
870

The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly emphasised that
judicial review requires real and not merely formal review of the

864
Z.N.S. v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 756, para. 60; S.D. v. Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 754,
para. 73.

865
Popov v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 704, para. 96.

866
Z.N.S. v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 756, para. 60.

867
See, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, para. 108.

868
Bouamar v. Belgium, ECtHR, Application No. 9106/80, Judgment of 29 February 1988.

869
A. and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 691, para. 202; Chahal v. United King-
dom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, paras. 127130.

870
Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 43, para. 128.
grounds and circumstances of detention, judicial discretion to or-
der release. In A. v. Australia,
871
it found that allowing the court
to order release of detainees only if they did not fall within a par-
ticular category of people was insufficient to provide an effective
judicial review of detention. It emphasised that [c]ourt review
of the lawfulness of detention [. . .] must include the possibility of
ordering release [and must be], in its effects, real and not merely
formal.
872
The Inter-American Court has held that the remedy of
habeas corpus is not exercised with the mere formal existence
of the remedies it governs. Those remedies must be effective,
since their purpose [. . .] is to obtain without delay a decision
on the lawfulness of [the] arrest or detention, and, should they
be unlawful, to obtain, also without delay, an order [for] [. . .]
release.
873
The review must meet standards of due process. Although it
is not always necessary that the review be attended by the same
guarantees as those required for criminal or civil litigation,
874
it
must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropri-
ate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question.
875
Thus, pro-
ceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure equality
of arms between the parties. Legal assistance must be provided
to the extent necessary for an effective application for release.
876

871
A. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656.

872
C. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 350, para. 8.3, fnding a violation of Article 9.4 where the
court review available to the author was confned purely to a formal assessment of the ques-
tion whether the person in question was a non-citizen without an entry permit. There was
no discretion for a court [. . .] to review the authors detention in substantive terms for this
continued justifcation. See also, Danyal Shafq v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 687: court
review of the lawfulness of detention under article 9, paragraph 4, which must include the
possibility of ordering release, is not limited to mere formal compliance of the detention with
domestic law governing the detention; Bakhtiyari v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 685: As to
the claim under article 9, para. 4, [. . .] the court review available to Mrs Bakhtiyari would be
confned purely to a formal assessment of whether she was a non-citizen without an entry
permit. The Committee observes that there was no discretion for a domestic court to review
the justifcation of her detention in substantive terms. The Committee considers that the ina-
bility judicially to challenge a detention that was, or had become, contrary to article 9, para. 1,
constitutes a violation of article 9, para. 4. See also, F.K.A.G. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit.,
fn. 656, para. 9.6. To the same effect see, Rafale Ferrer-Mazorra et al v. United States, IACHR,
op. cit., fn. 395, para. 235.

873
Surez-Rosero v. Ecuador, IACtHR, Series C No. 35, Judgment of 12 November 1997,
para. 63; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 142143.

874

875
Bouamar v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 868, para. 60. See, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR,
op. cit., fn. 536, paras. 107109.

876
Ibid., paras. 6063; Winterwerp v. Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 855, para. 60: essential
that the person concerned has access to a court and the opportunity to be heard in per-
son or through a legal representative; Lebedev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 4493/04,
Judgment of 25 October 2007, paras. 8489; Suso Musa v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 680,
para. 61.
Where detention may be for a long period, procedural guarantees
should be close to those for criminal procedures.
877
The review must be prompt. What is a reasonable time for ju-
dicial review of detention to take place will depend on the circum-
stances. The Human Rights Committee found in Mansour Ahani
v. Canada that a delay of nine and a half months to determine
lawfulness of detention subject to a security certificate violated
Article 9.4 ICCPR.
878
However, in the same case a delay of 120
days before a later detention pending deportation could be chal-
lenged was permissible. In ZNS v. Turkey,
879
the European Court
of Human Rights held that, where it took two months and ten days
for the courts to review detention, in a case that was not complex,
the right to speedy review of detention was violated. In Skakurov
v. Russia, the Court held that delays of thirteen and thirty-four
days to examine appeals against detention orders in non-com-
plex cases were in breach of Article 5.4 ECHR.
880
In Embenyeli v.
Russia,
881
where it took five months to process a review of deten-
tion, there had also been a violation of Article 5.4.
b) Effective judicial review in national security cases
Special procedures for judicial review of detention in cases involving na-
tional security or counter-terrorism concerns, raise particular issues in
regard to Article 9.4 ICCPR and equivalent protections, where they rely
on the use of closed evidence not available to the detainee or his or
her representatives. Detention on the basis of national security certif-
cates in Canada, as well as counter-terrorism administrative detentions
in the UK, illustrate these diffculties. In A. v. UK, the European Court
of Human Rights found that the system of review of administrative de-
tention of persons subject to immigration control and suspected of ter-
rorism, which relied on special advocates to scrutinise closed evidence
and represent the interests of the detainee in regard to the allegations
it raised, without the detainee being aware of them, did not provide
suffcient fair procedures to satisfy Article 5.4. The Court held that the
detainee had to be provided with suffcient information to enable him
to give instructions to the special advocate. Where the open material
consisted only of general assertions, and the decision on detention was

877
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 855, para. 79; A. and Others
v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 691, para. 217: in view of the dramatic impact of
the lengthyand what appeared at that time to be indefnitedeprivation of liberty on the
applicants fundamental rights, Article 5 para. 4 must import substantially the same fair trial
guarantees as Article 6 para. 1 in its criminal aspect.

878
Ahani v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 503.

879
Z.N.S. v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 756, paras. 6162.

880
Shakurov v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 55822/10, Judgment of 5 June 2012, para. 187.

881
Eminbeyli v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 662, para. 10.5.
based mainly on the closed material, Article 5.4 would be violated. In
Mansour Ahani v. Canada,
882
the Human Rights Committee held that a
hearing on a security certifcate which formed the basis for the deten-
tion of a non-national pending deportation was suffcient to comply with
due process under Article 14 ICCPR. The Committee based its decision
on the fact that the non-national had been provided by the Court with
a redacted summary of the allegations against him, and that the Court
had sought to ensure that despite the national security constraints in
the case, the detainee could respond to the case against him, make his
own case and cross-examine witnesses.
4. Reparation for unlawful detention
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and rep-
aration for victims of gross violations of international human rights law
and serious violations of international humanitarian law (the Principles)
affrm that States have an obligation to provide available, adequate,
effective, prompt and appropriate remedies to victims of violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in-
cluding reparation.
883

In accordance with this general principle, persons who are found by do-
mestic or international courts or other appropriate authorities to have
been wrongly detained have a right to reparation, in particular compen-
sation, for their wrongful detention (Article 5.5 ECHR; Article 9.5 ICCPR,
Article 14.7 ArCHR). Under the ICCPR this right arises whenever there
is unlawful detention, i.e. detention which is either in violation of do-
mestic law, or in violation of the Covenant. Under the ECHR, it arises
only where there is detention in contravention of the Convention itself
(although in practice this will include cases where the detention did not
have an adequate basis in domestic law).
884
The award of compensation
must be legally binding and enforceable:
885
ex gratia payments will not
be suffcient.

882
Ahani v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 503, para. 10.5.

883
Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and rep-
aration.

884
Nowak, CCPR Commentary, op. cit., fn. 730, pp. 180182.

885
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Plenary, Applications Nos. 1209/84, 11234/84,
11266/84, 11386/85, Judgment of 29 November 1988, para. 67.
CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN MIGRATION
Economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights are an essential part of the
corpus of international human rights law. They are recognised in the
UDHR and guaranteed by the ICESCR as well as other UN human rights
treaties (CERD, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD) and at a regional level by several
treaties including, but not limited to, the European Social Charter, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
(ACHPR) and the Arab Charter of Human Rights (ArCHR). They encom-
pass a range of guarantees relating to the right to work, workplace and
trade union rights (addressed in Chapter 6); rights to health, education,
social security, and an adequate standard of living including housing,
food, water and sanitation; and rights to engage in cultural activities.
Some of these rights, or aspects of them, are also protected under civil
and political rights instruments such as the ICCPR and the ECHR.
As with civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights are
universally applicable, to citizens and to non-citizens, including all cate-
gories of migrants. They are subject to principles of non-discrimination
on a number of grounds including race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status. Particular guarantees relating to the ESC rights of children
are set out in the CRC, as well as relating to the ESC rights of women
in CEDAW. ESC rights provide a framework for considering questions
of migrants entitlements to social services in the host State, and the
States obligation to provide for the basic living needs of migrants who,
because of their migration status or for other reasons, are unable to
work.
I. General Principles
1. Duties to Respect, Protect and Fulfl
As with all human rights under international human rights law, ESC
rights carry legally binding obligations on States to respect, protect and
fulfl. The CESCR has adopted and developed this three-tier classifca-
tion of State obligations to guarantee the Covenant rights.
886

886
See, generally, ICJ, Courts and Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
op. cit., fn. 29, pp. 4253. See also a complete description in SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, paras. 4448; and, CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24,
op. cit., fn. 29, paras. 1317. See also, Article 6, Maastricht Guidelines, op. cit. fn. 29. See
also, CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, paras. 6079.
The duty to respect requires the State not to intervene unduly in the
enjoyment of a particular right. These duties apply to situations such
as: State-organised or sanctioned forced evictions, direct threats to
health by State actors, interruption of existing levels of medical treat-
ment provided by the State, arbitrary termination of employment in the
public sphere.
887
The duty to protect requires the State to prevent third parties from
unduly interfering in the right-holders enjoyment of a particular right.
Such duties arise, for example, in cases of privately conducted forced
evictions, labour conditions in the private labour market, failure to com-
ply with health or education requirements in the private sphere, dis-
crimination in contracts directed at providing basic services, such as
health, water, housing or education, and abusive termination or modi-
fcation of contracts.
The duty to fulfl imposes obligations on a State to, as appropriate, fa-
cilitate, provide or promote access to ESC rights. The obligation to fulfl
imposes a duty on the State to guarantee a minimum essential level of
each right to all individuals who cannot, for reasons beyond their con-
trol, realise the right without assistance.
2. Obligations of immediate effect and progressive
realisation
Under the ICESCR, obligations to respect and, in most instances, to
protect the Covenant rights are of immediate effect. Similarly, non-dis-
crimination and the guarantee of the enjoyment of at least minimum
essential levels of the rights
888
are immediate obligations.
In addition, States have immediate obligations under Article 2.1 ICESCR
to take steps, to the maximum of the resources available to the
State, to realise the Covenant rights. This obligation is not in itself
qualifed or limited by other considerations. Steps towards that goal
must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenants en-
try into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate,
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obli-
gations recognised in the Covenant.
889

887
See, endorsement of justiciability of duty to respect in SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria,
ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, paras. 45, 54, 6162, 66.

888
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, paras. 910. See also, Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, adopted 2 to 6 June 1986, reproduced in UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (Limburg
Principles); and, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, focussing on the
concept of progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights, 2007 substantive
session of the UN ECOSOC, UN Doc, E/2007/82, 25 June 2007.

889
CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, para. 2.
This notwithstanding, certain aspects of the Covenant rights, as re-
gards the obligation to fulfl, are subject to the principle of progressive
realisation (Article 2.1 ICESCR), an acknowledgement that their full
realisation might not be achieved immediately and that there may be
resource constraints that should be taken into account when assessing
State compliance with some of these obligations.
3. Prohibition of retrogressive measures
Article 2.1 ICESCR also prohibits States from taking retrogressive mea-
sures in regard to the rights contained therein.
890
The prohibition of
retrogression means that any measure adopted by the State that sup-
presses, restricts or limits the content of the entitlements already guar-
anteed by law, constitutes a prima facie violation. It entails a compar-
ison between the previously existing and the newly passed legislation,
regulations and practices, in order to assess their retrogressive charac-
ter.
891
A State adopting retrogressive measures breaches its ESC rights
obligations unless it can show that the measures:
were taken in pursuit of a pressing goal;
were strictly necessary; and
there were no alternative or less restrictive measures available.
892

4. Non-discrimination and application to non-nationals
Irrespective of whether a particular obligation is of immediate effect
or is to be realised progressively, it must not be implemented so as
to exclude or unjustifably discriminate against non-nationals. Article 2
ICESCR protects against discrimination in relation to the Covenant
rights. The CESCR has made clear that the prohibition of discrimina-
tion also includes discrimination against non-citizens on the grounds of
nationality. Although this is not an express ground, it is included under
other grounds in Article 2.2 ICESCR. The Committee has stated that:
[t]he ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights
[. . .]. The Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals,

890

891
ICJ, Courts and Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, op. cit., fn. 29,
p. 6.

892
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, para. 9. See, Free Legal Assis-
tance Group and Others v. Zaire, ACommHPR, Communications Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91,
100/93, 19
th
Ordinary Session, March 1996, para. 48 and holding; Acevedo Buenda et al.
(Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller) v. Per, IACtHR, Series C No. 198,
Judgment of 1 July 2009, para. 103; Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, IACHR, Case
No. 12.249, Report No. 27/09, Merits, 20 March 2009, para. 105 (fnding prohibition of
retrogressive measures under Article 26 ACHR); and, National Association of Ex-Employees
of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al. v. Peru, IACHR, Case No. 12.670, Report
No. 38/09, Merits, 27 March 2009, para. 140.
such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers
and victims of international traffcking, regardless of legal status and
documentation.
893
An exception, permitting limitations on the appli-
cation of the Covenant rights to non-nationals is given for developing
countries in Article 2.3 ICESCR.
894

The CRC also includes protection against discrimination in regard to the
ESC rights of children protected by the Convention, including on the
basis of the childs or the childs parents national origin. The Committee
on the Rights of the Child has stated that the enjoyment of rights stip-
ulated in the Convention is not limited to children who are citizens of a
State Party and must therefore, if not explicitly stated otherwise in the
Convention, also be available to all childrenincluding asylum-seeking,
refugee and migrant childrenirrespective of their nationality, immigra-
tion status or statelessness.
895

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that the principles
of equality and non-discrimination, including on the basis of nationality,
are peremptory norms of international law, (jus cogens) and therefore
impose binding obligations on all States, to respect and fulfl them.
896

As clarifed by the Court, the obligation to respect and ensure the prin-
ciple of the right to equal protection and non-discrimination is irrespec-
tive of a persons migratory status in a State. In other words, States
have the obligation to ensure this fundamental principle to its citizens
and to any foreigner who is on its territory, without any discrimination
based on regular or irregular residence, nationality, race, gender or any
other cause.
897
The African Commission has held that measures depriving non-nationals
of rights which are not expressly guaranteed only to citizens (such as
the right to vote) will constitute arbitrary discrimination under Article 2
of the African Charter, as [r]ights under the African Charter are to be
enjoyed by all, without discrimination, by citizens and non-nationals
residents alike.
898

893
CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 30. See also, Article 42, Limburg
Principles, op. cit., fn. 888. Certain kinds of discrimination between citizens and non-citizens
are also covered by Article 26 ICCPR, but the Human Rights Committee did not precise many
cases of application. See, CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 31.

894
However, it is inferred that this provision was limited to end domination of certain economic
groups of non-nationals during colonial times. The fact that the exception is set only for de-
veloping countries means that no other country can advance any exception on this ground.
See, Articles 4344, Limburg Principles, op. cit., fn. 888. Its application has been excluded for
children by the CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 16.

895
CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, paras. 12 and 18.

896
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, para. 101 (our em-
phasis) and holding at para. 4.

897
Yean and Bosico Case, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 281, para. 155.

898
IHRDA v. Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 80.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that when a State decides
to provide benefts to a migrant, it must do so in a way that is compli-
ant with Article 14 ECHR,
899
which prohibits unjustifed discrimination in
the enjoyment of other ECHR rights on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other sta-
tus. The Court ruled that immigration status could be considered as an
other status on which unjustifed discrimination was prohibited under
Article 14 and the fact that immigration status is a status conferred by
law, rather than one which is inherent to the individual did not pre-
clude this classifcation, since a wide range of legal and other effects
fow from a persons immigration status.
900
However, [g]iven the el-
ement of choice involved in immigration status, [. . .] while differential
treatment based on this ground must still be objectively and reasonably
justifable, the justifcation required will not be as weighty as in the case
of a distinction based, for example, on nationality. Furthermore, [when]
the subject matter [. . .] is predominantly socio-economic in nature, the
margin of appreciation accorded to the Government will be relatively
wide.
901
Because of this wider margin of appreciation given to the au-
thorities, the European Court found it justifable to discriminate in the
prioritization for the assignment of housing benefts by disfavouring
migrants who are undocumented or that are present in the national
territory on the condition that they had no recourse to public funds, as
this specifc discrimination pursued a legitimate aim, namely allocating
a scarce resource fairly between different categories of claimants.
902
The European Committee on Social Rights has considered the exclusion
of certain categories of foreign nationals (those unlawfully present on the
territory) from the Charter rights. Drawing on the nature of the Charter
as a living instrument inspired by the values of dignity, autonomy, equali-
ty and solidarity, the Committee found that the exclusion of undocument-
ed migrants did not apply to rights such as the right to healthcare, of
fundamental importance to the individual since [they are] connected to
the right to life itself and [go] to the very dignity of the human being.
903

The Committee has stressed that this choice in applying the Charter
follows from the legal need to comply with the peremptory norms of
general international law (jus cogens) such as the rules requiring each
state to respect and safeguard each individuals right to life and physical

899
Bah v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 56328/07, Judgment of 27 September
2011, para. 40.

900
Ibid., para. 46.

901
Ibid., para. 47.

902
Ibid., para. 50.

903
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France, ECSR, Complaint
No. 14/2003, Merits, 8 September 2004, paras. 3032.
integrity.
904
The Committee failed to apply this approach to the right to
social protection/benefts under Article 23 of the ESC(r),
905
to the right
to adequate housing (Article 31.1 ESC(r)), even for unaccompanied mi-
nor s
906
or the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion
(Article 30 ESC(r)),
907
but it found that the right to immediate shelter
is closely connected to the right to life and is crucial for the respect of
every persons human dignity
908
and is therefore applicable to undocu-
mented migrants.
909
The Committee has also considered of fundamental
importance the obligation to provide protection and special aid from
the State for children and young persons temporarily or defnitively de-
prived of their familys support.
910
The right to health (Article 11 ESC(r)),
the right to social and medical assistance (Aritcle 13 ESC(r)) have been
equally considered applicable to undocumented foreign minors.
911
The
Committee has also held that the part of Article 16 relating to the right
of families to decent housing and particularly the right not to be deprived
of shelter applies to foreign families unlawfully present in the country.
912

5. Remedies for violations of ESC Rights
Although the extent to which ESC rights are justiciable
913
has been
controversial, arguments that ESC rights cannot be adjudicated on by
courts, or that they are policy objectives rather than rights, have been
authoritatively dismissed, and ESC rights are regularly adjudicated on
by national courts. International judicial or quasi-judicial bodies also
adjudicate on a comprehensive catalogue of ESC rights, as described
further in Annex II.
The way in which ESC rights can be claimed in courts and the reme-
dies available will vary according to the legal system and the domestic

904
Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, ECSR, Complaint No. 69/2011, Merits,
23 October 2012, para. 33.

905
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. Ireland, ECSR, Complaint
No. 42/2007, Merits, 3 June 2008, para. 18.

906
Defence for Children International (DCI) v. the Netherlands, ECSR, Complaint No. 47/2008,
Merits, 20 October 2009, paras. 4445.

907
DCI v. Belgium, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 904, paras. 143147.

908
Ibid., para. 47.

909
Ibid., paras. 4648.

910
Article 17(1)(c) ESC(r). See, DCI v. the Netherlands, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 906, para. 66; DCI
v. Belgium, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 904, para. 39.

911
DCI v. Belgium, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 904, paras. 102, 119122.

912
DCI v. Belgium, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 904, para. 136.

913
Justiciability refers to the ability to claim a remedy before an independent and impartial
body when a violation of a right has occurred or is likely to occur, [and it] implies access to
mechanisms that guarantee recognised rights: ICJ, Courts and Legal Enforcement of Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights, op. cit., fn. 29, p. 6. The case Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia,
ACommHPR, Communication No. 241/2001 (2003), 33
rd
Ordinary Session, 1529 May 2003,
paras. 7885, constitutes a good example, and not the only, of justiciability of ESC rights.
law and to national implementation of international obligations. The
effectiveness will also depend on the legal system of each country and
to what extent ESC rights have been incorporated into domestic law.
Nevertheless, even where national legal systems do not provide directly
for remedies for ESC rights, their invocation may be a useful tool for the
interpretation of national laws concerning the provision of benefts or
social services for migrants, and may also help to support an eventual
communication against a violation submitted to an international human
rights mechanism.
The CESCR has stressed that, [w]hile the general approach of each
legal system needs to be taken into account, there is no Covenant right
which could not, in the great majority of systems, be considered to pos-
sess at least some signifcant justiciable dimensions.
914
The Committee
accepts the possibility of resorting to administrative remedies for some
rights. These must in any case be accessible, affordable, timely and
effective.
915
However, the Committee stressed that there are some ob-
ligations in relation to which the provision of some form of judicial
remedy would seem indispensable in order to satisfy the requirements
of the Covenant.
916
It stressed that judicial review and the judiciarys
application of domestic law must be undertaken in consonance with the
ICESCR, otherwise [n]eglect by the courts of this responsibility is in-
compatible with the principle of the rule of law.
917
The right of access to
courts for non-citizens without any discriminatory implementation, de-
nial or omission of ESC rights has been also highlighted by the CERD.
918

As noted in Section I.4, the obligation of non-discrimination is of im-
mediate effect.
919
In addition, the CESCR has found of immediate effect
the principle of gender equality (Article 3 ICESCR), the right to fair
wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinc-
tion of any kind (Article 7.1 ICESCR), freedom of association and trade
unions rights (Article 8 ICESCR), essential rights relating to child labour
(Article 10.3 ICESCR), the right to be free from hunger and to access
basic shelter (article 11 ICESCR), the right to free and compulsory pri-
mary education (Article 13.2(a) ICESCR), the right of parents to have
their children educated in respect of their religious and moral convic-
tions (Article 13.3 ICESCR), the liberty of individuals and bodies to es-
tablish educational institutions (Article 13.4 ICESCR), and the freedom

914
General Comment No. 9, The domestic application of the Covenant, CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, para. 10.

915
Ibid., para. 9.

916
Ibid., para. 9

917
Ibid., paras. 14 and 15.

918
See, CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 29.

919
CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, paras. 1 and 5. See, Articles 22 and 35,
Limburg Principles, op. cit., fn. 888.
of scientifc research and creative activity (Article 15.3) ICESCR). The
CESCR clearly rejected any inference that these elements of rights and
obligations might be non-self-executing.
920
The list is illustrative and
non-exhaustive.
921
Furthermore, it must be recalled that, even in the
case of obligations subject to progressive realisation, national courts
can review compliance with ESC rights based on principles of reason-
ableness, proportionality and necessity.
Box 14. ESC Rights in regional courts
ESC rights are adjudicated by a number of international courts
and tribunals. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the African Commission supervise and rule on the implemen-
tation of the ESC rights included in their main instruments.
922

The European Court has a more limited role due to the scarce
presence of the ESC rights in the European Convention, but
it includes protection for some rights also protected as ESC
rights including the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol 1)
and other ECHR rights allow it to adjudicate on some aspects
of ESC rights, including the right to respect for private and
family life and to respect for the home (Article 8 ECHR) and
the right to property (Article 1 Protocol 1). The European
Court can also fnd violations of ESC rights under the general
prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 1 of Protocol 12
ECHR (for those States Parties that have ratifed the Protocol),
which prohibits discrimination in regard to any right set forth
by law.
923
The European Committee of Social Rights can re-
ceive collective complaints, and, despite the restrictive scope
of the European Social Charter, its jurisprudence is opening
up to adjudicating on at least a minimum common core of
ESC rights for all migrants, regardless of their status. Finally,

920
Ibid., para. 5.

921
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 9, op. cit., fn. 914, para. 10.

922
See, SERAC and the CESR v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, para. 68. In Socio-Eco-
nomic Rights Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, Communication
No. 300/2005, 5
th
Extraordinary Session, 2129 July 2008, para. 65, the Court said that the
African Charter [. . .] constitutes a normative base for socio-economic rights claims which
allow any claim brought under the Charter to be litigated before national courts.

923
In particular, the Explanatory Report to Protocol 12 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 177, clarifes that the prohibition
of discrimination refers to the enjoyment of any right specifcally granted to an individual
under national law; [. . .] the enjoyment of a right which may be inferred from a clear obli-
gation of a public authority under national law, that is, where a public authority is under an
obligation under national law to behave in a particular manner; [unjustifed discrimination]
by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power (for example, granting certain
subsidies); [or] by any other act or omission by a public authority (for example, the behav-
iour of law enforcement offcers when controlling a riot).
a recently agreed Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which al-
lows for individual complaints to the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, will, when entered into force, pro-
vide a universal international mechanism for adjudication on
ESC Rights (see, Annex 2).
a) Means of judicial enforcement
A number of national courts, as well as international bodies and experts
have developed jurisprudence which may clarify the content and defne
standards facilitating the legal enforcement of ESC rights. Principles
developed in this jurisprudence include the following:
The question as to whether a State has discriminated against
certain individuals and groups, has failed to respect and protect
ESC rights or has taken retrogressive measures in relation to the
rights (see, above, Section 3) are subject to adjudication by na-
tional courts as immediate and/or negative obligations.
924

Even for aspects of rights that are subject to progressive realisa-
tion, courts can judicially review compliance with them based on
principles of reasonableness, proportionality and necessity.
925

A number of national legal systems will judicially enforce ESC rights
within the scope of the minimum core content.
926
Minimum
core refers to the absolute minimum essential level of each right
without which the right would be meaningless.
927
The CESCR has
established that a State Party in which any significant number of

924
See, for example, Belgian Court of Arbitration, Case No. 5/2004, January 14, 2004 and Por-
tugal Constitutional Tribunal, Decision No. 39/84, April 11, 1984.

925
See, Article 4 ICESCR, and CESCR, Statement: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take
Steps to the Maximum of Available Resources under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant,
UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, para. 8. See also, ICJ, Courts and Legal Enforcement
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, op. cit., fn. 29, at pp. 3336.

926
See, German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) and German Federal Administrative
Court (BVerwG): BVerfGE 1,97 (104f); BVerwGE 1,159 (161); BVerwGE 25, 23 (27); BVerf-
GE 40, 121 (133, 134); BVerfGE 45, 187 (229); BVerfGE 82, 60 (85) and BVerfGE 99,
246 (259). Swiss Federal Court, V. v. Einwohnergemeinde X und Regierungsrat des Kanton
Bern, BGE/ATF 121I 367, 27 October 1995. Brasilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tri-
bunal Federal), RE 436996/SP (opinion written by Judge Calso de Mello), 26 October 2005.
Argentine Supreme Court, Reynoso, Nida Noemi c/INSSJP s/amparo, 16 May 2006 (majority
vote agreeing with Attorney Generals brief). See, for more explication on this point, ICJ,
Courts and Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, op. cit., fn. 29.

927
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 14, op. cit., fn. 37, para. 47 (on right to health). See
also, Article 9, Maastricht Guidelines, op. cit., fn. 29. This notion of minimum core seems re-
fected in the obligation to respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers, enshrined
in Article 1 of the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (C143), ILO,
adopted on 24 June 1975. Despite the low ratifcation of this Convention, such an approach
would make applicable this provision also to State non-Parties.
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obli-
gations under the Covenant.
928
In order to avoid a violation the
State must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use
all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as
a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.
929
An example
of minimum core content has been provided by the Executive
Committee of the UNHCR, which found under the Geneva Refugee
Convention, a right of asylum-seekers, even in situations of large-
scale influx, to receive all necessary assistance and be provided
with the basic necessities of life including food, shelter and basic
sanitary and health facilities.
930
In a number of national legal systems, courts often rely on a
broad interpretation of civil and political rights, such as the right
to life, to develop protection against the most serious violations
of ESC rights.
931
The Inter-American Court has determined that
the right to life includes a right not to be prevented from access
to conditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the
adoption of measures to prevent the breach of such right.
932
This
entails a duty to respect and protect on the State.
933
The Court
has recognised obligations to take positive, concrete measures
to fulfil the right to a decent life, as part of the right to life,
934
as
also guaranteed by Article 11 ICESCR.
935
The European Court of

928

929
Ibid., para. 10.

930
Conclusion No. 22, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 151, para. II(B)(2)(c). See also, for refugee women,
Conclusion No. 64 (XLI) on Refugee Women and International Protection, ExCom, UNHCR,
41
st
session, 1990, para. (a)(ix). The minimum core for refugee children and adolescent
is higher, due to the link with the general principle of the best interest of the child. The
UNHCR ExCom has found within the minimum core for children the right to education, ade-
quate food, and the highest attainable standard of health. See, Conclusion No. 84 (UNHCR,
op. cit., fn. 214, para. (a)(iii).

931
See, ICJ, Courts and Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, op. cit.,
fn. 29, Chapter 4, at pp. 6572.

932
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACtHR, Series C No. 146, Judgment of
29 March 2006, para. 153. See also, Street Children (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatema-
la, IACtHR, Series C No. 63, Judgment of 19 November 1999 (Street Children Case), paras.
144 and 191; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACtHR, Series C No. 125,
Judgment of 17 June 2005, paras. 161163.

933
Street Children Case, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 932, para. 144.

934
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 932, para. 162.

935
See, Article 11 ICESCR and Article 27(2) CRC. See also, CRC, General Comment No. 6,
op. cit., fn. 138, para. 44; Concluding Observations on Japan, CERD, Report of the Commit-
tee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly, 56
th
Session, UN Doc.
A/56/18 (2001), p. 35, para. 177; Concluding Observations on Gambia, CRC, Report of
the Committee on the Rights of the Child on its 28
th
Session, UN Doc, CRC/C/111 (2001),
28 September 2001, para. 450.
Human Rights has held that forced evictions,
936
forced displace-
ments and destruction of homes,
937
and the exposure of housing
to unhealthy environmental conditions
938
may amount to a vio-
lation of the right to privacy, family life and home, to a violation
of the right to property,
939
and even to inhuman and degrading
treatment.
940
Box 15. Destitution, the right to life and freedom from
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
The Inter-American Court has recognised that the right to
life includes a right not to be prevented from access to con-
ditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the
adoption of measures to prevent the breach of such right.
941

This entails a duty on the State to respect and protect. Indeed,
the State has an obligation to guarantee the creation of the
conditions required in order that violations of this basic right
do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents

936
See, for example, Connors v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 66746/01, Judg-
ment of 27 May 2004, paras. 3545.

937
See, for example, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 21893/93,
Judgment of 16 September 1996, para. 88; Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 410,
paras. 174175; Yyler v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 26973/95, Judgment of 10 May
2001, paras. 7980; Demades v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 16219/90, Judgment
of 31 October 2003, paras. 3137; Seluk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR, Applications
Nos. 23184/9423185/94, Judgment of 21 April 1998, paras. 8687; Bilgin v. Turkey,
ECtHR, Application No. 23819/94, Judgment of 16 November 2000, paras. 108109; Ay-
der and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 23656/94, Judgment of 8 January 2004,
paras. 119121; Moldovan and Others (2) v. Romania, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 41138/98,
64320/01, Judgment of 12 July 2005, paras. 105, 108110.

938
See, for example, Lpez Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR, Application No. 16798/90, Judgment of
9 December 1994, paras. 51, 5658; Guerra and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, Applica-
tion No. 14967/89, Judgment of 19 February 1998, para. 60; Taskin and Others v. Tur-
key, ECtHR, Application No. 46117/99, Judgment of 10 November 2004, paras. 115126;
Moreno Gomez v. Spain, ECtHR, Application No. 4143/02, Judgment of 16 November 2004,
paras. 6063; Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 55723/00, Judgment of 9 June
2005, paras. 94105, 116134.

939
See, for example, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, para. 88; Cyprus v.
Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 410, paras. 187189; Yyler v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937,
paras. 7980; Demades v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, para. 46; Xenides-Arestis v.
Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 46347/99, Judgment of 22 December 2005, paras. 2732;
Seluk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 8687; Bilgin v. Turkey, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 108109; Ayder and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937,
paras. 119121. In Oneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 48939/99, Judgment of
30 November 2004, the Court decided that the applicants proprietary interest in a precarious
hut built irregularly in State-owned land was of a suffcient nature to be considered a pos-
session in the sense of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.

940
Yyler v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 7476; Seluk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 7780; Bilgin v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 100104;
Moldovan and Others (2) v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 111, 113114.

941
See, fn. 932.
from violating it.
942
There is also a duty to take positive,
concrete measures geared towards fulflment of the right to a
decent life, especially in the case of persons who are vulnera-
ble and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority.
943
The European Court has held that neither the right to life
(Article 2 ECHR) nor any other provision of the ECHR can
be interpreted as conferring on an individual a right to enjoy
any given standard of living.
944
However, it has found that in
certain cases where, contrary to standards or duties in its own
national law, the State fails to provide for the basic material
needs of asylum seekers, the extreme poverty and destitu-
tion that results, in combination with uncertainty as to how
long such destitution will continue, will violate the freedom
from inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.
945

In such cases, the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers
and their need for particular protection by the State, are fac-
tors that heighten the States obligations to provide them with
decent material conditions.
946

The European Committee on Social Rights has found that cer-
tain rights of the European Social Charter (revised) are of fun-
damental importance since they are connected to the right
to life,
947
and are therefore available to all on the territory,
despite the treaty limitation to citizens and migrants legally
present on the territory.
II. Specifc rights of signifcance for migrants
This Section outlines the international human rights law jurisprudence
related to certain ESC rights that have particular signifcance for mi-
grants, and which may be useful in litigation on migrants rights. The
rights dealt with are the right to an adequate standard of living, includ-
ing the right to food, to water and sanitation and to adequate housing;

942
Street Children Case, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 932, para. 144.

943
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 932, para. 162.

944
Wasilewski v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 32734/96, Admissibility Decision, 20 April
1999, para. 3. See also, Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 70767/01, Judg-
ment of 6 September 2005, para. 28.

945
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 324, paras. 250263; Rahimi v. Greece,

946
Ibid., para. 251.

947
FIDH v. France, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 903, para. 30; DCI v. Belgium, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 904,
para. 33.
the right to the highest attainable standard of health; the right to social
security; and the right to education. The right to work, workplace rights,
and other related rights are addressed separately in Chapter 6.
1. The right to an adequate standard of living
Article 11 ICESCR provides that States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
948
Other rights,
whose respect and realisation are necessary to the attainment of an
adequate standard of livingfor example the right to water and sanita-
tionare also protected by Article 11.
949

The right to a continuous improvement of living conditions is an ob-
ligation of progressive realisation. The other rights contained in
Article 11including the right to food, water and housinginclude ob-
ligations of immediate effect and core elements that must be realised
immediately.
950

a) The right to water and sanitation
The right to water entitles everyone to suffcient, safe, acceptable,
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic
use.
951
The right to water is intrinsically linked with the right to life and
human dignity, as well as with the right to the highest attainable stan-
dard of health, the right to housing and the right to food.
952
Water must
be available, and be of suffcient quality to be safe and healthy.
953

States have an immediate obligation to ensure access to the minimum
essential amount of safe water, on a non-discriminatory basis,
954
es-

948
Article 11.1 ICESCR. See, Article 14.2(h), ICEDAW; Article 27 CRC; Article 70, ICRMW; Arti-
cle 28, CRPD. See also, CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 44; Concluding
Observations on Japan, CERD, op. cit., fn. 935, para. 177; Concluding Observations on
Gambia, CRC, op. cit., fn. 935, para. 450.

949
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 148, para. 3.

950
CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, para. 10. See also, CESCR, General com-
ment No. 14, op. cit., fn. 37, para. 43; and General Comment No. 19, The right to social
security, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para. 59.

951
CESCR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 148, para. 2. The right to water is also recog-
nized explicitly in some human rights treaties: Article 14.2(h) CEDAW; Article 24.2(c) CRC;
Article 28.2(a) CRPD; Articles 20, 26, 29, 46 of the Convention (III) relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (III Geneva Convention); Articles 85,
89, 127, IV Geneva Convention; Articles 54 and 55 API to the Geneva Conventions; and
Articles 5 and 14 APII of the Geneva Conventions. A more detailed analysis is contained in
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., fn. 148, to which we remand.

952
See, ibid., paras. 1 and 3.

953
See, ibid., para.12.

954
pecially for disadvantaged or marginalised groups.
955
States should give
particular attention to those categories of people who have traditionally
encountered diffculties in the enjoyment of such right, including refu-
gees, asylum-seekers and migrants.
956
All persons or groups who have
been denied their right to water must have access to an effective judi-
cial or other appropriate remedy which can provide reparation, includ-
ing restitution, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repe-
tition, in case of violation.
957
The right to sanitation is fundamental to human dignity and privacy,
and is linked to the right to safe water supplies and resources, as well
as to rights to health and housing.
958
It requires States to progressively
extend safe sanitation services, taking into account the particular needs
of women and children.
959
b) The right to food
Article 11.1 provides for the right to adequate food. Article 11.2 ICESCR
recognises the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hun-
ger,
960
which is a right of immediate effect. In accordance with this
right, a State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction
access to the minimum essential food which is suffcient, nutritionally
adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger.
961

The CESCR has recognised that the right to food is linked to the inherent
dignity of the human person and indispensible for the fulflment of other
human rights.
962
The African Commission too stressed that the right to
food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is there-
fore essential for the enjoyment and fulflment of such other rights as
health, education, work and political participation.
963
The right to adequate food is fully realised when every man, woman
and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and econom-
ic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.
964

While some aspects of this right are likely to be realised only progres-
sively, the obligation under Article 11.2 to ensure freedom from hunger
is of immediate effect, being a core obligation of the right to food. The

955

956

957

958

959
See, ibid., para. 29. See also, Article 14.2 CEDAW; Article 24.2 CRC.

960
Article 11.2 ICESCR. See also Article 24.2(c) CRC; Article 28.1 CRPD.

961

962
Ibid., para. 4.

963
SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, para. 65.

964
CESCR, General comment No. 12, op. cit., fn. 148, para. 6.
same applies to the obligation to respect, and in most instances protect,
the existing access to adequate food or means for its procurement. The
right to adequate food implies the availability of food in quantity and
quality suffcient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from
adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture, and the
accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not
interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.
965
The CESCR has emphasised that unjustifed discrimination in access to
food, or in means of its procurement, will violate Article 11,
966
and that
States must ensure access to an effective judicial or other appropriate
remedy which can provide reparation, including restitution, compensa-
tion, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, for violations of the
right to food.
967
c) Right to adequate housing
The right to adequate housing
968
is likely to be of particular relevance to
migrants. It is protected as part of the right to an adequate standard of
living in Article 11 ICESCR, and is also expressly protected in a number
of global and regional instruments. It is distinct from civil and political
rights of respect for the home,
969
which are related to the right to re-
spect for private life, although there is some overlap in protection with
this right. The right to adequate housing, as protected under ESC rights
treaties, establishes a right to adequate shelter and accommodation
and entails duties to respect, protect and fulfl. The right to housing
includes rights to: security of tenure, which requires legal protection
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats; the right to have
adequate housing with facilities essential for health, security, comfort
and nutrition; fnancial costs associated with housing at such a level
that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threat-
ened or compromised; housing that is habitable, safe, protects from the
elements and from disease and provides adequate space; housing that
is accessible to those entitled to it; and that is located so as to allow

965
Ibid., para. 8.

966
Ibid., para. 18.

967

968
See, Article 11.1 ICESCR; Article 25.1 UDHR; Article 5(e)(iii) ICERD; Article 14.2 CEDAW;
Article 27.3 CRC; Article 28.1 and 28.2(d) CRPD; Article XI ADRDM; Articles 16 and 31
ESC(r); Article 16, Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Womenin Africa; Article 10 of the
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, GA resolution 2542(XXIV), 11 December
1969; section III (8) of the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976 (Report
of Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (United Nations publication,
Sales No. E.76.IV.7 and corrigendum); chap. I); Article 8(1), Declaration on the Right to De-
velopment, General Assembly resolution No. 41/128, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128, 4 December
1986; and Workers Housing Recommendation (R115), ILO, adopted on 28 June 1961.

969
See, Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8 ECHR, Article IX ADRDM, Article 11 ACHR, Article 10 ACRWC,
Article 12 UDHR.
access to employment, health-care services, schools, child-care centres
and other social facilities.
970
The CESCR foresees that aspects of the right to housing should be ju-
dicially enforceable, whether against the State or private third parties.
Legal actions might be aimed at preventing planned evictions or demo-
litions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; seeking com-
pensation following an illegal eviction; challenges against illegal action
carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or private) in
relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms
of discrimination; lawsuits against any form of discrimination in the
allocation and availability of access to housing; and complaints against
landlords concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions. In
some legal systems it would also be appropriate to explore the possi-
bility of facilitating collective or class action suits in situations involving
signifcantly increased levels of homelessness.
971

It should be noted that particularly poor conditions of housing might
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 16 CAT
and equivalent provisions in other treaties.
972
i) Forced evictions
The prohibition of forced evictions is one aspect of the right to housing that
is of immediate effect and breaches should be able to be challenged in
court, whether the eviction is by State or third party actors.
973
The CESCR
defnes forced eviction as the permanent or temporary removal against
their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes
and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to,
appropriate forms of legal or other protection.
974
Eviction affects not only
several ESC rights, but may also, depending on the circumstances, affect

970
General Comment No. 4, The right to adequate housing, CESCR, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9
(Vol.I), 13 December 1991, para. 8. The European Committee on Social Rights takes a similar
approach in its jurisprudence. See, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Greece, ECSR,
Complaint No. 15/2003, Merits, 8 December 2004, para. 24. The Committee found a violation
of the right to adequate housing, even though this is a right of progressive realisation, because
the State could not satisfy even its minimum standards with regards to Roma (see 4243).
See also, ERRC v. Italy, ECSR, Complaint No. 27/2004, Merits, 7 December 2005, para. 35;
ERRC v. Bulgaria, ECSR, Complaint No. 31/2005, Merits, 18 October 2006, para. 34; European
Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. France, ECSR,
Complaint No. 39/2002, Merits, 5 December 2007, para. 74; ERRC v. France, ECSR, Com-
plaint No. 51/2008, Merits, 19 October 2009, para. 46. On the protection of right to adequate
housing by Articles 16 and 31, see, ERRC v. Bulgaria, ECSR, paras. 1518. However, the right
to adequate housing under the European Social Charter, at least on its face, covers only for-
eigners of other Contracting States lawfully resident in the territory of the State.

971

972
Concluding Observations on Slovenia, CAT, op. cit., fn. 353, para. 211.

973
General Comment No. 7, The right to adequate housing: forced evictions, CESCR, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), 20 May 1997, para. 8.

974
Ibid., para. 3.
civil and political rights, such as the right to life, the right to security of
the person, the right to non-interference with privacy, family and home
and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
975
Consequently,
if the domestic legal system does not allow for legal actions directly pro-
tecting against forced evictions under the right to housing, the matter
may sometimes be brought to court under other rights protected by in-
ternational human rights law, such as the right to respect for the home.
976

In order not to be arbitrary, under the CESCR, evictions must be carried
out in compliance with the relevant provisions of international human
rights law and in accordance with general principles of reasonableness
and proportionality. They must be precisely provided for by law, in pri-
mary legislation, must be in accordance with a legitimate aim, and pro-
portionate to the aim pursued.
977
Evictions must take place pursuant
to a precise, fair and open procedure, with the opportunity for genuine
consultation with those affected, information made available within a
reasonable time
978
and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior
to the scheduled date of eviction. The evicted person must be provided
with legal remedies and, where possible, legal aid to persons who are in
need of it to seek redress from the courts.
979
In particular [e]victions should not result in individuals being rendered
homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights. Where
those affected are unable to provide for themselves, the State Party
must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available
resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or
access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.
980
The ECSR has held that illegal occupation of a site or dwelling may jus-
tify the eviction of the illegal occupants. However the criteria of illegal
occupation must not be unduly wide, the eviction should take place in
accordance with the applicable rules of procedure, and these should
be suffciently protective of the rights of the persons concerned.
981

975
Ibid., para. 4.

976
Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8 ECHR, Article IX ADRDM, Article 11 ACHR, Article 10 ACRWC,
Article 12 UDHR.

977
See, CESCR, General Comment No. 7, op. cit., fn. 973, para. 14, which refers also to CCPR,
General Comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 791.

978
See, Miloon Kothari, Basic Principles and Guidelines on development-based evictions and dis-
placement, in Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component
of the right to an adequate standard of living, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/18, 5 February 2007, Annex 1.

979

980
Ibid., para. 16. See also, Concluding Observations on Norway, CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.109, 13 May 2005, para. 38.

981
ERRC v. Greece, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970, para. 51; ERRC v. Bulgaria, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970,
para. 51; International Movement ATD Fourth World (ATD) v. France, ESCR, Complaint
No. 33/2006, Merits, 5 December 2007, paras. 7778; FEANTSA v. France, ECSR, op. cit.,
fn. 970, paras. 8586; ERRC v. France, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970, para. 67.
Evictions must be justifed and carried out in conditions that respect the
dignity of the persons concerned. Alternative accommodation must be
made available. The law must establish procedures and timing of the
eviction, provide legal remedies and offer legal aid to those who need it
to seek redress to courts. Finally, the system must provide for compen-
sation. Legal protection for persons threatened by eviction must include,
in particular, an obligation to consult the affected parties in order to fnd
alternative solutions to eviction and the obligation to fx a reasonable
notice period before eviction.
982

It should also be noted that forced evictions, either by the State or by
private parties, may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
for example when this involves destruction of the home, or is based on
discriminatory grounds.
983
ii) Discrimination in housing and equal application to migrants
The enjoyment of the right to housing, including the prohibition of arbi-
trary forced evictions, must not be subject to any form of discrimination,
whether caused by actions of the State or of third parties.
984
This prin-
ciple applies to non-citizens, regardless of their status.
985
Furthermore,
the ILO Convention No. 97 and the European Social Charter (revised)
both provide for the obligation of host countries to apply a treatment no
less favourable than that which it applied to its own nationals, without
discrimination in respect of nationality, race, religion or sex, in respect
of accommodation.
986

982
See, ERRC v. Italy, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970, para. 41; ERRC v. Bulgaria, ECSR, op. cit.,
fn. 970, para. 52; ATD v. France, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 981, paras. 7778; FEANTSA v. France,
ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970, paras. 8586; ERRC v. France, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 970, para. 68.

983
Yyler v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 7476; Seluk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 7780; Bilgin v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 100104;
Moldovan and Others (2) v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 111, 113114. See,
Sudan Human Rights Organisations and Others v. Sudan, ACommHPR, Communications Nos.
279/03 and 296/05, 45
th
Ordinary Session, May 2009, para. 159.

984
CESCR, General Comment No. 4, op. cit., fn. 970, para. 6; CESCR, General Comment No. 7,
op. cit., fn. 973, para. 10. See also, Concluding Observations on Belgium, CESCR, Report of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Economic and Social Council,
UN Doc. E/1995/22 (1995), p. 34, para. 157; Concluding Observations on Denmark, CESCR,
op. cit., fn. 188, paras. 21 and 34; Concluding Observations on Cyprus, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 784,
para. 21; Concluding Observations on Luxembourg, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/LUX/CO/13,
18 April 2005, para. 17; Concluding Observations on France, CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/FRA/CO/16,
18 April 2005, para. 12.

985
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 32. See, Article 5(e)(iii) ICERD.
See also, Concluding Observations on Luxembourg, CERD, op. cit., fn. 984, para. 17; Con-
cluding Observations on France, CERD, op. cit., fn. 984, para. 12. The principle has also been
upheld by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers in Recommendation R(88)14 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on migrants housing, adopted by the Committee
of Ministers on 22 September 1988 at the 419
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies.

986
Article 6.1, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO, adopted on 1 July
1949; and Article 19.4.3 ESC(r). Article 19 ESC(r), contrary to almost all provisions of that trea-
ty, is applicable to all migrant workers and foreigners, regardless of their status or provenience.
As for the regime applicable under international law for refugees and
asylum-seekers, the Geneva Refugee Convention provides that States,
in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject
to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully
staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the
same circumstances.
987
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
has recommended with regard to women migrant workers that States
should, under Articles 2(c), (f), and 3 of the CEDAW, provide tem-
porary shelter for women migrant workers who wish to leave abusive
employers, husbands or other relatives and provide facilities for safe
accommodation during trial.
988
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that, when a State
decides to provide housing benefts, it must do so in a way that is
compliant with Article 14 ECHR
989
which prohibits unjustifed discrimi-
nation in the enjoyment of other ECHR rights on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status. However, the Court has also ruled that, while immigration
status constitutes one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under
Article 14 ECHR (see, Section I, 4), it is justifable to discriminate in
the prioritization for the assignment of housing benefts by disfavouring
migrants who are undocumented or that are present in the national
territory on the condition that they had no recourse to public funds, as
this specifc discriminationpursued a legitimate aim, namely allocating
a scarce resource fairly between different categories of claimants.
990
The European Committee on Social Rights has ruled that the right to shelter
(Article 31.2 ESC(r)) is to be granted to all migrants, regardless of their sta-
tus.
991
It requires the State to provide shelter as long as the undocumented
migrants are under its jurisdiction and unable to provide housing for them-
selves. The living conditions of the shelter should be such as to enable
living in keeping with human dignity.
992
The Committee found that, since

987
Article 21, Geneva Refugee Convention.

988
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(c)(iv).

989
Bah v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., fn. 899, para. 40.

990
Ibid., para. 50.

991
See, DCI v. the Netherlands, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 906, paras. 4648. The Committee reads
the obligation to provide shelter for undocumented unaccompanied children also under Ar-
ticle 17.1(c) ESC(r): the obligation to provide protection and special aid from the State for
children and young persons temporarily or defnitively deprived of their familys support.
On the same line, CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(i).

992
DCI v. the Netherlands, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 906, para. 62. For full reasoning on content of
right to shelter see paras. 6165.
in the case of unlawfully present persons no alternative to accommodation
may be required by States, eviction from shelter should be banned as it
would place the persons concerned, particularly children, in a situation of
extreme helplessness which is contrary to the respect of their human dig-
nity.
993
The Committee has also further determined that failure to accom-
modate [undocumented] minors shows, in particular, that the Government
has not taken the necessary and appropriate measures to guarantee the
minors in question the care and assistance they need and to protect them
from negligence, violence or exploitation, thereby posing a serious threat
to the enjoyment of their most basic rights, such as the rights to life, to
psychological and physical integrity and to respect for human dignity,
994
in
breach of their right to to appropriate social, legal and economic protection
under Article 17.1 ESC(r). Furthermore, failure to appropriately accommo-
date undocumented children or young persons, whether accompanied or
not by their family, breaches the States obligation to take the necessary
measures to guarantee these minors the special protection against physical
and moral hazards required by Article 7, 10, thereby causing a serious
threat to their enjoyment of the most basic rights, such as the right to life,
to psychological and physical integrity and to respect for human dignity.
995
The European Committee of Social Rights also affrmed that lack of ac-
commodation for children and young persons leads to violations of their
right to access health services and of the obligation of States to prevent
epidemic and endemic diseases under Article 11 ESC(r). The Committee
has specifcally ruled that the lasting incapacity of the reception facili-
ties and the fact that, consequently, a number of the minors in question
(particularly those accompanied by their families) have been consistently
forced into life on the streets exposes these minors to increased threats to
their health and their physical integrity, which are the result in particular
of a lack of housing or foster homes. In this connection, the Committee
considers that providing foreign minors with housing and foster homes is
a minimum prerequisite for attempting to remove the causes of ill health
among these minors (including epidemic, endemic or other diseases) and
that the State therefore has felt to meet its obligations as far as the
adoption of this minimum prerequisite is concerned.
996
iii) Protection of the right to housing through civil and political rights
The ECHR affords protection from destruction of homes
997
and forced
evictions
998
under the right to respect for the home and family and

993
Ibid., para. 62.

994

995
Ibid., para. 97.

996
Ibid., para. 117.

997
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937.

998
Mentes v. Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 23186/94, Judgment of 28 November 1997.
private life (Article 8 ECHR). Article 8 requires that State action which
interferes with a persons home or displaces them from it must be ad-
equately prescribed by law, serve a legitimate aim, be necessary in a
democratic society and be proportionate to the aim pursued. However,
the Court has emphasised that Article 8 does not recognise a right to
be provided with a home.
999
The Court also held that, in applying the
proportionality test, it is highly relevant whether or not the home was
established unlawfully.
1000
Moreover, if no alternative accommodation
is available the interference is more serious than where such accommo-
dation is available.
1001
Article 8 also requires procedural safeguards to
be available to ensure a fair decision process in cases where the right to
respect for the home is at issue.
1002
The European Convention also affords protection for housing rights
through the right to property (Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR). However, in
order to fall within the application of this provision, there must be a
property right in the home itself.
1003
Article 1 of Protocol 1 prohibits
arbitrary deprivation of possessions. It recognises that States are enti-
tled to control the use of property in accordance with the public inter-
est.
1004
Any such interference with property rights must be adequately
prescribed by law and be proportionate to the public interest served.
1005
The African Commission has found that arbitrary eviction and expropria-
tion of houses constitutes a violation of the right to property (Article 14
ACHPR).
1006
Although the Charter does not contain an express right

999
Chapman v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 27238/95, Judgment of 18 January
2001, para. 99. See also, Beard v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 24882/94,
Judgment of 18 January 2001, para. 110; Coster v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application
No. 24876/94, Judgment of 18 January 2001, para. 113; Lee v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, GC,
Application No. 25289/94, Judgment of 18 January 2001, para. 101; Smith v. United King-
dom, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 25154/94, Judgment of 18 January 2001, para. 106.

1000
Chapman v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 102. See also, Beard v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 113; Coster v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 999, para. 116; Lee v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 104; Smith v.
United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 109.

1001
Chapman v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 103. See also, Beard v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 114; Coster v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 999, para. 117; Lee v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 999, para. 105; Smith v.

1002
See, Connors v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 936, para. 83.

1003
The situation of possession will not have to be established de jure by showing property titles,
but, in absence of adverse claims, can be established also by situations de facto, such as the
fact that the occupants built the house or lived there for generations (the last being rarely appli-
cable to migrants). See, Dogan and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 88038811/02,
8813/02 and 88158819/02, Judgment of 29 June 2004, paras. 138139.

1004
See, Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR.

1005
Chassagnou and Others v. France, ECtHR, GC, Applications Nos. 25088/9428331/95
28443/95, Judgment of 29 April 1999.

1006
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, ACommHPR, Communications Nos.
54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97196/97, 27
th
Ordinary Session, 11 May 2000, paras. 127128.
to housing, the African Commission has stated that the corollary of
the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
mental and physical health [. . .], the right to property, and the protec-
tion accorded to the family mean that the right to shelter or housing,
including protection from forced evictions are effectively engaged under
the Charter.
1007

2. Health
The right to health, or, more precisely, the right to the highest attain-
able standard of health, is recognised in numerous international instru-
ments.
1008
It encompasses both the liberty to control ones own health
and body, and the entitlement to a system of health protection that pro-
vides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable
level of health.
1009
As the CESCR has noted, the right to health embrac-
es a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in
which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying de-
terminants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe
and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working
conditions, and a healthy environment.
1010
The right to health requires
that healthcare be available and accessible to all without discrimination.
It must be affordable, including to socially disadvantaged groups, and
culturally accessible to minorities.
1011
The CESCR has clarifed that States have a core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of minimum essential levels of healthcare rights.
1012
These
core obligations are:
To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and ser-
vices on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or
marginalised groups;
To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutri-
tionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger;

1007
SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, paras. 6063.

1008
Article 12 ICESCR; Article 25.1 UDHR; Article 5(e)(iv) ICERD; Articles 11.1(f) and 12
CEDAW; Article 24 CRC; Article 25 CRPD; Article 11 ESC(r); Article 16 ACHPR; Article 10,
Protocol of San Salvador; Article XI ADRDM; Article 14, Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights
of Women in Africa; Article 14 ACRWC; Constitution of the World Health Organisation, adopt-
ed 19 June to 22 July 1946. The right to health has been proclaimed by the Commission on
Human Rights, as well as in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 and
other international instruments.

1009

1010
Ibid., para. 4.

1011
Ibid., para. 12

1012
Ibid., para. 43. Defnition of primary health care is also enshrined in the Declaration of
Alma-Ata, adopted 612 September 1978 at the International Conference on Primary Health
Care.
To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an
adequate supply of safe and potable water;
To provide essential drugs;
To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and
services;
To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan
of action; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are
devised, as well as their content, should give particular attention
to all vulnerable or marginalised groups;
To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal)
and child health care;
To provide immunisation against major infectious diseases;
To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and en-
demic diseases;
To provide education and access to information on significant
health problems.
1013
a) Non-discrimination in healthcare and equal application to
migrants
As with all ESC rights, States must respect the principle of non-discrim-
ination and the prohibition of retrogressive measures that affect the
right to health.
1014
The duty of non-discrimination in regard to the right
to health includes discrimination towards migrants and asylum-seekers,
regardless of their status.
1015
This is confrmed by the CERD and CESCR:

1013
Taken verbatim from ibid., paras. 4344.

1014
Ibid., para. 30.

1015
See, ibid., para. 34. See also, Concluding Observations on Serbia and Montenegro, CESCR,
UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.108, 13 May 2005, para. 60; Concluding Observations on Italy, CESCR,
Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Economic and
Social Council, UN Doc. E/2001/22 (2001), p. 34, paras. 123 and 138; Concluding Obser-
vations on Belgium, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 3 December 2007, paras. 21 and
35; Concluding Observations on France, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/FRA/CO/3, 16 May 2008,
paras. 26 and 46. See also, Concluding Observations on Kyrgyzstan, CRC, Report of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child on its 24
th
Session, UN Doc. CRC/C/97 (2000), p. 51,
para. 311; Concluding Observations on Slovenia, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.230, 26 Febru-
ary 2004, paras. 5455; Concluding Observations on Oman, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/OMN/CO/2,
29 September 2006, para. 46; Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, CRC, UN Doc.
CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, 30 January 2009, paras. 5152; Concluding Observations on Sweden, CRC,
2009, op. cit., fn. 209, paras. 6061. See also, Concluding Observations on Bhutan, CEDAW,
op. cit., fn. 489, paras. 2930; Concluding Observations on Ecuador, CMW, op. cit., fn. 502,
paras. 3940; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(i) and (l);
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, op. cit., fn. 29. Indeed, CEDAW also recommended
that special attention should be given to the health needs and rights of women belonging
to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as migrant women, refugee and internally dis-
placed women [. . .], CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, op. cit., fn. 29, para. 6.
CERD has affrmed that States have the obligation to [e]nsure [. . .] the
right of non-citizens to an adequate standard of physical and mental
health by, inter alia, refraining from denying or limiting their access to
preventive, curative and palliative health services.
1016
The CESCR has
determined that [a]ll persons, irrespective of their nationality, residen-
cy or immigration status, are entitled to primary and emergency medical
care.
1017
Nevertheless, this is a minimum requirement. When a health-
care system normally provides treatment beyond primary and emer-
gency medical care, the exclusion of asylum-seekers, or documented
or undocumented migrant workers and members of their families from
the system would violate Article 12 ICESCR read together with Article 2,
Article 5 ICERD, or (in cases involving children) Article 24 CRC.
1018
The CRC has stressed that, [w]hen implementing the right to enjoy the
highest attainable standard of health and facilities for the treatment of
illness and rehabilitation of health under article 24 of the Convention,
States are obligated to ensure that unaccompanied and separated chil-
dren have the same access to health care as children who are [. . .]
nationals.
1019
It also pointed out that, under Article 39 CRC, States
have the obligation to provide rehabilitation services to children who
have been victims of any form of abuse, neglect, exploitation, torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or armed conficts. In order
to facilitate such recovery and reintegration, culturally appropriate and
gender-sensitive mental health care should be developed and quali-
fed psychosocial counselling provided.
1020
The Executive Committee of
UNHCR has stressed that the minimum core of protection for refugee
or asylum-seeker children is higher than for adults. On the right to
health, they have an immediate right to the highest attainable standard
of health,
1021
and States are under the obligation to provide medical or
other special care, including rehabilitation assistance, to assist the social
reintegration of refugee children and adolescents, especially those that
are unaccompanied or orphaned.
1022
The Human Rights Committee

1016
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 36 (based on Article 5(e)(iv)
ICERD), and CESCR, General Comment No. 14, op. cit., fn. 37, para. 34, which specifcally
includes asylum-seekers and illegal migrants.

1017
CESCR, General comment No. 19, op. cit., fn. 950, para. 37.

1018
See, Concluding Observations on Italy, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1015, paras. 123 and 138; Con-
cluding Observations on Belgium, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1015, paras. 21 and 35; Concluding
Observations on France, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1015, paras. 26 and 46. See also, Concluding
Observations on Slovenia, CRC, op. cit., fn. 1015, paras. 5455; Concluding Observations
on the Netherlands, CRC, op. cit., fn. 1015, paras. 5152; Concluding Observations on Swe-
den, CRC, 2009, op. cit., fn. 209, paras. 6061; Concluding Observations on Norway, CERD,
UN Doc. CERD/C/NOR/CO/18, 19 October 2006, para. 21.

1019

1020
Ibid., para. 48.

1021
Conclusion No. 84, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 214, para. (a)(iii).

1022
Ibid. para. (b)(vi).
has suggested that certain grave practices against the health of people,
particularly women, may amount to a violation of the right to life.
1023
The ILO Convention No. 97 provides for duties for State Parties related
to the right to health of migrants. They pertain to medical examinations,
care and hygiene before the migration journey, during the journey and
on arrival.
1024
As highlighted in the previous section on the right to housing, the
European Committee of Social Rights stressed particularly the connec-
tion of the right to housing with the right to health, fnding that lack of
adequate accommodation for children and young persons may lead to
violations of their right to access health services and may breach the
obligation of States to prevent epidemic and endemic diseases under
Article 11 ESC(r). Indeed, the Committee considered that providing
foreign minors with housing and foster homes is a minimum prereq-
uisite for attempting to remove the causes of ill health among these
minors (including epidemic, endemic or other diseases) and that the
State therefore has felt to meet its obligations as far as the adoption of
this minimum prerequisite is concerned.
1025
b) Protection of the right to health through civil and political rights
The European Court of Human Rights, although it has not expressly rec-
ognised a right to health, has found that the right to respect for private
and family life is relevant to complaints about public funding to facil-
itate the mobility and quality of life of disabled applicants [and might
be] applicable to [. . .] complaints about insuffcient funding of [health]
treatment.
1026
According to the Court, the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) might also enter
into play as [i]t cannot be excluded that the acts and omissions of the
authorities in the feld of health care policy may in certain circumstanc-
es engage their responsibility under Article 2 [and] an issue may arise
under Article 2 where it is shown that the authorities of a Contracting
State put an individuals life at risk through the denial of health care
which they have undertaken to make available to the population gen-
erally.
1027
The Court also found that the right to life (Article 2 ECHR)

1023
See, CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 10.

1024
Article 5, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO.

1025

1026
Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, ECtHR, Application No. 14462/03, Admissibility Decision,
4 January 2005; Sentges v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 27677/02, Admissibility
Decision, 8 July 2003; Powell v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 45305/99, Admis-
sibility Decision, 4 May 2000.

1027
Ibid. See also, Powell v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1026; Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 410, para. 219; Nitecki v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 65653/01, Admissibility
Decision, 21 March 2002.
require[s] States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether
public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of
their patients lives.
1028
The Court has, however, stressed that where a
[. . .] State has made adequate provision for securing high professional
standards among health professionals and the protection of the lives of
patients then errors of judgment on the part of health professionals or
negligent co-ordination among health professionals in the treatment of
a particular patient will not violate the States positive obligations un-
der Article 2 ECHR.
1029
In practice, when the authorities were or ought
to have been aware of the need for appropriate treatment in order to
avert a real and immediate risk to life, and failed to take timely mea-
sures to provide such treatment, then Article 2 ECHR may be violat-
ed.
1030
The Court has also ruled that, just as it is not open to a State
authority to cite lack of funds or resources as an excuse for not hon-
ouring a judgment debt [. . .], the same principle applies a fortiori when
there is a need to secure the practical and effective protection of the
right protected by Article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the
Convention.
1031
The European Court of Human Rights has also recognised that States
have a positive duty under the right to a family life (Article 8 ECHR)
and the right to life (Article 2) to ensure that the right to a healthy en-
vironment is respected and guaranteed both by public authorities and
private entities and individuals.
1032
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that States are
responsible for regulating and supervising the rendering of health ser-
vices, so that the rights to life and humane treatment may be effectively
protected. All of this requires setting up a legal system which effectively
respects and guarantees the exercise of such rights, and supervising
permanently and effectively the rendering of services on which life and
humane treatment depend.
1033
The Court therefore affrmed an obliga-
tion of States to grant a minimum standard of the right to health and to
supervise its implementation both by public and private entities in light
of the right to life and humane treatment (Articles 4 and 5 ACHR).
1034

1028
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 32967/96, Judgment of 17 January
2002, para. 49. See also, Erikson v. Italy, ECtHR, Application No. 37900/97, Admissibility
Decision, 26 October 1999; Nitecki v. Poland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1027.

1029
Panaitescu v. Romania, ECtHR, Application No. 30909/06, Judgment of 10 April 2012, para. 28.

1030
Ibid., para. 36.

1031
Ibid., para. 35.

1032
See, Lpez Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 938, paras. 5158 (Article 8 ECHR); Oneryildiz
v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 939, paras. 71, 90, 9496 (Article 2 ECHR); Guerra and Others
v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 938, paras. 5660.

1033
Albn-Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, IACtHR, Series C No. 171, Judgment of 22 November 2007,
para. 121.

1034
The African Commission has held that [d]enying people food and medi-
cal attention [. . .] constitutes a violation of Article 4 [right to life]
1035
as
well as of the right to health (Article 16 ACHPR). The African Commission
has determined that the right to health includes a duty to protect citi-
zens from adverse consequence of pollution, whether caused by State
or private action, in addition to the duties of States under the right to
a healthy environment (Article 24 ACHPR).
1036
The African Commission
has also found that the failure of the Government to provide basic
services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage
of medicine
1037
constitutes a violation of the right to enjoy the best
attainable state of physical and mental health.
3. Social Security
The right to social security is recognised by several international human
rights treaties and instruments.
1038
Under the CESCR, it includes the
right to access and maintain benefts, whether in cash or in kind, with-
out discrimination in order to secure protection, inter alia, from (a) lack
of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, em-
ployment injury, unemployment, old age, or death of a family member;
(b) unaffordable access to health care; (c) insuffcient family support,
particularly for children and adult dependents.
1039

The CESCR has also defned the minimum core content of the right to
social security. This includes:
a) To ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a mini-
mum essential level of benefts that will enable them to acquire at
least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water and
sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education;
b) To ensure the right to access to social security systems or schemes
on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged and
marginalised individuals and groups;
c) To respect existing social security schemes and protect them from
unreasonable interference.
1040

1035
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 1006, paras.
120 and 122.

1036
SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 29, paras. 5253.

1037
Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 892, para. 47.

1038
Article 9 ICESCR; Article 5(e)(iv) ICERD; section III(f), Declaration concerning the aims and
purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Declaration of Philadephia), adopted on
10 May 1944; Articles 22 and 25.1 UDHR; Articles 11.1(e) and 14.2(c) CEDAW; Article 26
CRC; Article XVI ADRDM; Article 9, Protocol of San Salvador; Articles 12, 13 and 14 ESC(r).

1039

1040
Ibid., para. 59.
a) Discrimination in social security and equal application to
migrants
The duty to give immediate effect to obligations of non-discrimination
also applies in relation to social security.
1041
The CESCR has recom-
mended that States should give special attention to the social security
needs of refugees, asylum-seekers, and non-nationals
1042
and has un-
equivocally stated that Article 2, paragraph 2, prohibits discrimination
on grounds of nationality.
1043
More precisely,
[w]here non-nationals, including migrant workers, have contrib-
uted to a social security scheme, they should be able to bene-
ft from that contribution or retrieve their contributions if they
leave the country. A migrant workers entitlement should also
not be affected by a change in workplace. Non-nationals should
be able to access non-contributory schemes for income support,
affordable access to health care and family support. Any restric-
tions, including a qualifcation period, must be proportionate and
reasonable. [. . .] Refugees, stateless persons and asylum-seek-
ers, and other disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and
groups, should enjoy equal treatment in access to non-contrib-
utory social security schemes, including reasonable access to
health care and family support, consistent with international
standards.
1044

The CERD has determined that making distinctions between the treat-
ment of nationals and non-nationals does not necessarily amount to
impermissible discrimination under CERD. The CERD found it suffcient
that access to social benefts did not discriminate among foreigners of
different nationalities and treated all non-nationals on an equal footing,

1041
Ibid., paras. 2930, 40. See also, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.104, 14 December 2004, para. 48; Concluding Observations on China, CESCR,
UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107, 13 May 2005, paras. 96, 114 and 124; Concluding Observa-
tions on Austria, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/AUT/CO/3, 25 January 2006, paras. 15 and 29
(on equal amount of social benefts); Concluding Observations on Costa Rica, CESCR,
UN Doc. E/C.12/CRI/CO/4, 4 December 2007, para. 21; Concluding Observations on Cyprus,
CESCR, op. cit., fn. 784, para. 18; Concluding Observations on Australia, CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/AUS/CO/4, 12 June 2009, para. 20. See also, Concluding Observations on Canada,
CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, 25 May 2007, para. 23 (including undocumented mi-
grants and non-removable failed asylum-seekers); Concluding Observations on Switzerland,
CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/CHE/CO/6, 23 September 2008, para. 17. See, Concluding Obser-
vations on Costa Rica, CEDAW, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women to the General Assembly, 58
th
Session, UN Doc. A/58/38 (2003), p. 86,
para. 63 (for women migrant workers and migrant domestic workers in formal and informal
sector); Concluding Observations on Lithuania, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/LTU/CO/2, 17 March 2006,
paras. 6263 (access to social welfare for children regardless of their migration status).

1042

1043
Ibid., para. 36.

1044
Ibid., paras. 3638. See also, Article 9, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Con-
vention (C143), ILO.
allowing them the same possibility to apply for permanent residence,
which would entitle them to the same benefts.
1045
The ILO Convention No. 97 and the Geneva Refugee Convention both af-
frm the obligation of a host country to apply to refugees, asylum seek-
ers, and migrant workers, treatment no less favourable than that ap-
plied to its own nationals, without discrimination in respect of nationality,
race, religion or sex, in respect of social security (that is to say, legal
provision in respect of employment injury, maternity, sickness, invalidity,
old age, death, unemployment and family responsibilities, and any other
contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is cov-
ered by a social security scheme).
1046
The ILO Convention on Equality
of Treatment (Social Security) (No. 118) also affrms this principle.
1047
Concerning refugees and asylum-seekers, the Geneva Refugee Convention
mandates States to accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territo-
ry the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is
accorded to their nationals.
1048
On the enjoyment of social benefts, the
Convention provides that States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying
in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect
of [. . .] [s]ocial security (legal provisions in respect of employment inju-
ry, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death,
unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which,
according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social secu-
rity scheme).
1049
The Convention nevertheless provides for restrictions
to this right. The Convention accepts that [t]here may be appropriate
arrangements for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in course

1045
D.R. v. Australia, CERD, Communication No. 42/2008, Views of 15 September 2009,
para. 7.1 (equally on the right to education, para. 7.2.); and D.F. v. Australia, CERD, Com-
munication No. 39/2006, Views of 3 March 2008, paras. 7.17.2.

1046
Article 6.1, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO; and Article 24, Gene-
va Refugee Convention. These Articles also provides for specifc limitations to this right. The
Committee of Experts has found that such limitations might not imply or lead to an automatic
exclusion of any given category of migrant workers from the benefts. See, Representation
(article 24)2003China, Hong Kong SARC097Report of the Committee set up to ex-
amine the representation alleging non-observance by ChinaHong Kong SAR of the Migra-
tion for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) made under article 24 of the ILO
Constitution by the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), Document No. (ilolex):
162003CHN097 (TUCP v. China, ILO), para. 41.

1047
See, Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention (C118), ILO, adopted on 28 June
1962. It is not a highly ratifed Convention, but some most developed countries are part of
it. See for interpretation of the Committee of Experts, Representation (article 24)2003
NetherlandsC118Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation made
by the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TURK-IS) under article 24 of the Constitution
of the ILO, alleging non-observance by the Netherlands of the Equality of Treatment (So-
cial Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), Document No. (ilolex): 162003NLD118, Geneva,
9 November 2006 (TURK-IS v. Netherlands, ILO).

1048

1049
Article 24(1), ibid.
of acquisition,
1050
and that [n]ational laws or regulations of the country
of residence may prescribe special arrangements concerning benefts or
portions of benefts which are payable wholly out of public funds, and
concerning allowances paid to persons who do not fulfl the contribution
conditions prescribed for the award of a normal pension.
1051
Otherwise, the regime granted by the Convention is quite favourable to
the refugee or asylum-seeker, provided that he or she is legally present
on the territory. The Convention recognises that [t]he right to com-
pensation for the death of a refugee resulting from employment injury
or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the
residence of the benefciary is outside the territory of the Contracting
State.
1052
In addition, it mandates States to extend to refugees the
benefts of agreements concluded between them, or which may be con-
cluded between them in the future, concerning the maintenance of ac-
quired rights and rights in the process of acquisition in regard to social
security, subject only to the conditions which apply to nationals of the
States signatory to the agreements in question.
1053
b) Protection of rights to social security through civil and
political rights
The right to social security is not only an ESC right but has also been
applied under the umbrella of certain civil and political rights, and prin-
cipally under the right to property.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to bene-
fts, such as emergency assistance, is a pecuniary right protected by
the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR), without it being
necessary to rely solely on the link between entitlement to emergency
assistance and the obligation to pay 'taxes or other contributions'.
1054

In the case of Gaygusuz v. Austria, the Court found that the non-rec-
ognition by the Austrian authorities of the applicants right to emer-
gency assistance based on the sole fact of his foreign nationality was
unreasonable and in violation of the prohibition of non-discrimination
(Article 14 ECHR).
1055
In Koua Poirrez v. France, the Court established
that the same prohibition of discrimination on the sole basis of national-
ity applied to non-contributory social schemes.
1056
It must, however, be

1050
Article 24(1)(b)(i), ibid.

1051
Article 24(1)(b)(ii), ibid.

1052

1053

1054
Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR, Application No. 17371/90, Judgment of 16 September 1996,
para. 41.

1055
See, ibid., paras. 41, 4652

1056
See, Poirrez v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 40892/98, Judgment of 30 September 2003,
paras. 3750.
stressed that in both cases the migrant workers concerned were legally
resident. It is not clear if the European Court would apply the same
regime to undocumented migrants.
The European Court has found that the right to respect for family life
(Article 8 ECHR) covers maternity benefts
1057
and child benefts.
1058

In the case Okpisz v. Germany, the Court held that granting child ben-
efts to non-nationals who were in possession of a stable permit and
not to others constituted arbitrary discrimination under Article 14 ECHR
read together with Article 8.
1059
The Court also recognised as protected by the right to property the right
to be a benefciary of an old age insurance system, which cannot, how-
ever, be interpreted as entitling the person to a pension of a particular
amount.
1060
The protection of the right to property is triggered once an
individual has paid contributions to the pension scheme, and does not
envisage an abstract right to have a pension.
1061
However, the Court
has recognised that the suspension of payment of a pension where
[. . .] the [benefciary] is neither a [national] citizen nor living within
the [State]
1062
does not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property as
it is considered to fall within the legitimate restrictions of Article 1.2 of
Protocol 1.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that it has compe-
tence to adjudicate the progressive realisation by a State Party of the
right of social security, under Article 29 of the ACHR.
1063
It has further-
more recognised that a State will violate the human rights of a migrant
worker, whether documented or not, when it denies the right to a
pension to a migrant worker who has made the necessary contributions
and fulflled all the conditions that were legally required of workers, or
when a worker resorts to the corresponding judicial body to claim his
rights and this body does not provide him with due judicial protection
or guarantees.
1064
Both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and

1057
Weller v. Hungary, ECtHR, Application No. 44399/05, Judgment of 31 March 2009.

1058
Okpisz v. Germany, ECtHR, Application No. 59140/00, Judgment of 25 October 2005.

1059
Ibid., para. 34.

1060
Mller v. Austria, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 5849/72, Admissibility Decision, 16 De-
cember 1974; X v. the Netherlands, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 4130/69, Admissibility
Decision, 20 July 1971; National Federation of Self-Employed v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Ple-
nary, Application No. 7995/77, Admissibility Decision, 11 July 1978, para. 2; T. v. Sweden, ECom-
mHR, Plenary, Application No. 10671/83, Admissibility Decision, 4 March 1985; Stigson v. Sweden,
ECommHR, Application No. 12264/86, Admissibility Decision, 13 July 1988; Szrabjet and Clark v.
United Kingdom, ECommHR, Applications Nos. 27004/95 and 27011/95, 23 October 1997.

1061
See, fn. 1060.

1062
X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 6572/74, 4 March
1976.

1063
Five Pensioners v. Peru, IACtHR, Series C No. 98, Judgment of 28 February 2003, para. 147.

1064
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have found that the
proprietary effect of a pension regime to which persons have made
contributions or met the respective legal requirements should be un-
derstood as falling within the scope of the right to property enshrined
in Article 21 of the American Convention.
1065
Similar to the approach of
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission
allows for restrictions on such rights when they are provided for by law,
respond to a legitimate aim to raise a social interest or to preserve
the general well-being in a democratic society, and are proportional.
1066
4. Education
The right to education
1067
is widely protected as an economic, social
and cultural right, as well as by civil and political rights instruments.
1068

It is well established that States have an obligation to provide free and
compulsory primary education.
1069
This is an obligation of immediate
effect, as are the obligations to have respect for the liberty of par-
ents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children
schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which
conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down
or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral educa-
tion of their children in conformity with their own convictions,
1070
and
the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational
institutions.
1071
While free secondary education and access to higher education are pro-
gressive obligations, States must respect the principle of non-discrim-
ination and the prohibition of retrogressive measures.
1072
Indeed, as
the Committee on the Rights of the Child pointed out [d]iscrimination
on the basis of any of the grounds listed in article 2 of the Convention,
whether it is overt or hidden, offends the human dignity of the child and

1065
National Association of Ex-Employees v. Peru, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 892, para. 103; Five
Pensioners v. Peru, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 1063, paras. 102104.

1066

1067
Article 13 ICESCR; Article 5(e)(v) ICERD; Article 10 ICEDAW; Articles 28 and 29 CRC; Articles
12.4, 30, 43.1(a), 45.1(a) and 45.4, ICRMW; Article 24 CRPD; Article XII ADRDM; Article 13,
Protocol of San Salvador; Article 17 ACHPR; Article 2 P1 ECHR; Article 17.2 ESC(r); Article 12,
Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa; Article 11 ACRWC.

1068
General Comment No. 11, Plans of action for primary education, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/4,
10 May 1999, para. 2

1069
Article 13.2(a) ICESCR. See, CESCR, General Comment No. 13, op. cit., fn. 785, para. 6(b).
See also, Article XII ADRDM; Article 13.3(a), Protocol of San Salvador; Article 11.3(a)
ACRWC; Article 17.2 ESC(r) (free primary and secondary education).

1070
Article 13.3 ICESCR; Article 13.4, Protocol of San Salvador; Article 2 P1 ECHR.

1071
Article 13.4 ICESCR; Article 13.5, Protocol of San Salvador.

1072
See, Article 13.2(b) and (c) ICESCR; CESCR, General Comment No. 13, op. cit., fn. 785,
para. 43. See also, Article 13.3(b) and (c), Protocol of San Salvador.
is capable of undermining or even destroying the capacity of the child
to beneft from educational opportunities.
1073
The CRC, the CESCR, the
CERD and the CMW have established that the non-discrimination re-
quirement also applies to refugees, asylum-seekers, and regular and
illegal migrants.
1074
Under the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
State Parties undertake to give foreign nationals resident within their
territory the same access to education as that given to their own na-
tionals.
1075
This obligation is contained in Article 3, which enshrines
obligations of immediate effect.
The CESCR has been clear that education must be accessible to all,
especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and fact, without discrim-
ination.
1076
In particular, the principle of non-discrimination extends
to all persons of school age residing in the territory of a State Party,
including non-nationals, and irrespective of their legal status.
1077
The

1073
General Comment No. 1, Aims of Education, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1, 17 April 2001,
para. 10.

1074
See, CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, paras. 12 and 18. See also, Concluding
Observations on Czech Republic, CRC, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on its
32
nd
Session, UN Doc. CRC/C/124, 23 June 2003, p. 178, para. 376(a); Concluding Observa-
tions on Kazakhstan, CRC, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on its 33
rd
Ses-
sion, UN Doc. CRC/C/132, 23 October 2003, p. 129, para. 643(a); Concluding Observations
on Luxembourg, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.250, 31 March 2005, paras. 5051; Concluding
Observations on Uzbekistan, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/UZB/CO/2, 2 June 2006, paras. 5758;
Concluding Observations on Jordan, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/JOR/CO/3, 29 September 2006,
paras. 8182; Concluding Observations on Qatar, CRC, UN Doc. CRC/C/QAT/CO/2, 14 October
2009, paras. 6061. Concluding Observations on United Kingdom, CESCR, Report of the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Economic and Social Council, UN Doc.
E/1995/22 (1995), p. 52, para. 291; Concluding Observations on Canada, CESCR, Report of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil, UN Doc. E/1999/22 (1999), p. 63, para. 414 (equality in education loan programmes);
Concluding Observations on China, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 10414, paras. 66, 89, 101, 116, 126;
Concluding Observations on Norway, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 980, paras. 22 and 43; Concluding
Observations on Macedonia, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/MKD/CO/1, 24 November 2006, para. 48
(no separate schools); Concluding Observations on Cyprus, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 784, para. 25
(obligation to report contact details of parents of foreign children enrolling in schools is direct
and indirect discrimination in right of education); Concluding Observations on Canada, CERD,
Report of the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly,
57
th
Session, UN Doc. A/57/18 (2002), p. 56, para. 337; Concluding Observations on Norway,
CERD, op. cit., fn. 1018, para. 22; Concluding Observations on New Zealand, CERD, UN Doc.
CERD/C/NZL/CO/17, 15 August 2007, para. 23; Concluding Observations on Germany, CERD,
UN Doc. CERD/C/DEU/CO/18, 21 August 2008, para. 22; Concluding Observations on Egypt,
CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/EGY/CO/1, 25 May 2007, paras. 3637; Concluding Observations on
Ecuador, CMW, op. cit., fn. 502, paras. 3536 (indirect discrimination due to obstacles in reg-
istration at birth).

1075
Article 3(e), UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, adopted on
14 December 1960. See also, World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for
Action To Meet Basic Learning Needs, UNESCO, adopted 59 March 1990, in particular
Articles I, II, and III.

1076
CESCR, General Comment No. 13, op. cit., fn. 785, para. 6(b).

1077
Ibid., para. 34.
Committee has expressly stated that the introduction or failure to re-
peal legislation which discriminates against individuals or groups, on
any of the prohibited grounds, in the feld of education [and] the failure
to take measures which address de facto educational discrimination
1078

constitute violations of Article 13 ICESCR.
Obligations of non-discrimination and to implement policies aimed at
avoiding discrimination also arise from Article 5(e)(v) ICERD. Although
Article 5 refers expressly to discrimination on grounds of national ori-
gin, but not of nationality, the CERD has clarifed that, under Article 5,
States must [e]nsure that public educational institutions are open to
non-citizens and children of undocumented immigrants residing in the
territory of a State Party; [and] [a]void segregated schooling and dif-
ferent standards of treatment being applied to non-citizens on grounds
of race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin in elementary and
secondary school and with respect to access to higher education.
1079
Regarding asylum-seekers and refugees, the Geneva Refugee
Convention stipulates that, Contracting States shall accord to refugees
the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elemen-
tary education.
1080
In addition, they shall accord to refugees treat-
ment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable
than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with
respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular,
as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certif-
cates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the
award of scholarships.
1081
In relation to unaccompanied and separated children, the Committee
on the Rights of the Child has made clear that States should ensure
that access to education is maintained during all phases of the displace-
ment cycle. Every unaccompanied and separated child, irrespective of
status, shall have full access to education in the country that they have
entered in line with articles 28, 29 (1) (c), 30 and 32 of the Convention
and the general principles developed by the Committee. Such access
should be granted without discrimination and in particular, separated
and unaccompanied girls shall have equal access to formal and informal

1078
Ibid., para. 59.

1079
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, paras. 3031.

1080
Article 22.1, Geneva Refugee Convention. The UNHCR ExCo affrmed the right to education
of refugee children is a fundamental right and called upon States, individually and collec-
tively, to intensify their efforts [. . .] to ensure that all refugee children beneft from primary
education of a satisfactory quality, that respects their cultural identity and is oriented to-
wards an understanding of the country of asylum, Conclusion No. 47 (XXXVIII) on Refugee
Children, ExCom, UNHCR, 38
th
session, 1987, para. (o). See also, Conclusion No. 84, UNHCR,
op. cit., fn. 214, para. (b)(v).

1081
Article 22.2, ibid.
education, including vocational training at all levels. Access to quality
education should also be ensured for children with special needs, in
particular children with disabilities.
1082
The Inter-American Court has specifed that, according to the childs
right to special protection embodied in Article 19 of the American
Convention, interpreted in light of the CRC and the Additional Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in relation to the obligation to ensure progres-
sive development contained in Article 26 of the American Convention,
the State must provide free primary education to all children in an ap-
propriate environment and in the conditions necessary to ensure their
full intellectual development.
1083
The European Court considers the right to education (Article 2 of
Protocol 1 ECHR) as one of the most fundamental values of the dem-
ocratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
1084
The right to ed-
ucation must not be denied to anyone and must not be restrictively
interpreted.
1085
The Court has found that excluding children from edu-
cation due to the lack of registration as regular migrants of the parents
constituted a violation of the right to education.
1086
This right of access
to education applies to primary and secondary education, in particular
as the Court affrmed that [t]here is no doubt that the right to educa-
tion guarantees access to elementary education which is of primordial
importance for a childs development.
1087
However, the Court left open
a certain margin to apply differential measures on access to tertiary
(college and university) education.
1088
In the case Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, the European Court stated that,
although Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing
a duty on the Contracting States to set up or subsidise particular ed-

1082
CRC, General Comment No. 6, op. cit., fn. 138, para. 41. See also, paras. 4243 for more
detail in measures to be taken.

1083
Yean and Bosico Case, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 281, para. 185.

1084
Timishev v. Russia, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, Judgment of

1085

1086
See, ibid., paras. 6567, presenting this case the applicants where Chechen citizens, there-
fore formally citizens of the Russian Federation, but they nevertheless required migration
registration in other parts of the country to access education.

1087
Ibid., para. 64. See, X. v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 5962/72,
Admissibility Decision, 13 march 1975; and, 15 Foreign Students v. United Kingdom,
ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 7671/76, Admissibility Decision, 19 May 1977.

1088
See, Karus v. Italy, ECommHR, Application No. 29043/95, Admissibility Decision, 20 May
1998, where the European Commission found that establishing higher fees for foreign stu-
dents to access Italian university did not violate the right to education, as the discrimination
was reasonably justifed by the aim of the Italian Government to have the positive effects of
tertiary education to stay within the Italian economy. See also, 15 Foreign Students v. UK,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1087.
ucational establishments, any State doing so will be under an obliga-
tion to afford effective access to them [. . .]. Put differently, access to
educational institutions existing at a given time is an inherent part of
the right set out in the frst sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
1089

The Court ruled that State authorities had breached the prohibition on
discrimination in relation to the right to education (in this case, second-
ary education) under Article 2, Protocol 1 read together with Article 14
ECHR, because the applicants had to pay school fees only because of
their nationality and immigration status. The Court found that, although
it could be legitimate for the State to curtail the use by short-term and
undocumented migrants of resource-hungry public services, by dif-
ferentiating between categories of migrants in allowing access to such
services,
1090
unlike some other public services [. . .], education is a
right that enjoys direct protection under the Convention. It is expressly
enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention [. . .]. It is also
a very particular type of public service, which not only directly benefts
those using it but also serves broader societal functions.
1091
Given the
importance of this right in the Convention system, the European Court
held that a stricter scrutiny applies in the assessment of the proportion-
ality of the discrimination based on nationality or immigration status
than when the enjoyment of other social benefts are at stake (see, for
a comparison with the rights to housing, section II.1.c.ii).

1089
Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 5335/05, Judgment of 21 June 2011, para. 49.

1090
Ibid., para. 54.

1091
Ibid., para. 55.
CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS
AND REFUGEES AT WORK
I. Introduction
Already in 1919, the ILO Constitution, which constitutes a chapter of
the Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, declared that uni-
versal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon so-
cial justice.
1092
These values were reaffrmed by the ILOs Philadelphia
Declaration of 1944.
1093
Given the prevalence of economic reasons for
migration, and the risks and discrimination which irregular migrants are
likely to face in their terms and conditions of work, labour rights, includ-
ing the right to work, and rights related to treatment in the workplace,
are particularly signifcant for migrants. As protected under the ICESCR,
ICEDAW, ICERD, the treaties of the ILO and regional human rights trea-
ties, labour rights broadly encompass:
the right to work, including the freedom from forced labour and
the free choice of employment;
workplace rights, including fair and equal remuneration, ade-
quate conditions of employment, protection from unfair dismissal
and reasonable working hours;
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to work and
work-place rights;
freedom of association and the right to form and join trade unions.
In 1998, the ILO Conference issued the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work which declared as binding under the ILO
Constitution the freedom to join and establish trade unions and free-
dom of assembly; the eradication of slavery, servitude and forced la-
bour; the prohibition of child labour; and the principle of equality of
treatment in labour.
1094
The Declaration extended the obligations under
these rights to all 183 Member States of the ILO, regardless of whether
they are parties to the relevant treaties, as the obligations are binding
under the ILO Constitution. However, it must also be noted that the ILO
Conventions do not approach the right to work as a human right or
within a human rights framework.
1095

1092
Constitution of the International Labour Organization, adopted in 1919, Preamble (ILO Con-
stitution).

1093
Declaration of Philadelphia, Article 2(a).

1094
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted on 18 June 1998
(ILO 1998 Declaration).

1095
See, Dr. Machteld Inge van Dooren, The right to work: background paper, submitted at
the Day of the General Discussion on article 6 ICESCR organised by the CESCR, UN Doc.
E/C.12/2003/12, 11 April 2003, para. 4.
II. The right to work
Article 6.1 ICESCR protects the right of everyone to the opportunity
to earn a living by work freely chosen or accepted. The right to work
as protected by Article 6 ICESCR is not an absolute right to obtain
employment. It consists of the right not to be unfairly deprived of
employment, and includes the prohibition of forced labour. The right
to work is also protected by Article 5(e)(i) ICERD, Article 11 CEDAW,
Article 23 UDHR, Article XIV ADRDM, Article 6 of the Protocol of San
Salvador to the ACHR, and Article 1 of the European Social Charter
(revised).
1096

States may legitimately regulate or restrict the right to work of non-citi-
zens or particular categories of non-citizensthose with particular types
of work or residence permits, or asylum seekers. The Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has acknowledged that State
Parties may refuse to offer jobs to non-citizens without a work per-
mit.
1097
However, different applications of the right to work of non-cit-
izens and citizens, as well as differences between different categories
of non-nationals, must be objectively justifable and non-discriminatory
on other grounds, such as race or ethnicity.
As to the treatment of refugees, the Geneva Refugee Convention
provides that Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully
staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards
the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
1098
However, any
restriction on the employment of non-nationals cannot be applied to
refugees who have either completed three years residence in the
country; or have a spouse who is a national of the country, unless he
or she abandoned them; or has one or more children possessing the
nationality of the country.
1099
The duty to provide treatment equal
to the most favourably treated non-nationals also applies when the
refugee wishes to engage in liberal professions, agriculture, indus-
try, handicrafts or commerce or to establish commercial or industrial
companies.
1100
A State Party to the ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised)
(No. 97) of 1949 has the obligation to maintain, or satisfy itself that

1096
See also, Article 15, EU Charter. In particular paragraph 3: Nationals of third countries who
are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working condi-
tions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.

1097
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 35.

1098

1099
Article 17.2, ibid.

1100
Articles 18 and 19, ibid.
there is maintained, an adequate and free service to assist migrants for
employment, and in particular to provide them with accurate informa-
tion.
1101
1. Slavery and Servitude
The prohibition of slavery and servitude was one of the frst human
rights standards to be universally accepted in international law. Today
slavery constitutes a crime under international law and its prohibition
has been recognised as a peremptory norm of international law (jus co-
gens).
1102
Slavery is prohibited under numerous treaties, most notably
the Slavery Convention 1926, which defnes it as the status or condi-
tion of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised.
1103
The Supplementary Convention on
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, of 1956, requires States Parties to prohibit slav-
ery-like practices including debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage
and the exploitation of child labour.
1104
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal on the for-
mer Yugoslavia has stressed the developing concept of slavery:
[t]he traditional concept of slavery, as defned in the 1926
Slavery Convention and often referred to as chattel slavery,
has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery
which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership. [. . .] The Appeals Chamber
considers that the question whether a particular phenomenon is
a form of enslavement will depend on [. . .] the control of some-
ones movement, control of physical environment, psychological
control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat
of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection

1101
Article 2, Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO. See also, Article 19.1
ESC(r). Article 19 is applicable to all foreigners, although paragraph 4 makes explicit refer-
ence to lawful migrants.

1102
Article 58, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieb-
er Code), 24 April 1863; Article 6(c), Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agree-
ment for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
(Nuremberg Tribunal), adopted on 8 August 1945; Article 22, Treaty of Versailles, 1919;
Slavery Convention, signed on 25 September 1926; Supplementary Convention on the Abo-
lition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted
on 7 September 1956; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Vukovic and Kovac, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, paras. 117119;
Article 7.1(c), Rome Statute; Article 4 UDHR; Article 6.1, ACHR; Article 8.12 ICCPR;
Article 10.1 ArCHR; Article 5 ACHPR; Aticle 4.1 ECHR, Article 11.1 ICRMW.

1103
Article 1.1, Slavery Convention.

1104
Article 1, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.
to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced
labour.
1105
Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, enslave-
ment, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, constitutes a crime against hu-
manity.
1106
The European Court of Human Rights has recently held that, for slavery
to exist, there must be the exercise of a genuine right to ownership and
a reduction of the status of the individual concerned to an object. It
considers that servitude entails a particularly serious form of denial of
freedom, and an obligation, under coercion, to provide ones services,
and it is linked with the concept of slavery.
1107
2. Forced labour
The prohibition of forced labour was also universally internationally
accepted at an early stage, and it has attained jus cogens status.
1108

Within the ILO system, forced labour is prohibited by the ILO Forced
Labour Convention (No. 29) of 1930, and the ILO Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention (No. 105) of 1957. In international human rights
law, its prohibition is enshrined in major international and regional hu-
man rights treaties as a right not subject to derogation.
1109

a) What is forced labour?
The defnition of forced and compulsory labour was established by the
ILO in 1930 as all work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has

1105
Kunarac et al., ICTY, op. cit., fn. 1102, paras. 117 and 119.

1106
Article 7.1(c), Rome Statute.

1107
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 276. See also, Van Droogenbro-
eck v. Belgium, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 7906/77, Judgment of 24 June 1982, para. 58.

1108
4
th
General Survey on Eradication of Forced Labour, ILO Committee of Experts on the Ap-
plication of Conventions and Recommendations, 2007, Document No. (ilolex): 252007G03,
para. 10. The European Court held that the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced
and compulsory labour enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies
making up the Council of Europe, Siliadin v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 73316/01,
Judgment of 26 July 2005, paras. 82 and 112; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 237, para. 283; Zarb Adami v. Malta, ECtHR, Application No. 17209/02, Judg-
ment of 20 June 2006, para. 43. The African Commission held that unremunerated work
is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the dignity inherent in the hu-
man being, Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, ACommHPR, op. cit.,
fn. 1006, 11 May 2000, para. 135.

1109
Article 6.2 ACHR; Article 8.3 ICCPR; Article 11.2, 3 and 4 ICRMW; Article 10.2 ArCHR; Article
4.2-3 ECHR; Article 1.2 ESC(r), according to the interpretation of the European Committee on
Social Rights in International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. Greece, ECSR,
Complaint No. 7/2000, Merits, 5 December 2000, paras. 17-18; Article 6 ICESCR (the CESCR
has found that forced labour is a direct violation of Article 6, see, General Comment No. 18,
The Right to Work, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, 24 November 2005, para. 32).
not offered himself voluntarily.
1110
The use of forced and compulso-
ry labour by private parties is absolutely prohibited
1111
and [n]o con-
cession granted to private individuals, companies or associations shall
involve any form of forced or compulsory labour for the production or
the collection of products which such private individuals, companies
or associations utilise or in which they trade.
1112
The Committee on
Migrant Workers held that forced and compulsory labour includes debt
bondage, passport retention, and illegal confnement.
1113
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted the ILO def-
nition, specifying that the menace of a penalty can consist in the
real and actual presence of a threat, which can assume different forms
and degrees, and the [u]nwillingness to perform the work or service
consists in the absence of consent or free choice when the situation of
forced labour begins or continues. This can occur for different reasons,
such as illegal deprivation of liberty, deception or psychological coer-
cion.
1114

The European Court has held that, for there to be forced or compulsory
labour, there must be some physical or mental constraint, as well as
some overriding of the persons will.
1115
Forced labour may also arise in some situations when a worker has
voluntarily agreed to perform work, but under economic constraint.
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations has found that labour exacted under economic con-

1110
Article 2, Forced Labour Convention (C29), ILO, adopted on 28 June 1930. See, 4
th
Gen-
eral Survey on Eradication of Forced Labour, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1108, para. 10; Representa-
tion (article 24)2007ChileC029 Report of the committee set up to examine the
representation alleging non-observance by Chile of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No. 29), submitted under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Colegio de Abogados de
Chile, AG, Document No. (ilolex): 162007CHL029, Geneva, 11 November 2008, para. 28
(Colegio de Abogados v. Chile, ILO). The defnition has been explicitly picked up in Van der
Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 8919/80, Judgment of 23 November
1983, para. 32; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, IACtHR, Series C No.148, Judg-
ment of 1 July 2006, paras. 157-160; CESCR, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., fn. 1109,
para. 9. The Human Rights Committee recognizes the ILO defnition but advances its own:
the term forced or compulsory labour covers a range of conduct extending from, on the
one hand, labour imposed on an individual by way of criminal sanction, notably in particu-
larly coercive, exploitative or otherwise egregious conditions, through, on the other hand,
to lesser forms of labour in circumstances where punishment as a comparable sanction is
threatened if the labour directed is not performed, Faure v. Australia, CCPR, Communica-
tion No. 1036/2001, Views of 23 November 2005, para. 7.5.

1111
See, Articles 4, Forced Labour Convention (C29), ILO. See also, for forced labour as conse-
quence of conviction, Article 6.3(a) ACHR.

1112
Articles 5.1, Forced Labour Convention (C29), ILO.

1113

1114
Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 1110, paras. 161 and 164.

1115
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 276. See also, Van Droogen-
broeck v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1107, para. 58.
straint will amount to forced labour when the economic constraint has
been created by the government; or when the government, although not
creating the situation itself, exploits the situation by offering excessively
low levels of remuneration. Even when it has not created the economic
constraint itself, the government might be held responsible for organiz-
ing or exacerbating economic constraints if the number of people hired
by the Government at excessively low rates of pay and the quantity of
work done by such employees had a knock-on effect on the situation of
other people, causing them to lose their normal jobs and face identical
economic constraints.
1116
Work experience in the context of education
or training is generally considered not to constitute forced labour.
1117

It must also be noted that the prohibition of forced labour is connect-
ed to the right to freely choose ones occupation. As the European
Committee on Social Rights remarked, the prohibition of forced labour
implies the freedom of workers to terminate employment.
1118
Certain specifc kinds of compulsory labour exacted by the State are
excluded from the defnition of forced and compulsory labour by in-
ternational human rights treaties as well as the ILO Forced Labour
Convention. These include:
any work or service required by compulsory military service laws
for work of a purely military character, and, in countries where
conscientious objection is recognised, any national service re-
quired by law of conscientious objectors;
any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obliga-
tions of members of the community as long as it is not applied
discriminatorily and it is proportionally imposed in regard to vol-
ume and frequency of work;
1119

any work or service that is a consequence of a criminal conviction,
or of detention or conditional release on the order of a court;

1116
Representation (article 24)1995SenegalC105Report of the Committee set up to
examine the representation made by the Senegal Teachers Single and Democratic Trade
Union (SUDES) under article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging non-observance by Sene-
gal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Document No. (ilolex):
161997SEN105 (SUDES v. Senegal, ILO), para. 30.

1117
Colegio de Abogados v. Chile, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1110, para. 28.

1118
FIDH v. Greece, ECSR, op. cit., fn. 1109, para. 17. It found in the impossibility to terminate
employment a violation of Article 1.2 ESC(r), i.e. freedom of choice of employment.

1119
Colegio de Abogados v. Chile, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1110, paras. 3338. The European Court
of Human Rights adopts the same criteria in Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 1110, paras. 3246; Zarb Adami v. Malta, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1108; Schmidt v. Germany,
ECtHR, Application No. 13580/88, Judgment of 18 July 1994. See also, Faure v. Australia,
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 1110, para. 7.5: to so qualify as a normal civil obligation, the labour in
question must, at a minimum, not be an exceptional measure; it must not possess a punitive
purpose or effect; and it must be provided for by law in order to serve a legitimate purpose
under the Covenant.
any work or service exacted in cases of public emergency or ca-
lamity threatening the life or well-being of the community.
1120
b) State obligations to prevent and investigate forced labour
The European Court of Human Rights, in particular, has emphasised that
States have obligations not only to refrain from, but also to criminal-
ise forced and compulsory labour practices and to effectively investi-
gate, prosecute and sanction those who carry out such practices.
1121
The
European Court has posited the principles of an effective investigation in
these cases:
The requirement to investigate does not depend on a complaint from
the victim or next-of-kin: once the matter has come to the attention
of the authorities they must act of their own motion. For an investi-
gation to be effective, it must be independent from those implicated
in the events. It must also be capable of leading to the identifcation
and punishment of individuals responsible, an obligation not of result
but of means. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition
is implicit in all cases but where the possibility of removing the indi-
vidual from the harmful situation is available, the investigation must
be undertaken as a matter of urgency. The victim or the next-of-kin
must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard
their legitimate interests. [. . .] In addition to the obligation to conduct
a domestic investigation into events occurring on their own territories,
Member States are also subject to a duty in cross-border traffcking
cases to cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of other
States concerned in the investigation of events which occurred outside
their territories.
1122

Box 16. A case of servitude and forced labour
The European Court of Human Rights considered the case of a
girl who had arrived in France from Togo at the age of 15 years
and 7 months with a person who had agreed with her father
that she would work until her air ticket had been reimbursed,

1120
See, Article 2, Forced Labour Convention (C29), ILO; Article 8.3(b) and (c) ICCPR; Article
6.2-3 ACHR; Article 11.34 ICRMW; Article 4.3 ECHR. Article 10 ArCHR provides for no ex-
ception, making thus the prohibition of forced labour absolute. As illustrated by Article 11.4
ICRMW, the frst duty will not apply to migrant workers, while the work due as civil obli-
gations might concern migrant workers and their families as long as it is imposed also on
citizens.

1121
See, Siliadin v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1108, paras. 89 and 112. See also, Concluding
Observations on Republic of Korea, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 23; Concluding Observa-
tions on Poland, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/POL/CO/5, 20 November 2009, para. 23; Princi-
ples 1 and 12-17, OHCHR Traffcking Principles, op. cit., fn. 244.

1122
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 288289; C.N. v. the United
Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012, para. 69.
that her immigration status would be regularised and that she
would be sent to school. In reality, the girls work was quickly
lent to a couple. She worked in their house without respite for
approximately ffteen hours per day, with no day off, for sever-
al years, without ever receiving wages or being sent to school,
without identity papers and without her immigration status
being regularised. She was accommodated in their home and
slept in the childrens bedroom. The European Court of Human
Rights found that this situation did not amount to slavery, since
it had not been demonstrated that the couple exercised a gen-
uine right of legal ownership
1123
over the girl. Nevertheless,
the Court found that this situation constituted servitude, since
it amounted to an obligation to provide ones services that is
imposed by the use of coercion,
1124
and forced labour.
c) Access to a remedy against forced labour
The right of victims of forced labour to a remedy for the violation of this
right is established under all of the human rights treaties that prohibit
forced labour. This right exists notwithstanding the legal status of a per-
son in a country. For example the UN Committee for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has emphasised the need for
access to effective legal remedies for undocumented women migrant
workers coerced into forced labour.
1125

Box 17. Human traffcking, forced labour and the
European Court
While, under the UN and Council of Europe traffcking conven-
tions, forced labour is one of the forms of exploitation which
characterise human traffcking,
1126
in international human
rights law the European Court of Human Rights has consid-
ered that human traffcking in itself falls within the prohibition
of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour.
1127
It has

1123
Siliadin v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1108, para. 122.

1124
Ibid., para. 124.

1125
See also, Concluding Observations on Saudi Arabia, CEDAW, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2,
8 April 2008, para. 24.

1126
Article 3, UN Traffcking Protocol; Article 4, Council of Europe Traffcking Convention.

1127
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 282. The Human Rights Commit-
tee fnds that human traffcking is a violation of Article 3 (gender equality), Article 8 (forced
labour) and Article 24 (children rights): see, Concluding Observations on Greece, CCPR, op. cit.,
fn. 240, para. 10. The Committee against Torture fnds that human traffcking for the purpose
of sexual and labour exploitation falls under the practices prohibited by Article 16 CAT (cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment): see, Concluding Observations on Spain, CAT,
op. cit., fn. 240, para. 28. See also, Conclusion No. 90, UNHCR, op. cit., fn. 240, para. (s).
also held that it undoubtedly also amounts to inhuman and
degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention.
1128
In the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia the Court held
that traffcking in human beings, by its very nature and aim
of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to
the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities
to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little
or no payment [. . .]. It implies close surveillance of the activ-
ities of victims, whose movements are often circumscribed. It
involves the use of violence and threats against victims, who
live and work under poor conditions.
1129
The European Court found that, in addition to criminal law
measures to punish traffckers, Article 4 [ECHR] requires
Member States to put in place adequate measures regulat-
ing businesses often used as a cover for human traffcking.
Furthermore, a States immigration rules must address rele-
vant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or toler-
ance of traffcking.
1130
State authorities have a duty to protect
an individual at risk of being traffcked or subject to forced or
compulsory labour, if they are aware, or ought to have been
aware, of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that
an identifed individual has been, or is at real and immedi-
ate risk of being, traffcked or exploited, or subject to slav-
ery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour.
1131
The duties
to protect and to investigate belong not only to a particular
State, but to all States through which the traffcking action
developed, from the country of origin to that of destination.
One of the measures of protection is to consider adopting
legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims

1128
M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, ECtHR, Application No. 40020/03, Judgment of 31 July
2012, para. 106.

1129
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, para. 281.

1130
Ibid., para. 284.

1131
Ibid., para. 286. See also, Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea, CESCR, op. cit.,
fn. 244, para. 23; Concluding Observations on Poland, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1121, para. 23;
Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 75; Concluding Ob-
servations on Bangladesh, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 457; Concluding Observations on
the Netherlands, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 212; Concluding Observations on Lebanon,
CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2829; Concluding Observations on Spain, CEDAW, 2004,
op. cit., fn. 244, para. 337; Concluding Observations on Singapore, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244,
paras. 2122; Concluding Observations on Guatemala, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2324;
Concluding Observations on Spain, CEDAW, 2009, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2122; Concluding
Observations on Switzerland; CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244, paras. 2930; Concluding Obser-
vations on Greece, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 240, para. 10; Concluding Observations on Thailand,
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 20; Concluding Observations on Spain, CAT, op. cit., fn. 240,
para. 28; Principle 1, OHCHR Traffcking Principles, op. cit., fn. 244.
of traffcking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily
or permanently, in appropriate cases.
1132
3. Child Labour
The effective abolition of child labour is an obligation binding on all ILO
Members.
1133
ILO standards establish that a child may not be employed
in work activities before the age of completion of compulsory studies
and, in any case, not before the age of 15.
1134
This general principle
may be subject to limited exceptions in national law, for example in
relation to artistic performances.
1135
Article 7 of the European Social
Charter (revised) also prohibits work under the age of 15 but provides
an exception for performing prescribed light work, which must be very
light in nature and duration.
1136
Article 10 of the ICESCR requires that
States set a minimum age of employment, and the CESCR has found
that States must take effective measures, in particular legislative mea-
sures, to prohibit labour of children under the age of 16.
1137

1132
Article 7.1, UN Traffcking Protocol. This position is reiterated by the CEDAW in Concluding
Observations on Spain, CEDAW, 2004, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 337; Concluding Observations
on Pakistan, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 245, para. 30 (victims of traffcking should be shielded from
prosecutions on illegal migration); Concluding Observations on Singapore, CEDAW, op. cit.,
fn. 244, paras. 2122; Concluding Observations on Lebanon, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 244,
paras. 2829; Concluding Observations on Denmark, CEDAW, op. cit., fn. 245, paras. 3233.
See Principles 3 and 7, OHCHR Traffcking Principles, op. cit., fn. 244: 3. Anti-traffcking
measures shall not adversely affect the human rights and dignity of persons, in particular
the rights of those who have been traffcked, and of migrants, internally displaced persons,
refugees and asylum-seekers; 7. Traffcked persons shall not be detained, charged or
prosecuted for the illegality of their entry into or residence in countries of transit and desti-
nation, or for their involvement in unlawful activities to the extent that such involvement is
a direct consequence of their situation as traffcked persons.

1133
Article 2(c), ILO 1998 Declaration.

1134
Article 2.3, Minimum Age Convention (C138), ILO, adopted on 26 June 1973 (ratifed 155).
Previous ILO Conventions have regulated specifc sectors, or set the bar lower at 14 years of
age: Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (C5), 1919 (ratifed 4, denounced 68), Article 2;
Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised) (C59), 1937 (ratifed 11; denounced 25),
Article 2; Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (C7), 1920 (ratifed 4, denounced 49), Article 2;
Mi ni mum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised) (C58), 1936 (ratifed 17; denounced 34), Article 2;
Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention (C112), 1959 (ratifed 8 denounced 21), Article 2;
Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention (C123), 1965 (ratifed 22 denounced 19),
Article 2; Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention (C10), 1921 (ratifed 5, denounced 50),
Article 1; Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (C33), 1932 (ratifed 3,
denounced 22), Articles 2, 3, 4. States must provide for minimum age of employment also
under Article 32.2(a) CRC; Article 10 ICESCR; Article 7.123 ESC(r) (15 years; 18 years for
dangerous and unhealthy occupation: prohibition during compulsory education); Article 34.3
ArCHR; Article 13(g), Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa.

1135
Articles 4 and 8, Minimum Age Convention (C138), ILO.

1136
Article 7.1 ESC(r). It also provides for minimum age of employment of 18 for dangerous and
unhealthy occupations (Article 7.2). See, defnition of light work, in International Commis-
sion of Jurists (ICJ) v. Portugal, ECSR, Complaint No. 1/1998, 10 March 1999, Merits, paras.
28-31. Same principles, de minimis, in Article 7(f) Protocol of San Salvador; Article 15 ACRWC.

1137
Article 10.3 ICESCR; CESCR, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., fn. 1109, para. 24.
Where children are employed, the State has additional duties of pro-
tection. Article 10 ICESCR provides that [c]hildren and young persons
should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their em-
ployment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life
or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable by
law.
1138
ILO Conventions also provide that, where children under the
age of 18 are employed, they must be subject to medical examinations
before and, periodically, during the employment, in order to determine
whether they are ft for the work.
1139
Some types of night work for young
persons under 18 are prohibited by ILO Conventions.
1140
The CRC oblig-
es States to protect all children, including through penalties and regard-
less of their status, from all forms of economic exploitation and from
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with
the childs physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.
1141
The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) of 1999
requires States to prohibit and eliminate several work practices as re-
gards children under 18:
1142
all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale
and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced
or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment
of children for use in armed conflict;
the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the
production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in par-
ticular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the
relevant international treaties;
work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried
out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
1143

1138
Article 10.3 ICESCR.

1139
See, Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (C77), ILO, adopted on
9 June 1946; Medical Examination of Young Persons (Non-Industrial Occupations) Conven-
tion (C78), ILO, adopted on 9 October 1946; Medical Examination of Young Persons (Under-
ground Work) Convention (C124), ILO, 23 June 1965.

1140
Article 3, Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (C6), ILO, adopted on 28 No-
vember 1919 (ratifed 51). See previous standards in Night Work of Young Persons (Indus-
try) Convention (C6), ILO, adopted on 28 November 1919 (ratifed 50, denounced 9); Night
Work of Young Persons (Non-Industrial Occupations) Convention (C79), ILO, adopted on
9 October 1946 (ratifcation 20).

1141
Article 32.1 CRC. See also, Article 15.1 ACRWC; Article 7(f), Protocol of San Salvador;
Article 7 ESC(r).

1142
Articles 1 and 2, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182), ILO, adopted on 17 June
1999.

1143
Article 3, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182), ILO. See also, CMW, General
Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, para. 61.
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography also pro-
hibits the sale of children, including for purposes of forced labour,
1144

and child prostitution.
1145
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Confict
prohibits the compulsory recruitment of children under the age of 18
into the armed forces and requires States to take measures to ensure
that recruitment of those below the age of 18 is truly voluntary.
1146
III. Workplace rights
International law protects rights at work in a number of ways. Firstly,
each individual retains the full range of his or her human rights when he
or she enters the workplace. In the case of employment in the private
sector, the State has obligations to take positive steps to protect these
rights. The circumstances of employment, working terms and condi-
tions, and day-to-day work-place interactions may implicate a variety
of human rights, and depending on the circumstances, may give rise to
violations.
Secondly, international law provides for particular human rights protec-
tion that is specifc to the work context. Such workplace rights, or as-
pects of them, are widely recognised in human rights treaties including,
at a global level, ICESCR, ICERD, ICEDAW and the ICRMW
1147
and in
general (with the exception of provisions of Part IV of the ICRMW) apply
to all migrants, whether or not they are legally present on the territory.
This contrasts with rights under ILO instruments, which for the most
part protect only regular migrant workers.
These rights entail a range of obligations for the State in relation to the
workplace. For example, the ICESCR includes the following rights:
the right to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work (Article 7(a)(i));

1144
See, Articles 1, 2(a) and 3(a), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (OP-CRC-SC).

1145
See, Articles 1, 2(b) and 3(b) OP-CRC-SC.

1146
Articles 2 and 3, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Confict (OP-CRC-AC).

1147
Articles 6, 7 and 8 ICESCR; Articles 5(e)(i) and 11 CEDAW; Article 27 ICERD; Article 23.1
UDHR; Articles 11, 25, 26, 40, 52, and 54 ICRMW; Article XIV ADRDM; Articles 6 and 7,
Protocol of San Salvador; Article 15 ACHPR; Article 34 ArCHR; Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 ESC(r);
Article 13, Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa; Declaration on the Hu-
man Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, Article 8;
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, Article 6.
the right to a decent living for workers and their families
(Article 7(a)(ii));
the right to safe and healthy working conditions (Article 7(b));
the right to equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in
his or her employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to
no considerations other than those of seniority and competence
(Article 7(c));
the right to rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for
public holidays (Article 7(d));
the right to non-discrimination in the realisation of all the com-
ponents of the right to work and of workplace rights (Articles 6
and 7, read together with Article 2.2).
1148
The Inter-American Court has identifed within the minimum core of la-
bour rights the prohibition of obligatory or forced labor; the prohibition
and abolition of child labor; special care for women workers, and the
rights corresponding to: freedom of association and to organize and
join a trade union, collective negotiation, fair wages for work performed,
social security, judicial and administrative guarantees, a working day of
reasonable length with adequate working conditions (safety and health),
rest and compensation.
1149
It has noted that the safeguard of these
rights for migrants is essential, based on the principle of the inalienable
nature of such rights, which all workers possess, irrespective of their
migratory status, and also the fundamental principle of human dignity
embodied in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration.
1150

The European Social Charter (revised) includes the right to just condi-
tions of work,
1151
the right to safe and healthy working conditions,
1152

the right to a fair remuneration,
1153
the right to protection in cases of
termination of employment,
1154
the right of workers to the protection
of their claims in the event of the insolvency of their employer,
1155
the
right to dignity at work,
1156
and the right of workers with family re-

1148
See also, article 7, Protocol of San Salvador; Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 ESC(r); Articles 30 and
31, EU Charter.

1149

1150

1151
Article 2, ESC(r).

1152
Article 3, ibid.

1153
Article 4, ibid.

1154
Article 24, ibid.

1155
Article 25, ibid.

1156
Article 26, ibid.
sponsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment.
1157
However,
these provisions of the European Social Charter (revised) cover only
nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within
the territory of the Party concerned, i.e. States that are party to the
European Social Charter, without prejudice to the rights of refugees
or stateless persons under the Geneva Refugee Convention and the
Statelessness Convention 1954.
1158
Nevertheless, those States which
have accepted the obligations contained in Article 19 ESC have un-
dertaken to secure for [migrant] workers lawfully within their ter-
ritories, insofar as such matters are regulated by law or regulations
or are subject to the control of administrative authorities, treatment
not less favourable than that of their own nationals in respect of [. . .]
remuneration and other employment and working conditions [and] to
secure for such workers lawfully within their territories treatment not
less favourable than that of their own nationals with regard to em-
ployment taxes, dues or contributions payable in respect of employed
persons.
1159
One of the main means by which migrants workplace rights are im-
paired is the withholding of their documents by private actors, wheth-
er employers, family members or others, as it creates a bond of de-
pendency of the migrant towards the documents withholder, and
impedes migrants access to their rights, including their labour rights.
This practice has been addressed by several treaty bodies.
1160
For
example, CEDAW has urged States to ensure that employers and re-
cruiters do not confscate or destroy travel or identity documents and
to train law enforcement offcers to protect against such abuses.
1161

The practice is also addressed by Article 21 of the ICRMW which pro-
vides: It shall be unlawful for anyone, other than a public offcial duly
authorized by law, to confscate, destroy or attempt to destroy iden-
tity documents, documents authorizing entry to or stay, residence or
establishment in the national territory or work permits. No authorized
confscation of such documents shall take place without delivery of a
detailed receipt. In no case shall it be permitted to destroy the pass-

1157
Article 27, ibid.

1158
Appendix to the European Social Charter (Revised), Scope of the Revised European Social
Charter in terms of persons protected.

1159
Article 19.45 ESC(r).

1160
See, Concluding Observations on the Republic of Korea, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3,
28 November 2006, para. 12; Concluding Observations on Japan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 517,
para. 24; Concluding Observations on Kuwait, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.98, 7 June
2004, para. 17; Concluding Observations on Lebanon, CERD, Report of the Committee
on Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the General Assembly, 53
rd
Session, UN Doc.
A/53/18 (1998), p. 42, paras. 175 and 184; Concluding Observations on Italy, CERD,
UN Doc. CERD/C/ITA/CO/15, 16 May 2008, para. 17; Concluding Observations on Syrian
Arab Republic, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/SYR/CO/1, 2 May 2008, paras. 3132.

1161
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8, para. 26(d).
port or equivalent document of a migrant worker or a member of his
or her family.
1162

1. Non-discrimination and workplace rights
A range of international instruments and standards contain require-
ments of non-discrimination in relation to workplace rights, these are
addressed below. The specifc protection from discrimination on the
basis of sex, as it applies to women migrant workers, is dealt with in
Section 2 below. It should be noted that the prohibition of discrimina-
tion, in particular as it relates to minimum work conditions, such as un-
fair dismissal, vacation, overtime and pay is an obligation of immediate
effect (see, Chapter 5, Section I.2).
1163
The CESCR has also recognised
that the right to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind is of immediate effect.
1164

a) ICESCR and ICERD
The prohibition of discrimination in relation to workplace rights under
the CESCR and CERD covers migrant workers and their families, re-
gardless of legal status or documentation.
1165
The CESCR has been
clear that the Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-na-
tionals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant
workers and victims of international traffcking, regardless of legal sta-
tus and documentation.
1166
Although disparate treatment of migrants
or categories of migrants in respect of access to employment may be
lawful, it can seldom be justifed in relation to rights in the workplace.
The CERD has stated that under ICERD, States must: take effective
measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in relation
to working conditions and work requirements, including employment
rules and practices with discriminatory purposes and effects; [. . .] to
prevent and redress the serious problems commonly faced by non-cit-
izen workers, in particular by non-citizen domestic workers, including
debt bondage, passport retention, illegal confnement, rape and phys-
ical assault.
1167
The CERD also defned the general principles appli-
cable to all migrants: while State Parties may refuse to offer jobs to
non-citizens without a work permit, all individuals are entitled to the

1162
Article 21 ICRMW.

1163
CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 7; CESCR, General Comment No. 18,
op. cit., fn. 1109, para. 19; Article 7 ICRMW; Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea,
CESCR, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 14; Concluding Observations on Japan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 517,
para. 24; Concluding Observations on Kuwait, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1160, para. 16.

1164
CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., fn. 147, para. 5. See also, Article 15 ACHPR.

1165

1166

1167
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, paras. 3334.
enjoyment of labour and employment rights, including the freedom of
assembly and association, once an employment relationship has been
initiated until it is terminated.
1168
b) ILO Conventions
The ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97) of
1949 mandates States to eliminate discrimination based on national-
ity, race, religion or sex, towards immigrants lawfully within their
territory by assuring them a treatment not less favourable than that
of their nationals in respect of remuneration, including family allow-
ances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime
arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, minimum
age for employment, apprenticeship and training, womens work and
the work of young persons.
1169
The Committee of Experts of the ILO
found that the fact that higher wages are being paid to local domestic
helpers than those paid to foreign domestic helpers, or to those nation-
al workers in comparable job categories, [. . .] would contravene the
Conventions goal of equal treatment between migrant workers and na-
tionals as regards remuneration.
1170
Furthermore, it declared that the
imposition of a special tax on foreign workers, or on the employers of
foreign workers, which has the effect of considerably reducing the salary
of a migrant worker in comparison to that of a national, is in breach of
the equality of treatment with regard to remuneration (Article 6.1(a)(i)
Convention No. 97).
1171
The ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention
(No. 143) of 1975 provides in its Article 1 that States undertake to re-
spect the basic human rights of all migrant workers.
1172
This provision
concerns all migrant workers, regardless of their status.
1173
It is the
only provision of the two ILO Conventions directly dealing with migrant
workers that does not exclude undocumented migrants from its appli-
cation. The Committee of Experts has clarifed that basic human rights
refers to the fundamental human rights contained in the international
instruments adopted by the UN in this domain, which include some fun-
damental rights of workers.
1174

1168
Ibid., para. 35

1169
Article 6.1(a)(i), Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO. The same
is expressed by Article 19.4.1 ESC(r). The ILO Convention has been ratifed by only 49
States.

1170
TUCP v. China, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1046, para. 32.

1171
Ibid., paras. 3537.

1172
Article 1, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (C143), ILO. The ILO
Convention has been ratifed by only 23 States.

1173
General Survey on Migrant Workers, ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations, 1999, Document No. (ilolex): 251999G01, para. 297.

1174
Ibid., para. 296. Footnote No. 19 referes to UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ICRMW, etc.
The ILO Conventions No. 111 and 158 do not cover discrimination based
on nationality, i.e. between nationals and non-nationals.
1175
Nevertheless,
the ILO Committee of Experts has clarifed that while ILO Conventions
are deemed to establish minimum standards and should be interpreted
as such by the ILO supervisory bodies, including this Committee, these
Conventions do not preclude Member States from using their provisions in
order to grant more favourable conditions to the workers concerned. Once
granted, however, more favourable conditions could not be revoked simply
on the grounds that they go beyond the minimum protection prescribed
by the Convention in question.
1176
This principle is also enshrined in the
ILO Constitution.
1177
As a consequence, the principle of non-discrimination
covering non-nationals, which comes from other international law instru-
ments, may be applicable by reference also to these ILO Conventions.
The ILO Domestic Workers Convention No. 189
1178
is also notable in this
respect, as it contains specifc provisions to address discrimination and
abusive practices against migrant domestic workers in its Article 15.
c) ICRMW
Article 25 ICRMW, which applies to all migrants regardless of legal status,
sets out obligations of equal treatment of migrant workers. The ICRMW
provides that migrant workers shall enjoy treatment not less favour-
able than that which applies to nationals of the State of employment in
respect of remuneration, conditions of work and terms of employment,
including on overtime, hours of work, weekly rest, holiday with pay,
safety, health, termination of employment relationship, minimum age
of employment, and restriction on work.
1179
These rights are not sub-

1175
See, Representation (article 24)1998EthiopiaC111, C158Report of the Committee
set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ethiopia of the Discrimina-
tion (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) and the Termination of Em-
ployment Convention, 1982 (No.158), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the
National Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW), Document No. (ilolex): 161998ETH111,
Geneva, 12 November 2001 (NCEW v. Ethiopia, ILO), para. 31; and, Representation (arti-
cle 24)1997SpainC097, C111, C122Report of the Committee set up to examine the
representation alleging non-observance by Spain of the Migration for Employment Conven-
tion (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958 (No. 111), and the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), made under ar-
ticle 24 of the ILO Constitution by the General Confederation of Labour of Argentina (CGT),
Document No. (ilolex): 161998ESP097 (CGT v. Spain, ILO), para. 35.

1176
TURK-IS v. Netherlands, ILO, op. cit., fn. 1047, para. 46.

1177
Article 19.8, ILO Constitution, which reads: In no case shall the adoption of any Convention
or Recommendation by the Conference, or the ratifcation of any Convention by any Member
be deemed to affect any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more favourable
conditions to the workers concerned than those provided for in the Convention or Recom-
mendation.

1178
Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers (C189), ILO, entered into force on
5 September 2013.

1179
Article 25.1 ICRMW. See, also, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not
Nationals of the Country in which They Live, Article 8.1(a).
ject to derogation in private contracts or because of the irregular stay
status of the migrant worker.
1180
The Committee on Migrant Workers
has clarifed that the list of rights in Article 25 is not exhaustive and the
equal treatment principle also covers any other matter that, according
to national law and practice, is considered a working condition or term
of employment, such as maternity protection.
1181
The ICRMW also requires States Parties to take positive measures to pro-
tect equality of treatment for irregular migrants, and provides that em-
ployers shall not be relieved of any legal or contractual obligations, nor
shall their obligations be limited in any manner by reason of such irreg-
ularity.
1182
Furthermore, the Committee has stated that States parties
shall provide for appropriate sanctions for employers who derogate from
the principle of equality of treatment in private employment contracts
with migrant workers in an irregular situation, and ensure that those
migrant workers have access to labour courts or other judicial remedies
when their rights are violated and without fear of being deported.
1183
The
Committee has dedicated its frst General Comment to the category of
migrant domestic workers, who are particularly at risk of exploitation.
1184
d) Geneva Refugee Convention
Under the Geneva Refugee Convention, a refugee lawfully present on the
territory of a State enjoys equal treatment to nationals in remunera-
tion, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration,
hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on
work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, wom-
ens work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the ben-
efts of collective bargaining.
1185
In addition, [t]he right to compensa-
tion for the death of a refugee resulting from employment injury or from
occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the residence
of the benefciary is outside the territory of the Contracting State.
1186
e) Inter-American system
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose approach to dis-
crimination against migrants was addressed in Chapter 5, has stated
that [a] person who enters a State and assumes an employment re-
lationship, acquires his labor human rights in the State of employment,

1180
Article 25.23 ICRMW.

1181
CMW, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 2, para. 62. See also, paras. 63 and 64.

1182
Article 25.3 ICRMW.

1183

1184
CMW, General Comment No. 1, op. cit., fn. 485.

1185
Article 24.1(a), Geneva Refugee Convention.

1186
Article 24.2, ibid.
irrespective of his migratory status, because respect and guarantee of
the enjoyment and exercise of those rights must be made without any
discrimination.
1187
Even if undocumented migrants are engaged, they
immediately become possessors of the labor rights corresponding to
workers and may not be discriminated against because of their irregular
situation. This is very important, because one of the principal problems
that occurs in the context of immigration is that migrant workers who
lack permission to work are engaged in unfavorable conditions com-
pared to other workers.
1188
The Court has also emphasised the obli-
gation to take measures to prevent discrimination against migrants by
private employers: The State is obliged to respect and ensure the labor
human rights of all workers, irrespective of their status as nationals or
aliens, and not to tolerate situations of discrimination that prejudice the
latter in the employment relationships established between individuals
(employer-worker). The State should not allow private employers to
violate the rights of workers, or the contractual relationship to violate
minimum international standards,
1189
which must be interpreted ac-
cording to the principle of the application of the standard that best pro-
tects the individual, in this case the migrant worker.
1190
2. Non-Discrimination and Women Migrant Workers
In addition to the workplace issues outlined above, migrant women may
face a range of particular concerns in the workplace including multiple
and intersectional forms of de jure and de facto discrimination due to
their status as migrants and as women. Acute problems can arise due
to ingrained and systemic workplace discrimination against women in
general, including in relation to pregnancy,
1191
inadequate legal regu-
lation of female-dominated occupations, including the informal sector,
work-place gender-based violence and abuse and discriminatory migra-
tion and residency schemes and regulations.
International law and standards protect women migrants from the di-
rect, indirect, de facto and de jure gender discrimination they may face
in the workplace
1192
and from discrimination which may arise due to
their status as non-nationals, refugees, migrant workers, as well as
from discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity.
1193
Moreover, in-

1187
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, paras. 133 and 134.

1188
Ibid., para. 136.

1189
Ibid., paras. 148, 146147 and 149, 160.

1190

1191
For a specifc overview of the international standards relevant to pregnancy and work-place
rights see section 4(d) below.

1192
Article 11 CEDAW; Articles 3, 6 and 7 ICESCR; General Comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22;
CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22.

1193
See analysis in Section 1 above.
ternational law and standards require that, where women may face
intersectional or multiple forms of discrimination due to a combination
of circumstances, this must be the subject of targeted action.
1194

In its General Comment No. 26, CEDAW has addressed the human rights
abuses and violations that women migrant workers may face and has
highlighted specifc steps which States must take to comply with their
international obligations to guarantee women migrant workers rights on
a basis of equality. These include: (i) lifting discriminatory restrictions on
migration, including those which exclude women from certain categories
of work or exclude female-dominated occupations from visa-schemes;
(ii) ensuring the legal protection of women migrant workers rights, in-
cluding through ensuring that female-dominated occupations are pro-
tected by labour laws and health and safety laws; (iii) repealing discrim-
inatory residency regulations which predicate womens residency on the
sponsorship of an employer or spouse; (iv) ensuring women migrants
have real and effective access to legal remedies in the case of abuse,
including by ensuring potential loss of work-permits or earnings do not
impede in law or practice with their recourse to remedies; (v) taking
concrete and meaningful steps in practice to guarantee women migrant
workers enjoyment of particular rights which may be at risk due to their
employment situation, including freedom of movement, personal in-
tegrity and freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment. The Committee has also highlighted the fact that the
Convention is applicable to all categories of women migrants.
1195

Other treaty bodies have also addressed the workplace situation of wom-
en migrant workers. For example, in an individual complaint against the
Netherlands, CERD found that a womans rights under ICERD were vi-
olated due to her dismissal when pregnant due to discrimination based
on sex and status as a non-national.
1196

3. Particular Workplace Rights
a) Fair remuneration
The ILO Protection of Wages Convention No. 95 of 1949 (96 ratifcations)
requires that [w]ages payable in money shall be paid only in legal tender,
and payment in the form of promissory notes, vouchers or coupons, or in

1194
CESCR, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 17. See also, CESCR, General Com-
ment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 5; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 25, op. cit.,
fn. 31, para.12; CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 30. CERD, General
Recommendation No. 25, op. cit., fn. 21, paras. 1 and 2.

1195
CEDAW, General Comment No. 26, op. cit., fn. 8.

1196
Yilmaz-Dogan v. the Netherlands, CERD, Communication No. 1/1984, Views of 29 Septem-
ber 1988. See also, CMW, General Comment No. 1, op. cit., fn. 485,
any other form alleged to represent legal tender, shall be prohibited.
1197

Under the Convention, wages must be paid directly and regularly to the
worker concerned except as may be otherwise provided by national laws
or regulations and employers are prohibited from limiting in any manner
the freedom of the worker to dispose of his or her wages.
1198
States are
required to pursue measures to promote [. . .] equality of opportunity
and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to
eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof,
1199
including discrim-
ination based on race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction or social origin.
1200
In addition, the Convention specifes that
wages and salaries shall respect the principle of equal remuneration for
men and women workers for work of equal value.
1201

The particular issue of women workers remuneration has also been
addressed in human rights instruments and by a number of the human
rights bodies. For example Article 11(d) of CEDAW specifes that States
should ensure the right of women, to equal remuneration, including
benefts, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as
well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work.
CEDAW has underlined womens right to remuneration, specifying that
unpaid work constitutes a form of womens exploitation that is con-
trary to the Convention. For its part CESCR has noted that rights to
just and favourable conditions of work under Article 7 of the ICESCR
require States to identify and eliminate the underlying causes of pay
differentials, such as gender-biased job evaluation or the perception
that productivity differences between men and women exist . . . adopt
legislation that prescribes equal consideration in promotion, non-wage
compensation and equal opportunity and support for vocational or pro-
fessional development in the workplace.
1202
b) The right to rest and leisure
The right to rest and leisure is recognised by the CESCR and several
ILO instruments. ILO Conventions state that a worker must beneft in

1197
Art. 3.1, Protection of Wages Convention (C95), ILO, adopted on 1 July 1949. The Conven-
tion provides also with more detailed provisions. We will report here only those of a general
character.

1198
Articles 5, 6, 12.1, ibid.

1199
Article 2, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (C111), ILO, adopted on
25 June 1958.

1200
Article 1(a), ibid.

1201
Equal Remuneration Convention (C100), ILO, adopted on 29 June 1951. See, General
Recommendation No. 13, Equal remuneration for work of equal value, CEDAW, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 1989; General Recommendation No. 16, Unpaid women workers
in rural and urban family enterprises, CEDAW, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.II), 1991,
after articles 2(c) and 11(c), (d) and (e) CEDAW.

1202
CESCR, General comment No. 16, op. cit., fn. 22, paras. 2324. The same standards are
obligations under Article 11.1(a), (b), (c), (d) CEDAW; Article 4.3 ESC(r).
every period of seven days from a period of rest comprising at least
24 consecutive hours,
1203
and that, as a principle, the work-time shall
not exceed eight hours in the day and forty-eight hours in the week.
1204

Other Conventions address requirements for paid holidays.
1205
The
European Social Charter (revised) provides for a right to a minimum of
four weeks of paid holidays per year.
1206
The ADRDM provides for a right
to leisure time, although it does not spell out any precise conditions.
1207

Several ILO Conventions deal with specifc aspects of the right to safe
and healthy working conditions.
1208
c) Termination of employment
The ILO Termination of Employment Convention (No. 158) of 1982 pro-
vides for obligations regarding the end of the employment relationship
at the initiative of the employer. This Convention has not yet met with
wide ratifcation.
1209
Nevertheless, its content might be used by other
international human rights authorities in consideration of the States
obligations relating to the right to work and the prohibition of unfair
dismissal.
1210
The basic principle is that [t]he employment of a worker
shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termi-
nation connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based
on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or

1203
Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention (C14), ILO, adopted on 17 November 1921; Weekly Rest
(Commerce and Offces) Convention (C106), ILO, Adopted on 26 June 1957.

1204
See, Article 2, Hours of Work (Industry) Convention (C1), ILO, Adopted on 28 November
1919; Article 3, Hours of Work (Commerce and Offces) Convention (C30), ILO, adopted on
28 June 1930.

1205
Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) (C132), ILO, adopted on 24 June 1970 (6 days
per yearratifed 40, denounced 14); Holidays with Pay (Sea) Convention (C54), ILO,
adopted on 24 October 1936 (9 to 12 days/yearratifed 4, denounced 2); Holidays with Pay
(Agriculture) Convention (C101), ILO, adopted on 26 June 1952 (ratifed 34, denounced 12);
Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), (C132), ILO, adopted on 24 June 1970 (3 weeks
ratifed 35).

1206
Article 2.3 ESC(r).

1207
Article XV ADRDM.

1208
Benzene Convention (C136), ILO, adopted on 23 June 1971; Occupational Cancer Conven-
tion (C139), ILO, adopted on 24 June 1974; Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and
Vibration) Convention (C148), ILO, Adopted on 20 June 1977; Occupational Safety and
Health Convention (C155), ILO, adopted on 22 June 1981; Protocol of 2002 to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Convention (P155), ILO, adopted on 20 June 1981; Occupational
Health Services Convention (C161), ILO, adopted on 25 June 1985; Asbestos Convention
(C162), ILO, adopted on 24 June 1986; Chemicals Convention (C170), ILO, adopted on
25 June 1990; Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention (C174), ILO, adopted
on 22 June 1993; Safety and Health in Mines Convention (C176), ILO, adopted on 22 June
1995; Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention (C184), ILO, adopted on 21 June 2001.
See, an application of the correspondent Article 2.4 ESC(r) in STTK ry and They ry v. Finland,
ECSR, Complaint No. 10/2000, Merits, 17 October 2001.

1209
As of January 2014 there were 35 State Parties, see http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312303.

1210
Article 7(d), Protocol of San Salvador; Article 24 ESC(r); Article 13(c), Protocol to the ACHPR
on the Rights of Women in Africa; Article 11.2(a), CEDAW; Article 54.1(a) ICRMW.
service.
1211
The Convention lists a series of reasons for which termina-
tion of employment is prohibited: union membership or participation
in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the
employer, within working hours; seeking offce as, or acting or having
acted in the capacity of, a workers representative; the fling of a com-
plaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer involving
alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent admin-
istrative authorities; age, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibil-
ities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social
origin; absence from work during maternity leave[;] [t]emporary ab-
sence from work because of illness or injury.
1212
The ILO Convention provides that workers must be given an opportunity
to contest the allegations made in order to terminate the employment
for reasons related to the workers conduct or performance.
1213
They
are entitled to appeal against that termination to an impartial body,
such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator.
1214

If the termination is unjustifed, these bodies, if they are not empow-
ered or do not fnd it practicable, in accordance with national law and
practice, to declare the termination invalid and/or order or propose re-
instatement of the worker, [. . .] shall be empowered to order payment
of adequate compensation or such other relief as may be deemed ap-
propriate.
1215
In any case, workers are entitled to a reasonable period
of notice.
1216
The Convention provides that [a]dequate safeguards shall
be provided against recourse to contracts of employment for a specifed
period of time the aim of which is to avoid the protection resulting from
this Convention.
1217
Two important provisions of the ICRMW, which concern only migrants
who have entered the country in a regular situation, are Article 49.2
and Article 51. They require time to be allowed for a migrant worker
who has become unemployed to seek another job before being deprived
of his or her authorisation of residence. Article 49.2 states that [m]
igrant workers who in the State of employment are allowed freely to
choose their remunerated activity shall neither be regarded as in an
irregular situation nor shall they lose their authorization of residence
by the mere fact of the termination of their remunerated activity prior

1211
Article 4, Termination of Employment Convention (C158), ILO, adopted on 22 June 1982.

1212
Articles 5 and 6, ibid.

1213

1214
Article 8.1, ibid. On the powers of the deciding bodies see Article 9.

1215
Article 10, ibid.

1216
See, Article 11, ibid. See also, Article 4.4 ESC(r).

1217
Article 2.3, ibid.
to the expiration of their work permits or similar authorizations.
1218

Another provision, Article 51, was included in order to afford the same
protection to migrants who are not permitted freely to choose their
remunerated activity, except where the authorisation of residence is
expressly dependent upon the specifc remunerated activity for which
they were admitted. The Committee on Migrant Workers has applied
this last provision on two occasions, where the State has not allowed
suffcient time to the migrant worker to fnd alternative employment
and linked automatically the loss of employment with the expiration of
the residence authorisation.
1219
An analysis of the drafting history of
the ICRMW suggests that Article 51 was introduced in order to protect
migrants from those work permits that are linked to a single employer
and that would, consequently, impede employment by another employ-
er. The provision implicitly allows for limitations in work permits as to
the kind of work to be performed.
1220
Some of the content of these Articles is refected in comments of the
Human Rights Committee in the examination of the principle of non-dis-
crimination and the right to private and family life.
1221
The Committee
has held that States have an obligation to guarantee full and effective
access to personal documents to migrants and that, in order to provide
a remedy for these violations, a State should consider establishing a
governmental mechanism to which migrant workers can report viola-
tions of their rights by their employers, including illegal withholding of
their personal documents.
1222
The African Commission has found that an abrupt expulsion without re-
course to national courts can severely compromise [. . .] the [migrants]
right to continue working [. . .] under equitable and satisfactory condi-
tions, resulting in loss of employment in violation of the right to work
(Article 15 ACHPR).
1223

1218
See also, Article 8, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (C143), ILO,
which applies this principle in an absolute way for migrant workers and members of their
family present in the territory for more than fve years.

1219
See, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/AZE/CO/1, 19 May 2009,
paras. 3435; and Concluding Observations on El Salvador, CMW, UN Doc. CMW/C/SLV/CO/1,
4 February 2009, paras. 35 and 36.

1220
See, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Drafting of an International Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, Third Com-
mittee, 43
rd
session, UN Doc. A/C.3/43/1, 20 June 1988, paras. 5366. The representative
of Italy has clarifed this approach to the text, that was proposed by Finland on behalf of
the Scandinavian and Mediterranean Group with amendments by the USA. The rejection of
the proposal by the Netherlands confrms this reading. Articles 51 and 49(2) were strongly
opposed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

1221
See, Concluding Observations on Thailand, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 244, para. 23.

1222
Ibid., para. 23.

1223
IHRDA v. Republic of Angola, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 395, para. 76.
d) Pregnancy
A range of international legal provisions require that womens employ-
ment not be terminated due to pregnancy, that women not be subject to
pre-migration or pre-hiring pregnancy testing, and that pregnant wom-
en be afforded paid maternity leave or social security protection. The
Human Rights Committee has held that practices such as requests by
employers of pregnancy tests before hiring violate the principle of gen-
der equality in light of the right to privacy (Articles 3 and 17, ICCPR).
1224

Article 11 of CEDAW provides, among other things, that States Parties
must, prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and that they must intro-
duce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefts without
loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances. Article 10 of
the ICESCR requires that during a reasonable period before and after
childbirthworking mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with
adequate social security benefts.
1225
The Human Rights Committee has
held that practices such as mandatory pregnancy tests before hiring are
not permissible under Articles 3 and 17 of the ICCPR.
1226
The ILO Maternity
Protection Conventions provides additional protection in this context.
1227
IV. Freedom of association in labour rights: the
right to form and join a trade union
Freedom of association is widely protected by global and regional human
rights treaties, including by Article 22 ICCPR and Article 8 ICESCR.
1228

It is also protected in instruments of the ILO, including the 1919 ILO
Constitution,
1229
and the ILO Philadelphia Declaration of 1944.
The right to join, not to join and to establish a trade union was rec-
ognised by ILO Convention No. 87 of 1948. It is a directly enforceable

1224
CCPR, General Comment No. 28, op. cit., fn. 22, para. 20. See also, CEDAW, General Rec-
ommendation No. 24, op. cit., fn. 29, para. 22.

1225
Article 10.2 ICESCR.

1226
See, fn. 1224.

1227
Maternity Protection Convention (C3), ILO, adopted on 28 November 1919 (29 Parties,
5 Denounced); Maternity Protection Convention (Revised) (C103), ILO, adopted on 28 June
1952 (ratifed 30, denounced 11); Maternity Protection Convention (C183), ILO, Adopted on
15 June 2000 (ratifed 18). While these have not met with wide ratifcation they can be used
as a tool of interpretation of the obligations arising from CEDAW and other treaties. The
Conventions apply irrespective of nationality.

1228
Article 22 ICCPR; Article 8 ICESCR; Articles 20 and 23.4 UDHR; Article 10 ACHPR; Article 35
ArCHR; Article XXII ADRDM; Article 16 ACHR; Article 8, Protocol of San Salvador; Article 11
ECHR; Article II.19.4(b) ESC(r). See, on trade unions angle, Declaration on the Human
Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, Article 8.1(b);
Article 5 ESC(r).

1229
Preamble, ILO Constitution.
right which can be claimed in court. Article 2 of the ILO Convention sets
out the basic principle:
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choos-
ing without previous authorisation.
As declared by the ILO Congress in 1998, this right entails an obligation
to promote and realise freedom of association, which is binding on all
Members of the ILO, even those who are not parties to Convention No.
87.
1230
Freedom of association includes the freedom of the organisations to
draw up their own constitutions and rules, elect their representatives, or-
ganise their administration and formulate their programmes,
1231
the right
of the organisations not to be subject to dissolution or suspension by the
administrative authority,
1232
and the right of the organisations to estab-
lish and join federations and confederations, whether national or interna-
tional.
1233
The exercise of these rights by the organisations must respect
national law, which shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so ap-
plied as to impair, the guarantees contained in the Convention.
1234
Finally,
freedom of association consists also in a right not to join a trade union.
1235
Freedom of association, in trade union matters, has been described
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as being of the utmost
importance for the defence of the legitimate interests of the workers,
and falls under the corpus juris of human rights.
1236
Moreover, the
Court has specifed that this safeguard has great importance based on
the principle of the inalienable nature of such rights, which all workers
possess, irrespective of their migratory status, and also the funda-
mental principle of human dignity embodied in Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration.
1237

1230
Article 2, ILO 1998 Declaration.

1231
Article 3, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (C87),
ILO, adopted on 9 July 1948. Other relevant ILO Conventions are Right to Organise and
Collective Bargaining Convention (C98), ILO, adopted on 1 July 1949; and Rural Workers
Organisations Convention (C141), ILO, adopted on 23 June 1975.

1232
Article 4, ibid.

1233
Article 5, ibid.

1234
Article 8, ibid.

1235
See, Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 7601/76;
7806/77, Judgment of 13 August 1981, paras. 52, 57; Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Den-
mark, ECtHR, GC, Applications Nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, Judgment of 11 January 2006;
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, ECtHR, Application No. 16130/90, Judgment of 30 June 1993. See
also, Article 10.2 ACHPR; Article 8.3, Protocol of San Salvador.

1236
Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, IACtHR, Series C No. 72, Judgment of 2 February 2001,
para. 158.

1237
Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 33, para. 157 (emphasis
added).
Central to the ILO Convention is the stipulation that freedom of associ-
ation may not be restricted for non-citizens, as it must be guaranteed
without distinction whatsoever.
1238
According to international human
rights law, the exercise of freedom of association can be restricted when
the restrictions are:
prescribed by law;
necessary in a democratic society;
1239
in the interest of national security or public safety, public order,
the protection of health and morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
1240
Non-discriminatory.
In particular, no restriction must be based on distinctions between citi-
zens and non-citizens, as has been found in the conclusions of several
human rights authorities.
1241
For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has found that the restrictions on participa-
tion in and the prohibition on aliens occupying positions of responsibil-
ity within a trade union is contrary to the Covenant.
1242

Article 5 ICERD prohibits race discrimination in relation to freedom of
assembly and association and the right to form and join trade unions.
1243

Despite the fact that Article 1.2 of the ICERD allows for distinctions
between citizens and non-citizens, the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination has clarifed that this Article must be con-
strued so as to avoid undermining the basic prohibition of discrimina-
tion; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any way from
the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the

1238
Article 2, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (C87),
ILO. See also, Article 6.1(a)(ii), Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (C97), ILO.

1239
For an interpretation of necessity in trade union cases see, Young, James and Webster v.

1240
See, Article 22.2 ICCPR; Article 26.2 and 40.2 ICRMW; Article 16.2 ACHR; Article 8.2, Proto-
col of San Salvador; Article 27.2 ACHPR; Article 11.2 ECHR (which adds as ground preven-
tion of disorder and crime); Article 35.2 ArCHR. See also, Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama,
IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 1236, paras. 156159, 168170; Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, ECtHR,
GC, Application No. 44158/98, Judgment of 17 February 2004, paras. 6465.

1241
See, Concluding Observations on the Republic of Korea, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 1160, para. 12;
Concluding Observations on El Salvador, CESCR, Report of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights to the UN Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/1997/22 (1997),
p. 34, para. 165; Concluding Observations on Kuwait, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1160, para. 38;
Concluding Observations on Costa Rica, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1041, para. 20; Concluding Ob-
servations on Mexico, CMW, op. cit., fn. 491, para. 36; Concluding Observations on Ecuador,
CMW, op. cit., fn. 502, para. 42; Concluding Observations on the Philippines, CMW, UN Doc.
CMW/C/PHL/CO/1, 14 July 2009, para. 3.

1242
Concluding Observations on El Salvador, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1241, para. 165; Concluding
Observations on Costa Rica, CESCR, op. cit., fn. 1041, para. 20

1243
Article 5(d)(ix) and (e)(ii) ICERD.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR and the ICCPR.
1244

It has also determined that many of the rights provided for by Article 5,
including freedom of association and the right to form and join trade
unions, must be guaranteed to all human beings regardless of their
migration status.
1245
Article 26 of the ICRMW also spells out the right to join trade unions,
while Article 40, which applies only to documented migrants and their
families, also includes the right to establish trade unions. The only ad-
ditional specifcation, in comparison with the freedom of association and
trade union rights guaranteed by general human rights and labour trea-
ties, is the right to seek the aid and assistance of any trade union.
1246

The Committee on Migrant Workers has stated that, although Article 26
does not provide for a right to establish trade unions for undocument-
ed migrant workers, if read together with other international human
rights instruments, may create broader obligations for States parties to
both instruments.
1247
ILO Convention No. 98 mandates States to protect workers from acts of
anti-union discrimination, including making the employment of a worker
subject to the condition that he or she shall not join a union or shall
relinquish trade union membership; or causing the dismissal of or oth-
erwise prejudicing a worker by reason of union membership or because
of participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the
consent of the employer, within working hours.
1248
The Geneva Refugee Convention establishes that [a]s regards
non-political and non-proft-making associations and trade unions the
Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their ter-
ritory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign
country, in the same circumstances.
1249
As noted above, the protection
offered by international human rights law is wider, because it also pro-
tects the freedom of association of undocumented migrants and asy-
lum-seekers.

1244
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30, op. cit., fn. 18, para. 2.

1245
See, ibid., paras. 3 and 35.

1246
Article 26.1(c) ICRMW. Article 8.1(a) of the Protocol of San Salvador is also declaratory
of customary international law and justiciable through the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights as from Article 19 of the same Protocol.

1247

1248
Article 1, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (C98), ILO (160 ratifca-
tions). See other Articles for more detail.

1249
ANNEX 1: THE CHOICE OF AN
INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM:
A CHECKLIST
I. Which mechanism you can use
a) Applicability of international obligations
1. What human rights treaties is the relevant State party to?
2. Have any reservations or interpretative declarations been made
by the State concerned?
3. Are all such reservations and declarations valid and permissible
(i.e. is it permitted by the treaty; is it contrary to the object and
purpose of the treaty?)
b) Temporal jurisdiction
1. Have the relevant treaties already entered into force?
2. Had the treaty entered into force before the facts of the case took
place?
3. If separate ratifcation or agreement is necessary for the individ-
ual or collective complaints mechanism relevant to the treaty, has
this taken place?
c) Territorial jurisdiction
1. Did the acts complained of take place within the territory of the
State concerned, or otherwise come under its authority or control
so as to fall within its jurisdiction?
2. Does the human rights body to which the complaint is to be sent
have jurisdiction over the State concerned?
d) Material jurisdiction
1. Do the facts on which the complaint is based constitute violations
of human rights treaty provisions?
2. Which mechanisms are competent to hear complaint on these
human rights claims?
e) Standing
1. Does the proposed applicant have standing to bring a case under
the individual or collective complaints mechanism concerned?
f) Time-limits
1. Is the case lodged within permitted time limits for the particular
international mechanism concerned? If not, are other internation-
al mechanisms still available?
II. Choice of mechanism: strategy
a) One or more bodies?
1. Is it possible to submit the case to one or more mechanisms?
2. Do any of the mechanisms exclude complaints that have been or
are being considered by others?
3. Can different elements of the same case be brought before differ-
ent bodies?
b) Which body is more convenient?
1. Under which mechanism has the case strongest chances of suc-
cess?
2. Which treaty or mechanism includes the strongest or most rele-
vant guarantees, or the strongest jurisprudence on the relevant
point?
3. Which mechanism provides the strongest system of interim mea-
sures if the case requires it? Are the interim measures of one or
another mechanism more respected by the State?
4. Which mechanism can provide the strongest remedies to the ap-
plicant?
5. Which mechanism assures the strongest system of enforcement
of fnal decisions?
c) Effect in the domestic system
1. Are the decisions of the court or tribunal concerned binding or
non-binding?
2. What is the effect of the mechanisms decisions on the national
system? Is there any possibility of re-opening national proceed-
ings following the decision of the international tribunal?
3. What is the political impact of the mechanisms decision in the
State concerned?
ANNEX 2: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REMEDIES AND THEIR USE
I. Using international mechanisms and remedies
There are a number of international mechanisms, judicial and non-judi-
cial, that may be available to migrants seeking remedies to violations of
legal venues to enforce rights.
International human rights mechanisms allowing individual petitions in-
clude:
Judicial mechanisms: International courts receive individual
petitions or applications, and have competence to interpret and
apply human rights instruments, declare whether the treaty has
been violated, and prescribe appropriate remedies in the individu-
al case considered. Their decisions are binding, and must be exe-
cuted by the concerned State. International human rights judicial
mechanisms include: the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on
Human and Peoples Rights.
Quasi-judicial mechanisms: These bodies have all the charac-
teristics of the judicial mechanisms, except that their decisions
are not binding. They include: the Human Rights Committee, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the Committee against Torture (CAT), the European
Committee on Social Rights (ECSR), the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the African Commission
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the Committee on
Migrant Workers (CMW), the Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) and
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
Non-judicial mechanisms: Non-judicial mechanisms are bodies
or organs that have no specific mandate to supervise a partic-
ular treaty and whose decisions or views are not binding. Their
legitimacy generally derives from the treaty establishing the in-
ternational or regional organisations from which they emanate,
rather than from a particular human rights treaty. This is the case
with the Special Procedures established by the UN Human Rights
Council.
1. Preliminary requirements
a) Jurisdiction (Temporal, material and territorial)
International judicial and quasi-judicial bodies can adjudicate on any
alleged violation according to the law subject to their jurisdiction. This
concept is not to be confused with the competence of a court or tri-
bunal to hear a particular case. In international law, jurisdiction of an
international body equates with the reach of international responsibility
of a State. It divides, therefore, into three categories: temporal ju-
risdiction (jurisdiction ratione temporisconcerning the period of time
within which the State is bound by the international obligation); mate-
rial jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione materiaeconcerning the limits of
the subject-matter of the State obligation), and territorial jurisdiction
(jurisdiction ratione lociconcerning the territorial reach of the States
responsibility).
i) Temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis)
The basic principle of international law is that an international mecha-
nism has jurisdiction to adjudicate on alleged violations of international
law that occurred after the obligation to respect the obligation entered
into force for the State concerned.
1250
This principle applies equally to
international human rights mechanisms, so that they have jurisdiction
only over facts or acts that arose only after the entry into force of the
relevant treaty for the State Party.
1251
However, the principle applies differently to different situations:
Instantaneous fact/act: the simplest situation occurs when the
fact or act to be contested is an instantaneous one. In this case,
it suffices to check whether the act occurred before or after the
entry into force of the relevant treaty;
1252
Continuous fact/act: when the breach of the obligation has a
continuing character, then the wrongful fact or act continues until
the situation of violation is ended. Examples include enforced dis-
appearances or arbitrary detentions, when the person continues
to be disappeared (his whereabouts continue to be unknown) or
detained even after the entry into force of the treaty, regardless

1250
See, Article 13, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. See, inter alia, Island of Palmas
(Netherlands/USA), UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), p. 829, at p. 845 (1928); Affaire
des navires Cape Horn Pigeon, James Hamilton Lewis, C.H. White et Kate and Anna, UNRIAA,
vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 66, at p. 69 (1902). See also, Northern Cameroons (Cameroon
v. United Kingdom), ICJ, Preliminary Objections, 2 December 1963, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 15,
at p. 35; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), ICJ, Preliminary Objections,
26 June 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 240, at pp. 253255, paras. 3136.

1251
See, X. v. Germany, ECommHR, Application No. 1151/61, Recuil des decisions, p. 119 (1961).

1252
See, Article 14.1, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
of whether the situation originated from an act/fact that occurred
before that date.
1253
This case must be distinguished from breach-
es of international obligations which occurred and ended before
the entry into force of the treaty but still have effects after the
entry into force of the treaty. In such cases, the mechanism will
however be able to adjudicate collateral violations: for example
the lack of investigation into responsibility for violations of human
rights law, if the State did not remedy it before the entry into
force of the treaty.
1254
Breach of obligation to prevent: this situation occurs when the
State has an obligation to prevent a given event, but fails to do so.
The breach extends over the entire period during which the event
continues and remains in violation of that obligation.
1255
ii) Material jurisdiction (ratione materiae)
This kind of jurisdiction relates to the treaty or the international obliga-
tion of which the international mechanism is the guardian. It means
that it is not possible to raise before an international mechanism human
rights violations that are not covered by the relevant treaty.
In assessing whether there is material jurisdiction, it should be borne in
mind that evolutive interpretation has led to an expansion of the scope
of certain human rights. For example, it is possible to argue against
a forced eviction under the ICCPR and the ECHR claiming a violation
of the right to respect for the home and for private and family life.
Also, the creation of conditions of life leading to a situation of desti-
tution might constitute a violation of the right to life (see, Box No. 14,
and Chapter 5, Section II.1(c)(iii)). The boundaries between civil and
political and social, economic and cultural rights, and among different
treaties must not be viewed strictly and a careful analysis of the mech-
anisms jurisprudence is recommended.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is competent ratione materi-
ae for breaches of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); the Committee against Torture (CAT) for the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) for the International Convention on the

1253
See, Blake v. Guatemala, IACtHR, Series C No. 36, Judgment of 24 January 1998, para. 67;
X. v. Switzerland, ECommHR, Application No. 7601/75, Admissibility Decision, 12 July 1976.
On continuing violations in the context of enforced disappearances, see, Serrano Cruz Sis-
ters v. El Salvador, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 853, paras. 100 and 105.

1254
See, Article 14.2, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. See, Lovelace v. Canada, CCPR,
Communication No. R.6/24, Views of 30 July 1981. See, Moldovan and Others (2) v. Roma-
nia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 104106.

1255
See, Article 14.3, ibid.
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD): the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW); and the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW)
for the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW); the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) for the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography (OP-CRC-SC), and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in
armed conficts (OP-CRC-AC); the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD) for the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD); the Committee on Enforced Disappearances
for the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance; and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) for the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
At a regional level, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is
competent to hear complaints referring to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The
European Committee on Social Rights (ESCR) is competent for collec-
tive complaints against the States Parties to the Additional Protocol
to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective
Complaints (Additional Protocol of 1995) and those who accepted the
collective complaint mechanism through a declaration under Article D
of the European Social Charter (revised). The ESCR is competent to
consider complaints only against those rights of the European Social
Charter by which the State Party has undertaken to be bound.
1256

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), established
by the OAS Charter,
1257
is competent
1258
to consider alleged violations
of American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American
Convention on Human Rights and of the right to establish and join trade
unions and the right to education under the Additional Protocol to the

1256
See, Article 11, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of
Collective Complaints (AP-ESC); and Article A (Part III), ESC(r).

1257
Article 106, Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS Charter).

1258
See, Article 23, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
approved by the Commission at its 137
th
regular period of sessions, held from 28 October to
13 November 2009, and modifed on 2 September 2011 and during the 147
th
Regular Period
of Sessions, held from 8 to 22 March 2013, for entry into force on 1 August 2013 (IACHR
Rules of Procedure). Other human rights treaties of IACHR competence are the Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disap-
pearance of Persons, and/or the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment
and Eradication of Violence Against Women Convention of Belm do Par.
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Protocol of San Salvador.
1259
The Commission has
found also that Articles 26 and 29 ACHR may allow this body to con-
sider violations of economic, social and cultural rights contained in the
Protocol of San Salvador.
1260
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) has subject-matter jurisdiction for violations of the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) only against States that have ac-
cepted it through a declaration done under Article 62 ACHR. It can also
adjudicate on violations of the right to establish and join trade unions
and the right to education under the Protocol of San Salvador.
1261
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) is com-
petent to hear individual complaints for violations of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) against the States Parties.
1262

The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights has the competence
to hear complaints for breach of the African Charter and of any other
human rights instrument ratifed by a State Party to the Protocol estab-
lishing the Court.
1263
iii) Territorial jurisdiction (ratione loci)
The jurisdiction ratione loci establishes the geographical reach of the
States human rights obligations. Most of the time, an alien will have
clearly entered the States jurisdiction when he or she accesses its ter-
ritory. It is indisputable that States must guarantee, secure and protect
the human rights of everyone who is on their territory.
1264
This also
occurs when the alien is present in an international zone or zone
dattente of an airport.
1265
However, States do not only have the obligation to secure and protect
human rights to everyone that is present on their territory, but also to

1259
See, Article 19.6, Protocol of San Salvador. See, National Association of Ex-Employees v.
Peru, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 892, para. 69; Pensioners of the National Agricultural Development
Bank (BANDESA) v. Guatemala, IACHR, Petition No. 138006, Report No. 102/09, Admis-
sibility Decision, 29 October 2009, para. 24; Tena Colunga et al. v. Mexico, IACHR, Petition
No. 2582/02, Report No. 44/04, Admissibility Decision, 13 October 2004, paras. 3940;
Meneses de Jimnez v. Colombia, IACHR, Petition No. 277902, Report No. 50/10, Admissi-
bility Decision, 18 March 2010, paras. 4546.

1260
See, Sanchez Villalobos and Others v. Costa Rica, IACHR, Petition No. 12.361, Report
No. 25/04, Admissibility Decision, 11 March 2004, para. 52; Meneses de Jimnez v. Colom-
bia, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 1259, para. 46.

1261
See, Article 19.6, Protocol of San Salvador. See, Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, IACtHR,
op. cit., fn. 1236, para. 97.

1262
Article 55 ACHPR.

1263
Article 3, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (P-ACHPR on African Court).

1264
Article 2.1 ICCPR; Article 2.1 CRC; Article 7 ICRMW; Article 1 ECHR; Article 1.1 ACHR;
Article 3.1 ArCHR.

1265
Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45, paras. 52-53.
all persons under their jurisdiction. The term jurisdiction has a wider
reach than the national territory of the State. It applies to all persons
who fall under the authority or the effective control of the States au-
thorities or of other people acting on its behalf, and to all extraterritorial
zones, whether of a foreign State or not, where the State exercises ef-
fective control.
1266
Furthermore, where persons or groups acting under
State authority act outside their States territory, so as to bring victims
of violations under their authority, bring the person or the property
concerned by the acts within the States jurisdiction, regardless of the
territory in which the acts took place or where the person or the prop-
erty were present.
1267
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has found that ju-
risdiction had extraterritorial reach in various situations, even outside
the territory of States Parties to the European Convention of Human
Rightsincluding in northern Iraq,
1268
Kenya,
1269
Sudan,
1270
Iran,
1271
in
a UN neutral buffer zone,
1272
and in international waters.
1273
Human

1266
See, fn. 46.

1267
See, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, ICJ, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 109; Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 46,
paras. 12.112.3; Ciliberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 46; General Com-
ment No. 31, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 10; Issa and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 46, para. 71; calan v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 47, para. 91; Ramirez v. France,
ECommHR, op. cit., fn. 47; W.M. v. Denmark, ECommHR, Application No. 17392/90, Ad-
missibility Decision, 14 October 1992, paras. 12; Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain,
ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 12747/87, 26 June 1992, para. 91; Loizidou and Others v.
Turkey, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para. 62; Ilascu and Others
v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 48787/99, 4 July 2001;
Freda v. Italy, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 8916/80, Admissibility Decision, 7 Oc-
tober 1980 para. 3; X. v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Application No. 7547/76, Admissib-
lity Decision, 15 December 1977, para. 81; X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECommHR,
Application No. 1611/62, Admissiblity Decision, 25 September 1965; Cyprus v. Turkey,
ECommHR, Plenary, Applications nos. 6780/746950/75, 26 May 1975, paras. 8 and 10;
Hess v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Application No. 6231/73, Admissibility Decision, 28 May
1975; X and Y v. Switzerland, ECommHR, Applications Nos. 7289/757349/76, Admissibility
Decision, 14 July 1977, para. 2; W. v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Application No. 9348/81,
28 February 1983, para. 5; Victor Saldao v. Argentina, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 17;
Coard et al. v. United States, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 37; Al-Skeini and Others v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, GC, Application no. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 133142;
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 7382. See also, Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights, 29 February 2012, available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/12/Maastricht-ETO-Principles- ENG- booklet.pdf; and their commentary avail-
able at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HRQMaastricht-
Maastricht-Principles-on-ETO.pdf.

1268
Issa and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46

1269
calan v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 47.

1270
Ramirez v. France, ECommHR, op. cit., fn. 47.

1271
Pad and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 47.

1272
Isaak and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 47.

1273
Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46; and, Women on Waves and
Others v. Portugal, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46.
rights obligations apply in unmodifed form to a State exercising ex-
tra-territorial jurisdictionfor example, an occupying power, a military
base abroad or a state operating an extra-territorial detention centre
as has been authoritatively affrmed regarding comparable obligations
under CAT, the ICCPR, the ECHR,
1274
by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights
1275
and the Refugee Convention.
1276

Of particular relevance for migrants is the fact that the States juris-
diction may extend in certain situations to international waters. The
IACHR has found that the interception and return of asylum-seekers,
on the high seas, to their country of origin constituted a violation
of their right to seek asylum in a foreign country, as granted by the
ADRDM and the ACHR.
1277
The Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights has clearly stated that measures of interception of
boats, including on the high seas, fall within the jurisdiction of the
State implementing the interception. From the moment of effective
control of the boat, all the persons on it fall within the jurisdiction of
the intercepting State, which must secure and protect their human
rights.
1278
The Committee against Torture has also held that the sei-
zure of a boat in international waters, and even the control over the
passengers in foreign territory in order to proceed with their identif-
cation and repatriation, attracted the jurisdiction of the State which
had control over them.
1279
The same principles apply in the context of
rescue operations at sea, analysed in Chapter 1.
In a case concerning human traffcking, the European Court of Human
Rights has held that there jurisdiction was established for the State of
origin of the person traffcked in so far as its obligations to protect the
concerned person from traffcking were engaged.
1280

1274
See, inter alia, Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 391; Al-Skeini
and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1267, paras. 133142.

1275
See, Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 163, 168 and 171.

1276
Concluding Observations on USA, CAT, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 20; Concluding Observations
on USA, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 323; UNHCR, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-re-
foulement, Opinion, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC, Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, paras. 6267,
concludes that: the principle of non-refoulement will apply to the conduct of State offcials
or those acting on behalf of the State wherever this occurs, whether beyond the national
territory of the State in question, at border posts or other points of entry, in international
zones, at transit points, etc. See also, para. 242. See further, UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on
the Extraterritorial Application, op. cit., fn. 293; CAT, General Comment No. 2, op. cit., fn. 31,
paras. 7, 16 and 19; Nowak and McArthur, op. cit., fn. 391, p.129, para.4; p.147, para. 72
and p. 199, para. 1801; CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 1011;
Concluding Observations on United Kingdom, CAT, op. cit., fn. 391, paras. 4(b) and 5(e).

1277
Haitian Interdictions Case, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 156, 157 and 163.

1278
See, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 46, paras. 7382; Medvedyev and
Others v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 51, paras. 6267.

1279
J.H.A. v. Spain, CAT, op. cit., fn. 266, para. 8.2.

1280
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 236, paras. 206208.
b) Standing
The terms locus standi or standing address the question of who is
entitled to enter an application or submit a complaint for a human rights
violation before an international mechanism. Whilst some internation-
al mechanisms with a judicial or quasi-judicial character provide for
standing for individuals to bring complaints, others allow for collective
complaints by groups.
Individual Complaints: some mechanisms allow only for the
victims of a violation, or for those petitioning on his or her behalf
to lodge a complaint. Certain mechanisms allow for general hu-
man rights NGOs to lodge a complaint on behalf of victims, even
without their direct authorisation, although it must be demon-
strated that it would have been impossible or very difficult to
obtain authorisation for reasons independent from the victims
themselves.
Collective Complaints: This mechanism allows organisations to
challenge a general legal or factual situation which gives rise to or
has the potential to give rise to human rights violations, without
naming individual complaints.
i) Standing to bring individual application: the meaning of victim
In individual complaints mechanisms, standing is generally accorded to
persons who are victims of a human rights violation. Victims may be
either direct or indirect. A victim is generally a person directly affected
by the violation of the human rights concerned.
1281
However, particular
cases might arise when the direct cause and effect is more blurred. For
example, the existence of a law that potentially impedes the individual
in asserting his or her rights, although the person has not yet breached
the law, may put the individual in the situation of victim, if the risk
of the law being applied when the action contrary to it is taken is more
than a theoretical possibility.
1282
Furthermore, laws might violate the in-
dividuals right even when the individual cannot be aware of it, because
the law makes such awareness impossible, for example in the case of
some types of surveillance.
1283
Individuals may also be indirect victims

1281
Companies might be victims too, but due to the scope of this Guide we will deal only with
individuals.

1282
See, Mauritian Women Case, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 55; Toonen v. Australia, CCPR, Communi-
cation No. 488/1992, Views of 31 March 1994, paras. 8.2 and 9. See, Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 7525/76, Judgment of 22 October 1981; Norris
v. Ireland, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 10581/83, Judgment of 26 October 1988; Open
Door and Well Woman v. Ireland, ECtHR, Plenary, Applications nos. 14234/88; 14235/88,
Judgment of 29 October 1992; Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Appli-
cations Nos. 7511/76; 7743/76, Report of 16 May 1980.

1283
Klass and Others v. Germany, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 5029/71, Judgment of 6 Sep-
tember 1978.
of a violation or might suffer from what could be called collateral vi-
olations. It is recognised, for example, that the relatives of a victim
of torture or disappearance might fnd their right not to be subject to
ill-treatment violated by the mere fact of having been exposed to this
situation.
1284
Finally, in cases of expulsion which might infringe a States
human rights obligations, because they could be contrary to the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement or disproportionally interfere with the right to
respect for family life, an individual can be a victim despite the fact that
potential and not actual violations are at issue (see, Chapter 2).
ii) Mechanisms for individual complaints
Universal treaty bodies do not provide for collective complaints. The
general rule is that complaints may be submitted by individuals who
claim to be victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the rights
set forth in human rights treaty for which the treaty body has compe-
tence.
1285
If the violation concerns a group of people, they can submit
as a group.
1286
The complaint may be submitted by the individual per-
sonally or by a third party acting on behalf of the individual or groups

1284
See, Quinteros Almeida v. Uruguay, CCPR, Communication No. 107/1981, Views of 21 July
1983, para. 14; Staselovich and Lyashkevich v. Belarus, CCPR, Communication No. 887/1999,
Views of 3 April 2003, para. 9.2. See, Kurt v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 724.

1285
See, Article 1, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(OP-ICCPR); Article 2 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution No. 63/117, UN Doc. A/RES/63/117,
10 December 2008 (OP-ICESCR); Article 2, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (OP-CEDAW); Rule 113(a), Rules of
Procedure of the Committee against Torture, UN Doc. CAT/C/3/Rev.6, 13 August 2013 (CAT
Rules of Procedure); Rule 91(b), Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD Rules of Procedure). See also, Rule 68.1, Rules and Procedures of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc. A/56/38 (SUPP),
as amended by A/62/38 (SUPP, Chapter V) (CEDAW Rules of Procedure); Article 5, Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure (OP-
CRC-CP); Rule 13, Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure, UN Doc. CRC/C/62/3, 16 April 2013 (CRC
Rules of Procedure); Rule 4, Provisional Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/49/3,
15 January 2013 (CESCR Provisional Rules of Procedure); Article 1, Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OP-CRPD); Rule 69, Rules of Procedure
of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc. CRPD/C/4/2, 13 August
2010 (CRPD Rules of Procedure); Rule 68, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances, UN Doc. CED/C/1, 22 June 2012 (CED Rules of Procedure).

1286
This requirement, valid for all treaty bodies, is made explicit in Article 2 OP-ICESCR and
Article 2 OP-CEDAW. See also, Rule 68.1, CEDAW Rules of Procedure; Article 5, Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure, not
yet into force (OP-CRC-CP); Rule 13, Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure, UN Doc. CRC/C/62/3,
16 April 2013 (CRC Rules of Procedure); Rule 4, Provisional Rules of Procedure under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UN Doc. E/C.12/49/3, 15 January 2013 (CESCR Provisional Rules of Procedure); Article 1,
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OP-CRPD);
Rule 69, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
UN Doc. CRPD/C/4/2, 13 August 2010 (CRPD Rules of Procedure).
alleging to be victims, with their authorisation.
1287
Another issue is
whether third persons or entities may act on behalf of the individuals or
groups claiming to be victims, without their authorisation. Treaty bodies
generally allow for this on condition that the person or entity applying
must justify the absence of authorisation, for example, because the vic-
tim is in a particular situation of risk or vulnerability which prevents him
or her from availing of the communication procedure, or because the
violation is so massive that it is impossible to obtain the authorisation
of all the people affected.
1288

The European Court of Human Rights receives applications from var-
ious entitiesindividual persons, NGOs, or group of individualswho
claim to be a victim (either direct or indirect) of the alleged violation.
1289

Applications cannot be anonymous, but the Court may grant leave to
anonymity of the claim in its communication to other parties or the
public, when the applicant has adduced suffcient reasons to justify this
departure from the rule.
1290
As for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, any per-
son or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally rec-
ognised in one or more Member States of the Organization of American
States (OAS), may lodge petitions containing complaints of violation
of this Convention by a State.
1291
In practice, however, the IACHR fre-
quently requests that the author of any complaint be either a victim
or a relative of a victim or have a mandate to act by the victim or by

1287
See, Rule 96(b), Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.10,
11 January 2012 (CCPR Rules of Procedure); Article 2 OP-ICESCR; Rule 113(a), CAT Rules of
Procedure; Rule 91(b), CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 2 OP-CEDAW. See also, Rule 68(1),
CEDAW Rules of Procedure; Article 5, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on a Communications Procedure, not yet into force (OP-CRC-CP); Rule 13, Rules
of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
Communications Procedure, UN Doc. CRC/C/62/3, 16 April 2013 (CRC Rules of Procedure);
Rule 4, Provisional Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/49/3, 15 January 2013
(CESCR Provisional Rules of Procedure); Article 1, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OP-CRPD); Rule 69, Rules of Procedure of the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc. CRPD/C/4/2, 13 August 2010 (CRPD Rules
of Procedure); Rule 68, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances,
UN Doc. CED/C/1, 22 June 2012 (CED Rules of Procedure).

1288
See, Rule 96(b), CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 2 OP-ICESCR; Rule 91(b), CERD Rules of Pro-
cedure; and Article 2, OP-CEDAW. See also, Rule 68.1, CEDAW Rules of Procedure. See, Rule 13,
CRC Rules of Procedure: communications may be submitted on behalf of the alleged victim(s)
without such express consent, provided that the author(s) can justify her/his/their action and
the Committee deems it to be in the best interests of the child. If possible, the alleged victim(s)
on whose behalf the communication is presented may be informed of the communication and
her/his/their views shall be given due weight in accordance with her/his/their age and maturity.

1289
Article 34 ECHR.

1290
Rule 47.4, Rules of the Court, ECtHR, 1 January 2014, Strasbourg (ECtHR Rules of Proce-
dure). See for details of applications, the entire Rule 47.

1291
Article 44 ACHR.
a relative of the victim. The Commission has clearly stated that [t]he
applicant must claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention, or
must appear before the Commission as a representative of a putative
victim of a violation of the Convention by a State Party. It is not suff-
cient for an applicant to claim that the mere existence of a law violates
her rights under the American Convention, it is necessary that the law
has been applied to her detriment.
1292
iii) Mechanisms for collective complaints: ECSR
The collective complaints system of the European Committee on Social
Rights does not provide for a right of individual application. It does con-
fer the standing to make a complaint on certain organisations, namely:
International organisations of employers and trade unions;
Other international non-governmental organisations which have
consultative status with the Council of Europe and have been
placed on a list established for this purpose by the Governmental
Committee;
Representative national organisations of employers and trade
unions within the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party against
which they have lodged a complaint;
National non-governmental organisations with competence in the
matters governed by the Charter, which have been allowed by the
Contracting State of origin to lodge complaints against it.
1293
iv) Individual and collective complaints: the ACHPR
Article 55 ACHPR does not place any restrictions on who can submit
cases to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.
The Commission has interpreted this provision as giving locus standi to
victims and their families, as well as NGOs and others acting on their
behalf, even when they are not representatives of the victims. Indeed,
for the African Commission, the African Charter does not call for the
identifcation of the victims of a Communication. According to the terms
of Article 56(1), only the identifcation of the author or authors of the
Communication is required.
1294
This position is an established principle
of the African Commissions jurisprudence.
1295

1292
Montoya Gonzlez v. Costa Rica, IACHR, Case 11.553, Report No. 48/96, Admissibility Deci-
sion, 16 October 1996, para. 28.

1293
Articles 1 and 2, AP-ESC.

1294
FIDH, National Human Rights Organisation (ONDH) and Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense
des Droits de lHomme (RADDHO) v. Senegal, ACommHPR, Communication No. 304/2005,
40
th
Ordinary, 1529 November 2006, para. 40.

1295
See, as reference, Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, ACommHPR, op. cit.,
fn. 1006. See also, Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, ACommHPR, Communication
No. 266/2003, 45
th
Ordinary Session, 1327 May 2009, para. 67.
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) has
established an African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child to monitor its implementation by State Parties.
1296
Article 44
ACRWC provides that the Committee may receive communication, from
any person, group or non-governmental organization recognized by the
Organization of African Unity, by a Member State, or the United Nations
relating to any matter covered by this Charter.
1297
The Committee is
therefore competent to hear both individual and collective complaints.
v) Mechanisms of indirect access
Individuals cannot directly bring a complaint to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights or the African Court on Human and Peoples
Rights. They generally take cases brought by a lower human rights
mechanism (IACHR or ACHPR) or by a State.
For the Inter-American Court of Human Rights only a State Party
and the Inter-American Commission have the right to submit a case
to the Court.
1298
However, in cases before the Court, alleged victims,
their next of kin or their duly accredited representatives are allowed
to participate in the proceedings by submitting pleadings, motions and
evidence, autonomously, throughout the proceedings. They may also
request the adoption of provisional measures.
1299
The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights accepts only cas-
es submitted to the Court by the Commission, the State Party which
has lodged a complaint to the Commission, the State Party against
which the complaint has been lodged at the Commission, the State
Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation, and by African
Intergovernmental Organisations. The Court may entitle relevant NGOs
with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute
the cases directly before it.
1300
NGOs will therefore need to have previ-
ous approval by the African Commission, while individuals will have to
ask the permission of the Court, most probably on a case-by-case basis.
The Interim Rules of Procedures do not say that the Court may entitle,
but that these last two kind of applicants are entitled to submit cases
to the Court, suggesting that, in its work, the Court will not unfavour-
ably exercise discretion on granting locus standi to individuals.
1301
The

1296
Article 32 ACRWC.

1297
Article 44.1 ACRWC.

1298
Article 61.1 ACHR.

1299
See, Article 27, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, approved
by the Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of Sessions, held from 16 to 28 November
2009 (IACtHR Rules of Procedure).

1300
Article 5, P-ACHPR on African Court.

1301
Article 33, Interim Rules of the Court, done at Arusha, Tanzania, 20 June 2008, entered into
force on 20 June 2008 (ACtHPR Rules of Procedure).
provisions will not change in the new Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights.
1302

2. Admissibility requirements
Admissibility requirements must be fulflled before a complaint is exam-
ined on the merits. They are contained in the human rights treaty estab-
lishing the competence of the human rights body to hear individual or
collective complaints. Generally, these requirements are very similar for
all human rights bodies and, even when some are not specifcally pro-
vided for in the treaty, they are usually upheld by the competent human
rights body on the basis of the uniform interpretation of international
human rights law. As for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, since these bodies do
not hear individual complaints directly, the admissibility criteria are the
same as those of their lower bodies, the IACHR and the ACHPR.
a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies
It is a general standard of international human rights law that, before
bringing a case before an international legal mechanism, an applicant must
have frst exhausted the domestic remedies available. The rationale of the
principle lies in the fact that, as it is the international responsibility of the
State as a whole that is challenged, the State must have had the possibility
to redress that human rights violation domestically, before an international
forum should be made available. However, only those remedies that are
effective need to be exhausted. If several effective and adequate remedies
are available, it is suffcient to exhaust only one of them.
1303
A domestic remedy is adequate only when it is able to address that
particular human rights violation according to international human rights
law standards.
1304
A complaint under a substantial provision containing a
right under international human rights law must be arguable before the

1302
Article 30, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted
by the 11
th
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt,
1 July 2008 (not yet in force) (ACJHR Statute).

1303
See, T.W. v. Malta, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 25644/94, Judgment of 29 April 1999, para.
34; Iatridis v. Greece, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 31107/96, Judgment of 25 March 1999,
para. 47. A comprehensive restatement of the European Conventions admissibility crite-
ria together with the European Courts jurisprudence is available in the Practical Guide on
Admissibility Criteria produced by the Research Division of the European Court of Human
Rights, and available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf.

1304
See, Danyal Shafq v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 687, para. 6.4; Vlez Loor v. Panama,
IACHR, Case 92-04, Report No. 95/06, Admissibility Decision, 23 October 2006, para. 36;
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 799, para. 64; Godinez Cruz v. Hon-
duras, IACtHR, Series C No. 5, Judgment of 20 January 1989, para. 67; Garbi and Corrales v.
Honduras, IACtHR, Series C, No. 6, Judgment of 15 March 1989, para. 88; Salah Sheekh v. the
Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, para. 121; Soldatenko v. Ukraine, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 361,
para. 49; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, para. 446.
domestic remedial mechanism.
1305
It is not necessary that the specifc ar-
ticle of the human rights treaty be used as a ground of judicial review. It
is suffcient that the substance of the human rights claim be arguable.
1306

The domestic remedy must also be effective, i.e. able to ascertain
and redress the potential violation once this is established. It must have
the power to give binding orders that reverse the situation of viola-
tion of the persons rights or, if that is impossible, provide adequate
reparations. Reparation includes, as appropriate, restitution, compen-
sation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
1307

Remedies whose decisions do not have binding force or whose decisions
or the implementation of them are at the discretion of a political body
are not deemed to be effective.
1308
Furthermore, particularly in cases of
expulsions, the remedy must have the power to suspend the situation
of potential violation when the lack of suspension would lead to irrepa-
rable harm/irreversible effects for the applicant while the case is being
considered.
1309
The remedy must also have certain characteristics of due process
of law.
1310
It must be independent, which means that it must not be
subject to interference by the authorities against which the complaint
is brought.
1311
It must afford due process of law for the protection of
the right or rights alleged to be violated, must be accessible by every-

1305
Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 99.

1306
See, Fressoz and Roire v. France, ECtHR, GC, Application No. 29183/95, Judgment of 21 Jan-
uary 1999, paras. 3337; Castells v. Spain, ECtHR, Application No. 11798/85, Judgment of
23 April 1992, paras. 2432.

1307
Articles 1923, UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation.
See also, ICJ, Practitioners Guide No. 2, op. cit., fn. 480, Chapters VI and VII.

1308
See, Madafferi and Madafferi v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 460, para. 8.4; C. v. Australia,
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 350, para. 7.3; L.Z. B. v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 304/2006,
Views of 15 November 2007, para. 6.4; L.M.V.R.G. and M.A.B.C. v. Sweden, CAT, Com-
munication No. 64/1997, Views of 19 November 1997, para. 4.2; Shamayev and Others v.
Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, para. 446. However, there must be evidence
in practice that the discretion of the political power does not lead to a predictable decision
according to legal standards. It must be evident that the discretion is absolute. Otherwise,
the applicant has a duty to try to exhaust also that remedy. See, Danyal Shafq v. Austral-
ia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 687, para. 6.5. See also, Article 22.5(b) CAT; Article 4.1 OP-CEDAW;
Article 77.3(b) ICRMW.

1309
See, Dar v. Norway, CAT, Communication No. 249/2004, Views of 16 May 2007, paras. 6.46.5;
Tebourski v. France, CAT, op. cit., fn. 353, paras. 7.37.4; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR,
op. cit., fn. 309, para. 90; Jabari v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 40035/98, Admissibility
Decision, 28 October 1999; Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 25894/94,
Judgment of 19 February 1998, paras. 47 and 48; Soldatenko v. Ukraine, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 361, para. 49; Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 101; Gebremedhin v.
France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 602, paras. 6667.

1310
See, Article 46 ACHR; and Article 31, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1311
See, CCPR, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 15; Keenan v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 769, para. 122; Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 101;
Judicial guarantees in states of emergency, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, 6 October
1987, para. 24.
one, and must not constitute a denial of justice.
1312
This will require
the provision of free legal advice, where necessary to ensure access
to the procedure.
1313
The remedy must afford the applicant suffcient
time to prepare the case, so as to allow a realistic possibility of using
the remedy.
1314
A particular situation arises under the Committee on Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD). Under the ICERD, any State Party may
establish a national body to consider petitions regarding violation of
ICERD rights.
1315
In countries where such bodies exist, before his or
her communication can be considered as admissible, the complainant
must frst demonstrate that he or she did not obtain satisfaction from
this body.
1316

i) Exceptions to the principle
There are situations in which an applicant is not required to exhaust do-
mestic remedies. In general, this arises where the remedy lacks effective-
ness, adequateness, or due process of law characteristics. Below we list
the most typical cases of exception to the rule of the exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies, although other situations may also arise where exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies is not required. A remedy need not be pursued:
If it can be incontrovertibly proven that it was bound to fail.
1317

This might occur when the remedy is subject to a consistent prac-
tice or jurisprudence, or the legal system has a normative frame-
work, which makes it virtually impossible for the individual case
to succeed.
1318
If the legal system as such fails to provide conditions for
the effectiveness of the remedy, e.g. because of lack of effec-

1312
See, Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 1304, para. 36. On access, see also, Conclud-
ing Observations on Mexico, CMW, op. cit., fn. 491, paras. 2526; Concluding Observations
on Egypt, CMW, op. cit., fn. 1074, paras. 2223; Concluding Observations on Bolivia, CMW,
op. cit., fn. 502, paras. 2324; Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR, Application No. 6289/73, Judgment
of 9 October 1979.

1313
Ibid., para. 45.

1314
See, Muminov v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 343, para. 90; Bahaddar v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1309, para. 45; Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 364, para. 8.2.

1315
Article 14.2 ICERD. However, this provision is not utilised in practice.

1316
Article 14.5 ICERD. See also, Rule 91(e), CERD Rules of Procedure.

1317
See, Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 89; Kleyn and Others v. the Neth-
erlands, ECtHR, GC, Applications Nos. 39343/9839651/9843147/9846664/99, Judg-
ment of 6 May 2003, para. 156; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317,
paras. 121124;

1318
See, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 317, paras. 121124; Kleyn and
Others v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1317, para. 156; Johnston and Others v. Ire-
land, ECtHR, Plenary, Application No. 9697/82, Judgment of 18 December 1986, para. 44;
Open Door and Well Woman v. Ireland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1282, paras. 4752; Keegan v.
Ireland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 200, para. 39.
tive investigation, or where it is a consistent practice not to follow
or implement court orders in particular situations, or where there
is a situation of conflict or impunity.
1319
The European Court has
held that remedies where the granting of relief is purely discre-
tionary need not be exhausted.
1320
If the process to obtain or access to the remedy is unreasonably
prolonged.
1321

If the victim does not have access to the remedy due to a lack
of legal representation, whether because of the unavailability of
legal aid, threat of reprisals, or restrictions on access to lawyers
in detention. This doctrine has been developed by the European
Court of Human Rights,
1322
the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights
1323
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights.
1324
The ACHPR has also found a remedy to be inacces-
sible for a group of Sierra Leonean refugees expelled by Guinea
because they would have been in constant danger of reprisals
and punishment, they constituted an impractical number of po-
tential plaintiffs for the capacity of the judicial system, and the
exhaustion of Guinean remedies would have required them to
return to a country where they suffered persecution.
1325

1319
See, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937, paras. 6977; Isayeva, Vu-
supova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Applications nos. 57947/0057948/0057949/00, Judg-
ment of 24 February 2005, paras. 143153; A.B. v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application
No. 37328/97, Judgment of 29 January 2002, paras. 6374; Velasquez Rodriguez v. Hon-
duras, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 799, para. 68; and, IHRDA v. Republic of Angola, ACommHPR,
op. cit., fn. 395, para. 39, where the swift execution of the expulsion which did not even allow
the applicant to gather their belonging was enough evidence of the impossibility to seize and
exhaust domestic remedies. See also, ZLHR and IHRD v. Zimbabwe, ACommHPR, op. cit.,
fn. 395, para. 56. See also, Article 46 ACHR, and Article 31, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1320
Buckley v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Application No. 20348/92, Admissibility decision,
3 March 1994.

1321
See, Zundel v. Canada, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 503, para. 6.3; Z.U.B.S. v. Australia, CERD, Com-
munication No. 6/1995, Views of 25 January 2000, para. 6.4; Vlez Loor v. Panama, IACHR,
op. cit., fn. 1304, para. 36; Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 799,
para. 93; Tanli v. Turkey, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No. 26129/95, Admissibility De-
cision, 5 March 1996. See also, Articles 2 and 5.2(b) OP-ICCPR; Article 3.1 OP-ICESCR;
Article 22.5(b) CAT; Rule 113(e), CAT Rules of Procedure; Article 14.7(a) ICERD; Rule 91(e),
CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 4.1 OP-CEDAW; Article 77.3(b) ICRMW; Article 7(e)
OP-CRC-CP; Rule 16, CRC Rules of Procedure; Article 2(d) OP-CRPD; Article 31.2(d) CED;
Article 46 ACHR; Article 31, IACHR Rules of Procedure; and Article 56.5 ACHPR.

1322
Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1312; Reed v. United Kingdom, ECommHR, Plenary,
Application No. 7630/76, Admissibility Decision, 6 December 1979; calan v. Turkey, ECtHR,
GC, op. cit., fn. 47.

1323
See, Exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90,
10 August 1990, paras. 3035. See also, Article 46 ACHR, and Article 31, IACHR Rules of
Procedure.

1324
Dr. Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, ACommHPR, Communication No. 235/2000, 46
th
Ordi-
nary Session, 1125 November 2009, paras. 116117.

1325
AIHRD v. Republic of Guinea, ACommHPR, op. cit., fn. 578, paras. 3236.
Whenever there are doubts as to the effectiveness, adequateness, im-
partiality or independence of a remedy, mere doubts about the effec-
tiveness of local remedies or the prospect of fnancial costs involved
1326

do not absolve the applicant from pursuing them. However, where an
applicant is advised by counsel that an appeal offers no prospects of
success, that appeal does not constitute an effective remedy.
1327
b) Time limitations
The Human Rights Committee provides no time limits for the com-
munication of the complaint. However, in case of a prolonged delay
from the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee will require
a reasonable justifcation for it. Otherwise, it will declare the complaint
inadmissible for abuse of the right of submission.
1328
It has recently
restated this approach in its Rules of Procedure where it is established
that a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submis-
sion, when it is submitted after 5 years from the exhaustion of domestic
remedies (. . .), or, where applicable, after 3 years from the conclu-
sion of another procedure of international investigation or settlement,
unless there are reasons justifying the delay taking into account all
the circumstances of the communication.
1329
The Committee against
Torture does not apply a specifc time limit, but has stated that it will
not admit communication received after an unreasonably prolonged
period.
1330
Neither the OP-CEDAW, the Committee on Enforced
Disappearance nor the OP-CRPD impose a time limit, but it is likely
that it will follow the Human Rights Committees jurisprudence. The
OP-ICESCR and the OP-CRC-CP will require a time limit of one year
after the exhaustion of the domestic remedies, unless the applicant
can demonstrate that it was not possible to submit the communication
within that time.
1331
CERD provides that the communication must be
submitted within six months of the exhaustion of domestic remedies,
including the national CERD body, except in cases of duly verifed
exceptional circumstances.
1332

1326
A. v. Australia, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 656, para. 6.4; Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit.,
fn. 309, para. 89; see, inter alia, Pellegrini v. Italy, ECtHR, Application No. 77363/01, Ad-
missibility Decision, 26 May 2005; MPP Golub v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Application No. 6778/05,
Admissibility decision of 18 October 2005; and Milosevic v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Applica-
tion No. 77631/01, Admissibility decision of 19 March 2002.

1327
Na v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 309, para. 89; Selvanayagam v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR, No. 57981/00, Admissibility decision of 12 December 2002; McFeeley v. United King-
dom, ECommHR, op. cit., fn. 4061, p. 44.

1328
Article 3 OP-ICCPR. See, Gobin v. Mauritius, CCPR, Communication No. 787/1997, Views of
20 August 2001, para. 6.3.

1329
Rule 96(c), CCPR Rules of Procedure.

1330
Rule 113(f), CAT Rules of Procedure.

1331
Article 3.2(a) OP-ICESCR; Article 7(h), OP-CRC-CP.

1332
Article 14.5 ICERD; Rule 91(f), CERD Rules of Procedure.
The European Court of Human Rights may only deal with the matter if
it is submitted to the Court within a period of six months after exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
1333
The date of submission is the date on which
an application form satisfying the [formal] requirements of [Rule 47] is
sent to the Court. The date of dispatch shall be the date of the post-
mark. Where it fnds it justifed, the Court may nevertheless decide that
a different date shall be considered to be the date of introduction.
1334

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requires that the
petition or communication must be lodged within a period of six months
from the date on which the party alleging violation of his or her rights has
been notifed of the decision that exhausted the domestic remedies. In
those cases in which the exceptions to the requirement of prior exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies are applicable, the petition shall be presented
within a reasonable period of time. For this purpose, the Commission con-
siders the date on which the alleged violation of rights occurred and the
circumstances of each case.
1335
The African Commission on Human
and Peoples Rights rules provide that the communications must be
submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are
exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter.
1336
c) Duplication of procedures or similar requirements
Generally, a complaint will be inadmissible if the same matter has al-
ready been examined by the human rights body or has been or is being
examined under another procedure of international investigation or set-
tlement.
1337
This requirement must however be interpreted restrictively.
A complaint can be introduced if the case submitted to another body was
submitted by a third party without authorisation by the victim or a family
member, if the human rights violations claimed were different, if it raised
different factual allegations than the ones presented, or if the complaint
was sent to a non-judicial body, such as a Special Rapporteur.
1338

1333
Article 35.1 ECHR. Where there are no available domestic remedies, the case should be
submitted within six months of the facts complained of. For an extensive explanation of
the six month requirement, see Lutete Kemevuako v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application
No. 65938/09, Admissibility decision of 1 June 2010.

1334
Rule 47.6, ECtHR Rules of Procedure. See rule 47 below at fn. 1354.

1335
See also, Article 46.2, ACHR, and Article 32, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1336
Article 56.6 ACHPR.

1337
Article 5.2(a) OP-ICCPR; Rule 96(e), CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 3.2(c) OP-ICESCR; Article
22.5(a) CAT; Rule 113(d), CAT Rules of Procedure; Article 4.2(a) OP-CEDAW; Article 77.3(a)
ICRMW; Article 7(d), OP-CRC-CP; Article 2(c), OP-CRPD; Article 31.2(c), CED; Article 35.2(b)
ECHR; Articles 46 and 47 ACHR; Article 33, IACHR Rules of Procedure; Article 56.7 ACHPR.

1338
See, in treaty law, Article 56.7 ACHPR. See also, on identity of applicants, Folgero and
Others v. Norway, ECtHR, Application No. 15472/02, Judgment of 29 June 2007; on dif-
ference of human rights complaints, Smirnova and Smirnova v. Russia, ECtHR, Application
No. 46133/99 and 48183/99, Judgment of 24 July 2003. See also, Baena-Ricardo et al. v.
Panama, IACtHR, Series C No. 61, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 18 November 1999,
para. 53; Durand and Ugarte, IACtHR, Series C No. 50, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
28 May 1999, para. 43 (on different applicants for same case).
There is an exception for the Human Rights Committee, which applies
this rule only to complaints pending before another international proce-
dure. If the other procedure has ended, it is still possible for the Human
Rights Committee to hear the same case.
1339
Article 31.2(c) also re-
fers only to pending complaints, which suggests that the Committee on
Enforced Disappearances may align its approach to that of the Human
Rights Committee.
1340
d) Signifcant disadvantage
Protocol 14 to the ECHR introduced a new admissibility requirement for
the European Court of Human Rights: that of signifcant disadvantage.
Protocol 14 to the ECHR now allows the Court to declare inadmissible an
application when the applicant has not suffered a signifcant disad-
vantage, unless respect for human rights as defned in the Convention
and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on
the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground
which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
1341
Applying the new criterion, the European Court of Human Rights has held
cases inadmissible for lack of signifcant disadvantage where alleged vio-
lations of fair trial guarantees or the right to property had led to pecuniary
losses of 150, 90 or 1 euros and the fnancial situation of the applicant
was not such that the outcome of the case would have had a signifcant
effect on his personal life.
1342
The Court held that it must take into con-
sideration both the applicants subjective perceptions and what is objec-
tively at stake in a particular case,
1343
and it recognised that a violation
of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus
cause a signifcant disadvantage without affecting pecuniary interest.
1344
Furthermore, the Court will also have to ascertain whether the exam-
ination is, nonetheless, required by the respect for human rights as de-
fned in the Convention and the Protocols. The Court has found this not
to be the case when the relevant law has changed and similar issues
have been resolved in other cases before it.
1345
Finally, the Court will

1339
Correia de Matos v. Portugal, CCPR, Communication No. 1123/2002, Views of 18 April 2006,
para. 6.2.

1340
Articel 31.2(c), CPED.

1341
Article 35.3(b) ECHR (emphasis added). The requirement has been interpreted up to now
in Petrovich Korolev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 25551/05, Admissibility decision of
1 July 2010; Mihai Ionescu v. Romania, ECtHR, Application No. 36659/04, Admissibility
decision of 1 June 2010; Rinck v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 18774/09, Admissibility
decision of 19 October 2010.

1342
Mihai Ionescu v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1341, para. 35.

1343
Petrovich Korolev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1341.

1344
Ibid.

1345
Mihai Ionescu v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1341, para. 37.
verify whether the case has not been duly considered by a domestic tri-
bunal, which has been interpreted as a duty to ascertain that no denial
of justice occurred at the domestic level.
1346
According to the OP-ICESCR, the CESCR may, if necessary, decline to
consider a communication where it does not reveal that the author has
suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the Committee considers that
the communication raises a serious issue of general importance.
1347

However, this provision does not constitute an admissibility criterium.
The wording if necessary means that the clear disadvantage test
is discretionary and likely to be used by the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights only in exceptional circumstances.
e) Other grounds
All UN Treaty Bodies, the ECtHR, the IACHR, and the ACHPR will reject
as inadmissible petitions which are anonymous, which constitute an
abuse of right of submission, or that are incompatible with the pro-
visions of the human rights treaty of their concern.
1348
CAT, CEDAW,
CESCR, the European Court, and the IACHR explicitly exclude from ad-
missibility complaints which are manifestly unfounded or insuffciently
substantiated,
1349
although this requirement will be considered also by
the other treaty bodies.
The OP-ICESCR excludes, moreover, complaints which are exclusive-
ly based on reports disseminated by mass media.
1350
The ACHPR will
not consider communications written in disparaging or insulting lan-
guage directed against the State concerned or its institution or to the
Organisation of African Unity.
1351
The ECSR provides two specifc grounds of inadmissibility, due to the
collective complaint system:
Subject-matter: non-governmental organisations may lodge a
complaint only in respect of those matters regarding which they
have been recognised as having particular competence.
1352

1346
Petrovich Korolev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1341.

1347
Article 4 OP-ICESCR (emphasis added).

1348
Article 3 OP-ICCPR; Rule 96(a), (c) and (d), CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 3.2(d) to
(g) OP-ICESCR; Article 22.2 CAT; Rule 113(b) and (c), CAT Rules of Procedure; Rule 91,
CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 4.2 OP-CEDAW; Article 77.2 ICRMW; Article 7(a), (b), (c)
OP-CRC-CP; Article 2(a) and (b) OP-CRPD; Article 31.2(a) and (b) CED; Articles 35.2(a) and
35.3(a) ECHR; Article 47 ACHR; Article 34, IACHR Rules of Procedure; Article 56.1 ACHPR.

1349
Article 4.2(c) OP-CEDAW; Article 22.2 CAT; Rule 113(b) and (c), CAT Rules of Procedure;
Article 3.2(d) to (g) OP-ICESCR; Article 7(f) OP-CRC-CP; Article 2(e) OP-CRPD; Articles
35.2(a) and 35.3(a) and (b) ECHR; Article 47 ACHR; Article 34, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1350
Article 3.2(d) to (g) OP-ICESCR.

1351
Article 56.3 ACHPR.

1352
Article 3 AP-ESC.
Other Grounds: complaints must be lodged in writing, relate to
a provision of the Charter accepted by the State Party and indi-
cate in what respect the State Party has not ensured the satisfac-
tory application of the provision.
1353
Although it is not properly an admissibility ground, the European Court
of Human Rights has modifed its Rule 47, with effect from 1 January
2014, according to which, from now on, the Court will have the power
to refuse to examine an application that does not satisfy all the formal
requirements of this Rule. As noted above, the six months time limit
of Article 35 ECHR will stop running from the moment of receipt of an
application fully compliant with these formal requirements.
1354
3. Interim measures
Interim, precautionary or provisional measures are orders issued by the
international mechanism in the preliminary phase of the international
dispute in order to assure that a situation of potential violation does not
lead to irreparable harm from before the case can be adjudicated on the
merits. Interim or provisional measures are often indicated in situations
of expulsions, where the international body requests the State to stay
the expulsion measure until a fnal decision is reached. Interim mea-
sures might also be prescribed for a situation of forced eviction, where
a stay of the eviction is ordered before the fnal ruling.
Interim measures are a corollary of the right to international petition
and have therefore been held to be binding on the States which have
accepted the international individual complaints mechanism.
1355

They are an essential element of procedure before international tribu-
nals, with particular signifcance for tribunals that adjudicate on hu-
man rights, and are widely recognised as having binding legal effect.
The binding nature of interim measures has its roots in both procedure
and substance: it is necessary, frst, to preserve the rights of the par-
ties from irreparable harm, protecting against any act or omission that

1353
Article 4 AP-ESC.

1354
See, Rule 47, ECtHR Rules of Procedure. Under Article 4 of the new Protocol No. 15 to the
ECHR, the time limit for applications to the Court is reduced to four months. The Protocol,
approved on 24 June 2013, is not yet into force and requires the ratifcation of all Contract-
ing Parties to the ECHR.
1355
See, LeGrand (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ, op. cit., fn. 837, at p. 503,
para. 103; Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, op. cit., fn. 324,
paras. 10.110.3; Dar v. Norway, CAT, op. cit., fn. 1309, paras. 16.316.5; Brada v. France,
CAT, Communication No. 195/2002, Views of 24 May 2005, para. 13.4; Pelit v. Azerbaijan,
CAT, op. cit., fn. 339, para. 10.2; Tebourski v. France, CAT, op. cit., fn. 353, paras. 8.29;
Singh Sogi v. Canada, CAT, op. cit., fn. 334, paras. 10.210.11; Shamayev and Others v.
Georgia and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434, paras. 470473; Mamatkulov and Askarov v.
Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 441, paras. 100112; Al-Sadoon and Mufti v. United Kingdom,
would destroy or remove the subject matter of an application, would
render it pointless, or would otherwise prevent the Court from consider-
ing it under its normal procedure;
1356
and second, to permit the Court to
give practical and effective protection to the Convention rights by which
the Member States have undertaken to abide.
1357
The binding nature of interim measures has been recognised by
the International Court of Justice,
1358
the European Court of Human
Rights,
1359
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
1360
the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights,
1361
the African Commission on
Human and Peoples Rights,
1362
the Human Rights Committee
1363
and

1356
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 441, paras. 101108; Paladi v. Mol-
dova, ECtHR, Application No 39806/05, Judgment of 10 March 2009, para. 87; Ben Khemais
v. Italy, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 361, para. 81.

1357
Ibid., para. 125; Aloumi v. France, ECtHR, Application No. 50278/99, Judgment of 17 Janu-
ary 2006, para. 103.

1358
LeGrand (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ, op. cit., fn. 837, at p. 503, para. 102.

1359
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 441; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia
and Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 434; Aloumi v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1260; Paladi v. Mol-
dova, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1356; Aleksanyan v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 769; Shtukaturov v.
Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 44009/05, Judgment of 27 March 2008; Ben Khemais v. Italy,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 361, Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 71386/10,
Judgment of 25 April 2013, para. 213: The crucial signifcance of interim measures is further
highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them, as a matter of principle, in truly excep-
tional cases on the basis of a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most
of these, the applicants face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of
grave, irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. This vital role
played by interim measures in the Convention system not only underpins their binding legal
effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the established case-law, but also commands
the utmost importance to be attached to the question of the States Parties compliance with
the Courts indications in that respect [. . .]. Any laxity on this question would unacceptably
weaken the protection of the Convention core rights and would not be compatible with its
values and spirit [. . .]; it would also be inconsistent with the fundamental importance of the
right of individual application and, more generally, undermine the authority and effectiveness
of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order [. . .].

1360
Chunim v. Guatemala, IACtHR, Series E, Order of the Court of 15 July 1991; James v.
Trinidad and Tobago, IACtHR, Series E, Order of the Court of 24 November 2000; Loayza
Tamayo v. Peru, IACtHR, Series E, Order of the Court of 13 December 2000; Haitians and
Dominican nationals of Haitian origin in the Dominican Republic v. the Dominican Republic,
IACtHR, Order of the Court of 14 September 2000. See further the extrajudicial comments of
Asdrbal Aguiar, former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Apuntes sobre
las medidas cautelares en la Convencin Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, in La Corte
y el sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Rafael Nieto Navia, Editor, 1994, p. 19.

1361
See, Letter to Center for Constitutional Rights and Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho In-
ternacional (CEJIL) from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Ref: Djamel
Ameziane, Precautionary Measures No. 211-08, United States, 20 August 2008, available at
http://ccrjustice.org/fles/2008-08-20 IACHR Initial Response.pdf.

1362
International Pen and Others v. Nigeria, ACommHPR, Communications Nos. 137/94, 139/94,
154/96 and 161/97, 24
th
Ordinary Session, 31 October 1998, para. 114.

1363
Piandiong v. the Philippines, CCPR, Communication No. 869/1999, Views of 19 October 2000,
para. 5.1; Khalilov v. Tajikistan, CCPR, Communication No. 973/2001, Views of 13 April
2005, para. 4.1; Mansaraj and Others v. Sierra Leone, CCPR, Communications Nos. 839/98,
840/98 and 841/98, Views of 16 July 2001, para. 5.1; Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, CCPR,
Communication No. 580/1994, Views of 19 April 2002, para. 4.11.
the Committee against Torture.
1364
Given the uniformity of the jurispru-
dence on this issue, other bodies such as the CESCR, CERD and CEDAW,
which have the power to issue interim measures, are also likely to up-
hold their binding nature.
The European Court has stated that, [w]hilst the formulation of the
interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the
Courts analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations [to
follow interim measures], the Court must have regard not only to the
letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated [. . .] and,
indeed, to its very purpose.
1365
In particular, the Court cannot con-
ceive [. . .] of allowing the authorities to circumvent an interim measure
such as the one indicated in the present case by using another domestic
procedure for the applicants removal to the country of destination or,
even more alarmingly, by allowing him to be arbitrarily removed to that
country in a manifestly unlawful manner.
1366
Interim measures can be issued by the human rights body invested by
the case from the moment of the communication of the case until the
reaching of a fnal decision.
1367
The Inter-American system allows for
the Commission to issue precautionary measures and to ask the Inter-
American Court for provisional measures even in cases of which the
Court is not yet seized.
1368
4. The effective exercise of the right to petition
When a State hinders or prohibits the applicant from applying to a
competent international body in order to seek protection for his or her

1364
Brada v. France, CAT, op. cit., fn. 1355; Pelit v. Azerbaijan, CAT, op. cit., fn. 339; Dar v. Nor-
way, CAT, op. cit., fn. 1309; Nuez Chipana v. Venezuela, CAT, Communication no.110/1998,
Views of 16 December 1998, para. 8; T.P.S. v. Canada, CAT, Communication No. 999/1997,
Views of 4 September 2000, para. 15.6.

1365
Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1359, para. 216.

1366
Ibid., para. 217

1367
See, Rule 92, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 5.1 OP-ICESCR; Rule 114, CAT Rules of Pro-
cedure; Rule 94.3, CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 5.1 OP-CEDAW; Rule 63, CEDAW Rules
of Procedure; Article 6 OP-CRC-CP; Article 4 OP-CRPD; Article 31.4 CED; Rule 39, ECtHR
Rules of Procedure (the obligation to comply with interim measures arises under Article 34
ECHR and also related to obligations under Articles 1 and 46 ECHR); Article 25, IACHR
Rules of Procedure; Article 63.2 ACHR; Article 27, IACtHR Rules of Procedure; Article 111,
Rules of Procedures of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted on
the 6 October 1995 (ACHPR Rules of Procedure); Article 27.2, P-ACHPR on African Court;
Article 51, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure. Similar provisions are included in Article 35, ACJHR
Statute.

1368
See, Article 76, IACHR Rules of Procedure.
rights, that State may be in violation of the provision of the treaty which
grants the applicant the right to petition.
1369
In treaty law, the European Convention on Human Rights establishes
that the High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way
the effective exercise of the right to submit individual applications.
1370

Furthermore, many States Parties to the ECHR are also parties to the
European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of
the European Court of Human Rights, which provides for certain protec-
tions and immunities.
1371
The OP-ICESCR also requires the State Party to take all appropriate
measures to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction are not subject
to any form of ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of com-
municating with the Committee pursuant to the present Protocol.
1372

These measures include positive obligations to protect against a wide
range of ill-treatment and intimidation, such as undue interference
and pressure against physical, moral and psychological integrity of the
person who communicated the case or of all persons that can suffer
adverse consequences as a result of the presentation of the communi-
cation.
1373
States Parties to the OP-CEDAW undertake to take all ap-
propriate steps to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction are not
subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of communi-
cating with the Committee.
1374
Where the Committee, receives reliable
information that a State Party has breached these obligations it may
request written explanations or clarifcation.
1375
The European Court of Human Rights has found violations of this obliga-
tion when a prison administration refused to post the applicants letter
to the Court itself or interfered with it,
1376
or when the applicant was

1369
Articles 1 and 2 OP-ICCPR; Articles 1 and 2 OP-CEDAW; Article 14 ICERD; Articles 1 and 2
OP-ICESCR; Article 76 ICRMW; Article 34 ECHR; Article 44 ACHR. See, Alzery v. Sweden,
CCPR, op. cit., fn. 364, para. 11.11; Agiza v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 332, para. 13.9;
Poleshchuk v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 60776/00, Judgment of 7 October 2004; Cot-
let v. Romania, ECtHR, Application No. 38565/97, Judgment of 3 June 2003; Akdivar and
Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937; Kurt v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 724; and
Ilascu and Others v. Russia and Moldova, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 406.

1370
Article 34 ECHR.

1371
See, European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European
Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 5 March 1996.

1372
Article 13 OP-ICESCR. See also, Rule 4, CRC Rules of Procedure.

1373
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and International Commission of Jurists, Com-
mentary to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, English edition, 2010, p. 100.

1374
Article 11 OP-CEDAW.

1375
Rule 91.2, CEDAW Rules of Procedures.

1376
Poleshchuk v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1369; Cotlet v. Romania, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1369.
directly asked by the national authorities about the petition,
1377
or when
the applicant was pressured or intimidated by the national authorities
not to fle or to withdraw the application.
1378
The Committee against Torture determined that a State had violated
the applicants right to petition where it did not grant a reasonable
period of time before the execution of the fnal decision to remove him
from the national territory, so as to not allow him to consider whether
to petition the Committee itself.
1379
5. Third party interventions
The universal treaty bodiesHRC, CESCR, CAT, CERD and CEDAW
do not provide expressly for the presentation of formal third party inter-
ventions in individual cases.
1380
It may however be possible to intervene
in the case by asking the applicant to include the third party interven-
tions in his or her application, or to petition the treaty body on an ad
hoc basis.
As for the European Court of Human Rights, according to Article 36
ECHR, in all cases before Chambers or the Grand Chamber, the
President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration
of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the
proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit
written comments or take part in hearings.
1381
NGOs may also make
submissions. The same Article gives standing as third party interveners
to other Contracting States and the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights. The request for leave to be invited to send written third
party observations must be duly reasoned and submitted in writing in
one of the Courts offcial languages no later then twelve weeks after
notice of the application has been given to the State Party concerned. In
cases before the Grand Chamber the time runs from the date of relin-
quishment of jurisdiction by the Chamber or of acceptance of the case
by the Grand Chambers Panel.
1382
The requirements are more restrictive for the European Committee
on Social Rights, due to the collective nature of the complaint
mechanism. According to the rules of procedure, States Parties to the

1377
Akdivar v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 937.

1378
See, Kurt v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 724; and Ilascu and Others v. Russia and Moldova,
ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 406.

1379
Agiza v. Sweden, CAT, op. cit., fn. 332, para. 13.9.

1380
The rules of procedure of the Human Rights Committee or the OP-ICCPR do not mention
third party interventions. See also, Article 8.1 OP-ICESCR; Rule 118.2, CAT Rules of Proce-
dure; Rule 95.2, CERD Rules of Procedure; Rule 72.2, CEDAW Rules of Procedures.

1381
Article 36.1 ECHR.

1382
Rule 44.3-4, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
collective complaint mechanisms are automatically invited to submit
their views on the complaint, as are the international organisations
of employers and trade unions, but the international organisations
may only make submissions on complaints lodged by national or-
ganisations of employers and trade unions or by NGOs.
1383
However,
the recently adopted Rule 32A gives to the President the possibility
to invite any organisation, institution or person to submit observa-
tions.
1384

In the Inter-American system, neither the ACHR nor the Rules of
Procedure provide for the consideration of third-party briefs by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. However, in prac-
tice, the Commission will accept the submission of amicus curiae briefs
without any particular formal requirements. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has institutionalised the submission of third
party interventions in its rules of procedures, according to which any
person or institution seeking to act as amicus curiae may submit a
brief, signed in order to ensure authenticity, to the Court in person, by
courier, facsimile, post or electronic mail, in a working language of the
Court, and bearing the names and signatures of its authors. If the brief
is transmitted by electronic means and not subscribed, or is not accom-
panied by its annexes, the original document or missing annexes must
be received by the Court within seven days from its transmission, oth-
erwise it will be archived, without having been taken into consideration.
The interventions may be submitted at any time during the contentious
proceedings for up to 15 days following the public hearing. If the hear-
ing is not held, they must be submitted within 15 days following the
Order setting the deadlines for the submission of fnal arguments. The
interventions are transmitted to the parties. They may also be submit-
ted during proceedings to monitor the compliance of judgments and on
provisional measures.
1385
In the African system, the rules of procedure of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights do not mention the sub-
mission of third party intervention. Conversely, Article 49(3) of the
new Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights seems
to give space for third party interventions.
1386
However, the Statute
has not yet entered into force and that the rules of the Court might
still provide otherwise.

1383
Rule 32, Rules of the European Committee of Social Rights, adopted during the 201
st
session
on 29 March 2004 and revised during the 207
th
session on 12 May 2005 and during the
234
th
session on 20 February 2009 (ECSR Rules of Procedure).

1384
Rule 32A, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1385
See, Article 44, IACtHR Rules of Procedure.

1386
Article 49.3 ACJHR Statute.
II. Procedures of international mechanisms
1. Universal Treaty Bodies
1387

The procedures of the UN treaty bodies, while rather similar, have not
been harmonised.
1388
Differences arise in the most recently established
bodies. Procedures are set out both in their constituting treaties and
in their rules of procedures. The communications must be presented
in one of the offcial languages of the United Nations, which are Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
a) Preparatory Stage
The rules related to the preparatory phase of the procedure are sim-
ilar for all the four human rights treaty bodies that receive individu-
al communications and have established rules of procedure. The UN
Secretariat receives the communication and verifes that all formal re-
quirements have been satisfed. The Secretariat may ask for clarifca-
tions on these requirements and on the intention of the complainant
effectively to seize the Committee of the communication. Once these
preliminary steps are satisfed, the communication is registered with
and transmitted to the Committee.
1389
b) Admissibility stage
Who decides? While it is generally the Committee as a whole which de-
termines whether the communication satisfes the formal requirements
for admissibility, it is possible for it to establish an internal Working
Group (WG) for decisions on admissibility.
1390
For CERD and CEDAW, the
WG can only make recommendations on admissibility.
1391
How? The Committee always takes the decision on admissibility by a
simple majority vote. When a Working Group is established, the systems

1387
Further practical information on how to submit a petition to the UN treaty bodies may be
found at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx.

1388
A process of harmonisation of the procedures of UN treaty bodies under the initiative of the
United Nations is undergoing. For more information see, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/treaty/reform.htm.

1389
See, Rules 8487, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Rules 103105, CAT Rules of Proce-
dure; Rules 8384, CERD Rules of Procedure; Rules 5658, CEDAW Rules of Pro-
cedure. In this section we address the procedures of universal human rights
mechanisms which have been tested in individual communications. For proce-
dures of the most recently established treaty bodies see their rules of, available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/62/
3&Lang=en (CRC); http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?
symbolno=HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1&Lang=en (CMW); http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx (CRPD); and http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno= CED/C/1&Lang=en (CED).

1390
See, Rules 111112, CAT Rules of Procedure; Rules 9398, CCPR Rules of Procedure.

1391
Rule 87, CERD Rules of Procedure; Rule 62, CEDAW Rules of Procedure.
vary. For the Human Rights Committee, the WG may take a decision on
admissibility only by unanimous vote, although an inadmissibility deci-
sion will have to be ratifed by the Committee as a whole; while for the
Committee against Torture the Working Group can declare a commu-
nication admissibile by majority vote or inadmissible by unanimity.
1392
Communications and Replies: The Committee requests information
of both the complainant and the State Party, fxing the appropriate
time-limits.
1393
The HRC requests the concerned State to provide a
written reply to the communication within six months on the admis-
sibility and merits, unless the Committee specifes that only observa-
tions on admissibility are needed. Then, the Committee may request
the applicant or the State to submit further observations. Each party
must be afforded an opportunity to comment on the observations of
the other.
1394
Revision of admissibility decision: A decision of inadmissibility may
be reviewed by the Committee at a later date where it is established
that the reasons for inadmissibility no longer apply.
1395
Decisions on admissibility and merits: In practice, the Committees
may decide together the admissibility and the merits of the commu-
nication when the information given to them is already suffcient for
reaching a fnal decision.
c) Merits
Closed Meetings: The Committees will examine the communication,
both at the admissibility and merit stage, in closed meetings.
1396
CERD
and CAT may invite the parties to participate in a closed oral hearing
in order to answer to questions and provide additional information.
1397

Communications: The general rule is that a Committee will transmit
the information to the State Party and inform the complainant,
1398
and
may request additional information on the merits.
1399
The Human Rights

1392
Rules 9398, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Rules 111112, CAT Rules of Procedure.

1393
See, Rule 115, CAT Rules of Procedure; Rule 92, CERD Rules of Procedure.

1394
Rules 9398, CCPR Rules of Procedure.

1395
Rule 116, CAT Rules of Procedure; Rule 93.2, CERD Rules of Procedure; Rule 70, CEDAW
Rules of Procedure.

1396
Rules 88 and 102, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 8 OP-ICESCR; Article 22.46 CAT;
Rule 88, CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 7 OP-CEDAW, and Rule 72, CEDAW Rules of Pro-
cedure; Article 77.67 ICRMW.

1397
Rule 94.5, CERD Rules of Procedure; Rule 117, CAT Rules of Procedure.

1398
Rule 117, CAT Rules of Procedure; Article 8 OP-ICESCR; Rules 99100, CCPR Rules of Pro-
cedure; Rule 94.1, CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 7 OP-CEDAW; Rule 72, CEDAW Rules of
Procedure.

1399
Ibid.
Committee provides that the State Party has six months to submit to
the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter
under consideration and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken
by the State. Any explanations or statements submitted by the State
Party will be communicated to the author of the communication, who
may submit any additional written information or observations within
fxed time-limits.
1400
For CERD, the State has three months from then
to submit its reasons. These will be transmitted to the complainant who
may oppose further observations.
1401
Material: The Committee will take into consideration all the informa-
tion made available to it by the parties.
1402
The CESCR also explicitly
includes all relevant documentation from other UN bodies, specialised
agencies, funds, programmes and mechanisms, and other international
organisations, including from regional human rights systems.
1403
Decision: The Committees will adopt their decision (Views) on
the case and forward them to the parties.
1404
The Human Rights
Committees rules of procedure explicitly say that this bodys deci-
sions are public.
1405
d) Friendly Settlement
The CESCR is the only Committee which expressly provides for the pos-
sibility of reaching a friendly settlement. The settlement must be on the
basis of the respect for the obligations set forth in the Covenant and
closes the communication procedure.
1406
While other UN human rights
treaties and corresponding rules of procedure do not expressly provide
for a procedure of friendly settlement, in practice the Committees may
provide their good offces for reaching this kind of agreement if the
parties so desire.
1407

1400
Rules 99100, CCPR Rules of Procedure.

1401
Rule 94.24, CERD Rules of Procedure.

1402
Rules 99100, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 8 OP-ICESCR; Article 22.46 CAT; Rule 118.1,
CAT Rules of Procedure; Article 14.7(a) ICERD; Article 7 OP-CEDAW; Rule 72, CEDAW Rules
of Procedure; Article 77.5 ICRMW.

1403
Article 8 OP-ICESCR.

1404
Rules 99100, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 22.7 CAT; Article 14.7(b) ICERD; Article 7
OP-CEDAW; Rule 72, CEDAW Rules of Procedure; Article 77.67 ICRMW.

1405
Rule 102(5), CCPR Rules of Procedure.

1406
Article 7 OP-ICESCR.

1407
See, Catarina de Albuquerque, Elements for an optional protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Analytical paper by the Chairperson-Rappor-
teur, Open-ended working group on an optional protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/WG.23/2, 30 November 2005,
para. 14; and CESCR, Report to the Commission on Human Rights on a draft optional proto-
col for the consideration of communications in relation to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/105, 18 December 1996, para. 38.
e) Interim Measures
Interim measures can be issued by the human rights body to which the
case has been submitted, when they are desirable to avoid irreparable
damage to the victim of the alleged violation from the moment of the
communication of the case until the reaching of a fnal decision.
1408
The
Human Rights Committee
1409
and the Committee against Torture
1410

have confrmed in their jurisprudence the binding nature of interim
measures. Given the uniformity of the jurisprudence on this issue, oth-
er bodies such as the CESCR, CERD and CEDAW, which have the power
to issue interim measures, are also likely to uphold their binding nature.
2. European Court of Human Rights
Application: An application to the European Court of Human Rights
should normally be made by completing and sending the application form
that can be found on the Courts website, to be flled out in one of the
offcial languages of the Court (English or French), together with copies
of any relevant documents and in particular the decisions, whether judi-
cial or not, relating to the object of the application.
1411
It is also possible
to frst introduce the complaint through a letter containing the subject
matter of the application, including the Convention articles claimed to
be breached.
1412
This letter will stop the running of the six months time
limit (see, supra). In this case, or in the case of an incomplete applica-
tion form, the Court will request the provision of additional information
within eight weeks from the date of the informations request.
1413
On
receipt of the frst communication setting out the subject-matter of the
case, the Registry will open a fle, whose number must be mentioned
in all subsequent correspondence. Applicants will be informed of this by
letter. They may also be asked for further information or documents.
1414
Preparatory Stage: The President of the Court will assign the case
to a designated Chamber of the Court, which is composed of seven
judges.
1415

1408
See, Rule 92, CCPR Rules of Procedure; Article 5.1 OP-ICESCR; Rule 114, CAT Rules of Pro-
cedure; Rule 94.3, CERD Rules of Procedure; Article 5.1 OP-CEDAW; Rule 63, CEDAW Rules
of Procedure.

1409
See, fn. 1363.

1410
See, fn. 1364.

1411
Application form may be found at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Application_Form_
2014_1_ENG.pdf. See, Article 47.1, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1412
Institution of Proceedings, Practice Direction, Issued by the President of the Court in accord-
ance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court on 1 November 2003 and amended on 22 September
2008 and on 24 June 2009, para. 3.

1413
Ibid., para. 4.

1414
Ibid., para. 7.

1415
Rule 52.1, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
Admissibility stage: When the application is on its own suffcient
to determine its inadmissibility or to be struck out of the list, it will
be considered by a single judge, whose decision is fnal. Otherwise,
the single judge will forward the case to a Chamber or a Committee
from among whose members the President of the Chamber of the
Court will appoint a Judge Rapporteur to deal with the case. The Judge
Rapporteur may request additional information from the parties, decide
whether the case may be considered by a single judge, a Committee
or a Chamber and may submit reports, drafts or documents to the
Chamber or Committee or the President.
1416
At this stage, the case
will pass to the Committee, which is composed of three judges of the
Chamber and whose decision is fnal. The Committee will give notice
of the application to the State concerned and request additional infor-
mation from both the parties. The Committee may by unanimous vote
declare the case inadmissible or strike it out of the list, or declare it
admissible and immediately reach a decision on the merits when the
underlying question in the case is already the subject of well-estab-
lished case-law of the Court. Otherwise, the Committee will forward
the case to the Chamber.
1417
The Chamber will also be able to notify
the decision to the State and request information from the parties. It
may also decide to declare the application inadmissible or strike it out
of the list at once. Before taking a decision, it may consider holding a
hearing at the request of a party or of its own motion, and, if consid-
ered appropriate, to decide the admissibility and merits of the applica-
tion at the same time.
1418

Friendly Settlement: At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may
be at the disposal of the parties with a view of securing a friendly set-
tlement of the dispute. In this case, proceedings are confdential and
are conducted by the Registry under instruction of the Chamber or its
President. If the settlement is reached, the case will be struck off the list
and the decision of the Court will be limited to a brief statement of the
facts and solution reached, which will be transmitted to the Committee
of Ministers for supervision of its execution.
1419
Striking Out of the List: At any stage of the proceedings, the Court
may decide to strike the application out of its list of cases when the
applicant does not intend to pursue his application; the matter has
been resolved; or when, for any other reason established by the
Court, it is no longer justifed to continue the examination of the ap-
plication. However, the Court shall continue the examination of the

1416
Articles 27 ECHR; Rules 49 and 52A, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1417
Article 28 ECHR; Rule 53, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1418
Article 29 ECHR; Rules 54 and 54A, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1419
Article 39 ECHR; Rule 62, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
application if respect for human rights as defned in the Convention
and the Protocols thereto so requires,
1420
and it can also decide to
restore an application previously struck out.
1421
The case will also be
struck out when a friendly settlement between the parties has been
reached
1422
or when a unilateral declaration by the respondent State
is accepted by the Court. In this last case, the Court may strike the
case out of the list even if the applicant wishes the case to contin-
ue.
1423
It will depend, however, on whether respect for human rights
as defned in the Convention and the Protocols requires otherwise.
The Court held that in order to establish this it will consider the
nature of the complaints made, whether the issues raised are com-
parable to issues already determined by the Court in previous cas-
es, the nature and scope of any measures taken by the respondent
Government in the context of the execution of judgments delivered
by the Court in any such previous cases, and the impact of these
measures on the case at issue.
1424
Examination of merits: Once an application has been declared ad-
missible, the Chamber may invite the parties to submit further evi-
dence and observations and hold a hearing. The Court in the form of
a Chamber will examine the case.
1425
Hearings are public, as are the
documents deposited with the Registrar of the Court, although access
may be restricted where the Court fnds particular reasons in the inter-
est of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society,
or where the interests of the juveniles or the protection of private life of
the parties so require, or in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice.
1426
Judgments of the Chamber are

1420
Article 37.1 ECHR.

1421
See, Article 37 ECHR; Rule 43, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1422
See, Rule 43.3, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1423
See, Akman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 37453/97, Admissibility Decision, 26 June
2001, paras. 2832; and, Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 26307/95, Judg-
ment of 8 April 2004, paras. 7576.

1424
Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 1423, para. 76. The Court also added that [i]t
may also be material whether the facts are in dispute between the parties, and, if so, to
what extent, and what prima facie evidentiary value is to be attributed to the parties sub-
missions on the facts. In that connection it will be of signifcance whether the Court itself
has already taken evidence in the case for the purposes of establishing disputed facts. Oth-
er relevant factors may include the question of whether in their unilateral declaration the
respondent Government have made any admission(s) in relation to the alleged violations
of the Convention and, if so, the scope of such admissions and the manner in which they
intend to provide redress to the applicant. As to the last-mentioned point, in cases in which
it is possible to eliminate the effects of an alleged violation (as, for example, in some prop-
erty cases) and the respondent Government declare their readiness to do so, the intended
redress is more likely to be regarded as appropriate for the purposes of striking out the
application. The list is not exhaustive. This practice is now refected in Rule 62A, ECtHR
Rules of Procedure.

1425
Article 38 ECHR.

1426
Article 40 ECHR. See, Rules 33 and 63, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
fnal, when the parties declare that they will not request referral to the
Grand Chamber, or when three months have passed from the date of
the judgment, without this referral being asked, or the Grand Chamber
rejected the request of referral.
1427
Just satisfaction: If the Court fnds a violation, it will afford just satis-
faction to the injured party.
1428
To make the award, the Court will need
to receive from the applicant a specifc claim of just satisfaction, and
the submission of items particular to the claim, together with any rel-
evant supporting document, within the time-limits set by the President
for submission of the applicants observations on the merits.
1429

Additionally, [i]n certain particular situations, [. . .] the Court may fnd
it useful to indicate to the respondent State the type of measures that
might be taken in order to put an end to theoften systemicsituation
that gave rise to the fnding of a violation [. . .]. Sometimes the nature
of the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the
measures required [. . .].
1430
In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others
v. Italy, since the transfer of the applicants exposed them to the risk
of being subjected to ill-treatment in Libya and of being arbitrarily re-
patriated to Somalia and Eritrea,
1431
the European Court ordered the
Italian Government to take all possible steps to obtains assurances
from the Libyan authorities that the applicants will not be subjected to
treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention or arbitrarily
repatriated.
1432
Referral or relinquishment to the Grand Chamber: A Chamber
may relinquish its jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber, composed of sev-
enteen judges, when the case before it raises a serious question af-
fecting the interpretation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or
where a resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a re-
sult inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court,
1433

unless one of the parties to the case objects within one month from
the relinquishment decision.
1434
Furthermore, any party may request
the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber within three months
from the Chambers judgment. The request will be examined by a fve
judge Panel appointed by the Grand Chamber, which will accept the
case only if it raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of

1427
Article 44 ECHR.

1428
Article 41 ECHR.

1429
Rule 60, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1430
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, GC, op. cit., fn. 46, para. 209. The measures are
ordered under Article 46 ECHR.

1431
Ibid. para. 211.

1432
Ibid., para. 211.

1433
Articles 3031 ECHR.

1434
See also, Rule 72, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
the Convention or the Protocols, or a serious issue of general impor-
tance.
1435
The rules of procedure before the Chambers apply also to
the Grand Chamber proceedings, including the designation of a Judge
Rapporteur.
1436
i) Legal Representation and legal aid
Applications may be initially presented directly by the victim or through
a representative.
1437
However, the European Court system requires
mandatory representation after the application has been notifed to the
Contracting State.
1438
The applicant may require leave to present his or
her own case, which can be granted by the President of the Chamber
only exceptionally. The representative must be an advocate autho-
rised to practise in any of the Contracting Parties and resident in the
territory of one of them, or any other person approved by the President
of the Chamber.
1439
He or she must have an adequate understanding of
one of the Courts languages, unless leave to use a different language
is given by the President of the Chamber, who can also remove an ad-
vocate if he or she considers that, because of the circumstances or the
conduct, the advocate can no longer represent his or her client.
Conscious of its own jurisprudence and of the costs of legal represen-
tation, the European Court of Human Rights provides for a legal aid
system. The decision to grant legal aid is made by the President of the
Chamber only when it is deemed necessary for the proper conduct of
the case and the applicant has insuffcient means to meet all or part
of the costs entailed. The decision to grant legal aid is made either
following the applicants request or proprio motu, from the moment
when the State concerned has submitted its observations in writing on
the admissibility of the case, or when that deadline has passed. Legal
aid, once granted, will cover all stages of the proceedings before the
Court, unless the President fnds that the conditions for it are no longer
present. Applicants who request legal aid must complete a form of dec-
laration, certifed by national authorities, stating their income, capital
assets, and any fnancial commitments in respect of dependants, or any
other fnancial obligations.
1440

1435
Article 43 ECHR. See also, Rule 73, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1436
Rules 50 and 71, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1437
Rules on representation are enshrined in Rule 36, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1438
A constant failure, through a long period of time, of the applicant to contact his representa-
tive might lead the Court to rule that s/he has lost interest in the proceedings and to strike
the case off the list. See, Ramzy v. the Netherlands, ECtHR, Application No. 25424/05,
Admissibility Decision, 20 July 2010.

1439
Rule 36.4(a), ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1440
See, Rules 100 to 105, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.
3. European Committee on Social Rights
Preparatory phase: The complaint must be addressed to the Executive
Secretary acting on behalf of the Council of Europe Secretary General
who will acknowledge receipt, notify it to the State Party concerned and
transmit it to the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR).
1441
The
complaints must be submitted in one of the Committees working lan-
guage, English or French.
Admissibility phase: For each case, the President of the Committee
will appoint one of its members as Rapporteur. The Rapporteur will pre-
pare a draft decision on admissibility, followed by, where appropriate, a
draft decision on the merits.
1442
The Committee may request additional
information from the parties on the admissibility of the complaint. If it
fnds it admissible, the Committee notifes the Contracting Parties to
the Charter through the Secretary General.
1443
The Committee may de-
clare the complaint admissible or inadmissible without having invited
the government concerned to submit observations when it considers
that the admissibility conditions are either manifestly fulflled or mani-
festly unfulflled.
1444
Examination of the merits: The Committee may request addition-
al information from the parties and may organise a hearing, at the
request of one of the parties or at the Committees initiative.
1445
The
Committee will draft a report containing its conclusions on the States
violation of the Charter, if it existed, and will transmit it confdential-
ly to the Committee of Ministers and the parties, under prohibition of
publication.
1446
Thereafter, the members of the Committee of Ministers
which are States Parties to the Charter adopt the report with a reso-
lution by a majority vote. If the ESCR found a violation of the Charter,
the Committee, in the same composition, can adopt a recommendation
to the State concerned with a two-thirds majority vote.
1447
The ESCR
report will be published immediately after the Committee of Ministers
adoption of a resolution, or, in any case, not later than four months after
its transmission to the Committee.
1448

1441
Article 5, AP-ESC. See, Rule 23, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1442
Rule 27, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1443
Articles 6 and 7.1, AP-ESC. See also, Rules 29 and 30, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1444
Rule 29.4, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1445
Article 7, AP-ESC. See also, Rules 31 and 33, ECSR Rules of Procedure.

1446
Article 8, ibid.

1447
Article 9, ibid.

1448
Article 8.2, ibid.
4. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The exact nature of the procedure for consideration of the petition/com-
munication depends on whether the petition/communication is based
upon an alleged violation of the American Convention on Human Rights
or the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
a) Petitions referring to the American Convention on Human
Rights
Preparatory Stage: The Executive Secretariat of the Commission un-
dertakes an initial processing of petitions lodged before the Commission.
If a petition or communication does not meet the requirements set out
in Article 28 Rules of Procedure (formal requirements of the application),
the Executive Secretariat may request that the petitioner or his or her
representative satisfy those requirements that have not been fulflled.
In particular cases, the Commission has also the power to expedite the
examination of the petition or communication.
1449

Admissibility Procedure: The Executive Secretariat of the Commission
forwards the relevant parts of the petition to the State in question with
a request for information within three months. Prior to deciding upon
the admissibility of the petition, the Commission may invite the parties
to submit additional observations, either in writing or in a hearing. Once
the observations have been received or the period set has elapsed with
no observations received, the Commission verifes whether the grounds
for the petition exist or subsist.
1450
The Commission establishes a work-
ing group of three or more of its members to study, between sessions,
the admissibility of the complaint and make recommendations to the
plenary.
1451
Once the Commission has considered the positions of the
parties, it makes a decision as to admissibility. The Commissions re-
ports on admissibility are public and are included in its Annual Report
to the General Assembly of the OAS. When an admissibility report is
adopted, the petition is registered as a case and proceedings on the
merits are initiated.
1452
Procedure on the merits: Upon opening the case, the Commission
sets a period of four months for the petitioner(s) to submit addition-
al observations on the merits. The pertinent parts of those observa-
tions are transmitted to the State in question so that it may submit
its observations within a further four months.
1453
The Commission

1449
See, Articles 26, 27, 29, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1450

1451

1452

1453
See, Article 37, ibid. Procedure for the hearings is in Articles 6169, ibid.
asks whether the parties are interested in a friendly settlement. The
Commission may carry out on-site investigations and may call for a
hearing.
1454
The Commission then deliberates on the merits of the case.
If the Commission establishes that there has been no violation in a giv-
en case, it indicates this in its report on the merits. The report will be
transmitted to the parties, and published in the Commissions Annual
Report to the OAS General Assembly. If the Commission establishes one
or more violations, it prepares a preliminary report with the proposals
and recommendations it deems pertinent and transmits it to the State
in question. In so doing, the Commission sets a deadline by which the
State in question must report on the measures adopted to comply with
the recommendations. The State is not authorised to publish the re-
port until the Commission has adopted a decision in this respect. The
Commission notifes the petitioner of the adoption of the report and its
transmission to the State. In the case of States Parties to the American
Convention that have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court, upon notifying the petitioner, the Commission gives
him or her one month to present his or her position as to whether the
case should be submitted to the Court.
1455
Friendly settlement: The American Convention provides that the
Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned
with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the ba-
sis of respect for the human rights recognized in this Convention.
1456

However, in the period after the initial submissions on the merits, the
Commission gives a time for the parties to express their interest in us-
ing the friendly settlement procedure.
1457
All friendly settlements must
be based on respect for the human rights recognised in the ACHR, the
ADRDM, and other relevant instruments.
1458
If a settlement is reached,
the Commission adopts a report with a brief statement of the facts
and the solution reached, which it shall transmit to the parties and
publish.
1459
Referral of the case to the Court: If the State in question has
accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in accordance
with Article 62 of the American Convention, and the Commission con-
siders that the State has not complied with the recommendations of
the report approved in accordance with Article 50 of the American
Convention, it refers the case to the Court, unless there is a reasoned

1454
See, Articles 39 and 43, ibid.

1455
Article 5051 ACHR. See, Articles 43 and 44, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1456
Article 48.1(f) ACHR. See also, Article 40, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1457
See, Article 37.4, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1458
See, Article 40.5, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1459
Article 49 ACHR. See, Article 40.5, IACHR Rules of Procedure.
decision by an absolute majority of the members of the Commission
to the contrary.
1460
Publication of the Report: If within three months from the trans-
mission of the preliminary report to the State in question the matter
has not been resolved or, for those States that have accepted the ju-
risdiction of the Inter-American Court, has not been referred by the
Commission or by the State to the Court for a decision, the Commission,
by an absolute majority of votes, may issue a fnal report that contains
its opinion and fnal conclusions and recommendations. The fnal report
will be transmitted to the parties, who, within the time period set by
the Commission, are required to present information on compliance
with the recommendations. The Commission will evaluate compliance
with its recommendations based on the information available, and will
decide on the publication of the fnal report by the vote of an absolute
majority of its members.
1461

b) Petitions concerning States that are not parties to the
American Convention on Human Rights
The Commission may receive and examine any petition that contains
a denunciation of alleged violations of the human rights set forth in
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in relation
to the Member States of the OAS that are not parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights.
1462
The procedure applicable to these pe-
titions is substantially the same as the one explained above with the ex-
ception of the referral to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
1463
5. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Preparatory Stage: As noted above, the Inter-American Commission
and States Parties are the only entities that can fle a case with the
Court. Once the case is received in an offcial language of the Court, its
President conducts a preliminary review of the application, asking the
parties to correct any defciency within 20 days, if the President fnds
that the basic requirements have not been met.
1464
If the applicant is
acting without duly accredited representation, the Court may appoint an
Inter-American Defender as representative during the proceedings.
1465

1460

1461

1462
These States are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Guyana, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and United States of America. See,
Article 51, IACHR Rules of Procedure.

1463

1464
See, Articles 3436 and 38, IACtHR Rules of Procedure.

1465
The Secretary of the Court notifes the application to the President and
the judges of the Court, the respondent State, the Commission, when
it is not the applicant, the alleged victim, his or her representatives or
the Inter-American defender, if applicable.
1466
When the application has
been notifed to the alleged victim, or his or her representatives, they
have a non-renewable period of two months to present their plead-
ings, motions and evidence to the Court.
1467
The State will also have a
non-renewable term of two months to answer.
1468
Preliminary Objections Stage: The States preliminary objections
may only be fled in the response to the frst application. The document
setting out the preliminary objections must set out the facts on which
the objection is based, the legal arguments, and the conclusions and
supporting documents, as well as any evidence which the party fling
the objection may wish to produce. Any parties to the case wishing to
submit written briefs on the preliminary objections may do so within
30 days of receipt of the communication. When the Court considers it
indispensable, it may convene a special hearing on the preliminary ob-
jections, after which it shall rule on the objections. The Court may de-
cide on the preliminary objections and the merits of the case in a single
judgment, under the principle of procedural economy.
1469
Additional written pleadings: Once the application has been an-
swered, and before the opening of the oral proceedings, the parties
may seek the permission of the President to enter additional written
pleadings. In such a case, the President, if he sees ft, shall establish
the time limits for presentation of the relevant documents.
1470
Hearing and Merits Phase: The hearings of the IACtHR are public,
although when exceptional circumstances warrant it, the Court may
decide to hold a hearing in private.
1471
The date of the hearings will be
announced by the Presidency of the Court and follow the procedure in-
dicated by Articles 45 to 55 of the Rules of Procedure.
1472
After the hear-
ings, the victims or their representatives, the State and the Commission
may submit their fnal written arguments.
1473
Friendly Settlement: If the victims, their representatives, the State
or the Commission inform the Court that a friendly settlement has been

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472
See, Articles 4555, ibid. See also, Articles 5760 on admission of evidence.

1473
reached, the Court will rule on its admissibility and juridical effects.
It may also decide to continue the case, nonetheless.
1474
Judgement: If the Court fnds that there has been a violation of a right
or freedom protected by the Convention, the Court shall rule that the
injured party be ensured the enjoyment of the right or freedom that
was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured
party.
1475
The judgments of the Court are fnal and the States Parties to
the Convention are bound to comply with them. Compensatory damag-
es provided with by the Court are executive in the State Party.
1476
Interpretative Rulings: The Court may accept request of interpreta-
tion of its previous judgments by any of the parties within 90 days from
the notifcation of the judgment.
1477
6. African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
Preparatory Stage: The Secretary of the Commission transmits to the
Commission for its consideration any communication submitted to him.
The Commission, through the Secretary, may request the author of a
communication to furnish clarifcations on the communication.
1478
Admissibility Stage: Communications are examined by the Commission
in private.
1479
The Commission may set up one or more working groups
of maximum three members to submit recommendations on admissibil-
ity.
1480
The Commission determines questions of admissibility pursuant
to Article 56 of the Charter.
1481
The Commission or a working group may
request the State Party concerned or the author of the communication
to submit in writing additional information or observations relating to
the issue of admissibility of the communication. If the Commission de-
cides that a communication is inadmissible under the Charter, it must
make its decision known as early as possible, through the Secretary to
the author of the communication and, if the communication has been
transmitted to a State Party concerned, to that State. If the Commission
decides that a communication is admissible under the Charter, its deci-
sion and text of the relevant documents shall, as soon as possible, be

1474
See, Article 63 and 64, ibid.

1475
Article 63.1 ACHR. See, Articles 6567, IACtHR Rules of Procedure.

1476
Articles 6768 ACHR.

1477
Article 67 ACHR. See, Article 68, IACtHR Rules of Procedure.

1478
See, Articles 102105, ACHPR Rules of Procedure.

1479
See, Article 106, ibid. See also, Article 59.1 ACHPR.

1480

1481
submitted to the State Party concerned, through the Secretary. The
author of the communication shall also be informed of the Commissions
decision through the Secretary.
1482
Merits: The State Party to the Charter concerned, within the three fol-
lowing months, must submit in writing to the Commission, explanations
or statements elucidating the issue under consideration and indicating,
if possible, measures it has taken to remedy the situation. All explana-
tions or statements submitted by a State Party must be communicated,
through the Secretary, to the author of the communication who may
submit in writing additional information and observations within a time
limit fxed by the Commission.
1483
Final decision: If the communication is admissible, the Commission
must consider it in the light of all the information that the individual and
the State Party concerned has submitted in writing; it shall make known
its observations on this issue. To this end, the Commission may refer
the communication to a working group, which submits recommenda-
tions to it. The observations of the Commission must be communicated
to the Assembly through the Secretary General and to the State Party
concerned. The Assembly or its Chairman may request the Commission
to conduct an in-depth study on these cases and to submit a factual re-
port accompanied by its fndings and recommendations, in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter. The Commission may entrust this
function to a Special Rapporteur or a working group.
1484
7. African Court on Human and Peoples Rights
The 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights,
which came into force on 25 January 2004, established the Court. On
1 July 2008, the Assembly of the African Union adopted a Protocol on
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which will
merge the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and
Peoples Rights. The Protocol has at the time of writing been ratifed by
only three States and will enter into force after the ffteenth ratifcation.
Preparatory Stage: The applicant must fle with the Court Registry
one signed copy of the application containing a summary of facts and
of the evidence he or she intends to adduce. It must specify the al-
leged violation, the evidence of exhaustion of domestic remedies, and
the orders or injunctions sought, plus the request for reparations, if

1482
See, Articles 117119, ibid.

1483

1484
sought.
1485
The Registrar transmits a copy to the President and the
members of the Court and, unless the Court decides otherwise, to the
other parties which might be potential applicants or respondents.
1486

The State Party must respond within 60 days, unless extension is grant-
ed by the Court.
1487
The Court may dismiss the application because
there is no merit in it at the preparatory stage, and will give reasons
for it.
1488
Admissibility Stage: The Court conducts preliminary examinations on
its jurisdiction and admissibility of the complaint, and may request fur-
ther information to the parties.
1489
The admissibility conditions are the
same as for the Commission. The Court may also request an opinion of
the Commission on admissibility or consider transferring the case to the
Commission itself.
1490
Friendly Settlement: The parties may bring to the attention of the
Court that a settlement has been reached. The Court will render a judg-
ment stating the facts and the solution adopted. It may also decide to
proceed with the case. The Court will also put itself at the disposal of
the parties with a view to reaching a friendly settlement.
1491
Merits Stage: The President of the Court will fx the date of the hearing
if applicable, which shall be public as a rule, unless it is in the interest
of public morality, safety or public order to conduct in camera hearings.
In the hearing evidence can be presented.
1492
Judgement: If the Court fnds that there has been violation of a hu-
man or peoples right, it must make appropriate orders to remedy the
violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation. The
Court must issue a judgment within 90 days from the date of com-
pletion of the deliberations.
1493
Judgments are binding on the parties.
States are bound by the treaty establishing the Court to execute the
judgment.
1494
Any party may apply to the Court within twelve months
from the date of the judgment to request an interpretation of it for the
purpose of execution.
1495
The Court can review its own judgments in

1485
Article 34, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1486
Article 35, ibid.

1487
Article 37, ibid. See also, Article 52, ibid., on preliminary objections.

1488
Article 38, ibid.

1489
Article 39, ibid.

1490
Article 6, P-ACHPR on African Court. See also, Article 40, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1491
Article 9, ibid. See also, Articles 5657, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1492
Articles 10 and 26, ibid. See also, Articles 4250, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1493
Articles 27 and 28.1, ibid. See also, Articles 5961, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1494
Articles 28 and 30, ibid. See also, Article 61, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1495
Article 28.4, ibid. See also, Article 66, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.
light of new evidence, which was not within the knowledge of the party
at the time of the judgment, when so requested by a party.
1496
III. What next? Enforcement system and
follow-up
After having obtained a judgment or opinion by an international body
establishing a violation, the applicant should be entitled to reparation.
Judicial remedies provide for enforceable reparation: the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights may order compensa-
tion or other measures of reparation, with which States are obliged to
comply.
Quasi-judicial international bodies may recommend, but cannot enforce,
reparations. A good-faith application of the treaty by State Parties en-
tails that States should carry out the recommendations of the compe-
tent body.
Once it has reached a fnal judgment, the European Court of Human
Rights transmits it to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
which supervises its execution. Article 46(1) ECHR states that the High
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the fnal judgment of the
Court in any case to which they are parties.
1497
The Courts judgments
are therefore binding. The Committee of Ministers will examine whether
the State Party has paid the awarded just satisfaction and the poten-
tial default interests,
1498
whether individual measures have been tak-
en to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured party
is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed
prior to the violation of the Convention[, and/or] general measures
have been adopted, preventing new violations similar to that or those
found or putting an end to continuing violations.
1499
If the Committee
of Ministers considers that a State Party has refused to abide by the f-
nal judgment, it may, after formal notice and with a two-thirds absolute
majority decision, refer the case to the Court for lack of implementation
of the judgment. The Court can then rule on the violation of Article 46
ECHR and refer the case to the Committee for measures to be taken.
1500

1496
Article 28.3, ibid. See also, Article 67, ACtHPR Rules of Procedure.

1497
Article 46.1 ECHR.

1498
Rule 6.2(a), Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of
judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, adopted by the Committee of Ministers
on 10 May 2006 at the 964
th
meeting of the Ministers Deputies (CMCE Rules for execution
of judgments).

1499
Rule 6.2(b), CMCE Rules for execution of judgments.

1500
See, Article 46 ECHR.
Exceptionally, where new facts come to light within a year of a judg-
ment, a party may request revision of the judgment.
1501
The American Convention on Human Rights does not establish any in-
stitutional role for the political organs of the Organisation of American
States to supervise enforcement of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights rulings. According to Article 65 ACHR, the Court is
obliged to submit an Annual Report to each regular session of the
General Assembly of the OAS for its consideration. In this report, the
Court will specify the cases in which a State has not complied with
its judgments, making any pertinent recommendations. However, the
Rules of Procedure provide that the Court may follow up on its judg-
ments and monitor its execution through reports of the State Party and
observations of the victims or their representatives. The Court may
request additional information from other sources and, if it deems it
appropriate, convoke a hearing with the State and the victims repre-
sentatives in order to monitor the compliance with its decisions. At the
hearing, the Court will hear also the opinion of the Commission. After
the hearing, the Court may determine the state of compliance and issue
appropriate orders.
1502
In the African system, the Committee of Ministers of the African Union
is mandated by the treaty establishing the Court to monitor the execu-
tion of the judgments of the African Court on Human and Peoples
Rights, once the Court is operational.
1503

The other bodies, whether universal or regional, apart from the Human
Rights Committee and the CERD, have procedures to assure follow-up
on the implementation of their recommendations.
The Committee against Torture and the CERD invite the State, when
communicating their decision, to provide information on their imple-
mentation and may appoint one or more Special Rapporteur(s) to follow
up and report on it.
1504
CESCR and CEDAW establish an obligation of
the State to report within six months, in writing, any action taken in
light of the views and recommendations, and specifcally provide that
the State Party may be invited to include further information in its peri-
odic report to the Committee.
1505

1501
Rules 7980, ECtHR Rules of Procedure.

1502
See, Article 69, IACtHR Rules of Procedure.

1503
Article 29, P-ACHPR on African Court.

1504
Rules 118.5 and 120, CAT Rules of Procedure; new Rule 95, paras. 6 and 7, CERD Rules of
Procedure, adopted on 15 August 2005, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cerd/docs/newruleprocedure- august05.pdf.

1505
See, Article 7.45 OP-CEDAW. See also, Rule 73, CEDAW Rules of Procedure; Article 9
OP-ICESCR.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, once it has
published a report on a friendly settlement or on the merits in which
it has made recommendations, may adopt any follow-up measures it
deems appropriate, such as requesting information from the parties and
holding hearings in order to verify compliance with friendly settlement
agreements and its recommendations. The Commission will report on
progress in complying with any such agreements and recommendations
as it deems appropriate.
1506
The European Committee on Social Rights will require the con-
cerned State to provide information about the implementation of the
Committee of Ministers recommendation in the periodic report it sub-
mits on the implementation of the Charter.
1507
IV. Reporting procedures
International reporting mechanisms do not bar the applicants from
bringing cases to quasi-judicial or judicial mechanisms. Although they
do not have the capacity to address an individual situation, their use
might be important in light of a case brought under them. This may be
because reports by these bodies might inform a judicial or quasi-judicial
mechanism on the country situation, or because it will be possible to
signal the case to these bodies both to exercise political pressure on the
national authorities and contribute to their analysis of the country situ-
ation. This last outcome is particularly signifcant given that individual
cases might take some years to be resolved in an international venue,
and that reports on country situations or diplomatic interventions on
the individual case might be quicker, therefore providing useful material
for the contentious case.
1. United Nations Treaty Bodies
The UN Treaty Bodies are those mechanism established by international
human rights treaties, most of which we have considered in the pre-
vious paragraphs, because they also have a quasi-judicial procedure
to consider individual cases. Each of them also has a procedure under
which States periodically report on their human rights situation and are
examined by the relevant Committee. These are:
The Human Rights Committee (ICCPR);
The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD);

1506

1507
Article 10 AP-ESC.
The Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW);
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);
The Committee against Torture (CAT);
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC);
The Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their
Families (ICMW);
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD);
The Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED).
All these Committees accept submissions from NGOs. These submis-
sions might also include some cases as example of human rights vio-
lations occurring in the country. Contacting a national or international
NGO in order to take into consideration the case in their report, might
increase the chances that the relevant Committee will address the gen-
eral human rights situation concerning it. An appropriate fnding of the
Committee might be of help in the individual case.
2. Non-judicial mechanisms taking individual petitions
Many of the Special Procedures established by the UN Human Right
Council to address particular issues (thematic mandates), to which
independent experts are appointed as mandate-holders, will receive
and address individual communications. Once a communication is re-
ceived, they will take it into consideration, and then, at their discretion,
they will decide whether to contact the concerned State requesting an
answer to the allegations. The communications will generally be pub-
lished in the Annual Report of the relevant Special Procedure. These
communications do not depend on whether the State concerned is a
party to a particular human rights treaty, and domestic remedies do not
need to be exhausted. Furthermore, Special Procedures are not bound
by the prohibition of duplication of complaints, so that it is possible
to present the same communication to more Special Procedures or to
Special Procedures and one judicial or quasi-judicial human rights body.
In addition to these Special Procedures, there also exists the Human
Rights Council Complaint Procedure established to address consistent
patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and
all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world and under
any circumstances.
1508

1508
See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/Pages/HRCComplaint
ProcedureIndex.aspx.
a) Basic Procedural Standards of Special Procedures
The UN Special Procedures follow in the consideration of communica-
tions some basic procedural standards that are enshrined in the Manual
of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council
1509

and in the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of
the Human Rights Council.
1510
These standards are not mandatory but
inform a harmonised procedure for mandate-holders and are generally
enforced by them.
Who can submit a communication: Communication may be submit-
ted by a person or group of persons claiming to be victim of violations
or by any person or group of persons, including, non-governmental
organisations, acting in good faith in accordance with the principles of
human rights, and free from politically motivated stands or contrary
to, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and claiming to
have direct or reliable knowledge of these violations substantiated by
clear information.
1511

How the communication must be submitted: The communication
must be in written, printed or electronic form and include full details of
the senders identity and address, and full details of the relevant inci-
dent or situation. Anonymous communications are not considered.
1512

Most Special Procedures provide questionnaires in different language to
be completed in order to present a communication.
1513
While the pre-
sentation of a communication through these forms is not mandatory, it
is highly recommended.
Which violations can be submitted for consideration: The kind
of violation that can be submitted to a Special Procedure depends on
the subject-matter which the mandate-holder is charged to consider.
1514
Conformity criteria: The communications (1) should not be man-
ifestly unfounded or politically motivated; (2) should contain a fac-
tual description of the alleged violations of human rights; (3) the
language of the communication should not be abusive; (4) and the
communication should not be exclusively based on reports dissem-

1509
Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, adopted at the
15
th
Annual Meeting of Special Procedures, June 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/chr/special/docs/Manual_August_FINAL_2008.doc (Manual of Operations).

1510
Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council, in
Resolution 5/2 of the UN Human Rights Council, Annex (Code of Conduct).

1511
Article 9.d, ibid.; Manual of Operations, op. cit., fn. 1509, para. 38.

1512
Manual of Operations, op. cit., fn. 1509, para. 38. Other formal requirements which may
ideally be included are listed in para. 39.

1513
See, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/questionnaires.htm.

1514
Ibid., para. 28.
inated by mass media.
1515
There is no need to exhaust domestic
remedies.
1516
Channels of communication: Mandate-holders address all their com-
munication to the concerned government through diplomatic channels,
unless otherwise agreed between the individual government and the
Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
1517
Mandate-holders
are not required to inform those who provide information about any
subsequent measure they have taken. They may, however, acknowl-
edge receipt of the information and provide an indication of outcomes
and follow-up, and may choose to provide some information, although
normally not involving disclosure of the specifc contents of communica-
tion with governments, unless an issue has been defnitively dealt with
by the government in question.
1518
Confdentiality: Mandate-holders take all feasible precautions to en-
sure that sources are not subject to retaliation.
1519
In communications
sent to governments, the source is normally kept confdential. An infor-
mation source may, however, request that its identity be revealed.
1520

The text of all communications sent and the responses to them are
confdential until they are published in the relevant reports of the man-
date-holders or the mandate-holders determine that the specifc cir-
cumstances require action to be taken before the time of publication.
1521

The names of alleged victims are normally refected in the reports, al-
though exceptions may be made in relation to children and other vic-
tims of violence in relation to whom publication of names would be
problematic.
1522
Action: The response to communication by mandate-holders may take
the form of letters of allegation or of urgent appeals. The decision to
take action is at the discretion of the mandate-holder.
1523
Letters of allegations: Letters of allegations are used to com-
municate violations that are alleged to have already occurred and
in situations where urgent appeals are not needed.
1524
In this
case, governments have two months to provide a substantive

1515
Article 9(a), (b), (c) and (e), Code of Conduct, op. cit., fn. 1510.

1516
Manual of Operations, op. cit., fn. 1509, para. 42.

1517
Article 14, Code of Conduct, op. cit., fn. 1510; Manual of Operations, op. cit., fn. 1509,
para. 28.

1518

1519
Ibid., para. 27.

1520
Ibid., para. 35.

1521
Ibid., para. 37.

1522
Ibid., para. 37.

1523
Ibid., para. 40.

1524
Ibid., para. 6.
response. Some mandate-holders forward the substance of the
replies received to the sources of information.
1525

Urgent appeal: mandate-holders may resort to urgent appeals
in cases where the alleged violations are time-sensitive in terms
of involving loss of life, life-threatening situations or either immi-
nent or ongoing damage of a very grave nature to victims that
cannot be addressed in a timely manner by the procedure of let-
ters of allegation.
1526
In the case of urgent appeals, governments
are generally requested to provide a substantive response within
thirty days. In appropriate cases, mandate-holders may decide to
make public an urgent appeal.
1527
Follow-up: The summaries of communications and of the govern-
ments replies are published in reports submitted to the Human Rights
Council. The general practice is for the mandate-holder to provide some
response to, or evaluation of, the exchange of information, although
this practice varies from one Special Procedure to the other.
1528
Box 18. Special Procedures most relevant to migrants
and refugees
Special Procedure Communications information
Special Rapporteur on
the human rights of
migrants
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/
Communications.aspx
Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention
Detention/Pages/Complaints.aspx
the sale of children,
child prostitution and
child pornography
Children/Pages/
IndividualComplaints.aspx
adequate housing as a
component of the right
to an adequate standard
of living, and on the
right to non-discrimina-
tion in this context
Housing/Pages/

1525
Ibid., para. 48.

1526
Article 10, Code of Conduct, op. cit., fn. 1510; Manual of Operations, op. cit., fn. 1509,
para. 43.

1527

1528
Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
Disappearances/Pages/
DisappearancesIndex.aspx
the right to education
Education/SREducation/Pages/
Working Group on the
issue of discrimination
against women in law
and in practice
Women/WGWomen/Pages/
SubmissionInformation.aspx
extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
issues/executions/complaints.htm
the right to food
Food/Pages/Complaints.aspx
freedom of religion or
belief
FreedomReligion/Pages/
Complaints.aspx
the promotion and pro-
tection of the right to
freedom of opinion and
expression
FreedomOpinion/Pages/
Complaints.aspx
the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the
highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and
mental health
Health/Pages/Individual
Complaints.aspx
Contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimi-
nation, xenophobia and
related intolerance
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Racism/SRRacism/Pages/
Contemporary forms of
slavery
Issues/Slavery/SRSlavery/Pages/
SubmittingInformation.aspx
torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading
treatment or punish-
ment
Letters of allegations:
Issues/Torture/SRTorture/Pages/
Allegation.aspx
Urgent appeals:
Torture/SRTorture/Pages/
Appeals.aspx
traffcking in persons,
especially in women
and children
Traffcking/Pages/complaints.aspx
violence against women,
its causes and conse-
quences
Women/SRWomen/Pages/
Complaints.aspx
the independence of
judges and lawyers
Judiciary/Pages/Complaints.aspx
extreme poverty and
human rights
Poverty/Pages/
Individualcomplaints.aspx
b) The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) is the only UN
Special Procedure whose mandate expressly provides for consideration
of individual complaints rather than merely communications, thereby
recognising a right of petition of individuals anywhere in the world.
1529

The WGAD may also take up cases on its own initiative.
1530
The Law: The WGAD bases its decisions on individual complaints on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for States Parties
to it, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; the
UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, and
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, as well as any other relevant standard.
1531

1529
See, Resolutions 1991/42 and 1997/50 of the UN Commission on Human Rights; Decision
2006/102 of the UN Human Rights Council; and Resolution 6/4 of the UN Human Rights Council.

1530
Revised Methods of Work, WGAD, in Fact Sheet No. 26, The Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, OHCHR, Annex IV, para. 13.

1531
Ibid., para. 7.
Who may submit a complaint: Complaints may be sent by the in-
dividuals directly concerned, their families, their representatives or
non-governmental organisations for the protection of human rights, al-
though the Group may also receive complaints by governments and
inter-governmental organisations.
1532
How the complaint must be submitted: The complaint must be sub-
mitted in writing and addressed to the Secretariat, including at least the
family name and address of the sender. As far as possible, each case
should include a presentation indicating names and any other informa-
tion making it possible to indentify the person detained. A questionnaire
is provided for by the WGAD website.
1533
Procedure. The consideration of individual complaints involves a four-
stage procedure.
Stage 1: The WGAD receives the complaint, which should contain
the minimum information highlighted above.
1534
Stage 2: The WGAD forwards the complaints to the government
through diplomatic channels, inviting it to reply with comments
and observations within 90 days. If the government communi-
cates that it desires an extension, this may be granted for a fur-
ther period of a maximum of two months.
1535

Stage 3: The replies by the government are brought to the atten-
tion of the complainant, which can further comment on them.
1536
Stage 4: The WGAD may adopt one of the following decisions on
the complaint:
(a) If the person has been released, for whatever reason, follow-
ing the reference of the case to the WGAD, the case is fled;
the Group, however, reserves the right to render an opinion,
on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the deprivation of lib-
erty was arbitrary, notwithstanding the release of the person
concerned;
(b) If the WGAD considers that the case is not one of arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, it shall render an opinion to this effect;
(c) If the WGAD considers that further information is required from
the government or the source, it may keep the case pending
until that information is received;

1532
Ibid., para. 12.

1533
Ibid., paras. 911. See questionnaire at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/detention/
docs/WGADQuestionnaire_en.doc.

1534
Ibid., paras. 914.

1535
Ibid., paras. 1516.

1536
Ibid., para. 15.
(d) If the WGAD considers that it is unable to obtain suffcient
information on the case, it may fle the case provisionally or
defnitively;
(e) If the WGAD decides that the arbitrary nature of the depriva-
tion of liberty is established, it shall render an opinion to that
affect and make recommendations to the government.
The opinion adopted by the WGAD is sent to the government
concerned together with the recommendations of the WGAD.
Three weeks later, the opinion is sent to the complainant.
Follow-up: The WGAD inserts the opinion in its annual report to the UN
Human Rights Council.
1537
The WGAD must also take all the appropriate
measures to ensure that governments inform it of follow-up actions
taken on the recommendations made.
1538
Review: In exceptional circumstances, the WGAD may reconsider
an already adopted opinion: (a) if the facts on which the request is
based are considered by the Group to be entirely new and such as to
have caused the Group to alter its decision had it been aware of them;
(b) if the facts had not been known or had not been accessible to the
party originating the request; or (c) when the request comes from a
government which has respected the delays for replies.
1539
Urgent Action Procedure: This procedure may be resorted to by the
WGAD (a) in cases in which there are suffciently reliable allegations
that a person is being arbitrarily deprived of his liberty and that the
continuation of such deprivation constitutes a serious threat to that per-
sons health or even to his life; or (b) in cases in which, even when no
such threat is alleged to exist, there are particular circumstances that
warrant an urgent action. The urgent action procedure does not pre-
judge any opinion that the WGAD may later adopt on the arbitrariness
of the deprivation of liberty.
1540

1537
Ibid., para. 19.

1538
Ibid., para. 20.

1539
Ibid., para. 21.

1540
Ibid., paras. 2223.
Composed of 60 eminent judges and lawyers from all regions of the world, the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists promotes and protects human rights through the Rule of
Law, by using its unique legal expertise to develop and strengthen national and interna-
tional justice systems.
Established in 1952 and active on the ve continents, the ICJ aims to ensure the
progressive development and eective implementation of international human rights
and international humanitarian law; secure the realization of civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights; safeguard the separation of powers; and guarantee the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and legal profession.
Migration and International Human Rights Law. Practitioners Guide No. 6
Copyright International Commission of Jurists, 2014
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) permits free reproduction of extracts from
any of its publications provided that due acknowledgment is given and a copy of the
publication carrying the extract is sent to its headquarters at the following address:
International Commission of Jurists
P.O. Box 91
Rue des Bains 33
Geneva
Switzerland
Other Commission Members:
Prof. Kyong-Wahn Ahn, Republic of Korea
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Philippines
Mr Muhannad Al-Hassani, Syria
Dr. Catarina de Albuquerque, Portugal
Mr Abdelaziz Benzakour, Morocco
Justice Ian Binnie, Canada
Justice Sir Nicolas Bratza, UK
Prof. Miguel Carbonell, Mexico
Justice Moses Chinhengo, Zimbabwe
Prof. Andrew Clapham, UK
Justice Radmila Dicic, Serbia
Justice Unity Dow, Botswana
Justice Elisabeth Evatt, Australia
Mr Roberto Garretn, Chile
Prof. Michelo Hansungule, Zambia
Ms Sara Hossain, Bangladesh
Ms Gulnora Ishankanova, Uzbekistan
Mr. Shawan Jabarin, Palestine
Justice Kalthoum Kennou, Tunisia
Prof. David Kretzmer, Israel
Prof. Csar Landa, Peru
Justice Ketil Lund, Norway
Justice Qinisile Mabuza, Swaziland
Justice Jos Antonio Martn Palln, Spain
Justice Charles Mkandawire, Malawi
Mr Kathurima MInoti, Kenya
Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, South Africa
Justice Sanji Monageng, Botswana
Tamara Morschakova, Russia
Prof. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Thailand
Justice Egbert Myjer, Netherlands
Dr Jarna Petman, Finland
Prof. Victor Rodriguez Rescia, Costa Rica
Mr Belisario dos Santos Junior, Brazil
Prof. Marco Sassoli, Italy-Switzerland
Prof. Olivier de Schutter, Belgium
Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, India
Mr Raji Sourani, Palestine
Justice Philippe Texier, France
Justice Stefan Trechsel, Switzerland
Prof. Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Colombia
ICJ Commission Members
September 2014 (for an updated list, please visit www.icj.org/commission)
President:
Prof. Sir Nigel Rodley, United Kingdom
Vice-Presidents:
Prof. Robert Goldman, United States
Justice Michle Rivet, Canada
Executive Committee:
Prof. Carlos Ayala, Venezuela
Justice Azhar Cachalia, South Africa
Prof. Jenny E. Goldschmidt, Netherlands
Ms Imrana Jalal, Fiji
Ms Hina Jilani, Pakistan
Ms Karinna Moskalenko, Russia
Prof. Mnica Pinto, Argentina
Migration and
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ISBN 978-92-9037-151-X 6

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