GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 37

Foresight Futures Scenarios

Developing and Applying a Participative
Strategic Planning Tool
Frans Berkhout and Julia Hertin
University of Sussex, UK
This paper presents the Foresight Futures, a participative planning tool developed
by SPRUScience and Technology Policy Research for the UK Foresight Programme.
It describes the process of developing the scenario framework, sets out the key
dimensions and basic storylines and summarises different ways in which the
Foresight Futures have been applied by government, researchers and industry.
Focusing on practical ways of using the scenarios, the final part of the paper provides
guidance on their use and discusses the potential of the approach.
Scenarios
Foresight
Future
Strategic
planning
Participation
Frans Berkhout is director of the ESRC Sustainable Technologies Programme
and a senior fellow at SPRU. His recent research has focused on the
relationship between technological innovation and environmental
management in industry and integrated approaches to environmental policy
and analysis.
u
SPRUScience and Technology
Policy Research, University of
Sussex, Mantell Building,
Brighton BN1 9RF, UK
!
f.berkhout@sussex.ac.uk
<
www.sussex.ac.uk/spru
Julia Hertin is a research fellow at SPRU. Her research interests include
sustainable development strategies, the environmental policy process and
corporate environmental performance.
u
SPRUScience and Technology
Policy Research, University of
Sussex, Mantell Building,
Brighton BN1 9RF, UK
!
j.hertin@sussex.ac.uk
<
www.sussex.ac.uk/spru
* The Foresight Futures scenarios were developed for the UK Foresight Programme with funding from
the Department of Trade and Industry as well as the Department of the Environment, Transport and
the Regions. The authors would also like to thank all those who contributed to the review and
refinement of the scenarios.
*
oresight is a way of thinking about the future, of identifying
opportunities and threats that may arise over the coming years and decades. Futures
scenarios represent a heuristic tool for foresight, enabling a range of audiences
business, government, researchersto envision possible futures in order to improve
decision-making and strategy-setting. Many aspects of an organisations future are
well defined and within its control. However, in a fast-moving and complex world, there
are also significant uncertainties about the future shape of markets, governance and
social values that will have an important impact on organisations and their capacity to
meet their objectives. As a systematic and inclusive approach, scenarios offer a means
of dealing with critical issues of innovation, reflexivity and framing in analysing change
in socioeconomic systems. In a business environment where social responsibility, trans-
parency and engagement are becoming increasingly important, scenarios planning can
also help in the process of managing stakeholder involvement and decision-making
processes.
This paper sets out a scenarios framework developed for the UKForesight Programme
in consultation with stakeholders from business, government and academia.
1
The
scenarios were developed, reviewed and revised over a series of studies and assignments
through the period 19972001 by a team of researchers at SPRUScience and Tech-
nology Policy Research, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. The framework builds on
an extensive review of national and global futures scenarios and draws on pre-existing
work such as the scenarios developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC 2000) to project future greenhouse gas emissions.
The paper begins by positioning the Foresight Futures approach in relation to the
different traditions and strands of the futures literature. It then describes the develop-
ment of the scenarios and sets out their storylines. The final section is devoted to
practical applications of the approach, which is widely used in the United Kingdom, in
both the policy-making context and the research context. The scenarios have proven to
be particularly suitable to explore environmental issues that are defined by processes of
long-term and complex change. They have also been applied in other domains such as
those concerning international trade and water demand. Based on interviews with 11
institutions and groups that have applied the Foresight Futures scenarios to a range of
issues the final section reviews the potential of the framework and provides guidance
for its use.
Foresight Futures in the context of the futures literature
Research on the future has heterogeneous intellectual roots and strands, including
operations research, scenario planning, La prospective and strategic management. Its
intellectual history is complex and has been influenced by a number of schoolsthe
RAND Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, Shell, SEMA Metra Consulting Group
and many others (see Godet 1987; Ringland 1998; van der Heijden 1996). Futures
research has its foundations in early systems thinking in the 1940s, where it was linked
mainly to security and strategic analysis. The 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of
rationalistic and control-oriented planning approaches. Implicit in this approach is a
rather mechanistic view of social, economic and technical systems, and it is based on a
general supposition that the future of socioeconomic systems is knowable (at least in
principle) and could usefully be portrayed by means of simplified quantitative models.
frans berkhout and julia hertin
38 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
F
1 The full versions of the scenarios and user guidance can be accessed electronically through the SPRU
website, at www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/environment/research/scenarios.html. They have also been pub-
lished by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2002).
The 1970s saw a new wave of interest in scenario planning, especially in corporate
strategic planning. This is often explained by the traumatic effect of the oil crisis in
1973 that drew attention to the possibility of major unexpected changes in the inter-
national economic system. However, long-term forecasting has increasingly become
discredited, not least because more often than not predictions have proved to be
incorrect. Early futures studies tended either to overestimate the potential of modern
technology and the pace of change (Kahn and Wiener 1967) or to underestimate the role
of technology and adaptive behaviour by people, organisations and societies (Cole et al.
1973; Meadows et al. 1972). These studies also overstated the reliability of their predic-
tions.
More recent approaches recognise that the future cannot be extrapolated through data
and relationships of the past, because drivers of change in social systems are not only
multiple but also mutable. Although change in social and economic systems is often
directional, path-dependent or locked in, novelty and surprise are also inescapable
features (Dosi 1984; Nelson and Winter 1982; North 1990). Moreover, humans are
uniquely capable of shaping their futures and of acting reflexively in response to new
knowledge about what the future may hold. One important element of reflexivity is
foresight itself, so that social and economic futures are always the outcome of efforts to
bring into reality projections of preferred or idealised futures (for a fuller discussion of
the ability of futures scenarios to address the issues of reflexivity, innovation and
framing, see Berkhout et al. 2002). All this means that the future cannot be treated as
an objective fact but needs to be thought of as being emergent and only partially
knowable. The future is a social construction about which legitimately diverse opinions
exist. In this sense, it should not be treated as empirical reality but rather as a set of
only partially viewable alternatives that describe a possibility space. The ultimate aim
of futures studies, then, is to explore future trends and potential discontinuities to
inform decision-making. Although current approaches seek to develop plausible
assumptions about the future, the accuracy of projections is not their most important
feature. Rather, they aim to provide a systematic framework to draw out, challenge and
refine, often tacit, knowledge about the future.
Foresight Futures: an exploratory scenario planning tool
Scenario planning employs qualitative tools to visualise the future, including storylines
(often illustrated by images and indicators) to create representations of alternative
worlds that resonate with a range of different individuals. Scenarios are plausible
representations of the future based on sets of internally consistent assumptions, either
about relationships and processes of change or about desired end-states. Unlike
normative scenario planning (also termed backcasting or normative forecasting), which
is based on positive or negative visions of the future (see Dreborg 1996), exploratory
approaches take past trends as their starting point. These approaches are based on four
key assumptions:
t The future not only is a continuation of past relationships and dynamics but also
can be shaped by human choice and action.
t The future cannot be foreseen, but exploration of the future can inform the deci-
sions of the present.
t There is not one possible future only. Uncertainty calls for a variety of futures
mapping a possibility space.
t Development of scenarios involves both rational analysis and subjective judgement.
It therefore requires interactive and participative methods.
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 39
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
Exploratory scenario approaches posit alternative framework conditions and attempt
to construct plausible representations of the future. These representations are seen as
alternatives against which current strategies may need to be robust (with the notion of
robust strategies). Here the future is pictured through the elaboration of multiple
alternative states over which social agents may have limited control but against which
they can respond more or less gainfully. This approach sets itself apart from traditional
planning by stressing the importance of adaptation to new circumstances.
Although there are different ways to construct scenarios, three main elements empha-
sised by the French school, La Prospective, build the core of most scenario exercises
(Godet 1987: 22):
t Identification of the key independent and dependent variables
t Analysis of actor roles and strategies
t Construction of plausible scenarios on the basis of assumptions about key variables
and relationships between them
However, large differences exist with respect to the methods used to build, test and refine
them. Most of the methods and tools have their origin in the 1960s and 1970s. They
involve, to a varying degree, expertise, creativity and interaction. Less formal approaches
include interactive methods such as futures workshops and conferences. More formal,
often quantitative, techniques based on expert knowledge include cross-impact analysis,
Delphi and expert consensus methods. Creative exercises include brainstorming and
scenario writing. The appropriate balance of methods and the interaction between par-
ticipatory and expert-based scenario techniques remains open to debate and dependent
on the problem context. In general, the narrower and more technical the issue, the better
defined the options; and the shorter the time-interval, the more useful the quantitative
techniques. Under conditions of higher uncertainty the authority of formal methods
and experts tends to decline. Many practitioners argue today that a balance of methods
is desirable and that efforts should be made to establish better links between them
(Fontela 2000; Greeuw et al. 2000).
The Foresight Futures were developed in a process that emphasised creativity and
interaction. The scenarios aim to provide a generic and scalable scenario-planning tool,
presenting credible and consistent visions of the world suitable for a range of different
applications. Therefore, they needed to start from a high level of abstraction, exploring
assumptions and value judgements about the future rather than drawing on specific
expertise and formal analysis. Most everyday decisions and actions are to some extent
contingent on assumptions about the future and what will happen in it (de Jouvenel
1967). Participatory scenario planning seeks to reveal, challenge, reconstruct and
synthesise these tacit assumptions about change. Quantitative information was used as
a way of synthesising and illustrating the qualitative content of the scenarios.
Approach and scenario framework
We began the process of scenario development by carrying out a comprehensive review
of the futures literature to identify different approaches to building, selecting and
grouping storylines (Hertin et al. 1999). It emerged that narrow sectoral futures often
fall into a limited set of scenarios (e.g. high technology and low technology; liberalisation
and regulation; high, medium and low demand). Scenarios designed to be applied to a
range of areas have to be based on a more generic conceptual framework. It was decided
to use four scenarios defined by the four quadrants of a two-dimensional matrix. This
frans berkhout and julia hertin
40 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
approach is not uncommon in scenario building (see Ringland 1998) and has been used
convincingly by the IPCC (2000) emissions scenarios. Its main advantage is that the
approach supports a degree of analytical rigour while not reducing the transparency of
the process for broad groups of participants. It also presents a compromise regarding
the number of different scenarios that should be used. Two scenarios are usually seen
as being overly narrow; approaches with three storylines are criticised because they often
lead to the identification of one best guess; the use of more than four scenarios appears
to be unmanageable in shorter planning exercises.
Framework conditions were defined by using two broad dimensions. A review of the
global futures literature and continuing discussions with stakeholders identified five
main dimensions of change (Berkhout et al. 1998): demography and settlement pat-
terns; the composition and rate of economic growth; the rate and direction of
technological change; the nature of governance; and social and political values. For a
number of reasons the last two were considered to be the most relevant dimensions of
change. Human demography in developed societies is relatively well characterised in
current population models and does not need to be contested within the scenario elabo-
ration process. Economic growth can be regarded as the outcome of a set of institutional
factors (economic and monetary policy, trade, the liberalisation and regulation of mar-
kets and so on), not as an autonomous factor of change. Likewise, technology is regarded
as being shaped by market, regulatory, political and cultural factors and should not be
seen as an autonomous factor of change. This corresponds with theories in evolutionary
economics that see the rate and direction of innovation as the product of economic and
institutional contexts within which innovation occurs (Nelson and Winter 1982). We
therefore sought to include technology as endogenous to processes of social and techno-
logical changean outcome, rather than an exogenous input.
To create a frame for more institutionally based futures scenarios, we chose, first,
social and political values and, second, the nature of governance to be foundational
determinants of future change. This framing of socioeconomic futures means that the
scenarios were generated from a set of conceptual associations rather than from
empirical or theoretical models of the real world. The strength of this approach is that
it facilitates an open exchange of ideas in the process of scenario elaboration, making
those ideas transparent and contestable. The general framework also keyed into many
contemporary political and social debates in the United Kingdom about the nature of
government, the role of the market, political relationships within the European Union
and the social control of new technologies. However, values and governance are not
simple, independent or easily definable concepts. In using them to construct a scenario
framework we have made a number of simplifying assumptions about what they mean
and about the range of different values and models of governance that are considered.
We take values to mean contemporary tastes, beliefs and norms and governance to
mean the way in which authority and control is exercised in societieswhether local,
national or global.
2
Although there are obvious connections between values and levels of governance, we
take these two dimensions to be independent in this scenarios framework, for two
primary reasons. First, many of the key social science debates centre on the role of values
and ideas, on the one hand, and interests embedded in institutional structures on the
other (Giddens 1984). Values are often held to play a role in supporting or legitimating
structures of power, but they can also have a role in disrupting and changing those
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 41
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
2 By governance we mean something wider than government (see Rhodes 1997). Government refers
to governmental institutions. Governance also includes non-governmental (private-sector, civil
society, regional and international) institutions with a role in exercising and shaping the exercise of
power in society.
structures. Likewise, structures of power can be seen as creating the essential conditions
within which values, ideas and knowledge are generated and sustained (Foucault 1971;
Latour and Woolgar 1979). Second, socioeconomic scenarios confront the central
paradox of the opportunities to reflect on and remake the future, and the cultural,
institutional and other constraints that limit the scope for change in social systems (the
stickiness of institutional routines; see March and Olsen 1989). The valuesgover-
nance frame of the scenarios can be seen as representing these institutional constraints,
allowing the scenario elaboration process to focus more on the reflexive and creative
opportunities in the possibility space.
The horizontal values dimension captures alternative developments in core values
represented in choices made by consumers and policy-makers. At one end of the
spectrum (the individual end; see Fig. 1), values are dominated by the drive to private
consumption and personal freedom. The rights of the individual and the present are
privileged over those of the collective and the future. Resources are distributed predom-
inantly through free and competitive markets, with the function of governance limited
to regulating markets and for securing law and order. At the other end (community),
values are shaped by concern for the common good. The individual is seen as part of a
collective, with rights and responsibilities determined by social goals. There is greater
concern about the future, equity and participation. Civil society is strong and highly
valued, and resources are allocated through more heavily regulated markets.
The vertical governance dimension aims to show alternative structures of political
and economic power and decision-making. The future of governance at the UK level and
regional level will be influenced to a great extent by developments in the European
Union and at the global level. At one end of the spectrum (interdependence; see Fig.
1), the power to govern is distributed upwards, downwards and outwards away from the
national state level. International economic, political and cultural relationships
frans berkhout and julia hertin
42 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
interdependence
World Markets Global Responsibility
National Enterprise Local Stewardship
autonomy
community individual
Conventional
development
Note: the horizontal axis represents values; the vertical axis represents governance.
Figure 1 four uk futures scenarios
Source: adapted from OST 1999
strengthen, and regional and national boundaries become more permeable. At the other
end of the spectrum (autonomy), economic and political power is retained at the
national (National Enterprise) and regional (Local Stewardship) levels. Sovereignty is
retained over key areas of policy, and the processes characterised as globalisation are
weakened. Governments have greater autonomy in decision-making, and economic,
political and cultural boundaries are maintained or strengthened. National and regional
development are more closely linked to local capabilities and resources.
Storylines and scenario characteristics
The four futures scenarios describe the United Kingdom in 2020. Although they focus
on broad socioeconomic trends at the UK national level the scenario framework can be
used to produce more tailored assessments of specific sectors and areas of policy. The
scenarios are presented as storylines that set out some general trends. A synopsis of key
drivers and underlying assumptions is given in Table 1 (more detail on economic trends,
social issues, regional development and sustainability is provided in DTI 2002; this
report also provides a set of key quantitative indicators).
World Markets
People aspire to personal independence, material wealth and mobility to the exclusion
of wider social goals. Integrated global markets are presumed to best deliver these goals.
Internationally co-ordinated policy sets framework conditions for the efficient
functioning of markets. The provision of goods and services is privatised wherever
possible under a principle of minimal government. Rights of individuals to personal
freedoms are emphasised.
Global Responsibility
People aspire to high levels of welfare within communities with shared values, more
equally distributed opportunities and a sound environment. There is a belief that these
objectives are best achieved through active public policy and international co-operation
within the European Union and at a global level. Social objectives are met through public
provision, increasingly at an international level. Control of markets and people is
achieved through a mixture of regulatory and norm-based mechanisms.
National Enterprise
People aspire to personal independence and material wealth within a nationally rooted
cultural identity. Liberalised markets together with a commitment to build capabilities
and resources to secure a high degree of national self-reliance and security are believed
to best deliver these goals. Political and cultural institutions are strengthened to buttress
national autonomy in a more fragmented world.
Local Stewardship
People aspire to sustainable levels of welfare in local communities. Markets are subject
to social regulation to ensure more equally distributed opportunities and a high-quality
local environment. Active public policy aims to promote economic activities that are
small-scale and regional in scope and acts to constrain large-scale markets and technol-
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 43
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
frans berkhout and julia hertin
44 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
World Markets National Enterprise Global Responsibility Local Stewardship
Social values
t
Internationalist
t
Libertarian
drivers
economic trends
t
Nationalist
t
Individualist
t
Internationalist
t
Communitarian
t
Localist
t
Co-operative
Governance structures
t
Weak
t
Dispersed
t
Consultative
t
Weak
t
National
t
Closed
t
Strong
t
Co-ordinated
t
Consultative
t
Strong
t
Local
t
Participative
Role of policy
t
Minimal
t
Enabling markets
t
State-centred
t
Market regulation to
protect key sectors
t
Corporatist
t
Political, social and
environmental goals
t
Interventionist
t
Social and
environmental goals
Economic
development
t
High growth
t
High innovation
t
Capital productivity
t
Medium to low
growth
t
Low innovation
t
Maintenance
economy
t
Medium to high
growth
t
High innovation
t
Resource
productivity
t
Low growth
t
Low innovation
t
Modular and
sustainable
solutions
social trends
Unemployment
t
Medium to low
t
Medium to high
t
Low
t
Medium to low (with
a larger voluntary
sector)
Income
t
High
t
Medium to low
t
Medium to high
t
Low
Equity
t
Strong decline
t
Decline
t
Improvement
t
Strong improvement
Areas of conflict
t
Social exclusion
t
Immigration and
emigration
t
Political
accountability
t
Unemployment
t
Poor public services
t
Inequality
t
Structural change
t
Change of skills
t
Political
accountability and
institutional rigidity
t
Land-use conflicts
t
Under-investment
t
Environmental
restrictions
Structural change
t
Rapid
t
Towards services
t
More stable
economic structure
t
Fast
t
Towards services
t
Moderate
t
Towards regional
systems
Fast-growing sectors
t
Health and leisure
t
Media and
information
t
Financial services
t
Biotechnology
t
Nanotechnology
t
Private health and
education
t
Domestic and
personal services
t
Tourism
t
Retailing
t
Defence
t
Education and
training
t
Large systems
engineering
t
New and renewable
energy
t
Information services
t
Small-scale
manufacturing
t
Food and organic
farming
t
Local services
Declining sectors
t
Manufacturing
t
Agriculture
t
Public services
t
Civil engineering
t
Fossil fuel energy
t
Traditional
manufacturing
t
Retailing
t
Tourism
t
Financial services
Table 1 scenario characteristics
ogies. Local communities are strengthened to ensure participative and transparent
governance in a complex world.
Using the Foresight Future scenarios
Change and adaptation to change are structural features of these societies. Companies,
policy-making institutions and civil-society organisations can work successfully and
efficiently only if they anticipate and take advantage of changing markets, technologies,
public attitudes and so on. Why and when can scenario planning add value to strategy
setting?
Although scenario exercises vary in their specific aims, they possess a number of
common traits that distinguish them from more traditional forecasting approaches. Not
only are they looking into the far future, usually one or more decades ahead, but also
they assess developments across a broad domain. Confronted with large uncertainties
about the future development of key driving forces, contemporary scenario exercises
tend to be based on principles of transparency and diversity. Transparency refers to the
process of making explicit assumptions about the relationships between drivers.
Diversity implies that scenarios go beyond a single best estimate, or a high and low
projection either side of this, and encourages us to explore a number of different, logi-
cally consistent pathways as a way of framing questions about the future.
The use of exploratory scenario approaches should be considered when:
t Discontinuous change is expected within normal planning horizons.
t Incremental adjustments carry the risk of negative effects over the longer term (e.g.
technological lock-in).
t There are opportunities for positive gains from pursuing strategies that are robust
against a number of different possible futures.
Broadly, the benefits of scenario planning are twofold:
t Scenario planning expands the range of future outcomes considered in strategic
decision-making. It promotes the development of strategies that are appropriate to
a variety of circumstances, avoiding the risk of putting all your eggs in one basket.
It places under scrutiny the assumptions underlying strategic decisions: for
example, about long-term growth prospects or consumer preferences.
t The process of engaging with scenario elaboration itself can be a valuable contri-
bution to preparing the ground for change. If carried out in an inclusive and positive
process, scenario planning can precipitate self-reflection and learning within the
organisation, strengthen strategic thinking at all levels and help overcome organisa-
tional rigidities and routines.
The Foresight Futures can be used in a range of different ways. Users are encouraged
to develop their own conclusions about the futures, employing the scenarios as a starting
point: elaborating and evaluating them in ways that are in tune with their needs. Over
the past three years, a number of institutions have used the scenarios as a structured
way of exploring the future (for a list of scenario exercises based on Foresight Futures,
see Table 2). Based on a review of these exercises and insights from the futures literature,
this section provides guidance on the use of the Foresight Futures scenarios. It offers
some ideas and recommendations, without attempting to be overly prescriptive.
Two fundamentally different approaches to the use of the Foresight Futures scenarios
can be distinguished. Most frequently, the scenarios are used in small-scale scenario
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 45
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
frans berkhout and julia hertin
46 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
Organisation or user Sector Aim Type Process Output; key
audience
ACACIA research
project (Parry 2000)
Climate
change
Assess climate
change impacts
(European Union
to 2050)
Detailed;
qualitative and
quantitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge;
small team
Report; European
Union policy
REGIS (Holman et al.
2002)
Climate
change
Assess climate
change impacts
(North West
England and East
Anglia to 2020 and
2050)
Detailed;
qualitative and
quantitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge;
small team
Report; UK policy
CSERGE, University of
East Anglia (Berkhout
et al. 1999)
Climate
change
Explore climate
change impacts
(East Anglia to
2020)
Detailed; mainly
qualitative
Structured
stakeholder
interviews
Report; regional
stakeholders
Cabinet Office PIU
(PIU 2002)
Energy Explore future
energy markets in
the UK
Detailed;
qualitative and
quantitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge
Report; UK policy
Cabinet Office PIU
(PIU 2000)
Trade Assess social and
ethical issues in
international trade
Detailed;
qualitative
Workshop Report; UK policy
Foresight Energy
Futures Task Force
(Foresight Programme
2000)
Energy Assess sustainable
energy
technologies
Sketchy;
qualitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge
Report; UK
government
Foresight Crime
Prevention Panel*
Crime Explore issues of
crime and crime
prevention (to
2020)
Sketchy;
qualitative
Participative
workshop
Consultation
document; UK
policy and
business
Foresight Integrated
Transport Chain Task
Force (Foresight
Programme 1999)
Transport Assess priorities
for sustainable
transport strategy
Detailed;
quantitative and
qualitative
Workshop;
detailed
elaboration by
project manager
Report; UK
government
Foresight Minerals
Panel*
Minerals Assess
sustainability of
minerals extraction
and use
Detailed;
qualitative and
quantitative
Workshop Report; UK
government
Environment Agency,
NWDMC (Environment
Agency 2001)
Water
demand
Assess levels and
structure of water
demand (to 2025)
Detailed; mainly
quantitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge;
small team and
consultation
Report; UK policy
and business
Digital Futures
research project
(Eames et al. 2001)
ICT and e-
commerce
Explore the digital
economy (to 2010
and 2020)
Detailed;
qualitative and
quantitative
Based on data and
expert knowledge;
small team and
consultation
Report; UK policy
and business
* To the authors knowledge, internal document only
ACACIA = A Consortium for the Application of Climate Impact Assessments; CSERGE = Centre for Social and
Economic Research on the Global Environment; ICT = information and communications technology; NWDMC =
National Water Demand Management Centre; PIU = Performance and Innovation Unit; REGIS = Regional Climate
Change Impact and Response Studies in East Anglia and North West England
Table 2 examples of users of the environmental futures scenarios framework
(continued opposite)
planning exercises, often one-off events that contributed to medium-term and long-term
business and policy planning. These processes usually:
t Are a qualitative exploration of trends
t Are participative
t Are based on the experience of practitioners
t Use scenarios as a communication tool
Frequently, their use depends on a champion of scenario planning at a senior level of
management. Their function is to attract interest and to stimulate creative thinking.
These processes tend to engage participants who are unfamiliar with the scenario
approaches and who are often unfamiliar with academic language and thinking.
In addition, the scenarios can be used in the context of research-based studies carried
out over longer periods. In these assessments, the main function of scenarios is to
provide a heuristic framework that allows one to construct a wider, but still coherent,
set of assumptions. It is used in very uncertain areas of research: for example, in climate
change impact assessment. These uses are characterised through:
t Qualitative and quantitative assessment of potential outcomes
t Scientific methods combined with consultation
t Use of data and expert knowledge
t Use of scenarios to assess outcomes
The main challenge for this approach is to combine the soft scenario tool with hard,
quantitative scientific methods, for which the quantitative indicators presented else-
where (DTI 2002) could provide a starting point. If it seems appropriate, they can be
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 47
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
Organisation or user Sector Aim Type Process Output; key
audience
Natural Environment
Research Council*
Environ-
ment
Identify
environmental
research priorities
Sketchy;
qualitative
Participative
workshop
Report; ENE Panel,
NERC science
policy
ESRC Financial
Services
Environmental
Network*
Financial
services
Explore ethical and
environmental
impacts on
financial products
Sketchy;
qualitative
Workshop Report; financial
services industry
Housing and Future
Skills

Built
environ-
ment
Offered as
strategic planning
tool
Not applicable Not applicable Construction and
engineering
industries
Environment Agency
Environ-
mental
protection
Element of
corporate visions
exercise
Illustrative
scenarios
developed for nine
environmental
themes
Workshop Input to early
framing of
visions report
* To the authors knowledge, internal document only No publication
ENE = Energy and Natural Environment; ESRC = Economic and Social Research Council; NERC = Natural
Environment Research Council
Table 2 (continued)
revised, specified or complemented by other indicators. Simple modelling and cross-
impact analysis can be employed to ensure consistency and analytical depth.
Engaging stakeholders
The key challenge of the scenario planning process is to engage stakeholders inside and
outside the organisation. The process will be successful in promoting creative and
unconventional thinking only if the process is based on engagement and trustful rela-
tions. However, the usefulness of the scenario planning method is sometimes contested.
Thinking 10, 20 or more years ahead is not routine for most organisations and can seem
difficult or meaningless. Scenarios are also criticised because the underlying assump-
tions often cannot be validated. Scientists often express concerns about using an
inherently subjective framework in the context of research. Practitioners sometimes feel
that a scenario exercise does not generate sufficient tangible outcomes. A successful
scenario planning process needs to address these concerns:
t Engaging stakeholders requires clarity about the aims and limitations of the
approach. The scenarios method does not aim to predict the future nor even to
identify the most likely future. Instead, it map outs a possibility space to inform
the decisions of the present. The scenarios method is based on subjective choices
(as, in fact, is any other approach to explore uncertain futures) but, unlike other
tools, it allows stakeholders to discuss and challenge these judgements.
t Experience has shown that the first presentation of the scenarios is crucial.
Sufficient detail needs to be given to convey the basic logic of the scenarios without
overwhelming the audience. It may be helpful for participants to have the chance
to become familiar with the scenarios in advance.
t If participants are to be convinced of the importance of their contribution, the aims
of the scenario-planning process need to be well defined, and clear indications need
to be given as to how the results of the process will feed into decision-making.
Getting the process right
Maximisation of the learning benefits of scenario planning exercises requires close
attention to process. Careful planning and structuring of the scenario elaboration,
synthesis and evaluation stages of scenario planning is needed. Without this, there is a
risk that the insights and results generated throughout the exercise do not feed through
to the implementation stage and that the initial enthusiasm of participants will be
transformed into frustration. The details of the process will be tailored to the needs and
resources available in each case. The process needs to accommodate integration of a
diversity of viewpoints and technical expertise, producing an iterative process combin-
ing creative, participative workshops and work carried out by individuals or in small
groups to synthesise and elaborate scenarios. Realism is needed about the time and
resources needed to complete an exercise: this tends to be underestimated. Time is
needed in the participative aspects of elaboration and in the process of making sense of
the results. Finally, stakeholders need to be involved in the elaboration of scenarios at
an early stage.
The scenario elaboration workshop is perhaps the most critical stage. Key points to
consider are:
t It takes time to familiarise participants with future thinking; the initial workshop
should be at least a full day.
frans berkhout and julia hertin
48 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
t A typical structure for the workshop might be to:
State the aim of the process
Introduce the scenario approach
Present the scenarios
Use break-out groups to elaborate sectoral scenarios (e.g. transport to 2020)
Provide feedback
Plan the next steps to be taken
t Moderation by a professional with scenario experience is recommended.
We recommend that three principles be applied in scenario elaboration and evalua-
tion:
t Symmetry. Equivalent effort should be devoted to the elaboration of all the scenarios
chosen.
t Balance. The scenario storylines and indicators should be developed as neutrally
and dispassionately as possiblecovering the same domains and seeking to avoid
bias towards or against any particular scenario.
t Triangulation. There should be a process of ensuring that the distinctiveness and
coherence of scenarios is retained (mainly by viewing the narratives side by side).
Developing sectoral scenarios
The scenarios provide a generic framework, but they are in themselves not relevant to
many sectors or policy domains. The aim of the framework and these guidance notes
is to provide a means for scenarios to be elaborated for any given domain of interest.
This requires:
t The identification of key drivers in the sector (e.g. international markets, social
preferences, regional planning)
t An assessment of the links between drivers and relevant sectoral trends
t Specialist knowledge of the sector
The scenario framework is a flexible tool that should be adapted and altered to suit
the needs of a given study; they can be modified and experimented with. They should
not be taken as an authoritative set of projections. The benefit of using a common set
of basic dimensions (values and governance) is that these have proven robust in a
number of different settings. However, these dimensions may not be relevant, or there
may be an interest in testing alternatives. New dimensions and new scenario labels
would then be the right course to take.
Effort devoted to the development of indicators will vary between studies. Indicators
may be illustrative of the storylines, or they may be outputs of the scenario planning
exercise that are used in further analysis (planning, options appraisal or scientific
modelling).
Building more detailed scenarios
Generally, we recommend that scenarios be kept simple to make them accessible and
to enable them to be used with non-specialist audiences. However, in longer or more
intensive scenario planning exercises, users may want to introduce surprises and
feedback mechanisms. There are several ways of achieving this:
GMI 37 Spring 2002 2002 Greenleaf Publishing 49
foresight futures scenarios: developing and applying a participative strategic planning tool
t Two scenarios can be combined: for example, one for the UK level and one for the
international level. This process needs to be selective because there are many
possible combinations. The choices made will depend on what is realistic and
relevant for the study in question. For example, a scenario exercise on the UK
manufacturing industry could examine the effects of an international World Market
scenario combined with a National Enterprise scenario.
t Unexpected events are not part of the scenario storylines presented here. They can,
however, be introduced during the planning process. This involves the identification
of relevant sideswipes (e.g. through a brainstorming session) and a subsequent
analysis of impacts under each scenario.
t Another approach would be to introduce a third dimension relevant to the sector:
high-technology and low-technology scenarios have been tried in a number of
exercises, including the IPCC scenarios (IPCC 2000). In this case the effects of
different assumptions about the adoption of energy technologies in the future was
analysed in detail for one of four socioeconomic scenarios.
t If the original set of scenarios is thought to oversimplify trends it is possible to add
a second round of scenario elaboration encouraging participants to think about
feedback mechanisms. This allows learning processes to be taken into account. One
option would be to organise this round of the evaluation as a game-playing simu-
lation.
Taking account of major shocks
The exploratory and synthetic approach used in these scenarios suggests that change
occurs gradually along a single trajectory. Future states are seen as being the outcome
of an accumulation of changes over time that all point in the same direction. But not all
change is like this. The direction of change may itself vary over time, with one set of
conditions being replaced by a new set. This change in direction may take place slowly
or it may happen suddenly as a result of major, surprise external events (such as financial
crises or environmental disasters). If the change is slow it may be possible for one
scenario to be superseded by another. If the change is sudden, the question to be asked
is how resilient a given scenario is to its impact. Answering this question will be very
difficult, mainly because large-scale, unanticipated events are hard to foresee. It would,
however, be possible to build up inventories of shock events by scanning conventional
and unconventional sources and through brainstorming. The question of resilience
could then be investigated by applying the shock to each of the scenarios and trying to
assess how easily each of them could recover or adapt to the impacts.
Conclusions: taking scenario planning into the organisation
In this paper we have presented a generic approach for participative scenario planning
developed in the UK and aimed at strategists in government and business. We believe
that futures scenarios are an example of a broader set of foresighting tools that business
and public-sector organisations need to apply more consistently. Thinking about the
future is intrinsic to all decision-making. It is not possible to make a decision without
considering what may be the future consequences of that decision. The appropriateness
of a decision and its consequences, given possibly changed future conditions, also needs
to be taken into account. The more uncertain and long-term the consequences of
present-day decisions, and the more vulnerable the organisation to these changes, the
frans berkhout and julia hertin
50 2002 Greenleaf Publishing GMI 37 Spring 2002
greater the need to formalise the process of thinking about the future. In a more complex
and interdependent world in which economic and political conditions are perceived to
change more rapidly, scenario planning can play this role. Specifically, it enables
organisations to make explicit and to challenge deeply held assumptions about the
future, to consider early signs of new contextual trends, to plan for possible responses
and to develop ways of increasing an organisations capacity to adapt.
Periodic scenario planning exercises run by specialists can be helpful, but, beyond
this, the organisation may also seek to embed futures routines within business pro-
cesses. Generating greater awareness about future trends may be seen as one condition
of organisational learning and change. Thinking about the future is often a social
process. The future becomes what enough people believe it will become. Only rarely can
the visions of individuals be translated into a reality for others without their agreement.
In this sense, the present is the outcome of past agreements about what the present
would become. We have stressed the participative nature of futures thinking, reflecting
on the need to make explicit and to challenge the ideas of many people through a
structured process and to synthesise the results in scenario narratives and indicators.
By embedding these processes within the routines of organisations not only will the
quality of scenarios exercises improve but also their utility in influencing change pro-
cesses will grow. Scenarios routines make for more self-aware and responsive organisa-
tions as well as organisations that successfully avoid the biggest pitfalls.
Having said this, the process of embedding foresighting routines within organisa-
tions (and keeping them out of the hands of futurologists) also raises new challenges.
A central issue relates to the value of the information and knowledge generated in
scenarios exercises. Information about the future often has economic value. Most
organisations work hard to protect certain kinds of information about the future (new
technologies, new business strategies and so on). Clearly, by extending the process of
foresighting to more groups within the organisation there will be a greater risk of such
information and the knowledge that surrounds it of escaping or of being taken. A second
issue concerns the possibly disruptive effects of considering alternative futures. Many
organisations are oriented towards a high-level mission or objective. This stabilises
relationships within the organisation and brings meaning to its activities. Typically, this
mission requires the rejection of alternative visions of what the organisation could be
doing. To give a simple example, members of a state-funded school will generally find
it difficult to imagine becoming a fee-paying school. But scenarios exercises, to be
successful, need to challenge deeply held beliefs and to push at the boundaries of an
organisations self-defined possibility space. It should be recognised that effective
foresight routines will be those that disrupt to some extent the cultural values of an
organisation.
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