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The Unconscious Experiencer:
Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika
Somadeva Vasudeva
1 Introductory
The exegetes1 of the non-dualist Trika school of aivismhere principally the
Kashmirian author Abhinavagupta (ca. 9751025 AD) and his immediate2 predecessors and followershave extended inherited doctrines to formulate a paradigm
of a complex self.3 In some of its manifestations, this self exhibits paradoxical
abilities, such as being simultaneously unconscious yet also an experiencer. These
unique characteristics are defended with epistemological argument, attacking rival schools of Skhyas, Naiyyikas, Mmsakas, and various schools of Buddhism, and recent scholarship is demonstrating the extent to which this transformed
the aiva non-dualist doctrinal positions, as substantial material was borrowed and
incorporated from other systems.4
Despite much recent work, for most readers, the opponents theories concerning
the nature of the selfBuddhists propounding its absence, schools of Skhya, Yoga, and Vednta that postulate a self that is primarily a seer (dra), a witness (skin), a knower (jt), or a cogniser (upalabdh)are much more well known,
1
I would like to thank Kei Kataoka and Christopher Wallis for corrections to an earlier draft.
These constitute the following disciplic succession: Somnanda (ca. 900950 AD) Utpaladeva (ca. 925975 AD) Lakmaagupta (fl. ca. 9501000 AD) Abhinavagupta Kemarja (ca. 10001050 AD). For this chronology see Sanderson (2007:411ff.).
3
Two independent aiva systematisations[1.] the Kl centered Krama, and [2.] the non-dualist
varapratyabhijinfluenced and informed this exegesis; Sanderson (2007:427434) calls it a
Krama-influenced, Pratyabhij-based exegesis of scripture in the Trika. There is also a lesser influence from [3.] the Spanda system and [4.] the dualist aivasiddhnta. Of these Utpaladevas varapratyabhij is frequently cited on matters of epistemology, while the aivasiddhnta is adduced
rarely without qualification, unless the context happens to be a commonplace aiva teaching with limited doctrinal implications. This exegesis presents itself as an exposition of revealed aiva scriptures called Tantras that comprise a system called the Mantramrga, or the Path of Mantras. See
Goodall & Isaacson 2011 for an up to date, general survey. The term Mantramrga is becoming
the preferred term for what some secondary literature still refers to as Tantrism.
4
See Torella (1994:introduction) for the substantial borrowings of Buddhist doctrine. Considering Somnandas hostility to Bharthari in his ivadi but his disciple Utpaladevas adoption of many
abddvaita positions in his foundational works of the varapratyabhij system, Torella has suggested the possibility that Somnanda was only aware of only the first Ka of Bhartharis Vkyapadya, a possibility that is reevaluated in Nemec (2011a:5967).
2
204
Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)
while the aiva voice remains less familiar.5

Before we can understand the Trikas doctrine of a self that can be an unconscious experiencer, we must unravel the internal dynamics driving this claim.
To do this, two central tenets of the Trika system therefore need to be evaluated,
with a perspective that seeks to contrast the Trika against the Skhya sources
from which it has inherited the mental triplex of the buddhi, ahakra and manas (and much terminology), and, with a view to differentiate the Trika from its Saiddhntika aiva rivals.6 Firstly, the Trikas self is an experiencer (bhokt) of experiences or qualia (bhoga) that can be pleasant, painful, and vexing or indifferent (depending on how one interprets moha).7 These qualia belong to the self, and not to
the mental mechanism, as would be the case for the Skhya. The Trikas self is
also an agent (kart). This specifically intends to establish that the self must be the
consumer of the fruits of karmic retribution (karmavipka) that it is responsible for.8
Secondly, the Trikas self is also a complex of seven types of perceivers (pramt) which are located within a series of paths (adhvan), primarily the path of the tattvas, or reality levels, and the associated path of the bhuvanas, or the worlds, which
constitute the primary ontological ranges of medieval aivism. Only one of the
seven perceivers can be the locus of self-awareness and identity at any given moment. Which perceiver this is depends on the type of object that is being cognised. In an ordinary cognition by the lowest type of perceiver the self is thereby refracted into a phenomenological hierarchy that is made up of these seven apperceptive grades. The lower three of these perceivers are furthermore distinguished
by the presence or absence of three limitations or defilements (mala): [1.] limitation of individuation (avamala), [2.] limitation by karmic retribution (krmamala), and [3.] limitation by my (myyamala). In accordance with a redefini5
For sustained, ongoing work on self as understood in the dualist aiva Siddhnta see Watson
(2006, 2013 etc.).
6
See Matagapramevara VP 6.4cc5ab for a more general aiva definition of the self: paur
tm samuddia ketr ketraja eva ca | arr ceti ruddhtm bhokt ca paribhyate.
7
This triad of sukha, dukha and moha has been accepted from the Skhya, where it is understood to represent the experiential aspect of the three guas, see, e.g., Yuktidpik 17c. The translation of moha is problematic. In Vcaspatis elaboration in the Skhyatattvakaumud (13.2, 1.1728:
atra ca sukhadukhamoh paraspara virodhina svnurpi sukhadukhamohtmakny eva nimittni kalpayanti | te ca parasparam abhibhvyabhibhvakabhvn nntvam tad yath str rpayauvanakulalasampann svmina sukhkaroti | tat kasya heto | svmina prati tasy sukharpasamudbhavt | saiva str sapatnr dukhkaroti | tat kasya heto | t prati tasy dukharpasamudbhavt | eva puruntaram tm avindat saiva mohayati | tat kasya heto | tat prati tasy moharpasamudbhavt anay ca striy sarve bhv vykhyt), a beautiful, young and modest woman of good family brings pleasure to her husband (sukh-k), pain to her co-wives (dukhk), and she leaves indifferent, stupefies, frustrates, confounds, vexes or beguiles other men (mohayati). The Saiddhntikas are quite aware that this triad derives from the Skhyas, see, e.g., Aghoraiva in Mgendravttidpik 2.14b: eva tarhi kpil manyante puruo hy akart svabhvanirmalas tasya vivekajnt prva parrtha pravttv asvatantratvt paramakraa praktir eva mahaddirpea sukhadukhamohtman svakryetmna bhogyatay darayati sa eva sasra ity
ucyate |.
8
In view of the widespread notion of the triple nature of bhoga mentioned above, I have, on the
whole, avoided translating derivatives of the root bhuj with words related to the English verb enjoy.
Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)
205
tion9 of the Mlinvijayottara,10 these are considered to be three forms of foundational ignorance.
Kemarja summarizes the non-dualist aiva view of the self as follows:
Svacchandatantroddyota 5.88 (Ked p. 76, 1 149rv ):

tath hy ayam tm [1.] sakocbhsasatattvprammanyattmanehbhilaabdoktenavena malena, [2.] ubhubhavsantman vividhajanmyurbhogadena krmea, [3.] tatprabhavena
ca kacukapuryaakasthlabhttmannjtikatrividhadehatadrayavicitrabhuvanabhoktavyrthasrthaprattibhj mykhyena malena ca valita | yata sarvasyaiva [1.] sakucito bhivagdimayo
[2.] ntarullekhaatkra [3.] kagaurdirpo mukatreda jnmtydiprattisiddha evyam artha |
2 satattv ] em. Sanderson, tattv Ked1 7 sakucito ] Ked, sakuciti + + +
1 8 mukatreda ] conj. Isaacson, mutreda Ked, muddheda 1
To explain, the self is enveloped by [1.] the defilement of individuation,

designated here11 by the word yearning, which is the erroneous conviction that one is incomplete,12 which has as its essence an appearance
of contraction, [2.] by the defilement of karmic retribution, which is
made up of positive and negative latent impressions, and which grants
the enjoyment of various births and life-spans,13 [3.] and by the defilement called My14 , deriving from that [impurity of karmic retribution], which occasions the cognition of a plethora of objects to be experienced in the threefold body with its various genera of embodiment,
[the threefold body] which is constituted by [a.] the [five] cuirasses
(see page 213), [b.] the ogdoad of the subtle body, and [c.] the body of
the coarse elements, and in diverse worlds which are the substrates [of
the body]. For this matter is established by everyones personal experience such as: I who am contracted, subject to yearning and so on,
who am overcome with hundreds of internal impressions, who appear
to be lean and pale and so on, in such and such a place,15 know this.
9
The three malas were originally imagined to be substantial defilements, see Goodall (1998),
Acharya (forthcoming).
10
The Mlinvijayottara is the root scripture the Tal seeks to explain.
11
In the SvaTa, the text being commented on. Cf. SvaTa 3.177a: nimittam abhilkhyam.
12
Tal9.65a: apramanyat ceya TalViv ad loc: apramanyatavamalalaka.
13
Or: various births, life-spans and experiences.
14
The Trikas exegetes also commonly use the PK 3.2.5ab definition of myyamala: bhinnavedyaprathtraiva mykhya.
15
Ked here reads amutra + ida. Amutra normally contrasts with iha, here, so that the meaning should be over there, or more commonly in the next world, an inappropriate sense for a description of direct personal experience, the core formulation of which is usually: aham ida jnmi, I know this. This is also implied by the evident correlations of the sequences 13 and a
c. My initial emendation to this was amuko treda, I, who am so and so, here. I have in-
206
While the model of the self that emerges is therefore a unique one, we can also
see that the categories being scrutinized appear to correspond to those of the Skhya (see table 1 for a comparison, though the aivas would contest this equivalence, of course). This does not mean that we must assume a direct borrowing of
these categories from contemporaneous Skhya works. In particular, the idea that
the self is an actual experiencer (bhokt), is also prominent in what remains of the Pupata Atimrga precursor to the aiva Mantramrga. For example, the expression cetanatvd bhokttvt tanmayatvc is repeated five times in Kauinyas Pacrthabhya 5.39 to qualify the purua. This Pupata conception of experiencerhood was not limited to the enjoyment of karmic retribution, however, since in commenting on 5.3 Kauinya cites a verse providing nirvacana-etymologies defining
the tm,16 where atti viayn, it consumes the objects of experience, seems intended as a paraphrase of bhokttva. As for the idea that the self is an agent, Kauinya does not use the term kart in his commentary to 5.3. But he does cite a
verse giving a string of specific agentive-suffix nouns with designate agents of specific cognitive actions attributed to the self:17 It is the listener, the toucher, seer,
taster, smeller, thinker, speaker, knower etc.. In this list the speaker could perhaps also be taken as a non-cognitive agent. But since all of the others seem intended as subvarieties of witnessing (skitva), we should presumably rather interpret vakt as some form of a cognising verbaliser agent. In a summary verse
Kauinya then cites a number of synonyms for the self, none of which however
conveys a primary meaning of agency: purua cetano bhokt ketraja pudgalo
jana | aur vedo mta sk jvtm paribh para ||. Only later, at 5.35, in an
argument concerning the apportioning of karmic retribution, does Kauinya imply
that the self is an agent.18
2 The Direct, Agentive Experiencer

Despite such an obvious inflow of Skhya ideas and material, the early Mantramrga was at odds with the Skhya long before the non-dualist aivas of the Trika school entered their most intense (and perhaps also most agressive) hermeneutic
phase. One of the most significant departures from the Skhya is the idea that
an experiencer must also be an agent. In the post scriptural period this was already
defended by Sadyojyotis (ca. 65075019 ), the earliest known commentator of the
dualist aivasiddhnta, who is also roughly a contemporary of the author of the
Yuktidpik (ca. 680720), the most important commentary to the Skhyakristead adopted a reading suggested by H. Isaacson (personal communication): amukatra, which eliminates the unncessary repetition of I, who am so and so.
16
Pacrthabhya 5.3: yad pnoti yad datte yac ctti viayn puna | yac csya satata bhva
tasmd tmeti sajita || (Cf. also Ligapura 1.70.96)
17
Ibid., sa ca rot spra dra rasayit ghrt mant vakt boddh ityevamdi
18
Pacrthabhya 5.35: tac ca dukha nnyo nubhavati kartaivnubhavati, And that suffering is experienced by [its] agent alone, not by another.
19
For this date see Sanderson (2006).

TRIKA
207
SKHYAKRIK
i)
conscious (cetana)
conscious (cetana)
ii)
consumer/experiencer (bhokt)
experiencer ([mahaddi]bhokt)
iii)
agent (kart)
non-agent (akart)
iv)
[seven perceivers (pramt)]
[witness]
1. sakala
dra
2. pralaykala
(+praktilaya PY)
3. vijnkala
(+videha PY)
4. mantra, 5. -a, 6. -mahea
[kevala purua]
7. iva
Table 1: The Trikas au and the Skhya purua
k.20 Sadyojyotis argues that experience is a kind of action, which implies that the
experiencer must be a kind of agent.21 This he uses to support the inherited aiva
scriptural doctrine of the selfs agency (karttva), and he attacks the Skhya idea
that experience is not direct, but that: Experience is the reflection of the self in
the experienced, like [the reflection] of the moon in water.22 Despite this, it is also
evident that the doctrine he defends, at least as far as the three internal organs
[1.] the mind or manas, the [2.] intellect or buddhi and [3.] personalization or ahakraare concerned, is in many respects derivative. He defines experience as
follows:
In brief, the intellect, that has assumed the form of the object of cognition such as happiness etc.,23 is the object of experience (bhogya). Experience (bhoga) is a manifestation of the experiencers awareness
tinged by the object of experiencein the object of experience (i.e. the
20
See e.g. Bhogakrik 99cd: akarttvbhyupagame bhoktabdo nirarthaka, If it is accepted

that the self is not an agent then the word consumer is meaningless. Aghoraiva comments: bhogasypi kriytvd bhokttvenaiva pusa karttva siddhyati, Because consuming too is an action, the
selfs status as an agent is established just through its being a consumer. The idea was so important
that Sadyojyotis repeats it with different wording at Tattvasagraha 16: vyartha bhoktrabhidhna vyartha ca tata pradhnacarita va | nari karttvavihne na ca bhoga ihprayojake da ||
21
We are fortunate to have Sadyojyotis Bhogakrik, where he discusses the relationship between
the categories of the bhokt, bhoga and the bhogya in depth. See especially Boccio (2002).
22
Refutation of the Skhya view of bhoga in Bhogakrik (75cd): bhogye bhoga prabho chy yath candramaso jale.
23
Sukha, happiness is a standard example for an internal object of cognition, while nla, a blue
thing, is a standard example of an external object of cognition.
208

buddhi).24
Aghoraiva expands this to mean that the experiencer (bhokt) here intends the
self functioning as a synthesizer (anusadht) of cognitive events. It manifests
an awareness that is tinged by the intellect that has itself ascertained the object of
cognition as pleasurable etc. This awareness takes the form: I am experiencing
pleasure etc.25 Such composite experiences are qualia (bhoga) for the Saiddhntikas.26
The manas or citta has a dual role, because it functions as the instigator (pravttikraka) or controller (adhiht) of the external senses27 and simultaneously is
also responsible for the internal function of attention (sakalpa).28 Since, for the
Saiddhntikas, attention is both an action and a cognition that is ever-present in the
self,29 it must be different from the products of the intellect and the personalization,
because these, being merely forms of grasping, namely of the grasped (grhya) in
the case of the intellect, and of the grasper (grhaka) in the case of personalization
respectively, are both purely cognitive (pratyaya).30
The functioning of personalization results in effort (sarambha), the intellect
achieves determination (adhyavasya) of a cognised object, and experiencerhood
is the defilement of individuation (avamala), which takes the form of mistakenly
believing non-self to be self.31 As is evident, much of this has direct antecedents
in the Skhya system, Sadyojyotis major departure (besides minor ones, such as
counting the three guas as tattvas) comes with the incorporation of the aiva five
cuirasses (kacuka) as enablers of the selfs cognition.
The Yuktidpik, to the contrary, suggests that the self must be a non-agent because it lacks the property of being productive (aprasavadharmitvt),32 which, con24
Tattvasagraha of Sadyojyotis 15: buddhir viaykr sukhdirp samsato bhogyam | bhogye bhogo bhoktu cidvyaktir bhogyanirbhs ||
25
Aghoraiva ad loc: tata ca bhoktur anusandhtu puruasya, bhogye buddhykhye sukhdyadhyavasyarpe, sukhy aha dukhy aham iti bhogyanirbhs bhogyoparakt cidvyakti savidudbhava sa bhogo mantavya.
26
See Boccio 1415 for a discussion of Bhogakrik 64cd65ab where Sadyojotis distinguishes
two types of bhogya.
27
Mgendratantra VP 12.9.
28
Cf. Matagapramevara VP 13.812.
29
For the aivasiddhnta caitanya is considered to comprise both action and cognition. See Mgendratantra VP 2.5ab: caitanya dkkriyrpa tad asty tmani sarvad |, similarly Bhogakrik of Sadyojyotis 130cd: dkkriye sarvaviaye sarvagatvd aor mate ||.
30
Laghuk to the Tattvasagraha of Sadyojyotis 8bcd: tatrecchabdena sakalpkhyam (My,
sakalpkhyam avadhna Ped Filliozat) ekgratparaparyyam ucyate | tac ca dkkriytmakatvd buddhyahakrakryd grhyagrahakaparmarstmano bhinna, tayo pratyayarpatvd |
ato yasyaitat krya tan mana iti manasiddhi.
31
Laghuk to Tattvasagraha 12ab: bhokttvena pustvamalenntmdv tmbhimnarpea
32
The compound prasavadharmin, a karmadhraya with the suffix -in, is here a iaprayoga
usage in place of the expected bahuvrhi prasavadharman. Bhattacharya (1993:205, and fn. 15)
has shown that already Vcaspati saw fit to explain this apparent solecism by arguing that the suffix is
meant to convey constant production (nityayogam), a meaning which could not be derived from the
209
versely, is the hallmark of matter.33 The property of being productive intends for
the Skhya specifically motility and transformation, both of which cannot be detected in the self.34 Agency lies not with the self but with the evolutes of primal matter. varaka does, however, admit that his non-agent self is an experiencer, or bhokt, when he advances the existence of experiencerhood as a proof for
the existence of a self. Since both manifest (vyakta) and unmanifest matter (avyakta) are insentient it is impossible that they could experience each other. Therefore, once we have identified matter as a thing to be experienced, we can establish that a correlated sentient experiencer of it must also exist, and this can only
be the conscious self.35 Evidently, the Skhya conception of experiencerhood
differs considerably from that of the aivas.
The non-dualist aivas manipulate these categories into a quite different set of
assumptions. Kemarja explains that experiencerhood arises from the defilement
of individuation, which is regularly interpreted as that form of ignorance that leads
to the mistaken belief that one is incomplete (apramanyat),36 as follows:
Svacchandatantroddyota ad 4.127cd (1 fol. 83v ): arrea yat kta
arrair yad arjita kicit tatraiva y viayatvensakti kicin me
syd ity abhivagas tad etan malakryam apramanyattmakavamalotthpita bhokttvam |
The state of being an experiencer (bhokttva) is a product of defilement
(mala), that is to say, it arises from the limitation of individuation (avamala), which has as its nature the belief that one is incomplete
a limited attachment to whatever is produced by ones body, or to whatever is accumulated by ones body, as objects of enjoymentthat takes
the form of the hankering: May I have a little bit!
bahuvrhi compound alone. The Yuktidpik (p. 180) is content to simply explains it as a possessive:
prasavrtho dharma, prasavadharma so systi (cf. P. 4.3.120) iti prasavadharm.
33
Yuktidpik p. 180: akartbhvo prasavadharmitvt |
34
Yuktidpik p. 180: ka punar asau prasavrtho dharma ity ucyate | praspandanaparimau |
nikriyatvd akarteti yvat tad idam aprasavadharmitvd akarteti |
35
Yuktidpik: puruo sti bhoktbhvt ||17c|| iha sukhadukhamohtmakatvd acetana vyaktam avyakta ca | tasmd asya parasparea bhogo nopapadyate ity avaya bhoktr bhavitavyam
| yo sau bhokt sa purua |. The Mharavtti adds an example invoking the consumption of food
as a parallel. iha madhurmlatiktalavaakaukay a ras | etai abh rasair yukta bhojana dv bhokt sdhyate | asti bhokt yasyeda bhojanam | evam ida vyaktvyakta dv sdhaymo 'sty asau paramtm puruo yasyeda bhoktur vyaktvyakta bhogyam iti | There are,
in this world, six flavours: sweet, sour, bitter, salty, pungent, and astringent. When one sees food
prepared with these flavours, the existence of a consumer can be established. In the same way, when
we see manifest and unmanifest matter we can establish that there exists a self, the Purua, for whom,
as an experiencer, this manifest and unmanifest matter is the thing to be experienced. The same
example is also given in Gauapdas Bhya.
36
Non-dualist commentators use a standardised set of expansions for the three defilements (see e.g.
NeTUdd 16.56): [1.] ava = apramanyat, erroneous belief that one is incomplete, [2.] krma
= ubhubhdisaskra, positive and negative karmic latencies, [3.] myya = bhinnavedyaprath,
manifestation of differentiated objects of cognition.
210
As such, it is not an ultimately existing reality, but an entity that is synthesized

in Bhairavaor non-dual consciousness, an event that incidentally is not considered in any way to impair or alter the fact that he remains the totality.37
This agentive experiencer then enjoys or suffers experience (bhoga), that is, the
fruits of karmic retribution (vipka). Karma, for Abhinavagupta, depends on an
agent because it is an action. It can be considered a product of the aforementioned
defilement only metaphorically:
Tal 9.98cd100ab (K1 fol. 65v , K2 fol. 367v 368r , B1 fol. 237v , K4
fol. 98rv ):
ki ca karmpi na mald yata karma kriytmakam ||
kriy ca karttrpt svtantryn na punar malt |
y tv asya karmaa citraphaladatvena karmat ||
prasiddh s na sakoca vintmani mala ca sa |
5 karmat ] KedK1K2B1, karmat K4
Moreover, karma itself does not evolve from defilement, because karma
is essentially action, and action arises from autonomy that consists
of agency, but not defilement [which is neither an agent nor independent].38 Karmas [essential] nature of being activity, which is generally acknowledged to be the production of differentiated effects,39 is
not possible in the self without contraction, and that [contraction] is
defilement ([ava]mala).
This introduces the important concept of contraction (sakoca),40 which characterizes the relationship between the supreme self, Bhairava, and the limited self.41
The limited self is a contraction of the plenary powers of Bhairava.42
37
Mlinvijayavrttika 1.745cd46ab: abhinno bhagavn ea bhairavo bhogyabhokttm || tmany evnusandhya sarvad pravigraha, This undivided Lord Bhairava, cognitively synthesizing
in himself the state of being an experiencer of objects of experience, is always endowed with a plenary
body.
38
Jayaratha ad loc: mald ity akartttmaksvtantryarpd ity artha.
39
Taking citraphaladatvena as a predicative instrumental rather than as a causal instrumental.
40
varapratyabhijvimarin 3.2.5: tatra svarpasya nimlana sakoca, There contraction
is a veiling of the own-form.
41
Tantrlokaviveka 1.5 : bhedapradhna tattadanantbhsasabhinna sakucittmarpa
naratvam, Individuality, which is determined by differentiation, which is interpenetrated with infinite appearances, and is a contraction of the self
42
Tantrloka 13.213: ajnarpat pusi bodha sakocite hdi | sakoce vinivtte tu svasvabhva prakate || When the heart is contracted, the souls knowledge is ignorance, but when
contraction ceases, its own nature shines forth. Jayaratha ad loc: iha hdi srabhte vimartmani rpe sakocite gubhvam pdite ya pusi parimittmany aprkhytirpo bodha saivjnarpat tena sahaikatvam ity artha. For Abhinavaguptas views on these kinds of erroneous
cognitions see Nemec 2011b: 250ff.
211
Because the contraction of Bhairava into the limited self is brought about by the
defilement of individuation (avamala), Abhinavagupta admits that, defilement,
as an enabling factor, might, in a transferred or figurative sense (upacra) be said
to cause karma.
.
ava
.
Bhairava
.
sakoca
au
.
.
bhoga
krma
.
bhokt
.
.
Figure 1: Contraction and the malas
The contracted agentive experiencer imagines that karmic fruition, either positive, negative, or delusional, is experience, and thereby he exists in various forms
such as gods, or humans etc.
Tal 9.100cd101ab (K1 fol. 65v , K2 fol. 367v368r , B1 fol. 237v , K4

fol. 98v ) with avataraik: tena sakoca vinsya na tattatphaladne smarthya | sakoca eva mala ity asya tatkraatvam upacarita,
sakucito hi bhokt ubhubhdytmaka bhinna sat phalam tmani bhogyatvenbhimanute yena devamanuydivicitrarpataysyvasthnam |
vicitra hi phala bhinna bhogyatvenbhimanyate ||
bhoktary tmani teneya bhedarp vyavasthiti |
2 vinsya na ] KedK4, vinn sya B1 2 tattat ] KedK4, tat B1 3 eva ] Ked,
eva ca K4 3 ity asya ] Ked, iti yasya B1, iti asya K4 4 sat phalam ] KedK4,
saphalam B1 6 syvasthnam ] Ked, vasthna tad ha B1K4
Therefore, without contraction [of the self], it (karma) has no capacity to produce differentiated effects. Defilement is none other than contraction, therefore its causality towards it (karma) is [intended] in a
figurative sense, for the contracted experiencer (bhokt) misconstrues
(abhi-man) the fruitiongiven as differentiated, and as good and bad
etc., to be an experience in himself, whereby he exists in various
forms such as gods, humans etc. For the diverse fruit, differentiated,
is misconstrued to be what is experienceable (bhogyatvena) in the experiencer who is [misconstrued to be] the self. From this derives this differentiated existence.
This very specific aiva understanding of the term bhokt as a direct agentive experiencer, that is to say, as an actual and immediate experiencer of karmic retribu-
212
tion, must therefore be distinguished from that of other schools of thought. This becomes evident if we contrast it with the more familiar notion that the self might be
an experiencer only indirectly, apparently, or metaphorically. Several varieties of
this view are expressed in the surviving works of the Skhya system and in presentations and refutations by opponents. In the most common version of this doctrine, the Skhya is at pains to deny that the selfs status of being an experiencer implies that the purua has undergone a transformation. Instead, it consists merely of the kind of experience one has when witnessing a reflection arising in a mirror (pratibimbodaya). This theory has been discussed in most detail in
Asano (1991).43
Even though the aiva Mantramrga44 has a long and complex history of assimilating, adapting and criticising the tenets of the Skhya, the details of which remain to be uncovered,45 we should not, in the present case, assume a direct influence from the Skhya without further evidence. This is because, as we have seen,
bhokttva is a topic already in the Pupata Atimrga precursor to the Mantramrga, and from the Pacrthabhya of Kauiya we can trace it back even further into the vetvatara and the Kaha Upaniads etc.46 The idea that the individual is an experiencer or enjoyer thus predates the Mantramrga by a considerable amount of time. The triad of the experiencer-experience-experienced (bhokt
bhoga-bhogya), too, that is common in the Mantramrga, occurs already in the Vkyapadya of the grammarian-philosopher Bharthari, another work that was influential in the formative period of non-dualist aiva doctrine. Since, however, it
is there found in the opening section, where Bharthari is comparing his conception of Brahman with the ultimate stages of other schools of thought without explicitly identifying them, it is not certain whether he is here alluding to the aitantra of Vragaa (ca. 300),47 or perhaps even to the Pupatas, or some other
group.48 It is therefore possible that some Skhya-like ideas are derived from
43
See also Saito (2011), Qvarnstrm (2012).

See most recently Watson, Goodall & Sarma (2013).
45
One of the most interesting ideas so far is that of Torella (1999), who proposes that we should
consider two different kinds of Skhya, one of them a *smnyastra. He concludes: One is
a relatively coherent complex of doctrines and beliefs which has become, subliminally as it were,
an integral part of Indian tradition, impelled by its intrinsic power and prestige deriving above all
from its being the first bold and consistent systemization of the scattered patrimony of upaniadic
speculations. The other is the Skhya as a darana trying to put in order or develop, in some way or
other, these doctrines, which are perceived as a timeless legacy even by those that are not their direct
upholders.
46
Cf. Kahopaniad 3.4, the parable of the chariot: 4. The senses (indriya), they say, are the
horses; / The objects of sense, what they range over. / The self combined with senses and mind /
Wise men call the enjoyer (bhokt). (transl. Hume 1921), and especially the vetvataropaniad
1.812.
47
Note that Mharavtti to Skhyakrik 73 states that the stra on which the Skhyakrik
of varaka is based, by which it means the aitantra, discussed the categories of the agent, the
experiencer, the experienced, and liberation: kart bhokt bhojya moka ctra cintyate.
48
Vkyapadya 1.4, ed. and transl. W. Rau (1977), ekasya sarvabjasya yasya ceyam anekadh | bhoktbhoktavyarpea bhogarpea ca sthiti ||, [Ohne Anfang und ohne Ende ist das
44
213
other schools of thought that have their own complex history of assimilating Skhya thought.
An immediate question arises. Where is it that this agentive experiencer enjoys
or suffers his experiences? To answer this we need to consider the non-dualist aivas systematisation of their scripturally inherited range of ontologies.
3 The Tattvakrama as an Artificial Causal Chain

The self proposed by the Trika finds itself located in and against an ontology of
six paths (aadhvan), only one of which is important for us here: the path of
the tattvas. The lower reaches of the aiva tattvakrama, or the hierarchy of the
principles or reality levels, appear to be an inheritance from the mature hierarchy of
principles of earlier Skhya thinkers. We thus find the individual soul, purua, the
highest principle of the Skhya, distiguished from prakti, matter, and the twentythree tattvas that evolve from it arranged beneath it just as in the Skhya schema.
These are the three mental facultiesthe intellect (buddhi), personalization (ahakra), and reflection (manas)49 the five faculties of sense perception (buddhndriya), the five faculties of action (karmendriya), the five sensory media (tanmtra),
and the five gross elements (mahbhta). For the non-dualist exegetes of the aiva
Mantramrga, this individual soul (purua), even if isolated from matter or praktithe goal of the Skhya systemis not yet liberated: they do not seek selfrealization, but rather god-realization, since only iva exists.
To these twenty-five were superadded the five kacukas, cuirasses, that inhibit
the individual soul: [1.] limitation by time (kla), [2.] binding fate (niyati), [3.]
limited power to act (kal), [4.] limited power of knowledge (vidy),50 [5.] limited
passion (rga). Above them is found primal matter (my). This reality level,
together with all of the principles below it, constitute the black (asita), or impure
(auddha), universe (adhvan, lit. path). Above this black universe is the white (sita), or pure (uddha), universe with five tattvas: ivatattva, aktitattva, sadivatattva, varatattva and uddhavidytattva, adding up to the commonly encountered
list of thirty-six tattvas. But what exactly is a tattva for the thinkers of the Trika?
In his Tantrloka Abhinavagupta cites a definition from a dualist Saiddhntika
work, the Matagapramevara, with approval.51 According to his interpretation, a
Brahman,] und wessen Dasein als des Einen, das aller Dinge Samen enthlt, hier vielfltig unter
der Gestalt von Genieer, zu Genieendem, und unter der Gestalt des Genusses auftritt,. With the
notion of the Bhartharis Brahman as the holder of all seeds (sarvabjasya: comms. aktyupagrhyasya, bhinnaaktipracitasya compare the Yogcra bja-theory, where the layavijna is said to
be sarvabjaka, see Kragh (2006:18, 304).
49
For these translations see Watson (2006:62).
50
Sometimes also labelled as auddhavidy, impure knowledge, to distinguish it from the higher
uddhavidy, pure knowledge.
51
Abhinavagupta has decided to endorse the view of the Matagapramevara presumably not just
because it accorded with his doctrinal agenda, but also because it was influential among his Saiddhntika co-religionists. The scriptural layer of the aiva Mantramrga does not present an unanimous
214
tattva is that which is recurrent (anugmin) in all of the members of its class.52 A
tattva is therefore comparable to an universal, or a common property (smnya).53
aiva scriptures arrange these tattvas into hierarchical lists: lower tattvas are
said to be evolutes of higher tattvas. This evolution is explained as causation, the
relationship between the tattvas in this hierarchical model is therefore one of cause
and effect (kryakraabhva): lower tattvas are caused by higher tattvas, resulting
in a fixed order of creative progression (si). In view of the complex history
of the rivalling streams of aiva revelation, such a claim to a firmly established
order is beset with problems.54 For Abhinavagupta this relationship is first of all
affirmed by the scriptural authority of the Siddhayogevarmata55 , the immediate
precursor of the Mlinvijayottara, the root scripture his Tantrloka is based on.56
This causation is however merely artificial (kalpita). From a strict savidadvaya non-dualist point of view, iva is the only existing cause and agent, and Abhinavagupta therefore distinguishes the causal relationship into two types: an absolute
causal relation (pramrthika) and an artificial one (kalpita, sa).57 Absolute,
or non-artificial causation is established by arguing that true agency (karttva) can
only be grounded in autonomy (svtantrya).
Tal 9.8 (B1 fol. 224rv . K4 exp. 4, 6):
vastuta sarvabhvn kartena para iva |
asvatantrasya karttva na hi jtpapadyate ||
In reality, the agent of all phenomena is supreme iva, who is capable
of acting (na),58 for agency is completely impossible for someone
view of what a tattva is. For the exegetical traditions of the Trika that are of concern here, the situation
is clearer: the tattvakrama is quite simply one of the six ontological paths.
52
Tantrloka 10.2ab (B1 fol. 268v ): em [em. Sanderson; te KedB1 ] am tattvn
svavargev anugminm |.
53
For a more detailed discussion of the various definitions of the aiva tattvas see Vasudeva
(2004:189191). This understanding is also found in the varapratyabhij system, e.g. varapratyabhijvimarin 3.1.2 p. 192: bhinnn vargn vargkaraanimitta yad ekam avibhakta
bhti tat tattva, yath girivkapuraprabhtn nadsarasgardn ca pthivrpatvam abrpatva ceti, That which is the efficient cause for the [conscious subjects] collectivisation of distinct
groups, [that which] appears as one, undivided, that is [defined as] tattva. As for example Earth and
Water [respectively in the case] of mountains, trees, cities etc. and rivers, ponds and oceans.
54
This relationship is argued for in Tal 9.7ff.(B1 fol. 223v ) Jayaratha introduces the section with
kryakraabhvtm tattvn pravibhgo vaktavya[], The demarcation of the tattvas, which
is based on the relationship of cause and effect, must be stated.
55
See Trszk (1999).
56
Tantrloka 9.7 (B1 fol. 223v ): tatrai (tatrai ] Ked, tatrai B1) daryate da siddha
(siddha ] Ked, siddh[e] B1)yogvarmate | kryakraabhvo ya ivecchparikalpita ||, In this
context is taught the relation of cause and effect, created by ivas volition, of these [tattvas], as it is
seen in the Siddhayogevarmata.
57
Tantrasra 8.34: tatrai tattvn kryakraabhvo daryate sa ca dvividha: pramrthika sa ca. The Tantrasra is a concise summary of his longer Tantrloka.
58
For this sense of na see Mlinvijayvrttika 1. 173cd174ab: kriyakte sphua sphro
mytva pratipadyate || mytattvasvarpe hi iventi vakyate. See Sanderson (1992:300ff.)
for a discussion of this term.
215
who is not autonomous.

This draws on the grammarian Pinis definition59 of the independent (svatantra) factor of action (kraka) as the agent (kart). This autonomy, moreover, is an
exclusive property of iva who consists entirely of consciousness. It would be contradictory to claim that something could be autonomous and at the same time unconscious.60 Without agency, Abhinavagupta claims, there can be no causality.61
These claims are defended against a Buddhist causal theory that draws on the Buddhist akaranandanas Dharmlakra.
Another important claim also derives from the Trikas non-dualism. The autonomous agent iva, as the only reality existing at the level of absolute causation, must also himself be the manifestation of the hierarchy of tattvas.
Tantrasra 8.34: tatra pramrthika etvn kryakraabhvo yad
uta kartsvabhvasya svatantrasya bhagavata evavidhena ivdidharntena vapu svarpabhinnena svarpavirntena ca prathanam |
Among those [two types of causation] the absolute causal relation is
such that it is a manifestation (prathanam) of the autonomous Lord,
whose intrinsic nature is agency (karttva), with such a body [in the
form of the tattvas] beginning with [the principles of] iva and ending
with Earth, [a body that is] different from his own form, but that rests
in his true form.
We may summarize the situation that the ordinary, transmigrating self, also
known as the sakala, finds itself in as follows. Believing himself to be an agent,
bound by the three defilements (mala) that are forms of foundational ignorance
about the selfs true status, consuming karmic retribution as an experiencer (bhokt), the self perceives, as a pramt, the twentyfour lower constituents of the hierarchical ontology of the tattvas from earth upto primal matter (prakti).62 This
limited self, or purua, moreover, is constituted by the twentyfifth tattva when it
is enveloped and inhibited by the next five tattvas, the cuirasses (kacuka) mentioned above. The order in which these come into existence is subject to disagreement in the revealed Tantras Abhinavagupta and his followers accept as authoritative. As a consequence, since Abhinavagupta insists that the divinely revealed scriptures must all be literally true, he heuristically gives up on causation as an absolutely stable or invariable phenomenon. The Trika can therefore be said to adhere
59
Adhyy 1.4.54: svatantra kart.

Tal 9.9, B1 335r , K4 exp. 6: svatantrat ca cinmtravapua parameitu | svatantra ca jaa ceti tad anyonya (anyonya ] KedK4, anyonya{ca} B1) virudhyate || Jayaratha comments:
svtantrya hi svaprakatvam ucyate jya ca paraprakyatvam ucyate na cnayos tdtmya
sasargo v bhaved ity ukta tad anyonya virudhyata iti |
61
Tal 9.10cd, B1 335r , K4 exp. 6: na karttvd te cnyat kraatva hi labhyate ||, Apart
from agency no other kind of causality can be obtained.
62
See Vasudeva (2004:192196).
60
216
to a doctrine of indeterminate cause, *aniyatahetuvda. This means that the different sequences of evolution can all be equally true. Kemarja justifies this breakdown of causality by appealing to the inherent relation of experiencer and experienced (bhokt-bhogya) that subsists between the self and the world.63
Svacchandatantroddyota 11.63cd64ab kacukapacakavalit pumso bhoktro bhogyasmnyarp ca praktir yugapad eva myta sambht bhoktbhogyayo parasparpekitvd ato tra kaldn yugapad eva tasmd iti mytattvd udbhava ukta.
Souls enveloped by the pentad of cuirasses become experiencers, and,
at the very same moment, primal matter, in the form of a generic thing
to be experienced, arises from My, because an experiencer and a
thing to be experienced mutually presuppose each other. Therefore it
is stated [in this Tantra, that the cuirasses] headed by kal arise simultaneously from My.
Some selves engage in limited knowing while being tinged by limited desire (rajyan vetti), others are tinged by limited desire while they engage in limited knowing (vidan rajyati), and as a consequence they imagine the hierarchical position of
these two cuirasses to be different.64
Limited selves can, moreover, perceive each others bodies and intuit, but not
perceive, each others sentiency. That is not to say that the limited sakala soul
cannot be perceived (as an object). It can, but not by another sakala. Instead, it
can be perceived by a different kind of perceiver, the pralaykala, who in turn is
perceptible as an object to the vijnkala, and so on to a depth of seven grades.
This constitutes the sevenfold apperceptive pramtbheda phenomenology of the
Trika that is present in every simple cognition.
4 The Experiencer as Perceiver

The aiva agentive experiencer is not helplessly stuck in this hierarchical tattvakrama by his subjection to karma. He can actively ascend, either by having his past and
future karmic fruition destroyed by aiva mantras in the ritual of initiation (dk),
or by practising the conquest of the reality levels (tattvajaya) to master these tattvas,
one by one, employing the techniques of aiva aagayoga.65 Different views on
what this ascent means can be found in the various aiva scriptures. For Abhinavagupta, following the homologies set out in the vypti section of the Mlinvijayottaratantra, the relative hierarchical position of the agentive experiencer vis-vis the tattvakrama is determined by the class of object he can perceive, and, in
turn, it determines the type of perceiver he is.
63
For this relation see especially Spandakrik 29 with the Vivti commentary.
Svacchandatantroddyota 11.63cd64ab: ka cid rajyan vetti kacic ca vidan rajyattydi
pus vicitraprattikramnusr kacukakramo nyathnyath ca sambhvyate.
65
For more detailed account see Vasudeva (2004:145ff.)
64
217
The innovation of a phenomenological perspective reorients the Trikas contemplative or yogic ascent; the lengthy and time-consuming surmounting of levels taught in the dualist aivasiddhnta is rejected as an inferior path. Instead of insisting on a gradual ascent along the hierarchy of the tattvas that requires the yogin to master each level in turn through introsusception (sampatti) and then transcend it with yogic judgment (tarka)the most important ancillary (aga) of aiva
yoga,the Mlinvijayottara teaches an oblique trajectory through a fifteenfold refraction of reality by seven levels of hierarchically stacked, subjective perceivers
(pramt). The seven progressively less pure types of apperceptive perceivers (saptapramt) are [1.] iva, [2.] mantramahevara, the sovereigns of mantra lords
[3.] mantrevara, the mantra lords, [4.] mantra, [5.] vijnkala, those freed from
limitation by [remaining only as] consciousness, [6.] pralaykala, those freed from
limitation by dissolution, [7.] sakala, the limited perceiver.66 Each one of these
forms of witnessing awareness possesses a faculty, a akti, that when active functions as the instrument with which the perceiver is capable of perception. Every perceiver acts as a transcendental subject of the objectivised level immediately below his own. If we add to these fourteen factors (i.e. seven cognisers and seven cognitive powers) also the purely objective level at which things can exist in their ownform (svarpa), we arrive at fifteen refractions (pacadaabheda) that are present in
every ordinary cognition. In Abhinavaguptas non-dualism of consciousness the inert own form must also be a form of consciousness. It differs from the sakala experiencers because they possess a much greater degree of self-awareness, something lacking at the level of the quasi-inert own-form, but even this most extrinsic object must be minimally self-aware.67
If a sakala manages, through yogic or gnostic efforts, to apperceive the self
which is perceiving an external thing, he thereby ascends to become the next type
of perceiver, the pralaykala. If such a perceiver is in turn made into an object of
apperception, then the next level of being a vijnkala is attained. This process
continues, in a reductive series, to the extent of seven apperceivers. At each stage
there is only ever one triad of perceiver, perception, and perceived, since the lower
perceivers are folded into the own-form, becoming in turn the next thing perceived.
The energies of these seven perceivers are explained as a gradual diminishing
and eventual falling away of the limited power of action (kal) and the limited
power of knowing ([auddha]vidy), which are two of the cuirasses (kacuka) that
hinder the soul, and their gradual replacement with uddhavidy, pure knowledge.68
What relation do these types of perceiverhood bear to the selfs enjoyerhood?
To explain this, aiva exegetes base themselves on the scriptural teaching that
the selfs experience (bhoga) is a type of knowing,69 an idea that is not in origin
66
Mlinvijayottara 1.14c17b.
Tal 10.9cd12ab.
68
Tal 4.34cd (omitted B1 fol. 84v , om.B2 fol. 37v ): sattarka uddhavidyaiva s cecch parameitu, Correct judgement (sattarka) is pure knowledge, and that is the volitional power of God.
69
Paukarapramevara JP 4.132c: yato jntmako bhogo; Svyambhuvastrasagraha 1.12:
bhogo sya vedan pusa sukhadukhdilaka | t samarthitacaitanya pumn abhyeti karma67
1.
2.
perceiver
instrument of perception
delement
experiencer
(pramt)
(pramtakti)
(mala)
(bhokttva)
Sakala
vidy (limited knowing)
ava, krma,
vipkabhokt
vivid, stable,
waking
[:earth prakti]
kal (limited power of action)
myya
& viayabhokt
& continuous
(jgrat)
Pralaykala
vidy and kal indistinct
ava, krma
bhogayogyat
not vivid, unstable
dreaming
& discontinuous
(svapna)
totally insensate
deep sleep
[:mytattva]
3.
Vijnkala
vidy and kal fading
ava
bhogayogyat
4.
5.
6.
7.
(suupti)
Mantra
uddhavidy emergent,
[:uddhavidytattva]
Vidy and kal latent
(/ adhikra)
Mantrea
uddhavidy emerged, latency
[:varatattva]
of vidy and kal latent
Mantramahea
uddhavidy emerged, latency
[:sadivatattva]
of vidy and kal absent
iva
icchakti, volitional power
[:ivatattva]
lucidity of
experience
[:mahmytattva]
(/ adhikra)
(/ adhikra)
sphuabheda,
discontinuation
fourth state
prarhabheda
of separation
(turya)
sphuabheda,
discontinuation
fourth state
aprarhabheda
of separation
(turya)
asphuabheda,
discontinuation
fourth state
aprarhabheda
of separation
(turya)
universal
identical
beyond the fourth
vivabhokt
with iva
(turytta)
Table 2: The pramtbheda

218
experience
219
exclusive to aivism.70 Already the earliest dualist aivas must therefore defend
the claim that the status of being an experiencer (bhokttva) is essentially the same
as the status of being a knower (jttva).71 It follows that all of the types of perceivers, merely by virtue of their being knowers, can also be accepted as experiencers. This raises two questions. Firstly, what is the nature of the experience
that the various perceivers are subject to? Secondly, the pralaykalas and the vijnkalas are by definition unaware of external objects. How can they be admitted as experiencers, since they do not even seem to be proper perceivers in the first
place?
The sakala perceiver, bound by all three defilements, can unquestioningly be
accepted as a consumer of karmic retribution. For non-dualist Trika theorists his
bhokttva can be considered real to the extent that the individual, limited self (au)
is itself real. The reality of the individual self is merely a contraction of the singular,
universal self that is Bhairava. This universal self is therefore the only absolutely
real experiencer of the hierarchy of the reality levels that constitute the universe
as the bhogya which is itself an embodiment of Bhairava.72 Bhairava, however,
evidently cannot be the experiencer of the three defilements (mala), since these are
not tattvas but merely forms of ignorance specific to the limited self. The sakala
perceivers bhokttva is dependent on the fuctioning of the defilement of karma
(krmamala), he can rise to the status of being a perceiver beyond the level of
the pralaykala only once he has been freed from it. To guarantee that ordinary
aiva initiates, who practise neither yoga nor gnosis, will be liberated after death,
this karmic defilement needs to be destroyed. In the ritual of aiva initiation a
relinquishing of the state of being a bhokt in all future births and on all levels of
the universe is therefore effected by an intervention called the disjunction (vilea).73
ta ||
70
The Yogastra 3.35 teaches similarly that bhoga is the non-discernment of sattva and purua.
71
See also, e.g., Narevaraparkpraka of Rmakaha 5: bhokttva hi jttvam ucyate tad
eva ca pramrthikam tmano rpa
72
Svacchandatantroddyota 4.96ab (Note here the intertextuality with ivopdhyyas commentary
to the Vijnabhairava 56): eva caikaiko pi pramt bhvo v vastuta aadhvasphrarpaprameaaktimaydihntaparmarasrhatvirntisatattva parabhairavarpa eva, In this way,
each and every perceiver or thing is in reality only supreme Bhairava, whose nature is repose in Iness which is the essence of the parmara of the syllabary beginning with a and ending with ha
which itself is constituted by the power of the supreme Lord who has extended himself into the six
[ontological] paths. Here the expression dihnta (a+di+ha+anta), lit. the phonemes from a to
ha, is here a variation on diknta, the phonemes from a to ka, and designates mtk, cf.
Svacchandatantroddyota 1.31cd: mtk pan ajt (em. ajn Ped) vivamtara sarvamantratantrajananm dikntm iti. On mtk as the unkown mother see Vasudeva (2004:l
lii). See also Paramrthasra 5: tatrntar vivam ida vicitratanukaraabhuvanasantnam | bhokt ca tatra deh iva eva ghtapaubhva ||
73
For a concise account see NeTaUdd 4.5cd6ab, see especially: sampteu bhogeu bhokttvbhvarpa vilekhya saskra ktv. See also Siddhntasrapaddhati (ed. Sanderson)
A fol. 23r225v3, B fol. 31v3--34v2: bhogbhve mypd bahirnikramaarpa vilea sabhvya
220
Since iva, as the highest experiencer, lacks the defilement that renders the
individual subject to karmic retribution, we cannot consider him to be an enjoyer
of this kind. Nevertheless, he is accorded the attribute bhokt both in early scriptural
sources, e.g. in the Svyambhuvastrasagraha,74 and in early exegesis, e.g. in the
ivastra,75 or in the Spandakrik.76 The Saiddhntika author Aghoraiva, when
commenting on such a scriptural passage, avoids potential doctrinal incoherence
by glossing bhokt as a synonym for protector (rakaka) in these contexts. This
interpretation is based on one of the two possible meanings of the root bhuj given
at Dhtupha 7.17: bhuja planbhyavahrayo.77 Elsewhere he cites the Parkhyatantra which states that ivas enjoyerhood is merely a figurative usage.78 The
Parkhyatantra, however, does not belong to the earliest phase of the aivasiddhnta, and earlier commentators of this tradition do not recourse to this justification.
Non-dualist authors, on the other hand, are not compelled to adopt this strategy. In their metaphysics, the whole of existence can be explained as the bodily selfexperience of iva who is simultaneously both the embodied universe and also its
experiencer. In the Svacchandatantra as interpreted by Kemarja, for example,
ivas bipolar manifestation is inscribed iconographically in a visualisation of Umpati who represents both the universe as the object of enjoyment, and who is simultaneously also the enjoyer of the universe. The left half of his body is the enjoyed (for vma also means agreeable, Kemarja: aeabhogyopabhogtmatay vmam ardham) and the right side of his body is the enjoyer.79
In this way both the lowest sakala perceiver and the highest iva perceiver can
both be considered experiencers, albeit of different kinds. But what about the other
perceivers, most of which also exist beyond the defilement of krmamala but lack
the universality of iva?
Since, as we have seen, the aivas claim that experiencers are knowers, it is
74
Svyambhuvastrasagraha 18.38: ivo dt ivo bhokt iva sarvam ida jagat | ivo yajati
sarvatra ya iva so 'ham eva tu ||
75
ivastra 1.11: tritayabhokt vrea.
76
E.g. Spandakrik 29: tena abdrthacintsu na svasth na y iva | bhoktaiva bhogyabhvena sad sarvatra sasthita || Vivti: svasth nsti y ivamay na bhavati, tata ca bhoktaiva varo bhogyabhvena itavyavasturpatay sad sarvatra sasthita.
77
Mgendrapaddhatik of Aghoraiva IFP transcript no. T 1021 p. 145: ivo bhoktaiva sarve
rakaka | bhokteti bhuji plana eva vartate.
78
Parkhyatantra 2.99ab: adhikr sa bhog ca lay syd upacrata. See e.g. Aghoraiva ad Ratnatrayapark 30: tasya cdhikrdayo vasth aupacrik ity uktamadhikr sa bhog ca lay syd upacrata iti |
79
2
4
Svacchandatantroddyota 10.1009ab (be 237v , 1 309r ): tasya ca bhagavato vivabhoktu

bhogasthna samasta vai tatrastha vmabhgata | vmabhgato vma dehrdham
ritya tatraiva sthita samasta bhogasthnam aeabhogyopabhogtmatay vmam ardham, dakia tu bhoktrpam evrdham | eva ca bhoktbhogtmakavivaarro ya bhagavn ata eva sahasrabhucaradirpa ||
2 samasta ] Ked, samaste be1 2 vma ] Ked1, vma be 4 bhoktrpam ] Kedbe,

bhoktrpm 1 4 evrdham ] conj., eva Ked, evrtham be1 4 bhogtmaka ] Ked1,
bhogtma be
221
evident that the higher perceivers must also enjoy some kind of experience. Abhinavagupta therefore discusses its nature several times. In the context of elaborating
the phases of lucidity, he proposes that the hierarchical position of the perceivers is
linked to the clarity and vividness of their experience:
When, for an [ordinary sakala] experiencer [1.] the form is vivid, stable and continuous, that is the waking state, for that same experiencer
[2.] its opposite is dreaming, which is the experience of the pralaykala, [3.] total unawareness is deep sleep, which is the experience
of the vijnkala, [4.] the process of ceasing to differentiate [oneself] from the object of experience, which is the fourth state, is the experience of the mantra etc., [5.] the experience of things as non-different
from iva is the state beyond the fourth, which is all-transcending.80
To the three perceivers in the white universe Abhinavagupta assigns the kind of
experience one has in the fourth state of lucidity (turya). More specifically, for the
Trika, these three levels of experiencerhood involve a balancing and gradual equation of subjectivity and objectivity, which when completed results in the attainment of the highest level of the ivapramt (see Vasudeva 2011:294297).
The special problem posed by the pralaykala and the vijnkala perceivers is
treated separately. As we have seen, in neither of these two phases of perceiverhood
is the self capable of directly cognising objects in the universe. The pralaykala is
still bound by krmamala and therefore potentially a bhokt of a kind comparable
to the sakala soul, but vijnkala perceivers, on the other hand, should not be
agentive experiencers of this kind, since for them this defilement is lacking.81 To
solve this problem, both of these higher perceivers are, as a pair, accorded a special
deferred status of agentive experiencers. Abhinavagupta raises this problem in the
context of a defense of the idea that the status of being a cognisable object (vedyat,
lit. to-be-known-ness) is a property of objects (bhvadharma):
2
4
6
Tantrloka[viveka] 10.132cd133ab (B1 fol. 276r , K8 exp. 54):

nanv asti vedyat bhvadharma ki tu laykalau ||
manvte neha vai kicit tadapek tv asau katham |
pralaykalavijnkalau hi prasuptabhujaganyasamdhisthayogipryatvn na kicij jnta iti tayor vedittvam eva nstty carya tadapekpi kathakra vedyat bhvadharma syt.
4 bhujaga ] KedK8, bhuja B1
apekaypi Ked
80
5 tayor ] Ked, om.B1K8
6 apekpi ] B1K8,
Tantrasra 9.51: ki ca yasya yad yad rpa sphua sthiram anubandhi taj jgrat, tasyaiva tadviparyaya svapna ya laykalasya bhoga, sarvvedana suupta yo vijnkalasya bhoga, bhogybhinnkaraa turya mantrdn, sa bhoga bhvn ivbhedas turytta sarvttam.
81
See Mlinvijayottara 1.22cd24ab.
222

Let us admit [then] that to-be-known-ness is a property of objects.
But the pralaykala and the vijnkala perceive nothing in the universe, how could it (to-be known-ness) be dependent on their perceiverhood?82 The pralaykalas and the vijnkalas are more or less
like yogins in a void-trance, they are like sleeping serpents. Because
of this they do not know anything, and as a consequence these two cannot possess perceiverhood. Therefore it is strange, that a to-be-knownness (vedyat), depending on their perceiverhood (tadapek), somehow should be a property of objects?
He responds by claiming that their experience is constituted by their bhogayogyat, or competence for experience. Yogyat literally designates a sort of suitability, congruity or propriety, and various translations are current for different contexts.83 I have translated it here in a more narrow stric sense as competence because Abhinavagupta interprets it here as a not yet activated, latent capacity, that
is, as a synonym of akti.84
The idea of bhokttva as bhogayogyat is not unique to the Trika. Goodall
(1998:262263) has shown that the dualist Saiddhntika author Rmakaha discusses two types of bhokttva: [1.] a specific form that is the state of having a
taste only for enjoyment (bhogaikarasikatva) that derives from passion (rga or
moha), and [2.] a generic type that is a fitness for experience (bhogayogyatva)
that occurs in the pralaykala.85
Abhinavaguptas understanding of yogyat can be seen already in the Vkyapadya. For Bharthari yogyat, restricted by actual utterance (abhidh = viniyoga),86
is the relation between word and meaning.87 Ogawa (1997) has demonstrated
82
Jayaratha: tad tayor vedittvam.

See, for example, Renou (1944:66): application virtuelle, conditions propres une application ; Rau 1977: Angepasstheit; Oberhammer 1991: Eignung, etc.
84
For yogyat as akti see Ogawa (1997). See also Tillemans (1997:164): Perhaps certain
Mmsaka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement between akti and yogyat.
85
Cf. Kiraatantra 3.2ab: bhokttva nma yat proktam andi malakraam| Vtti: yad etad
bhokttvam asmbhi prgukta tad andi | yato malakraam ukta tato malasynditvt tad apy
andi | etad ukta bhavatianyad evsmn mohajanitd bhokttvd bhogayogyatvalakaam etad
bhokttvam | pralaykale vidyate na tu vijnakevale karmbhvt | tasya karmavanmalo pi kraa pariatamalasya pralaykalasypi paramevarnugrhyatvn na tat sambhavati yata | (cf.
Goodall & co. (2008:372)). See also Nryaakaha commenting on Mgendratantra 8.88: yogyat
bhogayogyat tu vayakldi deaklavayovasthdyupalakitam arhatvam.
86
Cf. Vkyapadya 2.405, Ogawa (1997:508) translates as follows: kriyvyaveta sabandho da karaakarmao | abhidhniyamas tasmd abhidhnbhidheyayo ||, The relation between instrument (karaa) and object (karman) is observed to obtain through action. Therefore [the relation between] abhidhna (i.e., abda) and abhidheya (i.e., artha) is restricted through [the action of] abhidh. Rau: Man sieht, dass das Verbum mitten in der Verbindung von Werkzeug und
Objekt steht. Das Aussprechen ist daher die genauere Bestimmung von Wort und Bedeutung.
87
Vkyapadya 3.3.29: indriym svaviayev andir yogyat yath | andir arthaih sabdnm
sambandho yogyat tath || Rau: Wie die Sinnesorgane eine anfangslose Angepasstheit an ihre [jeweiligen] Sinnesobjekte besitzen, so ist die anfangslose Verbindung der Wrter mit [ihren] Bedeutungen eine Angepasstheit.
83
223
that Bhartharis conception of yogyat was originally formed in the context of

the kraka theory. A word (abhidhna = instrument relative to abhidh) and its
meaning (abhidheya = object relative to abhidh) are related to each other by the
action of abhidh (Vkyapadya 2.405). Since Bharthari takes word and meaning
as instrument and object, he also presupposes the participation of an agent, an abhidht. This role is fulfilled, as Ogawa (1997:507) notes, by the verb, since a verb
is treated as the agent (kart). The speaker, on the other hand, is responsible for the
activating utterance that orients a word towards a particular meaning, an activity
designated by terms such as praidhi and viniyoga and explained as pravakaraa, ukti, abhisadhna.
Abhinavagupta similarly considers the pralaykala and the vijnkala to possess an intrinsic relation with the object of cognition through yogyat: the objects are suited to a future cognition by the awakened pralaykala or vijnkala experiencer. What is lacking in the present moment is a cognitive activation
by the agent (kartviniyoga), that is, the experiencer is not currentlybecause of
a trance-like cognititive dormancydirecting or applying his cognitive faculty towards the object, and therefore no cognition is taking place. But just as the grammarians admit that something might function as a cause based on mere potentiality (yogyamtrat),88 so also Abhinavagupta accepts a potentiality for bhoga, actualised
only in the future, as a sufficient reason to categorise the pralaykala and the vijnkala perceivers as experiencers. For the pralaykala and the vijnkala, objective reality will, at the moment of their awakening, attain the status of being actually cognisable (prakarea vedyat ysyati), whereas currently, in their stupor, it possesses this status merely by fitness (yogyatmtrea vedyat ysyati).89
Abhinavaguptas claim is motivated only in part by his need to establish cognitive closure by exhausting the function of each type of perceiver in the Trikas pramtbheda, for it also follows from the Trikas savidadvaya view that even apparently insentient things are really conscious. There is therefore no reason to
deny that even these two beings possess at least nominally a certain kind of knowing and experiencing. Abhinavagupta attributes to them a deferred condition of
knowing and agentive experience, a condition that, although it is oriented to a future event, can affect their status in the present. All pralaykalas and the vijnkalas will at some point invariably be awakened by iva from the stupor that isolates them, they are classified as bhotsyamna-, to be awakened.90 They will
then be assigned roles as either limited sakala souls or as mantras, mantrevaras or mantramahevaras.91 This is, incidentally, their only chance for liberation, for in their isolation they are stuck, and are unable to either ascend or descend on their own. Let us consider as a final passage Abhinavaguptas argu88
See Ogawa (1997:505).

Tantrlokaviveka 10.140cd145ab: etasya laykalder etad bhvajta svabodhvasare prakarea na tv idnm iva yogyatmtrea vedyat ysyati
90
Tal 10.133cd134.
91
Tal 10.135ab.
89
224
ment that intends to make this plausible by introducing a parallel scenario that is experientially verifiable:
Tantrloka 10.140cd145ab (B1 fol. 277r , K4 fol. 11rv exp. 92, 93):
ata prabhotsyamnatve ynayor bodhayogyat || 140
tadbald vedyatyogyabhvenaivtra vedyat |
tath hi ghanidre pi priye nakitgatm || 141
m drakyatti ngeu sveu mty abhisrik |
eva ivo pi manute etasyaitatpravedyatm || 142
ysyatti sjmti tadn yogyataiva s |
vedyat tasya bhvasya bhoktt tvat ca s || 143
laykalasya citro hi bhoga kena vikalpyate |
yath yath hi savitti sa hi bhoga sphuo sphua || 144
smtiyogyo py anyath v bhogyabhva na tjjhati |
Therefore, because their status is one of beings to be awakened [from
their trance in the future], these two possess a competence for knowing.
In their case, the status of being a cognisable object is [admitted as a
property of objects as] a result of a fitness for the status of being a
cognisable object based on that [competence for knowing].92 To give
an example: A woman who is keeping a rendez-vous with her lover,
even though her lover is [still] fast asleep, can barely contain herself
[thinking]: He will see me who has arrived unexpectedly! In the
same way, iva also thinks: This will be known by him, therefore
I create [it].93 At that moment,94 the status of being cognisable is
simply fitness,95 and the experiencerhood of the object is of the same
kind,96 for who can fathom the strange experience of the pralaykala
and the vijnkala? To whatever extent there is awareness, to that
extent there is experience, [whether it be] vivid, not vivid, suitable for
memory, or otherwise, but [irrespective of these attributes] it does lose
not its status of being the thing-to-be-experienced.97
92
Jayaratha ad loc: ata samanantaroktn nyyd anayo pralaykalavijnkalayo prabhotsyamnatve prabubhutsuday, samanantaram eva vedittvasyvayam abhivyakter, y bodhe yogyat ptratva tadapekay ca yogyatrpataiva vedyatpi dhardau sambhavatti ko nmtra vighaanvaka ||.
93
Jayaratha ad loc: etasya laykalder etad bhvajta svabodhvasare prakarea na tv idnm iva yogyatmtrea vedyat ysyatty ato hetor grhyagrahakarpatay parasparnurpa
yugalam ida nirmiomty eva bhagav chivo pi parmatti |
94
In the state of being a Pralaykala or Vijnkala, Jayaratha ad loc: tadn pralaykaldyavasthy.
95
Jayaratha ad loc: yogyatayaiva vedyat bhvadharma ity artha |
96
I.e. a mere fitness, or competence. Jayaratha ad loc: tvatti sukhadukhdyanubhavarpaprarohvasthvilakaayogyatmtrarpaivety artha |
97
Jayaratha ad loc: citro htydi | bhogo hi deaklvasthsvlakaydivaicitryea nnvidho
bhokt vyavatihate yath sphua eva sukhadukhdyanubhavo bhoga iti na niyantum ucitam
225
In this way, the actual experience of the pralaykala and the vijnkala perceivers is removed from their current state of being by two degrees. Firstly, they
are experiencers only in the remote sense that they possess fitness for experience.
But secondly, this fitness is itself contingent on their eventual awakening. In their
current trance state, however, they only posses a fitness to be awakened. Therefore their fitness to experience depends on their fitness to be awakened. Abhinavagupta does admit that he considers the experience of the two higher experiencers counter-intuitive or strange (citra). Jayaratha even calls the claim that experiencerhood could depend on a future contact with experience unprecedented.98
Surely we do not commonly call a child an old man simply because at some future
time he will be old?99
Abhinavagupta therefore extends the scope of his simile to demonstrate that
ordinary language usage does endorse the varieties of experience he has posited.
Tantrloka 10.145cd147ab (B1 fol. 277r , K4 fol. 11rv exp. 92, 93 ):

ghanidrvimho pi kntligitavigraha ||
bhoktaiva bhayate so pi manute bhoktt pur |
utprekmtrahno pi k cit kulavadh pura ||
sambhokyam dvaiva rabhasd yti samadam |
tm eva dv ca tad samnayabhg api
anyas tath na savitte kam atropalabhmahe |
3 bhoktt ] KedK4, bhoktt B1
Someone who is unconscious in deep sleep, his body embraced by

his beloved, is still called an enjoyer (bhokt), and he himself [when
awakened] considers it a past enjoyerhood.100 Even someone lacking bare imagination (or expectation),101 just at the sight of an eleasphue pi tathbhvt | eva bhvitym asphuatare pi yogyatmtrea bhaved eva bhogavyavahras tattadbhoktraucityena tath tath bhogopapatte ||
98
Jayaratha ad loc: nanu kim idam aprva paribhyate bhvibhogasambandhanibandhan bhoktteti |
99
Jayaratha ad loc: na hi bhvansthavirabhvena blo pi sthavira ity anupacarita yujyate
vaktum iti.
100
Jayaratha ad loc: na kevala mhadaym eva yogyatmtrea bhoktbhogyat (bhoktbhogyat ] B1K4 ac, bhoktbhogyabhvo KedK4 pc) bhaved yvad amhadaym apty (apty ] KedK4 pc, ity B1K4 ac) ha, The relation of enjoyer-enjoyed can arise through mere fitness not just in an unconscious state, but even in a conscious state. Therefore he says
101
Gnoli comments that the expression utprekmtrahno pi appears to be the opposite of what
is expected here. Gnoli (1992:258) fn. 5: Invece di -hno pi ci si aspetta, nel primo pda, una
qualche parola dal significato esattamente contrario: e cos traduco. Therefore he translates: Taluno,
giovandosi della sua fantasia e nulla di pi, al solo vedere una bella donna pensa al suo futuro possesso
e diventa d'un subito ebbro di gioia. We could produce this sense by emending to something like
utprekmtradhr api or utprekmtraniho pi. However, all the MSS available to me transmit
the cpd. unanimously, and it is also possible to interpret the verses api adversatively: If even such
an unimaginative man feels passion, how much more so would an imaginative man (or a vijn-
226

gant woman who is about to be loved102 before him, becomes intensely
aroused.103 Another man, even though he might be of similar disposition, seeing the same woman at the same time, [does] not [react] like
that. O consciousness! Whom shall we blame for this?
T+n
T-0
p
.
. .
.
p
T-n
Vk/Pk
.
M.
By
.
B.
Vy
.
V.
Bhy
.
Bh
.
Figure 2: Bhokttva and the Isolated Perceivers

On the basis of this distinction of bhoga into the two modes of actualised (prakarea, prarohea) and potential (yogyamtrea), it is permissible for the nondualist aivas to consider even these two laykala perceivers as agentive experiencers through their deferred status of enjoyerhood. The process described by Abhinavagupta is given schematically in figure 2.104
The Mlinvijayottara, the scripture expounded in the Tantrloka, is innocent
of nearly all of the elaborate ratiocination Abhinavagupta imposes on its much simpler presentation of the doctrine of the pramtbheda. But against the historical background depicted, it would not have been possible for him to simply adkala) do so. This verse is meant to explain metaphorically how the vijnkalas, who abide in bare
consciousness (Tal 9.92ab: vijnakeval prokta uddhacinmtrasasthita), can be experiencers,
while the previous verse described the pralaykalas, who exist in a kind of stupor.
102
The future middle participle here expresses immediate futurity.
103
utpreketi kulavadhviaya (kulavadhviaya ] KedK4, kulavadh + + + viaya B1) sakalpa (sakalpa ] KedB1, sakalpa K4) | sambhokyamm ity adavat kariyamasambhogm ity artha | ata eva rabhasd avalokanasamanantaram evvegavatbhilea (evvegavatbhilea ] KedK4 pc, evvegatbhilea B1K4 ac) labdhalbha iva samada sambhogasamucitm nandamayatm iyd yensya bhoktbhvo bhavet ||
104
Vk/Pk is the Vijnkala or Pralaykala. M stands for the Mantra-, Mantrevara and Mantramahevara perceivers. By is bodhayogyat, fitness to be awakened. B is bodha, the awakened state. Vy
is vedyatyogyat the fitness for possessing objects to be known, and V is vedyat, the possession of
objects to be known. Bhy is bhogayogyat, the fitness for experience and Bh is bhoga, experience.
T-0 is the moment of awakening, where all of the shifts in status occur.
227
mit that the self is not, even in some of its more extreme phases, an experiencer.
To do so, would be to deny scriptural authority. Rather, he found it more parsimonious to accept a tenuous, doubly removed, remote experiencerhood. This, of
course, brings him dangerously close to the Skhya theory of remote experiencerhood. To shore up his at first sight implausible justification he developed an heuristic scenario pinpointing familiar differentials in the experience of a love relationship to serve as a commonplace dnta. The model of the aiva experiencer that
has emerged from these materials is a complex one, and one that has been refined
by the sustained effort of systematizers. In the passages cited above, Abhinavaguptas exegesis is less concerned with either an asseverative or harmonizing engagement with scriptural sources, but rather with an heuristic approach that seeks to adduce similes based on commonplace scenarios that make his systematisations appear plausible and convincing.
More needs to be said, in this context, about the enjoyerhood that the Trika
accords to the next three perceivers, the mantras, the mantrevaras and the mantramahevaras. This is a topic for a future paper that focusses on the precise
roles played by agency (karttva) and authority (adhikra) in the constitution of
the Trikas self.
Abbreviations
K2 Tantrloka. rnagar acc. no. 1054-iii, 190 fol., rad, only the Tantrloka.
K4 Tantrloka. rnagar acc. no. 1792, rad, the Tantrloka with the Viveka or Vivecana commentary of Jayaratha.
K5 Tantrloka. rnagar acc. no. 2081, rad, the Tantrloka with the Viveka or Vivecana commentary of Jayaratha.
K7 Tantrloka. rnagar acc. no. 2201, rad, only the Tantrloka.
K8 Tantrloka. rnagar acc. no. 7771 & 7772.
B1 Tantrloka with the Viveka commentary of Jayaratha. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin HS or 12 434,
rad, only the Tantrloka.
1 Svacchandatantroddyota. rnagar acc. no. 1054-ii. rad. 411 fol.
be Svacchandatantroddyota. Berlin Hs Or 11 255, rad. Accessed on microfilm dated 27.10.99.
conj.
corr.
em.
om.
{x}
kicit.
+++
x y
...
conjecture
correction
emendation
omitted
deletion
kicit supplied
illegible akaras
citation ranges from x to y
obeli enclose corrupt passages that the present editor cannot improve upon
228
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The Unconscious Experiencer:

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

while the aiva voice remains less familiar.5

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Svacchandatantroddyota 5.88 (Ked p. 76, 1 149rv ):

To explain, the self is enveloped by [1.] the defilement of individuation,

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

2 The Direct, Agentive Experiencer

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

[seven perceivers (pramt)]

4. mantra, 5. -a, 6. -mahea

Table 1: The Trikas au and the Skhya purua

See e.g. Bhogakrik 99cd: akarttvbhyupagame bhoktabdo nirarthaka, If it is accepted

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

As such, it is not an ultimately existing reality, but an entity that is synthesized

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Tal 9.100cd101ab (K1 fol. 65v , K2 fol. 367v368r , B1 fol. 237v , K4

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

See also Saito (2011), Qvarnstrm (2012).

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

3 The Tattvakrama as an Artificial Causal Chain

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

who is not autonomous.

Adhyy 1.4.54: svatantra kart.

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

4 The Experiencer as Perceiver

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

vidy (limited knowing)

kal (limited power of action)

vidy and kal indistinct

not vivid, unstable

vidy and kal fading

Vidy and kal latent

uddhavidy emerged, latency

of vidy and kal latent

uddhavidy emerged, latency

of vidy and kal absent

icchakti, volitional power

beyond the fourth

Table 2: The pramtbheda

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

Svacchandatantroddyota 10.1009ab (be 237v , 1 309r ): tasya ca bhagavato vivabhoktu

2 samasta ] Ked, samaste be1 2 vma ] Ked1, vma be 4 bhoktrpam ] Kedbe,

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

Tantrloka[viveka] 10.132cd133ab (B1 fol. 276r , K8 exp. 54):

5 tayor ] Ked, om.B1K8

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)

Jayaratha: tad tayor vedittvam.

Bhokttva in the Pramtbheda of the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva)

that Bhartharis conception of yogyat was originally formed in the context of

See Ogawa (1997:505).

Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 24 & 25 (20122013)