[A.C. No. 4017.

September 29, 1999]

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO
R. NALDOZA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this
Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor
of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing
a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the
appeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the following
acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and
executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US
dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the
appealed case
[1]
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.
[2]
In his Answer, respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an
appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on
[3]
appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA Decision. He also
controverts complainants allegation that he asked for a cash bond and that he
[4]
issued the fake receipt.
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this
wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to
defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468,
entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that
when the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5,
1992, the respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had
already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent
desire to collect or to bleed his client of several thousand pesos of attorneys fees,
convinced the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on
December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for
Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter
misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay,
which it did, *a+ Cash Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in
order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme
Court. The said amount was given to the respondent.
x x x *S+ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be
paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such

kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondents misrepresentation, Atty.

Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court
receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant
corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the
Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification
revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the
amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court
Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for
purpose of showing that the said computation was requested by and addressed to
[5]
the respondent. (citations omitted)
[6]
Meanwhile, a criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was filed
against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable
in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the
[7]
criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors
[8]
Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioners report and
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his
recommendation in this manner:
x x x *R+espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature
[on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors
his position on a mere denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent
denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of
the respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,
however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified
and irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent
denied] that he ha[d] anything to do with it because it was the complainant who
signed the Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be
the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is
true that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian,
president of the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he
signed the said petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was
actually the one who prepared the same and the notary public before whom the
affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the said
petition.
The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R.
107984 was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never given
a chance to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x x. However,
respondent does not deny that he is the person referred to by the handwritten
name P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.

In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this

Commission as his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People of the Philippines versus Primo R.
Naldoza, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion
to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present
administrative case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based
[9]
on the same facts and evidence. (citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his acquittal in
the companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrative
[10]
complaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal case for estafa was
completely different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did
[11]
not exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision
itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly
[12]
liable to herein complainant for $2,555.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the
gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents Motion to
Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared
of administrative liability, because he has been acquitted of estafa which involved
the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was the very same issue
[13]
litigated in this case, and that his exoneration was a result a full blown trial on
[14]
the merits of this case.
In a similar case, we have said:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos *of+ the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx
criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
[15]
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.
[16]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
[17]
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment
[18]
or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required. Thus, a
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts
[19]
and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
[20]
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the
same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not
inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this
Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
[21]
administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition

in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it
[22]
would be well to remember the Courts ruling inIn re Almacen, which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis
ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.
First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision,
despite knowing that it had already become final and executory. The IBP
investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G.
Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had
received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conlcusion that
[23]
they *had+ lost the case before the Supreme Court. This, however, does not
substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the
appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has
been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed,
the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for
petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the
assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained
from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was
[24]
needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian, respondent
explained that the amount would cover all the expenses to be incurred in the
Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for
the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or
paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be
[25]
garnished. Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna Deles declared that
respondent received the amount on the representation that it would be paid to
[26]
the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite the
contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral

obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of
one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an
[27]
admission of misconduct. In his Answer submitted to this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the
allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in
all the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was made to report to
him personally and to his Board of Directors the progress of the cases both orally
and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral
obligation only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as
attorneys fee *to+ which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24,
and under sec. 37 of the above-cited rules, I have the right to apply the funds
received from Gatchalian in satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services,
otherwise known as Attorneys Lien, as shown in my Service Billings and Statement
[28]
of Accounts. (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondents claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his
attorneys lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was
needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to
[29]
his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice. The claim that
respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is just an
afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the
conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional
[30]
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to
him, respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing
that the Supreme Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the
[31]
[32]
testimonies of Gatchalian and Deles were equally clear on this point. After
respondent had presented the false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such
payment was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection and
Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the amount
[33]
of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said case contain no
indication at all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or that it has
been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of respondent
cannot overturn the IBPs findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to
conceal his misappropriation of his clients money. We agree with the IBP that it is
unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a
layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the
Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the
[34]
respondent.
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his
[35]
noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:
*L+awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.

Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from
his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake
[36]
receipt to hide his deed. InDumadag v. Lumaya, the Court ordered the indefinite
suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received
pursuant to an execution, viz.:
*E+ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client,
the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of
P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of
professional responsibility.
[37]
In Obia v. Catimbang, we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had
misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the
Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession."
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up
his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk
of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform
all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4801. February 27, 2003]

MENA U. GERONA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mena U. Gerona against Atty.
Alfredo Datingaling for allegedly falsifying a document and notarizing it afterwards.
The complaint, which is in the form of an affidavit, concerns a document
entitled Consent to Quarry purporting to be an agreement whereby complainant
Mena U. Gerona and her party, composed of Lucila Umali Magboo, Feliciano U.
Umali, Marife Umali, Jovita Umali Galicia, P.J. Galicia, Wendy Sunshine Umali, and
Aurelia Umali Miranda, allegedly agreed to allow Ronald Reagan Hernandez,
represented by Engr. Bayani N. Melo, of legal age, Filipino, of Alangilan, Batangas
City, his heirs, successors, and assigns, to enter or occupy a portion of their property
in Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas and engage in a QUARRY business and related
[1]
activities.
Complainant stated:
1. That I am filing a case for disbarment against ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING of
Batangas City whose house is at the back of the Provincial Jail;
2. That I am constrained to file such disbarment case for the reason that the said
ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING in notarizing the attached document, Annexes A and
A-1, he made it appear that I together with my brother and sisters appeared before
him on July 2, 1997 when in truth and in fact we did not and in the said document
Atty. Alfredo Datingaling said, and I quote:
BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR AND IN THE CITY OF BATANGAS PERSONALLY
APPEARED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, NAMELY:
RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ, represented by: ENGR. BAYANI MELO
LUCILLE U. MAGBOO
MENA U. ENRIQUEZ GERONA
FELICIANO UMALI
JOVITA U. GALICIA
WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI
AURELIA UMALI MIRANDA
KNOWN TO ME AND TO ME KNOWN TO [BE] THE SAME PERSONS WHO EXECUTE[D]
THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED TO [HAVE] MADE THE
SAME AS THEIR FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACT AND DEED.
THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT RELATES TO A CONSENT TO QUARRY AGREEMENT,
CONSIST[ING] OF TWO (2) PAGES, INCLUDING THE PAGE IN WHICH THE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT [IS] WRITTEN AND HAS BEEN SIGNED BY THE PARTIES
TOGETHER WITH THEIR INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON EACH AND EVERY PAGE
THEREOF.
ND
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 2 DAY OF JULY 1997 AT BATANGAS CITY,
PHILIPPINES.
3. That aside from the fact that not one of us appeared before Notary Public
Alfredo Datingaling at Batangas City on July 2, 1997 and we have individual daily

time records as we are working in Metro Manila, we have signed each and every
document of Annexes A and A-1 before him as stated by him in his
acknowledgement and clearly page 1 which is Annex A has not been signed by any
of us and the name WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI refers to two persons which are my
nieces, Wendy is nine (9) years old and Sunshine is twelve (12) years old and both of
them have no legal personality to appear before a Notary Public to sign any legal
document and moreover RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ who appears to have a
Residence Certificate No. 8988196 is a son of Elvira Atienza and is only nine (9)
years of age and the first page, Annex A has been written on a different typewriter
and inserted to the document as the front page and allegedly signed on July 3, 1997
at Batangas City ahead of the notarization of the document which was on July 2,
1997. In short, Atty. Alfredo Datingaling falsified the whole document and he
aggravated such act of falsification when he notarized the same; that moreover, it
refers to a parcel of land which has never been agreed by the parties;
4. That for such acts of falsification, I have filed with the City Fiscals Office of
Batangas City a falsification case against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling and his clients,
[2]
Elvira Atienza, Bayani Melo and Apolonia Bonado.
Complainant charged that despite knowledge of the falsity of the document,
respondent, as notary public for Batangas City, notarized it on July 3, 1997.
This Court required respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against him. In his counter-affidavit dated March 2,
1998, respondent claimed that the complaint is baseless, out of focus, an
[3]
afterthought, childish and in the nature of self-indictment. Respondent denied
the allegations against him and claimed that complainant had signed the
documents on July 2, 1997 in Quezon City and had it notarized by respondent the
next day (July 3, 1997) in Batangas City. Respondent stated in his counter-affidavit:
The document was already prepared when it was brought to my law office by
Bayani Melo and company who signed in our office on July 03, 1997. It was my
secretary who stamped my name as Notary Public on the bottom of the
Acknowledgement ready for my signature, but through inadvertence she
overlooked that date July 02, 1997 thereof as the date of the actual notarization. It
bears emphasis that such date (July 02, 1997) was typewritten beforehand which
could easily be reformed if the parties so desire. So why does the complainant
want to create trouble?
Explaining a little further, the negotiation or transaction between the group of
Ronald Hernandez represented by Bayani Melo on the one hand (my client), and the
group of Mena Umali Gerona on the other took place at the residence of Mena
Umali Gerona in Quezon City where the document in question was prepared on July
2, 1997, and the parties agreed to meet each other in Batangas City, the following
day July 3, 1997 for purposes of notarization at the office of the Notary Public ATTY.
[4]
ALFREDO R. DATINGALING.
Attached to the counter-affidavit were the affidavits of Bayani Melo and Matias
[5]
Magnaye (marked Annexes A and B, respectively), corroborating respondents

allegations. Bayani Melo had signed as the representative of Ronald Reagan

Hernandez, while Matias Magnaye as a witness to the Consent to Quarry.
In reply, complainant submitted an affidavit, dated April 23, 1998, received by
this Court the following day. Respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10
days, but he did not do so.
In her reply-affidavit, complainant submitted a copy of the resolution of the
provincial prosecutor of Batangas in I.S. No. 97-3353 (for falsification of public
document), finding probable cause against respondent and recommending the filing
of an information for falsification of a public document against all the respondents
named in the case, including herein respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling. The
prosecutor stated:
After a painstaking study and careful analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, the undersigned has observed the following striking dissimilarities on the
two copies of the document Consent to Quarry (Authorization) which would
clearly distinguish one from the other, to wit:
Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has
that blank space for the technical description of a parcel of land subject of their
agreement; it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the bottom but unsigned by
Lucila Umali Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.
On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry reveals
that the technical description refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao,
Mabini, Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and in the approved
plan/Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry; it is dated July 3, 1997,
it has two signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan
Hernandez and it is also unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo.
Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the
signatures of Mena U. Gerona, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the
signatures of witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and Apolonia before the
acknowledgment portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment
portion; blank as to the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series
of.
Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures of
Mena, Feliciano, and Aurelia as well as the witnesses before the acknowledgment
portion; it is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R. Datingaling and it is
docketed as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.
It has been also established that the said document was brought to Menas
residence on July 2, 1997 ready for signatures and in fact it was signed there by
Mena, Feliciano, Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those witnesses. After
the signing of said document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were
brought by the group of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo
R. Datingaling on July 3, 1997. The issue now is whether the crime of falsification
has been committed by the respondents?
From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent to
quarry and the testimony of the complainant and his brother Feliciano, the

undersigned honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had been
committed by the respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is
clear that Mena Umali and her brother and sisters had not presented themselves or
appeared before said Notary Public for the acknowledgment of said document as
their free act and voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized
document are different from the lot they intended to be the subject of their
agreement. From the unnotarized copy dated July 2, 1997 which bears the
proposed insertions/modifications, the land intended to be described as the subject
of that agreement is but a parcel of land while in the notarized copy, it describes
two parcels of land. Further, had the complainant and her brother and sisters
appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said document, then there is
no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda
would not be required to sign on the first page of the document. In fact, Bayani
Melo signed again the said document on the first page while Ronald Reagan
Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was required to sign said
document on the first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to hold respondents
for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.
....
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an
information for Falsification of Public Document be filed against all the respondents
[6]
under I.S. No. 97-3353 . . . .
In addition, complainant submitted on December 4, 2000 a list of criminal
cases, eight in all, filed against respondent, including that filed by
complainant. Four of the cases had been dismissed, while four others were
pending. Most of the cases were for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, estafa, and estafa
through falsification of a public document.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, to
whom this case was assigned, recommended the suspension of respondent Alfredo
R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a period of one year. In his
report, Atty. Cunanan stated:
We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has not
shown qualities that endear him to the profession or the Bar. While complainants
present criminal case against the respondent may be pending, and he still enjoys
the presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is
concerned, the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the
evidence presented by the complainant considered vis--vis the unconvincing
explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and the
criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.
We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the
[7]
practice of the profession for a period of one (1) year.
The IBP Board of Governors approved the report with modification:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, . . . the Report and Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner . . .; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility more
particularly Canons 1 and 7, Respondents Commission as Notary Public is hereby
SUSPENDED with disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for two years
[8]
from receipt of notice.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration declaring himself innocent and
insisting he had no participation in the transaction. In addition, he denied receipt of
the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, his motion was denied by
the IBP Board of Governors on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the
case as it had already been endorsed to this Court. The IBP Board cited Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court as the basis of this resolution.
Rule 139-B, 12(b) provides:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
. . . .
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for
[9]
reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v. Villanueva that although Rule
139-B, 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is nothing in its
text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion for
reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors may be filed within 15
days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion before the
Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
[10]
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.
Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was filed
after the records of this case had been forwarded to this Court, we have decided to
treat the motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of Rule 139-B,
12 (b).
After due consideration of respondents motion for reconsideration, we find
the motion to be without merit.
First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against
respondent, the records show that as of the date of filing of respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still pending trial
[11]
before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. Respondent claims that
although he notarized the document, he had no participation whatsoever in the
transaction. He merely notarized the document on the representation of the
[12]
persons who appeared before him.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a
[13]
respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
[14]
could accomplish the end desired. To be sure, conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative
[15]
proceeding. As we have held in Calub v. Suller, the dismissal of a criminal case is
not determinative of the liability of the accused for disbarment. In the case at bar,
however, the criminal prosecution based on the same acts charged in this case is
still pending in the court. To avoid contradictory findings, therefore, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case for falsification of a public document.
Second. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato
Cunanan, as to the violation of Act No. 2103 are fully supported by the
evidence. Act No. 2103, 1(a) provides:
The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
[16]
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the
document to appear personally before him and to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by other
persons, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the
ones who had executed the same and the latter should be required to affirm their
[17]
acts. Respondent failed to do this.
Respondent also failed to controvert complainants evidence that Wendy
Sunshine Umali are actually two different persons named Wendy and Sunshine,
both surnamed Umali; that they were minors at the time of the execution of the
aforesaid document; and that their signatures therein had been made by an
unidentified person. It is clear even from the face of the Consent to Quarry that
Wendy and Sunshine Umali are two different minors, who were represented by a
person who signed the document in their behalf, thus lending credence to
complainants claim that the document is fictitious. In fact, the residence certificate
number of Wendy Sunshine Umali is not stated in the notarized document. In
addition, page one of the agreement appears to have been intercalated and to have
been typed with a different machine.
The acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a private
document is converted into a public document, making it admissible in court
[18]
without further proof of its authenticity.

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot therefore be

overemphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents
is at stake in every aspect of that function.
However, the suspension of respondent from his commission as a notary
public for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is too severe
[19]
a penalty for what he has committed. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr., this Court
suspended respondents commission as a notary public for one year for notarizing
the verification of a motion to dismiss when the fact was that three of the affiants
had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he
had been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the suspension of
respondent from his commission as notary public for one year would be proper.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of violation
of Act No. 2103, 1(a) and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as notary
public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely. The
charge of falsifying a public document is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
of an administrative case for the same act should the evidence warrant such action.
SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004]

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF
ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the
same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court
provision covering this cases central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and
breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.
[1]
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this
Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of
law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior
[2]
Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94, a
disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar
[3]
Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996. Under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this
realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda
C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras
case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain
the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to
enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his
suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine
[4]
Bar.
[5]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997, the
Bar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam
requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case against
[6]
Maquera and of the rules violated by him.
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case from the
[7]
District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997.
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60)
[8]
days from the IBPs receipt of the case records.
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the
[9]
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998. However, the notice was
returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last known
[10]
address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address.

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and
Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending
Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates
[11]
and pays his IBP membership dues in full.
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February
28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the
territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services,
then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling
[12]
his clients case.
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987,
Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against
Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros
property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in
satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of
redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid
[13]
period.
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred
[14]
U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in
the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera
[15]
and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter.
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying
Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera
[16]
had the title to the property transferred in his name.
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C.
[17]
Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted
[18]
hearings regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct.
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam
[19]
[20]
praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its
Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee
for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his
failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyers acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the
client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in
[21]
writing.
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty
(30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the

difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount
due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that
other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action
[22]
by the Superior Court of Guam.
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property
in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except
for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written
agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three days
following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them,
and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal services to
[23]
Castro.
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered
[24]
its Decision suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a period of
two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-client
relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when
they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of redemption to
Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from
the eventual transfer of Castros property to him since he was able to sell the same
to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for
services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also
ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case
that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business
[25]
transactions between an attorney and his client in a very general sort of way.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded
that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no
evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the
[26]
Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in
turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
[27]
Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992,
which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court forany deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice

of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely:
acquiring by assignment Castros right of redemption over the property subject of
the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of
redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate
Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine
Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this
jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property
by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in
payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in
relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph
[28]
5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients
property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article
[29]
1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily
[30]
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
[31]
The case of In re: Ruste illustrates the significance of the aforementioned
prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of a
case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his
clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that
the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances
obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses
driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latters
behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a
harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential
relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the
[32]
rights of both.
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros
right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the
redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it

concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The
court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in
payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a
market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right
of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting
payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to
US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from
the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from
the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn
duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that *a+ lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence
reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
[33]
continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering
Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically
[34]
result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are
mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the
basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
[35]
suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of
Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a
[36]
lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary
evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer
must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable
notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the
[37]
scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on
his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is
not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maqueras current
and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically
informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he
should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution),
may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be
suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues
[38]
from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules
of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant

suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year
shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
[39]
Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or
disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in
the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty.
Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes
later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]

JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN and ATTY.
JUANITO P. NOEL, respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose A.
Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P.
Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their duties and
obligations towards him as their client, especially in the complainants right to
appeal to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. The allegations
[1]
in the complaint dated February 12, 1996 in support of the accusations are as
follows:
1.
Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A.
Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano, na ang Judge ay si Honorable
Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay Recovery of possession with damages. Itoy
iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-73739 na ang Judge naman dito
ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang
abogado ko.
...
4.
Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay nagtanong
sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay
ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagot at sinabi ko sa kaniya,
Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa
inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand
Pesos bilang downpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot
Wala kang ibinibigay sa akin!
5.
Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder at
ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong. Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at
nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel Sayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na
kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di ko alam kung bakit hindi niya
ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ng
bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).
6.
Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi ni
Atty. Noel no Rebuttal pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw
na ang aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat
mag rebuttal i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga sinabi ng Judge
na: Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days submitted for
decision. Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay submitted for decision;
7.
Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Bakit may ibinigay na zerox
copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban sumagot si Atty. Noel, at
sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa court. Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako
kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na:
Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay nila? Sa palagay ko ay

hindi lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang
isinagot ko;
8.
Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng motion for reconsideration,
sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang
tayo. Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa
Supreme Court para parehas ang laban; Na bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang
decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na
tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.
9.
Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal makaraan ang ilang
buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13,
1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty.
Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni Atty.
Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng sekretarya ay Nasa probinsiya
maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad kong sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang para
maka-apila sa Supreme Court. Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw yun
para sagutin.
10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban) na
sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon sa
Supreme Court, itoy madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat ibinigay
niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila.
11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong Dec. 1,
1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling
linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at
Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin kay Atty. Noel sa Supreme
Court.
12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni Atty.
rd
Noel sa Gedisco 3 Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang kaniyang
sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing
Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose
Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.
13.
Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang
katotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na akoy natalo ng walang kalaban-laban, pagkat
nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng
apilasyon sa Supreme Court.
14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni Atty.
Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na halagang one
hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na
makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.
In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was
neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 144860-CV
M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano and in the
appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43; they do not have a
lawyer-client relationship because he is on leave in the practice of law since

October 18, 1993 when he was designated Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and
during his incumbency as such, and up to the filing of this administrative complaint
in 1996, he is still on leave as law practitioner because he was elected Mayor of
Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995 election; probably, complainant included him as
respondent because he thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of
Atty. Juanito P. Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might
have seen him or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he
was on leave in his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to
meet visitors from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro Manila;
and he has not received any single centavo from the complainant.
In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in 1994,
he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion of the ground
floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila which complainant
bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her daughter Teresita
Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the RTC but upon the effectivity of
the law expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case
was transferred to the MTC. From the evidence of the defendant, he honestly saw
no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC rendered a decision dismissing
the case on the alleged ground that the identity of the subject matter of the action
was not clearly established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila
(Branch 43) and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the
complaint. On November 13, 1995, he received a copy of the RTC decision dated
October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC. Through the telephone, he
informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant instructed
him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers to the Court of
Appeals and not with the Supreme Court as complainant claims. He advised the
complainant that he could find no error in the said decision and a further appeal
would be frivolous and without merit and requested the complainant to come over
so that he could discuss the matter with him. Whenever the complainant went to
the law office, he failed to see him because the latter was still attending court
hearings. The complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by his
secretary. Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up
by phone, or see him personally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired
another lawyer to handle the appeal. He was surprised when he received on July
18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19, 1996,
requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.
We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A. Quiambao
submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the complaint against Atty.
Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a Resolution dated February 27,
2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation.
We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyerclient relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.

From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty.
Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty. Panganiban
went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was
[2]
designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas due to the indefinite leave of
absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as mayor of the said
municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he secured the services of Atty.
[3]
Panganiban on January 6, 1994. It is thus clear that Atty. Panganiban was not an
active associate of the law firm, since at that time, he was already on leave from the
practice of law. Moreover, the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for Recovery
of Possession and Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel
alone and not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the
said civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not
once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the complainant nor did he sign any
document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint against
Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.
As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate
attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of
complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a further
appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review despite the
manifest desire of the complainant to do so.
Anent the first issue.
Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failure to present in evidence the receipt
dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that complainant
made a partial payment of P10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of the subject
property. Complainant claims that this piece of document proves that complainant
bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who bought it only on July 30,
1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the non-presentation of the subject
receipt is suppression of evidence.
Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same was
mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not exist during
the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the presentation of
evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have been alleged in the
complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the
other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that the receipt was given to him,
the same cannot be used as evidence because the receipt shows that it was signed
by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a party to the sale; neither does it appear in the
receipt that Romeo was acting in a representative capacity.
A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue.
It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the
same seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28, 1986 while
that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant claims that actually
the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as evidenced by the subject
receipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of the subject property as

the same is already in the possession of the other buyer. Complainant filed an
[4]
ejectment case against the tenant of the other buyer but the same was dismissed
for the reason that complainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over
the property in question. Unable to take possession of the subject property,
complainant filed a case against the seller for the annulment of the contract of sale,
the Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court
awarded him damages of P80,000.00.
Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise
[5]
Agreement. The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which is the
same property that was previously sold to complainant on November 28, 1986,
including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amount
of P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the same
amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to the said
[6]
compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer of Right in favor of
the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by the seller over the said
property.
Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a result
of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take possession of the
subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in this case that complainant
claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The MTC dismissed the
complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to
file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against him.
We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was
not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time of
presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant stating
the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and attested that the
contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants allegation that he gave the
receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering the importance of the subject
receipt to his case, he should have called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was
no allegation of the existence of the subject receipt.
We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.
As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noels refusal or
failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further
appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the appeal to the
RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called the
complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of the adverse
RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one month within which
to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid the respondents visits on
December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the filing of the appeal to the higher
court but that he was not able to talk to Atty. Noel; that it was only when he went

to the RTC that he learned that he lost the case because the period of the appeal
has lapsed.
Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13, 1995
and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the complainant to
inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for the complainant to
call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was instructed by the
complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he told the complainant
that there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the decision of the court is
correct, and second, he is obligated by the code of professional responsibilities to
refrain from filing a frivolous and unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter,
complainant went to his office twice, the last of this instance was when
complainant took all the records of the case and never came back which led him to
believe that complainant will not appeal the adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel
further states that, in any event, his relationship with the complainant ended upon
the issuance of the decision and that the complainant should not expect that he
would still appeal the case.
We find for the complainant.
It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up the
status of the case. From the time, complainant filed the case with the MTC up to
the time he appealed with the RTC, complainant was vigilant with his rights
constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that upon receipt
of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noels version is to be given
credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just allowed the time to appeal to
lapse. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner in his Report:
Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same subject
matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of annulment of contract of sale with
damages, a case of action for recovery of ownership and possession, an appeal to
the Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb that he lost it (the appeal)
and did not find it essential to discuss the matter with his lawyer for possible
remedial action? That is, as claimed by his lawyer?
...
As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim that the
complainant followed up his case several times with his office (outside of the two
occasions that he conceded the complainant did so), the complainant was precise in
detailing the circumstances which described how he tried his best to seek the
presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailed circumstances, and
specific places. Given the character which had characterized the effort of the
complainant to seek appropriate legal remedies for his complaints, the assertions
would be consistent, that is, that he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.
We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision
within the 15-day prescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty. Noel
received the adverse RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and the complainant was
informed about the adverse RTC decision on November 24, 1995. Hence,
complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty. Noel failed to

ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel entrusted entirely with
his secretary the duty to inform the complainant about the adverse decision. And
the secretary informed the complainant rather late and worse with the wrong
information that the complainant has still a month within which to file an
appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive period to appeal without
complainant having availed of the said remedy.
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
[7]
connection therewith shall render him liable. If only Atty. Noels position of not
filing an appeal because it would only be frivolous has been properly communicated
to the complainant at the earliest possible time so that the complainant would be
able to seek the services of another lawyer for help, it would have been
commendable. A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought
[8]
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. But as it was,
Atty. Noels negligence as afore-discussed robbed the complainant of the
opportunity to at least look for another lawyer for professional help and file an
appeal, after all, it is the client who finally decides whether to appeal or not an
adverse decision.
We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be
expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client
relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a counsel
of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his
client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is
[9]
expected to do his best for the interest of his client. Second, Atty. Noel admitted
that complainant instructed him to file an appeal with the higher court. Even
assuming that their contract does not include filing of an appeal with the higher
courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the interest of the complainant by
informing and discussing with the complainant of the said decision and his
assessment of the same. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
[10]
bounds of the law. It is the obligation of counsel to comply with his clients lawful
request. Counsel should exert all effort to protect the interest of his client.
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant
lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the
[11]
case.
In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of
[12]
[13]
reprimand, fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three
[14]
[15]
[16]
months, six months and even disbarment in aggravated case.
The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a
suspension from the practice of law for one month is just penalty under the
circumstances.
Complainants claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present
disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case where
[17]
damages could be awarded. A disbarment case is a proceeding that is intended to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers; to protect the

administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important

function shall be competent, honorable and reliable, men in whom courts and
[18]
clients may repose confidence. It has been emphasized in a number of cases that
disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or
[19]
a criminal action.
Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is
DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED for one month with a warning that
a repetition of the same would be meted a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to respondents personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

March 17, 1922

In re Attorney EUSEBIO TIONKO
Attorney-General
Villa-Real
for
the
Government.
Rector, Casal & Ozaeta for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings, involving the suspension from practice of attorney Eusebio
Tionko, are before the court pursuant to the provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that, on a letter addressed to attorney Tionko by
his former clients, Gertrudes Alvarado and Numeriano Casion, coming to the
attention of the Judge of First Instance of Surigao, at the instance of the latter,
charges of professional misconduct were filed against attorney Tionko, and that
after due hearing an order was issued by the trial judge on October 25, 1921,
suspending the respondent Tionko from the exercise of his profession until the
further order of the Supreme Court.
The charges preferred against the respondent, to follow somewhat the plan of his
counsel in this court, are two, namely: (1) The neglect by attorney Tionko of the
interests of his clients Alvarado and Casion; and (2) the failure of attorney Tionko to
turn over the fees advanced to him by his clients to their new attorney, Hilarion Z.
Elumba, in March, 1920, and his deceit in formulating the receipt for this money
with a wrong date. We find the first charge to be proved, and the second charge not
to be proved.
About May 14, 1918, attorney Tionko agreed to obtain for Gertrudes Alvarado and
Numeriano Casion the registration of two parcels of land. Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Tionko received his fees of P114. More than a year having elapsed without word
from their attorney, the clients addressed a letter to him dated July 22, 1919, calling
his attention to the period allowed for the presentation of their claims. They
received no answer. Six months later, on February 23, 1920, another letter was sent
to Mr. Tionko by registered mail telling him that they feared the period provided by
law would expire and that they themselves had already secured the necessary plans
from the Bureau of Lands. They received no answer to this letter. Alvarado and
Casion then engaged another attorney, Hilarion Z. Elumba. This decision was
communicated by them to Mr. Tionko in a letter dated March 20, 1920, in which
they further required of him the delivery to attorney Elumba of the P114 previously
tendered as professional fees. This communication, likewise, failed to bring results.
Thereupon, the letter dated April 1, 1921, which gave rise to the proceedings
against attorney Tionko was prepared and transmitted por conducto del Hon. Juez
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia, Surigao, Surigao. (Through the Hon. Judge of the
Court of First Instance, Surigao, Surigao.)
In the meantime, it is only fair to say that attorney Tionko had been quite diligent in
taking the necessary steps to obtain the plans he desired from the Bureau of Lands.
Thus, in April, 1918, he wrote the Bureau of Lands asking that the plans for the
lands of Alvarado and Casion be forwarded to him. Later, on June 27, 1918, he paid
the Bureau of Lands the sum of P12.12, in order to expedite the issuance of the

plans. Still later, on November 21, 1919, he received the necessary plans after the
payment of an additional P2.
Respondent's intercession with the officials of the Bureau of Lands does not relieve
him of all responsibility. In the first place, he was content to wait complacently for
nearly two years for copies of two plans. In the second place, he was guilty of a
violation of the ordinary rules of professional courtesy in repeatedly disdaining to
answer the communications of his clients, whereas for all they knew, the time for
the reclaiming of title to their lands might expire and they might lose all rights in
their property through the negligence of their counsel. In reality, while the interests
of the clients were not prejudiced, this was not because of any great activity on the
part of attorney Tionko, but rather through the fortunate circumstances of delay in
the hearing of the case and through the securing of new counsel. The lawyer owes
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. (Code of Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association and the
Philippine Bar Association, No. 15, In re Filart [1919], 40 Phil., 205.)
The second charge narrows down to a question of veracity between attorneys
Tionko and Elumba. As the contested receipt signed by attorney Elumba contains
the date April 15, 1920, and as this bears out the claim of attorney Tionko, we are
content to let the point rest here without further elaboration. The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an
officer of the court in accordance with his oath. (Re Reily [1919], 7.A.L.R., 89.)
Counsel insinuates that attorney Tionko has been highhandedly suspended from
the exercise of his profession through the machinations of one of his personal and
political enemies, who is no other than the judge who decreed his indefinite
suspension. The record does disclose that the Judge of First Instance who pressed
the charges against Mr. Tionko did fail to retain that equanimity which is to be
expected of judicial officers. However, this is all beside the point, for the person at
bar is not Judge Andres Borromeo but attorney Eusebio Tionko.
It will be recalled that respondent Tionko was suspended from the practice of the
law on October 25, 1921. Inasmuch, therefore, as the respondent has lost the
emoluments of his profession for nearly five months, we feel that this period is
amply sufficient, and, consequently, refrain from further disciplining him.
Accordingly, it is ordered that, as of this date, the respondent Eusebio Tionko be
reinstated as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands. So ordered.

[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES
III, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was
[1]
initiated by a complaint-affidavit filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7,
1994 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, the Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia
International Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant charges respondent Meneses
with the following offenses, viz.: (1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming
a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything
within his power to protect his clients interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4)
loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount
of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable
[2]
settlement of a pending case.
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant,
Inc., a group of companies which includes Pan Asia International Commodities, Inc.,
through its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of
respondent Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled
various cases and was properly compensated by his client in accordance with their
[3]
retainer agreement. One of the litigations handled by him was the case of People
vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch
134, Regional Trial Court of Makati. On December 24. 1993, respondent received
the sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to be given to
therein offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court
settlement and with the understanding that a motion to dismiss the case would be
filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his
client the receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification
made with the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or
any pleading in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable
settlement was not finalized and concluded. Despite repeated demands in writing
or by telephone for an explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents
pertaining to the aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored
the pleas of herein complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez for investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit his
answer to the complaint pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of
[4]
Court. Two successive ex parte motions for extension of time to file an answer
[5]
were filed by respondent and granted by the Commission. On November 14,
[6]
1994, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, instead of an answer.

In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality
to sue him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his
legal services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that
Navarro had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case
nor had been authorized by its board of directors to file this disbarment case
against respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell
Management and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993
according to the verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the
case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaa was
not an employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him
as its legal counsel; and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded
because the same was archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of the
country.
[7]
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, stresses that
respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to
account for the amount of P 50,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondents
arguments in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission;
and that he was fully aware of the interrelationship of the two corporations and
always coordinated his legal work with Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
resolved to deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to
[8]
file his answer. On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was
[9]
adopting the allegations in his motion to dismiss his answer. When the case was
set for hearing on February 9, 1995, respondent failed to attend despite due
notice. He thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case several
times allegedly due to problems with his health.
On the scheduled hearing on June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to
attend. The commissioner accordingly received an ex parte the testimony of
complainants sole witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary
[10]
evidence. Thereafter, complainant rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called
Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Recall Complainants
[11]
Witness
for
Cross-Examination which
was
granted
by
the
[12]
Commission. Estrellita Valdez was directed by the Commission to appear on the
scheduled hearing for cross-examination.
Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and
granted by the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on
May 31, 1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated
warnings. Consequently, the Commission considered him to have waived his right
to present evidence in his defense and declared the case submitted for
[13]
resolution.
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, submitted its Report and
[14]
Recommendation to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Commission ruled that the refusal and/or failure of respondent to

account for the sum of P50,000.00 he received from complainant for the settlement
of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any
shadow of a doubt that he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to be
penalized.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from
the practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to
return theP50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with
[15]
such requirement would result in his disbarment. The Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
[16]
Commissioner in its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997.
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this
case through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12
[17]
(b) of Rule 139-B. It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a
copy of said resolution, with the investigating commissioners report and
recommendation annexed thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him
and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated
demands therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness
for the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
[18]
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment.
Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a
lawyer which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely
holding in trust the money he received from his client to used as consideration for
amicable settlement of a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did
no materialize, he was necessarily under obligation to immediate return the money,
as there is no showing that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
[19]
capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue
him is unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon
the verified complainant of any person. The right to institute a disbarment
proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters
of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of

the charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar
Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who
[20]
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject
however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
[21]
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to
[22]
him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of
the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients
request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by
deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an
unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the
status of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the
letter of Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that
although a copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally
delivered to respondents address and received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he
had failed to restitute the amount ofP50,000.00 to complainant within the 15-day
period provided therein. Neither has he filed with this Court any pleading or
written indication of his having returned said amount to complainant. In line with
the resolution in this case, his disbarment is consequently warranted and exigent.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The
dispositive portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the
Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will
[23]
result (i)n his DISBARMENT.
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or
disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to
complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended,
subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in
criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment
cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative
[24]
[25]
penalties, not can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no reason
why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary
actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only
possible and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of
the peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was
[26]
immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted. The evidently
is not the situation here. Also the implementation of the penalty provided in the
resolution will involve a cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final

action to be taken by this Court, it will have to wait for a verified report on whether
or not respondent complied with the condition subsequent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court and
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the
county.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5394. December 2, 2002 ]

RIZALINO
FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY.
REYNALDO
NOVERO,
JR. respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for
alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of Civil Case No. 7500 which
complainant Rizalino Fernandez and others had filed against the Bacolod City Water
District before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Bacolod City.
[1]
In his letter, dated October 16, 1996, to the Court Administrator,
complainant imputed the following negligent acts to respondent which led to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 7500:
1. Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing on January 11, 1996
nor seek a postponement thereof, for which reason the trial court
considered respondent to have waived further presentation of his
evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits for admission
on January 30, 1996;
2. Notwithstanding receipt of the order dated January 11, 1996,
respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits on January 30, 1996,
prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case;
3. While respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, he did not file his motion within the reglementary period,
as a result of which the said motion, actually filed on May 7, 1996,
was denied by the trial court on May 14, 1996 for having been filed
out of time;
4. When asked for an explanation regarding the dismissal of the case,
respondent informed complainant through a letter, dated July 30,
1996, that he had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, but the motion, which had been filed a long time ago, had
not yet been resolved by the trial court;
5. Respondent tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming that
the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last
witness. The truth was that complainants sister had already testified
and there was no more witness to present; and
6. Respondent only attended one (1) hearing in the civil case.
[2]
In his answer, dated September 3, 1997, respondent averred that the
complaint filed against him was baseless and was purely malicious and speculative
considering the fact that it was not made under oath. He alleged that complainant
engaged his legal services after the first counsel had withdrawn from the case
because of a misunderstanding with complainant. He stated that he had no
knowledge of what had happened in the case before he handled it because
complainant did not furnish him the records and stenographic notes of the previous
proceedings despite his repeated requests. Respondent further claimed that he
failed to formally offer the exhibits as evidence because complainant could not be

reached when he was needed for conference and the latter even tried to take over
the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more witnesses who
nevertheless failed to appear during trial despite several postponements.
The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which
[3]
submitted a report, dated February 3, 2001, finding respondent guilty of violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) month.
Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), which in its report and recommendation, dated October 15, 2001, found
respondent remiss in observing the standard care, diligence and competence
prescribed for members of the bar in the performance of their professional
duties. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with warning that
the commission of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely in
[4]
the future. The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
[5]
was approved on June 29, 2002 by the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, dated September 17, 2002,
alleging that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because
it was not verified. According to him, the complaint was a mere political ploy to
discredit him because he was aspiring for a congressional seat in the 1998
elections. He denied complainants claim that he attended only one hearing. He
explained that he was not able to terminate his presentation of evidence because
complainant insisted on presenting as witness his sister who was residing in Manila,
even though the latter repeatedly failed to appear in court despite several
postponements. He claimed that complainant had told him that his intention was
really to delay the case as he was using the same as his leverage in a criminal case
filed or to be filed against him by the Bacolod City Water District for his alleged
water tapping. When he refused to go along with the scheme, complainant
allegedly threatened to change counsel. Respondent further alleged that
complainants attitude is apparent from the fact that the latter caused to be
disseminated several copies of the IBP Resolution recommending his (respondents)
suspension and distributed them to radio stations in Bacolod City. For these
[6]
reasons, respondent sought the reversal of the IBP Resolution.
After review of the records of this case, the Court finds the report of the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP to be well taken. The records clearly show
that respondent has been negligent in the performance of his duties as
complainants counsel. His failure to file his formal offer of exhibits constitutes
inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause of his client since it led to the
dismissal of the case. To compound his inefficiency, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration outside the reglementary period, which was thus accordingly
denied by the trial court for being filed out of time. Hence, the order issued by the
trial court dismissing the case became final. Respondents acts and omission clearly
constitute violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides in
pertinent parts:

CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
As this Court has held:
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even
malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes
to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law
and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole[7]
hearted fealty to the clients cause.
Respondents attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on
complainant is apparent. His averment that complainant failed to turn over to him
the records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence
and inadequacy in handling complainants case. Considering that respondent has
been practicing law for almost 15 years, he should have known that he could easily
obtain a copy of the records and stenographic notes from the court where the case
was docketed.
Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious attitude of complainant
in trying to manipulate the manner in which he was handling the case as the main
reason for his failure to formally offer his exhibits in contravention of the order of
the court. But respondent should bear in mind that while a lawyer owes utmost
zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he also has the responsibility of
employing only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and he should not allow the latter to dictate the procedure in handling the
[8]
case. As this Court said in another case:
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and
zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end
that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the
law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in
support of his clients cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full
discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility
[9]
that he may displease the judge or the general public.
As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken
cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as
required in Rule 139-B, 1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
[10]
Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect and does
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint.
The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance

that matters which are alleged are true and correct the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with
[11]
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.
However, instead of suspension for six (6) months as recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, we hold that the suspension of respondent Atty.
Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for one (1) month, as recommended by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, would be commensurate considering that this is the first time Atty.
Novero is found guilty of neglect of his clients case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month effective upon finality
hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this
complaint will be dealt with even more severely.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL
L.
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

BAUTISTA, complainant,

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent
Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him,
respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court
to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite.
In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his
clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor
Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter
referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent
fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil
Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is
one of the defendants and, without said case
being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the
properties of the Fortunados, which properties
are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No.
Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former
client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from
the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that
the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial
Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of

Quezon City falsified documents purporting to
be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30,
1971" and submitting the same document to the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with
the complaint for estafa filed by respondent
against complainant designated as I.S. No.
7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to
complainant who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several
complaints without legal basis before the Court
of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false
assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that
while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does
not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on
November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply
to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent
filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as
a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as
witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required
to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him,
claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him
constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment
to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of
scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to
file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record,
p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26,
1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor
General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from
notice.

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the
recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months.
The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of
misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients
during the pendency of the case where the properties were
involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject
of their land development agreement had already been sold at a
public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a
document where two signatories who had not signed the original
(or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed
their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit
more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments
to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It
is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is
sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor
General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims
that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides
that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the
present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF
ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the
Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as
provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to
respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not
mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707;
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to
the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court
may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by
referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the

Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and
recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the
Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented
by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the
effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of
the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B
provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been
substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred
to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated
even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on
November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum
[Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor
General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To
refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in
duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to
further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than
thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant
the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present
evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There
was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that
respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11)
documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent
committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation
of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of
misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of
Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document
assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered
by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an
area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At
the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In

executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to

himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring
his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part
by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that
the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach
of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil.
774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics,
which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the
new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a
purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new
Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of
the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended
or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible
act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and
to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because
of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from
acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary
relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot
be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize
the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the
matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the
new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing
jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in
litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action
may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really
implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer

depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer

of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent
was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last
paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON
A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23
Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire
satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey
to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and
assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements
found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis
supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties
to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not
the land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that
the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The
land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public
auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his
appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a
certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood
to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client,
he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land
development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was
duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as
constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale
was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent
failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the
negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to
live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a
premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant
was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to
inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of
their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public
auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the
project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should
observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a
ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113,
February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified

documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development
agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the
signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon
A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and
Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on
December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names.
However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the
original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado
and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and
Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote
them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the
letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp.
4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and
Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed,
the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's
Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p.
16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on
May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original
addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct
constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a
manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no
impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee
contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394].
The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the
Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided,
you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the
suit, including court fees.
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a
lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be
subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding

Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at
his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The
execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer
and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for
acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as
counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's
findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his
acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the
Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly
states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the
recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is
where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure
of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule
15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him
before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole
purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this
case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No.
5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and
lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp.
402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for
libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case
No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General
made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to
harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly
holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing
the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since
the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining
grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent
violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal
profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of
law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of

the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638,
647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the
offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed
serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let
copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 1417. April 17, 1996]

INVESTMENT
AND
MANAGEMENT
SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LEODEGARIO V. ROXAS, respondent.
SYLLABUS
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; LAWYER; OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT. - A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great
propriety. He is also an officer of the court, and he owes to it, as well as to his
peers, utmost respect and fidelity. His relationship with others should no less
be characterized than by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor.
In taking an oath as a member of the legal profession, he makes a solemn
promise to so stand by those pledges.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredes for petitioner.
Leodegario V. Roxas for and in his own behalf.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The administrative proceedings against Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas started way
back in 1975 when a petition for disbarment or suspension was filed, on 03
January of that year, by the Investment and Management Services
Corporation. The petition averred that the complainant managed three
corporations in the Philippines, to wit: Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc., Prime Trading
Corporation and Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. Respondent lawyer, while he was still
petitioners Administrative and Legal Officer, allegedly misappropriated or
appropriated for his own use and benefit certain sums of money or checks which he
received in trust x x x from the Prime Trading Corporation and Luzon Leather
Industries, Inc. amounting to P2,623.80, from the debtors of Luzon Leather
Industries, Inc. amounting to P3,444.00, and from a number of employees of the
Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc. amounting to P1,749.50 or a (grand) total of
[1]
P7,817.30. In addition, according to petitioner, respondent issued bouncing
checks to pay for personal obligations.
In the Courts resolution of 13 January 1975, respondent was required to file
an answer to the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The resolution was sent
to his address at 647 John Glenn Street, Moonwalk Subdivision, Phase II, Paraaque,
Rizal. There was no response. On 08 September 1977, or more than two and a half
years later, respondent filed a Motion for Substitution of Xerox Copy of the
Petition supposedly because the copy sent to him was not legible in certain
portions that thereby prevented him from preparing an answer. He asked that the
ten-day period within which to file his answer be counted from his receipt of a new
copy of the petition. He listed his address at 566-B Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila.
In a manifestation, dated 23 September 1977, petitioner informed the Court
that respondent was furnished with a legible copy of the petition per Registry
Receipt No. 12212. On 20 December 1977, petitioner filed a second manifestation
stating that the legible copy of the petition sent to respondent at his Malate
address was returned unclaimed.

The Court, on 16 January 1978, directed the Clerk of Court to mail the copy of
the petition to respondent at 89 Igualdad (Equalidad) Street, Lemery, Batangas,
which was respondents permanent address shown in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations. Respondent was given another ten (10) days within which to answer
the petition. The Court further resolved to refer the matter to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation after the
expiration of the ten-day period, with or without respondents answer, in order to
avoid a further delay in the proceedings.
On 27 April 1990, the OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L.
Kilayko, transmitted to the Court its report, with the recommendation that
respondent be suspended for five (5) years from the practice of law. A separate
complaint was filed by the OSG with the Court.
In its resolution, dated 04 June 1990, the Court required respondent to file his
answer to the administrative complaint filed by the OSG within fifteen (15) days
from notice.
In his answer, filed on 20 July 1990, respondent denied the charges claiming
that they were merely intended to harass or embarrass him. Respondent, this time,
indicated his address at 2310-D San Anton Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
The OSG filed its reply on 17 January 1991, averring that respondents general
denial should be deemed an admission of the material allegations of the complaint.
In the resolution of 04 February 1991, the matter was referred by the Court to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 08 November 1995, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Agustinus V. Gonzaga
transmitted to the Court the records of the case, as well as the notice and copy of
the decision,viz:
Please take notice that on February 18, 1995 a resolution was passed by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the above-entitled case the
original of which is now on file in this office, quote:
RESOLUTION NO. XI-95-287
Adm. Case No 1417
Investment and Management
Services Corporation vs.
Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable law and
rules, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) month from the practice of
[2]
law.
From the Commissioners Report, dated 30 January 1995, it would appear that
the case had been set for hearing a number of times but both complainant and
respondent failed to appear. While the notices sent to respondent at his Sampaloc
address were at first received by him, later communication, however, remained
unclaimed. The report noted that for lack of evidence, the complaint should be

dismissed; however, it added that respondents actuations, supra, in the course of

the proceedings deserved disciplinary sanctions. IBP, adopting the Commissioners
Report, ordered the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) month.
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governing Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys, if the IBP Board of Governors, by a majority vote of its total
membership, determines that a lawyer should be suspended from the practice of
law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations. The resolution, together with the whole record of the case,
[3]
shall then be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. In its resolution of
25 February 1992, the Court also directed, thus:
Re: Cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension or fine upon
lawyers. - The Court En Banc RESOLVED that effective today, all cases involving the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or fine upon lawyers shall be decided either
by Division or En Banc conformably with the following rules:
(1) If the penalty of suspension is imposed for a period of one (1) year or less, the
resolution of a case shall be by the Division concerned; if the penalty exceeds one
(1) year, resolution shall be by the Court En Banc;
(2) If the penalty imposed is a fine of P 10,000 or less, the resolution shall be by the
Division concerned; if more than P10,000 resolution will be by the Court En Banc;
(3) In case both suspension and a fine are involved, resolution shall be by the Court
En Banc if the suspension exceeds one (1) year or the fine exceeds P10,000;
(4) In case of two or more suspensions of the lawyer, service of the same will be
successive, not simultaneous.
Accordingly, we shall take the IBP decision ordering the one-month suspension
of respondent to be merely recommendatory.
After a thorough review of the case, we find nothing to warrant a reversal of
the findings of the IBP; indeed, the Court believes, given the circumstances, that a
more severe penalty than that recommended needs to be imposed.
Respondent clearly had no intention to squarely face the charges against him.
By repeatedly changing his address without informing the investigating officials or
the Court he somehow managed to evade the administrative investigation for, after
years of delay, no longer could complainant corporation be reached to substantiate
its charges. The Court cannot take the matter lightly.
A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great propriety. He is also an
officer of the court, and he owes to it, as well as to his peers, utmost respect and
fidelity. His relationship with others should no less be characterized than by the
[4]
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. When he took the oath as a
member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by those
pledges. In this covenant, respondent lawyer has miserably failed.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon his receipt of this
decision.

Let a copy hereof be entered in respondents personal record as attorney and

member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000]

MAXIMO DUMADAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO L. LUMAYA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On the basis of an administrative complaint for Unethical Practices, Conflict of
[1]
Interest and Disloyalty To Clients dated December 22 1983 filed by complainant
against respondent praying that the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed
on the latter, the case was referred to Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) by the
[2]
Court for investigation and report.
[3]
On February 26, 1990, the OSG submitted a Report finding respondent culpable
for infidelity and disloyalty to his client, negligence of duty, unethical practices and
[4]
violation of his lawyers oath. As penalty, the OSG recommended that after due
hearing, "respondent be suspended from the practice of law for not less than five
[5]
(5) years."
[6]
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 21, 1991 the Court found that respondent
[7]
made a "clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility" and suspended
[8]
respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.
[9]
A "Petition For Reinvestigation and Reconsideration," filed on July 8, 1991, was
[10]
subsequently denied by the Court per its Resolution dated January 13, 1992.
The records show that thereafter, respondent sent a letter dated February 17,
[11]
1992. Stressing in the said letter that he was not seeking a reconsideration of the
denial of his petition for reinvestigation, respondent averred in sum that he was a
"not very healthy" sixty-two (62) year old who merely wanted to know how long he
would stay suspended and if he was disqualified to be issued a commission as a
notary public considering that his commission was not renewed. This letter was
[12]
noted by the Court in a Resolution dated March 30,1992.
[13]
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation dated May 15, 1992 where
he prayed that the Court issue a resolution or decision on his averments that:
1.] he has been suspended from the practice of law and denied a
notarial commission for more than one (1) year already;
2.] for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the
Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental where Branch VII of the
Regional Trial Court and the Second Municipal Court set a popular
public clamor which constrained the undersigned to file the
manifestation;
3.] more than fifty percent (50%) of the pending civil and criminal
cases were cases handled by the respondent and these cases are
still pending resolution especially due to the lack of lawyers in the
municipality considering that most of the litigants are poor and
could not afford to hire lawyers from Mati, the capital town of
Davao Oriental or from Davao City where plane fare coming from
said places is Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) one way with no hotels
nor lodges in Baganga;

4.] there is no regular judge in Baganga after the retirement of

Judge Osias Y. Verano last March 5, 1992 and many detained
accused are in jail without hope for an early resolution of their
cases coupled with the fact that respondent is still under
suspension and they cannot hire "exorbitant" lawyers;
5.] he has been advised to secure petitions to be signed by all
Barangay Chairmen in the Eighteen (18) Barangays of the
municipality, the Seventy-Four (74) Chapters of the GKK, all NGOs,
other religious and civic organizations and to submit them to the
Supreme Court to request the Court to lift his indefinite
suspension so that he may help those who are actually helpless
and so that he may be issued a notarial commission in order to
help those who need notarial assistance without fear of being
charged beyond their capacity to pay;
6.] the Court can refer to the records of Branch VII, RTC, Baganga,
Davao Oriental and the same would show that most of the civil
and criminal cases resolved or decided therein were cases
handled by respondent;
7.] the filing of the Manifestation is for the purpose of requesting
the Court to provide him with advice as to whether the filing of a
petition was necessary to lift the order of his indefinite
suspension as well as the issuance of a notarial commission.
The foregoing manifestation was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated July 15,
[14]
1992.
On July 26, 1994, respondent filed a Petition For The Lifting Of Respondents
[15]
Suspension From The Practice Of Law which the Court referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation in a
[16]
Resolution dated March 13, 1995.
In a Report and Recommendation dated August 14, 1998, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the lifting of the indefinite suspension of respondent.
On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIII98-171 adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. In acting
favorably on respondents petition, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that:
Respondents plea is anchored on the following allegations:
"xxx.....xxx.....xxx
4......That respondent accepted his suspension as Gods grace but
due to respondents knowledge in law, he has been continuously
approached for legal advice or assistance and what respondent
could do is prepare for them pleadings or documents and to
secure practitioners to do what I am suspended from doing;
5......That respondent has remained busy in his desire to save and
as a matter of fact, with humility, respondent is the Elected
Federation President of the Federation of Senior Citizens and the

Invalid[s]. He is a member of the Lupong Tagapayapa and has

performed duties as Chairman of the Pangkat Tagapayapa of
Barangay Central, Baganga, Davao Oriental;
6......That respondent, however, has observed that there are poor
people who actually need the services of a Lawyer, and whose
hunger for justice hang mercifully on a cloud of uncertainties (sic),
as they say, here is the jurisdiction of Branch VII at Baganga,
Davao Oriental;
7......That actually there are no permanent resident lawyer[s] in
the Municipalities of Boston, Cateel, Baganga and Caraga, all in
the First District of Davao Oriental. The three practicing lawyer[s]
come only to Baganga during court hearings and since they reside
in the City of Davao their fees are high. Notarial services could not
be rendered regularly;
8......That I feel capable to fill the vacuum and be able to serve the
poor people but there is need for the undersigned to request and
pray the Supreme Court to lift the suspension imposed.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice dated January 10, 2000, respondent who
turned Seventy-One (71) years old last October 25, 1999, once again implores and
at the same time chides the Court for slumbering on acting upon the IBP
Resolution to lift his indefinite suspension, although he still insists on his innocence.
The insolence of respondents remonstrations that the Court has been sleeping on
its job in acting upon his case not only underscores his callous disregard of the
myriad administrative and judicial travails the Court has to contend with as the
Tribunal of Last Resort, among them, the chronic problem of an overflowing docket
of which his case is but one additional aggravation; it also betrays his absolute lack
of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by the
Court to cope with these concerns. Needless to state, such presumptuousness is
only too deserving of rebuke.
Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP
[17]
nor, much less, obliged to accept the same as a matter of course because as the
Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant
[18]
members of both bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own
findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of the IBP,
OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to
for investigation and report. Indeed, Sections 1, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court state that:
SEC. 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal

knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents

as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by
the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against any erring attorneys including those in the government
service; Provided, however, that all charges against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court
of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are charged with
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court; Provided,
further, that charges filed against Justices and Judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication. (italics supplied)
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapters who
shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Boar of Governors for
[19]
assignment to an investigator.
SEC. 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the
investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together with the record and all the evidence
presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme
Court. (italics supplied).
SEC. 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. After receipt
of respondents answer or lapse of the period therefor, the
Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board
of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigators, may
suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of
the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency
of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme
Court. (italics supplied)
SEC. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court may suspend an attorney from practice of any of the causes
named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme
Court in the case. (italics supplied)
SEC. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial
Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which

the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the
case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar
the attorney as the facts may warrant. (italics supplied)
For all respondents protestations to the contrary, the Court is hardly convinced of
his innocence for his culpability has been established and aptly adjudicated upon.
While the harshness of an indefinite suspension, more so when viewed in the light
of the prevailing circumstances of this case, can not be gainsaid, it must be stressed
that
The indefiniteness of respondents suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of
his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
[20]
officer of the courts.
Respondents suspension for more than nine (9) years to date, for his professional
indiscretion, underscored by his insistent protestations of innocence, appears not to
have fully reformed him and opened his eyes to the error of his ways. Such an
unrepentant attitude and unwillingness to acknowledge his misconduct puts his
fitness for re-admission to the practice of law under serious inquiry. Respondent
must always remember that [T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance
of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of
the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well xxx That is why respect and
[21]
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
As has been stated earlier, the indefiniteness of respondents suspension puts in his
hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. Until such
time as he has purged himself of his misconduct and acknowledged the same by
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity
to live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded from every member of
the bar and officer of the court, respondents suspension must deservingly be fixed
at ten (10) years. Consequently, the same may only be lifted after the expiration of
the said period, counted from the time when his suspension actually commenced.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the period of respondents suspension

from the practice of law is hereby fixed at Ten (10) Years. The "Petition For The
Lifting Of Respondents Suspension From The Practice Of Law" is,
therefore, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5763. December 3, 2002]

GABRIEL T. INGLES, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICTOR DELA SERNA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
In a complaint, dated 25 July 2001, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Atty. Gabriel Ingles, charged Atty. Victor dela Serna with violation,
specifically of Canon 8, Rule 8.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complaint stemmed from a memorandum submitted by Atty. dela Serna
in Civil Case No. 5781, entitled Cattleya Land, Inc., vs. Carmelita Fudot Singpit and
Atty. Narciso dela Serna, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, of
Bohol. Respondent lawyer, who represented the defendant, stated in his
memorandum thusly:
Recourse Available to Cattleya
When it turned out that Tecson had already sold Lot 2-A to Fudot TCT -17402 in
1986, Cattleya can blame only its lawyers, Atty. Federico Cabilao and Atty. Gabriel
Ingles. Apparently, these lawyers were themselves fooling Cattleya so that they
can get their commission and overprice immediately. x x x (Underscoring
supplied).
Bad Faith on the Part of Cattleya and Its Lawyers Cabilao and Ingles
x x x The reason is obvious, Cattleya through its agents and lawyers, Atty. Cabilao
[1]
and Atty. Ingles, are in cohorts with Tecson and Pizarras.
Complainant averred that the statements were false and malicious and argued
that they were uncalled for in a memorandum that should contain only a
summation of the facts and the laws applicable to the case. In passing, complainant
also denied that he had overpriced the property in order to obtain a commission.
In his answer, Atty. dela Serna maintained that the proper forum to consider
the complaint should have been the Regional Trial Court that tried the case, and not
the IBP, where complainant could have asked the court to cite respondent for
contempt.
In a transmittal letter, dated 05 August 2001, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez,
Director for Bar Discipline, submitted to the Court 1) a Notice of the Resolution of
the Board of Governors and 2) the Records of the Case consisting of 51 pages. The
resolution of the Board of Governors (Resolution No. XV-2002-232), adopting the
recommendation of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, read:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex `A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent having conducted
himself with utter discourtesy by using uncalled for statements in his Defendants
Memorandum without evident proofs of said accusations and using offensive and
abusive language therein respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
[2]
law for six (6) months.

When Atty. dela Serna learned of the resolution, he promptly filed an Appeal
before this Court claiming a denial of substantive and procedural due process, no
formal investigation having been conducted by the IBP before it issued
the resolution recommending his six-month suspension from the practice of law.
A review of the records would indeed show that no formal investigation was
conducted by the IBP.x
In Cottam vs. Atty. Laysa (326 SCRA 614) and Baldomar vs. Atty. Paras (348
SCRA 212), the Court outlined the procedure for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar. The Court elucidated:
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the
Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it
outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that
further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by
merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be
heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to
appear despite reasonable notice. Hereunder are some of the pertinent provisions
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on this matter; viz.:
`SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. The National Grievance
Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar
referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.
`x x x
xxx
xxx
`SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the
Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent,
requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of
service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the
satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may
be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the
resolution of dismissal shall be furnished to the complainant and the Supreme Court
which may review the case motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant
filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complaint.
`No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
`x x x
xxx
xxx
`SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to
answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation
of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses
on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable
notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
`The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months form the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of
Governors upon prior application.

`Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The
corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of
Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if
necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings
before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of
Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are
spared from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just
due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.
Subject to such highly exceptional cases as it might deem warranted, the Court
here reiterates the indispensability for a formal investigation of complaints against
members of the Bar particularly, such as in this instance, where the IBP would
recommend the serious penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. The IBP is likewise directed to act on this referral with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.