Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16,
1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for
brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in
performance of duty. When a person in the service of the national government
of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound,
the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of
disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of
the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees
of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first
against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of
some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize
the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
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Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the
Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief,
LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be
service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice
favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated
November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the
statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2
dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity)
stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to
then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,
that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that
the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to
Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner
"elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the
aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the
event that a claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by
respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the
resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of
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Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness,
injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D.
626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the
same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein
a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and
portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is
an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it
was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on
the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This
latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on
the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law. 10

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Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of
the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the
fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same
section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not
restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored
this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new
Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or
codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute
or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It
is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the
whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised
act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the
prior act. 16

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According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the
intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the
weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body
which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already
rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of
Sison vs. Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This
principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a
showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that
Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of
statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere
with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the
two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the
language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to
make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act
will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits
are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in
a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na
kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano
ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
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babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung

kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

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ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation
of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the
said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
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punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring
the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse
of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to
this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
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The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent
of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.
Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention
is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of
the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are
being recorded.
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Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board
of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That
is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any
more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of
a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill
as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is
the communication between one person and another person not between a
speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications
by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
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secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to

constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication
to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written
or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning
of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of
conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations
are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19
following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders
as among the acts punishable.
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WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also
employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with
whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the
investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao,
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing
Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived
with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after
petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests.
Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao
and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

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Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving
her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations
three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability
to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full
backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and
in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with
his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on
any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled
by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private
respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the
proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself,
preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of
the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for
the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or
misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when
she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to
present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and
filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her
side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her
eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
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What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who
has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a
person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have
accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as
provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has
gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a
whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things,
to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the
other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women,
Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

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It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective

bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may
be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the
State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of
the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full
protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the
same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of
Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to
social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution
and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his
job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance
under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code.
Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the
aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness
or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature
even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that
amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated
which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13

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To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a
legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled
to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her
job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione
positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not
been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement
under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be
effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of
the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement
may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19
or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will
not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make
execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement"
between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and
separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of
the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof
statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba
legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception,
such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between
the employer and the employee.

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In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency
and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where
the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence
of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he
works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to
organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a
non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by
foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy
Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had
already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one
that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute
an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been
unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions
that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a
matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any
company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent
Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable
position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not
create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from
operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the
development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company
assets.

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In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As
we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee
who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since
Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation
although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not
condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous
because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and
anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had
direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already
resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute
management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having
had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should
have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to
hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to
REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her
salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309,
which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and
the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay,
on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between
the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been
pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter
barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that
because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.
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Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed
with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the
deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law,
there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of
Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual
who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby
making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the
decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice.
Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the
petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec.
3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he
was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is
clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a
crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny
his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two
years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands
and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before
he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the
trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction
that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves
out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply
read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
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But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the
previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be
acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in
which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be
sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was
acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended
parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay
moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused
compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent
with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be
entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution.
If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof
thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on
the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is
quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly
convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build
an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. 5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he
did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the
conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say
as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C.
Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is
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contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard,
that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept
when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results,
logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
"unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required
quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in
court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust
accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial
court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence.
To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in
league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who
bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused
arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he
did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said
anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything
in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the
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defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that

conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26,
1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants to
an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two
counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said
crimes? Basbacio was as the record shows nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of
action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they
apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner
and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal.
We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of
Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS,
respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

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CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post
the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended,
providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as
follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these
rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the
case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also
to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of
P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000
from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by
the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims
arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules
and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which
the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that
the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against
the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be
binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with
the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
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In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily
answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest
that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of
the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following
provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath
with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis
supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal
bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and
surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond
is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are
not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been
violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the
conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
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(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the
recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it
were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may
not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000
to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by
the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal
bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction
of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are
subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the
foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of
the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to
the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a
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further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the
interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J.
CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-ininsolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR
CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo
I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1,
1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as
follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the
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case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the
said petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of
any property owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors
from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use and
benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any
property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable
sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of
the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated
with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter
that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or
attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of
insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in
November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on
December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles
City from disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors,
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic)
appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that
Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in March
1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated the real
properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they
were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were already
transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it
is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case
which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of
petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the
prayer that the insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court)
be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex
"D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of
respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
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On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second
urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of
sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex
"E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of
certain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not
redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order
disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr.
Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered claimants in this
case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby
directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take
his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and
discharge his functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the
attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at
8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective
representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with their
principals, shall have already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents
which are now in the actual or constructive custody and
management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under this actual
or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do
so, as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously
authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in
Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles
City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice
thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the
proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment
on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up
a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was
done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of
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spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and
40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles.
(Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering
private respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay
petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of
14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and
attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said
decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and
executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18,
1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale
the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as
the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of
petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to
issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among
other things, that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of
matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought
to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the
insolvents available for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the
insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of
jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending
before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with
its assailed extended order with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted
order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the
Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of RadiolaToshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate in
the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by
the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied
petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
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Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION
OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF
PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH
NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is
dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months
after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the
clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court,
assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and
effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and
such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects
in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the
property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all
of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall
dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior
to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the
levy on attachment against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court
of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency
proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548,
was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the
said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject
properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

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Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the
legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and
the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the
insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor
of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not
equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section
79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of
the Insolvency Law is very clear that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1)
month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments
vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately
prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by
private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given
by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against
the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This
rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. Hence, where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and
harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by
Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be
considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a
violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines
(100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be
considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

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Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the
jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim
filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and
execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of
subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the
former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was
approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled
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corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local

government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service
as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this
Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed
an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to
one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by
petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA
6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely
requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or
casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not
entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the
law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a
certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations.
Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular
benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no
reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988,
the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.

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Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your

separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,
insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her
arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23
(sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of
R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the
following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period
to perform specific activities or services with a definite expected
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be
separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity
under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or
vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the
enactment of this law and have received the corresponding
benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by
mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted
and approved by the head of office concerned."
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Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . .
If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with
more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous
service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic)
purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from
the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the
Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija).
The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which
petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its
regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the
expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire
under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available
only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits
but reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be
made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of
the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such
as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special
projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce
voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing
the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is
called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government
civil servants).
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Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the
Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No.
6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful
that no such specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities,
and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all
of whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit system;
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(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether

performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the noncareer service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year
and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,
unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70;
Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a
laborer holding emergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River
Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a
research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975
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to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1
January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga
River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA
W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the
status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was
changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December
1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status
as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered coterminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June
1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil
Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable
services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services,
while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some
contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment
therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the
following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments,
official records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies
concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June
22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
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3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement
are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, coterminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career,
and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's
employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No.
11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the
service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that
which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for
the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment
is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is coexistent with the appointee, in that after the resignation,
separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a
period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and
upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is
termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in
(c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency;
in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law
but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It
can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made
a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine
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its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work
pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-projectregular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her
service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are
to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by
said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim
in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may
be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in
the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
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because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit,
simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in
response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees
who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he
explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to
extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep.
Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on
coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel
of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual
employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite
expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of
the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy,
hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their
occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel
from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the office functus officio.
Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have
to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's
argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the
plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of
the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement
benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a
case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a
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removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made
thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990
(5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the
grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need
not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual,
emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be
promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the
test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to
promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income
tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within
a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was
filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the
application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice,
her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years
the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements
in this decision.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant,
is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial
started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of
the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R.
No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to
dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of
the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the
peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

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Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated
in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of
the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid
any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the
omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code
because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the
peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It
was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of
Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It
is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his
office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law
Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law.
In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while
acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and
which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however,
only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative
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Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos.
2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at
bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law
enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions
are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be
noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during
the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or
take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived
of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year:
Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on
January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of
the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating
the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be
disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided,
however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on
September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917,
the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of
the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid
any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
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SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any
manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the
right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by
imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided
in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the
national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee
shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee.
Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in
Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by
the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law
simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that
when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might
have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated
above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely
destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile.
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently
borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
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province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since
the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and
not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the
Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally
known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to
have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if
and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term.
In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called
"judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to
statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled
that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that
the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of
what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will
understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal
in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no
such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions
of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found
enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is
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to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the
statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as
in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A
Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it
of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes
with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland
Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently,
has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz,
271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to
enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such
were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit?
Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge"
in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of
judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the
law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than
strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised
Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along
with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given
authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of
the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in
election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp.
708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or
executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

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In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601),
this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March
31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen,
Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he
was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January
25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly
included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the
filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices
of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep.
Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill
No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides,
the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any
legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a
mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so
clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709).
Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as
expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of
omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
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maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p.
307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and
this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with
areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin
case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on
the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by
Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three
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hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish
title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon
that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano,
Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July
6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due
to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They
insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had
bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the
case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in
court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining
whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this
late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was
based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court.
The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is
annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action
and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
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On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511,
July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in
the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua,
59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119
Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16;
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99
Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29,
1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114,
August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long
settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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