Platos Republic

Book 1
Polemarchus view of justice is that it is to do good to friends and harm to enemies. Socrates
responds with three dilemmas towards this view. The first is that one can be mistaken not only
with respect to ones actions but also with respect to whom one befriends. If we do good to a
friend who is bad, and harm to an enemy that is good, we do not appear to be acting justly.
Polemarchus then clarifies that a friend ought to both appear and be good, whereas an enemy
ought to appear and be bad. The second response is to pick out what art justice is. In other
words, in which domain is justice demonstrated. Polemarchus responds that it is in making war
and being an ally in battle, or else in the use and acquisition of contract in peacetime. Socrates
does not assess the former claim, but he reduces the latter to meaning only that the just human is
good for protecting money. He does so by demonstrating that money, and all other devices, is
used by other practitioners more knowledgably, such that the just human has no particular craft.
This refutation seems to suggest that justice is not a techne. Polemarchus then returns to his
original standpoint that justice is helping friends and harming enemies, to which Socrates
responds with his third point, namely, harm is always unjust. He demonstrates that doing harm
always affects the recipient negatively, and so makes them worse than they were before. Doing
so is the work of injustice, and so it is never just even to harm ones enemies. It is also
established here that justice is a human virtue.

Thrasymachus first position is that the just is the advantage of the stronger. When asked to
clarify, he gives an obviously problematic answer, namely, that the rulers of the city set down
laws, the obedience of which is to their advantage. Justice, he claims, is obedience to the laws
and is therefore to the advantage of the stronger. Because Thrasymachus requires both that the
citizens obey the laws and also that the laws are to the advantage of the stronger, Socrates is able
to separate these two conditions, by demonstrating that the rulers are prone to making mistakes,
and could setting down a law to their disadvantage. As Thrasymachus seems to think that
obeying the law is more crucial to what is just, he must therefore maintain that it is possible that
justice is to the disadvantage of the stronger (i.e. the rulers). Thrasymachus then clarifies his
position so as to not admit of any mistakes, because making a mistake implies lack of
knowledge, and of lack of knowledge is a lapse in the craft of ruling. Socrates goes on, then, to
show that all crafts concern something other than itself. In the case of ruling, the stronger rule
over, and are concerned only with, the weaker. Thus, it would not seem to be the case that the
stronger rule for their own advantage, but rather for the advantage of the ruled (i.e. the weaker).

Thrasymachus finally gives the more complete version of his position, which seems closest to
the position represented by Antiphon, namely that justice is a hindrance to the stronger, and it is
more advantageous to act unjustly. The weak act justly, which makes it easier for the unjust to
get the better of them (pleinexia), that is, to take advantage of them. One aspect of
Thrasymachuss view, that gets reformed in Glaucon and Adeimantuss version, is that for
Thrasymachus the unjust human is more successful. He always gets more than the just human.
Socrates concluding arguments will aim to show that the just person is the knowledgeable one,
and is therefore more successful. It is only with Glaucon and Adeimantuss position that Socrates
evaluates whether the just way of life is truly good in itself, or if it is good in virtue of its
rewards.
Socrates demonstrates that the unjust desire to get the better of both just and unjust people,
whereas just people only desire to get the better of unjust people. By comparing this model
with other crafts, where knowledge, wisdom, etc. want to get the better of lack of knowledge, he
shows that unjust is akin to lack of knowledge and vice. This argument seems strange, because it
has already been shown that justice is not a craft. However, Socrates shows that knowledge is
wisdom, and wisdom is good, as well as showing that knowledge always gets the better of lack
of knowledge. But does justice fit into any of these categories? Socrates ends up being content
with saying because the just human is like the wise and good, the just human is therefore wise
and good. Finally, Socrates shows that because the unjust is opposed to itself as well as its
opposite, it is unable to accomplish anything because it is always forming factions against itself.
Socrates next introduces a function argument, where he defines the work of each thing is
what it alone can do, or can do more finely than other things. In addition to the work of
each thing, there is also a virtue of each thing with respect to its work. For example, the function
of the eye is to see and its virtue is to see well, whereas its vice is to see poorly or even not at all
(blindness). Socrates next considers that the functions of the soul include managing, ruling,
and deliberating, and finally living. Because justice is the virtue of the soul, and injustice is
its vice, it follows that a soul cannot manage, rule, deliberate, or live well if it is unjust, but can
do so if it is just.

[Conclusion]
It is interesting that in the discussions with both Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, the arguments
can be broken up into three key phases. The first considered justice as a kind of activity that is
susceptible to mistakes. This phase is therefore at the level of reality, together with form and
matter. The second phase considers justice as a craft, but one that does not make mistakes. Thus,
it is possible to analyze the craft itself with respect to its explicit purpose and effect of the craft.
This phase is at the level of the form of the craft and/or justice itself. However, as neither of
these were adequate, the next level considers whether or not justice is good, or whether it does
good. This phase is then at the level of virtue. These three phases imitate the progress made in
the allegory of the cave, the metaphor of the sun, and the divided line. First is the level of
appearances, then the level of forms, and finally the level of the good or virtue.

Book II
Glaucon and Adeimantus try to reinvigorate Thrasymachuss argument by challenging Socrates
as to whether justice is good in itself, good for what comes out of it, or both good in itself and for
what comes out of it. Socrates believes it is good in itself and for what comes out of it, however
Glaucon presents the case that it is only good for what comes of it, and that acting justly is rather
a burden. Socrates argument against Thrasymachus showed only that injustice was a lack of
knowledge and would not lead to a successful, happy life. However, Glaucon is providing the
alternative of perfect justice and injustice. Perfect injustice is a person who is clever enough to
get away with everything s/he does, so as to reap the benefits of injustice, while still maintaining
the reputation of justice (Ring of Gyges). Alternatively, perfect justice must appear as injustice,
in order to test the merits of the good of justice itself, instead of its semblance, reputation, or
benefits. Perhaps this answer was partially answered in considering soul as the living function of
the person, and justice its virtue. However, this may only have shown that justice enables a
person to attain happiness easily, but not that justice itself is good. Thus, Socrates must show that
provided the rewards of justice and injustice are the same, or more precisely, provided the
rewards of injustice are greater than those of justice, is justice a good way of life.

In order to describe justice, Socrates decides to build a city in speech, which will serve as a
macrocosm of a person. The first principle they begin to follow is that every citizen should do
what they are most suited to do, rather than each person doing every job to suit only their own
needs, much like the function argument in book 1 prescribed. Socrates builds a very small city
with only the essentials, but Glaucon calls it a city of pigs, and asks to include more luxuries
so as to appear more genuine. A new profession is needed for a larger city: guardians (soldiers).
The guardians are to be philosophic in nature, in order that they may sense whether a person is
enemy or friend and act responsively. In order to have soldiers with such a nature, Socrates
begins to create an education program, which considers many classical Greek tales as
inappropriate. Only tales that depict gods in an appropriate nature, and likewise humans in an
appropriate nature, are to be used to educate the children, who are at a young age plastic and
malleable.

Book III
Book III continues the discussion of what poetry is to be included in the educational program for
the guardians. After dealing with the content of the poetry, Socrates considers next the style,
whether narrative, imitative, or both. He is concerned that including imitations of weaker
individuals will negatively affect the growth of the guardians, so only sensible, courageous, good
people are imitated in art, and the rest are presented through narrative. This is because
imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits
and nature, in body and sounds in thought. After poetry, Socrates treats music in a similar
fashion, addressing the instruments, the modes, and the content. Next he considers the
gymnastics, which are necessary for developing the body not only for its own sake, but also for
the sake of the development of the soul. It is important to have a balanced regimen that includes
both gymnastic and music training, because too much of the former produces savageness and
hardness, but too much of the latter produces softness and tameness.

Finally, Socrates suggests that a ruling class is necessary in order to make sure the guardians, the
workers, and the city as a whole are in order. The rulers are to be chosen from the guardians, and
must care for the city. They must demonstrate a resistance to a change in conviction. In order
to cohere the city better, Socrates suggests an introduction of a noble lie. The noble lie states that
all the people are born from the earth, and a god gives each individual a type of metal, which
determines which class (ruling, guardian, worker) they are most suited for. This lie shows that
the people all come from the same source, but that they have different natures nevertheless, and
ought to function according to their nature. The guardians are also not permitted to have private
property, in order that they may perceive the city as their property that is shared by the
community, and so that they may defend it responsively.

Book IV
Book IV begins with a criticism by Adeimantus that the guardians would not be happiest given
the conditions they must live in. Socrates responds that though the guardians may not be
happiest, the purpose of the project was to construct the best city regarded as a whole, rather than
with respect to any of its parts.

Next they examine the city with respect to its four virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation and
justice. Wisdom is a kind of knowledge belonging to some of the citizens that counsels not
about the affairs connected to some particular thing in the city, but about how the city as a
whole would best deal with itself and the other cities. Naturally, wisdom belongs to the
guardian class. Courage, is the preserving of the opinion produced by law through
education about what and what sort of thing is terrible. Courage belongs to the auxiliary
class. Moderation is a kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and
desires, however it manifests itself as that in which the better rules over the worse, such
that the rulers and the ruled have the same opinion about who should rule. Moderation
therefore exists throughout all of the classes, in such a way that the more base desires are subject
to the higher, intellectual desires. This leaves justice, which presents itself as one must
practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally
most fit justice is the minding of ones own business and not being a busybody. Justice,
likewise, seems to exist throughout the all of the citys classes.

Next, Socrates considers whether three similar parts exist in the human soul. He asks an
interesting question, namely, do we act in each of these ways as a result of the same part of
ourselves, or are there three parts and with a different one we act in each of the different ways?
He will end up arguing for the latter by comparing the soul and its action(s) to a top. Nothing can
act in both one way and the opposite of that one way, unless it does so in different parts or in
different respects, like a top that is both moving and standing still. Likewise with the soul,
Socrates gives three different kinds of actions, although one seems the most pure: the desire for
irrational things; the calculating part which obstructs desire, and the spirited part. These suffice
to correspond to the money-making class, the guardian class, and the auxiliary class,
respectively. Socrates considers the role of the calculating and spirited part of the soul to be to
watch it [the desiring part] for fear of its being filled with the so called pleasures of the body
and thus becoming big and strong, and then not minding its own business, but attempting to
enslave and rule what is not appropriately ruled by its class and subverting everyones entire
life. Finally, then, Socrates considers the examples on Book 1 with respect to the description of
justice now provided. Rather than attempting to define justice to accommodate every type of
action, justice is rather an internal ordering of the soul, whereby the just human acts in such a
way to preserve this order and condition. One calculates the most appropriate action to maintain
this form, and this decision is carried out by the spirited, courageous part, which keeps the
desiring part of the soul in line.

[Conclusion]
Although the presentation of this account is relatively straight forward, synthesizing it with
respect to the accounts of justice given by the Sophists is more difficult. Specifically, what is
justices relationship to nature and convention in Socrates account? Justice means that each part
of the soul does what it is naturally most fit to do. Therefore, Socrates can say that it is natural to
be just. However, this nature only exists in the best city/person.

Another peculiarity is considering the unjust persons soul. Whereas in the just persons
soul/city, there are three clearly delineated parts, the unjust soul/city is less distinct. Furthermore,
injustice can otherwise be described as lapses in the other virtues. When parts of the soul attempt
to do the work which they are not fitted to do, this is likewise a disagreement between which part
should rule and which part should be ruled, thus a disaccord between the desires of the whole,
i.e., immoderation. Likewise when a part of the soul other than the calculating part begins
determining the actions of the whole, this is likewise a lapse in wisdom. The talk about parts of
the soul is imported from the discussion of the city, where each part is a different class or role of
the citizens. Although it might be easier to say that these parts are distinct only in their actions,
Book IV attempted to argue, first, that the actions are best executed by that which is by nature
most fitted to do so, and second, that a thing cannot do both one action and its opposite.

It does seem then, that there are distinct parts of the soul which, when in agreement with their
nature, leads to a just person. It is by working against ones nature that one allows the desires to
take control of a persons actions. When a person acts only according to his or her desires, they
are unjust. If this is the case, then it seems that Socrates response to the Sophists (at least here) is
that all (or most) people have by nature a calculating part of the soul which is, also by nature,
more suited to counseling the actions of the person. He was able to argue for this in Books I-IV
by claiming that no other knowledge contained in the desiring parts would be adequate to
determining the well-being of the whole, because each knowledge, or craft, is suited only to its
object. Therefore, there must be some knowledge most suited to the person, or city, as a whole.
This knowledge will be presented later in the dialogue, but the existence of this knowledge is
meant to oppose the opinion of the Sophists, which, according to the presentation in the book, is
in favor of the inactivity of this knowledge, and allows for a free-for-all of the desires to compete
for control of the body/city as a whole. This will also be presented later in the dialogue.

Book V
Book V presents the three waves: the equal education and practice of men and women; the
common community of men, women, and children; and finally, the introduction of the
philosopher as the necessary ruler for the city. In each of these cases, Socrates attempts to
address, first, the issue as to whether each doctrine is beneficial to the city, and second, whether
each doctrine is possible.

The first wave is the equality of men and women. The argument claims that although men may
be in general stronger than women, women are naturally suited for the same classes and jobs as
men are. It is not only possible but also probable that many women are more suited for a
particular job than many men are. It is rather a persons soul that determines their suitability for a
particular job. Therefore, women must go through the same education as men in order to fulfill
their position as optimally as possible.

The second wave is the common community of men, women, and children. The purpose of this
doctrine is to eliminate any source for faction within the city, so that the city will act as unified
as possible. Private family and property allow for irrational preference of one citizen or another,
which can cause problems for the city. Therefore, when the citizens all treat each other entirely
equally, and furthermore treat each other as the only relevant family, the city will be more
unified, and therefore more just.

The third wave addresses the possibility of the city to exist at all. Socrates responds by
comparing the city of speech to a painting of a beautiful person, but one who may never exist.
Furthermore, he points out that actions or deeds can never reach the same precision or reality as
speech can, although he will nevertheless attempt to provide the condition whereby the most just
city possible could come into being. This condition is that the philosophers must rule as kings.

A philosopher is different from others because the philosopher is a lover of the sight of the
truth. Whereas the others delight in fair sounds and colors and shapes and all that craft makes
from such things, but their thought is unable to see and delight in the nature of the fair itself.
The distinction then turns out to be the difference between opinion and knowledge. Knowledge
is always knowledge of something that is, and cannot be of something that is not. The complete
opposite of knowledge is ignorance, which is necessarily of what is not. However, Socrates
postulates that there is something else besides knowledge and ignorance, namely, opinion. Since
knowledge is of what is, and ignorance of what is not, opinion must be between the two, and
opines something that participates in both being and non-being. Socrates then shows that the
multiplicity of things (fair things, just things, etc.) participate in both being and non-being
because a fair thing can also appear ugly, a just thing unjust. Thus fair things differ from the fair
itself, which cannot participate in non-being, i.e. ugliness.

Book VI
Socrates continues to describe the philosopher. A philosophic nature will exhibit good memory,
good learning, magnificent, charming, and a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and
moderation. Adeimantus responds by giving the public opinion of philosophers, namely that
philosophy often tricks people in speech to believe one thing, while in deed philosophers end up
being either vicious when improperly learnt or useless when properly learnt. Socrates agrees to
this reproach, but responds by saying that it is the publics fault that philosophy is received in
such a manner. He gives an image of the crew of a ship, in which the appearance of the
knowledge of sailing is a result of convincing people of a certain opinion, but true knowledge of
sailing appears strange to the rest, who neither have knowledge nor knows what the knowledge
would appear like. This is to say that the public do not know what true philosophy is, but rather
they believe it to be what the sophists practice, which has more to do with rhetorical skill instead
of the love and pursuit of truth and wisdom. It is also a problem that those with a philosophic
nature exhibit great potential, but few can go uncorrupted; in fact, Socrates claims that no city is
in a condition worthy of the philosophic nature. Thus, it is only by chance, he claims, that a
genuine philosopher can come to be, and likewise it is a chance that a city could become just
through the counsel and leadership of a philosopher.

Next, Socrates returns to the education for philosophers. The first few things listed appear simply
as a more rigorous program than the guardians. Most important, however, is the study of the
idea of the good, which is the greatest study and that its by availing oneself of it along with
just things and the rest that they become useful and beneficial. To explain the idea of the good,
Socrates first distinguishes between the sensible and the intelligible, namely, things and ideas.
Corresponding to each thing is a power which grasps each thing, namely sensation (e.g. sight,
hearing, etc.) and intellecting, respectively. There is furthermore, according to Socrates, a third
class of thing, without which the sensation of the sensible is possible, namely light (with
respect to sight). The relationship between sight, sensible, and light/sun, Socrates claims, is that
it [the eye] gets its power it has as a sort of overflow from the suns treasury the sun isnt
sight either, but as its cause is seen by sight itself. Then finally, as the good is in the intelligible
region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so the sun is in the visible region with
respect to sight and what is seen. Thus the good is not only intelligible via its idea, but also it is
the source and cause of intelligibility. Socrates goes on to say that
what provides the truth of the things known and gives the power to the one who knows, is
the idea of the good. And, as the cause of knowledge and truth, you can understand it to
be a thing known; but, as far as these two are knowledge and truth if you believe that
it is something different from them and still fairer than they, your belief will be right
Not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but
also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isnt
being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.

Naturally, this passage is an important and contested passage in the history of philosophy.
Although I would prefer it not to treat the good as some transcendent One, it is hard to avoid
such an interpretation given the last passage, which extends the comparison of the good to the
sun so as to include not only an epistemological claim with reference to truth, but also a
metaphysical claim with reference to being. In Polanskys notes, he reminds us that this ultimate
principle need not always be the Good, but can be other ideas or forms depending on the context.
Furthermore, the good doesnt need to necessarily be ineffable, as the Neoplatonists may take it
(have not yet read them thoroughly; cf. My Notes on the Neoplatonists, once they are written),
but could rather be a self-sufficient idea that also is cause of all the others, without itself being
those other forms. Recall that the purpose of describing the good was to find an ultimate
principle which would ground the forms of justice and fair. Justice itself and fairness itself are
contested concepts, so Socrates needs recourse to some higher form, the good, which grounds
justice, fairness, and other forms. Finally, the extent to which this ultimate principle is actually
good is unclear. Polansky seems to think that Socrates makes the ultimate principle to be the
good because it helps the larger argument of the Republic as a whole, namely that the just life is
better than the unjust. In other words, Socrates is identifying the source of being, knowledge,
truth, etc. with the good because it helps the argument.

Setting aside the metaphysical issues, the good is the source of intelligibility and truth. Just as the
sun provides light so that we may see thing that are visible, the good is the cause of both our
intellect and allows our intellect to understand intelligible things. Otherwise formulated, the good
is the cause of knowledge and truth, but is something other than both. It would seem that without
knowing, or at least studying, the idea of the good, we cannot be sure of the truth of our
opinions. The idea of the good needs no higher principle, since it is itself the highest. Therefore
if someone knows the idea of the good, they can understand what is true, because the good is the
cause of the true.

Following the sun-good analogy is the divided line. Socrates tells us to take a line and cut it into
unequal segments, one for the intelligibles and one for the visibles. Then cut the two segments
once more according to the same ratio. The intelligibles are divided into forms (eide) and
mathematical objects (ta mathematica), and the visibles are divided into things and images
(eikones). Corresponding to each class of being is a form of apprehension. Forms are
apprehended through intellection (noesis), mathematical objects through thought (dianoia),
things through trust (pistis), and images through imagination (eikasia). Glaucon also uses
opinion as being lower than both intellection and thought, though this could describe the
apprehension of all visible entities. It is impossible to tell which segments are larger or smaller,
but the middle two sections are necessary equal in size. The more explicit relation of using the
same ratio for three divisions seems to indicate a relation of a being to its appearance, where the
relation of intelligible to visible is the same as a form to its image (mathematical object), and
likewise the same as a thing to its reflection, dream-image, etc.

Also in this section is Socrates comparison between hypothetical (mathematical) thinking and
dialectical thinking. Mathematical thinking begins from certain hypotheses and proceeds from
beginning to end in the production of results. Dialectical thinking, on the other hand, begins from
a certain point, but seeks the conditions for those hypotheses by working backwards and aims to
find an ultimate principle or beginning, that which is free from hypothesis (the good?). From this
ultimate principle, from this beginning it is possible to go back downward with ultimate certainty
and truth making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going
through forms to forms, it ends in forms too.

Book VII
Socrates starts right away with the allegory of the cave. Very briefly, there is a community of
people, whose legs and heads are bound so as only to be able to see a wall. Shadows are cast on
the wall using facsimiles of things and a fire, both within the cave. All the people have
knowledge (opinion) of are images of facsimiles produced by an artificial source of
intelligibility/visibility (the fire). Socrates then asks us to imagine a person who is released from
this situation, and who is able to see increasingly more real things. From shadows, to her fellow
prisoners, to the facsimiles, to the fire. Next she leaves the cave and is able to discern first real
shadows and reflections, then the things themselves, then stars, starlight, the moon, and
moonlight, then finally the sun and its light. Perceiving and comprehending the sun means,
again, that one understands the source of visibility as well as the source of being of seasons,
growth, etc. When she returns to the cave, she is unintelligible to the other prisoners, because she
speaks of what really is, while the prisoners have only experienced what seems to be.

Socrates considers, then, that the task of education is not to provide people with a new skill or
knowledge, but rather to turn their soul in the direction of what (already) is. Interestingly,
Socrates at one point considers the other virtues of a soul, as they are called, are probably
somewhat close to those of the body. For they are really there beforehand and are later produced
by habits and exercises, while the virtue of exercising prudence is more than anything somehow
more divine, it seems. Because prudence exists always, the task of education is not to engender
knowledge, but to affect a person in a certain way so that they use their prudence. This would
seem to suggest that all people have the same capacity for prudence, though the soul of each
person is turned in a different direction. If this is the case, the obstacle of education and of a
virtuous soul is the body and its desires. Socrates concludes that the philosophers would much
rather stay out of the cave and contemplate what truly is, but for the sake of the city, they must
return to rule the city in the direction of the good. Philosophers, it seems, are they only people
who have discovered a better life than politics, so they are the only ones qualified to rule.

Socrates considers next the proper supplemental education for the philosophically inclined. He
believes that numbers are important because they lead the soul to contemplate what is, rather
than what appears. He gives the three finger example, which states that when one considers
three fingers only as fingers, there is no reason to go beyond sensation. Each finger as adequately
a finger, and there is therefore no need to question ones opinion. Rather, when one considers
certain features (Socrates points to relational figures), it is evident that the apprehension of the
finger is problematized. Namely, the finger is both big(ger than one finger) and small(er than the
other finger). It follows that the finger is both X and not X. This is a contradiction, and so one
cannot be sure whether the finger is either X or not X; one no longer knows what X is. Socrates
believes this leads one to the consideration of characteristics as numbers (one and two). If the
finger is X and not-X, then it is two simultaneously. But two ([big and small]) is separated into
ones ([big] and [small]). Intellect is able to consider each one individually, whereas sight sees
them mixed together. Thus, intellect is able to consider each one by asking the question, what is
X ([big]; [small]; etc.)?

This example leads Socrates to believe that an understanding of numbers is necessary for the
understanding of what is always, rather than what appears and what becomes. Following the
education of numbers, Socrates includes arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry (were it to exist),
and astronomy, as each includes one more dimension than the one prior (one dimension, two
dimensions, three dimensions, three dimensions in motion). Finally, dialectic is to be included in
the education. Like in Book VI, dialectic is portrayed as the working backwards from
hypotheses, by searching for the principle by which everything ultimately actually is. Socrates
repeats the results of the divided line in Book VI, and establishes that trust and imagination (of
visibles) are opinions, whereas knowledge and thought (of intelligibles) are intellections.
Furthermore, opinion is concerned with coming into being and intellection with being.

Throughout Book VII, there is a concern for the reception of true knowledge by the uninitiated,
whether it be children or the community as a whole. There is always a risk of being
misunderstood, or appearing crazy, or of corruption. Socrates addresses this by ensuring that the
mode of presentation of this knowledge suits the recipient. Is this why Socrates (Plato) uses
images throughout the dialogue? This question also summons the question of the best life:
political or philosophical. Within the greater question of justice, and the macroscopic
presentation of the city, Socrates requires that the philosophers return to the city to lead it, even
when they know that philosophy is a better life. Although the dilemma is explicit here, perhaps
we are obligated to wait until we return to the microscopic consideration of the just individuals;
Socrates even suggests that it is unjust for the philosophers to leave the city for good. Perhaps a
life of pure philosophy is the equivalent of the unlimited desire of the soul which must be
limited, following Polanskys reading of Platos philosophy.

Book VIII
Socrates discusses the deviations from the just city and likewise the just person in Book VIII.
This includes timocracy (ruled by love for honor), oligarchy (rule by love for wealth),
democracy (rule by love for freedom), and tyranny (rule? by love? for [?]) (Book VIII only gets
as far as the tyrannical city, and Book IX will resume with the tyrannical person/soul).

Timocracy is able to come into being because of the intrinsic imperfection and irrationality of the
world and nature. Socrates says that a city so composed [Kallipolis] is hard to be me moved.
But, since for everything that has come into being there is decay, not even a composition such as
this will remain for all time; it will be dissolved. Specifically, he refers to a birth number
which if not satisfied, will lead to imperfect reproduction, and allow for the degradation of the
state. The birth number section is practically impenetrable, but it is meant to show the
impossibly immense precision required to maintain the just city. Timocracy, then, is a city much
like Sparta or Crete. Socrates suggests that the classes of the just city will enter into conflict with
one another, leading to the enslavement of the bronze and iron (money-makers) by the gold
and silver (guardians and auxiliaries). He suggests that the timocratic city will lack an
adequately philosophical ruling class, and will instead be ruled according to spiritedness shared
by the auxiliary class. Such a city will nevertheless rule over the desiring part of the city
adequately, and is therefore second in splendor, beauty, or justice to Kallipolis. Perhaps the
auxiliaries are still acting in a way according to their nature (they still resemble auxiliaries from
the just city), but are inadequate to the position of ruling. Moreover, the money-making class,
now the slave class, still appears to work according to its nature. Likewise, the timocratic person
is likewise torn between the intellectual, rational part and the desiring part, and so leads her life
through the middle ground of the spirited part. She shares certain characteristics with the just
person, and is moreover able to rule over her desires, but only through her spiritedness and love
for victory.

The oligarchical city is a regime founded on property assessment, in which the rich rule and the
poor man has no part in ruling office. Because the desiring, money-making part is the ruling
class, they no longer have specialized rulers or soldiers, and therefore every person must work in
all roles of the city. This violates the goal of one person, one job, or in other words the
stipulation for justice as minding owns business. As justice no longer exists, it also is suggested
that this city no longer exhibits any virtue. Nevertheless this city, and likewise the oligarchic
person, is able to hold down bad desires, and is therefore more graceful than many. This
whole is still driven by a single desire for wealth, although the whole itself is in conflict with
itself with regard to its shape (there is a wealthy and poor part), and therefore the person is not as
virtuous because of this inner conflict.

The oligarchic city and person are therefore different from the democratic city and person,
because in the latter, all desires are permitted. Socrates suggests that the conflict between
wealthy and poor is unsustainable, and advances to a state of equality for everybody. Because
everybody is equal, everybody shares equal freedom, such that Socrates believes a democracy to
be the fairest regime. Its problem is that it allows all desires to manifest themselves, both good
and bad. Democracy seems to be the ground zero for all regimes, but lacks any distinct qualities
of its own. Likewise, the democratic person appears fickle, and displays many sorts of
dispositions, because nothing is permitted to rule over the person for long. Every desire is
granted permission to lead the soul in a direction for a period of time until another desire takes its
place.

Democracy is therefore also a breeding ground for a tyranny. Tyranny is possible when a
particular person is able to take advantage of the desires of the populous and can maintain power
through such means. Socrates states that the tyrant is only able to remain in power by waging
war against its own citizenry. Not only must the tyrant fight against the city, but moreover he
must attack the strong, wise, courageous members of the city, because they are the ones most
likely to succeed in seizing back control of the city. It is suggested, then, that the tyrant cripples
the city by eliminating every virtuous member within it, and leaving only the weak members,
who are unable to free themselves from the tyrannical rule.

Book IX
Socrates says that different kinds of desires and pleasures, some better and more noble than
others. When we dream, or baser desires manifest themselves, but when we are awake, we can
check the baser desires through calculation. He says this in order to relate the tyrannical person
to the person in dreams. The tyrannical person has crippled the nobler parts of the soul, and so
relinquishes control of the baser desires. The tyrants soul is inverted because the desiring part
rules over the intellectual part, which therefore enslaves the person. This unrestrained desire,
Socrates explains, is a very wretched condition in comparison to the monarchical person, who
can control her savage desires.

Socrates gives a second proof that the just person is happier than the unjust person. For each of
the three parts of the soul (learning, spirited, desiring) there corresponds a specific pleasure
(wisdom and learning, victory and honor, money and gain, respectively). However, only the
learning part can adequately judge which pleasure is best. Therefore, the spirited person and the
desiring person, although they claim their pleasure is best, are not adequate judges for the claim.
Only the just person can make the claim, and because the just person finds wisdom to be the
greatest pleasure, it follows that wisdom is the greatest pleasure.

The third proof concerns the relation of pleasure to pain. Socrates points out that in addition to
pure pleasure and pure pain, there is the repose of pain which appears pleasant, and the repose of
pleasure with appears painful. The repose is situated between pleasure and pain, just as opinion
was situated between ignorance and knowledge. Socrates then argues that only the just person
can participate in the highest pleasures, because the just person has knowledge of that which
most fully is. The other types of persons only experience the semblance of pleasure, although not
in what most completely is (pleasurable). On the other end, the tyrant only finds the basest things
pleasurable, but is never satisfied, because these base pleasures participate least in what truly is.
These pleasures are always changing, and can never be fully satisfied.

Socrates next provides an image of a soul (and person). One part of the soul is a many-colored,
any-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and savage beasts and can change them and
make all of them grow from itself; one part is a lion, and another part is a human being. These
aggregate is joined as one, and is covered over by the appearance of a human being. This
aggregated soul, when unjust, allows the savage part to take control of the person and enslave the
other parts. The just alternative is to have the human control the other two, while still preserving
and maintaining them so as to please all parts of the soul as is appropriate.

The ultimate argument of this book is similar to the arguments in Book I against Polemarchus
and Thrasymachus. Namely, the unjust person is always in conflict with him or herself and is
unable to live a satisfied life. The development in the discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus
appears to internalize this point. Thus even when the unjust person has every semblance of
success and pleasure, they are never satisfied with it because these semblances of pleasure are
removed from what truly is. The just person, on the other hand, knows what is and knows how to
feel satisfaction and pleasure appropriately. Thus, the just person does not the semblance of
success and pleasure, because happiness is rooted in the soul, not in the external appearances.

Book X
Socrates returns to a criticism of imitation, which seems to include all art (poetry, painting, etc.).
The first point is to differentiate a form (idea), the thing itself, and its copy. God is the creator of
a thing in nature (i.e. the form). A craftsperson produces corporeal instantiations of the form.
Finally, imitators replicate not the form, but the corporeal instantiation, based on appearance.
Similarly, Socrates differentiates three kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of the user, of the
maker, and of the imitator. The using art knows most of all what is regarding the content of the
art. Likewise, the makers art has access to this knowledge by trusting the users art. However,
the imitative art knows nothing about what is concerning the content of an art, but only what
appears to be. Because imitation manipulates semblances and appearances, it interacts with the
baser part of the soul, the opining part, rather than the learning, intellectual, wise part, which is
concerned more with what is. On these grounds (poetry deals with appearances and opinions,
whereas philosophy deals with being and knowledge), Socrates bans all of poetry from the city.

Socrates argues next that the soul is immortal. First, he considers good that which saves and
benefits, and bad that which corrupts and destroys. Then, he considers the badness proper to the
soul to be injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, and lack of learning. However, none of these
are sufficient enough to genuinely destroy the soul, but only to warp it. Moreover, no other vice
has an effect on the soul, but rather a vice can only affect that of which it is a vice of. Therefore,
because nothing can destroy the soul, the soul is immortal.

The argument for the immortality of the soul proceeds into the argument for the preference for
the just life versus the unjust life. Glaucons original stipulations were to consider the just life
without any outward manifestation of justice, and likewise the unjust life without any
manifestation of injustice. Book IX showed that the unjust person is necessarily unsatisfied
whereas the just person is perfectly content, in both cases regardless of what possessions or fame
each individual had. Here in Book X, Socrates will try to show that not only is justice preferable
over injustice without any such reward, but moreover justice does indeed provide rewards.
Although injustice cannot destroy the soul, it affects the life we choose in the afterlife (as
depicted by the Myth of Er). The most significant part of the myth is this selection process for an
individuals next life following their death. It is suggested that a formerly unjust person will not
have the adequate knowledge to choose a satisfactory life; they will therefore repeatedly choose
unhappy lives. The just person, on the other hand, does have the knowledge to choose a
satisfactory life. Both lives seem to reinforce themselves for several cycles of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction, such that justice is exponentially better than injustice. Nevertheless, this part of
the argument seems to depend in large part on the previous books, namely that the just life is
intrinsically better than the unjust one.