CMH - 70 102 1

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History of Operations Research

in the United States Army
volume i:
Charles R. Shrader
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH
UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 2006
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For those who served, 19421962
CMH Pub 701021
Written under contract DASW01-02-D-0016; DO 3

to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001
ISBN 0-16-072961-0
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Foreword
a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that oers

important insights into the natural tension between military
leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth
of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions
that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and
improvement of the Army since 1942.
In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to
1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of Americas long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its
application in support of military operations in Vietnam;
and its significant contributions to the Armys postVietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a
victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf
War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and
strategic vision.
These volumes should be of interest not only to those of
us in the Armys analysis community but also to civilian leaders and military commanders and sta ocers at all levels.
The story of OR in the U.S. Army oers many insights into
our past, our present, and our future. Its careful study will
more than repay the time and eort that is invested.
perations research (OR) emerged during World

War II as an important means of assisting civilian
and military leaders in making scientically sound
improvements in the design and performance of weapons
and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and,
after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic
policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army
used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in
a few scattered ocial documents, in the memories of those
who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that
have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to
a comprehensive, coherent history.
In this, the rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles
R. Shrader has for the rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S.
Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s.
He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative,
and placing it within the context of the overall development
of American military institutions. Often working with only
sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide
WALTER W. HOLLIS
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
for Operations Research
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Preface
topic as complex as the history of operations research (OR) in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1962
requires a denition of terms. For the purposes of
the study that follows in this volume, what is meant by the
U.S. Army and by the dates 1942 to 1962 is quite clear.
U.S. Army takes in the whole of the Army structure, both
military and civilian, including the higher-level headquarters
and sta of the War Department/Department of the Army
and the technical and administrative services as well as the
combat arms in times of both war and peace. It also includes
the Army Air Forces up to the creation of a separate U.S.
Air Force in 1947. The starting date for this study, 1942, was
determined by the rst eorts to create an OR capability in
the U.S. Army; the ending date, 1962, was determined by
the beginning of the major changes in Army organization
and procedures instituted by Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara, notably the initiation of eorts to reorganize
the Army along functional lines and to consolidate related
activities under major functional commands, such as the
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command and the U.S.
Army Materiel Command.
The denition of operations research is much more difcult because the term is one that has as many denitions
as it has practitioners and commentators.1 Dozens, if not
hundreds, of denitions have been oered over the years,
each correct and useful in its own way. There is little to be
gained by recapitulating all of those denitions here. It may
be best simply to state the denition that has been used to
limit operations research in this volume, the ocial U.S. Department of Defense denition:
calculations and models, the reality is that many of the best

military OR studies have relied only peripherally on mathematical methods. Indeed, although the use of such methods
is often helpful, and in some cases essential, it is possible to
produce perfectly satisfactory OR studies without them.
What elements are essential to OR? For the purposes
of this study, OR may be considered to have ve essential
elements, or steps:
1. the denition of the problem and the determination of
the means of measuring its critical elements3;
2. the collection of data (either by direct observation, the
use of historical data, or the use of computer-generated data);
3. the analysis of the collected data (using both mathematical and nonmathematical methods);
4. the determination of conclusions based on the analysis
of the collected data; and
5. the recommendation to the military decision maker of a
course of action designed to correct or improve weapons and equipment, organization, doctrine, strategy,
or policy.
To further dene OR in this study, the focus has been on
four principal applications of operations research to Army
decision making:
1. the development, testing, and performance evaluation
of weapons and other equipment;
2. the design and evaluation of military organizations,
tactics, strategy, methods, and policy;
3. the evaluation of human performance and behavior;
and
4. the design and evaluation of eective management
structures and procedures.
The analytical study of military problems undertaken to provide responsible commanders and sta agencies with a scientific basis for decision on action to improve military operations.2
It should be noted immediately that the ocial denition does not stipulate the use of mathematical techniques
as an essential element of OR, although most other denitions do and the popular conception of OR is almost entirely
that of an activity immersed in complex mathematics. Despite the fact that almost from its beginnings OR has been
closely identied with the use of sophisticated mathematical
This study deals primarily with the rst two applications

and to only a limited degree with the third. The examination
of the fourth application of OR to Army management has
been deferred to a subsequent volume because the major use
of OR for that purpose falls after 1962. Between 1942 and
1962, the main thrust of OR work in the U.S. Army was in
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cult. The materials on Army OR preserved in the National

Archives are generally quite adequate for the World War II
period and the postwar period up to approximately 1950.
The document trail then thins, and it appears that very little
useful material covering Army OR in the 1950s and early
1960s has made its way into the ocial archives. This is
particularly true of the OR groups in the technical services.
Similarly, the oce les, planning documents, organizational
memoranda, periodic reports, and similar materials for the
Operations Research Oce and its successor, the Research
Analysis Corporation, seem to have gone missing, thus leaving a large gap in our knowledge of what actually happened.
fact the improvement of weapons and equipment, organization, tactical doctrine, and, to a lesser degree, the formulation
of higher-level strategy and policy pertaining to the political,
economic, and social issues facing the Army.
The focus on the ve essential elements and the four applications of OR serves to limit the scope of this study and
thus to give it greater coherence. It does mean, however, that
certain elements of the story must be omitted or given only
cursory treatment. Moreover, the present work is not a study
of the evolution of OR techniques, and thus there is relatively
little discussion of the nature and development of new techniques and methods in OR, of which there were many from
1942 to 1962. Rather, the focus here is on the development
of Army OR organizations and the uses to which the Army
applied OR in the period under consideration. It is in fact the
story of when, how, and why the Army gathered, arranged,
and managed the resources needed to create an eective and
ecient OR program to aid Army leaders and sta ocers in
making key decisions during the two decades after 1942.
It is, of course, impossible to address all of the issues
considered signicant by all of the readers of this study. I
have tried to highlight the major events and controversies
and to present them as thoroughly and as accurately as possible, given the limited documentary evidence available. Each
and every person connected with Army OR since 1942 has
his or her own version of what happened and why. However, nding written documentation for the history of OR
in the Army from 1942 to 1962 has proven surprisingly dif-
Acknowledgments
Given the complexity of the story and the gaps in the
available documentation, it should not be surprising to the
reader that some omissions and imperfections appear in this
study. The responsibility for those is mine alone, and I am
grateful for the assistance I have received from many sources. I wish to acknowledge specically the contribution of
Eugene P. Visco and Brian R. McEnany. Their fund of lore,
penetrating comments, and useful suggestions have made
this a much better study than it would otherwise have been.
I am also much indebted to Randy Jones and Jim Hooper
of SAIC for their support, and to Christine Cotting for her
excellent editing. As always, my wife Carole has patiently
endured my preoccupation with the task at hand and thus
deserves a special acknowledgment.
CHARLES R. SHRADER
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
October 2005
preface notes
1Operations research is also known as operational research,

operations analysis, management science, industrial engineering,
decision science, and, in its more expansive manifestation, systems
analysis.
2JCS, Joint Publication 102: Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (Washington: Oce of the Chairman, JCS,
23 Mar 94), p. 277.
3In fact, the problem is continually reassessed and redened

throughout the course of any OR study, and steps 1 through 4 often run
concurrently.
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Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
page
iii
v
Prologue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Classical and Early Modern Antecedents of Operations Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scientic Analysis of the Wars of Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Emergence of Military Operations Research in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
3
4
5
6
Chapter one / Operations Research in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radar and the Origins of Operational Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR in the British Armed Forces, 193945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR Crosses the Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Role of NDRC and OSRD in the Development of OR in the United States . . . . . . . . .
OR in the United States Navy, 194145 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mine Warfare Operations Research Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Emergence of the Operations Research Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR in the United States Army Air Forces, 194245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Origins of OR in the AAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Leach-Davidson Report, August 1942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Formation of the Operations Analysis Division on the Air Sta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Analysis Sections with Major Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personnel Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Relations with OSRD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OA Section, U.S. Eighth Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accomplishments of AAF Operations Analysis Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR in the United States Army Service Forces, 194245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Research Branch, Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Analysis Branch, Signal Section, HQ European Theater of Operations . . . . . .
The Army Ordnance Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Army Service Forces Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR in the United States Army Ground Forces, 194245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Research Section, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacic Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Balanced TeamOperational Research Section, HQ Pacic Ocean Area . . . . . . . . .
Historians and Op Annies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
9
11
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15
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18
21
22
23
24
24
25
26
27
29
30
31
32
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37
38
40
41
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Chapter two / Operations Research in the Postwar Era, 194550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Demobilization of OSRD and OFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research in the United States Navy, 194550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research in the United States Air Force, 194550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reconstitution of the Air Force OA Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Project RAND and the RAND Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research in the Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army Operations Research Developments, 194550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Embedded Operations Research in the Technical Services and Army Field Forces, 194550 . .
The Operations Research Oce, 194850 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Negotiations with The Johns Hopkins University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Establishment of the General Research Oce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sta Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of the GRO/ORO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORO Fiscal Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The ORO Research Program, August 1948June 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Inuence of Ellis A. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OROAn Early Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
page
55
56
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58
58
59
60
62
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63
64
64
66
66
67
68
70
73
75
77
Chapter three / The Expansion of Army Operations Research, 195062. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Operations Research Oce, 195061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORO in Korea, 195053 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORO at Home, 195061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OROs Relationship with The Johns Hopkins University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army Oversight of ORO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORO Work Program, 195061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other ORO Activities, 195061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Internal Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORO Relationships with Other DOD OR Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Industry and Academia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Organizations Using Operations Research, 195062 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Human Resources Research Oce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Special Operations Research Oce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Computers and Wargaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Development of High-Speed Electronic Digital Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Early History of Wargames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Computers and Wargaming at ORO, 195061 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recruitment and Training of Army OR Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Demise of ORO, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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108
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Chapter four / Operations Research and Combat Developments, 195062 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Emergence of Combat Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Need for an Integrated Combat Developments System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Project VISTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Establishment of a Combat Developments Element in OCAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Haworth Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HQ CONARC and Responsibility for Combat Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Developments in the Army Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Combat Operations Research Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Establishment of the United States Army Combat Developments
Experimentation Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Creation of the United States Army Combat Developments Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research in the Technical Services, 195062 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ordnance Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Army Research Oce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Chemical Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Signal Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Army Medical Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Research in the Other Technical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
page
133
133
134
134
135
136
137
138
139
142
145
146
147
147
149
150
151
151
152
Chapter five / The State of Army Operations Research, March 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
157
Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
161
Appendix A / Biographical Sketches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Walter Barton Leach (190071) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellis Adolph Johnson (190673) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
163
163
164
Appendix B / Army Air Forces Operations Analysis Elements in World War II . . . . . . . . . .
167
Appendix C / The Army Research and Development Program, 192462 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Army Research and Development, 192445 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army R&D Funding, 195062 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Reorganization of Army R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
169
169
170
173
173
174
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Selected Bibliography of Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
181
185
List of Figures
Figure 11U.S. Navy Operations Research Elements: 7 October 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 21Proposed ORO Organization: March 1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 22Proposed ORO Organization: June 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 31ORO Organization: 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 32ORO Management Systems Division: 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 33ORO Tactics Division: 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 34ORO Strategic Division: 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 35ORO Operations Division: 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 36ORO Organization: 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
68
68
89
89
90
91
91
93
ix
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List of Figurescontinued
page
Figure 37ORO Relationship to JHU: After 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 38STAG Organization: End of First Quarter, FY 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 41Combat Developments Section, HQ CONARC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 42Organization of CORG: July 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 43Organization of CORG: 1 May 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 44United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation
Center: 1958. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 45Organization of ROEC: 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 46Organization of CORG: 1 January 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 47Organization of the Chemical Corps: June 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure C1R&D Division, General Sta, U.S. Army: 23 October 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure C2Oce, Chief of Research and Development, Oce of the Deputy
Chief of Sta for Plans and Research, Headquarters, Department of the Army:
circa March 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Tables
Table 21ORO Budgets: FY 1949 and FY 1950 (Projected) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 31Army Sta Responsibility for ORO Research Programs:
July 1948August 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 32Department of the Army ORO Senior Military Advisors: 194861 . . . . . . . .
Table 33ORO Analysts and Research Aides: 195560 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 34Distribution of ORO/RAC Personnel, by Discipline: 1953 and 1963 . . . . . .
Table 35ORO Appropriations and Expenditures: FY 1956FY 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 36Distribution of ORO Projects, by Division or Topic Area:
FY 1956FY 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 37Distribution of ORO Studies, by Topic: July 1948June 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 38HumRRO Personnel Strength: FY 1952FY 1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 39STAG Personnel Status: FY 1961FY 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
117
137
141
141
143
144
146
149
172
176
69
95
95
95
97
99
100
100
110
118
Illustrations
(The illustrations appear after page 132; all are from Department of Defense les, unless otherwise noted.)
W. Barton Leach
Vannevar Bush
National Defense Research Committee
The main building of the Operations Research Oce complex
Brig. Gen. Lester D. Flory
Maj. Gen. John P. Daley greets Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Thornton L. Page (Courtesy, Digital Library and Archives, University Libraries, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University)
Analysts from the Combat Operations Research Group
A war game in progress
Col. Alfred W. DeQuoy
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History of Operations Research

in the United States Army
36171_Frontmatter.indd Sec1:1
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8/4/06 6:01:48 PM
Prologue
an the intensely human endeavor of war be accurately and thoroughly described in mathematical
terms? At Mathematics and War, a conference
held in Karlskrona, Sweden, in August 2002, two Danish
scholarsLt. Col. (ret.) Svend Bergstein and Svend Clausen of the Danish Defense Research Establishmentpresented papers titled, respectively, War Cannot Be Calculated and War Can Be Calculated.1 Citing the Austrian
philosopher Karl Popper and the Prussian military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz, Bergstein argued that war is a human
activity that cannot be reduced to mathematical formulae.
Clausen, citing the work of Frederick W. Lanchester and the
Danish combat model, Defense Dynamics, argued that war
can indeed be accurately described by mathematical models. Although the issue was not denitively decided at Karlskrona, it is certain that science, and mathematical analysis in
particular, has played an important, if often sub rosa, role in
warfare from the earliest times. The Stone Age tribal leader
who rst discovered that twelve men were better than six in
a ght and that a light stone could be thrown farther than a
heavy one was the rst to apply mathematical analysis, and
what today we call operations research (OR). In the millennia
that followed, the sophistication of mathematical knowledge
increased steadily, and military and political leaders increasingly relied on the use of scientic techniques to aid them in
making decisions that improved their chances of victory.
Classical and Early Modern Antecedents of
Operations Research
Archimedesthe ancient Greek mathematician, physicist, and mechanical engineerhas become the patron saint
of military operations researchers, and most modern writers
on OR have been obliged to make at least a brief reference to
him.2 Born around 287 B.C.E. in Syracuse, the largest of the
Greek city-states in Sicily, Archimedes studied mathematics
in Alexandria with disciples of Euclid and was for many years
the scientic advisor to King Hieron II of Syracuse.3 When
a Roman army commanded by Marcus Claudius Marcellus
laid siege to Syracuse in 213 B.C.E., Archimedes invented
a number of military devices and techniques for countering
the attacks of the Roman siege methods. His best-known

military inventions were his new types of catapults, a device
known as Archimedes Claw for overturning ships, and a (perhaps apocryphal) system of curved mirrors to focus sunlight
on the attacking Roman ships and set them on re. When
the Romans nally took the city in 212 B.C.E., Marcellus ordered that its citizens be spared, but Archimedes was killed
by an impatient Roman soldier who failed to recognize him.
Archimedes was perhaps the rst operations analyst. In his
role as scientic advisor to King Hieron, he used what can be
considered a very early form of OR techniques. He collected
empirical data, analyzed those data using mathematics, and
used the results to design equipment and formulate methods
for countering the Roman siege.
A century and a half before Archimedes applied his
understanding of mathematics and physics to the design
of weapons to defend his native Syracuse, King Philip II of
Macedon (382336 B.C.E.) set about creating an army and
a tactical doctrine based on what can only be described as
scientic observation and mathematical calculation.4 Philip studied the military art in Thebes under Epaminondas,
the victor over the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra in 371
B.C.E. Epaminondas (circa 418362 B.C.E.) was perhaps
the greatest military innovator of ancient Greece and is credited with developing the so-called oblique order in which a
commander weakens one portion of his battle line to provide massive numerical superiority at another portion to
overwhelm the enemy line by concentrating mass at a critical
point. Philip was an apt student and, having observed the
oblique order tactic in action, applied basic mathematics to
the reform of the phalanx, the principal infantry formation.
He increased the depth and reduced the width of the traditional phalanx and equipped his soldiers with the sarissa, a
pike about twice as long as the traditional infantry weapon.
Philip also devised a new method of employing his supporting cavalry (by forming them in mobile wings on either ank
of the main phalanx formation) and developed the stonethrowing catapult into a true eld artillery weapon. Philips
innovations, based on empirical observation and scientic
analysis, produced an oensive force with greatly increased
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history of operations research in the u.s. army

power and speed on the battleeld. His son, Alexander the
Great (356323 B.C.E.), subsequently used Philips tactical
improvements to conquer much of the known world.
For almost a millennium following the death of Alexander the Great, the Romans militarily dominated the western
world. Best known for the development of the science of poliorcetics, or siegecraft, and for their skill in military engineering, the Romans, like Philip II of Macedon, used eld observations and mathematical analysis to constantly improve
the weapons and tactics of their armies. The Roman castra,
or eld camp, was a model of geometric precision, and the
method of its construction was likewise a model of eciency
based on established calculations of the time, materials, and
manpower required to construct it. Roman siegecraft included a variety of siege engines, the design and use of which
were based on careful scientic observation and analysis.
With the decline of the Roman Empire in the West
after the fth century A.D., the science of military weapons
design and tactical innovation were continued in the Eastern Empire (Byzantium), but in the West both science and
the military art remained almost static until the onset of the
Renaissance in the late fourteenth century. First in Italy and
then in northern Europe, the knowledge of the ancients was
revived by scholars, and innovation ourished in all of the
arts and sciences. The application of science to military affairs was not neglected, and some of the most famous men
of the Renaissance turned their hands to the design of weapons and improvements in tactics, and oered the results of
their research to the military and political leaders of the day.
Such famous Renaissance scientists as Leonardo da Vinci
(14521519), Michelangelo Buonarotti (14751564), and
Galileo Galilei (15641642) applied the re-emerging sciences of physics and mathematics to the solution of military
problems, and the tactical doctrines of such writers as Niccol Machiavelli (14691527) also owed a great deal to an
understanding of the application of mathematical principles
to military organization and tactical formations.5 As the historian Henry Guerlac has noted:
Science and warfare have always been intimately connected. In
antiquity this alliance became strikingly evident in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. . . . The cultural and economic rebirth of western Europe after the twelfth century shows that
this association was not fortuitous, for the revival of the ancient
art of war was closely linked with the recovery and development of ancient scientic and technical knowledge.6
The scientic revolution of the late seventeenth century and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century saw a
quantum improvement in the sophistication of mathematics,
physics, and the other sciences, as well as a growing conviction among educated people that it was possible to discover
and state precisely the natural laws that governed not only
the physical universe but all human activities, including the

conduct of war. Perhaps the most concrete examples of the
successful application of the rapidly improving sciences of
mathematics and physics to military aairs were the advances in the science of fortication made by the French engineer
Sbastien Le Prestre de Vauban (16331707), an advisor to
King Louis XIV.7 Steeped in the mathematics and physics
of both gunpowder weapons and the design of fortications,
Vauban developed new methods for the construction of fortications to resist the ever-improving cannon of the age. At
the same time, he devised mathematically based methods for
the conduct of eective siege operations.
The application of scientic thought to warfare did
not go unpracticed in America. The American scientist and
statesman Benjamin Franklin wrote to his British colleague
Joseph Priestley on 3 October 1775:
Britain, at the expense of three millions, has killed 150 Yankees
this campaign which is 20,000 a head. And at Bunkers Hill,
she gained a mile of ground half of which she lost by our taking
post on Ploughed Hill. During the same time 60,000 children
have been born in America. From these data any mathematical
head will easily calculate the time and expense necessary to kill
us all, and conquer our whole territory.8
Scientific Analysis of the Wars of Napoleon

The quarter-century after 1789 was one of continuous
revolution and war in Europe, and culminated in the defeat
of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. The length, breadth, and
complexity of the military campaigns of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, and the innovations in the
military art that accompanied them, provided substantial
grist for the mills of military commentators and theorists.
The three greatest of these were the Austrian Archduke
Charles, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, and the Swiss
Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini.9 The work of the Archduke
Charles is little known in the English-speaking world, but
the works of both Clausewitz (17801831) and Jomini
(17791869) have had a profound inuence on military
theory in Great Britain and the United States. Both Clausewitz and Jomini were veterans of the Napoleonic wars, and
both sought to construct a comprehensive description of the
principles and laws governing war based on historical data
and personal observation. Having analyzed their material,
both men arrived at their conclusions and wrote them up for
the edication of their patrons.10 In this, both were engaged
in massive works of operational analysis as we understand
it today, albeit Clausewitzs analysis was based not so much
on mathematics as on the idealist philosophy of Immanuel
Kant. Jomini, who expressed skepticism regarding the value
of mathematical calculations and explicitly denied that his
work was based on mathematics, nevertheless clearly used
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prologue
the language and laws of geometry to illustrate the points
he wished to make about such matters as the principles of
concentration and of interior lines.11
Since the early 1980s, the work of Clausewitz has been
in vogue in the United States and has signicantly inuenced
the development of American military thought and doctrine.
However, the inuence of Jomini has been no less profound
and has been of much longer duration. Soon after the publication of Jominis Summary in 1838, his work became the
foundation for the study of tactics and strategy in the U.S.
Army. Adopted as a text at West Point and taught to generations of American ocers by the great military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, the work of Jomini colored every
aspect of American military thought and practice well into
the twentieth century. American military commanders from
Grant and Lee to Pershing, MacArthur, and Eisenhower
were steeped in the Jominian geometry of war and sought
to adhere to the principles laid down by him for the conduct
of campaigns.
The Emergence of Military Operations Research
in World War I
Science, including mathematics, advanced steadily in the
hundred years between Waterloo and World War I. During
the same period, military technology also developed by leaps
and bounds. By 1914, the belligerent powers had at their
disposal many new weapons unknown toeven unimagined byClausewitz and Jomini. The dreadnought battleship, the airplane, the submarine, the tank, the radio, rapidre artillery used in the indirect re mode, poison gas, and
a variety of other new military technologies dominated the
battleelds of Europe. Scientists were called upon directly to
aid the war eort by studying the new weapons and suggesting improvements in their design and use.
The war had scarcely begun when Frederick William
Lanchester (18681946), a pioneer in the British automobile
industry and an early student of aeronautics, wrote his seminal work titled Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth
Arm.12 While admitting that the use of military aircraft up
to that time provided insucient evidence from which to
draw lasting conclusions about the airplanes long-term importance as a weapon of war, Lanchester nevertheless sought
to provide something in the nature of a lead in the direction
in which it appears development [of military aircraft] may
be logically anticipated.13 In considering the role of military
aircraft in combat, Lanchester discussed at length the importance of concentration as a factor in military victory from
ancient times to his own era, and noted that one of the great
questions at the root of all strategy is that of concentration;
the concentration of the whole resources of a belligerent on a
single purpose or object, and concurrently the concentration
of the main strength of his forces, whether naval or military,

at one point in the eld of operations.14
Having laid down the principle of concentration,
Lanchester allowed that direct comparisons of numerical
strength of combatant forces are common but not suciently mathematically sophisticated. He thus proceeded to construct a more useful mathematical formula for determining
which side in a conict might possess the greater strength.
This was his famous N2 Law, which postulated that the
ghting strength of a force may be broadly dened as proportional to the square of its numerical strength multiplied
by the ghting value of its individual units, or, expressed in
mathematical notation, FS = n2 x FV, where FV (ghting
value) is a variable inuenced by the armament, training,
morale, and so forth of the force in question.15 Lanchesters
mathematical representations of such concepts as relative
strength of opposing forces, concentration, weapons characteristics, and their eects on casualty rates and the outcome
of battles are said to represent possibly the rst mathematical analysis of forces in combat and have provided the basis
for subsequent work on combat models and battle simulation to the present day.16
World War I also saw the involvement of other scientists in studying the weapons and methods of modern war.
The British scientist Lord Rutherford was called upon to
consult with the Admiralty on the campaign against the
German U-boats.17 In 1915, Lord Tiverton (the Earl of
Halsbury from 1921) initiated a study of strategic bombing,
and in his report to the Air Board in September 1917 (titled
Lord Tivertons System of Bombing) he touched on a number of topics such as target selection, the value of large-scale
bombing raids, and the concept of circular error probable,
all of which would be studied in detail by operations analysts in World War II.18 An even more direct link between
scientic study of military operations in World War I and
the OR activities of World War II was provided by A. V.
Hill, the head of the Anti-Aircraft Experimental Section
of the British Armys Munitions Inventions Department in
World War I and a prominent science advisor to the British
government in World War II.19 Brevet Major Hill and his
associates, nicknamed Hills Brigands, studied antiaircraft
problems and developed tactics and procedures to enhance
the eectiveness of antiaircraft re in the 191418 war.
Although the United States did not enter World War
I until April 1917, American scientists were fully engaged
in designing, testing, and improving the weapons and tactics of the U.S. armed forces before 1917. In response to
the sinking of the Lusitania by a German U-boat on 7 May
1915, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels established
the Naval Consulting Board to mobilize American scientists
for the study of naval problems. In early July 1915, Secre
8/4/06 6:01:49 PM

tary Daniels asked Americas greatest scientist, Thomas Alva
Edison (18471931), to serve as an advisor to the board.20
Edison agreed, and the Naval Consulting Board became an
important means of managing American scientic skills for
the war eort. The board remained an unocial entity until
29 August 1916, when Congress recognized its status in the
FY17 naval appropriations bill. Edison played an important
part in organizing the eorts of the board and personally
undertook a wide variety of scientic studies, often spending long periods at sea collecting data.21 His most notable
contributions dealt with the submarine threat and included
a plan for coastal shipping that minimized the U-boat threat,
a study of the tactic of zigzagging (which found the tactic
useless for merchant ships moving at less than 10 knots), and
the preparation of a tactical board game designed to illustrate methods by which merchant vessels might avoid being
sighted by enemy submarines.22
Edisons studies for the Naval Consulting Board were
characterized by the collection of empirical data from actual
operations, eective application of scientic method and statistical techniques to the analysis of that operational data, and
the formulation of recommendations to Navy leaders on how
to solve complex operational problems. Edison was particularly adept at dening measures of eectiveness, a skill that
gave his studies substantial weight and brought him very close
to the type of OR that would ourish in World War II.23
Like many of the operations analysts who followed him,
Edison learned that a civilian scientist could expect serving
ocers to ignore or even actively discredit the results of his

studies, particularly because he was not in continuous direct contact with the operational commanders in the eld.24
Consequently, his work had no eect on the Navy, and the
suggestions he made to the British Admiralty in late 1917
were either already being put into eect or were judged impractical.25
Conclusion
What links Archimedes, Epaminondas, Philip II of
Macedon, the Renaissance military innovators, Vauban, Jomini, Lanchester, Tiverton, Hill, and Edison? All of them
sought to dene and nd solutions to the problems of weapons design, military organization, and tactical methods by
collecting operational data and subjecting it to more or less
rigorous scientic, often mathematical, analysis. They then
presented their conclusions to the military leaders of their
time for implementation and consequent improvements that
enhanced the prospects of victory. As both scienceparticularly the science of mathematicsand military technology became more sophisticated over the centuries, so too did
the quantitative and qualitative analysis of warfare and the
solutions derived therefrom. Although their methods may
today be considered primitive, Archimedes and the others
were indeed the forefathers of those operations analysts who
have attempted, with some success, to describe many aspects
of war in concrete terms.
prologue notes
1Draft conference program, Dept of Mathematics and Physics,

Roskilde University, 27 Aug 02 (http://mmf. ruc.dk/~booss/mathwar/,
accessed 1 Feb 03). The conference included several other papers of
interest to operations researchers.
2See, for example, Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group:
A History of Naval Operations Analysis (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1984), pp. 34; U.K. Air Ministry, Origins and Development of
Operational Research in the Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3368 (London:
Her Majestys Stationery Oce, 1963), p. xvii (hereafter cited as OR in
RAF).
3N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, eds., The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 9899.
4Ibid., p. 815; Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1964), pp. 1821; John F. C. Fuller, Armament and
History (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1945), pp. 2829.
5For the contributions of Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Galileo, see
Henry Guerlac, Vauban: The Impact of Science on War, in Edward
Mead Earle, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler, college ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 2942.
For Machiavelli, see Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the

Art of War, in the same volume, pp. 325.
6Ibid., pp. 2930.
7On the life and work of Vauban, see Guerlac, Vauban, pp. 2648.
8Quoted in R. V. Jones, The Blackett Memorial Lecture 1982: A
Concurrence in Learning and Arms, Journal of the Operational Research
Society 33 (1982): 77980.
9For a discussion of the inuence of all three theorists and a comparison
of Clausewitz and Jomini, see the excellent paper by Christopher Bassford
titled Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, presented at the 23d
Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State
University, 26 Feb 93, http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/
Jomini/JOMINIX.html, accessed 3 Feb 03. For Clausewitz, see Hans
Rothfels, Clausewitz, in Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 93113;
and the introductory material in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976). For Jomini, see the essay by Crane Brinton, Gordon A.
Craig, and Felix Gilbert, Jomini, in Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.
7792; and the introductory material in Antoine-Henri Jomini, Jomini
36171_Frontmatter2_V&VII.indd Sec1:6
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prologue
and His Summary of the Art of War: A Condensed Version, J. D. Hittle,
ed. (Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1947). Bassford (Jomini and
Clausewitz, p. 16, n. 11) listed a few of the many English translations of
Jominis work and those American texts derived from Jomini.
10Clausewitz rst work, The Principles of War, was written in
1812 for the Prussian crown prince. His famous On War was published
posthumously in full in 1832. Jominis best-known work, Prcis de lart de
la guerre (The Summary of the Art of War), published in 1838, was written
for the Russian czar Alexander I.
11Bassford, Jomini and Clausewitz, p. 13.
12Frederick W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of
the Fourth Arm (London: Constable and Company, 1916). Although
Lanchesters work was not published until 1916, much of it was written as
early as October 1914.
13Ibid., p. 4.
14Ibid., p. 39. In focusing on the importance of concentration,
Lanchester echoed the conclusions that underlay Epaminondas oblique
order more than two thousand years earlier.
15Ibid., p. 48.
16Joseph H. Engel, Lanchesters Equations, in Saul I. Gass and
Carl M. Harris, eds., Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management
Science, 2d (centennial) ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001),
pp. 43740.
17U.K. Air Ministry, OR in the RAF, p. 1.
18Joseph F. McCloskey, The Beginnings of Operations Research:
19341941, Operations Research 35, 1 (1987): 143. The concept of circular
error probable describes the mathematical probability of the distribution

of bomb or artillery strikes around the putative aiming point.
19Ibid. A physiologist, Archibald Vivian Hill (18861977), shared
the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1922 for his work on the
heat generated by muscle activity.
20Edisons work as president of the Naval Consulting Board is
summarized in Lloyd N. Scott, Naval Consulting Board of the United States
(Washington: USGPO, 1920). See also William F. Whitmore, Edison
and Operations Research, Journal of the Operations Research Society of
America 1, 2 (1953): 8385; and Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group,
pp. 68. The Naval Consulting Board, which met formally for the rst
time on 7 October 1915, comprised Edison as president, Dr. Miller
Reese Hutchinson, and two members from each of the eleven largest U.S.
engineering societies. Rear Admiral William Strother Smith served as the
Navys liaison ocer to the board.
21Scott (Naval Consulting Board, pp. 16092) enumerated Edisons
many and varied contributions.
22Ibid., pp. 16570, 180; Whitmore, Edison and Operations
Research, pp. 8384. Edisons board game was very similar to the popular
game Battleship that is available in toy stores today.
23Whitmore, Edison and Operations Research, p. 83; McCloskey,
Beginnings, pp. 14344.
24Whitmore, Edison and Operations Research, p. 85; William F.
Whitmore, Military Operations ResearchA Personal Retrospect,
Operations Research 9, 2 (1961): 261.
25Whitmore, Edison and Operations Research, pp. 8485.
8/4/06 6:01:49 PM
8/4/06 6:01:49 PM
chapter one
Operations Research in World War II
he story of the development of operations research

(OR) in World War II encompasses the mobilization of scientists in Britain and the United States and
the cooperation of the two great transatlantic allies as well as
the design of new weapons and their constant improvement,
the study of the human factors involved in their use, and the
constant search for better methods of their employment.1 It
is also the story of the steady development of a new science
and the bureaucratic battles to ensure that it was used fully in
the ght against the Axis powers. On an even more nite level,
it is the story of how managers and analysts were recruited,
trained, administered, and employed in OR work and of the
specic contributions they made to winning the war.
The story begins shortly before the war in Great Britain
with the development of radio detection and ranging, better known by its acronym (radar), and the eorts of British
scientists to nd eective ways of using the new technology
to solve Britains most pressing military problem: the defense
of the homeland against attack by enemy aircraft. The science of OR emerged from the search for eective techniques
for the use of radar, and, once the war began, OR methods
quickly spread as the British armed forces at home and overseas created OR units to nd the solutions to urgent technical and operational problems.
British OR practitioners eagerly shared their discoveries
with their American colleagues, and, after Pearl Harbor, the
U.S. armed forces began to establish OR units. Although administrative problems and the resistance of some commanders slowed the growth of OR in the U.S. forces, particularly
in the Army ground forces, the value of OR for improving
combat operations was gradually recognized, and OR in the
U.S. armed forces took on a character of its own that was
somewhat dierent from its British model.
The new science of OR gave the Allies a signicant advantage over the Axis powers in World War II. The methods
of OR steadily increased in sophistication over the course of
the war and were applied to an increasing variety of military

activities. By 1945, planning for postwar military organization in both Britain and the United States included provision for the continued use of OR in developing new weapons, organization, tactics, and strategy.
Radar and the Origins of
Operational Research
In March 1934, the Nazi government of Germany, led
by Adolf Hitler, denounced the disarmament clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles, restored compulsory universal military
service, and openly began the process of rearmament and
aggression that led to World War II. Great Britain, its defenses debilitated by a decade and a half of neglect, at last
began to recognize the challenge posed by a resurgent Germany. An aerial bombing attack on Britain appeared to be
the most dangerous threat, and, at the end of July 1934, the
British government acted to increase the size of its air defense forces. The eort was accelerated in the spring of 1935
after Hitler bragged that the Luftwae had achieved parity with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and would soon reach
equality with France.2
In the spring of 1934, A. P. Rowe, then the assistant
for armaments to H. E. Wimperis, the director of scientic
research in the Air Ministry, attended a demonstration of
an acoustic early warning system comprising a number of
enormous concrete sound reectors installed on the Channel coast. Convinced that the acoustic system would not
work, Rowe studied all the Air Ministry les on air defense,
and, in June 1934, he wrote a memorandum for Wimperis
identifying the urgent need for an eective early warning
system against enemy aircraft.3 Five months later, in November 1934, Wimperis recommended to the secretary of
state for air, Lord Londonderry, the formation of a committee to study the problem of air defense. Lord Londonderry
quickly approved Wimperis suggestion and named the
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distinguished chemist and rector of the Imperial College
of Science and Technology, Henry E. Tizard, to head a
Committee for the Scientic Study of Air Defence. Other
members appointed to the committee included A. V. Hill,
P. M. S. Blackett, Wimperis, and Rowe as secretary.4 Ocially charged with considering how far recent advances in
scientic and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen
the present methods of defence against hostile aircraft, the
Tizard Committee met for the rst time in January 1935.5
Shortly before the rst meeting, Professor Hill suggested
that the superintendent of the Radio Department of the
National Physical Laboratory, Robert Watson-Watt, be
consulted about the feasibility of a death ray to be used
against enemy bomber crews.6 Watson-Watt concluded
that the death ray concept was impractical but did suggest
that reected radio waves might be used to locate aircraft
in ight. On 26 February 1935, Watson-Watt conducted a
demonstration of his concept of radio detection and ranging, and Rowe reported favorably about it to the Tizard
Committee, upon whose recommendation the Air Ministry
named Watson-Watt to lead a small group of scientists in a
series of experiments on the detection of aircraft by radio
waves.7 The technical obstacles were quickly overcome, and
by July 1935 Watson-Watts team had demonstrated that
radar was capable of detecting unknown aircraft up to a
range of 33 miles as well as guiding interceptor aircraft at
long range and directing searchlights and antiaircraft guns
at short range.8
It soon became obvious that the utility of radar as a
means of defense against enemy bombers depended on its
integration with the existing system of ground observers,
interceptor aircraft, and antiaircraft artillery positions. Accordingly, the Air Ministry established the Bawdsey Research Station under Watson-Watt in early 1936 to serve as
the focal point for radar experimentation as well as headquarters for the chain of radar stations planned for the English coast.9 That same year, the RAF Fighter Command was
established and charged with the air defense of Britain, and a
small team of RAF ocers led by Dr. B. G. Dickins, an engineer from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough,
was established at Biggin Hill in Kent to study how the radar
chain might be used for aircraft interception. The Biggin Hill
group, working closely with the scientists at Bawdsey, conducted a series of experiments between 1936 and 1938 that
aimed at integrating radar with other early warning, ghter
direction and control, and antiaircraft artillery systems. As P.
M. S. Blackett later wrote, the Biggin Hill experiments were
the rst step towards the fully edged operational research
sections (ORS) eventually attached to all the major commands of all three Services.10 The ocial historian of OR
in the RAF also observed that
the Biggin Hill experiments are important historically for two

reasons. Firstly, they developed the technique that won the
Battle of Britain and, secondly, they marked the beginning
of an era of close collaboration between the serving ocer
and the scientist in the study of operational problems which
achieved such great success during the war and has remained
with us to this day.11
From 1937 to the outbreak of war in 1939, the scientists at Bawdsey and Biggin Hill took part in the annual air
defense exercises conducted by Headquarters, RAF Fighter
Command. The rst of these exercises was held in the summer of 1937, and an attempt was made to integrate the information generated by the Bawdsey radar station with the
general air defense warning and control system, but the results achieved were unsatisfactory.12
In July 1938, Watson-Watt became director of communications development in the Air Ministry, and A. P. Rowe
took over as superintendent of Bawdsey Research Station
for the rest of the war. During the 1938 air defense exercises,
Rowe assigned two teams to evaluate the developing air defense system. The team led by Eric C. Williams studied the
problems associated with the process of plotting and ltering
the data received from the chain of ve radar stations then in
operation.13 Although the technical aspects of using radar
for aircraft detection were validated, new problems arose
from the need to handle data from more than one station.
The second team, led by G. A. Roberts, went to the operations rooms of the ghter groups to observe the controllers
handling the information generated by the chain of radar
stations. Roberts focused on the overall system while his colleagues, I. H. Cole and J. Woodforde, concentrated on ghter
control techniques and improvement of the equipment used
in the operations rooms.
Plans called for the relocation of the Bawdsey Research
Station to Dundee in Scotland in the event of war.14 Shortly
before the outbreak of war in September 1939, A. P. Rowe
and the RAF ocer-in-charge of radar development, Squadron Leader Raymund G. Hart, made an informal arrangement for a small group of scientists from Bawdsey to remain
behind to form a research section at Headquarters, Fighter
Command, at Stanmore.15 The teams from Bawdsey led by
Williams and Roberts went to Stanmore again during the
1939 air defense exercises, and their work so impressed Air
Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding that he asked for a section to be permanently stationed at Stanmore. Both teams
were subsequently attached to Fighter Command headquarters in accordance with the Rowe-Hart agreement and
Air Chief Marshal Dowdings request. A Canadian on the
sta at Bawdsey, Harold Larnder, was assigned to lead the
combined team on 3 September 1939.16 The team, which
was designated the Stanmore Research Section in February
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operations research in world war ii

1940, remained part of the Bawdsey establishment (that is,
the Telecommunications Research Establishment under the
newly formed Ministry of Aircraft Production) until June
1941 when it was ocially incorporated into the RAF as
Operational Research Section (ORS) Fighter Command.
OR in the British Armed Forces,
By the summer of 1941, the Air Ministry had recognized the value of the work being done at RAF Fighter
Command, and it was decided to establish OR sections
throughout RAF on the pattern of the Stanmore group. OR
sections were soon established in the other RAF commands
at home and overseas as well as in the Army, the Admiralty,
and the Ministry of Home Defense.17 Eventually a limited
number of OR sections were also formed for service with
British ground forces. Each of the services also established a
number of high-level committees and other agencies to coordinate the work of their various OR sections and to provide
liaison with similar units in the other services.
The number of people engaged in OR work in Britain
grew steadily throughout the war but was constrained by the
availability of skilled scientic talent; by mid-1942, the British were already struggling to nd enough qualied personnel for OR work.18 Even so, just before V-E Day, RAF had
some two hundred scientic ocers engaged in OR at home
and overseas, and the British Army had another 365 scientists so occupied.19 By the end of the war, the overall total
had risen to more than one thousand.20
Most of the analysts and supervisors in the British OR
programs were scientists (mainly physicists), engineers, or
mathematicians.21 This was only natural because new OR
workers were normally recruited by those already involved in
OR. Leading scientists such as Tizard, Watson-Watt, Rowe,
and Blackett were particularly active recruiters. Despite a
preference for men from the hard sciences, a number of life
scientists (particularly biologists and geneticists), geologists,
statisticians, and a few businessmen and liberal arts graduates
were recruited as well. Although the British OR analysts were
mostly men, several women university graduates were also
active in OR work, notably K. M. M. Goggin at ORS RAF
Bomber Command and Hilary Lang-Brown who worked at
both ORS RAF Fighter and Bomber commands.22
The British soon discovered that what was really required
was not so much formal scientic training as it was a scientic mind attuned to questioning assumptions, devising and
testing hypotheses by means of logic and experimentation,
collecting and analyzing large quantities of diverse data, and
formulating eective solutions. Maj. W. Barton Leach and
Dr. Ward F. Davidson concluded that only approximately
20 percent of the OR work undertaken by the British up to
mid-1942 required specialized scientic knowledge or ad-
vanced mathematical training, and that such knowledge and

training were less necessary when the project involved the
analysis of operational systems (true operational analysis)
rather than the more technical study of specic weapons.23
In point of fact, the men and women engaged in OR work
frequently found themselves dealing with matters far from
their eld of specialization. Dr. Cecil Gordon, the geneticist
who developed planned ying and planned maintenance
for RAF Coastal Command, wrote:
The complete disregard for frontiers between the dierent
subjects, and the readiness to accept any problems as within
their terms of reference, has been a refreshing contrast to the
rigid specialization that has developed in all other branches of
science. The Operational Research Sections have recaptured
the atmosphere of the period of the foundation of the Royal
Society.24
Like Gordon, many of the British and Commonwealth

scientists who entered OR work during the war were distinguished men in their eld. ORS Coastal Command alone
boasted ve fellows of the Royal Society (P. M. S. Blackett,
John C. Kendrew, Evan J. Williams, Conrad H. Waddington, and John M. Robertson) and one fellow of the Australian National Academy ( James M. Rendel) as well as two
future Nobel laureates (Blackett and Kendrew). One reason that so many eminent British scientists were eager to
participate in OR activities was perhaps their view that it
oered an excellent way to inuence government policy and
decision making.25
By and large, the scientists engaged in OR work in Britain remained in civilian status, but a few were commissioned
in the British armed forces before they were recruited for
OR work, and members of the overseas OR sections were
frequently given honorary commissions to clarify their status in the event of capture by the enemy.26 In addition, some
military ocers with the requisite skills were seconded to
OR units in each of the services. Blackett and other prominent OR experts frequently voiced their preference for civilian analysts, noting that men of the highest intellectual
capacity were required and that civilians were better able to
deal comfortably with all ranks and were not distracted by
routine sta duties or the imperatives of a military career.27
A good deal of the credit for dening OR and codifying
its scientic rules as well as determining the organizational and administrative structure of the British OR sections
should go to P. M. S. Blackett.28 In December 1941, shortly
before he left Coastal Command for the Admiralty, Blackett
prepared a paper, titled Scientists at the Operational Level,
in which he outlined his opinions regarding the organization
and utilization of scientists in OR units working with the
services.29 This paper, which is considered by some to be the
cornerstone of modern operations research,30 provides the
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rationale for assigning civilian analysts to operational military units, drives home the value of scientic methods to the
study of operations, and addresses the proper organization
and administration of OR units.
One of the principles evolved by the British was that OR
groups should be formed on the request of the commander
to assist him in solving his problems, functioning as integral
parts of his command and working closely with his military
sta and subordinate commanders. Projects were initiated
either on request from the commander or, more commonly,
by the OR section itself. The OR section chiefs reported directly and only to the commander and normally sat in on
sta meetings and conferences.31 By working in close proximity to the uniformed elements of the command, the OR
units gained access to all types of operational information
and shared in the informal communications networks.
The acceptance of this arrangement by both civilian analysts and military ocers helped oset the natural suspicion
in which civilians were held by many ocers. When the war
began in 1939, the very idea that scientists should interfere
in matters of tactics and strategy was anathema to senior ofcers in Britain.32 However, as scientists and military personnel worked together much of the old mutual antipathy
evaporated, and the two groups were usually able to work
out a reasonable modus vivendi, particularly after the military learned that the scientists were genuinely interested in
improving operations rather than showing up the military.33
In those cases in which the OR analysts gained the complete
trust and condence of the commander, they enjoyed the
one supreme privilege of the court jester of old, namely that
of saying things which would [be] lse-majest from anyone
else. The privilege is a very great oneit should be used on
occasions, but never abused.34
The British OR sections made signicant contributions
to winning the war as well as to developing the methodology
of operations research. Leach and Davidson characterized
the results achieved by the British operational groups up to
1942 as uniformly successful, in some cases dramatically so,
and Wing Commander A. C. Menzies, the head of the British Air Ministry Center of Operational Research, told them
that experimental research (except where some entirely new
device like Radar is produced) is likely to yield an improvement of the order of 5 or 10%; but the yield of operational
research is likely to be 100% or more.35 In a postwar essay
titled Recollections of Problems Studied, 194045, P. M.
S. Blackett was less precise but cited a number of areas in
which the accomplishments of the OR sections contributed
to winning the war.36
The Stanmore Research Section and its successor, ORS
Fighter Command, initiated the new science of operational
research and designed the integrated radar-based air defense
system that ensured the victory of RAF in the Battle of Britain. Charles F. Goodeve later noted that radar increased the
probability of intercepting an enemy aircraft by a factor of
10, and the work of ORS Fighter Command increased it by
another factor of 2.37 The operational analysts at Stanmore
also investigated a number of related problems. including
enemy bomber and escort tactics; procedures for night operations, including the development of ground control intercept
equipment and methods; the most protable use of weapons under various conditions; and the eects of weather and
other factors on defensive air operations.38 During the battle
in France in May 1940, they were called upon to extend their
analytical eorts into the eld of high-level strategic policy
making. On 14 May, the French requested additional RAF
ghter support. The commander of RAF Fighter Command,
Sir Dowding, intuitively opposed the transfer of additional
aircraft and pilots to France and tasked the Stanmore group
to make an assessment of British and French aircraft losses.
In a matter of hours, Eric C. Williams, the deputy section
chief, made a study of the problem and concluded that additional transfers would involve attrition that could not be
made good and that Fighter Command would be weakened
beyond recovery in the face of the likelihood of a German attempt to invade Britain.39 The section chief, Hugh Larnder,
prepared the results of Williams study in easily understandable graphic form and delivered the graphs to Dowding, who
presented them to the War Cabinet on 15 May. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was inclined to accede to the French
request but was convinced by Dowdings clear presentation
of the risks and thus refused to send additional squadrons to
France, thereby preserving critical aircraft and pilots for the
coming Battle of Britain.40 The involvement of the Stanmore
analysts in questions of higher policy marked a signicant
change in the tasks that OR analysts were called to perform.
Thereafter, OR would also be used to predict the outcome of
future operations with the objective of inuencing policy.41
Larnder himself concluded that had Dowding not won his
battle with Churchill in May, he would almost certainly have
lost the Battle of Britain in September.42
ORS Coastal Command made major contributions to
the defeat of the German U-boat threat in the crucial battle
in the Atlantic. One of the most striking accomplishments
of the OR analysts at Coastal Command was E. J. Williams
work on depth charge settings, which led immediately to a
dramatic improvement of Coastal Command aerial attacks
on German submarinesestimates of the increased eciency ranged between 400 and 700 percentand signicantly
diminished U-boat activity around the British Isles in the
last half of 1941.43 A second major contribution was made
by Coastal Command analysts supervised by Cecil Gordon
in studies that led to the important concepts of planned y-
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ing and planned maintenance, which proposed that the
level of ying intensity be set rst, and the maintenance
organization be revamped accordingly, thereby allowing a
reduction in the number of maintenance crews, more ecient use of ground crews, and more ying time.44 Planned
ying and planned maintenance were subsequently adopted
throughout RAF and signicantly increased the available ying hours for RAF aircraft.
ORS Bomber Command contributed important studies on bombing accuracy, the eect of given bomb loads
on dierent types of targets, aerial gunnery, and the causes
of bomber losses.45 It was found that large-scale air raids
over Germany produced proportionately fewer friendly
losses than did smaller raids, a nding that led to the rst
thousand-plane RAF raid over Cologne, Germany, in May
1942.46 ORS Bomber Command also contributed to the
development of numerous technological innovations for
the protection and guidance of bombers, including the use
of Window (a cloud of small metallic strips dropped by
bombers to confuse enemy radar) and the Gee, Oboe, and
H2S airborne radar navigation and bombing systems.47
At Anti-Aircraft Command, Blacketts Circus studied
the best methods of conveying radar information to the antiaircraft artillery positions, the best deployment of the available guns and radar sets around London, and the claims of
enemy aircraft destroyed by antiaircraft re. Their work resulted in a reduction in the number of rounds red to down
one German aircraft from twenty thousand in the summer
of 1941 to only four thousand in 1942.48 One Army Operational Research Group (AORG) study, conducted with
ORS Air Defence of Great Britain (ORS Fighter Command), resulted in methods that led to antiaircraft guns
shooting down approximately 82 percent of the German V1 buzzbombs red at England, a rate double that before the
study.49 Another notable AORG study of artillery gun drills
demonstrated that one crew member performed no function
whatsoever during drills and could easily be eliminated because his task was to act as horse holder in a unit that had
not had horses for two decades.50
The OR analysts at the Admiralty under the direction
of P. M. S. Blackett also made substantial improvements in
the organization and defense of convoys and antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) operations in general, and in such elds as
the use of radar and radio, aids to navigation, naval gunnery,
and mine warfare as well as the continuation of RAF Coastal
Command studies on the use of aircraft to attack submarines.51 Studies of the January 1941April 1943 Atlantic
convoys by H. R. Hulme and J. H. C. Whitehead revealed
that, with the number of escort vessels being held constant,
the loss rate of merchant ships in convoy could be reduced by
simply increasing the size of the convoys.52 Larger convoys
also reduced the overall number of crossings by one-third

and the number of U-boat attacks by almost as much.53 The
OR eorts at the Admiralty played a major role in winning
the crucial battle in the Atlantic.
In addition to solving many complex operational problems, the British OR sections provided a much better level
of feedback from the operating units to which they were
attached to the national scientic and engineering establishments that were charged with developing new weapons
and equipment and improving existing materiel. By virtue
of their scientic and engineering backgrounds, the civilian
analysts in RAF, the Army, and the Royal Navy were able
to understand and describe problems and opportunities that
the military users of weapons and equipment were often not
prepared to recognize.54
The British OR sections also made signicant contributions to the development of OR methodology. In a paper
prepared in May 1943, titled A Note on Certain Aspects of
the Methodology of Operational Research, Blackett summarized many of the OR techniques developed in Britain up
to that time.55 The Stanmore Research Section established
the basic methods of operational research in the course of its
studies on the integrated air defense system and other problems associated with the control of ghters in both defensive and oensive operations. E. J. Williams 1941 study of
optimum depth charge settings for RAF Coastal Command
is often considered the classic operations research study of
World War II.56 Blackett later noted that
this work of Williams constitutes perhaps one of the most
striking major achievements of the methods of operational
analysis. This method is simply that of the scientic study of
the actual operations of war, using all the statistical material
that can be collected combined with a detailed knowledge of
the physical properties of the weapons used and of the actual
tactical situation. Such work can only be achieved by the closest
collaboration between scientists of great analytical ability and
the Service operational stas.57
The density method, a basic OR tool, was rst enunciated in the form of a series of equations in the reports prepared
by E. J. Williams in March and October of 1942 regarding
oensive ASW operations in the Bay of Biscay.58 The basic
theorem can be expressed as u = A x D, where u is the total
number of submarine sightings or detections, A is the area
swept out, and D is the surfaced density obtained by dividing the number of surfaced U-boats in the total area by the
size of the total area.59 According to Joseph F. McCloskey
(a professor at Cal State, Dominguez Hills, and an expert
on OR in World War II), the density method was the basic
method of analysis used by ORS Coastal Command . . . and
took into account the number of submarines known or believed to be in an area, the proportion likely to be on the
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surface at any given time, and the characteristics and performance of the aircraft patrolling the area.60
OR units were also attached to some British ground
forces. No. 2 ORS with Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomerys 21. Army Group developed almost from scratch
the process of battle analysis, including techniques for assessing air and artillery support as well as the physical and
morale eects of ground combat operations.61
In retrospect, the principal contribution of the British
OR organizations to OR methodology was to bring together the two primary aspects of OR: (1) the evaluation of the
performance of weapons and equipment and (2) the analysis
of operations to determine how the weapons and equipment
interacted with tactics, and to what degree tactics dictated
the weapons selected.62 Subsequently, two other important
uses of OR emerged: the prediction of the outcome of future operations either in the tactical or the strategical [sic]
eld with the object of inuencing policy, and . . . the study of
the eciency of the organisations which wielded the equipment and weapons in battle.63 All four aspects of OR would
prove critical to Allied victory in World War II.
OR Crosses the Atlantic
The Atlantic Ocean has never been an obstacle to communication between British and American scientists or military men. Thus, it was only natural that word of the new
techniques of operational research soon reached the United
States. Individual British scientists, British scientic missions
to the United States, U.S. military attachs and observers in
Britain, and direct contact between British and American
military commanders and sta ocers ensured that the benets being derived from OR by the British armed services
were well known in America long before Pearl Harbor.64
The work on the development of radar and its integration in the British air defense system being done at Bawdsey, Biggin Hill, and Stanmore was undoubtedly known by
American scientists and military personnel through private
communications even before the war began in September
1939. However, the rst ocial government-to-government
discussions of radar and the new techniques of OR probably came with the Tizard scientic mission to the United
States in September 1940. The idea of sending a scientic
mission to the United States to share information on the development of new technology in Britain and to encourage
American scientists and industrialists to aid in its production was the brainchild of Sir Henry Tizard and A. V. Hill,
both members of the Tizard Committee on air defense.65
Following an unsuccessful visit by Hill to Washington,
D.C., in May 1940, undertaken on the suggestion of Tizard
for the purpose of encouraging greater exchange of scientic
information and military experience between Britain and the
United States, the two men developed a plan for a full-scale

scientic mission to the United States in the hopes of encouraging the Americans to help produce some of the new
war technology being developed in Britain. The concept was
laid out by Tizard and approved by Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. Meanwhile, the fall of France in May 1940 made
Anglo-American scientic cooperation even more urgent,
and, in July 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to
receive the mission headed by Tizard.
The Tizard mission, which included both British and
Canadian scientists and military personnel, arrived in Washington at the end of August 1940, prepared to hand over to
the United States the results of their research and development in a wide range of elds.66 The collection of scientic
innovations that the British delivered to the United States
has been called the most valuable cargo ever brought to our
shores.67 The British gift would be paid for many times
over by American improvements and mass production of
technology rst designed in Britain, such as radar, ASDIC
(sonar), the sonobuoy, the variable time fuze, and the cavity
magnetron.68
At rst, U.S. Army and Navy ocers were leery of disclosing their own secrets to the British, and it was not until
mid-September that the necessary permissions were obtained for serious discussions with the Tizard mission to
proceed. Once the hesitation of the American military was
overcome, the Tizard mission proved extremely successful.
Information on current developments was exchanged, and
plans were made for future scientic cooperation. The decision made to pool scientic information and the later decision to divide up research responsibilities have been called
the starting point for Allied supremacy in new weapons,
notably radar and subsurface warfare devices.69
On 27 June 1940, three months before the arrival of the
Tizard mission, President Roosevelt established the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) under the Council of National Defense and named as its chairman Dr. Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineer and then president of the
Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., as well as chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
A year later, in June 1941, Bush was named to head the new
Oce of Scientic Research and Development (OSRD);
and Dr. James B. Conant, a chemist and president of Harvard
University, took over as chairman of NDRC, which was subsumed under OSRD. NDRC, and after its creation OSRD,
greatly facilitated the exchange of scientic information with
the British and provided a channel for disseminating information about OR and other British scientic developments
throughout the American scientic community.
On 13 December 1940, Bush wrote to Sir Henry Tizard
in hopes of arranging a reciprocal visit by American scientists
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to Britain to discuss developments and the establishment of
oces in London and Washington to facilitate the exchange of
information. The details were worked out, the British issued
an invitation, and on 1 February 1941 President Roosevelt
asked Dr. Conant to lead the American delegation. Accompanied by Carroll Wilson and Frederick L. Hovde, Conant
arrived in England on 1 March.70 On 11 March, President
Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act, and British hesitations
about providing the Americans with sensitive scientic data
evaporated. Conant and his group were received cordially,
and serious discussions about the exchange of information,
the possible divvying up of elds of research, and the creation
of permanent oces to facilitate contacts ensued. The British stressed the importance of using scientists to work closely
with the military services and no doubt pushed the new concept of OR. Conant suggested that American scientists be
sent to Britain for training in radar and other matters, and
upon his return to the United States in April 1941 he urged
the Army and Navy to form OR groups.71
Conant was successful in establishing a permanent
American oce for scientic cooperation in London, and
a similar oce, called the British Central Scientic Oce,
was established in Washington, D.C., in April 1941, headed
by Dr. Charles G. Darwin, director of the National Physical
Laboratory. In the rst nine months after the establishment
of the U.S. London liaison oce, twenty-six American scientists visited Britain and studied a variety of scientic matters.72 OR was closely connected with the development of
radar in Britain, and representatives of NDRC Division 14
(Radar) were perhaps the rst to recognize the importance
of OR. Ralph Bowen, a member of Division 14 and research
director at Bell Laboratories, made a comprehensive study of
the British OR program by the end of 1941, and Division 14
and its principal contractor, the Radiation Laboratory at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), kept a close
eye on OR developments.
Among the American scientists who learned about OR
work during visits to Britain before Pearl Harbor was John
T. Tate, a physicist from the University of Minnesota and
editor of Physical Review, who traveled to Britain in June
1941 and observed OR activities at Coastal Command and
at the Admiralty. Thornton L. Page of the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory (responsible for mine warfare activities in the
U.S. Navy) was also among the visitors who had direct
contact with British OR analysts. An American group that
included Jacob Bronowski, LeRoy A. Brothers, and Charles
J. Hitch also spent time studying the eects of bombing
with the OR analysts at the civil defense establishment at
Princes Risborough.73
A number of U.S. military ocers also traveled to Britain before Pearl Harbor to study British air defense, stra-
tegic bombing, and antisubmarine warfare activities. They

could scarcely have avoided learning something about the
British development of OR. Army Air Forces Maj. Gordon
P. Saville went to Britain in the summer of 1941 to observe
the Battle of Britain. Then-Lt. Gen. Henry H. Hap Arnold, the commander of the Army Air Forces, subsequently
recalled Maj. Saville from England to set up air defenses in
the United States, and, by the end of January 1942, Saville
was already contemplating the establishment of his own
OR group.74
Two weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. naval air attach in London passed to the chief of
naval operations, Admiral Harold Stark, a copy of P. M.
S. Blacketts new paper on Scientists at the Operational
Level and recommended establishment of an OR program in the U.S. Navy.75 The Navy technical bureaus, especially the Bureau of Ordnance, were already acquainted
with Blacketts work, and informal talks about establishing
OR in the mine warfare eld were in progress. Navy Capt.
Wilder D. Baker, the ocer-in-charge of ASW studies for
the Atlantic Fleet, also read Blacketts paper and asked John
T. Tate of NDRC Division 14 to provide some scientists to
help with ASW studies.76
The Role of NDRC and OSRD in the Development of OR
in the United States
In the months after the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. armed forces gradually began
to develop an OR capability. A major role in that development was played by civilian scientists from NDRC and
OSRD.77 Created by the Council of National Defense on 27
June 1940 to coordinate and support war-related research,
NDRC became a component of OSRD when that oce was
established by Executive Order 8807 on 28 June 1941 to advise the president on the status of defense-related scientic
and medical research, to coordinate federal government research related to national defense, and to marshal scientic
personnel and resources for the war eort. Executive Order
8807 also created a second component of OSRD, the Committee on Medical Research (CMR) to support military
medical research.78 Two other federal agencies, the National
Academy of Sciences and the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics, both of which existed before the war, completed the group of government agencies that oversaw and
supported scientic research in World War II.79
As noted previously, NDRC established a London liaison oce following the visit of James B. Conant to Britain
in March and April 1941. The liaison oce became a component of OSRD per OSRD Administrative Order No. 1
of 20 August 1941. The rst head of the oce, Frederick
L. Hovde, was replaced by Bennett Archambault in April
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1942. The oce had a small permanent sta and handled a
large number of visiting American scientists (some 250 per
quarter), generated some seven hundred cables per quarter,
and processed more than fty-nine thousand reports, letters,
and samples over the course of the war.80 The oce was ofcially abolished in late July 1945, but some liaison activities
continued to mid-November 1946.
Vannevar Bush is often credited with promoting OR
in the United States in World War II, but the evidence
strongly suggests that Bush in fact acted as a brake on the
adoption of OR.81 Although practical considerations such
as the scarcity of scientic manpower colored Bushs views,
his desire to keep OSRD out of the services OR programs
appears to have primarily sprung from his intent to preserve
the purity of science as a search for truth unhampered by
government controls. At least until mid-1943, Bush sought
to avoid the involvement of OSRD and its subordinate agencies in OR activities, arguing that OR sections might constitute a drain on scientic talent, interfere with the organization of scientic research and development (R&D) work,
and properly belonged to the services to manage directly.
His principal concern was to establish and preserve the autonomy of American science from government control and
interference, and the involvement of OSRD with OR in the
services would bring scientists too much under the control
of the government and the military. Moreover, he believed
that OR beneted the military, not scientic research and
development, and that, although scientists had much to oer
the military, the military had nothing to give scientists.82 By
dening OR as outside the scope of OSRDs proper functions and by suggesting that OR did not require the scientic
skills of OSRD research and development personnel, Bush
hoped to avoid the loss of key research scientists and managers to the service OR programs.83
Bushs attitude was outlined in a letter he addressed on
29 May 1942 to Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses and Rear
Adm. W. A. Lee, Jr., his colleagues on the Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee ( JNWEC) of the Joint
Chiefs of Sta:
A certain amount of operations research is being started in this
country. . . . I judge that it has in some instances produced signicant results [in Britain]. However, in regard to possible efforts along the same lines in this country, I have a few denite
ideas already formulated. . . . Research of this sort should, I feel,
be conducted by groups that are a part of the armed services
themselves, on account of the intimate interconnection with
operations. . . . It would be undesirable for NDRC to become
closely identied with such matters. This is for the general
reason that the NDRC is concerned with the development of
equipment for military use, whereas these groups are concerned
with the analysis of its performance.84
A few months later Bush wrote to Sir Henry Tizard:
It has been my view from the outset that this kind of activity
[OR] is one for which the Services themselves should take the
main responsibility. I am sure that civilian agencies can be of
real assistance in the selection of personnel who should remain
in civilian status, but in view of the need for intimate relationship between the operational research group and their commanding ocers, we consider that this mutual condence can
best be established and maintained if the activity is one which
is clearly recognized as a Service activity.85
Bush continued to hope that OSRD could avoid direct

involvement in the management and operations of OR sections in the U.S. armed forces. On 15 February 1943, he
wrote to Karl T. Compton, then the president of MIT:
This movement is certainly of great importance and I hope
that it will go well. On the other hand, I hesitate to become
too much involved with it, for I think it will prosper to best advantage if the Services go ahead with it themselves and do not
feel that it is being forced upon them in any way by any outside
scientists and engineers.86
Bushs eort to avoid deep involvement in OR was compromised by his subordinates in NDRC and OSRD, many
of whom became enthusiastic supporters of OR. The chairman of NDRC, James B. Conant, had observed the British
OR teams in action during his 1941 visit to Britain and argued forcefully for the adoption of a similar OR program in
the United States.87 Later, Conant wrote to Bush, As our
priority situation develops, I believe it may well prove that
we could transfer a number of men from NDRC projects to
operational research with an increased eectiveness in the
total war eort.88
During the rst months of 1943, scientists in NDRC
divisions with an interest in OR, notably Howard P. Robertson, Alan T. Waterman (a professor of physics at Yale
University), and Warren Weaver (head of NDRC Applied
Mathematics Panel), began to exert pressure on Bush to allow
greater OSRD involvement in OR.89 On 26 July 1943, John
H. Teeter wrote to Carroll Wilson arguing that Operational
Research ts into OSRD because of the need to coordinate
the distribution of scarce scientic manpower, the necessity
for constant interchange of information between the laboratories and the operating units in the eld, and the desirability
of raising the morale of R&D personnel by providing an opportunity to desert the bench and take up a gun.90 Moreover,
the heads of NDRC divisions with an operational rather than
strictly technological orientation saw OR as a way to market
their expertise directly to the military.91 Some NDRC leaders even took positive action on their own. For example, John
T. Tate of NDRC Division 14 oered the divisions assistance
to the Navy in the creation and operation of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG).92
In the end, Bush was forced to yield by the combined
force of demands by the armed services for OR involvement
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and the positive response to the concept of OR among his
own subordinates. The nal straw was probably a letter Bush
received from Ward F. Davidson in which Davidson noted
that the available scientic personnel in the United States
might be better used in OR than in research and development.93 In March 1943, Davidson directed another memorandum to Bush in which he noted:
One of the serious weaknesses under the present very loose organization is that there is not ready means for training men in
the broad principles of operations analysis nor for instructing
them in essential matters of military organization. . . . Finally, it
seems to me that OSRD might take the responsibility for (a) a
central Operations Analysis organization [and] (b) employing
civilian OA personnel for assignment to service commands.94
Bushs response was to simply rename the activity in

question in hopes of avoiding the adoption of OR on the
British model, which he believed gave the military too much
control over scientic activity. He thus proposed a program
of what he wished to be called operational analysis, managed
by the services directly with some limited support provided
by OSRD in recruitment, training, and liaison but without
burdening OSRD program and sta.95
The rapidly growing need for the services of scientists
with units in the eld oered Bush an opportunity to reach a
compromise on the matter of OSRD involvement in OR. By
mid-1943, the development of new military technology by
the Allies had progressed to the point that the focus for the
use of scientic manpower ought to change from developing new weapons to assisting the services in the optimal use
of those weapons already in production. At the same time,
internal OSRD discussions on the desirability of creating an
OSRD-managed OR program had convinced Bush that he
could no longer hold out.96 On 15 October 1943, Bush created the Oce of Field Service (OFS) with Karl T. Compton as chief and Alan T. Waterman as deputy.97 The mission
of OFS was to act as the OSRD focal point for OR activities
as well as to coordinate the elding and use of new weapons
systems by the armed forces. As Erik Peter Rau wrote in his
1999 doctoral dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania,
Bushs main objective in creating the OFS was to position
the OSRD as the principle [sic] broker of all forms of civilian technical expertise needed by military commands in the
eld, particularly those in the Pacic.98
OFS undertook three main types of projects: operational analysis; the assignment of one or two scientists to
assist combat units with the process of introducing new
weapons and equipment; and the assignment of groups of
scientists to the active theaters to conduct special studies,
make reports, and devise recommendations for improvements in the design and use of weapons and equipment.99
OFS also sponsored four large permanent eld activities:
Navy ASWORG, the ALSOS mission in Europe to survey German scientic developments, the Operational Research Section at Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.s Pacic Ocean Area headquarters in Hawaii, and the Research
Section at General MacArthurs Southwest Pacic Area
headquarters.100 Navy ASWORG, which operated under
a contract with Columbia University arranged by OSRD
and later administered by OFS, was of course deeply involved in OR, but the two OFS-sponsored groups in the
Pacic functioned more along the lines of a eld service
organization despite their names. In every case, the OR
activities for which OFS did take responsibility remained
under the operational control of the military organizations
to which they were attached.101
By the end of the war nearly ve hundred men and
women had been involved in the work of OFS.102 Of that
total, more than a third (37 percent) were physicists, electrical engineers, or communications experts, and others were
drawn from chemistry, civil and mechanical engineering, the
earth sciences, the life sciences, medicine, and industrial engineering, with a handful from such diverse elds as economics, law, and library science.103
For the most part, OSRD agencies did not participate
directly in OR work. However, NDRC and CMR, working closely with the armed services, did conduct some activities that can be characterized as OR.104 For example, the
Applied Mathematics Panel of NDRC, established in November 1942 under the direction of Warren Weaver, was
involved in the application of mathematics and statistical
methods in the analysis of bombing accuracy.105 Working
closely with Army, Army Air Forces, and Navy agencies at
home and overseas, the panel also studied rocket accuracy
and various gunnery problems of both naval and eld artillery. NDRC Division 2 (Eects of Impact and Explosion),
under MIT architect John E. Burchard, was also interested
in OR work on bombing eects being conducted by the
British Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Department at Princes Risborough.106
The civilian scientists of NDRC and OSRD also made
important contributions to the denition of OR and the description of its functions. Writing to Frederick B. Jewett on
7 February 1942, Karl T. Compton described the dierence
between an OR section and a eld research group. He dened the former as a civilian body attached to an operating
arm of the Army or Navy, whose function is to analyze the
eectiveness of various types and elements of eld operations
and advise the armed services on this subject and the latter as
a group of civilians who have accompanied newly developed
equipment into the eld or on board [sic] ship to study its
operation as a piece of equipment in order that the producer
of the equipment may be informed regarding points of failure
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or desirable redesign or adaptation which will make it perform its functions as an instrument in the hands of troops
more satisfactory.107 The distinction was an important one
in view of the fact that the teams organized by OFS for service with Army ground forces in the Pacic late in the war
were identied as OR sections but actually functioned more
as eld research groups. Civilian scientists also distinguished
between functional OR groups and structural ones. Functional OR groups focused on a particular military problem
(for example, antisubmarine warfare), whereas structural
OR groups were assigned to specic military commands and
focused on the problems of that command.108
Perhaps the most dicult challenge that OSRD faced
was nding sucient scientic manpower to meet Americas
needs. OSRD had to compete with American industry for
the services of both research scientists and engineers. Accordingly, OSRD focused on recruiting scientists from academia to meet the needs of the government and the armed
services.109 At rst, OSRD tried to decentralize research on
contract and leave the scientists at their home universities,
but eventually it became necessary to place scientists with
the operating units in the eld.110
Liaison with the armed services was another knotty problem faced by OSRD. To perform their functions adequately,
civilian scientists of NDRC, CMR, and OFS required easy
access to a wide variety of operational information that could
be obtained only from the services.111 In some cases, the services did not collect such data and had no eective way of
doing so. Much of the data they did have was classied, and
military ocers were normally reluctant to provide classied
information to civilians. Eventually, OSRD was able to reduce
this problem and many other aspects of working eectively
with the armed services. One method was that of seconding
ocers from the services to work with NDRC divisions and
other scientic groups as project liaison ocers, but these
ocers often lacked the necessary technical and military experience, rotated frequently, and often served the interests
of their military service rather than those of the country as
a whole.112 Somewhat better results were obtained through
the military members of the OSRD Advisory Council, the
War Department liaison ocer to NDRC, and the Navy coordinator of research and development.113
The other major forum for the coordination of OSRD
with the services was the Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Sta. In February
1942, Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson and the Army representative on the
OSRD Advisory Council, called Secretary Stimsons attention to the need to ensure that the War Department General Sta, and particularly the planners in the War Plans
Division, were kept up to date on the many new scientic
developments inuencing strategy and tactics.114 To perform this function, Bundy recommended the formation of a
three-man committee consisting of Vannevar Bush as chairman, an Army general, and a Navy admiral.115 Bush made a
similar proposal to President Roosevelt in March 1942, and
apparently also discussed the matter with Secretary Stimson.116 In April 1942, it was decided to form such a committee that would report to the newly formed Joint Chiefs
of Sta. JNWEC met for the rst time on 12 May 1942,
with Bush as chairman, Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses as
the Army representative, and Rear Adm. W. A. Lee, Jr., as
the Navy representative. The committee was charged with
coordinating the eorts of civilian research agencies and the
armed services in the development and production of new
weapons and equipment.117
JNWEC also played an extremely important role in the
spread of OR in the U.S. armed forces. It was for JNWEC
that Leach and Davidson compiled their comprehensive report on OR in Britain and the United States in the summer
of 1942.118 For a time, JNWEC was also the base for Maj.
Leachs intense eorts to spread the word about OR and
promote its adoption in the U.S. armed services. Although
primarily involved in the development and elding of new
weapons and equipment, JNWEC continued to be concerned with the use of OR techniques by U.S. forces until
the end of the war.
OR in the United States Navy,
The United States Navy owns the distinction of having the rst active OR group in the U.S. armed forces: the
Mine Warfare Operations Research Group (MWORG),
established informally in January 1942.119 The Navys early
adoption of OR was partly the result of prewar contacts with
British OR groups at RAF Coastal Command and the Admiralty working on problems of naval mining, antisubmarine
warfare, and convoy organization. The work being done in
Britain was directly applicable to the problems faced by the
U.S. Navy immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus,
it was only natural that the Navy should have been eager to
create its own OR capability. Although not the largest program in terms of numbers of scientists employed, the World
War II Navy OR program was arguably the best organized,
and it was the only U.S. OR program to survive essentially
unchanged into the postwar period.
Mine Warfare Operations Research Group
MWORG was ocially established as part of the U.S.
Navy Bureau of Ordnances Research Division on 24 June
1942, but it had existed informally since late January 1942
and thus merits distinction as the rst OR organization in
the U.S. armed forces. MWORG grew out of work being
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done on countermeasures for German magnetic mines from
December 1939 at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL)
in Washington, D.C.120 The NOL Mine Research Unit, led
from early 1940 by Ellis A. Johnson, a Carnegie Institution
physicist, focused on techniques for sweeping for magnetic
mines and degaussing (demagnetizing) U.S. naval and merchant vessels.121 In July 1940, Ralph D. Bennett, a professor
of electrical engineering at MIT, was called to active duty as
a lieutenant commander, U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) and
was assigned the task of expanding NOL sta, which he did
by bringing in accomplished scientists of his acquaintance,
increasing the scientic sta at NOL from a dozen to nearly one thousand.122 The scientists whom Lt. Cdr. Bennett
recruited joined a group that at various times included Dr.
Frances Bitter, William Shockley, John Bardeen, Shirley L.
Quimby, Lynn Rumbaugh, Scott Forbush, David Katcher,
and Dr. Thornton L. Page, all of whom would play important roles in OR in World War II and after.
On weekends, Johnsons Mine Research Unit met informally to discuss broader issues of mine and countermine
warfare and developed wargaming methods to work out the
interesting problems raised by naval mining operations. On
Saturday, 6 December 1941, Johnson was at Pearl Harbor
inspecting degaussing eorts, and the other members of the
group were in Washington, D.C., playing a wargame involving an aerial mining attack on Pearl Harbor.123 Following
the Japanese attack on the very next day, 7 December, Johnson helped to ensure that Pearl Harbor and its approaches
were clear of mines, and, on his return from Hawaii in January 1942, he set up an informal seminar at the NOL to
discuss mine warfare operations. The group was authorized
by NOL as a scientic study group in the Mine Research
Unit and met regularly from 21 January to 17 June 1942.124
Johnson reported the results of the meetings to Capt. J. B.
Glennan, the head of NOL, suggesting that wargames could
be used to develop mine countermeasures.125
Some naval ocers opposed the involvement of civilians
in sensitive operational matters such as those discussed in
NOL seminars, but the vice chief of naval operations, Vice
Adm. Frederick J. Horne, knew of Shirley Quimbys reports
on British mining operations and the work of Johnsons NOL
study group, and he urged NOL to continue the groups
work, basing it on the British OR model.126 In fact, the
Johnson study group had close contacts with the British OR
specialists working on naval problems and incorporated information on British mining operations and mine-sweeping
procedures into their informal discussions.127 The wargames
that they developed also used OR concepts learned from
the British. Quimby, a physicist from Columbia University,
served as the NOL liaison ocer in Britain and reported on
British OR methods with regard to mining.128 In the sum-
mer of 1942, Quimby was replaced by Dr. Thornton L. Page,

an astronomer from the University of Chicago who had long
been in contact with British OR scientists and had worked
with Blacketts group in 1941.129
On 1 March 1942, the NOL study group was combined
with a similar group in the Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) to
form the Mine Warfare Operations Research Group.130 Dr.
Walter Michels was designated as head of the new group and
had the assistance of Dr. Page and Dr. Laurence E. Hoisington in the task of studying all operational aspects of oensive
mine warfare, particularly analytical approaches to mineeld
design and the development of basic equations for mineeld theory.131 On 24 June 1942, MWORG was ocially
incorporated into the BuOrd Research Division. However,
MWORG inherited only part of the original NOL study
group, and additional scientists had to be recruited. Dr.
Francis Bitter, a physicist from MIT, was selected to head
MWORG (vice Walter Michels).132 Shirley Quimby was
recalled from London, and in September 1942 Ellis Johnson
transferred to MWORG, where he joined the famous mathematicians James Alexander and John von Neumann.133
By mid-1942, MWORG had grown to some nineteen
scientists, most of whom were physicists or mathematicians
and all of whom were employed by the Navy as civilian contract personnel on a per diem basis that varied from $9 to
$25.134 MWORG reported to Cdr. L. W. McKeehan, the
director of underwater ordnance research in the BuOrd Research Division.135 Its work involved two phases:
1. the gathering and analysis of information pertaining
to all aspects of naval mine and countermine operations, including the distribution of shipping, mineable
waters, degaussing facilities, and the characteristics of
U.S. and foreign mines; and
2. the application of the information and analyses developed in the rst phase to more-general problems
and the formulation of a theory of mining that included the study of the selection of mines, optimum
mine-laying patterns, countermeasures, and sweeping
techniques.136
The combination of technical and operational knowledge
represented in the theory of mining appealed to naval ofcers in BuOrd and the Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO) who felt mines were not suciently appreciated by ocers in the eets.137
One of the most dicult problems MWORG faced was
merely obtaining information. MWORG contacts with British OR groups, particularly with Blacketts team at the Admiralty, were excellent, and reports on British development
often reached MWORG in Washington, D.C., in less than
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three weeks.138 However, obtaining operational information
from ocial Navy sources was much harder, mainly because
of the reluctance of Navy ocers to provide classied or
otherwise sensitive information to civilians, even civilians
who were ocial Navy employees.139 This problem was partially resolved with the transfer of MWORG from BuOrd
to OCNO on 31 October 1942.140 The civilian scientists in
MWORG and the naval ocers in OCNO soon developed
a close relationship. MWORG received necessary operational information and, in return, promoted mining operations in the Pacic. Otherwise, the relationships established
by the civilians in MWORG with naval ocers were excellent, and MWORG received its fair share of attention and
resources from the Navy hierarchy.141 With respect to the
use of civilians instead of military personnel for OR tasks,
Cdr. McKeehan even expressed the view that prior knowledge of military operations and doctrine was of secondary
importance to the ability to think without squeaking.142
Once the problems of the German magnetic mine, degaussing, and mine sweeping were under control, MWORG
turned its attention to the oensive use of mines in the
Pacic. Ellis Johnson had become convinced that the most
eective OR work would be done in the active theaters of
operation by commissioned ocers with full access to operational data and plans.143 In 1943, he accepted a commission as a lieutenant commander, USNR, and volunteered to
return to Pearl Harbor as mining operations ocer for the
Pacic Fleet.144 Accompanied by Lt.(jg) William F. Wallace,
USNR, Johnson arrived at Pearl Harbor on 15 March 1943
for duty on the sta of the commander of Service Squadron
Six, Pacic Fleet, where he and Wallace were joined by Lt.
Cdr. Shirley L. Quimby, USNR, and Lt. Kenneth L. Veth,
U.S. Navy (USN).145 Quimby and Veth soon left for Australia to advise Gen. Douglas MacArthur on oensive mining operations, and Wallace was sent to Guadalcanal to serve
as ocer-in-charge of mining operations. Following a tour of
the South Pacic with Capt. George D. Hull, the commander
of Service Squadron Six, Johnson remained at Pearl Harbor
working on torpedoes and aerial magnetic mines.146 Johnson
was joined at Pearl Harbor by Lt.(jg) Thornton Page who
came out to work on plans for the central Pacic. One of
the rst problems Johnson tackled was that of malfunctioning torpedoes, a problem he solved with tests in a quarry,
thereby earning for himself the condence of the naval sta
in general and Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, the commander
in chief of the Pacic Fleet (CINCPAC), in particular.147
Eorts to assist Admiral Nimitz to initiate a program of
mine laying by submarines were almost derailed in the early
fall of 1943, when MWORG personnel identied the need
for a sterilizer to disarm the submarine-laid mines after a
certain time.148 Against the advice of MWORG experts, a
British sterilizer, untested for compatibility with American

equipment, was put into use and proved not to work, thereby putting at risk American submarines that had to traverse
areas seeded with such mines. Admiral Nimitz, well known
for permitting few outsiders to become involved in his theater, turned against submarine mine laying and against
MWORG as well.
The rst MWORG eorts to promote mine laying
by aircraft in the Pacic also encountered problems when
MWORG scientists began to infringe on the work of their
former colleagues in the Bureau of Ordnance.149 The conict
was resolved several months later when the BuOrd scientists
needed MWORG and its OCNO patrons to help promote
the use of the new aerial mines they had developed.150
Despite the false starts, by the end of 1943 Johnson obtained the concurrence of the CINCPAC sta to use aerial
mines in the carrier strikes of the Fifth Fleet across the central
Pacic as well as to use the minelayer U.S.S Terror to transport the mines, equipment, and personnel to the carriers.151
Johnson, Page, and Wallace left Pearl Harbor on U.S.S. Terror on 5 March 1944 and oversaw the mining operations by
aircraft from U.S.S. Hornet and naval patrol bombers from
Eniwetok atoll.152
Johnson continued to pursue aggressively the development of oensive mining against the Japanese and began to
achieve better results after the OCNO sta mounted an intense letter-writing campaign to inform commanders in the
Pacic about the potential of aerial mining.153 Even so, the
reception in the eld was only lukewarm. In the southwest
Pacic, General MacArthur authorized a small trial of aerial
mining but assigned the task to the Royal Australian Air
Force, which laid 1,142 mines with generally good results.154
A second trial was made in August 1944 using B29s of the
XX Bomber Command to lay mines in Palembang Harbor
in Sumatra.
In late July 1944, the OCNO sta appointed Johnson
as project manager for the aerial mining program, a position that gave him the authority to promote and coordinate
mine-related activities throughout the Pacic on behalf of
BuOrd and OCNO.155 In late September 1944, he proposed to Lt. Gen. Henry Arnold a plan for aerial mining
of the Shimonoseki Straits, but Gen. Arnold preferred not
to interrupt the strategic bombing of Japanese cities and he
stalled for time.156 It was only after Johnson convinced Admiral Nimitz to issue a formal request to Gen. Arnold for
Army Air Forces (AAF) support on 7 November 1944 that
Arnold nally agreed that the aerial mining program should
begin in the spring of 1945.157 Arnold was good to his word,
and the mining campaign, codenamed Operation STARVATION, was conducted by XXI Bomber Command between
the end of March and 15 August 1945. It was a tremendous
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success, isolating Japan and closing some 140 Japanese ports
for long periods.158 Although only approximately 5 percent
of the overall AAF eort was involved, the results of the
mining campaign were as important to the defeat of Japan as
the much larger strategic bombing campaign against military
and industrial sites on the Japanese mainland.159 Operation
STARVATION has also been called the most complete
single example of the successful application of military operations-research techniques during the war.160
Like the other two early OR groups in the U.S. armed
services, the OR group in the AAF Directorate of Air Defense
and the OR group in the Army Signal Corps, MWORG initially focused on technical and engineering matters. However,
with the development of the concept of a theory of mining
MWORG took the rst steps toward the application of OR
to more-general problems of tactics and strategy, which were
matters well beyond the purely technical problems of mine
warfare.161 As McCloskey noted, the work of Ellis Johnson
and his colleagues on the mining campaign in the Pacic was
particularly important in that respect.
Johnson and his associates went far beyond classical operations research as it was developing in Britain and as it was
being applied in both the ASWORG and the Army Air Forces
Operations Analysis sections. They started with technological
concerns and had developmental roles; their analytical or advisory roles were subordinated. And Johnson and some of his
colleagues went beyond recommending strategy and tactics to
playing operational roles.162
Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group

ASWORG was the largest and most complex of the
Navys World War II OR elements.163 On 16 March 1942,
Capt. (later Rear Adm.) Wilder D. Baker, who was the antisubmarine warfare ocer for the Atlantic Fleet and was
stationed in Boston, Massachusetts, wrote to the Navys coordinator of research and development, Rear Adm. Julius A.
Furer, recommending the establishment of an OR element
in the Atlantic Fleet ASW unit, similar to the OR sections
in RAF Coastal Command and the Royal Navy.164 Rear
Adm. Furer approved the idea and made arrangements for
the necessary scientic personnel through NDRC. Dr. John
T. Tate, then chairman of NDRC Section 6 (Subsurface
Warfare), selected Dr. Philip M. Morse, an MIT physicist,
to head the project on a part-time basis.165 Tate then placed
an NDRC contract on the Navys behalf with Columbia
University for the administration and pay of the necessary
scientists.166 Morse selected the initial group of men for the
project, including Dr. William B. Shockley, who was designated the groups executive head.167 The Navys ASW OR
group, designated as Group M (for Morse), thus came into
ocial existence on 1 April 1942.168
Most of the early Group M personnel were physicists,

mathematicians, or statisticians (actuaries).169 Their annual
salaries ranged from $2,500 to $5,100 and were based on
what they were earning previously plus an additional amount
to cover the costs of living away from home.170 Almost from
the beginning, the naval ocers overseeing ASWORG felt
that additional sta was needed, and Morse spent considerable time trying to nd men of suitable training and ability.
The actual recruitment and administration of ASWORG
scientists were handled by NDRC through the contract with
Columbia University.171 By the end of the war, ASWORG
included a total of eighty-six scientists, many of them men of
substantial reputation.172
In general, ASWORG operated as a single unit with
its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and certain members
detailed on a temporary basis to serve with various Navy
ASW commands.173 At any given time between one fourth
and one third of the ASWORG sta was in the eld.174
The men in the eld collected, evaluated, and analyzed data
for the group in Washington and undertook the analysis of
specic problems for the command to which they were attached.175 The studies conducted by both the ASWORG
eld representatives and the main group in Washington were
distributed widely throughout the Navy by the central oce
in Washington, D.C., which also played an important role
in coordinating the activities of the eld representatives and
shifting personnel from one assignment to another to meet
constantly changing requirements.176
ASWORG analysts also worked closely with the Army
Air Forces.177 Until the fall of 1943, the AAF I Bomber
Command on Long Island, commanded by Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson, was responsible exclusively for airborne
ASW work in the Atlantic, and, in June 1942, the AAF
established a Sea Search and Development Unit (SADU),
led by Col. W. C. Dolan at Langley Field in Virginia, to investigate problems of airborne ASW equipment and tactics.
In September 1942, Howard H. Hennington of ASWORG
went to SADU at Langley Field, where he was later joined
by Maurice Bell and Donald D. Cody.178 In October 1942, I
Bomber Command was redesignated as AAF Anti-Submarine Command (AAFAC), and ASWORG analysts Arthur
A. Brown and Malcolm E. Ennis arrived at AAFAC headquarters where they were joined in December by Arthur W.
Brown.179 In December 1942, Brig. Gen. Harold M. McClelland, the AAF director of technology, was assigned as
the AAF liaison ocer to ASWORG.180
In November 1942, Morse and Shockley traveled to
England to view British OR activities rsthand.181 They visited E. J. Williams at Coastal Command, Blackett at the Admiralty, Brig. B. F. J. Schonland at Anti-Aircraft Command,
the newly formed U.S. Eighth Air Force operations analysis
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:21
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(OA) unit, and the AAF ASW squadrons stationed in Cornwall. Morse returned to the United States in late December,
but Shockley remained until January 1943 helping the AAF
1st and 2d antisubmarine squadrons at St. Eval.182 One result of their visit was the exchange of British and American
OR analysts. ASWORG analysts Arthur A. Brown and Edward J. Lamar went to ORS Coastal Command and Blacketts team at the Admiralty, and J. P. T. Pearman of ORS
Coastal Command, who had already been to the Caribbean
in early 1942 to assist American ASW eorts, became the
key British contact with ASWORG.183
Like their colleagues in MWORG, the civilian scientists in ASWORG encountered some diculties in dealing
with Navy traditions and biases.184 Operational information was closely guarded, and, as Morse himself later wrote,
to let nonmilitary persons participate in even minor operational decisions was, of course, heretical to many ocers,
especially those in the Navy, with their tradition that the
commander of the ship of the eet was absolute master.185
Such attitudes extended even to the top of the Navy hierarchy. When ASWORG was established in June 1942,
Admiral Ernest J. King insisted that NDRC ensure that
Morses group work only for the Navy and disclose no information, even to NDRC, unless authorized by the Navy.186
ASWORG analysts sometimes discovered that their Navy
colleagues were holding out on them, and Morse noted,
some of the group were irritated by what they called the
Navys refusal to make us members of the family. They felt
that withholding facts from us restricted us to the smaller,
tactical problems and made it impossible for us to help in
the bigger, strategic decisions.187
On 20 May 1943, responsibility for all ASW operations was consolidated in the newly activated Tenth Fleet
with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the following July, ASWORG was transferred from Atlantic Fleet to
Tenth Fleet control.188 Until about the time of its transfer
to the Tenth Fleet, ASWORG focused almost exclusively
on ASW matters. Afterward, ASWORG personnel began
to investigate a number of pressing problems in other areas.
Among the important OR studies conducted by ASWORG
between April 1942 and September 1945 were those dealing with problems of searching for and attacking enemy
submarines, convoy protection, the operating capabilities of
U.S. and foreign equipment, and countermeasures for German submarine radar and acoustic torpedoes.189 Perhaps
ASWORGs most important contribution was the development of a general search theory, or what Morse called a set
of denitions of important quantities and equations relating
these quantities so as to predict search eciencies and patterns, as well as to specify a procedure to evaluate the quantities from the answers we hoped to nd in the operational
reports.190 On the basis of search theory, the essence of

which was worked out by George K. Kimball and Bernard
O. Koopman, ASWORG analysts were able to develop the
basic rules for visual and radar sightings and more-eective methods for locating and engaging enemy submarines
by both aircraft and surface vessels.191
Emergence of the Operations Research Group
In September 1943, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
wrote to Admiral King and other senior Navy ocers about
the Navys use of OSRD scientists for OR work, noting
that the increased complexity of modern warfare demands
prompt analysis of the performance of new weapons and
equipment and of the operational procedures incident to
their use.192 Secretary Knox also noted that as the demand
for OR had increased, the number of qualied naval personnel became inadequate and civilian scientists had to be obtained on loan from OSRD, a satisfactory method but one
that should be considered temporary, with OSRD scientists
being replaced by ocers or civil service personnel if such
services were required indenitely.
By the late summer of 1943, the Allies had won the
Battle of the Atlantic, and ASWORG was able to turn
to other problems of particular interest to the Navy. The
group formed teams to deal with those problems. The situation was put on a regular basis on 7 October 1944, when
Admiral Ernest J. King, the commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet,
and chief of naval operations (COMINCH/CNO), ordered the transfer of ASWORG from the Tenth Fleet to
the Readiness Division of Headquarters, COMINCH, and
reorganized it under the new title of Operations Research
Group (ORG).193
The various ASWORG teams ocially became subgroups of ORG, and the scientic personnel for ORG
subgroups continued to be obtained on loan from the Ofce of Field Service, OSRD, and administered under the
OSRD contract with Columbia University.194 The various subgroups were loaned out to the various divisions of
Headquarters, COMINCH/CNO, or to commanders of
the various eets, and a central ocethe Operations
Research Center (ORC)was established and assigned
to the Readiness Division of Headquarters, COMINCH/
CNO.195 The director of ORG served as both the head
of ORC and the consulting supervisor of the subgroups.
The resulting organization for OR in the Navy is shown
in Figure 11.
The experience of the Navy Operations Research Group
during World War II provided several important lessons for
the future and for the other services.196 The rst lesson was
that civilian scientists could best serve the military by remaining out of uniform and thus unrestrained in their con-
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:22
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Figure 11U.S. Navy Operations Research Elements: October
HQ, COMINCH/CNO, USN

Readiness Division
Mine Warfare
ORG
(March 1942)
Anti-Submarine
Warfare
ORG
(April 1942)
Operations
Research
Group
(October 1944)
Operations
Research
Center
(October 1944)
Submarine
ORG
(November 1943)
Anti-Air ORG
(SpecORG)
(September 1944)
Amphibious
ORG
(October 1944)
Liaison Officer
in Britain
(January 1943)
Air Operations
ORG
(October 1944)
Note: The dates shown are those of formal organization.

Source: Details of the establishment, organization, operations, and achievements of the various ORG subgroups can be found in Keith R. Tidman,
The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Operations Analysis (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 8189, and ORG, HQ,
COMINCH/CNO, Summary Report to the OFS, OSRD, Washington, 1 Dec 45, pp. 2436, in College Park, Md., National Archives II, RG 227,
Entry 179, Box 301, Folder Summary Rpt to OFS, OSRD.
tacts with all ranks, staying free from routine sta duties and
unbothered by restrictions on their intellectual freedom.197
Second, the formal training of scientists and mathematicians
made them especially well suited to collecting and analyzing
the data needed to nd solutions to the Navys technical and
tactical problems. Third, for the Navy to take best advantage
of its OR personnel, they needed to have access to the highest levels of the naval hierarchy as well as to all available operational data. Fourth, the optimal organization for OR was
one that had both OR units in the eld and a core OR group
at headquarters in Washington, D.C.198 Fifth, mutual trust
among the civilian scientists in ORG and the naval ocers
with whom they served was essential.
OR in the United States Army Air
Forces,
The development of operations research in the U.S.
Army Air Forces began early in 1942 and eventually spread
to AAF units around the world.199 The AAF program drew

inspiration from both the British and the Navy programs
but diered from them in several respects. Unlike the Navy
ORG, which maintained relatively tight central control with
the principal OR unit located in Washington, D.C., and
teams sent to the active theaters only for limited periods,
the AAF system was decentralized, the operations analysis sections serving with the principal Air Force command
headquarters at home and overseas being both more autonomous and more closely tied to the command that they
served.200 The central oce at HQ USAAF in Washington,
D.C.the Operations Analysis Division (OAD)served
only to help set up the OA sections and provide them with
necessary training and administrative support. In this they
resembled the British ORS more closely than the Navy
ORG. The relationship of the AAF OR program with
NDRC and OSRD was also somewhat stormier than the
Navys relationship with those organizations.
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The Origins of OR in the AAF
Given the early success of the ORS RAF Fighter Command in strengthening the air defenses of Britain, it was
only natural that one of the rst applications of OR in the
United States was to the complex problems of air defense.
After 7 December 1941, Anglo-American contacts regarding OR increased rapidly, and, in response to a request
from the U.S. military mission in London, the British Air
Ministry sent Robert Watson-Watt to the United States
in January 1942 to evaluate radar and air defense systems
in Hawaii, on the West Coast, and in Panama.201 Watson-Watt did not spare the feelings of his hosts, and his
report on his visit, which ended in April 1942, criticized
U.S. radar and air defense warning systems as insucient
organization applied to technically inadequate equipment
used in exceptionally dicult conditions.202 Watson-Watt
recommended that the U.S. armed forces employ scientists
to improve the air defense system in the same way the ORS
RAF Fighter Command was doing, but neither the Navy
nor the Army Air Forces took direct action.203 WatsonWatts visit did spur interest in OR at fairly high levels,
however, and General Arnold ordered an independent review of U.S. air defenses.204
When the independent review conrmed the faults
found by Watson-Watt, Arnold directed that the AAF air
defense system be thoroughly reorganized. Maj. Gordon P.
Saville, who had been in England observing RAF Fighter
Command operations, was recalled to the United States,
promoted to colonel, and appointed director of air defense
on the Air Sta.205 Col. Saville was familiar with the work
of the ORS RAF Fighter Command and immediately acted
to establish an equivalent capability in his directorate. He
consulted with Vannevar Bush at OSRD who passed him
on to Frank B. Jewett of the National Academy of Sciences.
Jewett introduced Saville to Cyril M. Jansky, Jr., and, on 20
March 1942, Col. Saville obtained the appointment of Jansky as a special consultant.206 Jansky established a small OR
section to support AAF air defense planning and operations
at the sta level.
Jansky familiarized himself with air defense problems,
made a trip to Britain to investigate OR activities, and then
immediately set about acting as a sta-level OR analyst for
Col. Saville, setting up OA units for the various ghter commands, coordinating their activities, and providing liaison for
them with other AAF agencies.207 Jansky obtained the personnel for the ghter command OA teams, most of whom
were highly qualied experts on radar and radio engineering.
Both Jansky and the men he recruited were hired by AAF on
a per diem basis as consultants, thereby circumventing the
restrictive civil service regulations.208
Saville and Jansky may have had ambitions for organizing

a large OA organization for the entire War Department.209
Soon after appointing Jansky as special consultant, Col. Saville directed him to study the application of OR throughout
the War Department, and, in late April or early May 1942,
Jansky produced Memorandum on Operational Analysis
in the War Department.210 Dening operational analysis
as the objective scientic study of data accumulated during
the normal operation of a system already functioning [the
objective of which] is the formulation of recommendations
looking towards improvement in the system and increased
over-all eciency, Jansky recommended that operations analysts be civilians without military authority and responsible,
after the British model, to the commander to whom they
were attached.211 In brief, Jansky envisioned a vast OR system spread throughout the War Department including Army
ground forces units.212 Operations analysts would act as the
regulators of the system, conducting the objective scientic
study of the data which are being accumulated continuously,
together with such limited experimental work as can be performed without in any way impairing or disturbing the normal functioning of the system for the purpose of advising
military commanders on ways to improve the eciency and
eectiveness of their organization and operations.213 As Rau
has noted, Jansky saw military activities as integrated systems
reliant upon dependable information. The job of the operations analyst . . . was to perfect the system.214
About the time Col. Saville and Jansky were starting up
OA activities in the AAF Directorate of Air Defense in the
early spring of 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and
his special assistant, Harvey H. Bundy, visited Panama to inspect the defenses of the Canal Zone.215 They discussed defense issues with the commander of the Caribbean Defense
Command, Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, who suggested that
a team of civilian analysts might be useful for integrating the
available radar equipment with the other defenses in Panama.216 The immediate requirement was satised in August
1942 by the dispatch of two experienced communications
systems engineers, Charles A. Parker and Graham L. Tevis,
under the aegis of Janskys newly established oce, to work
with Lt. Gen. Andrews Caribbean Defense Command.217
They soon proved their worth, and Gen. Andrews expressed
the opinion that if all the operational analysts selected are of
the caliber of these two men there will be no question as to
their value to the government.218
The Leach-Davidson Report, August 1942
On his return to Washington, D.C., from Panama in the
spring of 1942, Bundy conferred with Vannevar Bush and
learned about ongoing OR activities in Britain.219 Their conversation led Bush to arrange the establishment of a commit-
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:24
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tee in the Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee
of the Joint Chiefs of Sta (of which he was the chairman) to
prepare a report on the desirability and method of extending and coordinating operations research and analysis in the
Army and Navy.220 On 7 July 1942, the task of preparing
the report was assigned to Maj. Walter Barton Leach, a Harvard Law School professor recently called to active duty; a
few days later, Dr. Ward F. Davidson, the director of research
for Consolidated Edison, was added to the team. A Navy
representative was to be included, but the Navy never supplied anyone to ll the slot.221
Leach and Davidson made a comprehensive survey of
OR activities in Britain and the U.S. armed forces and submitted their report on 17 August 1942. At the end of their
report, Leach and Davidson made ve recommendations
concerning the future development of OR in the Army and
Navy. They argued forcefully for the use of well-qualied civilian analysts assigned to eld units and responsible directly
to the eld commander but supported and coordinated by a
central oce in Washington; eective means of administering the corps of civilian analysts with regard to recruitment,
training, assignment, pay and benets, and travel arrangements; eective coordination of the Army and Navy OR
programs; eective liaison between the U.S. and the British
OR communities; and the extension of OR techniques to all
aspects of Army and Navy operations.222 They also warned
of the dangers of uncontrolled growth in OR activities and
laid down the principle, subsequently followed by AAF, that
OA sections should be formed only on specic request of the
commanders of the units that they were to serve. Leach and
Davidson also noted:
Our investigation has convinced us that in many commands at
various levels a civilian or group of civilians, operating as an
adjunct to the commander, can perform important services of
an analytical nature which cannot as a practical matter be performed by Army or Navy personnel in war time. We have been
impressed by the record of success of analysts in England and
(for a brief period) in this country, by the uniform satisfaction
of service ocers with analysts attached to their commands, by
the insistent demands of these ocers for more analysts, and
by the desire for this type of help evinced by ocers who have
become familiar with the experience of other commands.223
Two weeks after submitting the report to JNWEC, Maj.

Leach wrote to Harvey Bundy to clarify several aspects.224 In
the accompanying memorandum, Leach noted that the OA
sections should be led by a non-scientist, preferably a lawyer,
with an outstanding scientist to head the sections scientic
personnel. He recommended that the OA section personnel be equally divided between scientists and non-scientists,
experienced older men and brilliant younger men. He also
restated the recommendation that the administration of the
OA sections be provided by a personnel corporation operating under a nonprot contract with the secretary of war
and the secretary of the Navy and that the Army and the
Navy each create a small unit to inform service ocers of
the benets of OA, to coordinate existing OA groups and
recruit new ones, to relieve the OA groups of administrative
burdens, and to provide liaison with the British and Canadians. Leach noted that the organization of such a coordinating oce should include an OA ocer, a civilian scientic
consultant, a junior ocer to perform security and personnel functions, and a clerical sta, and that it be attached at
Sta level to a general ocer convinced of the worth of the
enterprise, having broad knowledge of service organizations
and having operational authority adequate to assure OA of
a fair hearing.225
Formation of the Operations Analysis Division
on the Air Sta
For the most part, the Leach-Davidson report was largely
ignored in the Navy and Army hierarchy. However, General
Arnold, already receiving requests for OR support from his
subordinate commanders and with several AAF OA units
already in operation, turned the Leach-Davidson report over
to his Advisory Council for its recommendation.226
Not long after submitting his report to JNWEC, Maj.
Leach accompanied the AAF director of technology, Brig.
Gen. Harold M. McClelland, and others to England to help
set up the OA sections for the U.S. Eighth Air Force.227
While Maj. Leach was in England, Col. Saville, Brig. Gen.
McClelland, and Brig. Gen. Muir Fairchild, the AAF director of bombardment, pressed General Arnold to establish
an OA coordinating oce similar to the one outlined in the
Leach-Davidson report.228 On 24 October 1942, Arnold
sent a letter to his subordinate Air Force commanders and
the chiefs of the Air Sta divisions noting the dramatic
successes already achieved by the British civilian OR analysts and the fact that many American military leaders who
had become familiar with the British experience had already
acted to establish OR units of their own.229 In conclusion
he stated, This method of using ocers and civilians for
purely analytical work has proven fruitful in many elds, and
the Army Air Forces should make use of it where appropriate.230 General Arnold also directed that an Operations
Analysis Division be created in Maj. Gen. Byron E. Gates
Management Control Division of the Air Sta. The necessary directive was issued, and OAD was established on 31
December 1942, with Leach, newly returned from England
and promoted to lieutenant colonel, as its chief.231
According to Rau, the original plan was to assign OAD
to Brig. Gen. McClellands Directorate of Technical Services,
but Col. Byron E. Gates, the assistant chief of the Air Sta
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:25
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for management control, made a successful grab to add OAD
to Management Control, which already supervised the Statistical Control Division.232 The choice of the Management
Control Division as the home for OAD was probably well
reasoned inasmuch as the Management Control Division
was the principal Air Sta element engaged in applying scientic management and statistical methods to the management of AAF. Leachs own take on the matter was given in
his two-year report:
There was never any theoretical justication for placing Operations Analysis under Management Control. But the Chief,
Management Control had the vision to see the possibilities in
an innovation which ran counter to basic military thinking. His
willingness to give this organization a free hand and to put his
full weight behind it when support was needed is the single
most important factor in any contribution it has made to the
Air Force.233
Lt. Col. Leach set up shop in Room 3D982 of the Pentagon and began to build OAD and a system of OA sections
throughout AAF in accordance with the blueprint provided
in the August 1942 report. OAD itself remained relatively
small, but the number of OA sections formed and deployed
to satisfy the requests of AAF commanders grew rapidly. The
number of commissioned ocers in OAD never exceeded
three, although four were authorized.234 The principal functions of OAD were recruiting and orienting analysts; establishing, equipping, and supporting the OA sections; maintaining liaison between AAF OA program and other OR
activities; and publishing and distributing OA reports.235
OAD also served as a temporary home for AAF analysts between eld assignments.236 Over time, some functions, such
as overseeing the training of terminal ballistics experts and
gunnery analysts, were delegated to other agencies.237
The AAF OA program was decentralized, and OAD
exercised no operational control of the OA sections once
they had been established. Under the circumstances, a large
headquarters operation was not required, but Col. Leach expressed some misgivings, writing, Some of this decentralization is healthy, but there has been too much of it. Moreover, the limited sta has prevented performance of some
functions which ought to have been undertaken.238 He conceded, however, that at this stage of the war it is not believed
that the basic set-up should be changed, but he did propose
a larger organization in the event of any subsequent war.239
Leach also experienced some disappointment in that two
of his main recommendations relating to the coordination of
Army and Navy OR eorts and liaison with OR elements
in the British and Canadian forces were never implemented.
In their report, Leach and Davidson had recommended the
creation of a Joint Operations Analysis Committee under
the Joint Chiefs of Sta, the purpose of which would be to
ensure that OR activities in the two services were properly

coordinated.240 The proposed committee was to consist of
one OR ocer and one civilian OR consultant from each of
the services. No such committee was ever formed, probably
because of disinterest on the part of the Navy. Based on their
discussion with Wing Commander A. C. Menzies, the head
of the British Air Ministry Center of Operational Research,
Leach and Davidson recommended the establishment of a liaison oce in London to be called the American Operations
Analysis Center to provide a focal point for contact between
British and American operations analysis personnel.241 The
center also never emerged.
Operations Analysis Sections with Major Commands
The rst six AAF Op Annies (civilian operations analysts) reported to the VIII Bomber Command in London
on 15 October 1942.242 Within a year after the formation
of OAD, there were nine OA sections (employing some
sixty-eight personnel) either in existence or requested by
commanders in the eld.243 By V-J Day, there were more
than twenty-ve OA sections with more than four hundred
ocers, enlisted men, civilian analysts, and clerical personnel, many of whom had served in more than one theater of
war.244 Janskys OA program in the Directorate of Air Defense continued to exist separately, but almost all other operations analysis units in the AAF came under the aegis of
Leachs OAD.245
Most of the OA sections were assigned to AAF operational or training commands, but late in the war OAD-sponsored analysts were also attached to several other Air Force
organizations. In mid-1945, General Arnold established
ve Air Evaluation Boards to conduct appraisals of AAF
operations in the various theaters.246 Each board consisted
of a small group of ocers and one Op Annie who was to
assist the board in dening its scope, organizing its eorts,
and writing its report. Leach recruited ve lawyers to ll the
Op Annie positions, and they were given a brief indoctrination and sent overseas. The ve lawyers were George W. Ball
(Europe), Stephen P. Duggan, Jr. (southwest Pacic), Ronald
J. Foulis (Mediterranean), Norman Newmark (central Pacic), and Joseph E. Nolan (China, Burma, India).247 Some
of the boards made little use of their analyst, and Col. Leach
expressed some chagrin for not ensuring that the analysts
were wanted and that the presidents of the boards were fully
aware of their usefulness in advance of their assignment.248
Some of the boards employed civilian scientists to assist in
their work. For example, William W. Whitmore, an instructor in physics from MIT, served with a group of seven other
civilians from December 1944 to June 1945, preparing a report on the tactical bombing of the French railway system
during the Normandy campaign.249
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:26
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The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
was established in 1944 to determine the eect of the Allied strategic bombing campaign on the Axis powers. The
USSBS worked closely with the Air Evaluation Boards,
and a few OAD-sponsored operations analysts were placed
on loan to USSBS to help organize its work.250 Only one
analyst, Theodore Tannewald, Jr., was actually assigned to
USSBS before the Japanese surrender, but several others
joined the survey in Japan after V-J Day.251
In addition to his duties as chief, OAD, Col. Leach also
served as a member of the committee of operations analysts,
established by General Arnold on 8 December 1942 as the
Advisory Committee on Bombardment.252 Other members
of the committee included a number of ocers from the Air
Sta, such as Leachs boss, Col. Byron E. Gates; Gates deputy,
Col. Guido R. Perera; and several distinguished civilians, including Elihu Root, Jr., and Dr. Edward M. Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.253 The purpose of
COA was to prepare a report on the progressive eect the
Allied strategic bombing campaign was having on the German war eort, but COA was really a steering committee for
a small army of analysts.254 The work of COA had an important inuence in shaping the evolving strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Japan. As Secretary of War Stimson wrote to Army Chief of Sta Gen. George C. Marshall in
December 1943, the work of this Committee indicates that
certain planning matters for specic operations can be eectively handled by this method although the usual operations
analysis section deals primarily with tactical matters.255
No OA section was established except on request of
the local commander whom it was to serve, and OAD functioned as an administrative support and coordination center
without interfering in the day-to-day operations of the OA
units.256 Each OA section was tailored to the needs of its
command, and each had a slightly dierent relationship with
its commander, his sta, and subordinate elements of the
command. In ideal situations, the chief of the OA section reported directly to the commander or to his chief of sta and
the OA section enjoyed unrestricted access to all elements of
the command without having to go through channels.
Leachs principal diculty was spreading the word about
the benets of OR to AAF commanders in the eld. Once
they learned of what OR might do for them, most AAF ofcers became wholehearted supporters of the concept.257
AAF operations analysts encountered few of the problems
of Navy OR workers regarding access to classied operational data.258 Even so, as Leach noted:
Quite naturally service ocers somewhat hesitate to let civilians into the inner sanctum. . . . We emphasize that operations analysis groups can only be valuable if the commander to
whom they are attached gives them a whole hearted coopera-
tion which can come only from an informed enthusiasm for

this type of help.259
Although each OA section was tailored to its command,

in October 1943 AAF attempted to standardize the organization of the OA sections by issuing a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) prescribing the personnel
and equipment authorized for OA sections assigned to Air
Force headquarters and to bomber, ghter, air support, and
air service commands.260 This TOE provided for 6 ocers
(1 colonel, 2 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, and 1 captain)
and 10 enlisted men (1 master sergeant, 1 sta sergeant, 2
sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 privates rst class, and 1 private).
The authorized equipment included the usual array of small
arms, entrenching tools, chemical protection gear, and oce
furniture and equipment, including a dictionary, a computing machine (mechanical adding machine), a paper-fastening
machine (stapler), and one typewriter.
In recognition of the growing number of operations
analysts in the eld, the War Department published Field
Manual 3027: Regulations for Civilian Operations Analysts,
Scientic Consultants, and Technical Observers Accompanying
U.S. Army Forces in the Field.261 The August 1944 edition of
FM 3027 replaced the edition of 3 September 1942, which
did not mention operations analysts. FM 3027 dened operations analysts, scientic consultants, and technical observers and prescribed their ocial status, privileges, discipline,
uniform, indoctrination, travel, reports, and credentials. In
general, operations analysts received the privileges of commissioned ocers, and FM 3027 included a table of equivalent ranks to clarify the status of operations analysts in the
event of their capture by the enemy.
The OA sections performed functions similar to those
of the Navy OR groups. The principal function of each OA
section was to analyze problems and advise the commander.
The OA section had no operational or administrative duties or powers. Among the types of problems studied were
bombing accuracy and techniques, bomb selection and fuzing, combat losses and damage, communications (including
radar and radar countermeasures), aerial gunnery, aircraft
operating ranges and fuel consumption, personnel matters,
and training activities. The choice of topics for study was directed by the commander or generated by the OA section
members themselves.
Personnel Issues
In December 1944, Col. Leach noted that obtaining the
able personnel is the secret of O.A. success and constitutes
the most dicult problem.262 Leach later dened the able
person he was looking for as a genius who hasnt forgotten
that the answers to hard questions come by hard work and
not by looking into a crystal ball. In picking men thats the
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standard we shoot at. Sometimes we hit it.263 The task was
a daunting one; in all, OAD recruited, trained, deployed, and
managed some four hundred professional and clerical personnel during World War II.264
OAD recruited personnel for the OA sections after
consulting with the local commander to determine his needs
and desires. In general, Col. Leach and most commanders
preferred civilian analysts to those commissioned in AAF,
although some commanders insisted that all of their analysts
be commissioned ocers.265 As Leach and Davidson noted
in their report:
The need for civilian analysts is a war-time military and naval
need of a country which undermans and undernances its
armed services in time of peace. When war comes every ofcer of superior ability is needed for important operational
and administrative posts, and the supply is inevitably less than
the demand. In any post or command the operational needs
of the moment and the problems of administration, personnel
and supply absorb the time and energy of the commander and
his sta. Therefore no time left to analyze new weapons or the
many intelligence and operations reports coming in.266
Responding to the questions of a journalist near the end

of the war, Col. Leach repeated his main argument for civilian rather than uniformed operations analysts:
The great diculty is that these ocers are so inevitably absorbed with carrying out todays mission and planning tomorrows they simply dont have the time and uninterrupted attention which most of these matters require. And thats where the
Operations Analysis Sections come in.267
The reasons for keeping the Op Annies in civilian status

were that civilians could deal more eectively with all ranks,
did not compete with sta ocers, could not be diverted to
other military duties, could be more easily dismissed if unequal to the tasks at hand, did not need to meet the rigid
physical standards required of commissioned ocers, could
not be commissioned easily under existing ocer procurement regulations, and normally refused to accept a commission anyway.268
Of course, Leach conceded that under certain circumstances it might be necessary to put operations analysts in
uniform, particularly when they were assigned to the overseas
theaters where they ran some risk of capture by the enemy. In
any event, Op Annies in the theaters were required by theater
regulations to wear uniforms without insignia. Consequently, they were often mistaken for war correspondents or USO
entertainers. One OA section chief was approached by a sergeant who asked, What instrument do you play, bub?269
Leach and other leaders in the AAF OA program did
not share the bias of the British and the U.S. Navy for scientists as analysts.270 In fact, as a practicing lawyer, Leach
had a positive preference for lawyers to lead the various OA
sections.271 In any event, by coming late into the eld, AAF

program managers found it dicult to nd qualied scientists who were not already employed in the Navy OR program or other essential war work. As Capt. Hall opined:
The fact that the abilities of certain civilians are not presently
being utilized in the war eort would be merely a regrettable
circumstance were it not for the fact that there appears to be
more than a fair chance that they could be of real help to the
Army in the conduct of the war.272
Leach therefore looked elsewhere.273 Of the 180 analysts

employed by AAF on 1 December 1944, 14 (including some
scientists) were university presidents or heads of university
departments or research labs, 71 were scientists or engineers,
37 were mathematicians or statisticians, 23 were educational
administrators, 17 were lawyers, 11 were university faculty
members (other than scientists), 3 were economists, and 5
were drawn from various branches of industry.274
In their August 1942 report Leach and Davidson noted
that there should be an organization to assume the administrative details of personnel management and pay for operations analysts but that there is no existing organization or
method of employment that ts the prescription even approximately.275 Among the alternatives they considered and
rejected were employment through the civil service, per diem
contracts, an OSRD contract with a university or other research organization, commissioning of analysts in the Army
Specialist Corps or in AAF, and the Presidents Emergency
Fund.276 All of the alternatives seemed to pose substantial
problems, and Leach and Davidson recommended the creation of a personnel management corporation that would
operate under a contract with the secretary of war.
Early on, Leach had hoped that recruitment and personnel management for the OA sections could be handled
under a contract between the secretary of war and a private
nonprot corporation, preferably the National Research
Council.277 When negotiations with the council fell through,
Dr. Frank Aydelotte of the Institute for Advanced Study at
Princeton University expressed interest in providing the
necessary corporate entity, but Leach rejected the oer after
considering the physical diculties of conducting business
between Washington, D.C., and Princeton, New Jersey.278
Instead, he discussed the matter with Harold N. Marsh, a
Washington lawyer who agreed to set up a corporation in
the District of Columbia to be known as Special Services,
Inc., that would undertake the task of managing AAF OA
personnel, and Leach himself bankrolled the establishment
of the corporation.279 That arrangement apparently failed to
get the approval of the secretary of war. Vannevar Bush at
OSRD also declined to help Leach by arranging a contract
with a university or research center along the lines of the
contract between ASWORG and Columbia University.280
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By September 1942, Leachs attempts to set up a corporation to handle OA personnel management assumed some
degree of urgency inasmuch as the analysts sent to the Eighth
Air Force were working on per diem consultant appointments limited to 180 days by Secretary of War Administrative Order No. 50, dated 29 August 1942.281 Having failed
to arrange for a contract for management of AAF operations
analysts, either through OSRD or on an ad hoc basis, Leach
was compelled to hire all AAF analysts as special consultants
on a per diem basis limited by law to no more than $25.282
The actual per diem rate (up to the $25 maximum) was determined by considering an analysts previous civilian salary
and an additional allowance for uniforms, equipment, and
the extra cost of insurance plus a subsistence allowance for
living away from home. Special measures had to be taken to
ensure that the overtime pay of $628.32 to which analysts
were entitled as civilian employees of the AAF did not result
in a net gain in compensation to the analyst. As Col. Leach
noted, Adherence to the salary policy . . . has been extremely
dicult in view of the competition of laboratories, industrial
companies and the Oce of Field Service of OSRD.283 In
fact, competitors of the AAF, including OSRD, professed
the no-gain, no-loss policy but found creative ways to provide fringe increases that gave them a recruiting advantage.
Even so, the salaries of civilian analysts working for the AAF
exceeded the direct salary and allowances of commissioned
personnel and thus sometimes caused problems in working
relationships at the unit level. Leach called the resolution of
this problem one of the major headaches of administration
of Operations Analysis.284
The overall costs of the AAF OA program were substantial. As of 1 December 1944, the annual cost of OAD
alone was $36,114.80 ($22,460 in ocers pay and allowances and $13,654.80 in clerical salaries).285 The cost of
the OA sections in the United States and overseas was
$1,162,241.44, including $932,955.70 in civilian analyst salaries, $91,961.74 in ocer pay and allowances, $127,324.00
in enlisted personnel pay and allowances, and approximately
$10,000 in salaries for civilian clerical personnel.286 Travel
expenses amounted to roughly $400,000, making the total
annual cost of the program approximately $1.75 million.
Relations with OSRD
The Navy got on well with Vannevar Bush and OSRD,
in large part because the Navy OR program was fairly limited, was organized on the traditional scientic functional
basis, relied on scientists for analytical work, and had a relatively troublefree contractual arrangement with Columbia
University. Leach and OSRD, however, had a much rockier
relationship.287 In the rst instance, Leach was an enthusiastic promoter of OR, envisioning a rather expansive OA
program for AAF, and thus clashed with Bushs desire to

minimize the eect of OR on the relationship between science and government. Moreover, the AAF program was organized along command lines, and AAF operations analysts
were more closely controlled by commanders in eld. The
AAF program also represented a potentially signicant drain
on scarce scientic talent already employed by NDRC and
OSRD. As a well-known scientist, Morse at ASWORG was
able to do a lot of his own recruiting by virtue of knowing the
potential recruits either personally or by reputation; OSRD
had only to administer them, and Bushs own stable was not
seriously aected. Leach, however, was late on the eld and
sought to impose signicant recruiting burdens on NDRC/
OSRD. Then, too, Leach had no convenient contractual arrangement for the management of AAF analysts and thus
represented another potential drain on OSRD time and effort. Signicantly, Leach and his AAF OA colleagues did not
share the Navy and OSRD preference for scientists for OR
work. As a lawyer, Leach was not a member of the scientist
club and thus raised hackles at OSRD, particularly those of
Vannevar Bush. When Leach saw to it that the distinguished
New York lawyer John M. Harlan was named to head the
Eighth Air Force OA section in October 1942, Bush moaned
to Karl T. Compton, the president of MIT:
Now it appears that Leach has probably gone too far. I fear
that after my conversations he has fallen into the fallacy that
so many attorneys have of trying to establish a dependent relationship between legal and scientic personnel rather than a
partnership. . . . I hope that I can aid him . . . to avoid this pitfall
along with some others.288
Many of Bushs colleagues at OSRD did not share his

disdain for OR and worked actively to involve OSRD in the
Navy and AAF programs, perhaps even to bring them under
the wing of OSRD. For example, Dr. Alan T. Waterman
pushed for an OSRD-sponsored OR program that would
take over many of the administrative and training functions
that plagued Col. Leach.289 Shortly before the creation of the
OSRD Oce of Field Service in October 1943, Col. Leach
let it be known that, unlike ASWORG, the AAF OA program would not be placed under OFS control.290 Leach did
not want to reorganize the AAF program along functional
lines, and he emphatically disagreed with the OFS policy of
rotating analysts between eld assignments and laboratory
work. Leachs opposition, in the words of Erik Peter Rau,
summarily crippled most of Watermans ambitions for operations research. Leach restricted the OFS role in Air Force
OR to recruitment and training, precisely the limitation
many OSRD sta members had wished to avoid.291
Despite his opposition, when OFS was created under
Karl T. Compton in October 1943, Leach tried again to
work through OSRD to meet AAF OA personnel needs,
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but the issue of temporary versus permanent assignment of
OFS analysts to AAF eld commands remained a sticking
point, and Leach subsequently returned to per diem contracts arranged by his oce.292 After two years of experience,
in December 1944, he addressed the problem at some length
(and with obvious frustration):
It was to be expected that the Oce of Scientic Research and
Development would be most helpful in securing able scientic
personnel. This proved not to be the case. This Division insisted upon the following as basic personnel policies:
(a) That analysts would be employed and paid by the Air
Forces.
(b) That analysts should undertake a term of service which
was indenite in duration and would end only when, in
the judgment of the [commanding general] to whom an
analyst was assigned, the job was completed. Ordinarily
this would mean employment for the duration.
(c) The analyst must have but one loyaltyto the Air Force
to which he is attached; he may communicate with his
previous employer, OSRD or scientic laboratories only
as permitted by his Commanding Ocer and then only
through channels.
(d) He must be prepared to accept a commission in the
Army of the United States if requested to do so.
The Oce of Scientic Research and Development declined to
furnish personnel to the Operations Analysis eort in the Air
Forces to be employed in accordance with the above-stated policies. Instead, OSRD set up an Oce of Field Service (OFS)
which oered to employ scientists and loan them to the Air
Forces for three- to six-month periods. The use of personnel
thus employed was tried on a sucient scale to constitute a fair
experiment; the experiment proved that this method of handling personnel was not satisfactory. This attitude of OSRD
has been a serious handicap to the Operations Analysis program. There is much more to be said on this subject, and at
some future day it should be said in such a way as to promote a
more eective handling of scientic and technical personnel in
the next war and between wars.293
The relations between the AAF OA sections and OSRD

were not entirely negative. Technical training for AAF operations analysts was provided through arrangements with
NDRC/OSRD at the Radiation Lab at MIT, the Radio
Research Lab at Harvard, and the NDRC Division 2 and
Applied Mathematics Panel. The Princeton University Station under John E. Burchards Division 2 of NDRC oered
courses of six to eight weeks on a variety of mathematical,
physics, and photographic interpretation/bomb damage assessment subjects to small groups of four to six analysts.294
Burchard and Division 2 also helped OAD recruit and train
specialists in terminal ballistics to serve in the overseas OA
sections.295 The NDRC Applied Mathematics Panel chaired
by Warren Weaver assisted OAD with the recruitment of
more than twenty mathematicians and the organization of
their training in aerial gunnery prior to their deployment to
overseas OA sections.296 The panel also helped the OA sections in the eld directly with the analysis of certain bombing
operations.297
OA Section, U.S. Eighth Air Force
It is simply impossible to discuss individually here the
organization, personnel, operations, and accomplishments of
each of the OA sections established by the AAF in World War
II, but the OA section, Eighth Air Force, merits attention as
both the earliest and the largest of the AAF OA sections.298
In many ways, the problems faced by the OAS Eighth Air
Forceand the solutions it foundwere representative of
those of the other AAF operations analysis sections.
During a visit to England in June 1942, Cyril M. Jansky,
Jr., of the AAF Directorate of Air Defense, was approached
by Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, the commander of the VIII
Bomber Command, who had observed OR in action in RAF
Bomber Command. Brig. Gen. Eaker expressed to Jansky his
desire for operations analysts.299 This raised the question of
whether the Eighth Air Force should have a separate OR
team or whether American analysts ought to be seconded
to ORS RAF Bomber Command, which would then serve
both Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command.300 Ultimately, the decision was to form an American OA unit. In
August 1942, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the commander of the
Eighth Air Force, acting on the advice of Brig. Gen. Eaker,
wrote to AAF commander General Arnold and to Vannevar
Bush asking for their help in forming an OR unit within the
Eighth Air Force.301 The request was approved, and the task
of assembling the group fell to Maj. W. B. Leach, who was
aided by Dr. Ward F. Davidson. Maj. Gen. Spaatz had asked
for fteen analysts, but that was considered too many to start
with, and the group assembled by Leach and Davidson, with
some reluctant help from OSRD, consisted of six men led by
the distinguished New York lawyer John M. Harlan.302
The six newly minted Op Annies arrived in England on
15 October 1942, accompanied by Brig. Gen. McClelland,
the AAF director of technology, and Maj. Leach. On 22 October, they reported to by then Maj. Gen. Eaker at Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command, at Wycombe Abbey near
London. Dr. B. G. Dickins and ORS RAF Bomber Command helped the new OA section settle in, and the two
groups subsequently maintained close personal and professional contacts.303
On 23 October 1942, Maj. Gen. Eaker issued a directive
concerning the organization and mission of the OA section,
stating that it would work directly under his chief of sta
and would have access to all information and elements of the
command.304 Eaker also gave Harlan a list of the projects
to be undertaken and personally set the new OA section its
rst task when he asked the simple question, How can I
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put twice as many bombs on my targets?305 Answering this
question and its correlatives became the primary mission of
the OA section for the rest of the war.
Although seemingly simple, Maj. Gen. Eakers question
involved the investigation of many diverse interrelated factors. The section immediately began analytical work and was
soon deeply involved in studies on bombing accuracy, bombing tactics, ight procedures, weapons selection, aircraft battle damage, radar, fuel consumption, and other topics.306 To
organize the work eciently, the OAS VIII Bomber Command was divided into seven subsections: Bombing Accuracy,
Bombs and Fuzes, Loss and Battle Damage, Radar and Radio
Countermeasures, Gunnery, General Missions Analysis, and
Tactical Mission Reporting.307 The Bombing Accuracy subsection gathered data, established standards, and developed
more-eective bombing tactics. The Bombs and Fuzes subsection studied the eects of various bomb and fuze combinations on various targets and recommended more-eective
selection of weapons. The Loss and Battle Damage subsection collected data, studied the eects of enemy weapons on
Eighth Air Force bombers, and recommended tactical and
technical methods of reducing the number of aircraft damaged or lost to enemy ak and ghters or to accidents. The
Radar and Radio Countermeasures subsection investigated
radar bombing methods and equipment as well as means
of foiling enemy radar and enemy jamming. The Gunnery
subsection studied aerial gunnery techniques and ways to
improve the eectiveness of Eighth Air Force gunners. The
General Mission Analysis subsection was established to handle nonrecurring problems and undertook two major projects: producing the day raid reports and conducting a study
of fuel consumption that resulted in signicant reduction in
the number of aircraft lost because they ran out of fuel. The
Tactical Mission Reporting subsection rationalized debriefing forms and mission after-action reports.
Inasmuch as the work of the OA section pertained to
the Eighth Air Force generally, it was transferred from VIII
Bomber Command to Eighth Air Force control when Maj.
Gen. Eaker replaced Lt. Gen. Spaatz as Eighth Air Force
commander in December 1942.308 In June 1943, an OA section headed by Lauriston S. Taylor was formed in the VIII
Fighter Command, the mission of which was to protect the
Eighth Air Force bombers and to provide training for the elements of Ninth Air Force then forming up in England.309 In
May 1944, small OA teams were authorized for each of the
three subordinate air divisions of VIII Bomber Command,
and, once formed, the Air Division OA section cooperated
actively with OAS Eighth Air Force.310
The OA section grew quickly, and by 1 January 1944 it
employed thirty-ve operations analysts with another seven
assigned to the three subordinate air divisions. In addition to
the thirty-ve Op Annies, the section also had fty-six other

personnel, including clerks, draftsmen, and stenographers, as
well as a detachment of female soldiers (WACs), for a total
strength of ninety-one.311 By the end of the war, some fortyeight uniformed and civilian operations analysts had served
with OAS Eighth Air Force.312
Accomplishments of AAF Operations
Analysis Sections
Although the AAF operations analysis program in
World War II produced no Nobel Prize winners, the Op
Annies contributed substantially to winning the war and
made important advances in the new science of operations
research. As Col. Leach noted after the war, the accomplishment of the OA Sections is almost impossible to evaluate.
OAS was a part of the team in its Air Force. Who can say
whether a touchdown is attributable to the half back, the
tackle or the coach?313 Indeed, each of the AAF OA sections was part of a larger team that included the sta, the
air and ground crews, and the administrative and support
personnel of the command to which it was assigned. The
improvements suggested by the OA sections in bombing accuracy, more-eective tactics, better aerial gunnery, fuel conservation, and the like had an enormous eect on AAF mission performance, and, as one journalist noted toward the
end of the war, the analysts practical, precise studies . . . have
not only been instrumental in making the AAF a more effective ghting machine but have saved countless lives in the
process.314 The problems studied and the solutions found
by AAF operations analysts during the war were many and
varied, and the list of specic accomplishments is long.315
One historian has noted that the most distinct contribution of the Eighth Air Force OA section was its work in measuring the accuracy of visual formation bombing.316 When
the rst OA section arrived at the VIII Bomber Command
in October 1942, fewer than 15 percent of the commands
bombs were falling within 1,000 feet of the aiming point; by
October 1944, the commands performance had improved to
greater than 60 percent, a fourfold increase in accuracy that
meant that in 1944 250 bombers were doing the work which
in 1942 would have required more than 1000.317 OAS VIII
Bomber Command analysts also recommended putting the
best bombardier in the lead plane and having everyone else
bomb on the leader, a method that resulted in a substantial
improvement in accuracy, the length of bomb patterns being
reduced from 4,600 feet to 3,200 feet and the width being
reduced from 2,600 feet to 2,500 feet.318 In all, the improvements in bombing accuracy inspired by OAS Eighth Air
Force more than satised Maj. Gen. Eakers initial request
to nd out how to get twice as many bombs on the target;
the overall increase was probably far greater than 1,000 per
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cent.319 The work of W. John Youden, Lt. Col. Philip Scott,
and James A. Clarkson of OAS Eighth Air Force on bombing accuracy led to the development of bombing tactics and
procedures that subsequently became the standard doctrine
for AAF in World War II.320 The analysts at OAS Eighth
Air Force also were active in work on radar countermeasures, a topic of interest to the British and to Division 15 of
NDRC as well. One estimate is that more-eective Allied
radar countermeasures saved U.S. strategic air forces based
in England alone some 450 aircraft and 4,500 casualties.321
OAS Ninth Air Force also conducted a number of
bombing accuracy studies that led to a threefold increase in
accuracy.322 Target analysis studies by Derald M. West and
Leonard H. Reinke at OAS Ninth Air Force led to more-efcient selection of weapons and tactics as well as more-accurate estimates of force requirements.323 Cliord H. Dowker
and Roger Hayward at OAS IX Bomber Command, together with George W. Taylor, the chief of OAS Fourteenth Air
Force, developed position ring and prepared the basic AAF
aerial gunnery manual, Get That Fighter, which was subsequently adopted by the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Chinese Air Force.324 OAS IX Bomber Command analysts in
Libya also discovered a magnesium brine in the salt lagoons
near Benghazi that could be used to stabilize the dust on airelds in Libya with consequent reduction of engine wear, saving perhaps the equivalent of fty B24 engines.325 At OAS
Fifteenth Air Force, George W. Housner made an analysis
of underground oil storage tanks in the ViennaLobau area
and concluded the tanks did not have bombproof covers
thereby facilitating a successful attack against themand
Robert N. Davis ew over the Ploesti oil elds and took the
rst radar pictures ever taken in combat.326
In the Pacic, Alexander Green of OAS XX Bomber
Command invented a sliderule-type device for estimating
the size of sighted ships and used it on its initial test ight to
identify the battleship Yamato and the main Japanese eet in
the Inland Sea, thereby precipitating the battle that nished
the Japanese Imperial Navy.327 Roger I. Wilkinson at OAS
Thirteenth Air Force also developed eective methods for
attacking moving ships from low altitudes using radar.328 At
home, William J. Crozier and Charles L. Foley of OAS Second Air Force discovered that the carbon dioxide re extinguishers used on most AAF aircraft actually fed rather than
extinguished res in the magnesium engines of the B29, a
discovery that led to changes that saved a number of B29s
and their crews.329
The contributions of AAF operations analysts to the development of OR theory and procedures are little mentioned
in the sources, but they too were no doubt substantial.330
The analytical problems presented to AAF analysts were
in their own way as new and complex as any faced by the
British ORS or the Navy ORG, and the Op Annies were

equally successful in nding innovative methods for dealing
with them.
Two AAF operations analysts made the ultimate contribution. Widnell D. Knott of OAS Second Air Force was
killed in the line of duty on 3 September 1944, and Robert
W. Arneson, the only Op Annie combat casualty, was killed
in action in the Pacic on 5 May 1945.331
The success of AAF OA sections can be measured in
part by the awards they received and the tributes paid to
them by the AAF commanders they served.332 On 2 November 1943, the commander of the IX Bomber Command
informed General Arnold that
the Operations Analysis Section has made important contributions to the eectiveness of operations in this command. These
people attack problems by rational methods with a detached
viewpoint which apparently makes it possible for them to discover solutions which tactical personnel have overlooked or
have not had the necessary uninterrupted time to develop.333
In a memorandum to Col. Leach written less than a year

later, General Arnold acknowledged that
Operations Analysts, comprising some of the ablest analytical
minds of the country, have served in all Air Forces at the request of the respective commanding generals. They have made
a signicant contribution to the impact of American air power
upon the enemy and the excellence of their work has been commended in ocial communications.334
On 29 May 1945, Maj. Gen. W. E. Kepner, the former

commander of the VIII Fighter Command and the Second
Air Division and then commander of the Eighth Air Force,
wrote to Maj. Gen. Eaker:
We feel that our OAS contributed heavily to the success our
mission. As a group of scientically trained civilian specialists,
they brought capable and enquiring minds to bear on a host of
operational problems. The freedom which they enjoyed from
military regimentation enabled them to deal directly with all
ranks and echelons in the Air Force with no lost motion. They
tackled with avidity any and all problems thrown at them and,
in the majority of cases, came up with the right answer.335
OR in the United States Army

Service Forces,
The Marshall Reorganization of March 1942 placed
the Armys technical services in the newly created Army
Service Forces. The Armys scientic branchesthe Ordnance Department, Medical Department, Signal Corps, and
Chemical Warfare Servicehad long been accustomed to
conducting scientic research and analysis as part of their
responsibility for the design and testing of weapons and
equipment. Such work often involved techniques of mathematical and statistical analysis that today we would consider
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part of the weapons design branch of operations research.
Until World War II, it did not, however, extend to the collection and analysis of operational data for the purpose of
making recommendations as to improvements in weapons,
tactics, or strategy. And, during World War II, only the Signal Corps tried to establish anything called an OR section,
and even then the work done was primarily of the engineering analysis variety.
Operational Research Branch, Oce of the
Chief Signal Ocer
Sir Robert Watson-Watts survey of U.S. air defenses
and his April 1942 report attracted the attention of AAF
commander General Arnold and led to the formation of operations analysis sections in AAF. The Army Signal Corps
bore primary responsibility for radar development, the most
prominent area in which British OR analysts had achieved
success. Watson-Watts report thus also caught the eye of
the Armys chief signal ocer, Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead,
who directed his planning director, Col. Frank C. Meade, to
set up an OR group.336 On the recommendation of Dr. Frank
B. Jewett of the National Academy of Sciences and Dr. Karl
T. Compton of MIT, Col. Meade selected Dr. William L.
Everitt to head the Signal Corps program, and Everitt was
duly appointed in March 1942 as a civil service employee,
grade P8.337 Everitts ocial title was senior consultant
in air communications, but he also held the titles of special consultant to the secretary of war and scientic advisor
to the chief signal ocer. In contrast to his several exalted
titles, Everitts civil service pay amounted to only $8,000 per
year, about one half of his previous annual income.338
Soon after his appointment, Everitt toured the country
examining radar sites, factories, and research facilities before
accompanying Cyril Jansky on a one-month trip to England
where they studied British OR programs rsthand. He then
returned to the United States to organize what came to be
called the Operational Research Branch, Oce of the Chief
Signal Ocer (ORB OCSigO).
The functions of ORB OCSigO included the analysis
of various problems having to do with radar equipment and
its use as well as the training and selection of radar personnel. As such, the branch more closely resembled an engineering consulting rm than a true OR section.339 Another
important task undertaken by Everitts group was the preparation and publication of manuals, equipment handbooks,
and other training materials in the radar, radio, and wire
communications eld.340 Everitt himself noted that ORB
studies the operations and operational procedures from a
detached engineering viewpoint and suggests to the operating groups new and better improved methods aimed at a
better overall Signal Service.341
Everitt drew up a rather rigid, detailed organizational

plan for the group based on its assigned functions and detailed job descriptions for the personnel he planned to hire.
The organizational scheme foresaw Everitt as the director
aided by an associate director in overseeing six subordinate
units each headed by an assistant director and employing
one to ve engineers or scientists and a team of clerks, stenographers, and draftsmen. Overall, Everitts plan called for
the employment of twenty-ve professional and nine clerical
personnel, all of whom he intended to hire through the civil
service. It was here that he ran into serious problems. The
civil service rules and procedures were restrictive, cumbersome, time consuming, and totally unsuited to the type of
organization required.342 The hiring of the necessary professional personnel through the civil service was also hampered
by the fact that the civil service regulations set salary levels
based on the number of subordinates one supervised rather
than on the technical qualications required, and many wellqualied prospects declined the oer of a job under such
conditions. Nevertheless, Everitt persevered and hired six
experienced radio engineers at various civil service grades
from P5 to P7.343 By October 1943, Everitts group had
grown to twenty-eight people.344
Once organization and hiring were under way, Everitt
drew up a list of six potential projects, all of which were essentially engineering studies concerned with radar operation,
performance, maintenance, and the training and performance
of radar operators. Only Project ORGE1 (which dealt
with the operation of air-surface vessel detection equipment
and the planning of ights so as to get adequate coverage)
even bordered on real OR.345
Several Army agencies were concerned with the development and use of radar, and the work of Everitts group
inevitably intersected with other radar-oriented activities.
He maintained close contact with other Signal Corps oces,
notably the Radar Division headed by Maj. Charles F. Fell
(also in the Directorate of Planning) and Col. Tom C. Rives
Radar Division in the Signal Supply Service. Inasmuch as
AAF was a prime user of radar and the AAF air defense system was based on it, Everitts ORB OCSigO also had extensive contacts with Janskys OA section in the AAF Directorate of Air Defense. To avoid duplication and working at
cross purposes, Everitt and Jansky worked out a memorandum of agreement as to the division of responsibilities between their two groups. The memorandum, signed on 9 May
1942, dened the function of Everitts group as to provide a
consulting engineering service which can assign a group of
technical specialists to analyze the technical operating problems involved in the proper functioning of the Radar and
Air Communications Systems, and to use eld experience
to advise the research and manufacturing establishments on
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changes to present and future equipment, to advise training
centers and schools on the selection of personnel and curricula to obtain the maximum technical performance from the
available equipment, and to serve as general consultant to the
chief signal ocer on engineering problems.346 Provisions
were also included for ORB OCSigO to provide consulting engineering services when Janskys personnel in the eld
were unable to deal with special problems. Everitt and the
ORB also worked closely with Col. Leach and OAD. The
two groups assisted each other with the procurement and
training of OR personnel, liaison, and the coordination of a
wide variety of OR matters.347
The ORB OCSigO also had a working relationship
with NDRC and OSRD, primarily in the area of training for
radar operators.348 Despite Everitts apparent belief that the
average American lacked the ability to be trained for radar
work in a few weeks, John Teeter of OSRD developed a twomonth program for Signal Corps radar specialists headed for
OA assignments. The students received basic training with
Everitt and his deputy, Lynne C. Smeby, in Washington,
D.C., and then went to the AAF School of Applied Tactics
in Orlando, Florida; the Radar Operators and Maintenance
School at Boca Raton, Florida; and, with stops at Langley
Field and Fort Monroe in Virginia and one day in New York
City, on to the Radiation Lab at MIT and the Radio Research Lab at Harvard.349
ORB OCSigO made many important contributions to
the eective use of radar by the U.S. Army and Army Air
Forces, not the least of which was the publication of a multitude of technical and training manuals. Inasmuch as their
work was almost entirely technical, it remained, as previously noted, more on the order of an engineering consulting
rm than a real OR organization, and the branchs contributions to the development of OR theory and procedures
were negligible.
Operational Analysis Branch, Signal Section, HQ European
Theater of Operations
In the spring of 1944, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) William S.
Rumbough, the chief signal ocer of the European Theater
of Operations, requested the assignment of an operational
analysis section to his oce.350 The purpose of the group
was to prepare sta studies and surveys on the technical feasibility of new operational uses of Signal Corps equipment,
submit recommendations for the improvement of existing
systems based on theoretical analysis of operational results,
and furnish an engineering consultant service on problems
concerning radiation propagation and electronics.351
The request was approved, and Dr. Everitt of ORB OCSigO selected the personnel for the team and then placed
them under contract with the Oce of Field Service, OSRD.
The initial group consisting of Karl R. Spangenberg, O. M.

Covington, and the section chief Royal V. Howard reported
to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United
States Army (ETOUSA) on 23 July 1944, and by the end of
September they were joined by Lucien L. Farkas, Robert A.
Fox, Eugene O. Pack, and Carl C. Bath.352
During the period 23 July 1944 through 20 May 1945,
the branch, led by Howard and then Farkas and billeted in
Paris, completed some thirty-one separate assignments, including work for the Twelfth Army Group, the First, Third,
and Ninth U.S. Armies, and the Combined Intelligence Ofce Survey. Most of their work dealt with radar, but they also
studied identication friend or foe systems, captured German signal equipment, guided missiles, and radio production facilities in France. Their duties occasionally brought
them under enemy re.
The degree to which the activities of the ETOUSA Signal Operational Analysis Branch constituted engineering
work rather than OR is testied to by Karl R. Spangenberg,
one of the original team members who later noted that the
group did useful work, although the nature of that work was
not as originally contemplated (that is, not to act in part as an
OA group) and that, although dicult, it would have been
both possible and desirable for it to act as an OA group.353
In fact, Spangenberg terminated his assignment to the group
and departed for the United States on 3 October 1944, writing in his after-action report to OSRD, Inasmuch as I am
not a service specialist, as there was not prospect of doing any
operations analysis, and as there is not immediate prospect of
further investigational work, I terminated my activity.354
The Army Ordnance Department
The World War IIera Army Ordnance Department
was responsible for the design, testing, and maintenance of
weapons, ammunition, and tank and automotive equipment.
Its activities were conducted in a number of laboratories and
testing sites throughout the United States and they involved
a good deal of mathematically based scientic research on
design and performance characteristics. Many analysts who
have served in the Armys OR program since World War II
assert that the Ordnance Department, and in particular the
Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, was deeply involved in OR during World War II. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence
does not support such an assertion.355 Even so, scientists at
BRL undoubtedly used a variety of mathematical and statistical techniques in their work on the design and testing of
the weapons systems, ammunition, and tank and automotive equipment for which they were responsible, and some
of their activities certainly bordered on OR even as it was
dened in World War II.
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Aberdeen Proving Ground was established in August
1917 as an ordnance test facility, and, in December 1938,
its Research Division was redesignated as BRL. In 1940,
the BRL was fully organized with 65 personnel and an annual appropriation of $120,000; by V-E Day, BRL sta
had increased to 729 people and the annual appropriation
to $1.6 million.356 The BRL was under the direction of an
Ordnance Corps ocer. From 1938 to 1941, the director
was Col. H. H. Zornig, and, from 1941 to 1949, Lt. Col.
L. E. Simon served in that position.357 The mission of BRL
was to conduct basic and technical research in ballistics and
the related elds of physics, chemistry, mathematics, and
engineering. Among the tasks undertaken were weapons
systems development; quality control; the development of
computing techniques; the preparation of ballistic tables for
guns, bombs, and rockets; and provision of information regarding the eects of various weapons when used in combat.
To organize the work more eciently, BRL formed sections
to deal with interior, exterior, and terminal ballistics and the
like. An internal advisory council assisted the director, and a
scientic advisory council of twelve eminent American scientists was formed in 1940 to provide advice and help with
the recruiting of scientists. One of the principal functions of
BRL was the preparation of ballistics ring tables for various weapons and ammunition as well as aerial bombs. The
BRL workload in this area increased greatly during World
War II, and a substantial portion of the BRL eort was
directed to testing weapons, ammunition, and bombs and
computing ring and bombing tables. Another major BRL
function was the surveillance of ammunition, and during the
war BRL scientists developed reliable sampling techniques
that signicantly improved the quality control of stockpiled
ammunition.
BRL also provided other technical information and assistance to troops in the eld. For example, BRL trained and
deployed technical service teams to calibrate guns in the eld.
This work, too, expanded exponentially between 1941 and
1945, and BRL research work was set aside to solve morepressing practical problems. The technical analysis assistance
provided by BRL to the Army and Army Air Forces in the
eld included studies to determine the optimum bomb pattern to ensure a high probability of destroying a target on a
single bombing run, the development for the Army in the Pacic of a special artillery fuze that would not explode when
hitting jungle treetops, the vulnerability of the German 88mm. gun to fragmenting shells, the reduction of sight errors
and dispersion of aerial gunnery, and computation for the
Army and Navy of new ballistics tables that would help ensure the destruction of concrete pillboxes.358 Toward the end
of the war, BRL also conducted a series of experiments on
the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft. All of these activities in-
volved the collection of test and operational data, analysis of

the data using mathematical and statistical methods, and the
production of recommendations for new weapons, ammunition, and fuzes, or the improvement of existing materiel and
corresponding means of improving techniques. As such, they
probably qualify as operations research under the denitions
now accepted.
The testimony of several scientists who worked at BRL
during the war also lend credibility to the claim that BRL
was involved in OR. In an oral history interview conducted
in April 1992, Arthur Stein, who rst began work at BRL in
October 1941, stated that in the early days of the war BRL
adopted a multidisciplinary approach to problems, many of
which were varieties of optimization problems.359 Stein related that some of his assignments at BRL were very interesting and might have been called operations research if that
discipline existed.360 On the other hand, he also stated that,
to his knowledge, there had been no work on the kinds of
operations research that dealt with large forces.361
Another BRL employee during the World War II period and after was Frank Grubbs, who served as an Ordnance
Corps ocer during the war and was rst assigned to BRL
in 1941. He remained there, with a short break, until the end
of 1946.362 In an oral history interview, Grubbs recalled that
military operations research got started with a group in the
BRL called [the] Advisory Council. It consisted of a director
of the BRL and the laboratory chiefs, and associate technical directors. Grubbs went on to state that OR began in the
Advisory Councils investigations regarding the infantry rie
and expanded to the study of artillery and other items, eventually resulting in the introduction of the weapons systems
analysis function at the lab.363 Grubbs testimony is somewhat problematic in that the activity he describes as OR and
the Weapons Systems Laboratory were postwar additions
to BRL. In his interview, the distinction between wartime
events and those that occurred in the immediate postwar period is sometimes unclear.
The available evidence thus seems to lead to the conclusion that, although BRL was involved in a number of what
might be termed proto-operations research activities, there
was no sustained and distinct OR activity in the Ordnance
Department in World War II. Of course, the successful application of OR to other military activities during the war
led to its widespread adoption throughout the Army, including the Ordnance Department, in the postwar period.
Other Army Service Forces Elements
The World War IIera Chemical Warfare Service (later
renamed the Chemical Corps) was responsible for the development and use of chemical (gas) and ame weapons and
defenses against such weapons. Of course, there were no ac
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tive chemical operations by U.S. forces during World War II,
and, as is the case with the Ordnance Department, there is
no documentary evidence to support the conclusion that the
Armys Chemical Warfare Service conducted any sustained
or distinct OR activities during World War II. However, the
Chemical Warfare Service apparently did ask the NDRC
Applied Mathematics Panel for assistance in calculating the
number of gas bombs of a given type required to produce a
minimum gas concentration over a specied area in a certain
time, a task that no doubt required the application of ORlike methods.364
The Army Medical Department was responsible for
evacuating and treating casualties and for providing medical
equipment and supplies. As part of its responsibilities, the
department conducted extensive medical research, including research that today might be included under the general
heading of OR of the human performance variety. Although
few details are available, a twenty-man group composed primarily of Medical Corps ocers, went to Fort Knox, Kentucky, in early 1942 to conduct studies on the performance
of armored crewmen.365
OR in the United States Army
Ground Forces,
The application of operations research techniques to the
improvement of the equipment and tactics of Army ground
forces lagged behind their application to air and naval operations. This was true in Britain as well as in the United States,
although by the end of the war the British had several OR
sections assigned to its ground forces and doing important
OR work. No. 2 ORS was assigned to Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomerys 21. Army Group, and the chief of
No. 2 ORS noted in his after-action report that the application of scientic methods to the development of weapons
was well established by World War II, but
the complexities of military tactics proved for a long time intractable, since even the smallest battle is a bewildering compound
of variables, and new methods had therefore to be worked out
before there could be any hope of results. . . . For the supercial
details of battle may be altered in a moment by the introduction
of a new weapon, while the underlying principles of warfare
scarcely change from one century to the next.366
From early 1942, U.S. Army OR leaders advocated

the extension of OR to Army ground forces. In AprilMay
1942, Cyril Jansky, the special consultant on operations analysis in the AAF Directorate of Air Defense, suggested that
operations analysis be applied not only to AAF commands
but also to the Armys armored, antiaircraft artillery, and
tank destroyer commands.367 In July 1942, the subject was
broached in NDRC when Robert W. King, the executive assistant to the chairman of NDRC, wrote to Vannevar Bush
suggesting that there was a need for the analysis of battle data
that might merit the creation of a group of analysts to study
land warfare activities.368 In their August 1942 report, Leach
and Davidson echoed Janskys opinion, noting that there was
no reason that operations analysis should not apply to such
areas as tank warfare or training programs.369
No action was taken in 1942 or most of 1943 to form
OR groups for the Army ground forces on the pattern of the
British, Navy, or AAF OR groups, but in November 1943, Lt.
Col. Leach brought the matter to the fore in a memorandum
prepared for Harvey Bundy, who passed it on to Maj. Gen.
Stephen G. Henry, the director of the New Developments
Division of the War Department General Sta, with the
comment, This development [OR] has been adopted with
conspicuous success by the Air Forces but the Ground Forces
have really not been aware of its advantages nor do I believe
they have studied the matter intensively.370 In his cover letter to Bundy, Lt. Col. Leach raised a number of issues growing out of his sixteen months of experience as chief of OAD,
noting that he was providing the memo to Bundy for his use
at such time as someone in the Ground Forces tentatively
concludes that Operations Analysis should be established
there and requests you for suggestions as to what steps ought
to be taken.371 In his 2 November memo, Leach recounted
the success of AAF OA sections and the advantages of using
civilian operations analysts before pointing out that Army
commanders in the eld would continue to ignore the value
of OA unless it was brought to their attention by top authority, as had been done by General Arnold in his 24 October
1942 letter to key AAF commanders and Air Sta ocers.372
Leach went on to set two prerequisites for the establishment
of OA in the ground forces: OA sections must be desired and
requested by commanders in the eld, and an administrative
organization must be established in Washington to recruit
and administer the OA sections. He further recommended
that the proposed Washington OA coordinating oce consist of a colonel as chief and one to three lieutenant colonels,
all under the supervision of a general ocer connected to operations, perhaps the chief of the theater group in the Operations Division of the War Department General Sta. On 25
November 1943, Lt. Col. Leach reiterated his arguments for
the extension of OA to the Army ground forces and the need
for the personal backing of the Army chief of sta in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.373
As a result of Leachs prodding, a draft letter was prepared
for the signature of Army Chief of Sta Gen. George C. Marshall, addressed to all major Army ground force commanders,
in which the drafter (probably Leach) stated that serious consideration should be given to the extension of the use of operations analysis teams to ground and amphibious operations in
all theaters.374 On 6 December 1943, Secretary Stimson sent
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a memorandum to General Marshall enclosing the draft and
several papers dealing with the development of OA in AAF
and noting that Lt. Gen. Willard F. Harmon, the commander
of Army forces in the South Pacic, had requested an analysis section to study jungle warfare, and that Lt. Gen. Jacob D.
Devers in Europe had expressed interest in having OA help.
Secretary Stimson suggested to General Marshall that it may
be that this would be an appropriate time to consider a general
extension of the operations analysis program.375
On 17 November 1943, Lt. Gen. Harmon had indeed
requested, a well-rounded Operations Analysis Section for
jungle warfare comprising ve or six men.376 Lt. Col. R. E.
Elwell from OAD, HQ AAF, was sent out to Lt. Gen. Harmons headquarters to assess requirements and reported that
Harmon planned to use the proposed OA section for improving troop morale, photographic interpretation, adapting
arms and equipment for jungle ghting, studying the use of
limited facilities for the movement of personnel and supplies,
and solving problems of communications and the adaptation
of communications equipment for use in jungle warfare.377
There is no evidence that Lt. Gen. Harmon ever received the requested OA team.378 General Marshall apparently did, however, charge two War Department General
Sta ocers in the current section of the Operations Division with overseeing the establishment of OA sections in
the Army ground forces, causing Vannevar Bush to opine,
It seems to me that the matter of operations [analysis] sections in the Ground Forces is well launched and apparently
in very good hands.379
Research Section, General Headquarters,
Southwest Pacic Area
Although no OA section was assigned to Headquarters,
South Pacic Area, two OA sections were formed under the
auspices of the Oce of Field Service, OSRD, in early 1944
for service in the Southwest Pacic Area and in the Pacic
Ocean (Mid-Pacic) Area. The rst to be formed was the
Research Section, Headquarters, Southwest Pacic Area.380
By late 1943, the attention of OSRD was turning from
the production of new weapons to the eective introduction to and use by the troops in the eld of those weapons
already in production. The creation of the OSRD Oce
of Field Service under Dr. Karl T. Compton, on 15 October 1943, provided a means by which OSRD could help
the armed forces meet the needs of eld commanders for
both eld services and operations research. Accordingly,
in December 1943, Dr. Compton traveled to the southwest
Pacic to discuss with Gen. Douglas MacArthur his needs
and desires for scientic help and he returned with a list of
twenty-ve problems on which scientic advice was needed. In February 1944, General MacArthur formally re-
quested the establishment of a research section in his headquarters at Brisbane, Australia, staed by representatives
of OSRD, to handle the visits of eld service consultants
and to provide OFS-sponsored scientists and technicians
to solve new problems as they arose. The Research Section,
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacic Area (GHQ
SWPA), began operations in April 1944 with the arrival of
Dr. George R. Harrison as section chief and E. B. Hubbard
as scientic aide.381 Contrary to the long-standing admonitions of Col. Leach, the research section was buried deep
in the headquarters structure by being assigned to the ofce of Maj. Gen. Spencer B. Akin, the GHQ SWPA chief
signal ocer.382 Consequently, the scientists in the section
did not have ready access to the key decision makers.383
The Research Section reported through the Signal Oce
and MacArthurs adjutant general to the War Department
General Sta New Developments Division.
Dr. H. Kirk Stephenson arrived in June 1944 to take over
as scientic aide, and in July 1944 Dr. Harrison returned to
the United States and was replaced as section chief by Dr.
Paul E. Klopsteg. In mid-September, the section moved
with MacArthurs GHQ to Hollandia. Klopsteg preceded
the main group and, when Hubbard, Stephenson, and the
three WACs assigned to the section arrived in Hollandia
in late September, they found that the Research Section,
GHQ SWPA, consisted of Klopsteg, a small table, and
a chair at one end of a Quonset hut.384 The following
month, both Klopsteg and Hubbard returned home, and
Stephenson became chief, a position he retained until the
end of the war.
In general, relations of the civilian scientists in the Research Section with their uniformed colleagues was satisfactory, but Stephenson related:
we also had a little trouble with the military men now and
then. Some of it resulted from stupidity, some from jealousy,
and some from pure cussedness. One ocer tried to steal my
oce and my three WACs while I was away on a trip, but the
WACs had connections.385
In early 1942, long before Dr. Comptons visit to GHQ

SWPA, Maj. Gen. W. H. Marquat, the commander of the
14th Anti-Aircraft Command, had tried to get analysts to
work with his command but was unsuccessful.386 He repeated his request to Compton in December 1943, and Dr. Sidney Darlington was sent out under OFS auspices in August
1944.387 Darlington worked until April 1945 with Maj. Gen.
Marquats sta and operating units to study the performance
of U.S. antiaircraft artillery and the performance and tactics
of Japanese aircraft. Darlington studied the eects of meteorological conditions on 90-mm. antiaircraft artillery re and
wrote several training circulars on the subject. In cooperation
with Henry Abajian of the Radiation Lab at MIT, he invent
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:37
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ed an attachment to the M9 antiaircraft predictor to correct
the problem of lagging bursts, a frequent problem because of
the Japanese pilots tactic of accelerating when they rst came
under antiaircraft re. Darlington moved to the Philippines
in November 1944 to conduct studies (using movie cameras)
on Japanese tactics for evading antiaircraft re.
During his visit to GHQ SWPA in December 1943,
Karl Compton was approached by the SWPA chief signal
ocer Maj. Gen. Akin with a request for experts in time and
motion studies to investigate the commands signal communications centers with a view to improving their operating
eciency.388 Two OFS contract experts, Herbert F. Goodwin and A. H. Mogensen, studied the problem from April
to June 1944, and their work was continued by D. F. Copell
from June to September 1944. The OFS experts provided
training in work simplication, and several hundred trainees were taught to apply the principles to various message
center functions.
During Comptons visit to GHQ SWPA he also discussed engineering problems with Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey,
chief engineer, GHQ SWPA, who asked for the help of several engineering experts to advise on construction problems,
especially the construction of airelds, and the performance
of engineer equipment in jungle environments.389 Subsequently, two engineers attached to the Research Section,
GHQ SWPAJ. A. Russell and J. P. Becichworked with
the engineers in New Guinea from April to September 1944,
advising on the siting and construction of airelds. They also
worked in the oce of the chief engineer, GHQ SWPA, in
Brisbane, assisting with planning and writing engineer training and instruction manuals. Russell and Becich were later
replaced by J. W. Farwell who served in New Guinea and
Leyte providing advice on construction problems.
By December 1944, the Research Section had personnel
scattered all over the southwest Pacic from Sydney to the
Philippines, and, in January 1945, the section moved with
GHQ, SWPA, to Tacloban on Leyte. There it was transferred from the control of Maj. Gen. Akin to the United
States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) Board headed by
Col. William Alexander.390 In early March 1945, the Research Section moved with the USAFFE Board and GHQ
SWPA to Manila. Almost immediately, Dr. Stephenson returned to the United States for consultations with Compton
and Bush, orientations on new equipment, and other matters. By the time he returned in late June, the war in Europe
had ended and Alan T. Waterman had traveled to the Pacic
to explore the possibilities of establishing a Pacic branch of
OSRD with lab and shop facilities in Manila.
The period from late June 1945 until the end of the
war on 2 September 1945 was one of great activity for the
Research Section. When Karl Compton arrived in Manila
in August 1945 to set up the Pacic Branch-OSRD, the

Research Section was overseeing some thirty-ve men on
assignment in the theater and more than forty on call for
various projects.391 Plans called for expansion to more than
two hundred scientists and technicians, but the war ended
before that could come to pass, and the section shrank
quickly. The last task handled by the section before being
ocially inactivated, on 13 September 1945, was the dispatch to Japan of a mission of nine scientists led by Dr. E.
L. Moreland to study the state of Japanese science and to
exploit Japanese scientists.392
In all, the Research Section, SWPA, managed some one
hundred scientists and technical personnel; the usual duration of assignment was from three to six months.393 For the
most part, the projects they undertook fell into the category
of eld service or engineering consultation rather than operations research, but some limited OR work was performed
by men assigned to the Research Section, GHQ SWPA.394
Among the topics studied were radar employment, radio
propagation, and radar countermeasures; LORAN (LOngRAnge Navigation, a terrestrial navigation system using
low-frequency radio transmissions from xed land-based
stations); marine borers and insect infestation of Army food
stores; tropical deterioration; transportation bottlenecks and
equipment failures; DUKW (amphibious truck) operations;
immunizations, treatment of malaria, and fungus infections
of the skin; the use of DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) and other insecticides; the use of smoke munitions in
combat; antiaircraft artillery; rockets; silent weapons; chemical warfare; mortars and tank-mounted ame-throwers;
engineering operations; Japanese weapons and equipment;
scientic intelligence; communications systems planning;
and time-motion studies to simplify communications centers operations.395
The Balanced TeamOperational Research Section,
HQ Pacic Ocean Area
On his way to the southwest Pacic in December 1943,
Karl Compton stopped in Hawaii to discuss the need for
scientic support with Admiral Chester Nimitz. Nimitz,
who shared General MacArthurs distaste for interlopers in
his command, declined Comptons oers of assistance, but
Compton enjoyed a warmer reception when he called on Lt.
Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., the commander of Army
forces in the Pacic Ocean Area.396 Richardson had already
inquired of the War Department in the fall of 1943 about the
possibilities of establishing an OR section, and he responded
positively to Comptons proposals.397 Compton stopped to
see Richardson again on his way back from MacArthurs
headquarters in late January 1944, and Richardson expressed
interest in a balanced team of civilian scientists sponsored
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by OSRD. The balanced team concept, which envisioned
a team composed of both OR and eld service representatives, was promoted by OSRD ocials who were somewhat
mied when Lt. Gen. Richardson dubbed his group the operational research section.398
In late February 1944, the ubiquitous Lt. Col. Leach
stopped in Hawaii on his way back from a visit to GHQ
SWPA and Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the South
Pacic. He called on Lt. Gen. Richardson and, following
some detailed legwork with Richardsons sta and subordinate commanders, made a number of useful recommendations regarding the organization and initial tasks of the
proposed ORS Pacic Ocean Area (POA).399 As to the organization of the team, Leach recommended that it consist of
a mature man with leadership and administrative abilities as
chief, to be stationed at Fort Shafter, Hawaii; a mature man,
preferably a physicist or mathematician or at least someone
accustomed to working with scientists, to be deputy chief
stationed at Schoeld Barracks and to spend much time in
forward areas; two men for the study of loading and supply problems; two men with construction engineering backgrounds and training in terminal ballistics; two mathematical
physicists able to adapt to the study of tactical problems and
the eective use of technical devices; a communications engineer with radio experience; two or three physically t and
enthusiastic younger men, not necessarily scientists, to serve
as a exible reserve; and two enlisted stenographers and one
enlisted draftsman to provide administrative support. Leach
also noted that the two senior men should be selected rst
and that they should help select the remaining team members. He also reminded Lt. Gen. Richardson that the success
of any OA section depended on the quality of its personnel,
and told him of the meeting with ocers of the 7th and 27th
divisions where he had collected information on the types
of problems with which an analysis section would deal.400
Leachs long list of principal problems suggested for initial
study included the ecient use of labor; the eectiveness of
depot operations; the reduction of paperwork; supply and
transportation problems associated with amphibious operations; the tactics of amphibious operations, including the
eectiveness of various types of pre-landing attacks, the coordination of re support, the detection and destruction of
underwater obstacles, the use of smoke, and peculiar hydrographic conditions; and all types of problems associated with
radar and radio communications in amphibious operations.
On 4 March 1944, Lt. Gen. Richardson submitted his
formal request for the assignment of a balanced team and
asked for a chief, deputy chief, and nine or ten men. Col.
Leach and Lt. Gen. Richardson had agreed that an OSRD
representative should be sent out to study requirements and
draw up a list of recommendations. Accordingly, in March
1944, Dr. Paul E. Klopsteg, then chief of NDRC Division

17, was sent to Hawaii to consult with Richardsons sta regarding the type of work required. He returned to Washington in April with a long list of potential projects.401
Meanwhile, the search for men to compose the team went
forward slowly. Many of the potential candidates, both for
the job of section chief and to serve as analysts and eld service men, were already gainfully employed and could not be
convinced to change jobs.402 John E. Burchard was proposed
as chief of ORS POA but was obligated to the Navy, so Dr.
Lauriston C. Marshall was selected, and Burchard agreed to
go with Marshall to Hawaii to help him get started.403 After
some diculties, Niels E. Edlefson, Roderick Stephens, Nathan Newmark, and Norman Dahl were selected for assignment to ORS POA, with Helge Holst as administrative assistant. Burchard, Marshall, Stephens, and Holst, accompanied
by Lt. Col. Henderson of the New Developments Division of
the War Department General Sta, arrived in Hawaii on 31
May 1944 and immediately set to work.
The mission of ORS POA was laid out in Section II,
Circular No. 102, Headquarters, United States Army Forces
in the Central Pacic Area, on 16 June 1944, and was subsequently revised and expanded in Circular No. 2, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacic Ocean Area
(USAFPOA), dated 2 January 1945. In brief, the ORS POA
mission was to inform military personnel of the command
about new scientic developments and equipment; to assist
in the use of existing equipment and techniques; to assist in
determining requirements for new equipment or modications to existing equipment and in the development of techniques for using that equipment; and to inform civilian and
Army scientic and technical agencies in the United States
of matters in the command having a bearing on the development of new equipment, modications, or techniques.404
By verbal authorization, the services of ORS POA were also
made available to Army Air Forces, Navy, and Marine Corps
units in the theater.405
Following the arrival in Hawaii of the initial contingent,
ORS POA grew steadily until the end of the war. A table of
organization was drawn up with the assistance of the USAFPOA G3 section calling for a permanent establishment of
twenty-three men. At the end of the war, ORS POA had a
total of fteen men organized in four main groups: weapons
and analysis; radar, communications, and countermeasures;
amphibious operations, transportation, and cargo handling;
and work simplication.406 Another nine people were in the
theater working out of ORS POA and cooperating with
ORS POA regulars, and two Army Signal Corps ocers
were detailed to ORS POA. By September 1945, nearly fty
men had been attached to ORS POA at one time or another
for varying periods.407
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Unlike General MacArthur, Lt. Gen. Richardson understood the importance of establishing the team directly
under the top command leadership, and he wrote to Compton on 5 May 1944 to tell him that would be the case with
ORS POA.408 For administrative purposes ORS POA
was assigned to work under the supervision of USAFPOA
G3 rather than as a separate Special Sta section, as had
been originally envisioned. Some diculties were encountered with restrictions imposed by lower-ranking ocers in
the G3 section and having to do with ORS POA direct
communications with OSRD, but Lauriston Marshall got
them resolved with POA chief of sta Maj. Gen. Clark L.
Runer.409 Throughout the assignment of ORS POA to
HQ USAFPOA, Lt. Gen. Richardson, Maj. Gen. Runer,
USAFPOA sta, and subordinate commanders maintained
a very positive attitude toward the civilians of the balanced
team, and Lt. Gen. Richardson even approved their informal
work for the Navy and Army Air Forces.
Of necessity, ORS POA interacted almost daily with
both the OSRD Oce of Field Service and the War Department General Sta New Developments Division. Marshall, the chief of ORS POA, had held a high position with
OSRD and had extensive experience in dealing with Vannevar Bush and the NDRC/OSRD bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he encountered a number of diculties in dealing
with OFS, mostly problems involving the terms of assignment of eld personnel.410 The OFS-sponsored personnel
who came to the theater on specic, temporary assignments
could be managed with little diculty, but the frequent
rotation, griping, and seeming lack of dedication and discipline of some of the permanent members of ORS POA
posed substantial problems. In his nal report, Marshall felt
compelled to state:
either there should be more control within the OSRD organization and willing discipline amongst its personnel or some
other scheme should be adopted in case of another war. If in
total war men are to be exempted from the operation of the
Selective Service Laws because of their peculiar abilities, there
is no apparent reason why they should not be subject to some
of the controls placed on members of the armed services in the
war service which their peculiar abilities make it possible for
them to render. When a man does not choose to work where
he can best contribute to the war eort because it will take or
keep him away from his family for a year, the comparison with
ocers of the armed services who have been absent from their
families for three or four years is unfavorable. The scientists
and those qualied to work with them in this war have been a
privileged class and some individuals involved have not always
recognized the obligations which should have accompanied
their privileges. The British method of handling their scientists
should be studied.411
In contrast, ORS POA and the New Developments Division worked well together and maintained cordial and rela-
tively stress-free relations. In his nal report Marshall noted

that the New Developments Division
performed the unique function of bringing together on a common meeting ground the points of view of the military and the
civilian scientists. The ocers in this section were thus in a position to see all sides of the problem and help in synthesizing
some of the points of view represented. Solutions to problems
were found quickly in this manner, aiding materially it is believed in expediting satisfactory conclusion of the war.412
ORS POA also enjoyed good relationships with the

Research Branch, GHQ SWPA, as well as AAF and Navy
operations research groups stationed in Hawaii.413 A clear division of responsibilities was worked out between ORS POA
and AAF OAS Pacic Ocean Area (Seventh Air Force), and
Marshalls team occasionally assisted the AAF section with
the loan of expert personnel. The eld service representatives
and OR analysts at ORS POA also maintained a good working relationship with the members of the Navy Operations
Research Group at Pearl Harbor, particularly those involved
in submarine warfare and air operations.414 Shortly before the
end of the war, more than a third of the personnel assigned
to ORS POA were in forward areas on temporary duty with
AAF units.415 Overall, ORS POA devoted about half of its
total eort to projects of interest to the Navy or AAF.416
ORS POA undertook a number of studies and provided
advice on a wide variety of topics, making particular contributions in the areas of radar defenses, communications, the
use of port facilities, and cargo handling.417 Lt. Gen. Richardson did not share General MacArthurs suspicions and
biases and was quite willing to have outsiders examine and
critique the operations of his command. Thus, although a
good portion of the work done by ORS POA fell into the
eld service category, a fair number of analytical studies also
used the methods of operations research. The constant interaction with Navy and AAF OR personnel no doubt kept the
analysts at ORS POA inspired and up to date on the newest
developments in OR and the successes being achieved by OR
analysts elsewhere. In any case, what OR work was done by
the members of ORS POA accounted for the largest part of
all OR work done in the Army ground forces in World War
II, and set the path for the sustained application of operations research techniques to land warfare for the U.S. Army
in the postwar period.
Historians and Op Annies
One brief coda needs to be added to the history of operations research in the U.S. Army during World War II. The
operations analysts sent out by Navy ORG, Army Air Forces
OAD, or to the Pacic by the OSRD Oce of Field Service
were not the only men in the eld gathering operational data,
subjecting it to analysis, and writing up the results in a form
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useful to military commanders and sta ocers. The Historical Branch of the War Department General Sta formed
a number of teams of historians who were assigned to the
various theaters of war for the purpose of collecting historical data, analyzing those data, and producing reports and
histories of the operations of Army Air Forces, Army service
forces, and Army ground forces units around the world.418
The work done by the Army eld historians was similar
in form and purpose, if not in content, to the work done by
operations analyststhe major dierence was that historians relied on historical method whereas the operations analysts frequently used mathematical and statistical models to
help them organize and understand the data. In fact, more
than one of the Armys World War II eld historians, notably Hugh M. Cole, later turned up in the Operations Research Oce and other postwar Army operations research
activities.
The degree to which the work of the historian and that
of the operations analyst is related is shown by one World
War II OSRD Oce of Field Service team formed at the
request of Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry, the director of the
New Developments Division. From 24 April to 28 October 1944, Douglas Nettleton and, from 24 July to 6 October 1944, Margaret Piedem were put on OFS contracts to
conduct a scientic analysis of Battle Records in an attempt
to determine the morale and physical eects of bombardment on individuals within the impact area.419 Assisted by
the project director from the New Developments Division,
Nettleton and Piedem studied ve landing operations on
coral atolls in the central Pacic: Tarawa, Makin, Kwajalein,
Roi Namur, and Eniwetok. After examining the available reports and other documentation, the team concluded that it
was not possible to nd any precise method of measuring
the direct eects of bombardment . . . [and] . . . that the information to be obtained from reports in their present form
is wholly inadequate for the type of analysis called for in the
basic directive.420 The project director thus recommended
that the study be discontinued until a standard form for reporting battle results was adopted. Moreover, he noted that
such statistical reporting of battle results would place an
undue burden on eld commanders but suggested that the
task might be undertaken by a civilian team.
Conclusion
The new science of operations research played a substantial role in winning World War II. Indeed, OR must be
reckoned with the other major scientic discoveries of the
World War II eraradar, sonar, modern re control, rockets
and guided missiles, the proximity fuze, the new incendiaries, and the atomic bombas one of the applications of science that helped the Allies win World War II.421 The ap-
plication of OR techniques to weapons systems design and

integration; the improvement of operational procedures, tactics, and strategy; the countering of enemy weapons, tactics,
and strategy; and the early identication of useless lines of
scientic research gave the Allies in World War II a decisive
advantage over the Axis powers, none of whom developed an
eective OR capability.422
Beginning with their work on the integration of radar
into the air defense system, British scientists created from
scratch the new science of operational research and built the
organizational and theoretical foundation on which the U.S.
armed forces formed their own OR organizations. The U.S.
Navy and the U.S. Army Air Forcesand to a much lesser
extent the U.S. Army service forces and U.S. Army ground
forcesabsorbed the British experience and used OR to
solve a wide variety of technical and operational problems.
Although they looked to British models for organizational
patterns and analytical techniques, the Army and Navy analysts devised their own unique solutions compatible with the
traditions, procedures, and needs of the services for which
they labored. In making their own contribution to the winning of the war, American OR managers and analysts worked
as part of a team that included the commanders, sta, and
operational forces as well as their supporting administrative
and logistical personnel.
The path taken in the development of OR in the United
States in World War II diverged somewhat from its British model. The dierences between operational research in
Britain and operations research/operations analysis in the
United States can be explained mainly by the fact that the
British eort was largely directed toward nding how to
do the best they could with limited resources whereas the
American eort, once the American war machine got rolling,
was directed more toward how to eectively integrate new
technology and new techniques into the ghting forces.
There were also other, somewhat supercial, dierences.
For example, the British had a preference for operations analysts trained in the hard sciences, a preference shared by the
U.S. Oce of Scientic Research and Development and the
U.S. Navy but mitigated by the Armys use of lawyers, economists, and even librarians. The British were also more successful in introducing operational research into their ground
forces. From 1941 to 1945, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army
Air Forces built on the British foundation large and complex OR organizations spread worldwide and conducting
research on a variety of technical and operational problems.
Navy and AAF analysts contributed to the development of
OR as a distinct methodology as well as to the solution of
many practical problems. On the other hand, the spread of
operations research in U.S. Army service and ground forces
was limited, both by the press of operations and the igno
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rance of eld commanders regarding the benets that might
be derived from the use of civilian operations analysts. Nevertheless, Army OR personnel were part of many of the
teams led by service and ground combat commanders, and
they did contribute their bit to winning the war.
The pressures on wartime operations researchers to
produce the solutions to practical problems in minimal
time left little time or energy for developing the theoretical
aspects of OR much beyond the basic formulae and rules
worked out by the British early in the war. Most of the problems faced by World War IIera operations analysts were
limited in scope and complexity and could be solved by relatively simple analytical methods.423 In most cases, common
sense backed by the existing mathematics, statistics, and
probability theory suced. But there were some exceptions.
The British work on density method and on planned ying and planned maintenance and American work on search
theory and bombing accuracy constituted signicant advances in the techniques of operations research.424 Perhaps
the development with the most signicance for the future
was the discovery that OR could be used not only to solve
immediate problems of optimizing existing equipment and
procedures but to predict the results that may be expected
from adopting proposed courses of action; these predictions
can then be used as guides to the development of future
strategies, tactics, and weapons.425
The complex and dicult task of organizing and managing World War II OR programs produced many practical
lessons regarding leadership, recruitment, training, administration, pay, and other aspects of integrating civilian specialists into the structure of the armed forces on a comparatively
large scale. The widespread use of civilian operations analysts created a number of challenges for Army civilian and
military leaders. In trying to meet those challenges, Army
leaders found many solutions, some eective and some ineective. The failures as well as the successes provided important lessons for the future, and, although the problems
remain much the same today, some of the World War IIera
solutions were soon forgotten and had to be rediscovered repeatedly in the postwar years.
One of the most dicult challenges faced by the managers of Army OR in World War II was nding an eective
mechanism for recruiting, training, administering, paying,
and distributing civilian OR specialists. Various methods
were tried, and none was entirely satisfactory. For a number
of reasons, the induction of civilian analysts into the armed
forces, even as commissioned ocers, was found to be undesirable except in limited circumstances. Employing analysts
in the civil service also had signicant drawbacks, and hiring them as special consultants on a long-term basis proved
clumsy and conicted with existing laws and regulations.
The best solution found was for the government to contract with a nonprot entity for the full range of personnel
recruitment and management services required. The model
for this method was the contract between the Navy Operations Research Group and Columbia University, arranged
through the Oce of Scientic Research and Development.
The ORGColumbia University arrangement was relatively
troublefree, and in the postwar period it would serve as the
model adopted by all three services.
The limited methods for employing OR personnel by
the U.S. armed forces was compounded by limitations on
the compensation that could be paid. In most cases, working for the Army or Navy as an operations researcher involved signicant nancial loss for the civilian scientist,
often amounting to half his previous salary. This obstacle
was overcome only through the patriotism and sacrice of
the individual analyst willing to interrupt a civilian career,
accept a substantial loss of income, and forgo personal comfort and freedom of action.
Another challenge encountered in the World War IIera
OR programs of the U.S. armed forces was that of merging
two distinct cultures espousing dierent values and ways of
doing things. The integration of civilian scientists into the
military structure of the Army or Navy was often dicult
and never entirely without friction. Uniformed personnel
naturally bore some negative feelings for civilians who were
free of the usual military restrictions, much better paid, and
often free to terminate their employment at will. Moreover,
many military ocers did not understand fully the purpose
of the civilian analysts in their midst, in some cases considering them spies sent to inform or regulate the performance
of the uniformed personnel. Higher-level commanders were
usually suciently aware of the purpose and value of their
civilian analysts, but lower-level commanders and sta ocers frequently placed obstacles in the way of the OR teams
assigned to their commands, blocking the analysts access to
crucial classied operational information and restricting their
communications with their counterparts in other commands
and in the broader scientic community. From the civilian
perspective, the restrictions of military life and tradition
could be annoying and apt to inhibit the work they were trying to do. The dierences between the military mind and
the scientic mind provided ample occasion for misunderstanding and even conict. Fortunately, the friction between
the two cultures tended to abate as time passed and the assignment of civilian specialists to operational units became
more common. Military personnel learned to understand and
even value the work of civilian analysts, and civilian analysts
learned to understand and tolerate the military way of doing
things. In the end, they were able to form an eective partnership, one that would endure far beyond World War II.
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It must also be said that the civilian scientists who served
in U.S. armed forces OR sections overseas bore a share of the
risk faced by their uniformed colleagues. One OSRD civilian
scientist was killed in action, one died in the line of duty, and
one was wounded in action, but not one was court-martialed
or given punitive discipline by a theater commander. In fact,
many of them received decorations and special letters of
commendation from commanders who observed their work
and felt the services had obtained some benet from it.
A third challenge encountered by the civilian and military managers of operations researchers in World War II
was identifying exactly what characteristics dened the ideal
Op Annie. The British and the U.S. Navy as well as the science Maa at NDRC and OSRD strongly preferred to recruit analysts from the ranks of those trained in the hard
sciences, such as physics and mathematics. But, as trained
scientic talent was absorbed by the war eort in Britain and
the United States, both the British and the U.S. Navy found
that they were obliged to include men trained in the life sciences and in such elds as statistics and economics. From
the beginning, AAF was less tied to an exclusive reliance on
scientists, and Lt. Col. Barton Leach recruited many lawyers
to serve in AAF OA sections. They proved a good choice
and justied the view that the essential characteristics of a
good operations analyst were not so much scientic training
as clarity of thought, the ability to organize and comprehend
large volumes of data, and the ability to reach logical conclusions based on the evidence. In view of the propensity to use
mathematical methods for the analysis of operational data
and mathematical language for describing the results of that
analysis, the mastery of mathematics was a desirable skill for
the operations analyst, but it was not an essential one. The
principal lesson derived from the World War II experience

is that both scientists and non-scientists could make signicant contributions in the eld of operations research.
The World War II mobilization of scientists for the war
eort, including the service OR programs, led to recognition of the great contribution that could be made by civilian
experts to military weapons development and operations,
and that recognition, combined with the political realities
of the postwar period, made for a permanent involvement
of scientists and other civilian experts in the nations defense eorts and consequently the involvement of the U.S.
government in American science and industry.426 As Erik
Peter Rau has noted, Vannevar Bush, the czar of American
scientic research and development in World War II, saw
OR as undermining his vision for a limited alliance between
the federal government and civilian scientists, but its eager
promotion by military ocials and Bushs own subordinates
pointed toward the strong and more permanent alliance between the two that would become one of the Cold Wars
most striking features.427
Although Army service and ground forces lagged behind the Navy and Army Air Forces in the integration of OR
into the decision-making process during World War II, even
the limited exposure of Army civilian leaders, commanders, and sta ocers had an eect. In the postwar period,
OR would become an integral part of the Army decisionmaking process, not only for the design and improvement
of weapons and other military equipment but for the development of tactical doctrine and strategic planning as well.
Having lagged behind the Navy and Army Air Forces in the
adoption and use of OR in World War II, the ground Army
quickly closed the gap in the postwar period.
chapter one notes
1What was called operational research in Great Britain was generally

known as operations research, operations analysis, or operations
evaluation in the United States. The terms are interchangeable and are
represented throughout this work by the abbreviations OR or OA, as
seems convenient.
2U.K. Air Ministry, Origins and Development of Operational Research
in the Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3368 (London: Her Majestys
Stationery Oce, 1963), p. 3 (hereafter cited as OR in RAF). The preface
and chapter I of this ocial publication form a comprehensive history of
the development of radar and of operational research in Great Britain
up to 1939. The same events are summarized usefully by Joseph F.
McCloskey in his article, The Beginnings of Operations Research: 1934
1941, Operations Research 35, 1 (1987): 14352. Unless otherwise noted,
the following narrative of events in Great Britain up to 1939 is derived
directly from these two sources.
3W. Peyton Cunningham, Denys Freeman, and Joseph F. McCloskey,

OR Forum: Of Radar and Operations Research: An Appreciation of A. P.
Rowe (18981976), Operations Research 32, 4 (1984): 959.
4Tizard was a scientist with wide military experience, and he had
directed experimental ying in the Royal Flying Corps in WWI. Hill was
a 1922 Nobel laureate in physiology/medicine, and he had played a key
role in proto-OR work in WWI as an Army captain directing the AntiAircraft Experimental Section of the Ministry of Munitions. Blackett, a
physicist, had served as a naval ocer in WWI, and he would later receive
the 1948 Nobel Prize in physics. Wimperis was a well-respected engineer
and inventor. The committee was reorganized in September 1936, and E.
V. Appleton (an authority on radio who would win the 1947 Nobel Prize
in physics) and T. R. Merton were later appointed as additional members.
5A similar committee, called the Committee for the Scientic Survey
of Air Oence, also headed by Tizard, was set up in January 1937 to study
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oensive air operations. The two committees merged in October 1939 to
form the Committee for the Scientic Survey of Air Warfare. The combined
committee was disbanded in June 1940, having contributed much to the
development of radar and having brought together British scientists and
military leaders (see P. M. S. Blackett, Tizard and the Science of War,
in P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional [New York:
Hill and Wang, 1962], pp. 10203).
6Harold Larnder, The Origin of Operational Research, Operations
Research 32, 2 (1984): 469.
7Cunningham and others, Of Radar and Operations Research, p.
960.
8Blackett, Tizard, pp. 10203.
9The radar station at Bawdsey Manor (near Felixstowe on the east
coast of England), the rst of a chain of radar stations on the east and
south coasts of England, was completed in 1937. The remaining stations
were completed by the summer of 1939.
10Blackett, Tizard, p. 103.
11U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 5.
12Larnder, Origin, p. 470.
13It was in connection with the work of Williams group, which
focused on nding ways to do a better job with the existing equipment,
that Rowe coined the term operational research (see Larnder, Origin,
p. 471).
14The Bawdsey Research Station did move to Dundee in September
1939. It was subsequently renamed the Air Ministry Research
Establishment and moved to the south coast of England, where it became
the Telecommunications Research Establishment in November 1940.
15U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 7; McCloskey, Beginnings, p.
146.
16Harold Larnder (190281) was one of the pioneers of OR in Great
Britain, serving at various times with the Bawdsey Research Station, RAF
Fighter and Coastal commands, and the Allied Tactical Air Force. For a
prcis of his career, see Ronald G. Stanseld, Harold Larnder: Founder
of Operational ResearchAn Appreciation, Journal of the Operational
Research Society 34 (1983): 17; and Larnder, Origin, p. 465.
17OR sections were also formed in the Royal Australian Air Force in
January 1944 and in the Royal Canadian Air Force in August 1944. The
development of OR in the British armed forces in WWII is thoroughly
documented in the ocial histories, the memoirs of participants, and
secondary works. The state of the British OR organization as it existed in
the summer of 1942 was described in a forty-sevenpage report by Maj. W.
B. Leach and Dr. Ward F. Davidson, submitted to the JNWEC of JCS. The
report was titled Report on Operations Analysis (Washington, 15 Aug
1942), College Park, Md., NARA II, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9,Folder
12 (hereafter cited as Leach-Davidson Rpt). The Leach-Davidson Rpt was
accompanied by a thirty-sixpage memorandum outlining the state of OR
work in England in more detail than in the basic report (see Memo 1, Maj W.
B. Leach and Dr. Ward F. Davidson, sub: Operational Research in England,
RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder OA in England, USN, USA (hereafter
cited as Leach-Davidson Memo 1). The evolution of OR in the RAF and
to some degree in the other services is covered in some detail in U.K. Air
Ministry, OR in RAF. A useful summary of developments in Great Britain
can be found in McCloskey, Beginnings, and the same authors British
Operational Research in World War II, Operations Research 35, 3 (1987):
45370. Additional material of interest can be found in J. G. Crowther and
R. Whiddington, Science at War (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948);
and Erik Peter Rau, Combat Scientists: The Emergence of Operations
Research in the United States in World War II (Ph.D. diss., University of
Pennsylvania, 1999). Important rst-person accounts include the several
articles by P. M. S. Blackett reprinted in his Studies of War and by Harold
Larnder in Origin. Other sources are listed in the bibliography.
18Leach-Davidson
Rpt, p. 9.
Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 179 n.; Florence N. Trefethen,
A History of Operations Research, in Joseph F. McCloskey and Florence
N. Trefethen, eds., Operations Research for Management (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1954), p. 8.
20McCloskey, British OR, p. 467.
21In a letter to the special assistant to the secretary of war, Harvey
B. Bundy, Maj. Leach wrote, the British did not conceive this system
but rather stumbled into it, and the method by which this happened has
led them to make the mistake of employing almost exclusively scientic
and mathematical personnel, with two unfortunate results: a drain on
scarce scientic manpower and the restriction of studies to areas where
the scientic component was high, although the most important tactical
recommendations had not been in the scientic eld. See Ltr, Maj W. B.
Leach to Harvey H. Bundy, 2 Sep 42, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder
OA, 1942.
22McCloskey, Beginnings, p. 152.
23Leach-Davidson Rpt, p. 9; Leach-Davidson Memo 1, pp. 1-10,
1-11. Of the remaining 80 percent, they found that a little more than
half required routine statistical help and the rest could be accomplished
without any specic scientic knowledge or training.
24Quoted in U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 179.
25Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 4243 et passim. In the 1930s, a
good number of Britains scientic elite were political liberals or leftists,
and they saw OR as a way to increase the inuence of science on policy
(Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 20). Tizard, Hill, Blackett, and WatsonWatt, among others, were adherents of the Social Relations of Science
Movement that ourished between 1931 and 1947, but in the end,
whatever political agenda they may have had was trumped by the need to
apply scientic knowledge to overcome the Axis threat.
26Leach-Davidson Memo 1, p. 1-9 n.
27Ibid., pp. 1-9, 1-10. On the problems associated with civilian versus
military status for OR personnel in the RAF, see U.K. Air Ministry, OR
in RAF, pp. 18081.
28McCloskey, Beginnings, p. 150; Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 28.
Rau noted that by 1942, the scientic elite had enthusiastically embraced
Blacketts framework for operational research and had begun to promote it.
At the same time, military commanders began to adopt scientic advisors.
The result was a rapid proliferation of OR groups (p. 76).
29P. M. S. Blackett, Operational ResearchDocument I: Scientists
at the Operational Level, Advancement of Science 5, 17 (1948), reprinted
in Blackett, Studies of War, pp. 17176. McCloskey noted that Scientists
at the Operational Level provides ample support for those who regard P.
M. S. Blackett as the father of OR (Beginnings, p. 149).
30Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of
Naval Operations Analysis (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984),
p. 10.
31Leach and Davidson noted that the British OR section was
extremely ecient largely because the head of the section was a member
of the commanders sta, worked in close cooperation with him, and
reported only to him (Leach-Davidson Rpt, pp. 1112)
32Blackett, Tizard, in Blackett, Studies of War, p. 113.
33Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 16, 20, 7576 et passim. Rau noted
that reliance on quantitative methods helped immeasurably by providing
a common language that both sides respected (p. 17).
34Stanseld, Harold Larnder, p. 5.
35Leach-Davidson Memo 1, pp. 1-2, 1-30.
36P. M. S. Blackett, Recollections of Problems Studied, 194045,
in H. G. Thurseld, ed., Brasseys AnnualThe Armed Forces Year-Book,
1953 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 88106, reprinted in Blackett,
Studies of War, pp. 20534.
19U.K.
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37Charles
F. Goodeve, Operational Research, Nature 161 (Mar

1948): 377, cited in McCloskey, British OR, p. 455.
39Larnder, Origin, pp. 47273; Stanseld, Harold Larnder, pp.
17. The French had requested ten additional ghter squadrons (120
aircraft) at a time when losses were running 36 aircraft every two days,
a rate that would soon deplete British resources below the level required
for home defense.
40Dowding later told Larnder that the presentation of the study results
in graphic form was what did the trick (see Larnder, Origin, p. 473).
41Ibid., p 472.
42Ibid., p. 474.
1-31. The RAF estimate was 700 percent, whereas that of the Royal Navy
was 400 percent (see Ltr, Com Gen, AAF [Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold], to
commanding generals, all Air Forces, all AAF Commands, all Directors
and Chiefs of all Air and Special Sta Divs, HQ AAF, 24 Oct 42, sub:
OA, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345). In any event,
the impact of the change was sucient to convince the German sailors
that the British had developed a new and better aerial depth charge twice
the size of the old one and a new radar capable of penetrating below the
surface of the ocean.
44U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, pp. 10203. Additional details on
the development of planned ying and planned maintenance can be found
in Crowther and Whiddington, Science, pp. 10406; McCloskey, British
OR, p. 457; and Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 7173.
45U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 43; Crowther and Whiddington,
Science, pp. 10607.
46McCloskey, British OR, pp. 45859.
47Ibid. Window was rst used in the raid on Hamburg in July
1943.
48Blackett, Recollections, in Blackett Studies of War, p. 211.
50Ibid.
51U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 41; Blackett, Recollections, in
Blackett, Studies of War, pp. 22023.
52Crowther and Whiddington, Science, pp. 10102. See also
Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 11; and McCloskey, British
OR, pp. 46566. The dividing line between large and small convoys was
set at forty ships.
53Crowther and Whiddington, Science, p. 102.
54U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 178.
55P. M. S. Blackett, Operational ResearchDocument II: A Note
on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research,
Advancement of Science 5, 17 (1948), reprinted in Blackett, Studies of War,
pp. 17698.
57Blackett, Evan James Williams, 190345, Obituary Notices of
Fellows of the Royal Society V (1947), reprinted in Blackett, Studies of War,
pp. 23536.
58U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, pp. 8183,
59For further development of the equation, see ibid., pp. 8283.
61Ibid., p. 465. See Terry Copp, ed., Montgomerys Scientists: Operational
Research in Northwest Europe: The Work of No. 2 Operational Research Group
with 21. Army Group, June 1944 to July 1945 (Waterloo, Canada: Laurier
Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2000).
62U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. xviii.
63Ibid.
64The prewar contacts between British and American scientists
and military leaders regarding OR are discussed in some detail in Rau,
Combat Scientists, pp. 11724; James Phinney Baxter III, Scientists

Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown, 1946), pp. 11923; Irvin Stewart,
Organizing Scientic Research for War: The Administrative History of the
Oce of Scientic Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948),
pp. 16880; and Joseph F. McCloskey, U.S. Operations Research in
World War II, Operations Research 35, 6 (1987): 9101. Unless otherwise
noted, the following account is based on the four sources just cited.
66Among the eminent British scientists accompanying Tizard were
John Cockcroft (Tizards deputy as scientic advisor at the Air Ministry),
A. E. Woodward-Nutt (secretary of the mission and involved in OR
studies at RAF Bomber Command), and Ralph Fowler (who had worked
with Hill on antiaircraft problems in WWI).
68Disclosure of the cavity magnetron, which made possible smaller
radar sets suitable for use in aircraft, led directly to the establishment of
the Radiation Laboratory at MIT and to a major redirection of U.S. radar
eorts (see McCloskey, U.S. OR, p. 910).
69Stewart, Organizing Scientic Research, p. 168.
70Wilson was Vannevar Bushs assistant. Hovde, the assistant to the
president of the University of Rochester, was to be the resident secretary
of the U.S. London mission once it was established.
71Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 12223.
72Ibid., p. 123. The oce was set up by Frederick L. Hovde under
NDRC auspices and was subsequently taken over by OSRD.
73McCloskey, British OR, p. 466. Brothers would become an
important proponent of OR in the AAF, and Hitch was later one of the
leading characters in the McNamara Revolution, which brought systems
analysis to prominence in the U.S. Department of Defense in the early
1960s.
74Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 124. Gordon Philip Saville eventually
rose to the rank of major general. He was born in Macon, Georgia, in
1902, and received a commission as an Air Corps second lieutenant in
June 1927. He saw WWII service as an observer in Great Britain and as
a sta ocer and commander in the North African and Mediterranean
theaters of operations. In November 1948, he was named commanding
general of the Air Defense Command, and in January 1950, he became the
DCS for development, HQ USAF. He died on 31 January 1984.
75Ibid., p. 122.
76McCloskey, U.S. OR, p. 911.
77The story of the role played by OSRD and its component
agencies in the development of OR in the U.S. armed forces is a complex
and lengthy one. Limitations of space, time, and focus permit only a
bare summary in this volume. For a detailed history of OSRDs role
in the mobilization of American science for WWII and the scientic
support of U.S. armed forces at home and abroad, the reader is directed
to the postwar series of ocial histories titled Science in World War
II. The series, which provides a comprehensive history of OSRD
and its component agencies in WWII, includes Baxter, Scientists
Against Time; Stewart, Organizing Scientic Research; and Lincoln R.
Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard, Combat Scientists (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1947), all of which have been consulted for this
study. Rau, Combat Scientists, provides a provocative interpretation of
OSRD activities, particularly the ambiguous attitude of Vannevar Bush
regarding OR. The documentary basis for both the ocial histories and
Raus dissertation can be found mainly in NARAII, RG 227 (Records
of the OSRD).
78OSRD and its two principal components, NDRC and CMR, were
wartime agencies and were disbanded after the war. CMR was terminated
on 20 January 1947, and OSRD and NDRC were abolished on 31
December 1947.
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79The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was created by

Congress in 1863 and was augmented by the National Research
Council (NRC), established in May 1918 to stimulate research in the
mathematical, physical, and biological sciences. The president of NAS
throughout WWII was Frank B. Jewett (in 1940, the president of the
Bell Telephone Laboratories). The National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) was created in 1915, and with Bushs departure to
head OSRD, the chair of NACA was taken by Jerome C. Hunsaker, a
captain in the Naval Reserve and head of the departments of mechanical
and aeronautical engineering at MIT.
81This is the central thesis of Raus dissertation. The core of Raus
argument is summarized in Combat Scientists, pp. 14446 and 334
36.
82Ibid., pp. 11920.
83Ibid., p. 129.
84Ltr, Vannevar Bush to Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses and Rear
Admiral W. A. Lee, Jr., Washington, 29 May 42, RG 218, Entry 343A,
Box 57, Folder OA.
85Ltr, Vannevar Bush to Sir Henry Tizard, Washington, 1 Oct 42,
RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder 15.
86Ltr, Vannevar Bush to Karl T. Compton, Washington, 15 Feb 43,
RG 227, Entry 177, Box 294, Folder OSRD in OAD, AAF.
88Memo, James B. Conant to Vannevar Bush, 3 Aug 42, sub:
Operational Research, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder 15.
89Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 278. Robertson had seen OR in action
at Princes Risborough in the early fall of 1941 and had already done a
short tour with the operational analysis section of the U.S. Eighth Air
Force. Weaver, too, had been to England and had seen OR at work (see
Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 27576).
90Rough draft of memo, John H. Teeter to Carroll Wilson,
Washington, 26 Jul 43, RG 227, Entry 177, Box 283, Folder Denition
and Methodology of OA.
91Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 277.
92Ibid., p. 133.
93Ibid., pp. 28992.
94Memo, Ward F. Davidson to Vannevar Bush, 30 Mar 43, sub:
Memo of Dr. Alan T. Waterman, 26 Mar 43, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box
9, Folder 14.
95Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 21, 103.
96Ibid., pp. 3006 et passim.
97The formal establishment of the Oce of Field Service (OFS) as a
principal subdivision of OSRD was conrmed by OSRD Administrative
Order 4, 8 November 1943. OFS was abolished by Executive Order 9913
on 31 December 1947. Compton left on 30 July 1945 to head the Pacic
branch of OSRD, and Waterman served as chief until 31 December 1946.
John E. Burchard became deputy chief vice Waterman. The history of OFS
is covered in detail in Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists.
99Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 41213. Stewart (Organizing
Scientic Research, pp. 13031) listed six functions performed by OFS,
but they are renements of the basic three functions noted.
100Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 31314. The role of OFS in
sponsoring OR/eld service organizations in the central and southwest
Pacic theaters is discussed in greater detail below.
101Ibid., p. 262.
103Ibid.
104Memo 2, Maj W. B. Leach and Dr Ward F. Davidson, sub: OA
in the U.S. Army and Navy, Washington, 7 Jul 42, RG 218, Entry 343A,
Box 57, Folder OA, pp. 2-492-53 (hereafter cited as Leach-Davidson

Memo 2).
105Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 40910; Rau, Combat
Scientists, p. 118.
106Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 11819.
107Quoted in Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 12728.
108Ibid., p. 23 n. 38. Most civilian scientists preferred the functional
arrangement inasmuch as it corresponded with the usual organization of
scientic work.
109Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 19.
110Ibid., pp. 1920.
111On the diculties of obtaining necessary data, see Stewart,
Organizing Scientic Research, pp. 15558.
112Ibid., pp. 15455.
113Ibid., pp. 15154. Initially, the Operations Division of the
War Department General Sta (WDGS) was designated as the Army
ground forces liaison with OFS, but that responsibility soon shifted to
the WDGS New Developments Division headed by Maj. Gen. Stephen
G. Henry, an enthusiastic supporter of OR as well as of eective elding
of new weapons (see Stewart, Organizing Scientic Research, p. 139;
Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 4041). From June
1940 to 2 September 1945, seven ocers occupied the War Department
liaison ocer position, only three of whom served more than one year.
However, Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer served as the Navys coordinator
of research and development, and thus as the Navys liaison ocer with
OFS, from mid-December 1941 to May 1945. It was only at the very
end of the war that the AAF established an oce to provide direct
liaison with OFS.
115Ibid.
118The basic report (Leach-Davidson Rpt) was accompanied by
a long memorandum on OR in Britain (Leach-Davidson Memo 1) and
another fty-threepage memorandum on the state of OR in the U.S.
Army and Navy (Leach-Davidson Memo 2).
119The interesting but relatively uncomplicated history of OR in
the U.S. Navy during WWII can be gleaned adequately from just three
sources: George Shortley, Operations Research in Wartime Naval
Mining, Operations Research 15, 1 (1967): 110; Tidman, Operations
Evaluation Group; and ORG, HQ, COMINCH/CNO, Summary
Report to the OFS, OSRD, Washington, 1 Dec 45, Appendix C, pp.
3839, located in College Park, Md., NARA II, RG 227, Entry 179, Box
301, Folder Summary Rpt to the OFS, OSRD (hereafter cited as ORG
Summary Rpt). McCloskey, U.S. OR, and Rau, Combat Scientists,
contain additional useful details.
120McCloskey, U.S. OR, p. 911. The development of MWORG is
covered in some detail in Shortley, Operations Research in Wartime, pp.
110, and in Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 16072. Curiously, MWORG
is not mentioned at all in Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group.
121Ellis A. Johnson was one of the major gures in Navy OR in
WWII and, from 1948 to 1961, he led Army OR work as director of the
Operations Research Oce of The Johns Hopkins University. His long
and distinguished career in OR is outlined in Thornton L. Page, George S.
Pettee, and William A. Wallace (assisted by Capt James Martin, USNR,
and Alice L. Johnson), Ellis A. Johnson, 19061973, Operations Research
22, 6 (1974): 114155. Degaussing is a process by which an electrical
current is passed around the hull of a ship to cancel its normal magnetic
eld and thus make it less likely to set o magnetic mines.
122John Burchard, Q.E.D.: M.I.T. in World War II (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1948), p. 93
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123Page
and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1143.
124Shortley, Operations Research in Wartime, p. 5; Page and others,
Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1144.

125Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1144.
126Ibid.; Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 163.
129Ibid.
130Shortley, Operations Research in Wartime, pp. 56.
131Ibid., p. 6.
132Burchard, Q.E.D., p. 98. Bitter had been called to Washington
in June 1940 to work with NOL on developing countermeasures to the
German magnetic mine. He had rst gone to England with two naval
ocers to observe British work on magnetic mines, and when he returned it
was decided that he should be commissioned as a commander, USNR, and
act as the middleman between the Navy and the civilian scientists working
on naval matters. On 1 September 1944, Commander Bitter left MWORG
to form the new Air Warfare Operations Research Group for the deputy
chief of naval operations for air, Admiral John S. McCain. Dr. Michels
resumed the position of director of MWORG for the rest of the war (see
Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 168; and Trefethen, History of OR, p. 15).
134Leach-Davidson Rpt, p. 16.
135Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-16.
136Ibid., pp. 2-18, 2-19.
139Ibid., pp. 2-20, 2-21; Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 16263.
140Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 165. MWORG operated under the
Base Maintenance Divisions Mine Warfare Section.
142Ibid., p. 2-22.
143Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, pp. 114445.
144Ibid., p. 1145. The Navy preferred that scientists dispatched
for service in overseas theaters be commissioned, and most of the Navy
OR specialists who deployed to the Pacic were given at least temporary
commissions, usually in the USNR. Thus, several of Ellis Johnsons
colleagues (notably Shirley Quimby and Thornton Page) also accepted
commissions in the Naval Reserve and served in uniform for the remainder
of the war.
145Ibid.
146Ibid. Wallace returned to Hawaii on 7 February 1944.
148The story of the useless sterilizers is told by Rau (Combat
Scientists, pp. 16768).
150Ibid., p. 168.
152Ibid., p. 1146.
154Ibid., p. 170.
155Ibid., pp. 17071.
156Ibid., p. 171. According to Shortley, the operation was conceived
over coee in the NOL cafeteria (Operations Research in Wartime, p.
7).
157Ibid. By that time, Johnson had shifted the focus of the campaign
from the Shimonoseki Straits to the Inland Sea of Japan.
158Ibid., p. 172. AAF heavy bombers dropped some thirteen
thousand mines of various types in a ve-phase campaign that lasted until
the end of the war, and Operation STARVATION resulted in the sinking
of or damage to more than seven hundred Japanese ships (ca. 1.5 million
tons), reducing Japanese shipping to a trickle at a cost of one B29 lost for
every forty-ve Japanese ships sunk (see Shortley, Operations Research
in Wartime, p. 8).
159Shortley, Operations Research in Wartime, p. 8.
160Ibid., p. 9. Johnson also contributed to XXI Bomber Command
ight operations by recommending single, low-level sorties to lessen the
ight time, conserve fuel, reduce maintenance time, lower crew fatigue,
and reduce losses to Japanese air defenses. Happily, his ideas coincided
with those of Lt. Gen. Curtis LeMay, the commander of XXI Bomber
Command, for low-level night bombing using radar rather than visual
aiming. One result was the reduction in B29 attrition from 10 percent
to 1 percent (see McCloskey, U.S. OR, p. 912; Shortley, Operations
Research in Wartime, pp. 78).
163Only a brief summary of the history of the Anti-Submarine
Wartime Operations Research Group (ASWORG) can be presented
here, based primarily on the ORG Summary Rpt. Tidman (Operations
Evaluation Group, chapter 1), and Rau (Combat Scientists, chapter 4)
devoted chapters to ASWORG and they should be consulted for details.
A useful summary is contained in McCloskey, U.S. OR, and there is a
rsthand account by the leader of ASWORG in Philip M. Morse, The
Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States, Operations
Research 34, 1 (1986): 1017. Leach and Davidson outlined the history of
ASWORG up to the middle of 1942 in their Memo 2.
164Ltr, Capt Wilder D. Baker to Coordinator of R&D, Oce of
the Sec Navy, Boston, 16 Mar 1942, sub: Records and Analyses of AntiSubmarine Warfare (reproduced in ORG Summary Rpt, Appendix C,
pp. 2932). Baker had observed ASW operations in Great Britain and
had read a number of ORS RAF Coastal Command reports as well as
Blacketts Scientists at the Operational Level (see Morse, Beginnings of
OR, pp. 1112).
165Philip McCord Morse (190385) subsequently became the
grand old man of American OR. Morse received his doctorate in physics
from Princeton University in 1929, and began his teaching career at MIT
in 1931. An expert on acoustics, he did some work on hydrophones and
acoustic mines before being tapped to head ASWORG. After WWII,
he was for a time the director of Brookhaven National Laboratory,
served as the deputy director of the JCS Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group (WSEG), and wrote and spoke widely on OR. He became the
rst president of the Operations Research Society of America in 1952
53. Details of his life and career can be found in his many writings, his
autobiography (Philip M. Morse, In at the Beginnings: A Physicists Life
[Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976]), and in William J. Horvath and
Martin L. Ernst, Philip McCord Morse, 19031983: A Remembrance,
166Leach and Davidson noted, NDRC has no responsibility other
than seeing that proper personnel is [sic] provided, and that the details
of salaries, travel authorization, etc. are taken care of; the direction of
operational research activities is assumed by the Navy (Memo 2, p. 249). NDRC was reimbursed by the Navy for the costs incurred. Morse
prepared an initial budget estimate that included $100,000 for salaries,
$100,000 for travel, and about $50,000 for overhead expenses (see LeachDavidson Memo 2, p. 2-4 n.).
167The original group included Morse (part-time), Shockley, A. T.
Craig, Phillip J. McCarthy, Arthur F. Kip, Maurice E. Bell, and Robert F.
Rinehart. The original seven were soon joined by W. A. Ambrose, Albert
Thorndike, James K. Tyson, and John R. Pellam (see McCloskey,U.S. OR,
p. 913). William Bradford Shockley (191089) became one of Americas
best-known scientists. Born in London of American parents and educated
in California, he received his doctorate in physics from MIT in 1936 and
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immediately went to work for Bell Labs, to which he returned after the war.
In 1956, Shockley shared the Nobel Prize in physics with John Bardeen
(another WWII Navy OR scientist) and Walter Brattain for their work
on the solid-state semiconductor (the transistor). From 1963 to 1975,
Shockley was a professor of physics at Stanford University and became
notorious for his controversial public pronouncements on genetics.
168The ocial Navy designation of ASWORG came into general
public use only after August 1942.
169When Leach and Davidson compiled their report in the summer
of 1942, the ASWORG stable included eight mathematicians and
statisticians and eight physicists, of whom four were sound experts and
two were radio experts. Their average age was 29 (see Leach-Davidson
Memo 2, p. 2-10).
170Ibid., p. 2-11. As executive head, Shockley received $6,300 per
annum. Morse was unpaid.
171When the OSRD OFS was created in January 1944, the
administration of ASWORG contract and all other Navy OR activities
supported by NDRC were transferred to OFS control (see ORG
Summary Rpt, p. 11).
172ORG Summary Rpt, pp. 2628. They included 32 mathematicians/
statisticians, 26 physicists, 6 chemists, 5 biologists/zoologists, 4 engineers,
3 astronomers, 2 geologists, 2 economists, 2 people with library science
degrees, and 1 architect.
173Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-6. In July 1942, ASWORG
had personnel attached to the headquarters of the commander in chief,
U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), in Washington; Atlantic Fleet in Boston;
Eastern Sea Frontier in New York City; Gulf Sea Frontier in Miami;
and Caribbean Sea Frontier in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Subsequently,
ASWORG personnel were attached to nearly all Navy units concerned
with antisubmarine warfare at home and overseas (see Tidman, Operations
Evaluation Group, pp. 3846).
174Trefethen, History of OR, p. 14.
176ORG Summary Rpt, p. 10.
177Ibid., pp. 48; Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 4951.
179Ibid.
180Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 49. McClelland was
replaced by Brig. Gen. Larson in April 1943.
181Ibid., pp. 5154.
182Ibid., p. 50.
184Morse, Beginnings of OR, pp. 1215; Leach-Davidson Memo
2, p. 2-10.
185Morse, Beginnings of OR, p. 12.
186Ibid., p. 15.
187Ibid., pp. 1516.
188ORG Summary Rpt, p. 10. The commander in chief, U.S. Fleet,
Admiral Ernest J. King, approved the transfer on 9 July 1943.
189Ibid., pp. 1415, 2325. The projects undertaken by ASWORG
are summarized in Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 6171.
190Morse, Beginnings of OR, p. 13. McCloskey (U.S. OR, p. 913)
noted that almost all of the initial data on which the U.S. theory of search
was built came from the British, but the analysis was entirely homegrown.
191McCloskey, U.S. OR, pp. 913, 915. Koopman was the author of
a paper titled A Quantitative Aspect of Combat in which he reworked
Lanchesters equations using probability theory rather than averages.
192Memo, Frank Knox to COMINCH/CNO, all Bureaus
and Oces, Navy Dept, Washington, 10 Sep 43, sub: ORSpecial
Assistance for, RG 227, Entry 177, Box 283, Folder Steps Leading to the
Establishment of OFS.
193Memo, Admiral Ernest J. King (COMINCH/CNO) to Director,
ASWORG, Washington, 7 Oct 44, sub: Operations Research Group

(reproduced in ORG Summary Rpt, Appendix C, pp. 3435). The
evolution of the ORG is discussed in Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat
Scientists, pp. 10620.
194ORG Summary Rpt, Appendix C, 36. The ORG was the largest
single contribution of OSRD to OR (see ORG Summary Rpt, p. 1). A
list of personnel who served in the ORG is in Thiesmeyer and Burchard,
Combat Scientists, p. 121.
195ORC conducted specialized OR studies, provided administrative
and scientic backup support for the various ORG subgroups, and acted
as liaison between ORG and other Navy organizations and OR groups
in the other services (see ORG Summary Rpt, pp. 1622; Thiesmeyer
and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 11315; Tidman, Operations
Evaluation Group, pp. 8992).
196The ve main lessons cited here are listed by Tidman, Operations
Evaluation Group, pp. 9294.
197In fact, the Navy preferred that OR analysts and supervisors
assigned to the eets be commissioned in the USNR. The Navy actually
tried a variety of modes for employing scientists for OR work. MWORG
used civilians on per diem contracts. ASWORG used civilians obtained
under an OSRD contract with Columbia University, and the various
ORG subgroups after 1944 relied on civilian scientists provided on loan
from the Oce of Field Service, OSRD.
198The authors of the ORG Summary Rpt (p. 1) concluded that
some of these [OR] activities can be carried out by a group assigned
to a single eld command. But for all of the activities to be carried on
eectively it is necessary that part of the group be in the eld and another
part work with the General Sta in Washington; with arrangements for
free interchange of ideas and men between eld and headquarters.
199Like the Navy ORG, the AAF OR program was large and
complex and it cannot be treated in great detail here. Unlike the Navy
program, however, the AAF program has yet to nd its scribe. There is
no comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) similar
to Tidmans Operations Evaluation Group. Nor is there a comprehensive
published history of OR in the AAF during the World War II period.
LeRoy A. Brothers Operations Analysis in the United States Air Force
(Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2, 1 [1954]: 116)
is a mere summary. Charles W. McArthur, Operations Analysis in the U.S.
Army Eighth Air Force in World War II, History of Mathematics, vol. 4
(Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society, 1990) does provide
some details on the World War II AAF OR program in general, but
focuses on the Eighth Air Force program. LeRoy A. Brothers and others,
Operations Analysis in World War IIUnited States Army Air Forces
(Philadelphia: Stephenson-Brothers, 1949) is useful but oers only a
simple listing of the various units that made up the AAF OR program,
the key dates, and lists of the leaders of the various units and the
personnel who served in them. As always, McCloskey, U.S. OR, provides
interesting details. Despite the relative scarcity of published material on
OR in the AAF in World War II, the documents on the subject to be
found in the National Archives are plentiful. Most of them are in RG 18
(Records of the Army Air Forces) but many useful items are to be found
in RG 107 (Records of the Sec Army), RG 218 (Records of the JCS),
and RG 227 (Records of the OSRD). Items of particular interest include
the August 1942 Leach-Davidson Rpt and Leach-Davidson Memo 2; Lt
Col W. B. Leach (chief, OA Div, HQ AAF), Washington, 15 Oct 43, sub:
Army Air Forces OA in Combat Commands, with Notes on OA in HQ
AAF in US, in US Services outside the AAF, and in OCSigO, RG 107,
Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345) (hereafter cited as Leach, AAF
OA in Combat Commands); and Memo, Col W. B. Leach (chief, OA
Div, HQ AAF) to Brig Gen Byron E. Gates (chief, Management Control
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:48
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Div, HQ AAF), Washington, 1 Jan 45, sub: Two-Year Rpt on OA, with
a summary and two enclosures: 1. List of OA Rpts as of 1 Nov 44; 2.
Robert L. Stearns (Chief, OAD, HQ, Twentieth Air Force), Progress
Report # 3 (Period 28 July 194415 November 1944), Washington, ca.
15 Nov 44, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345 (hereafter
cited as Leach, Two-Year Rpt).
200In general, the AAF personnel involved in OR preferred the
term operational analysis (OA), although the analysts with the Eighth
Air Force in England commonly used the term operational research to
describe their work, just as did their nearby British colleagues.
205Ibid., pp. 12324.
206Leach-Davidson Rpt, p. 19; Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 225;
Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 125. Cyril Moreau Jansky, Jr., was born in
1895 and held a master of science degree from the University of Wisconsin
(1919). He was a former professor of radio engineering at the University
of Minnesota (192028) and a consultant on radio engineering in
Washington with a large clientele. He died in 1975. His papers are at the
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, , and at the University
Libraries, University of Maryland, College Park.
207Leach-Davidson Rpt, pp. 1920. In May 1942, Jansky dened his
function as, to assist in the organization of the [OA] groups in the various
Interceptor Commands and then to standardize and correlate their work.
See Cyril M. Jansky, Jr. (special consultant, Directorate of Air Defense,
HQ USAAF) and William L. Everitt (director, ORG, Radar and Air
Communications Div, OCSigO), Memo for Col Tom C. Rives and Col
Gordon P. Saville, Washington, 9 May 42, sub: Delineation of Functions
between Operational Analysis in Air Defense in the Army Air Force and
Operational Research in Radar and Air Communications in the Signal
Corps, RG 111, Entry 1024, Box 3027, Folder 00400.112Operational
ResearchGeneral.
2-26. The problem was that such consultant contracts were limited to 180
days, and Jansky later ran into problems with this hiring method (see Rau,
Combat Scientists, p. 159). Jansky, who had earned $27,000 per year as
a private consultant, accepted the maximum government rate of $25 per
day, or $9,125 per year (see Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-25).
209See Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 15460. In a letter to Frank
B. Jewett on 7 February 1942, Karl T. Compton, the president of MIT,
characterized Saville as the spark plug of this [OR] eort for our Army
for at least eighteen months (Ltr, Karl T. Compton to Dr Frank B. Jewett,
[Boston], 7 Feb 42, sub: Operations Research Sections, RG 227, Entry
177, Box 284, Folder OSRD in OAD, AAF).
210Leach-Davidson, Memo 2, p. 2-26; Rau, Combat Scientists, pp.
15556. Janskys memo is reproduced in Leach-Davidson Memo 2, pp.
2-312-34.
211Cyril M. Jansky, Jr., Memorandum on Operational Analysis in the
War Department, Washington, ca. AprMay 42 (hereafter cited as Jansky
Memo on OA), reproduced in Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-31.
212The extent of the system envisioned by Jansky is clear from the
two charts that accompanied his Memo on Operational Analysis. See
Chart I (Operational Analysis in a Typical Defense Command or Theatre
of Operations) and Chart II (Operational Analysis in Directorates),
reproduced in Leach-Davidson Memo 2, following p. 2-34; Rau, Combat
Scientists, p. 156.
213Jansky Memo on OA, reproduced in Leach-Davidson Memo 2,
p. 2-32.
215They
were apparently accompanied by Col. Saville (see LeachDavidson Memo 2, p. 2-27).

216McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 3; Trefethen, History of OR,
p. 12.
217Leach-Davidson Rpt, p. 19; McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 3;
Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 15859.
218Cited by Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 15960.
219McArthur, Operations Analysis , p. 3.
221The terms of reference for the reporting team are included in
Memo, Vannevar Bush to Ward F. Davidson, Washington, 11 Jul 42, sub:
Investigation and Rpt on OA, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder 15.
Maj. (later Brig. Gen., USAFR) Walter Barton Leach (190071) deserves
more than any other person the title of Father of U.S. Army Operations
Research. For details of his life and career, see the brief biographical
sketch in Appendix A of this volume.
222Leach-Davidson Rpt, pp. 2347.
223Ibid.
224Ltr, Maj W. B. Leach to Harvey H. Bundy, Washington, 2 Sep
42, transmitting a memo by Leach on OA, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68,
Folder OA, 1942.
225Ibid. The role of the coordinating oce recommended by Leach
and Davidson would be lled in the AAF by OAD in the Management
Control Div of HQ USAAF with Leach as chief. The Navy did not form
a similar unit, but its functions were, in eect, performed by ORG after
October 1944.
226McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 4. By August 1942, Janskys
oce in the Directorate of Air Defense was already in operation, two
analysts were enroute to Lt. Gen. Andrews Caribbean Defense Command,
the I Bomber Command was taking advantage of the Navys ASWORG,
and steps were in progress to create an OA section in the VIII Bomber
Command in England.
227The establishment and history of the Eighth Air Force OA section
is discussed in greater detail below.
228Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 258
229Ltr, Com Gen, AAF [Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold], to commanding
generals, All Air Forces; All Army Air Forces Commands; All Directors
and Chiefs of All Air and Special Sta Divs, Washington, 24 Oct 42, sub:
OA, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 1942.
230Ibid., p. 3.
231The directive establishing OAD and prescribing its functions is at
Tab G of Leach, Army Air Forces OA in Combat Commands.
232Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 259. A month before the creation of
OAD, Capt. John M. Hall, the assistant executive ocer in the Oce of
the Assistant Secretary of War, prepared a memo for Harvey H. Bundy
in which, after noting he did not believe that sucient attention has been
paid to the problem of integrating Operations Analysis with the rest of
the Army at sta level, he recommended the creation in the Operations
Division of the WDGS of an OA section, the chief of which would
report to the ACS, Operations Division. The eleven functions of such an
OA section listed by Capt. Hall included all of those that OAD would
perform for the AAF. See Memo, Capt John M. Hall to Harvey H. Bundy,
Washington, 1 Dec 42, sub: Organization of OA in the Army, RG 107,
Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 1942.
233Leach, Two-Year Rpt, p. 22.
234Ibid. A total of eight commissioned ocers served in OAD
between 31 December 1942 and 2 September 1945. Col. Leach remained
the chief until July 1945 and was then replaced by Lt. Col. Roscoe C.
Crawford as acting chief until 2 September 1945. At various times, eight
scientic and clerical personnel also served in OAD (see Brothers and
others, Operations Analysis, pp. 4142).
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235Brothers
and others, Operations Analysis, p. 41.

237Leach, Two-Year
Rpt, p. 21.
238Ibid.
239Ibid.,
p. 22. The recommended stang for any future OAD was

chief of section (1 colonel); executive ocer (1 major); personnel section
(1 lieutenant colonel and 1 captain); training section (1 lieutenant colonels
and 4 civilian instructors); publication and dissemination section (1 major,
1 civilian librarian, and 1 civilian scientist); and overseas liaison section (1
lieutenant colonel and 1 major).
241Ibid.
242Civilian operations analysts in the AAF were often known to
their uniformed colleagues as Doc, the Quiz Kids, or Op Annies (see
Charlotte Knight, Ask Them Another, Air Force 28, 8 [1945]: 31).
243Leach, Army Air Forces Operations Analysis p. 1.
244Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, pp. 12.
245Jansky oversaw six operations analysts stationed in Panama and
Florida, with I Fighter Command, and at Drew Field (see Leach, Army
Air Forces Operations Analysis, additional p. 1). The principal AAF OA
elements created during WWII are listed in Appendix B of this volume.
246Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, p. 36; Leach, Two-Year
Rpt, pp. 2021.
247Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, p. 36. The ve men
served at various times and for various periods between August 1944 and
September 1945. Ball had a distinguished career as a diplomat and foreign
policy expert after the war.
248Leach, Two-Year Rpt, pp. 2021.
249Burchard, Q.E.D., p. 74.
250Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, p. 40.
251Tannenwald was a New York lawyer and served with USSBS
in the European Theater from September 1944 to January 1945 (see
Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, p. 40).
252The COA is discussed by McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp.
814.
253Earle was the editor of a well-known anthology of military
thought, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1941).
254McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 9.
255Henry L. Stimson (Sec War), Memo for the Chief of Sta (Gen.
George C. Marshall), Washington, 6 Dec 43, sub: OA, RG 107, Entry
113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345.
256Twelve principles for the assignment of civilian analysts to a
military command were laid out in the Leach-Davidson Rpt (pp. 56).
257A few AAF commanders at rst declined the opportunity to add
an OA section to their headquarters. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, the
commander of the Fourteenth Air Force in China, was known for his crusty
character and is said to have responded to an oer of an OA section by
requesting the equivalent in gasoline (see McCloskey, U.S. OR, p. 919).
258A notable exception was the refusal of the VIII Bomber Command
Intelligence (A-2) Section to allow the newly formed OA section access
to any technical information. The problem was soon solved by the
intervention of the commander, Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker (see Rau, Combat
Scientists, p. 245).
259Memo, Maj W. B. Leach and Dr Ward F. Davidson, Washington,
20 Jul 42, sub: Memo as to Investigation of Branches of the Army and
Navy in Which OA Could Be Used, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 57, Folder
OA.
260U.S. War Department, United States War Department Table of
Organization and Equipment No. 1787S: Army Air ForcesOperations
Analysis Section, Special (Washington: U.S. War Dept, 4 Oct43). A copy
can be found in RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345. The
impetus for publication of the TOE came from OAS Eighth Air Force
(see McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 2930).
261U.S. War Department, Field Manual 3027: Regulations for
Civilian Operations Analysts, Scientic Consultants, and Technical Observers
Accompanying U.S. Army Forces in the Field (Washington: U.S. War Dept,
31 Aug 44).
262Leach, Two-Year Rpt, Summary.
263Knight, Ask Them Another, p. 34.
264The AAF OA section elements created during the war, the
approximate number of analysts employed, and the section chiefs are
listed in Appendix B of this volume.
265For example, the nine analysts who served in the Fifth Air Force
in the Southwest Pacic Area were commissioned ocers. Their chief,
Sidney K. Wolf, was a lieutenant colonel.
267Knight, AskThem Another, p. 31.
269Knight, Ask Them Another, p. 60. The uniform and other
administrative details pertaining to civilian scientists posted overseas are
discussed in Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 8891.
270In June 1942, Capt. John M. Hall, assistant executive to the
assistant secretary of the Army, stated that it was not necessary for
analysts to have any particular scientic training or background, writing,
In fact, it might be better if they had none. What is needed is a type of
cool-headed person with common sense who can analyze what comes in
in a cold-blooded manner and make unbiased criticisms (Memo, Capt
John M. Hall, 23 Jun 42, sub: Use of Competent Civilians in the Analysis
of Operational Eciency, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 1942
[hereafter cited as Hall Memo]). Whereas Bart Leach might have agreed,
Phil Morse and P. M. S. Blackett surely would not.
271Leach-Davidson Rpt, pp. 2328 passim. For example, the
distinguished New York lawyer John M. Harlan was selected to head the
Eighth Air Force OA section. He proved an excellent choice and later
became an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
272Hall Memo, p. 1.
273The possibilities had already been discussed in the Leach-Davidson
Rpt (pp. 2328) with attention given to lawyers, business executives, and
other non-scientic types.
276Ibid., pp. 2829. Leach and Davidson noted that the civil service
methods had been tried by the Army Signal Corps group headed by
William Everitt and were found to be extremely clumsy, the more so
because the Civil Service and Classication Acts were formulated to
eliminate politics, nepotism, and the spoils system from the lower ranges
of government employment; they were never designed for a situation
where men are being begged to take jobs that are bound to represent
sacrices to them. Analysts could be employed under per diem consultant
contracts for a maximum of only 180 days. The commissioning of analysts
in the Army oered possibilities, particularly for those being assigned to
overseas commands where there was some danger of capture by the enemy,
but there were limits on the number of annual ocer accessions to the
Army. Employment by the Presidents Emergency Fund was not a viable
alternative, and the Army Specialist Corps was soon to be dissolved.
277Ltr, Maj W. B. Leach to Harvey H. Bundy, 30 Sep 42, sub:
Contract for Employment of Operations Analysts, p. 1, RG 107, Entry
113, Box 68, Folder OA, 1942 (hereafter cited as Ltr, Leach to Bundy, 30
Sep 42). The National Research Council headed by Dr. George Barrows
was a subsidiary of NAS led by Dr. Frank B. Jewett.
278Ibid.
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:50
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279Ibid., pp. 12.
280Bush
was already uneasy with the ASWORG-Columbia

University arrangement and was under some pressure from the Bureau
of the Budget. He thus wanted to avoid any further entanglements and
controversy (see Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 28385).
281Ltr, Leach to Bundy, p. 2. The analysts working for Jansky in the
Directorate of Air Defense, hired under similar arrangements, had already
been working more than six months, and it was being suggested that their
employment violated Administrative Order No. 50.
282Arrangements for payment of AAF analysts is outlined in Leach,
Two-Year Rpt, pp. 56.
284Ibid.
285Ibid., p. 6.
286Ibid. The average annual salary for an analyst was $6,637.91.
287Rau (Combat Scientists) discusses the friction between OSRD
and the AAF OA program in some depth. See, in particular, pp. 23640,
26571, 28386, and 293300.
288Ltr, Vannevar Bush to Karl T. Compton, Washington, 15 Feb 43,
RG 227, Entry 177, Box 284, Folder OSRD in OAD.
289See, inter alia, memo, Alan T. Waterman to Vannevar Bush, ca. 4
Apr 43, sub: Notes on Future Manpower Needs and Availability in the
Radar Field, RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder 14.
291Ibid., p. 327.
292Alan T. Waterman, then Karl Comptons deputy at OFS, discussed
the problem with Vannevar Bush in a 27 December 1943 memo (see
memo, Alan T. Waterman to Vannevar Bush, 27 Dec 43, sub: Requests
to OFS for Permanent Appointments with the Armed Services, RG 227,
Entry 177, Box 284, Folder OAProjects with OAD).
296Ibid.
298The story of OAS Eighth Air Force is admirably told in McArthur,
Operations Analysis.
300Ibid. A member of Maj. Gen. Eakers sta discussed the matter
with Dr. B. G. Dickins of ORS RAF Bomber Command as early as May
1942 (see U.K. Air Ministry, OR in RAF, p. 46).
301McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 6; Rau, Combat Scientists, pp.
13132.
302McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 67. The other members
of the team were Leslie H. Arps (another lawyer), James Alexander
(a mathematician on loan from the Navy MWORG), W. Norris
Tuttle (research director for the General Radio Company and OSRD
consultant), William J. Youden (a biochemist and statistician from the
Boyce Thompson Plant Research Institute), and Howard P. Robertson (an
NDRC physicist from Princeton University). Alexander and Robertson
both returned to the United States in January 1943 under something of a
cloud (see McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 2729, and Rau, Combat
Scientists, pp. 25358). Harlan served as a civilian until July 1943 when
he accepted a commission as a lieutenant colonel. Later promoted to
colonel, he headed the section until August 1944, when he was reassigned
and replaced by Leslie Arps, who had received his commission as a major
in July 1943 and was subsequently promoted to lieutenant colonel
(see Leach, Two-Year Rpt, p. 13). On Harlans reassignment and Arps
tribulations as the new section chief, see McArthur, Operations Analysis,
pp. 20510.
304Leach, Army
Air Forces Operations Analysis, p. 3; McArthur,

Operations Analysis, pp. 1920.
305McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 20; Brothers, Operations
Analysis, p. 1.
306McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 2225.
307For the organization and tasks performed by the various
subsections, see McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 3045.
308A new OA section for VIII Bomber Command was promised but
never materialized. Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle replaced Lt. Gen. Eaker
as commander of Eighth Air Force in January 1944.
309Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, p. 13; McArthur,
Operations Analysis, pp. 3536, 87100. OAS VIII Fighter Command
also covered the VIII Air Support Command, which became the nucleus
for the Ninth Air Force in November 1943, and OAS VIII Fighter
Command lost most of its personnel to the new OA section, Ninth Air
Force.
310McArthur, Operations Analysis, pp. 21013.
311Leach, Two-Year Rpt, pp. 12. The rst WAC [member of
the Womens Army Corps], Sgt. Eileen Hazelton, was assigned to the
Bombing Accuracy Subsection in July 1943; by the end of the war thirteen
WACs were assigned (see McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 34).
313Ibid., p. 1. Leach went on to list ten major accomplishments of
the OA sections.
314Knight, Ask Them Another, p. 31.
315Some idea of the variety of the problems studied by AAF analysts
can be gleaned from the short list of reports presented in Leach, Army Air
Forces Operations Analysis, pp. 57.
316McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 328.
318Brothers, Operations Analysis, p. 6.
319Ibid., p. 9,
320McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 328; Brothers and others,
Operations Analysis, p. 2.
322Lauriston S. Taylor, Operations Analysis, Military Review 26, 6
(1946): 25.
323Ibid.
324Ibid.
327Ibid., p. 920. The work of Ellis Johnson, a Navy operations
analyst assigned to the XXI Bomber Command to plan the aerial mining
campaign against Japan, has already been mentioned.
328Ibid.
329Ibid., p. 921; Leach, Two-Year Rpt, p. 7.
330One notable exception is the denition by OAS VIII Bomber
Command analysts of the concept of circular error probable, a concept
subsequently much used by the armed forces, particularly in planning the
use of nuclear weapons (see Brothers, Operations Analysis, pp. 34).
331Brothers and others, Operations Analysis, Dedication. Arneson
was awarded the Medal of Freedom posthumously.
332McArthur (Operations Analysis, pp. 32325) noted many of the
individual decorations and awards made to Eighth Air Force analysts,
and Brothers and others (Operations Analysis, passim), indicated the
decorations and awards earned by all the AAF analysts.
334Quoted by McArthur, Operations Analysis, p. 323.
335Ibid., p. 324.
336Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 124. The basic source for the
establishment of the Signal Corps OR section is Leach-Davidson Memo
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:51
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2, pp. 2-422-46. Unless otherwise noted, most of the following account
is based on that source. Other sources for the history of the Operational
Research Branch, Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer (ORB OCSigO)
include Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 14954 et passim, and the documents
included in RG 111, Entry 1024 and Entry 1036A. The ocial history
volumes on the Signal Corps in the series United States Army in World War
IIThe Technical Services produced by the Armys chief of military history
contain practically nothing about Signal Corps OR activities, and what
is written is often incorrect. For example, George R. Thompson, George
Raynor, and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943
Through 1945) (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966), pp. 5, 613, put the date
of the establishment of the ORB OCSigO in late 1942. As the Army ocer
responsible for radar development, Maj. Gen. Olmstead was familiar with
British radar developments and the application of OR to solve the problems
of integrating radar with the British air defense system.
337Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-42. William Litell Everitt was born
in Baltimore, Maryland, on 14 April 1900. He served in the U.S. Marine
Corps (191819) and received a doctorate in electrical engineering from
Ohio State University in 1933. A well-known consultant, he was a major
in the Signal Corps reserves from 1932 to 1941, serving his active-duty
tours at the laboratories at Wright Field in Ohio, and at Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey. After the war, he was a professor of electrical engineering at the
University of Illinois and dean of the universitys College of Engineering.
He was president of the Institute of Radio Engineers in 1945. He died on 6
September 1986. Col. Meade had rst approached Vannevar Bush at OSRD
for assistance, but, as was his usual practice, Bush palmed him o to Jewett
at NAS and then warned NDRC division chairmen to inform Jewett if they
heard of any moves looking toward the establishment of such sections (see
Memo, Vannevar Bush to Chairmen of NDRC Divs, Washington, 30 Jan
42, RG 227, Entry 177, Box 284, Folder OSRD in OAD).
339Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-42. Everitt even suggested at one
point that the name of the group be changed to the Technical Research
Group.
340Thompson and others, Signal Corps, pp. 310, 613.
341William L. Everitt, ca. Oct 43, draft titled Operational Research in
the Signal Corps, p. 9, RG 111, Entry 1036A, Box 51, Folder unmarked.
342Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-46. See also Rau, Combat
Scientists, pp. 15253. Leach and Davidson (Leach-Davison Rpt, p. 28)
noted that Everitt had encountered fantastic problems in dealing with the
civil service and that those problems had cost him two months of delay.
343Ibid. The initial hires included Lynne E. Smeby (as associate
director), Norton, Singer, Smith, Omberg, and Bateman.
344Leach, Army Air Forces Operations Analysis, additional p. 2.
345Leach-Davidson Memo 2, p. 2-44. Rau (Combat Scientists,
p. 154) noted, however, that the projects proposed by Everitt were not
dissimilar to those pursued by British scientists working in operations
research.
346Cyril M. Jansky, Jr., and William L. Everitt, Memo for Col Tom C.
Rives and Col Gordon P. Saville, Washington, 9 May 42, sub: Delineation
of Functions between Operational Analysis in Air Defense in the Army
Air Force and Operational Research in Radar and Air Communications
in the Signal Corps, RG 111, Entry 1024, Box 3027, Folder 00400.112
Operational ResearchGeneral.
347Ltr, Lt Col W. B. Leach to OCSigO, Army Service Forces, Attn:
Planning Director, Washington, 16 Apr 43, sub: Procurement and Training
of Operations Analysts for the Army Air Forces and Coordination of
Their Technical Activities, RG 111, Entry 1024, Box 3027, Folder 10
00400.112 Engineer and Analyst Indoctrination.
348For a detailed discussion of Everitts diculties in dealing with
Alan T. Waterman and OSRD on technical training for Signal Corps and
AAF OR personnel (for whom Everitt had agreed to act as agent), see
Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 27983, 32732.
349Memo, John H. Teeter, 7 Apr 43, sub: Operations Analyst Studies,
RG 227, Entry 177, Box 284, Folder Denitions and Methodology of
OAJ. H. Teeters Memoranda on Training for OA. See also Memo, J.
H. Teeter, ca. 15 Apr 43, sub: Operation Analyst Training Program, RG
227, Entry 177, Box 284, Folder Denitions and Methodology of OAJ.
H. Teeters Memoranda on Training for OA.
350The history of the Operational Analysis Branch, Technical Liaison
Division, Signal Section, Headquarters European Theater of Operations,
U.S. Army, is summarized in Lucien L. Farkas (acting chief, Operational
Analysis Branch, Technical Liaison Division, Oce of the Chief Signal
Ocer, European Theater of Operations [ETO]) to chief signal ocer,
War Dept, Washington, Attn: director, NDD, 25 May 45, sub: Activities
of the Operational Analysis Branch in the European Theater of Operations
(hereafter cited as Farkas Memo to CSO); and Lucien L. Farkas (eld
service consultant) to Alan T. Waterman (OFS, OSRD), 25 Oct 45, sub:
Rpt of Activities during Time Employed by the Oce of Field Service,
Oce of Scientic Research and Development, both in RG 227, Entry
179, Box 292, Folder OFS-NDD ETO Rpts; Smeby.
351Farkas Memo to CSO, p. 2.
352Ibid., pp. 45. Howard returned to the United States on 27
October 1944, and Farkas took over as acting chief.
353Karl R. Spangenberg, ca. 4 Sep 44, sub: Rpt of Activities, ETO,
Jul 22 to Sep 4, 44, pp. 1, 6, RG 227, Entry 179, Box 292, Folder OFSNDD ETO Rpts; Smeby.
354Ibid.
355The Leach-Davidson Rpt and Memo 2 make no mention of
any Ordnance Department OR activity, and an admittedly perfunctory
examination of the extensive les on WWII Ordnance Department
activities in the National Archives has disclosed no material on
Ordnance OR workat least none under the heading Operations
Research or Operations Analysis. Similarly, the ocial history of BRL
( John G. Schmidt, Volume I: A History of the United States Army Ballistic
Research Laboratories, 19141956. Ballisticians in War and Peace Series,
3 vols. [Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: U.S. Army BRL, 1956] covers
the WWII period) makes no mention of any specic OR section or
activity.
356Schmidt, History of BRL, p. 25.
357Ibid., pp. 28. Lt. Col. Simon was an expert on statistical methods,
sampling, and quality control.
358Ibid., pp. 5255.
359Oral history interview with Arthur Stein conducted by Eugene
P. Visco and James Williams, Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria,
Va., 2 Apr 92, p. 7. The interview was conducted as part of the Oce of
the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral
History Project.
360Ibid., p. 5.
361Ibid., p. 8.
362Oral history interview with Dr. Frank Grubbs conducted by
Eugene P. Visco, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 26 Oct 94, pp. 12.
The interview was conducted as part of the Oce of the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral History Project.
363Ibid., p. 3.
365Leach-Davidson Rpt, pp. 2829. No further information on this
activity has been found.
366Allied Forces, 21. Army Group, No. 2 ORS. Operational Research
in North West Europe: The Work of No. 2 Operational Research Group with
21. Army Group, June 1944July 1945 (London: Allied Forces, 21. Army
Group, No. 2 ORS, 1945), p. i.
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367Jansky
Memo on OA, reproduced in Leach-Davidson Memo 2,
p. 2-31.
368Ltr, Robert W. King to Vannevar Bush, Washington, 2 Jul 42, RG
218, Entry 343A, Box 9, Folder 15.
370Memo, Harvey H. Bundy to Maj Gen Stephen Henry, Washington,
9 Nov 43, forwarding Ltr, Lt Col W. B. Leach to Harvey H. Bundy, 4 Nov
43 (hereafter cited as Ltr, Leach to Bundy, 4 Nov 43); and Memo, Lt Col
W. B. Leach to Harvey H. Bundy, 2 Nov 43, sub: Desirability and Method
of Establishing an OA in the Ground Forces, RG 107, Entry 113, Box
68, Folder OA, 194345 (hereafter cited as Memo, Leach to Bundy, 2
Nov 43).
371Ltr, Leach to Bundy, 4 Nov 43.
372Memo, Leach to Bundy, 2 Nov 43, pp. 12.
373Memo, Lt Col W. B. Leach (chief, OAD, HQ AAF) to the sec
war, Washington, 25 Nov 43, sub: Desirability and Method of Extending
OA to Ground and Amphibious Operations, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68,
Folder OA, 194345).
374Draft one-page letter to theater commanders re Extension of
OA to Ground and Amphibious Operations, Appendix A to Alan T.
Waterman, Outline of Developments Leading to Establishment of
ORS, CPA, after Jul 44, RG 227, Entry 179, Box 308, Folder CPA2
MiscellaneousGeneral (hereafter cited as Waterman, Outline of
Developments).
375Memo, Henry L. Stimson to Gen George C. Marshall, Washington,
6 Dec 43, sub: OA, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345.
376Memo, Lt Col W. B. Leach to Maj Gen Stephen G. Henry
(director, NDD WDGS), Washington, 6 Dec 43, sub: Analysis Section
for Jungle Warfare Requested by Lieutenant General Harmon, RG 107,
Entry 113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345. Lt. Gen. Harmon suggested
that the proposed jungle warfare OA could be integrated with Robert L.
Stearns Thirteenth Air Force OA section and that Stearns (along with
Harmon himself ) could act as the supervisor of the new OA team.
377Msg, Operations Div, WDGS (for the chief of sta ) to Com Gen,
South Pacic Area, Washington, 20 Dec 143, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 68,
Folder OA, 194345.
378Writing to Karl T. Compton on 15 December 1943, Harvey
Bundy indicated that the team for Lt. Gen. Harmons headquarters was
being activated, but no further evidence regarding the team or its activities
has been found, and it is not mentioned in the ocial OSRD histories
(see Memo, Harvey H. Bundy to Karl T. Compton, Washington, 15 Dec
43, sub: Conf with Gen MacArthur Concerning OA, RG 107, Entry
113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345). Harmons team may well have been
canceled or disapproved at some stage.
379Memo, Vannevar Bush (director, OSRD) to Harvey H. Bundy
(special asst to sec war), Washington, 7 Jan 44, RG 107, Entry 113, Box
68, Folder OA, 194345. The two sta ocers in question were Col.
Thomas North and Lt. Col. C. W. Leihy.
380The history of the Research Section, HQ SWPA, is
summarized in H. Kirk Stephenson, Summary of Activities of the
Research Section, Southwest Pacific Area, after 13 Sep 45; H. Kirk
Stephenson, Summary of Principal Projects, late 1945; and H.
Kirk Stephenson, Civilians in the Army, The Story of the Research
Division, Southwest Pacific Area, 1945, all in RG 227, Entry 177,
Box 284, Folder SWPAResearch Section SWPAReports by H.
K. Stephenson and A. T. Waterman. Unless otherwise noted, these
three documents form the basis for the following account. See also
Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research, pp. 13738; Thiesmeyer
and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 294304 et passim; and Rau,
Combat Scientists, pp. 31519, et passim.
381Harrison was the dean of science at MIT and the chief of
NDRC Division 16. The Research Section, GHQ SWPA, was formally
established by General MacArthurs directive in July 1944.
382Stephenson, Summary of Activities, p. 2. Maj. Gen. Akin was
MacArthurs representative for research and technical matters, and it was
anticipated that much of the Research Sections work would deal with
communications and radar. General MacArthur was well known for trying
to minimize the impact of outsiders on his command, which may explain
why the Research Section did not enjoy a more prominent placement.
383Rau, Combat Scientists, p. 317. Moreover, Maj. Gen. Akin
placed the section under the supervision of one Maj. Harrington, a man
Dr. Harrison described as neurotic and homosexual and whom Harrison
succeeded in having dismissed from the Army (see Rau, Combat
Scientists, p. 317).
384Stephenson, Civilians in the Army, p. 4.
385Ibid., p. 12.
386Stephenson, Summary of Principal Projects, p. 4.
387Maj. Gen. Marquat had hoped for two men right away and
perhaps three or four later (see Ltr, Karl T. Compton [chief, OFS] to
Harold Hazen [professor of electrical engineering, MIT], Washington,
15 Mar 44, RG 227, Entry 180, Box 310, Folder SWPA 9, Projects,
Army). Darlington held a doctorate in theoretical physics from Columbia
University, had worked at Bell Telephone Labs for fteen years, and had
spent the previous three to four years working on antiaircraft matters and
radar bombing (see Ltr, Alan T. Waterman [deputy chief, OFS] to George
R. Harrison [Research Section, GHQ SWPA], Washington, 10 Jul 44,
RG 227, Entry 180, Box 310, Folder SWPA 9, Projects, Army).
388Stephenson, Summary of Principal Projects, pp. 910. See also
William L. Everitt, Memo for the Record, Washington, ca. Apr 44, sub:
Herbert F. Goodwin and OA in SWPA, RG 111, Entry 1024, Box 3026,
Folder 00370.2 OA.
389Ibid., p. 9.
390Stephenson, Summary of Activities, pp. 23. The change was
fortuitous in that the USAFFE Board (later renamed the Pacic Warfare
Board) was composed of Army ocers from all of the technical services
who functioned as eld observers for new tactics and equipment. Thus, the
Research Section scientists and the ocers most interested in their work
had easy access to one another. On the other hand, the subordination of
the Research Section to the USAFFE Board meant that it was yet another
step removed from the top of the chain of command inasmuch as the head
of the USAFFE Board, Col. Alexander reported to the USAFFE deputy
chief of sta, Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall (see Stewart, Organizing
Scientic Research, p. 141).
391Ibid., p. 4.
392Ibid. The Moreland mission was assisted by Dr. L. D. Leet, who
was attached to the Research Section, GHQ SWPA, in August 1945
after having drawn up lists of Japanese scientic personnel for intelligence
targeting (see Stephenson, Summary of Principal Projects, p. 10).
393Ibid., p. 1.
394Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 40717 passim.
395Stephenson, Summary of Principal Projects, pp. 114 passim.
See also Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 412; Stewart, Organizing
Scientic Research, pp. 13738.
396Lt. Gen. Richardsons command was renamed several times during
the war. Initially, it was U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacic Area
(USAFICPA), then U.S. Army Forces Pacic Ocean Area (USAFPOA),
and nally U.S. Army Forces in the Mid-Pacic Area (USAFMIDPAC).
For convenience, Lt. Gen. Richardsons command is referred to throughout
this work as USAFPOA. The history of the establishment and operation
of the ORS, HQ USAFPOA (ORS POA), is deftly summarized in
Waterman, Outline of Developments, after Jul 44, with Appendices:
A. Draft letter to theater commanders re Extension of OA to Ground
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:53
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and Amphibious Operations; B. Ltr, Maj H. F. Henderson (acting
director, WDGS NDD) to Karl T. Compton (chief, OFS), 4 Mar 44,
sub: Operational Analysis Group for Central Pacic; C. Paul E. Klopsteg
(consultant, OFS), Encl. No. 1 (List of Proposed OR Projects); D. Ltr,
John E. Burchard to Karl T. Compton, 9 Jul 44, sub: Rpt to Chief, OFS,
RG 227, Entry 179, Box 308, Folder CPA2 MiscellaneousGeneral,
and Memo, Lauriston C. Marshall (chief, ORS USAFMIDPAC) to Alan
T. Waterman (chief, OFS), 21 Nov 45, sub: Final Rpt of Activities, ORS,
AFMIDPAC (hereafter cited as Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov
45), encl Final Rpt of Activities, ORS, HQ, AFMIDPAC, 31 May 44 to 2
Sep 45, RG 227, Entry 182 Box 331 Folder Final Rpt of Activities, 21 Nov
45. See also Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 28893.
Unless otherwise noted, the following account is based on these sources.
397Waterman, Outline of Developments, p. 1. Lt. Gen. Richardson
was responding in part to the letter sent by General Marshall in December
1943.
399The details of Leachs activities in Hawaii and his recommendations
are in Memo, Lt Col W. B. Leach to Lt Gen R. C. Richardson, 22 Feb 44,
sub: Recommendations as to OAS, USAFICPA (hereafter cited as Memo,
Leach to Richardson, 22 Feb 44), plus a memo re Leachs discussions with
ocers of the 7th, 27th, and 38th Infantry Divisions about studies needed
re Army ground operations (RG 227, Entry 179, Box 308, Folder Klopstegs
CPA Survey).
400Memo, Leach to Richardson, 22 Feb 44, p. 1. Leachs discussions
with Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith and ocers of the 7th and 27th Infantry
Divisions were summarized by Maj. Fred J. Sengstacke and are at pp. 13
of Tab A, Leachs memorandum to Richardson.
401Klopstegs list is reproduced in Waterman, Outline of
Developments, Appendix C. In the end, it bore little resemblance to the
work actually undertaken by Richardsons balanced team.
402Waterman, Outline of Developments, p. 6.
403Ibid., pp. 45. Burchard was an architect and the chief of NDRC
Division 2. Marshall had been the director of MIT Radiation Labs British
branch. Burchard apparently had other reasons for going to Hawaii, as he
explained in a letter to Karl Compton on 9 July 1944, reporting his stay in
Hawaii from 30 May to 7 July 1944 (reproduced in Waterman, Outline
of Developments, Appendix D).
404The various elements of the ORS POA mission are discussed in
detail in Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 515.
405Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, p. 5.
406Ibid., pp. 34. Details of the organization of ORS POA,
including its Administrative Group, are summarized in Memo, Marshall
to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 1619. The Work Simplication program
was discontinued around 1 June 1945.
407Stewart,
Organizing Scientic Research, p. 136. A roster of the

scientic consultants, operations analysts, and administrative personnel
who served in ORS POA is in Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov
45, pp. 13.
408The status of the ORS within the headquarters is covered in detail
in Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 2026.
409Waterman,Outline of Developments, pp. 910. For the problems
encountered with communications, see Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21
Nov 45, pp. 2729.
410The OSRDORS POA relationship is discussed in Memo,
Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 3033.
411 Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, p. 33.
412Ibid., p. 36.
413The relationship of ORS POA with other agencies is discussed in
detail in Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 4047.
414For the ORS POA relationship with the Navy, see Memo,
Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 4244.
415Stewart, Organizing Scientic Research, p. 137. For the ORS POA
relationship with the AAF, see Memo, Marshall to Waterman, 21 Nov 45,
pp. 4142.
416Ibid.
417For the operations of ORS POA, see Memo, Marshall to
Waterman, 21 Nov 45, pp. 3740. The initial topics for investigation
listed by Leach, with a few exceptions, turned out to be substantially the
program followed by ORS POA.
418Oddly enough, there is at this time no comprehensive published
history of the WDGS Historical Branch eld historical program in
WWII, but see John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to
the Study and Use of Military History (Washington: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 1978), pp. 31215.
419Summary of Analysis of Battle Records (Major Davis) Project,
ca. Oct 44, p. 1, RG 227, Entry 177, Box 284, Folder OAAGF
Nettleton-Piedem Study.
420Ibid., pp. 12.
421Burchard, Q.E.D., p. 261.
422Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 9; U.K. Air Ministry, OR in
RAF, p. xx.
423Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at US Army Operations Research
Past and Present, Combat Systems Technical Paper RACTP102
(McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, Apr 1964), p. 5.
426Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 2, 4; Burchard, Q.E.D., p. vi.
427Rau, Combat Scientists, pp. 56..
36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:54
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chapter two
Operations Research in the Postwar Era, 194550
lthough the contribution of operations research

(OR) to the Allied victory in World War II cannot be measured, the widespread use of OR gave
the Allies a decided edge over the Axis powers. By V-J Day,
2 September 1945, the armed services of the British Commonwealth and the United States had created OR establishments that were contributing substantially to the development and introduction of new weapons and equipment and
to the evolution of more-eective organizations, tactics, and
strategies. However, the successful OR structures created
during the war were signicantly reduced in the immediate
postwar demobilization as civilian analysts and administrators hurried home to their families and former employers.
Even so, in the United States the Navy Operations Research
Group (ORG) continued at reduced stang, and the Army
Air Forces (AAF) retained a substantial portion of its wartime operations analysis (OA) capability. The ground Army,
which had not developed a comprehensive OR capability
during the war, abandoned what few OR organizations it
had, although such research continued to be an embedded
part of the research and development (R&D) activities of
the Armys technical services. Nevertheless, the general consensus was that OR was a valuable tool and that civilian scientists were a necessary complement to military professionals and career civil servants, particularly in the R&D eld.
In September 1946, Lauriston S. Taylor, who had played an
active role in wartime OR in AAF, noted that
with the advent of even more complicated scientic warfare
than we have ever known, I am personally convinced as to the
necessity of maintaining a program of operations analysis not
only for peacetime operations but to constitute a liquid reserve
for instant action if another war should threaten us.1
After the euphoria of the wars end had passed, all of the
armed services took positive steps to rebuild and reorganize
their OR capabilities. A number of factors aected that rebuilding and reorganization from 1945 to 1950. Not only
were the problems of warfare more complex, as Taylor suggested, but the perception of a lack of threat in the immediate
postwar period led to a signicant reduction in the nancial
and human resources available to the services. Consequently,
interservice competition for the available resources made
OR an important means for determining priorities and the
optimal use of scarce resources. The onset of the atomic age,
the growing threat of the Soviet Union, and Americas new
global commitments all required the development of new
equipment, organizations, tactics, and strategies in the services. Operations research provided a means of determining
priorities for the eective and ecient distribution of scarce
resources to meet these new commitments.
The postwar demobilization of the Oce of Scientic
Research and Development (OSRD) and its adjunct, the
Oce of Field Service (OFS), both of which had played a
prominent role in the wartime organization and management of scientic manpower, including OR analysts, obliged
each of the services to nd new ways of attracting and administering the scientic personnel needed to continue their
OR programs. Each of the services subsequently found its
own unique solution to the problem of continuing and expanding the OR organizations that had proven so successful
during the war. The Navy set up a contractual relationship
with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to
administer the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), the
successor to the wartime Operations Research Group. To
deal with the broader problems of strategy and policy, AAF
established Project RAND, which was converted in 1948 to
the RAND Corporation, an independent nonprot foundation. The U.S. Air Force, newly independent from the Army
in 1947, also relied on the civil service to sta a revived Operations Analysis Division (OAD) on the Air Sta and OA
cells at each of the major command headquarters to handle
operational problems. Following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA), the newly created Department of
36171_03OR 2.indd 55
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Defense (DOD) also quickly established an OR capability
by creating in December 1948 the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to support the Joint Chiefs of Sta.
As it had during the war, the Army lagged behind the other
services in creating a postwar OR capability. However, the
recognition of the value of OR to the Army R&D program
led to the establishment in August 1948 of the General Research Oce (GRO), soon renamed the Operations Research Oce (ORO), under contract with The Johns Hopkins University ( JHU). By June 1950, all of the U.S. armed
services once again had fully functioning OR organizations
prepared to confront the challenges of a new war in Korea.
The Demobilization of OSRD and OFS
Despite its many faults and problems, the Oce of
Scientic Research and Development and its adjunct, the
Oce of Field Service, played important roles in mobilizing and coordinating the scientic resources of the United
States during World War II. Both organizations were especially important to the development of OR in the services.
The contribution of OSRD was recognized by the United
States Congress in a report of the House Appropriations
Committee on 17 October 1945:
This splendid agency but a few months hence will go out of existence. The contribution that it has made to the winning of the
war is inestimable. Without such contribution, it is safe to say
that victory still would await achievement. However, the oce
has been essentially a war agency, and it is now engaged in liquidation. To its distinguished and internationally known head,
Dr. Vannevar Bush, and the sta of great scientists he gathered
around him to aid in the development of new weapons, the Nation owes much.2
the country would have to understand . . . that results

would come about through time, often after many failures, and in ways not always foreseeable or expected.5
In June 1944, the secretaries of war and Navy already had
recognized that OSRD would be demobilized at the end
of the war and that some mechanism would be needed to
continue the participation of civilian scientists in military
R&D. Accordingly, on 22 June 1944, the secretaries created
a Committee on Postwar Research headed by Charles E.
Wilson, the vice chairman of the War Production Board, for
the purpose of studying postwar R&D needs of the services
and how those needs might be met.6 The Wilson committee
recommended establishing within the National Academy of
Sciences the Research Board for National Security, comprising civilian scientists and representatives of the Army and
Navy and funded by transfers from Army and Navy appropriations until Congress could establish the board on a permanent basis.
Although the recommendation of the Wilson committee
was accepted by the service secretaries, its implementation
was blocked by the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to
permit the necessary transfer of Army and Navy funds. Bills
were introduced in Congress to establish the board in law,
but no immediate action was taken.7 On 22 July 1947, the
Congress passed an act for the creation of a National Science
Foundation as the successor to OSRD, but President Harry
Truman vetoed the bill.8 Meanwhile, a committee headed by
Vannevar Bush was created in early July 1946 to coordinate
R&D of joint interest to the Army and the Navy.9 Veterans
of the wartime Navy and AAF OR programs also lobbied
successfully for the National Research Council to form a
Committee on Operations Research in 1948.10
OSRD and OFS began to dissolve as soon as the war
ended. Both scientists and administrators were eager to return to their peacetime tasks, and the lack of an immediate
threat to the national security lessened the apparent need for
their services. A rump sta was retained to liquidate OSRD
contracts and assets, but all active coordination of scientic
support for the armed forces was terminated. OSRD and its
adjunctsthe National Defense Research Committee, the
Committee on Medical Research, and the Oce of Field
Servicewere formally abolished on 31 December 1947
by Executive Order 9913 of 26 December 1947. As a consequence, the armed services were left to their own devices
to nd new mechanisms for reestablishing and maintaining
their OR capabilities.
OSRD had been the focal point for contracting with

civilian scientists to support the military forces during
the war. Its postwar demobilization raised the question
of how the services would recruit, train, manage, and
compensate scientic talent in the future. Although
Vannevar Bush believed that a successor to OSRD specically oriented toward supporting the military was
unnecessary, he did advocate the creation of a national
research foundation to continue the management of
scientic endeavor in the national interest.3 The proposed foundation was to include a military section
dedicated to assisting the armed forces on technical and
scientic matters, including OR.4 Although there was
general agreement that some sort of national organizaOperations Research in the
tion to coordinate scientic R&D was desirable, there
United States Navy,
was no consensus on the shape it ought to take. Bush
and others warned that the needed research would be
At the end of World War II, the Navy had the most
expensive and that the government, the Congress, and comprehensive and centralized OR program of all the U.S.
36171_03OR 2.indd 56
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operations research in the postwar era,

armed services. By the summer of 1945, the Navy Operations
Research Group, which had evolved from the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG), included some ninety scientists and had an annual budget of
$800,000.11 Headed by Dr. Philip M. Morse, ORG had subgroups working on antisubmarine warfare, eet air defense,
naval air operations, submarine operations, and amphibious
warfare. ORG analysts had made substantial contributions
in all of those areas.
As the end of the war approached, the commander in
chief, U.S. Fleet, and chief of naval operations (COMINCH/
CNO), Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, expressed to Secretary
of the Navy James V. Forrestal his satisfaction with the work
done by ORG and recommended that uninterrupted continuation of this service into peacetime is necessary. Action
should be taken at this time in order to preclude any discontinuity upon cessation of hostilities.12 Admiral King recommended that ORG be continued into peacetime at approximately 25 percent of its wartime strength. His rationale for
continuing ORG was that it had been of active assistance to
the Navy in the evaluation of new equipment, in the evaluation of specic phases of operations (such as naval gunre),
in the evaluation and analysis of tactical problems and the
development of new tactical doctrines, in the technical aspects of strategic planning, and in liaison between the eets
and the Navy and civilian R&D establishments.13
Secretary Forrestal quickly approved Admiral Kings
recommendations, and plans were made to continue ORG.14
In view of the successful wartime relationship between the
Navy and Columbia University for the administration of ASWORG, it was decided to establish the postwar Navy OR
program on a similar basis, and contract negotiations were
opened with MIT. Despite some reluctance on the part of the
institute, an initial three-year contract was signed on 1 November 1945, and the reorganized ORG came into existence
under the supervision of the Navy deputy chief of naval operations (eet operations and readiness).15 The new organization was named the Operations Evaluation Group to assuage
the concerns of the chief of the Oce of Naval Research
(ONR).16 The sta was reduced to approximately twenty-ve
professionals, chiey physical scientists and mathematicians,
and a budget of $300,000 was provided.17 Philip M. Morse
remained for several months as the director of OEG before
returning to MIT. He was replaced by Dr. Jacinto Steinhardt,
who had received his doctorate in chemistry from Columbia
University in 1934 and had served in the Navy OR organization during the war.18 Morse, George Kimball, and other
wartime ORG members continued as consultants.
Soon after the contract with MIT was signed, it became
apparent that the Navys OR needs were greater than originally envisioned, and the Navy began to call for an enlarge-
ment of OEG. Dr. Steinhardt was reluctant to increase the

size of the group rapidly, fearing a loss of cohesion and focus,
and it was not until 1949 that the OEG complement grew to
thirty-ve professionals.19 Thereafter, OEG grew more rapidly, and by the start of the Korean War it had a sta of sixty,
including forty scientists, and an annual budget of more than
$500,000, although budgetary restrictions all but eliminated
its eld programs.20
OEG maintained a central oce in Washington, D.C.,
and eld teams with the major naval commands. OEG director reported to the head of the New Developments and Operational Evaluation Subsection of the Oce of the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness. Individual OEG members were assigned as analysts
to eight dierent desks in the Oce of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OCNO), an arrangement that recalled the
wartime subsections of ORG.21 In addition, two members
served on the sta of the commander, Operational Development Force (ODF); one member served part-time on the
sta of the commander, Naval Forces Europe; and from time
to time OEG members lectured at the Naval War College
and the National War College and took part in eet maneuvers.22 OEG worked closely and eectively with the Navy
ODF, which was created to conduct operational tests of new
weapons, equipment, and methods proposed for introduction into the eet, to explore ways and means of improving
the eective use of existing weapons and equipment, and
to recommend training procedures, countermeasures, and
changes in tactical doctrine.23 Additional tasks performed
by OEG members included maintaining operational statistics, recording the results of training exercises, providing
mathematical computations in support of ongoing projects,
gathering and analyzing technical intelligence, and supervising the preparation of publications and the performance of
other administrative duties.24
As provided in its contract with MIT, the purpose of
OEG was to furnish liaison for the eets with the development and research laboratories . . . and conduct studies
and make reports to the deputy chief of naval operations
(eet operations and readiness).25 The broad array of studies
undertaken by OEG included analyses of past operations;
analyses of the operational capabilities of new equipment, in
the light of the Navys requirements; development of tactical
doctrine; formulation of new requirements; and analyses of
strategic alternatives.26 Within the contractual parameters,
OEG was also charged with providing operations analysts
for selected Navy eld units and for other agencies within
the Navy Department.27
In OEGs rst year (November 1945November 1946),
its analysts were called on to complete more than 120 projects
but spent much of their time writing up the results of war
36171_03OR 2.indd 57
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time ORG research.28 In 1946, OEG published ve reports
dealing mostly with World War II antisubmarine warfare,
OR methods, and search and screening operations, as well
as fty-ve studies dealing with such subjects as World War
II combat air patrols, zigzag patterns, coastal early warning
systems, search theory, and the evaluation of eet antiaircraft defense patterns.29 Other projects were undertaken in
the elds of naval tactics and doctrine, antisubmarine warfare, antiaircraft defenses and gunnery, naval air operations,
guided missiles, radar, and atomic warfare.30 OEG published
three studies in 1946 that subsequently became classics in
the OR literature. They included Charles M. Sternhell and
Alan M. Thorndikes Antisubmarine Warfare in World War
II (originally OEG Report 51), Philip M. Morse and George
E. Kimballs Methods of Operations Research (originally OEG
Report 54), and Bernard O. Koopmans Search and Screening
(originally OEG Report 56).31
Operations Research in the
United States Air Force,
By the end of the war, like the Navy, AAF had a large
and eective OR program making substantial contributions
to the improvement of aircraft, weapons, equipment, organization, tactics, and operational strategy. Under the direction
of Col. W. Barton Leach, the Operations Analysis Division
at Headquarters, Army Air Forces, oversaw the recruitment
and training of some 275 operations analysts in twenty-six
operations analysis sections assigned to, and controlled by,
the major Air Force eld commands.32 Unlike the Navy program that was highly centralized, administered by OSRD or
under contracts with academic institutions, and composed
almost entirely of scientists, the Air Force OA program was
decentralized, relied on the civil service and individual consultants for the recruitment and administration of its personnel, and included a number of non-scientic people.
Eight months before the end of the war, Col. Leach
wrote to Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to the secretary
of war, expressing his views on the post-war handling of Operations Analysis.33 In a memorandum that he prepared for
Bundy, Col. Leach expressed the opinion that there would be
no place for a large OA organization staed by civilian analysts in the peacetime Air Force because there would be sufcient uniformed ocers to handle the reduced OA workload. Nevertheless, Leach recommended that measures be
taken to ensure a rapid and eective expansion of OA in any
future war. To that end, he recommended that Air Force ofcers receive orientation on the use of OA, that forty to one
hundred key civilians be trained in OA and subject to call-up
to form the nucleus of a revived Air Force OA group in the
event of war, and that a permanent OA division be created
in Air Force headquarters consisting of three ocers rotat-
ed every six months.34 Leach also warned against adopting

without careful study the use of commissioned analysts, letting OSRD handle the problem, turning OA over to Army
ocers, or putting the civil service in charge. As he noted:
Experiments have been made with all of these ideas, and all
have badly failed. A system has been developed, after two and
a half years, which works with considerable eectiveness. Before major changes are made in this system, at the very least it
should be determined whether experience in this war oers any
evidence as to the desirability of such a change.35
This time, Leach, who had almost single-handedly created the wartime Air Force OA program, missed the mark
badly in his basic premise. In fact, the Air Forces need for
OR would expand signicantly in the postwar period, and
it would be necessary to reconstitute an active OA structure,
albeit at a reduced stang level, as well as to create a new
agency for dealing with problems of higher-level strategy and
policy in a nuclear age.
Reconstitution of the Air Force OA Program
Although highly valued by Air Force leaders, much of
the existing Army Air Forces OA organization disappeared
in the immediate postwar demobilization as commands
were merged or abolished. Consequently, AAF lost most of
its OA capability. However, a vestigial organization was retained. In October 1945, LeRoy A. Brothers, a leading veteran of the wartime program, was appointed chief analyst
of the vestigial OAD under the assistant chief of Air Sta,
A-3.36 In the spring of 1946, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, an early
OA enthusiast and then deputy commander of AAF, wrote
to the commanders of major units with remaining OA sections and asked their views on the future peacetime role of
OAD.37 All men replied positively, recommending that the
Air Force OA work continue and that a pool of experienced
analysts be assembled for that purpose.
Subsequently, AAF began to reconstitute its OA program. In April 1946, LeRoy Brothers was appointed as assistant for operations analysis to oversee the revived OAD
under the deputy chief of sta for operations in AAF headquarters. Operations analysis oces were reestablished in
each of the major AAF commands. As was the case during
the war, the revived Air Force OA organizations relied on
civilian analysts hired and managed under the regular civil
service system.
On 11 October 1946, the new AAF OA organization
was formally approved by the publication of Air Force Regulation 207: Operations Analysis. The mission of OA, as
stated in AFR 207, was to provide commanders and their
stas with ready and informal access to scientists with specialized training in the techniques applicable to the analysis
of air warfare and to analyze the problems of air warfare
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with the objective of improving equipment, weapons and
weapons systems, tactics, and strategy to furnish, wherever
possible, a quantitative basis for command and management
decisions.38
The organization prescribed by AFR 207 replicated
that of the wartime period. An Operations Analysis Division under a civilian assistant for operations analysis was
established in the Operations Directorate of Air Force headquarters to conduct studies in support of the Air Sta and to
coordinate AAF OA activities. Initially, OAD did not exercise centralized control over the OA oces attached to each
major command, but later editions of AFR 207, published
after the Air Force gained independent status, gave OAD
general authority to monitor and coordinate programs of all
Operations Analysis oces and to select, indoctrinate, and
recommend assignment of all operations analysts employed
by the Air Force.39
AFR 207 limited the OAD sta to ten analysts, but the
new assistant for operations analysis, LeRoy Brothers, developed a good working relationship with the Air Sta as well
as a reputation for turning out high-quality studies, and, by
May 1947, the OAD sta included 6 physicists, 5 mathematicians, 3 statisticians, 7 engineers, and 1 educationalist.40
The relatively small OAD sta was known for the objectivity and professionalism of its studies and it turned out
a good deal of solid work in the decade following the war.41
Among the major subjects taken up by OAD analysts in the
postwar period were weapons eectiveness, continental air
defense operations, and the development of an air operations
attrition model.42 OAD also undertook the preparation of
a history of OR in the Army Air Forces in World War II.
Pieces were prepared, but no comprehensive formal publication resulted.43
AFR 207 also authorized the creation of an Operations
Analysis Oce (OAO) under a civilian chief in each major
Air Force command that wanted one. These oces were the
lineal descendants of the wartime OA sections, being similarly organized and performing similar functions. OAOs
operated independently under their respective commanders and conducted OR studies of immediate practical value
to their command, focusing on the performance of aircraft,
weapons, and equipment and on the improvement of tactics
and operational procedures. The need for, and attractiveness
of having, an OAO soon became apparent to every Air Force
commander. As Prof. I. B. Holley has noted:
virtually every major organization within the Air Force had
learned that the best defense against a scheme proposed by the
outside professionals, the PhDs at RAND or elsewhere, was to
have a PhD or a whole roster of them on the sta or on contract
to call up for the counter-battery re when threatened . . . the
battle of the doctors.44
With only loose control exercised by OAD, each OAO

had the opportunity to set an independent course. In some
cases, the OA oces were larger and more inuential than
OAD itself. For example, OAO at Strategic Air Command
headquarters was able to build a strong program including
fteen analysts in 1948, when OAD had only ten.45
Project RAND and the RAND Corporation
As World War II drew to a close, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Dr.
Theodore von Karman (Arnolds scientic advisor), Dr. Edward L. Bowles (a consultant to the secretary of war), and
other senior ocials in the War Department recognized the
need to retain at least some of the scientic talent that had
been assembled during the war, particularly in view of the increased importance of R&D to the American armed forces.
Meeting on 1 October 1945 at Hamilton Field in California, AAF and industry leaders devised a concept for a new
organization to provide independent scientic analysis, particularly in the areas in which military policy, planning, and
technology intersected.46 Believing that it would be dicult
to recruit and administer suitable scientic personnel for the
project through the existing civil service system and that a university would not want to take on a highly classied project,
AAF leaders decided to attach the project to an existing commercial rm located outside the Washington, D.C., area so as
to insulate its sta from day-to-day requests for assistance.47
General Arnold persuaded Donald Douglas, the president of
Douglas Aircraft Company, to take on the project, and Project RAND (an acronym for research and development) was
initiated by a $10 million letter contract issued on 2 March
1946. Under the terms of the contract, Douglas Aircraft was
to conduct a program of study and research on the broad
subject of intercontinental warfare, other than surface, with
object of recommending to the Army Air Forces preferred
techniques and instrumentalities for this purpose.48
Franklin Collbohm was named director of Project
RAND. Responsibility for the project was assigned to a new
Air Sta agency created on 1 December 1945the Oce
of the Deputy Chief of the Air Sta for Research and Development (later the Deputy Chief of Sta, Development)
headed by Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay.49 By early 1948, the
Project RAND sta had grown to more than two hundred
scientists and engineers recruited from industry and academia and organized in three main divisions: aircraft, missiles, and evaluation of military worth.50
In May 1947, Project RAND moved into its own ofces in Santa Monica, California, but the AAF contract with
the Douglas Aircraft Company had already raised questions
of conict of interest. General Arnold was a close friend of
Donald Douglas, and Douglas competitors were suspicious
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that the Air ForceDouglas research connection might give
Douglas an advantage in other contracting.51 For its part, by
1948 Douglas Aircraft was eager to free itself from the arrangement, believing that it may have lost other government
contracts because of the governments concern with being
even-handed. Accordingly, it was agreed that the relationship of Project RAND with Douglas Aircraft be terminated
and that a new, independent, nonprot corporation would
be set up to manage Project RAND. The RAND Corporation was chartered in California in May 1948 with Franklin
Collbohm as president.52 In late July 1948, the new nonprofit corporation secured some $1 million in operating capital
in the form of an interest-free loan from, and a private bank
loan guaranteed by, the Ford Foundation.53 Some three hundred Douglas employees working on Project RAND were
transferred to the new corporation on 1 November 1948.54
The relationship of the Air Force to Project RAND
and the RAND Corporation was subsequently laid out in
Air Force Regulation 209: Air Force Policy for the Conduct of
Project RAND, which dened Project RAND as
a continuing program of scientic study and research on the
broad subject of air warfare with the object of recommending
to the Air Force preferred methods, techniques, and instrumentalities . . . operated by The RAND Corporation under contract
with the Department of the Air Force.55
AFR 209 also created a Project RAND Military Advisory

Group chaired by the Air Force deputy chief of sta, development, for the purpose of advising the Air Force chief of
sta on the RAND research program and other matters
having to do with Project RAND and the RAND Corporation.56
Day-to-day OR problems continued to be handled by
OAD and the OA oces at major Air Force headquarters.
The RAND research program constituted what the Air
Force called background research, that is, the application of
scientic analysis of the weapons, equipment, methods, and
organization of air warfare, including economic, political,
and social factors, to enable the Air Force to take advantage
of new scientic discoveries and counter their development
by potential enemies.57 Accordingly, the RAND research
program focused on such general areas as future air warfare
and the development of nuclear weapons, and it included
studies on such major topics as strategic bombing systems,
air defense, tactical air operations, and Air Force logistics.58
RANDs rst publication, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, was published on 2 May
1946.59 The work of fty analysts, it dealt with matters far
from the day-to-day operational problems of concern to
World War II operations analysts. Overall, initial progress
in research and publication by Project RAND was slow, and
the results were disappointing to the projects sponsors.60

In fact, a good deal of the early work was subcontracted by
Project RAND to other research and industry rms.61
The wartime Air Force OR program had been heavily
focused on the physical sciences and mathematics. Although
a few social scientists and other non-scientic personnel
were employed as administrators and analysts, the wartime
work did not generally extend to studies involving anything
other than operational problems. The RAND research program, however, was more comprehensive and more theoretical, and it often involved political, economic, and social considerations. Accordingly, RAND sought to hire a number of
social scientist to complement its sta of physical scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers.62 The idea of integrating
social scientists into the RAND research eort was sold by
John D. Williams, a mathematician on the RAND sta, to
Gen. Curtis LeMay, the Air Force deputy chief of sta for research and development, at a meeting in Washington, D.C.,
in late 1946.63 Following a meeting in New York with prominent social scientists, RAND created an Economic Division
under Charles J. Hitch and a Social Science Division under
Hans Speier and produced a number of useful studies in the
social sciences.64
Department of Defense
Two years after the end of World War II, the armed
forces of the United States underwent a major reorganization with passage of the National Security Act of 1947
(NSA 1947).65 The NSA 1947 created a National Military
Establishment (NME) comprising three separate military
departmentsNavy, Army, and the newly established and
coequal Air Forceeach headed by its own civilian secretary with cabinet status, a seat on the newly created National
Security Council, and direct access to the president.66 NME
was to be overseen by a secretary of defense who also had
cabinet rank and served as the principal military advisor to
the president. The NSA 1947 formally recognized the status
of the Joint Chiefs of Sta ( JCS) and created the Central
Intelligence Agency.
The NSA 1947 represented a compromise between the
single unied armed forces advocated by the Army and the
Army Air Forces, and the totally independent services championed by the Navy. Accordingly, the secretary of defense had
only weak general authority, direction and control over the
separate military departments. Indeed, James V. Forrestal,
the secretary of the Navy appointed by President Truman
as the rst secretary of defense, proclaimed that this oce
will probably be the biggest cemetery for dead cats in history.67 The arrangement proved unwieldy, and following the
report of the Hoover Commission68 in 1949, the 1947 act
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was amended by the National Security Act of 1949 (NSA
1949), which replaced NME with a Department of Defense
and eliminated the cabinet status of the service secretaries,
subordinating them to the secretary of defense. The authority of the secretary of defense to oversee the military departments was strengthened, and a position was created for a
deputy secretary of defense. The NSA 1949 also provided
the secretary of defense with a sta, increased the size of the
Joint Sta from 100 to 210, and provided for a non-voting
JCS chairman.
The NSA 1947 established a Research and Development Board (RDB) to integrate and coordinate military
R&D programs, advise the secretary of defense on scientic
research relating to national security, allocate responsibilities
among the services for projects of joint interest, and formulate policy in connection with R&D for agencies outside the
Department of Defense. RDB, which consisted of two ofcers from each of the three services and Dr. Vannevar Bush
as chairman, came into existence on 30 September 1947.69
JCS evaluated the relative importance of the major types
of military operations to its strategic plans, and RDB estimated the adequacy of present equipment and techniques
for performing those operations successfully. RDB then
combined both the strategic and technological assessments
to arrive at the relative importance of each major area of
R&D. This set of ratings constituted the boards master plan,
which served as a broad guide to the military eort in the
whole R&D program. RDB was assisted in its work by some
two thousand expert consultants drawn from the ranks of
both civilian and military scientists and technologists who
met in various committees, panels, and working groups to
review military R&D programs and recommend to RDB the
direction that each program should take.70
Although the Joint New Weapons and Equipment
Committee headed by Vannevar Bush had played a major
role in promoting the establishment of OR organizations
during the war, the Joint Chiefs of Sta did not have its own
OR organization. In view of the involvement of DOD, JCS,
and RDB in complex matters of weapons development, organization, and strategy, both the Hoover Commission and
a special committee appointed by Secretary Forrestal recommended establishing an organization to provide an impartial
evaluation of weapons systems at the JCS level.71 Accordingly, on 11 December 1948, Secretary Forrestal directed
the formation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
to provide rigorous, unprejudiced, and independent analyses of present and future weapons systems under probable
future combat conditions.72
WSEG was ocially established on 21 February 1949,
by JCS and RDB, with the concurrence of the secretary of defense.73 Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, then commanding general, U.S.
Army Pacic, and commander of the Eniwetok atomic bomb

tests, was appointed as director of WSEG, and, on 14 March
1949, Dr. Philip M. Morse, a veteran of the Navy ORG and
OEG, joined WSEG as deputy director and research director.74 WSEG was placed under the administrative direction
of the assistant secretary of defense for research and development but worked directly for the secretary of defense, JCS,
and RDB.75 The assigned mission of WSEG was twofold:
(1) To provide DOD with comprehensive, objective, and independent analyses and evaluations under projected conditions of war, which will include but not necessarily be
conned to:
(a) Present and future weapons systems;
(b) The inuence of present and future weapons systems
upon strategy, organization, and tactics;
(c) The comparative eectiveness and costs of
weapons systems;
(2) To make available to the Department of Defense timely
advice and assistance to aid decisions in the allocation of
resources for the development of the most eective combination of weapons systems.76
The sta of the group was composed in equal parts of ofcers of the three armed services and civilian scientists hired
under the regular civil service system, organized into three
divisions plus a review board.77 The Analysis and Evaluation
Division was composed of all permanently assigned civilian
scientists and was divided into project teams to study specific problems. The Military Studies and Liaison Division was
composed of the assigned military personnel who worked
with the project teams and provided the civilian analysts
with information on military needs and requirements. The
executive secretariat handled routine administrative matters,
and the review board, comprising the deputy director and
the heads of the three divisions, recommended research priorities, reviewed the results of major projects, and advised
the group director on policy matters.
By 31 December 1949, the WSEG sta had grown to
13 full-time civilian analysts, 6 civilian analysts on loan from
various organizations, 15 military ocers, and 8 civilian and
3 military part-time consultants.78 Ultimately, the combination of military ocers and civilians managed by the civil
service system proved less than adequate, and, in September 1955, the Department of Defense negotiated a contract
with MIT to provide the scientic personnel required by
WSEG.79 Subsequently, in April 1956, representatives of
ve universities (MIT, Case Institute of Technology, Stanford, California Institute of Technology, and Tulane) met
and incorporated as the nonprot Institute for Defense
Analyses to provide scientic sta for WSEG.80
As of 1 November 1949, WSEG had been assigned eight
projects, and seven other preliminary studies were under way
in anticipation of future assignments.81 The rst and most
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important of the original eight projects was an evaluation of
certain aspects of the strategic air oensive plans. The other
topics under study included nuclear- and chemical-powered
aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, air defense, antisubmarine warfare, airborne operations, carrier operations, and
ground force operations.82 In general, WSEG studies were
of high quality, and, in his 1949 report, the secretary of defense echoed the directive that established the group, noting
that these analyses are being made by the ablest professional
minds, military and civilian, employing the most advanced
analytical methods that can be brought to bear.83
The WSEG sta was small, and the analyses undertaken were often complex and demanded immediate attention.
Accordingly, the group frequently relied on the OR organizations of the three services to provide data for its own studies.84 An informal Joint Operations Research Group was
also formed under DOD auspices to conduct periodic seminars for the exchange of information on OR methods among
WSEG and the OR organizations of the three services.85
The heads of the ve service OR groups (OEG, OAD, Project RAND, WSEG, and Army ORO) also met monthly to
coordinate their work to avoid duplication.86
International Cooperation
By the end of World War II, operational research was
well established in the armed services of the British Commonwealth, and after the war the British armed forces maintained substantial OR organizations.87 As early as 1942, the
British Army had considered plans for a postwar operational
research establishment staed by serving ocers.88 A number of such ocers were trained and they served alongside
civilian analysts in the British Armys OR sections during
the war. On 1 November 1945, they were absorbed in the
Military Operational Research Unit (MORU) organized
under the War Oce. MORU operated in conjunction with
the Army Operational Research Group (AORG), which at
the end of 1945 employed 365 scientists.89 Subsequently,
the two organizations were merged under the AORG title
and charged with the scientic study of the soldier and his
weapons, equipment, and clothing; requirements for new
weapons and equipment; the content and methods of military training; and logistical problems.90
The Royal Canadian Air Force had established an OR
unit in 1942 under the direction of Prof. J. O. Wilhelm, and
the Royal Canadian Navy had followed suit with the formation in 1943 of a Directorate of Operational Research
under Dr. J. H. L. Johnstone.91 In 1944, the Canadian Army
formed a similar directorate at Army headquarters in Ottawa as well as a Canadian Army Operational Research Group
under Dr. J. T. Wilson. In Canada, the wartime military OR
organizations were subsumed in the postwar period under
the Defence Research Board (DRB).92 DRB controlled an

operational research group that served as a holding group for
civilian OR analysts attached to the armed forces or to DRB
itself. Some trained active-duty ocers were also involved.93
The Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment
(CAORE) was created at the Royal Military College, Kingston, eective 22 December 1949, but its sta was restricted
to ve people until May 1950.94
To provide liaison with their British counterparts,
WSEG and the U.S. armed services OR groups jointly maintained a representative in Great Britain.95 A tripartite agreement between the armies of Great Britain, Canada, and the
United States was also established to provide a forum for the
standardization and exchange of OR methods and information.96 A series of periodic conferences on Army operational
research was also initiated by the British Army Operational
Research Group, the Canadian Army Operational Research
Establishment, and the U.S. Army ORO. The First Tripartite Conference on Army Operational Research was held
in London on 2129 April 1949.97 The Second Tripartite
Conference on Army Operations Research was hosted by
ORO in Washington, D.C., on 2327 October 1950, and
included representatives from the Oce of the Secretary of
Defense and WSEG, the Department of the Army (DA)
and ORO, the Department of the Air Force and the RAND
Corporation, the Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations
and OEG, the British defense ministries and their OR organizations, and the Canadian defense ministries, DRB, and
CAORE.98 The Tripartite Agreements on Army Operations
Research were put in nal form at the 1950 conference and
included agreement that the priorities for research by the
OR groups of all three armies should be armored warfare;
air support of ground operations; lightening the load of the
infantry soldier; the eect of atomic weapons on future army
organization and operations; and general study of the optimum system of ground weapons, including command and
control and training.99
Army Operations Research
Developments,
The rapid growth of military technology triggered by
World War II greatly increased the importance of scientic
research and development, and the Armys postwar R&D
establishment expanded to deal with such new developments as guided missiles, electronics, and nuclear weapons that were needed to meet Americas new global commitments in the growing confrontation with the Soviet
Union.100 Despite a strong economy, the United States had
only limited resources with which to meet its obligations.
The fundamental problem faced by all of the armed forces
in the postwar period was how to achieve maximum mili-
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tary results with a minimum of men, money, and materiel,
and how to use U.S. industrial, technological, and scientic
superiority to overcome decits in manpower vis--vis the
main potential enemy, the Soviet Union. Accordingly, OR
assumed great importance as a means of rationalizing decisions about the overall allocation of resources as well as the
development of eective weapons systems, organization,
tactics, and strategy.
The Army ground forces had lagged far behind the
Navy and the Army Air Forces in establishing a widespread
and eective OR organization during World War II, and
the few OR units that the Army did stand up were quickly
inactivated in the rapid demobilization after V-J Day.101
However, the need for OR to support research and development of Army weapons systems was widely recognized,
and the integrated OR activities embedded in the Ordnance
Corps and Signal Corps continued for the most part. Until
the Air Force gained its independence in September 1947,
however, the OR activities pursued by the Army Air Forces
constituted the Armys principal OR undertaking.102 It was
not until the summer of 1948 that the Army moved to establish a comprehensive OR organization that was capable
of dealing with the analysis of organization, tactics, and
strategy, as well as with weapons analysis. In part, the delay
was caused by the continued assumption that the problems of land warfare were less amenable to OR techniques
and by ignorance of how OR methods might be applied to
ground combat that stemmed from the Army ground forces
having had little wartime experience with OR.103 However,
the creation of ORO in 1948 provided a focal point and
model for subsequent development, and ORO was instrumental in broadening the scope of OR in the Army. As a
result, by 1950, the Army used OR in a number of areas
and had progressed far beyond an exclusive focus on engineering and weapons development applications to studies of international politics, economics, national policy, and
global strategy.
Embedded Operations Research in the Technical Services
and Army Field Forces, 194550
The few specic OR agencies created by the Army during World War II were disbanded in the postwar demobilization.104 For the rst three years following the war, the
only operations research conducted by the Army, except for
that conducted by AAF, was the embedded OR conducted
by the Armys technical servicesprimarily the Ordnance
Corpsand the Army ground forces test and evaluation
boards as part of their weapons and equipment development
programs. OR techniques were applied extensively to problems of weapons analysis but generally did not extend to the
analysis of operational problems.
In May 1946, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, was

abolished and the technical services resumed their R&D
functions.105 In the performance of those functions, the
technical services relied on a variety of OR methods but
generally did not form identiable OR sections until after
1950. Accordingly, the degree to which OR played a role in
the R&D activities of the technical services in the 194550
period cannot be dened with any degree of certainty. Most
of the evidence for such OR activity is anecdotal, and in most
cases no mention of OR under that name is made in ocial
reports and documents. However, as Dr. Ellis A. Johnson,
the director of the Army Operations Research Oce, told
his audience at a conference of social science consultants on
19 September 1949:
There are, in addition, in all of the Services, groups which are
not formally designated as operations research groups, but
which do carry out what the more formally recognized groups
recognize as operations research. For example, in the Army, the
Aberdeen Laboratories of Army Ordnance carry out some of
the most successful operational research studies on the weapons analysis level. These are used by all of the Services in the
Department of Defense.106
Many of the people involved in the R&D eld in the

postwar years later related that some OR activity was embedded in the activities of the technical services. Dr. Floyd
Hill, for example, recalled that after being drafted in August
1945, he was brought into the Ordnance Corps Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland, as a private, and he worked there until December
1946, when he was discharged from the Army. He then was
hired as a civilian in the same job under Herman Gay in the
Terminal Ballistics Laboratory of BRL. In 1949, he became
the section head of the Tank Eectiveness (Vulnerability)
Section. Hill recalled that the work conducted by him and
his associates clearly involved OR techniques, but was not
identied as OR.107
During and shortly after World War II, BRL indeed
conducted a variety of studies on the vulnerability and survivability of various Army equipment, notably aircraft, as
well as studies on weapons eectiveness and bombing patterns.108 In the postwar period, BRL continued to conduct
overall weapon system studies from an engineering and
operations analysis viewpoint, applied research on factors
aecting system performance in order to establish desirable
characteristics and proposed basic designs for new and improved weapons, and technical feasibility studies.109 Operations research methods were embedded in such studies, but
OR was not considered a distinct specialty in its own right.
Similar work took place at other Ordnance Corps laboratories. George Schechter, who went to work in 1941 at the
Pittman-Dunn Laboratories at Frankford Arsenal, later had
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a hand in the development of the recoil-less rie and the aircraft ejection seat. He also worked for a number of rms,
such as Analytics, Inc., and the Battelle Memorial Institute,
both of which used OR techniques extensively. However,
Schechter recalled that he was always identied as a physicist
and never as an OR analyst. Speaking of his time at the Pittman-Dunn Laboratories, Schechter noted that he worked
for Dr. William J. Kroeger, a good physicist, a good engineer,
a good sort of country manager, and OR didnt mean a thing
to him except he did it all the time. He just did it.110
Operations Research techniques were also embedded in
the work of the Army test and evaluation boards that became
the responsibility of the Oce of the Chief of Army Field
Forces (OCAFF) following the November 1948 reorganization of the Army. OCAFF initiated requirements for new
equipment, determined the desired military characteristics,
and oversaw the service tests conducted by the various test and
evaluation boards that were consolidated after the war into
just four main boards with a functional rather than branch
orientation.111 All four OCAFF boards used OR methods to
a limited extent as part of their primary mission of conducting service tests and evaluations of new equipment.112
The Operations Research Oce, 194850
Although by 1948 both the Army technical services
and the Army eld forces boards were using OR techniques
to support the development of weapons and equipment,
the Army still had no dedicated OR organization capable
of applying OR techniques to the study of Army strategy,
tactics, and organization. The Army thus lacked an important tool in the growing competition with the Navy and the
Air Force for roles and missions and the associated budget
dollars.113 In the spring of 1948, the Army nally acted to
create its own comprehensive OR organization. Formed in
August 1948, ORO quickly became the Armys answer to
the Navy OEG and the Air Force OAD, OAOs, and Project
RAND.
A number of factors prompted the Army to create its
own OR organization. In an April 1946 memorandum, the
Army chief of sta, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, had strongly urged the creation of a research organization outside the Army, and the director of army logistics, Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand, had called attention to the
Armys need for scientic advisors as well as its lack of an
OR capability.114 At the end of 1947, the Defense Research
and Development Board recommended that the armed forces expand the facilities and the scope of their operational
analysis groups, and noted in their report that
our general investigations into these matters revealed that although the Navy and the Air Force have operational analysis
sections working on problems peculiar to their respective ser-
vices, the Army Ground Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Sta
have no analytical groups of a similar nature within their organizational structure. This, we believe, is a serious shortcoming
and one which we recommend should be corrected at the earliest possible date.115
The board report produced the same reaction in the Department of the Army as it did in the Department of Defensean acceleration of eorts already under way to create
a credible OR organizationand $1 million was appropriated for operations research in the FY49 Army budget. The
Army Sta ocer charged with overseeing R&D matters,
Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAulie, the deputy director of logistics for R&D, was tasked to conduct a study of how the $1
million OR appropriation might best be spent.116 There were
several options for how such a group might be organized
the two basic models were a nongovernmental, independently
administered group and a group under the civil service integrated into the military agency that it served.117 The Navy
OEG operated under the rst type of arrangement with
a contract with MIT. The Air Force had both types: OAD
and OAO were integrated into the Air Force structure with
some military personnel and all civilian employees under civil
service, and Project RAND operated independently under a
contract with the Douglas Aircraft Company.
The model of an independent nonprot organization
aliated with a university had many advantages. It presumably provided more-exible hiring and ring procedures,
more-generous salary opportunities, and a congenial, professional, and academic atmosphere, as well as a means of
hiring consultants.118 It was thought that such a nongovernmental agency would also provide maximum objectivity because of its independent status, maximum exibility
because of its divorce from day-to-day problems, and increased attractiveness as a career outside the civil service.119
It would also provide a means to recognize and reward superior performance quickly and to rapidly eliminate personnel
who did not meet the desired standards of prociency.120
After some study, the decision was made to proceed with
the formation of a university-based, independent, nonprot
OR organization. That choice was shaped in large part by
the inuence of Dr. Vannevar Bush who thought that creating an atmosphere of intellectual independence conducive
to good scientic research would provide a better opportunity to attract scientic talent.121
Negotiations with The Johns Hopkins University
Maj. Gen. McAulie began with a survey of potential
university sponsors. To guide his eorts, he prepared an
outline of the proposed General Research Oce, including
the general elds of study and the proposed administrative
organization and contractual arrangements.122 The organi-
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zation envisioned by Maj. Gen. McAulie was to be under
the direct supervision of a civilian scientist who would have
at his disposal a General Research Oce, staed with the
necessary scientic and administrative personnel.123 The
project was to be run on a contract basis with a civilian university or institute, and, although most problems were to be
formulated, analyzed, and evaluated by the GRO sta, other
problems were to be subcontracted out to various universities and nonprot research institutions.
Maj. Gen. McAulie foresaw that two types of research
would be conducted by the proposed GRO: Operations
Research and basic research of a non-materiel nature,
with the latter initially constituting a minor part of the
program.124 The problems to be studied would be those
unique to the Department of the Army and would include
problems in the general elds of combat and strategic intelligence techniques, combat psychology and morale, analysis
of weapons and weapons systems, comparative overall economic costs of various methods of waging ground warfare,
psychological warfare and cold war techniques, logistics,
analysis of general progress in psychology as it pertained to
Army applications, and other related broad elds of nonmateriel research. McAulie also noted that although the
initial cost of this type of research is expensive, the eventual savings to the Government in time, money, materials
and manpower, will be immeasurably greater and that only
those [studies] that have the very highest priority can be
undertaken with the amount of money requested for this
Fiscal Year.125 The close connection of the Army proposal
to the December 1947 recommendations of the Defense
Research and Development Board was evident in the long
quotation from that report included in Maj. Gen. McAulies memorandum.126
In April 1948, McAulie settled on The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, as the best choice
to administer the Army OR program.127 JHU oered several distinct advantages: It was conveniently located close to
Washington, D.C.; it enjoyed a good reputation in science,
technology, the professions, and scholarship; and it had experience in managing military programs, having been the site
of the Navys Applied Physics Laboratory since 1942.128
In early May 1948, McAulie opened negotiations with
the JHU president, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, that led in August
to establishing the General Research Oce under JHU auspices. The initial reaction of the authorities at JHU to the
Army proposal was not entirely positive. In a 2 May 1948
memorandum to President Bowman, Dr. Arthur E. Ruark,
assistant director of the JHU Institute for Cooperative
Research (ICR), noted that although participation in the
growing science of quantitative scientic strategy and operations planning was perhaps a good thing, if a choice had to
be made, ICR preferred to work with the Navy with which

negotiations had already been under way for six months.129
Three days later, on 5 May, Ruark prepared a checklist of
points for the forthcoming discussion with the Army in
which he laid out the pros and cons of working with the
Army and/or Navy.130 Noting that the eld of operational
studies is here to stay but had yet to receive the attention it
deserved, Ruark stated that the Army is behind the game in
operations analysis. Clearly the pressure to establish a hardhitting activity, promptly, comes from very high quarters.131
He then summarized the potential JHU contract with the
Navy, noting the narrow scope of the proposed Navy work
and pointing out that if we work for only one service, let it
be the Navy.132 With regard to the Army proposal, Ruark
noted that the decision could not be postponed beyond 20
May at the latest, that the total number of people involved
would probably approach 130140 (versus 7 to 10 for the
Navy project), and that JHU ought to envision a ten-year
commitment. He went on to point out that the personnel required for the two projects would be quite dierent because
the Navy requirement was specialized whereas the Army
proposal was broader and carried with it a heavy long-term
commitment for JHU. Noting that there would of course, be
wails from the pacists and appeasers and the campus Commies, Ruark concluded that, although
personally, my task will be easier if the Armys kind oer is rejected. . . . I believe the work should be undertaken, hedging the
contract about with understandings and agreements which will
permit steady, conservative progress rather than hurried construction of a jerry-built crew and an ineective sub-contract
structure; which, indeed, would defeat the goals in which we
are all interested.133
Eventually, Maj. Gen. McAulie and the authorities at

JHU were able to reach an agreement, and a contract was
signed.134 On 5 May, Ruark had outlined the tentative terms
for the Army contract, addressing such matters as the types
of analysis to be performed, how tasks would be assigned,
liaison arrangements, training activities, the responsibilities of the Army and of JHU, subcontracting, and overhead
costs.135 In his memorandum, Ruark suggested it was understood that the work would be administered through the
Institute for Cooperative Research and that there would be
an administrative group in Baltimore to handle business and
contracting matters and a working group at the Pentagon or
elsewhere in the Washington, D.C., area. In addition, the
university would carry on extensive sub-contracting of the
research work assigned to it, in Universities and other nonprot institutions, but not in industrial companies without
written permission of the Army.136
The arrangement worked out between the Army and
JHU assumed certain mutual responsibilities.137 For its part,
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the Army was expected to provide up-to-date information
on Army plans, programs, and policies that might result in
requirements for future studies; complete background information, data, and reports available to the Army and pertinent to assigned projects; vigorous and eective general supervision of the OR program to include the assignment and
approval of projects, establishment of project priorities, periodic review of the work program, and prompt evaluation and
distribution of OR publications; and constructive criticism
of the OR work. For its part, JHU undertook to ensure that
the OR group became thoroughly familiar at rst-hand with
all the pertinent military aspects of the assigned problems;
translate its studies into language that simply and clearly
showed the values, costs, and eects of proposed courses of
action; and keep the Army fully advised of the status of its
current program and its capability to undertake new work.
Establishment of the General Research Oce
Although the new General Research Oce began operations on 8 August 1948, it was not until the publication
of Department of the Army Memorandum No. 3502 on 20
September 1948 that its existence was made ocial.138 DA
Memo 3502 announced that JHU would act as contractor
to conduct the general research program of the Department
of the Army, and that program would consist of Operations
research and/or analysis on problems that are not unique to
any one Army agency [and] basic research of a nonmateriel
nature for which primary cognizance has not been assigned
to a specic Army agency.139 The memorandum also prescribed that the Army contract with JHU would be under
the supervision of the deputy director for R&D in the Logistics Division of the General Sta, and it created a Department of the Army Ad Hoc Advisory Committee under
the chairmanship of the GRO project ocer; the committee would have one ocer from each General Sta division,
each technical service, OCAFF, and an ocer from the Ofce of the Army Comptroller, whose purpose was to assist
in the selection and coordination of problems proposed for
inclusion in the general research program and to recommend
assignment of priorities to those selected.140 Channels were
established for the submission of proposed study topics by
Army agencies, and all Army agencies were instructed to
furnish appropriate assistance to GRO on request, to include providing access to reports and data, facilitating visits
to Army installations, and giving advice and assistance.141
The memorandum also prescribed procedures for handling
classied information.
On 27 December 1948, GRO was renamed the Operations Research Oce, and, on 13 January 1949, DA Memo
3502 was superseded without substantial change by Special Regulations No. 70555: Research and Development
Operations Research Oce.142 The general research program

became the operations research program of the Department
of the Army, and a representative of the adjutant general was
added to the Department of the Army Advisory Committee.143 The most signicant change, however, was the inclusion of a formal mission statement that would remain essentially unchanged for the life of ORO:
The mission of the Operations Research Oce is to apply
scientic, qualitative, and quantitative analysis to the study of
warfare with the objective of improving the strategy, tactics, logistics, weapons, and weapons systems of the future.144
An article in the 21 August 1948 edition of the Baltimore Evening Sun announced the formation of the new ofce under the leadership of Dr. Ellis A. Johnson and noted
that Lt. Col. W. C. Farmer of the Army General Sta had
been designated as project ocer to work closely with Dr.
Johnson.145 The twenty to thirty scientists under Johnsons
direction were to be quartered at Fort Lesley J. McNair in
the District of Columbia and would work on problems of
weapons development, strategy, tactics, and logistics, including studies of antiaircraft weapons and defenses; training
motivation; the application of biomechanics to weapons design; logistical support of airheads; and individual protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.146
Sta Recruitment
In early August 1948, GRO was assigned oce space in
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair,
and newly appointed director Ellis A. Johnson began to recruit a top-notch administrative sta and a battery of highly
competent professional analysts from various disciplines.147
To support the full-time ORO sta, Johnson also formed
a panel of consultants with broad interests and established
relations with a number of contract research organizations
that were able to perform work for ORO on a subcontract
basis.148 Although his eorts were successful, the recruitment and retention of high-quality professional sta members would be a chronic problem despite the ORO structure
as an independent, nonprot, university-aliated entity.149
In May 1948, the assistant director of JHUs Institute
for Cooperative Research, Arthur Ruark, had estimated that
support of the proposed Army GRO would require an addition to the JHU payroll of sixty-ve to eighty-ve people,
more than half of them in Washington, D.C.150 Ruarks estimate was fairly accurate. At the end of the rst six months,
the ORO professional sta consisted of just 8 analysts working on ve projects, but by 30 June 1949, the ORO sta had
grown to 26 professional and 34 administrative personnel
plus 9 consultants.151 In addition to the sixty full-time ORO
employees, subcontractors were employing another sixty-six
people on ORO projects on both a full-time and a part-time
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basis.152 At the end of the rst full year of operations (in August 1949), the ORO sta had grown to forty-one professional and forty-nine administrative personnel.153 Fourteen
of the sta members held a doctoral degree, and a total of six
projects had been assigned. At that time, the growth of the
ORO sta was projected to reach a total of 130 personnel
(75 professional and 55 administrative) by 1 July 1950, with
seventeen projects assigned. In fact, by the summer of 1950,
ORO still had only about 40 professional analysts but did
boast a list of more than 100 consultants and a number of
subcontractors.154
The senior sta assembled by Dr. Johnson were for the
most part distinguished scientists with World War II experience in OR. It is not surprising that they included the
physicists George H. Shortley, Lynn H. Rumbaugh, and
William L. Whitson, all of whom had worked with Johnson in the Navy Ordnance Laboratorys mine warfare OR
unit and on the Pacic mining campaign during the war.155
Robert J. Best, a chemist who joined ORO in January 1949,
had experience in the Navy OEG and later made major contributions in the analysis of tactical combat operations.156 In
April 1949, Johnson recruited Dr. George S. Pettee, a political scientist, to work on military aid and psychological warfare problems.157 Pettee became deputy director of ORO in
1950. In August 1949, Johnson selected Lester D. Flory, a
retired Army brigadier general who had earned a master of
science degree in electrical engineering from MIT in 1930,
to serve as the ORO executive director.158
As the recruitment of George Pettee demonstrated, a
notable aspect of Johnsons recruiting eorts for ORO was
the selection not only of physical scientists but of representatives of the social sciences. For example, the early ORO
sta included a number of historians, recruited on the assumption that their skills would be required to help locate
and analyze World War II Army operational records, the
most likely source for data on operational matters.159 Ellis
Johnson was also no respecter of gender roles. He hired
many women for professional positions in ORO, including
historian Dorothy Kneeland Clark who did seminal work
on casualties; the chemist Grace Donovan who served for
a time as the ORO representative to the Army Operational
Research Group in Britain; Kay Hafstad, a meteorologist;
and Jean Taylor who supervised a very successful ORO program for employing high school students as junior analysts
during the summer.160
One issue that arose soon after Johnson began to assemble the professional sta for ORO was that of training.
Although many of the hired analysts had wartime experience in military OR organizations, many did not, and it was
necessary to train new ORO sta in Army ways.161 Given
the ignorance of OR throughout the Army, it was also neces-
sary to orient ORO customers on what OR could and could

not accomplish. The problem was resolved, albeit slowly and
haltingly, by on-the-job training of ORO analysts, the visits
of ORO personnel to Army installations, and the sharing
within ORO of experience by those ORO personnel who
did have military experience.162 ORO also undertook a vigorous internal eort to gather information about the Army
and build an understanding of what the Army did and how
it worked.
Organization of the GRO/ORO
In the beginning, the General Research Oce was,
like the biblical Earth, without form and void, and it was
not until March 1949 that a plan for internal organization
emerged. On 4 March 1949, Ellis Johnson wrote to the director of the Institute for Cooperative Research at JHU to
propose a exible organization for ORO divided into three
main parts as shown in Figure 21.
The Project Analysis and Synthesis Division (PASD)
would be the locus of the principal operations research work,
with each project carried out by an ad hoc team headed by
a project chairman who would report to the ORO director.163 The ad hoc PASD project teams would be supported
by the Project Studies Division (PSD) under the supervision of the deputy director. Fixed groups within PSD would
conduct studies required to support particular PASD projects or studies that were common to a number of such projects.164 The Administrative Division would perform the
usual administrative, personnel, and scal work under the
supervision of the ORO executive director. The executive
director would also oversee the Project Board, comprising
senior ORO members, which would review completed or
ongoing projects.
Dr. Johnsons 4 March 1949 proposal was apparently
never adopted, and ORO operated for some time without
a formal internal structure, but by June 1949, both the sta
and the work program had grown to such an extent that a
new organization was proposed.
The proposed June 1949 structure, shown in Figure
22, was predicated on the view that a military action
contains three important elements: a military element
(considerations of strategy and tactics), a technological element (questions of weapons and their capabilities), and
a human element (considerations of the interface of men
with machines).165 It also anticipated additional growth in
the ORO stang and work program inasmuch as it had
not yet been considered necessary to actually subdivide
the ongoing ORO projects. It appears that the June 1949
organizational plan was also never actually adopted, and a
xed organizational structure for ORO was not set until
the early 1950s.
36171_03OR 2.indd 67
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Figure 21Proposed ORO Organization: March

Director
Deputy Director
Executive Director
Project Board
Project Studies
Division
Project Analysis
and Synthesis Division
Administrative
Division
Source: Memo, Dr. Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to director, ICR, Fort McNair, Washington, 4 Mar 49,
sub: Proposed Organization for the ORO, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33,
Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 49.
Figure 22Proposed ORO Organization: June
!DVISORY'ROUP
3TRATEGIC2ESEARCH
$IVISION
$IRECTOR
!SSISTANTTOTHE$IRECTOR
$EPUTY$IRECTOR
0ROJECT"OARD
%XECUTIVE$IRECTOR
!DMINISTRATION
$IVISION
4ECHNOLOGICAL
2ESEARCH$IVISION
(UMAN2ESOURCES
2ESEARCH$IVISION
Source: ORO, Administrative Operations Report for the Two Quarters Ending 30 June 1949, p. 32, Figure 5,
in Quarterly Report, vol. II, no. 1, 2, 30 Jun 49 (Fort McNair, Washington: JHU ORO, 1949), pp. 33, RG 319, Entry
82, Box 2129, Folder Quarterly Rpt.
Because ORO was a creature of both the Army and

JHU, the director of ORO reported to two higher authorities. In the Army chain he reported to the deputy director
of logistics for R&D. Day-to-day coordination was routed
through the assigned ORO project ocer, the rst of whom
was Lt. Col. W. C. Farmer.166 As an employee of JHU, the
director of ORO also reported to the JHU president and
board of trustees through the Institute for Cooperative Research.
ORO Fiscal Arrangements

Although ORO scal management was in the hands
of JHU, the level of stang and the annual work program
depended on the annual Army appropriations passed by
the Congress. The initial appropriation for FY 1949 was $1
million, and, as part of the negotiation with the Army, Dr.
Ruark, prepared a detailed projection of the costs to support
GRO in FY 1949.167 He proposed a contract for FY 1949
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Table 21ORO Budgets: FY and FY (Projected)

FY 1949
Current
Projects
ALCLAD
ANALAA
EVANAL
GUNFIRE
MAID
POWOW
Subtotal
Professional
Salaries and
Wages ($)
13,767
39,122
5,794
5,794
22,459
3,622
90,558
Other Costs
($)
61,083
73,141
8,412
16,156
42,534
5,390
206,716
Subtotal
($)
74,850
112,263
14,206
21,950
64,993
9,012
297,274
Subcontracts
($)
26,850
240,943
Not available
103,583
219,000
32,350
622,726
Total
Obligations
($)
Estimated for
FY 1950 ($)
101,700
353,206
14,206
125,533
283,993
41,362
920,000
170,000
320,000
7,500
75,000
100,000
200,000
872,500
Proposed Projects
DONKEY
TREMABASE
TEAM
SITE
ATTACK
FREVO
Reserve for additional projects
TOTAL
220,000
105,000
200,000
160,000
95,000
40,000
99,500
920,000
1,792,000
Note: The FY49 budget supported thirty-one professional analysts working on six projects. The proposed FY50 budget was intended
to support seventy-ve analysts working on seventeen projects. The project codes are expanded in the discussion of the ORO work program
below.
Source: Memo for Lt. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin (director of logistics, Army Sta ), Washington, JHU ORO, 10 Aug 49, sub: Condensation
of the Third and Fourth Quarterly Rpts of the JHU ORO, pp. 12, RG 319, Entry 153, Box 519, Folder P&O 020 ORO.
for $1 million, plus $64,500 in overhead costs, distributed

as follows: Washington, D.C., oce salaries, $385,000, plus
$38,500 in overhead (10 percent); Contract Technical Group
in Baltimore salaries, $45,000, plus $18,000 in overhead (40
percent); Contract Business Group in Baltimore salaries,
$20,000, plus $8,000 in overhead (40 percent); miscellaneous expenses at the Pentagon and in Baltimore, $85,000;
and subcontracts, $465,000.168 The actual ORO obligations
for FY 1949 totaled $920,000, as shown in Table 21.
The ORO budget originally projected for FY 1950 was
$1,792,000, of which $1,740,000 was to be provided to support the ORO contract with JHU and $52,000 was to be
held in reserve by the quartermaster general for use by ORO
to obtain services from other government agencies.169 However, as of 30 September 1949, the gures for FY 1950 were
still not rm and it was anticipated that there would be a
cut of approximately 10 percent, thereby reducing the FY50
ORO budget to around $1,584,000.170
The actual Army appropriation for FY 1950 provided
approximately $1.5 million for the Operations Research Of-
ce.171 By comparison, the Air Force FY50 budget included

$4 million for Project RAND and $300,000 for operations
analysis (OAD and OAO), and the Navys FY50 budget included $400,000 for OEG.172
The Armys contractual arrangement with JHU was not
without some problems in the rst few years, generally as
a result of late appropriations by Congress and the Armys
reluctance to issue a multiple-year contract. The original
DAJHU contract expired on 30 June 1949 and had to be
extended for three months, for a sum of $230,000.173 This
caused considerable concern at JHU, and, on 29 December
1949, JHU president Detlev Bronk wrote to the assistant
secretary of the Army, Archibald Alexander, about the failure of the Army to renew the ORO contract in a timely
manner.174 After noting that JHU had agreed to accept the
initial ORO contract as a part of its patriotic duty in spite
of severe disadvantages to the University, President Bronk
emphasized the need for a stable research program and a realization of the fact that a research program usually leads to
practical results only after a considerable period of prosecu
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tion of the program.175 He then complained that, although
the original one-year ORO contract had been extended several times, JHU had been forced to conduct scientic studies
for the Department of the Army for the period from 1 July to
10 August 1949, without a formal contract or scal support
from the Army. Moreover, he noted, the extensions were
for only short periods, and the failure of the Army to enter
into long-term renewals promptly was a matter of concern
to him, the JHU board of trustees, and the ORO sta. The
solution proposed by President Bronk was that the Army
execute the ORO contracts for a period of three years to assure to present and prospective members of the Operations
Research Oce sta a certain amount of stability . . . prerequisite to the recruitment of the able personnel needed for this
work.176 After considerable internal discussion and delay, the
Army eventually acceded to President Bronks request.
The ORO Research Program, August 1948June 1950
The raison dtre for ORO was to conduct operational
research studies on matters of interest to the Army. Thus, the
annual ORO work program was a matter of high interest to
Army leaders and to JHU. DA Memo 3502 provided several mechanisms for shaping and controlling the ORO work
program. The deputy director of logistics for R&D on the
Army Sta was charged with general supervision of ORO
operations, and day-to-day coordination and oversight was
provided by the assigned ORO project ocer, a sta ocer
assigned to the Logistics Division R&D Group. A Department of the Army Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, chaired by
the ORO project ocer (later by the deputy director of logistics for R&D), oversaw the ORO work program, assisted
in the selection and coordination of problems for study, and
recommended priorities.177
DA Memo 3502 also prescribed procedures by which
the Army sta, the technical services, and other Headquarters, Department of the Army agencies could submit proposals for ORO study projects directly to the deputy director of
logistics for R&D.178 Other Army agencies were enjoined to
submit such proposals through the proper military channels,
and other DOD agencies were invited to do so through the
chief of sta, U.S. Army.
To provide greater detailed control of approved ORO
projects, the DA advisory committee early on recommended
that an ad hoc project advisory group (PAG) be formed to
oversee the progress of each project. The deputy director
of logistics for R&D approved the recommendation, and
thereafter a PAG comprising representatives of interested
Army Sta and other Army agencies was formed for each
ORO project. Each PAG was chaired by a representative
from the Army Sta agency that held primary interest in the
particular study area.179 PAGs task was to review periodi-
cally OROs work on the project to insure that the results

obtained will fulll a need of the Department of the Army
and to render appropriate advice and assistance to the ORO
upon the request of the ORO Project Chairman.180 PAG
was not empowered to issue any directives to ORO but was
to recommend changes and remedial actions to the deputy
director of logistics for R&D.181 The chairman of each PAG
submitted periodic progress reports along with any recommendations for changes.182 One notable weakness of the
PAG system was that, for each of the ocers assigned to a
PAG, the work was an additional duty and thus perhaps did
not receive all of the attention it merited.183
In November 1949, Ellis Johnson wrote to Detlev Bronk,
suggesting the creation of yet another mechanism for reviewing the work of OROprobably as a means of creating an
academic counterweight to Army criticism of the ORO
work program.184 Noting that the University could give the
Operations Research Oce essential and important assistance by an appropriate review of our ndings prior to their
submission to the Army, Johnson recommended the formation under JHU auspices of a high-level Review Committee to be chaired by President Bronk. Among the potential
members of the committee suggested by Johnson were Vannevar Bush to represent the physical sciences; Gen. Dwight
D. Eisenhower or Gen. Jacob D. Devers to represent the military needs of the Army; Dr. Lee DuBridge, Dr. Enrico Fermi,
or Dr. E. O. Lawrence to represent the atomic weapons eld;
Dr. Donald Young or Dr. Pendleton Herring to represent the
social sciences; Dean Edward Mason to represent the eld
of economics; and Dr. Donald Marquis to represent the eld
of psychology.185 Apparently Johnsons recommendation was
never implemented by JHU, although the university board of
trustees established a committee headed by Robert W. Williams to oversee ORO, and the JHU Committee on Sponsored Research provided additional oversight.186
Determining what projects to pursue proved an enduring challenge for ORO throughout its existence.187 As one
historian has written:
Many researchers at ORO, in their original conception of their
mission, saw themselves as scientists who were to explore all
aspects of warfare and its long-range implications, while the
Army appeared to be primarily interested in seeking ways to
apply operations research to questions concerning logistics and
supply. Also, the Army did not seem to be interested in applying
operations research to the use of weaponry in combat. . . . This
dierence in viewpoint was the start of the troubled relationship
between the Army and ORO that would persist throughout
OROs history.188
In practical terms, the approval and design of each project undertaken by ORO was the product of a joint Army
ORO consideration of several factors, including the nature
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and scope of the problem, the relative importance of the
study to the Army, the probability that the problem could actually be solved, the approximate time required to complete
the study, and the eect of the proposed study on the overall
ORO work program.189 For the most part, the Army was focused on the near term and generally wanted quick, easily accomplished studies that would produce concrete solutions to
immediate problems.190 Ellis Johnson and key members of
the ORO sta, however, were forward looking and preferred
to take on studies of emerging problems, particularly those
outside traditional weapons and tactical analysis topics.191
The system of individually authorized projects that prevailed until 1951 created certain problems in budgeting and
recruiting competent sta members.192 For example, it made
dicult the recruitment and retention of a sta of analysts
representing a span of knowledge and expertise broad enough
to ensure that ORO could begin work immediately on urgent
problems. In 1951, the problem was mitigated by the adoption of a new system for initiating and reviewing projects that
included reserving 3040 percent of the ORO capability for
urgent, unprogrammed studies requested by the Army and a
small percentage for work on basic OR techniques.193
It has often been stated that ORO focused initially on
weapons evaluation and tactical analysis problems, in part
because the Army had a backlog of such problems and in
part because Army commanders and sta ocers were unfamiliar with the capabilities of OR.194 This was not entirely the case. From the beginning, in fact, the scope of
the ORO research program was quite broad and included
an emphasis on matters other than military weapons and
equipment, much more so than the OR programs of the
other services.195 The rst two approved ORO projects
Project ANALAA and Project EVANALboth assigned
in August 1948, dealt with air defense systems and the
means for analyzing the performance of Army equipment,
respectively. However, the third approved projectProject
MAIDalso assigned in 1948, was a major study of the
pros and cons of providing military assistance to foreign
countries, and thus it focused on questions of international
relations and economics.196 Moreover, although the Army
was denitely interested in applying OR to questions of logistics and supply, such topics involved more than a technical analysis of weapons systems alone.197 During the process
that led to forming ORO, Maj. Gen. McAulie and others
had assumed that operations research would be used early
on for the study of problems related to Army training and
organization, and this, too, soon came to pass.198
As the Army educated itself with respect to OR and recognized the importance of such elds as international relations, economics, and psychology to the postwar Army, the
ORO work program was expanded to include studies with
a social science component (for example, Project MAID and

Project POWOW, which dealt with the techniques of psychological warfare).199 Analysts trained in the physical sciences were not particularly well suited to address such topics,
and ORO was obliged to recruit a team of competent social
scientists to ensure its ability to take on projects in the social
sciences.200 On 1921 September 1949, ORO sponsored a
conference of its social science consultants for the purpose of
obtaining criticism and guidance with respect to the undertaking of ORO to establish research patterns and methodology in the social sciences upon the highest level of competence.201 The conference was attended by representatives of
DOD, the U.S. armed services, and other government agencies, as well as twenty-two social science consultants. Dr.
Edward S. Mason, dean of the Graduate School of Public
Administration at Harvard University, served as chairman.
Recommendations were sought with respect to current and
potential new methods of attacking problems involving the
social sciences, research methods in general, the progress and
direction of work under contract, the organization and functions of the ORO sta, and the general relationship between
research and actions and decisions.202 The attendees provided candid assessments of the state of play at ORO regarding
such matters, and their advice was subsequently quite useful
in ne-tuning the ORO research program.
In its rst two years of existence, ORO was tasked with
several major studies including analyses of air defense systems, military aid to other countries, the accuracy of artillery re, and armor operations, as well as the use of tactical
nuclear weapons, protection of the individual soldier, mines
and other antitank weapons, intelligence operations, the
threat to overseas lines of communication, logistics, military
costing, guerrilla warfare, and psychological warfare.203 Each
project typically consisted of several subprojects or studies
conducted either by ORO sta, by subcontractors, or by a
combination of the two under the chairmanship and direction of a senior ORO analyst.
As of 30 September 1949, six main projects were
under way204:
1. Project ANALAA (Project No. 99481) was assigned on 25 August 1948, and involved an analysis
of antiaircraft weapons and systems.205 The ANALAA project chairman was Dr. Ervin H. Bramhall
(later Dr. James H. Henry) and the vice chairman
was Col. Seymour I. Gilman. The project required
fty-four ORO man-months in FY 1949, at a cost of
$353,206; and it involved several contractors, including the Stanford Research Institute, the American
Power Jet Company, the Battelle Memorial Institute,
the Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, and Curtiss
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Wright Corporation, at a cost of $240,942 in FY
1949. The FY50 costs were estimated at $320,000
for ORO sta and $170,000 for subcontractors. The
recommendations put forward by Project ANALAA
were important factors in the Army decision to accelerate development of antiaircraft missiles and to
retain reasonable numbers of heavy antiaircraft guns
until suitable missiles were available.
2. Project EVANAL (Project No. 99482) was assigned in August 1948 and was completed on 12 July
1950, under the chairmanship of Emery L. Atkins.206
The task of Project EVANAL was to determine a
means for analyzing the performance of Army equipment under various environmental conditions, particularly arctic ones, and to determine the feasibility
of using business machines for that purpose. Project
EVANAL involved eight ORO man-months in FY
1949, at a cost of $14,207. No subcontractors were
involved. The principal recommendation was that the
Army undertake additional research in the development of military characteristics and specications for
business machines capable of aiding the rapid analysis of the performance of Army equipment under
various climatic conditions.
3. Project MAID (Project No. 99483), also begun
in 1948 and completed in early 1950, was headed
personally by Ellis Johnson. It involved analyzing
the potential value of U.S. military aid programs to
foreign countries.207 Project MAID required thirty-one ORO man-months in FY 1949, at a cost of
$283,992 and involved several contractors, including
the Stanford Research Institute, Harvard University, the University of Washington, and International
Public Opinion Research, Inc., at a cost in FY 1949
of $219,000. Estimated FY50 costs were $100,000
for ORO sta, with no subcontractor costs. Project
MAID was the earliest ORO project to extend beyond a strictly Army topic into the elds of international relations and economics, and the extensive report on Project MAID (issued in nal form in early
1950) had a signicant inuence on the Armys support for passage of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949,
which established the Military Assistance Program, a
key element of Americas Cold War strategic policy.
4. Project ALCLAD (Project No. 99494), assigned
on 1 October 1948, involved the analysis of individual protection means from all known forms of warfare
and recommendations for future research on, development, and use of the optimum equipment and
systems to protect the individual soldier.208 Active
work on Project ALCLAD began on 15 February
1949, under the chairmanship of Dr. John H. Gardner with the assistance of Norman A. Hitchman and
Robert J. Best, and the project was completed on 31
May 1952. For purposes of the study, the known hazards to the individual soldier on the battleeld were
divided into seven groups (missiles and missile fragments, concussion from explosion, nuclear radiation
and radioactive substances, pathogenic and chemical
agents, heat radiation, aming agents, and insects
and insect-borne diseases). Each hazard group was
assigned to a team of three ORO sta members and
two consultants. In all, ORO expended nineteen manmonths on Project ALCLAD in FY 1949, at a cost
of $101,700, plus $26,850 for a subcontract with the
Midwest Research Institute. Estimated costs for FY
1950 were $170,000 for ORO sta and $50,000 for
subcontracting. Project ALCLAD produced several
important recommendations, including one against
the use of body armor; also addressed were the need
to reduce the combat load of the individual soldier, a
redesign of the helmet, the wearing of gas masks during training exercises, and the need for additional research on chemical warfare agents and defenses. The
recommendation against the development and use of
body armor is particularly interesting as an example
of how a logical scientic analysis might lead to conclusions that run counter to common sense or might
be politically or morally unsound.
5. Project GUNFIRE (Project No. 99495) was assigned on 23 November 1948 but was closed out in
favor of the more-general Project REDLEG.209 The
purpose of Project GUNFIRE was to determine the
nature and extent of existing deciencies in equipment, techniques, computational procedures, organization, training, and doctrine that adversely aected
the accuracy of predicted artillery res, and to outline
a program to correct the deciencies. The project was
chaired by Wayne E. McKibben (later William L.
Whitson). Project GUNFIRE involved eight ORO
man-months in FY 1949, at a cost of $125,533,
plus $103,583 paid to subcontractors, including the
Franklin Institute Laboratories for Research and Development, Snow and Schule, and Dunlap and Associates. The FY50 costs were estimated at $75,000
for ORO sta and no subcontractor support. Recommendations derived from Project GUNFIRE
included the need to develop a method of delivering
predicted artillery re without the need for meteorological corrections, a revision in artillery training
methods, and the development of operational steps
to reduce the possibility of gross personnel errors.
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6. Project POWOW (Project No. 99496) was assigned
on 26 February 1949.210 Its purpose was to determine
by scientic analysis and synthesis the eectiveness of
weapons, instruments, and techniques that might be
used by ground forces in conducting psychological
warfare (PSYWAR) operations. Project POWOW
was headed by Kenneth W. Yarnold (later Willmoore
Kendall) and involved a long list of ORO personnel,
consultants, and subcontractors, the most important
of which was the University of Chicago. The study
focused on an assessment of tactical psychological
warfare operations in northwest Europe during World
War II with the expectation that it would reveal probable eects of psychological warfare on the Russians.
Project POWOW involved ve ORO man-months in
FY 1949, at a cost of $41,362, plus $32,350 paid to the
University of Chicago. The FY50 costs were estimated at $200,000 for ORO sta and $80,000 for subcontractors. Recommendations derived from Project
POWOW included establishment of a roster of qualied Army PSYWAR personnel, the need to prepare
manuals of area studies, the re-examination of the use
of aerial loudspeakers, and the establishment of Army
research facilities for PSYWAR outside ORO.
As of 30 September 1949, ORO also had six proposed
projects pending approval211:
1. Project DONKEY: to analyze the use of surface-to-surface guided missiles in support of Army operations212
2. Project TREMABASE: to analyze the comparative
feasibility of transporting by air, sea, or land the personnel, weapons, and supplies necessary to establish
and maintain an advanced base213
3. Project TEAM: to determine the most important
factors in interpersonal relations as they apply to the
organization, motivation, and utilization of groups
of men for military purposes, and to determine the
most eective methods of controlling such social behavior as a means of increasing the tactical eciency
of the military unit
4. Project SITE: to determine the most eective methods, techniques, and organization for planning and
conducting Army training and educational programs
5. Project ATTACK: to evaluate on a continuing basis
the use of atomic weapons in support of Army operations214
6. Project ARMOR: to determine the most eective
methods of destroying, damaging, delaying, and canalizing enemy forces (particularly armor) by the use of
land mines.215
Preliminary and nal results of ORO projects and studies

were distributed in a number of forms, including briengs and
published reports. In most cases, the studies were classied or
otherwise restricted in their distribution. The two principal
types of ORO publications were technical memoranda and
nal reports. Technical memoranda were published in the
T series (for example, ORO-T-4: Antiaircraft Artillery Materiel and Personnel in the Type Field Army, 9 February 1950);
they were working papers developing specic aspects of an
approved ORO project or special studies assigned by the Department of the Army. Final reports were published in the R
series (for example, ORO-R-1: Economic and Logistic Study
of the Tactical Employment of Three Guided Missiles at Specied Monthly Rates, 21 November 1949); they contained the
nal conclusions and recommendations of ORO on a given
project. By 30 June 1950, ORO had published more than one
hundred technical memoranda and ve nal reports. Internal ORO matters and internal sta papers were addressed in
the project report (PR) series, the sta paper (SP) series,
and the sta memorandum (S) series. Technical memoranda and nal reports were carefully vetted by internal review groups (the so-called murder boards), whereas project
reports and sta papers were less well vetted and were limited
in distribution. Sta memoranda could be prepared on any
topic but were not distributed outside ORO.
The Inuence of Ellis A. Johnson
The nature and scope of the projects undertaken by
ORO as well as the oces organization, stang, and overall philosophy were profoundly inuenced by one man, Dr.
Ellis A. Johnson.216 ORO, and with it the bulk of the Armys postwar OR program, was largely Johnsons creation.
In much the same way that W. Barton Leach created and
sustained the Army Air Forces operations analysis program
during World War II, Ellis Johnson fostered the use of OR
in the Army after the war. A competent scientist and OR analyst in his own right, Johnson was also a consummate manager and bureaucratic in-ghter, and he seldom let pass an
opportunity to strengthen and broaden the ORO program.
His forceful, enigmatic, and sometimes quarrelsome personality was a major factor in the establishment and growth of
ORO, as well as in its ultimate demise.
Johnsons vision of the nature and possibilities of operations research as a discipline was broad. Addressing the
ORO social science consultants in September 1949, he dened the function of OR in the Army as being
to develop analytical theories of action, checked by experience,
capable of predicting, within specied limits of error, the probable results and costs of military action. Such predictions can
be used by the Army as one of the important elements in the
decisions reached by the Army commanders . . . for major deci-
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sions, operations research can play approximately a 30 percent
part in the decisions.217
Johnsons attitudes toward military aairs and the role

to be played there by scienceoperations research in particularwere shaped by his experiences in World War II. The
realization that the aerial mining campaign against Japan
which he had done so much to design and promotehad
resulted in substantial destruction and loss of life imbued
him with some degree of skepticism about the usefulness of
military conict as a means of resolving international problems. He is reported to have expressed his revulsion for war,
stating, Ive always thought a scientist could do more for his
country before a war.218 At the same time, he gleaned from
his experience several principles that he subsequently applied to ORO. Among these were the ideas that
ne research simply could not be done under dictated direction by a user; it had to be invented, if possible, by the scientist. Successful results could not be guaranteed, and nished
results could not be promised for a deadline time. There might
be many successes, but surely also occasional failures.219
the possibilities of OR helping the armed forces with the complex and fast-changing problems of warfare, convinced of its
importance, and dedicated to patriotic service and the advancement of operations research as a science and a profession.223
Both his experience and his instincts told him that ground
warfare was in many ways more complex than air or sea
warfare, and that it would be necessary to develop eective
methods of operations analysis to deal with those complexities almost from scratch.224 Accordingly, he intended to create in ORO an organization that would be
large, diverse, and strong, to emphasize innovative methods and
approaches, and to extend the boundaries of the eldfrom
eectiveness studies to cost-eectiveness work, from tactics to
logistics and procurement investigations, from studies centered
on technical hardware options to ones focusing on the human
element.225
We have had many, many discussions bordering on arguments.

Neither of us ever wins, naturally. I was very happy to have
him accuse me last night of indicating or giving the impression
that he didnt need to know anything about military science
and tactics. That is what I have been trying to impress upon
him in the past months. Unfortunately, I apparently had not
succeeded.222
Johnsons experience with the aerial mining campaign in

the Pacic made clear to him the degree to which OR was useful at the strategic level and what substantial results could be
obtained.226 As director of ORO, he became a forceful and
consistent advocate of the extension of OR to problems well
beyond the usual matters of weapons analysis and the improvement of tactics to the strategic level and the broader elds of
national and international policy. Johnsons ideas on the broad
application of OR to matters of policy and international affairs were reected in the early addition of social scientists to
the stable of ORO analysts. In part, he saw OR as a means
for building rather than destroying society, and he lobbied the
president of The Johns Hopkins University to support OR
work in improving the lot of developing countries.227
On a more-basic level, Ellis Johnson was a skilled and
inspirational leader. He created in ORO an internal ethos
that placed a high value on technical competence, cooperative
endeavor, and enthusiastic pursuit of knowledge. He demonstrated sincere interest in the professional development
of ORO sta and established an atmosphere that made the
work easy and enjoyable.228 Johnson delegated authority and
supported his sta. As the long-time ORO technical librarian
Margaret Emerson recalled, we were really one big family.229
Although often suspected of being an empire builder,
Johnsons vision of ORO was a good deal broader. Addressing the participants at the Second Tripartite Conference on
Army Operations Research on 27 October 1950, Johnson
praised the OR work being done at the weapons analysis level
in the technical services and the Army eld forces and noted
that the
From the beginning, despite his skepticism regarding

both the usefulness of military operations and the enlightenment of military ocers, Ellis Johnson dedicated himself
to exploring
ORO has to t into the Army as one of the organizations carrying out operations research as a team. . . . It is my own opinion
that we will eventually have in the Army a family of operations
research organizations of whom we will be a member, a notable
member, I hope.230
Johnson believed that those who directed operational research programs such as those of ORO should also be qualied practitioners of the art and frequently turn their hand
to actual analysis.220 He also developed a keen appreciation
for the need of OR analysts to gain a degree of competence
in military aairs, and for close cooperation between the OR
analyst and those responsible for the military decisions.221
Well known for having little patience with the limitations
of the so-called military mind, Johnson nonetheless was able
to work eectively with Army leaders. As Maj. Gen. Ward H.
Maris, the deputy assistant chief of sta, G-4, for research and
development, told his audience at the Second Tripartite Conference on Army Operations Research in October 1950:
I consider Dr. Johnson an outstanding leader. He enjoys our
complete condence, and the condence of his co-workers.
As a soldier it is my duty to keep the military viewpoint and
the military requirements before him and his splendid group of
scientists. Possibly, he may feel at times that he is suering from
the so called military mind as opposed to the scientic mind.
When those two minds get together, it is really something.
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For good or ill, ORO was Ellis Johnson. He guided its
formation, stang, and development with a strong hand and
labored mightily to nd for it a central role in the Armys decision-making process. For the most part he was successful, and
he, more than any other individual, dominated and advanced
the eld of Army operations research in the postwar period.
OROAn Early Assessment
The degree of success achieved by ORO in its program
of analytical studies in the rst years of its existence was
mixed. Despite the best intentions of all concerned, the
early ORO products left something to be desired both in
focus and quality. In general, ORO was able to tackle successfully problems involving discrete technical and tactical
issues, but the more complex the problem and the greater
the number of non-quantitative aspects involved, the less
chance it [had] for success.231
Inexperience on the part of newly minted ORO analysts,
a lack of focus on matters of central importance to the Army,
a tendency to take up operational planning issues best left
to the Army Sta, and the lack of tangible results on some
early projects all contributed to criticism of ORO within the
Army.232 Ignorance and misperceptions on the part of some
Army commanders and sta ocers also contributed to the
criticisms directed at ORO. Many Army ocers continued
to be uninformed about the capabilities, methods, and limitations of operations research, and the old problems that had
hampered the development of OR in the military in World
War II resurfaced. Some ocers complained that ORO was
seeking to usurp military functions by becoming involved in
operational matters, and that ORO analysts were spying
on military leaders.233 Others simply could not accept the
intrusion of civilian long-hairs in military matters.234 Still
others complained that ORO work was far too broad and
theoretical and that it did not address day-to-day issues of
pressing importance to the Army.
There were also those people in both ORO and the Army
who questioned the value of ORO studies when all too often
the Army seemed to have failed to implement those recommendations contained in the ORO reports. In fact, even given
a successful study, the nexus between the study recommendations and positive Army action remains dicult to demonstrate. It would appear that the number of ORO recommendations actually implemented by the Army was quite small,
with perhaps only one study in ten resulting in a substantial
payo during the entire period up to approximately 1956.235
However, as the Army and the ORO learned to work together and the Armys needs and desires became clearer, the ORO
was better able to satisfy the Armys demands.
Ellis Johnson and the leaders of the ORO were aware of
the many problems facing the new organization, including
the challenge of meeting Army expectations regarding the

scope and usefulness of ORO studies. In the ORO quarterly report issued on 30 June 1949, Johnson addressed these
problems directly, noting that
it is important to outline the problems whose solutions are
now for the most part well and favorably under way: (1) the
recruiting of a scientic sta of high quality; (2) the training of
this sta in the methodology of Operations Research; (3) the
familiarization of the ORO sta and of the Army with respect
to problems of mutual concern; (4) the organization of ORO as
an eective working part of the General Sta of the Army; and
(5) the provision of high level guidance from the Army as to its
needs and the orientation of our eorts.236
Other problems included the usual diculties of a new organizationinternal administrative issues, adequate facilities,
and underfundingas well as morale problems among the
ORO analysts that stemmed from a feeling that their eorts
were not appreciated.237
Evaluating the rst six months of ORO operations, Johnson reached three main conclusions. First, close coordination
and cooperation of the Operations Research programs of the
United States, Britain, and Canada are necessary and desirable and should be extended for mutual benet.238 Second,
Operations Research should not be centralized in the Army in a
single group such as ORO, but . . . should be situated at each . . .
of three principal levels: in the weapons laboratories, for analysis of weapons; at the headquarters and boards of the Army
in connection with the development of new tactics; and at the
General Sta level in connection with strategic decisions. . . .
It is true that there are several important and highly successful
Operations Research activities in a few commands of the Army,
as for example at the Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen,
Maryland. These deserve full recognition and might well be
formalized as independent Operations Research activities. In
general, however, the aiding of command decisions by Operations Research needs to be further implemented at the weapons
analysis and tactics level.239
Third,
ORO scientists must work in close cooperation with their
military colleagues . . . guarantee should be provided that the
military aspects of ORO projects will be given fully realistic
attention . . . representation of the military interest cannot be
provided solely by civilians even though they may have had actual combat experience . . . vital and necessary military knowledge must be furnished directly by ocers on active duty, working full-time in ORO at actual project problems.240
At the time the ORO was formed in the summer of 1948,

there had been an agreement between the Army and The Johns
Hopkins University that Johnson would be given at least three
years to overcome initial problems and establish an eective
working organization capable of providing the Army with
such advice and assistance as the most advanced operational
research techniques could make practicable.241 However, after
only one year the Army undertook a comprehensive review
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of the ORO organization and performance that included a
number of substantial criticisms and recommendations for
redirection of the course set by Johnson and his team. On 30
September 1949, the Plans and Operations (P&O) Division
of the Army General Sta completed a sta study to examine
the organization, functions, and working relationships of the
[ORO] with a view to recommending changes if any appear
desirable.242 The study, approved by the Army chief of sta,
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, on 31 October and released on 3 November 1949, contained the following conclusions:
3.
The execution of the Army operations research program

under the Director, Logistics Division, by contract with
The Johns Hopkins University should continue.
4. OROs work, which encompasses the Army-wide operations research program, should have greater emphasis on
the weapons use level; problems at the General Sta level
should be limited during OROs formative period.
5. OROs work should be directly related to the basic over all
mission of the Army. Research on matters of joint concern
should not normally be undertaken except on request of
the Research and Development Board or the Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group.
6. Existing projects should be reviewed and where appropriate abandoned or narrowed in scope in consonance with
paragraph 5 above.
7. A closer working relationship should be established between ORO and the Army. To this end the assignment of
additional military personnel to ORO should be eected.
8. The responsibility of the Army Advisory Committee
should be broadened to provide the means by which the
Deputy Director for Research and Development, Logistics Division, can obtain advice on general policy guidance.
9. Increased liaison should be maintained with the eld. The
Army operations research program should envisage the
creation of a eld oce at the Oce, Chief, Army Field
Forces. Upon the creation of this oce, ORO personnel
located at Hqs. Department of the Army should then perform the function of serving the General Sta only.
10. Appropriate steps should be taken to educate military
personnel at the Hqs. Department of the Army and the
Oce, Chief, Army Field Forces in the aims and purposes of operations research.
11. After a period of six months, Plans and Operations Division should make appropriate recommendations as to
the desirability of re-locating ORO within the Department of the Army organization.243
The P&O Division study addressed many of the concerns already expressed by Ellis Johnson, notably the need for
better Army guidance, a closer working relationship between
the ORO and the Army, increased liaison with units in the
eld, and the education of Army ocers about OR. However, the study conclusions regarding the scope of the ORO
study program struck a sensitive nerve, particularly because
these criticisms appeared to have been introduced by that
segment of the Army Sta eager to restrict the work of the
ORO to mundane (but nevertheless important) matters of

weapons analysis and improvements in tactical doctrine.
Johnson and many members of the ORO sta were
committed to the idea that OR techniques could be applied
eectively to the study of problems of strategy and policy
rather than only at the weapons analysis and tactical level.
However, as the 30 September 1949 sta study revealed, this
idea found considerable opposition in the Army, and Johnson
was already struggling to ensure that ORO eorts to apply
OR to strategic and policy decisions continued. As he told
the attendees at an ORO conference of social science consultants in September 1949:
With respect to the extension of operations research to the
strategic problem, there is a great deal of diculty. The tactics
approach uses the results of weapons analysis. The strategic approach must make use of both the weapons analysis and tactics
operations research. However, it comes to problems of another
order of magnitude and diculty. In particular, it comes to
problems, at the present time, which are associated with problems of human relations to a far greater extent than the weapons analysis or the tactics problems, and there is a question of
whether or not we can develop a methodology in any reasonably short time.244
The negative view of the ORO attempts to extend the

use of OR into the eld of strategy and policy contained in
the P&O study prompted Johnson to react in several ways
to protect the ORO. On 11 November 1949, he wrote to
JHU president Dr. Detlev Bronk to advise Bronk that he
( Johnson) had an appointment to meet with the Army chief
of sta, General Collins, on 21 Novembera meeting that
he believed would result in important policy decisions regarding the ORO.245 Johnsons concerns centered around
three issues raised by the P&O sta study that he believed
would be discussed in the meeting with General Collins.
The rst was whether the scope of the ORO work should be
very wide and include a serious attempt to apply operations
research methods to the strategic problems of the Army.246
He noted that
on the extreme right are ocers who believe that this is solely
the function of military personnel, and that scientists should be
concerned solely with consideration of the design of weapons.
On the extreme left are ocers who believe that the strategic
problems can be solved only by civilian groups who work with
some assistance from the military. It is dicult to determine
where the median lies.247
The second issue was whether or not operations research should attempt to integrate the ndings of social science in its solutions of action problems.248 Johnson mentioned that he had discussed this problem with leaders in the
social sciences as well as with the other members of the Joint
Operations Research Group. In meetings with the latter, it
became clear to Johnson that
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the Navy was neutral, or possibly negative to the use of the social science disciplines in operations research, that the WSEG
was at the best luke warm, that the Air Force, and in particular
the RAND Corporation, was enthusiastic and believed that
the application of the social science disciplines constituted the
only new and hopeful approach toward the solution of action
problems.RAND and ourselves are interested in cold war
solutions that go toward peace as well as the ones that need to
be considered as going toward a hot war.249
The third issue concerned the degree of freedom that

the ORO was to be given to do its work. Johnson told
Bronk that
at the present time there is an intensive eort on the part of
the Army to develop a system for detail [sic] and specic control over all of OROs research work. This is accompanied by a
very high pressure to provide immediate and useful answers to
the General Sta. This is the usual eect which results from a
lack of understanding on the part of the customer of the way in
which research can contribute. If this Army eort is successful,
it will in my opinion result in a lowering of integrity in ORO . . .
some compromise must be made.250
Johnsons solution was for the ORO research program to include a reasonable mix of projects proposed by the Army,
projects proposed by the ORO, and short-term studies to
satisfy the Armys immediate needs.
Ultimately, the eorts of some Army sta ocers to restrict the ORO work program were unsuccessful. The growing Cold War with the Soviet Union soon made it clear that
the Army could no longer conne its OR program to matters
of a purely military nature, such as the design of weapons
and the development of tactical doctrine. The new reality
was that the Army found itself deeply enmeshed in issues of
national policy and global strategy that could be addressed
only by specialists in the elds of international relations, economics, psychology, and the other social sciences. Ellis Johnson and his associates had discerned this trend early on and
had acted to align the eorts of the ORO to accommodate
it. The wisdom of their actions would be borne out by the
signicant contributions made by the ORO to Army decision making in the 1950s.
Conclusion
The period between the end of World War II in September 1945 and the Communist invasion of the Republic
of Korea at the end of June 1950 was a tumultuous time for
the United States Army. The drastic postwar demobilization, lean budgets, restricted manpower ceilings, the reorganization required by the National Security Act of 1947,
and the rapid growth of technology, particularly nuclear

weapons, posed enormous challenges for the Army. These
challenges required new methods and new insights. A small,
but growing, part of the Armys ability to deal with those
challenges successfully was the emerging application of operations research as a tool for decision making. As the newly
appointed secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, noted in
his rst report in 1948, a salutary trend in military research
and development is the extension and strengthening of operations analysis research which was begun in isolated elds
during World War II.251
Operations research activities in the Army expanded
dramatically with the creation of the Operations Research
Oce in the summer of 1948. Until that time, the Armys
only OR capability had resided in the technical services and
the test and evaluation boards, and it was focused primarily
on weapons analysis. The ORO augmented that capability
but soon moved on to broader studies of problems in the
growing elds of peacetime research and development, international relations, defense economics, and national policy.
Despite signicant growing pains, the ORO proved to be a
potentially valuable tool for determining priorities and designing the most eective and ecient weapons systems, organization, tactics, and strategy.
The rst years of the ORO also provided important lessons regarding the conditions necessary for a successful OR
organization. The three principal lessons learned were that the
OR analyst should be free of any direct responsibility for the
operation under study, the OR analyst should have sucient
time for research and not be harassed by day-to-day requirements, and the OR analyst should have the condence of the
military commander or sta responsible for the operation
under study.252 These were exactly the conclusions that had
been reached regarding the World War II OR experience.
Despite a successful start to the ORO that greatly increased the Armys use of and benet from operations research, several deciencies remained in the Armys overall
organization and program for OR Most notable were the
lack of a single agency at the Department of the Army level
charged with general sta supervision of all Army OR activities, and the lack of operations analysts on the Army Sta
itself, other than the few in the technical services.253 Neither deciency would be corrected until the 1960s. In the
meantime, the Armys operations analysts would face the
challenge of a new hot war in Korea, an intensication of the
Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the continued rapid
growth in military technology.
36171_03OR 2.indd 77
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chapter two notes
1Lauriston
S. Taylor, Operations Analysis, Military Review, 26, 6
(1946): 25.
2Quoted in Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientic Research for War: The
Administrative History of the Oce of Scientic Research and Development
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. viii.
3Charles Alexander Holmes Thomson, The Research Analysis
Corporation: A History of a Federal Contract Research Center (McLean, Va.:
Research Analysis Corporation, 1975), p. 2.
4The proposals for a National Research Foundation included
provisions for a successor to the OSRD OFS to provide technical and
scientic assistance to the military forces in the eld (see Lincoln R.
Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard, Combat Scientists [Boston: Little,
Brown, 1947], p. 321).
5Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 2.
7Ibid., pp. 31920. Senate Bill 1297, introduced in the 79th
Congress by Sen. Harley Kilgore of West Virginia, called for the creation
of a National Science Foundation on the pattern advocated by Vannevar
Bush. A similar bill (S.B. 1285) was introduced by Sen. Warren Magnuson
of Washington. A compromise version (S.B. 1850) was worked out and
passed the Senate, but it died in the House of Representatives.
8Ibid., p. 333. President Trumans decision to veto the bill was
apparently based on cost considerations.
9James Phinney Baxter III, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1946), p. 450.
10Erik Peter Rau, Combat Scientists: The Emergence of
Operations Research in the United States during World War II (Ph.D.
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1999), p. 338. The work of the National
Research Council Committee on Operations Research led eventually to
the creation of the Operations Research Society of America (ORSA)
in 1952.
11Joseph F. McCloskey, U.S. Operations Research in World War II,
Operations Research 35, 6 (1987): 916; U.S. Congress, Oce of Technology
Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, OTA-BP-ISS-157 (Washington:
USGPO, 1995), p. 14 (hereafter cited as OTA History).
12Ltr, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (COMINCH/CNO) to James
D. Forrestal (Sec Navy), Washington, 19 Aug 45, sub: Continuation of
ORG, Provisions for (reproduced in ORG, HQ, COMINCH/CNO, ,
Summary Rpt to the OFS, OSRD, Washington, 1 Dec 45, Appendix C,
pp. 3839, located in College Park, Md., NARA II, RG 227, Entry 179,
Box 301, Folder Summary Rpt to the OFS, OSRD (hereafter cited as
ORG Summary Rpt).
13Ibid., p. 39.
14The history of the Navys postwar OR program is covered admirably
in Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval
Operations Analysis (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp.
1129. See also Joseph H. Engel, Operations Research for the U.S. Navy
since World War II, Operations Research 8, 6 (1960): 798809.
15Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 9698.
16Ibid., p. 97. ONR was the ocial contracting agent for the Navy
even though OEG was to report to the CNO. ONRs only real function
was to manage OEGs funding levels.
17OTA History, p. 14.
18Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 100.
19Ibid., pp. 10811.
20OTA
History, p. 15. The OEG budget for FY 1949 reached $1

million (see Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, Figure 11). The
status of OEG as of October 1950 is summarized in J. L. Everett, The
Operations Evaluation Group, US Navy, in ORO, The Second Tripartite
Conference on Army Operations Research, 2327 October 1950, vol. II
(Washington: JHU ORO, 1950), pp. 16165 (located in College Park,
Md., NARA II, RG 319, Entry 82, Box 2136, Folder JHU-OROTripartite Conf ) (hereafter cited as Second Tripartite Conference).
21Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 10910. The seven
desks were Antisubmarine, Tactical and Doctrinal Publications Panel,
Antiaircraft and Gunnery, Naval Air, Guided Missiles, Radar, and Atomic
Energy Warfare.
22Ibid., p. 110. One OEG analyst was assigned to the Naval War
College in the dual role of student and OEG liaison ocer (see Everett,
Operations Evaluation Group, p. 162).
23U.S. Department of the Navy, Oce of the Sec Navy, Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1949, in U.S. DOD, Oce of the
Sec Def, Second Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Annual Reports
of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air
Force for the Fiscal Year 1949 (Washington: USGPO, 1950), pp. 21314
(hereafter cited as Second Rpt of the Sec Def). At any given time, three to six
OEG analysts were attached to ODF headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia
(see Everett, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 162).
24Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 110.
25Ibid., p. 98.
26Ibid.
27William T. Bradley, Operations Research in the Armed Services,
student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn.,
1957, p. 19.
28Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 102, 10911.
29Engel, OR for the U.S. Navy, p. 801. See also Tidman, Operations
Evaluation Group, pp. 10408, 11628, for a discussion of the OEG
research program, 194650.
30Florence N. Trefethen, A History of Operations Research, in
Joseph F. McCloskey and Florence N. Trefethen, eds., Operations Research
for Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), p. 21.
This work was originally prepared, under the same title, for presentation
before the JHU-ORO Informal Seminar in Operations Research, 1952
53.
31Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 10204. Methods
of Operations Research by Morse and Kimball has been published
commercially, most recently by Dover Press (New York, 2003). Koopmans
Search and Screening has been published by Pergamon (New York, 1980).
Both works have also been reprinted in the Military Operations Research
Societys Heritage Series.
32LeRoy A. Brothers, Operations Analysis in the United States
Air Force, Seminar Paper 1, 6 Oct 53, JHU-ORO Informal Seminar
in Operations Research, 195354, Baltimore, p 13 (hereafter cited as
Brothers, Seminar Paper 1).Although the Army Air Forces did not
become a separate service until passage of the National Security Act in
1947, it was, for all intents and purposes, independent from the time of
the Marshall reorganization of the Army in March 1942. For convenience,
the term Air Force may be taken here to mean the Army Air Forces in the
period before 1947.
33Ltr, Col. W. Barton Leach (chief, OAD, HQ AAF) to Harvey H.
Bundy (special asst to the Sec War), Washington, 16 Jan 45, encl Memo,
36171_03OR 2.indd 78
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sub: OA in the AAF for the Next War and Between Wars, RG 107, Entry
113, Box 68, Folder OA, 194345.
34Ibid., attached Memo, passim.
35Ibid., attached Memo, p. 6.
36Trefethen, History of OR, pp. 2122. It should be noted that
most of what was designated as OR in the Army until the summer of
1948 was conducted under the auspices of the AAF.
37Taylor, Operations Analysis, p. 25.
38USAF, Air Force Regulation 207: Operations Analysis (Washington:
HQ, Dept of the Air Force, 6 May 53), para. 2. AFR 207, 11 October
1946, was superseded essentially unchanged by AFR 207, 5 July 1949,
and then by AFR 207, 6 May 1953.
39Ibid., p. 4.
40I. B. Holley, Jr., The Evolution of Operations Research and Its
Impact on the Military Establishment; The Air Force Experience, in
Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and
Warfare: The Proceedings of the Third Military History Symposium, United
States Air Force Academy, 89 May 1969 (Washington: USGPO for the
Oce of Air Force History, HQ USAF, and the U.S. Air Force Academy,
1983), p. 93. The status of OAD and OAO as of October 1950 is discussed
in LeRoy Brothers, The Oce of the Assistant for Operations Analysis,
US Air Force, in ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. II, pp. 15053.
41Ibid., pp. 93, 9697.
42Brothers, Seminar Paper 1, pp. 912.
43Holley, Evolution of OR, p. 92.
44Ibid., p. 96.
45Ibid., pp. 9697.
46Participants in the 1 October 1945 meeting included Gen.
Arnold, Edward Bowles, Donald Douglas (president of Douglas Aircraft
Company), Arthur Raymond (chief engineer at Douglas Aircraft), and
Franklin R. Collbohm (Raymonds assistant). See the history of the
RAND Corporation at http://www.rand.org/about/history.
48Ibid., pp. 1516. The history of Project RAND and the RAND
Corporation is well documented. Perhaps the most comprehensive study
is Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprot
Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1966). See also Charles J. Hitch, RAND: Its History, Organization and
Character. RAND B200. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
1960); RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation: The First Fifteen
Years (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1963); and the history
of the RAND Corporation at http://www.rand.org/about/history.
50OTA History, p. 16; Hitch, RAND, p. 5. The status of Project
RAND as of October 1950 is discussed in L. J. Henderson, Jr., Outline of
Research Analysis of the RAND Corporation, in ORO, Second Tripartite
Conference, vol. II, pp. 15460.
51OTA History, p. 16; Smith, RAND Corporation, p. 40. General
Arnolds son, William B. Arnold, had married Donald Douglas daughter
in 1943.
52OTA History, p. 16. The RAND Corporation articles of
incorporation were dated 14 May 1948, but the Project RAND contract
was not formally transferred from the Douglas Aircraft Company to
the RAND Corporation until 1 November 1948. See the history of the
RAND Corporation at http://www.rand.org/about/history.
53History of the RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/about/
history.
55USAF, Air Force Regulation 209: Air Force Policy for the Conduct
of Project RAND (Washington: HQ, Dept of the Air Force, 22 Jan 54),
pp. 1, 2.
56Ibid., p. 5.
57USAF,
Oce of the Sec Air Force, Semiannual Report of the

Secretary of the Air Force for the Period January 1 to June 30, 1950 (hereafter
cited as Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Air Force), in U.S. DOD, Oce of the
Sec Def, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual
Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of
the Air Force, January 1 to June 30, 1950 (Washington: USGPO, 1950),
p. 155.
58Lorna Jae, Quantitative Analysis and Army Decision Making
(Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness
Command Historical Oce, 1984), p. 7; Bradley, OR in the Armed
Services, p. 27. Early on, RAND created a Nuclear Energy Division
(later the Physics Division) that also did work on contract for the Atomic
Energy Commission (see Hitch, RAND, p. 6).
(McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, Apr 1964), p. 5; OTA
History, p. 16; and history of the RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.
org/about/history.
60Smith, RAND Corporation, p. 51.
61Ibid., p. 53.
62William L. Whitson, The History of Operations Research (I),
Seminar Paper 2, 15 Oct 52, JHU-ORO Informal Seminar in Operations
Research, 195253, Baltimore, pp. 67 (hereafter cited as Whitson,
Seminar Paper 2). For a discussion of the development of a role for the
social sciences at RAND, see Smith, RAND Corporation, pp. 6065.
63Smith, RAND Corporation, p. 61. General LeMay approved the
concept with his usual decisiveness, saying, Lets do it up right. If were
going to do this, do it on a meaningful scale (Smith, RAND Corporation,
p. 61 n. 35).
64Hitch, RAND, p. 8.
65NSA 1947 was enacted by the 1st Session of the 80th Congress on
24 July 1947 as Public Law 253.
66For a brief summary of the changes occasioned by NSA 1947 and
NSA 1949, see Charles R. Shrader, ed., Reference Guide to United States
Military History, 1945 to the Present (New York: Facts On File, 1995), pp.
68.
67Quoted in Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 278. As secretary of the Navy, Forrestal had
led the opposition to unication of the armed forces. Forrestal resigned
as secretary of defense in March 1949 and committed suicide on 22 May
1949. He thus did not live to see the correction of the situation. He was
replaced by Louis A. Johnson, an advocate of greater centralization of
power in DOD.
68The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, popularly known as the Hoover Commission, was set up
under the chairmanship of former president Herbert Hoover in 1947 and
delivered its reports and recommendations to President Harry Truman
and Congress in 1949. The commission was an eort to improve the
eciency and eectiveness of government. A second Hoover Commission
continued work on government reorganization during the Eisenhower
Administration.
69A brief overview of the establishment, organization, and functions
of RDB can be found in U.S. DOD, Oce of the Sec Def, First Report
of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: USGPO, 1948), pp. 12124
(hereafter cited as First Rpt of the Sec Def). See also U.S. Army General
Sta, Logistics Div, Research and Development in the Department of the
Army (Washington: Logistics Div, General Sta, U.S. Army, 1948), pp.
1112, and Oce of the Sec Def, chart titled Organization for National
Security, dated 5 Nov 47, in Lowell R. Eklund, Science and the Soldier:
The Organization for Research and Development in the Army: Past,
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Present, and Future (MS thesis, Syracuse University, 1947, Tab 39). RDB
replaced the Joint Research and Development Board established by the
secretaries of War and the Navy on 6 June 1946. Vannevar Bush retired
on 15 October 1948, and was replaced by Dr. Karl T. Compton, who had
headed the wartime OFS in OSRD. Compton resigned from RDB on 10
November 1949 for reasons of health (see U.S. DOD, Oce of the Sec
Def, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31,
1949 (hereafter cited as Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Def), in U.S. DOD,
Oce of the Sec Def, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and
the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy,
and Secretary of the Air Force, July 1 to December 31, 1949 [Washington:
USGPO, 1950], pp. 7475).
70Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Def, Jan 1Jun 30, 1950, p. 36. By the end
of 1948, RDB had reviewed approximately eighteen thousand projects. Of
those, some ve thousand were completed, superseded, or canceled, leaving
about thirteen thousand active and inactive projects to be coordinated (see
First Rpt of the Sec Def, p. 15).
72Second Rpt of the Sec Def, p. 16.
73Rpt, Philip M. Morse (director of research, WSEG), sub: Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group Status, Washington, 1 Nov 49, p. 1, RG 319,
Entry 153, Box 643, Folder P&O 334 Research and Development Board
(hereafter cited as WSEG Status Rpt).
74Ibid. Morse, who had briey directed the Navys postwar OEG
and was a member of the board of the RAND Corporation, resigned
from WSEG in September 1950 to return to MIT. He was replaced by
Howard P. Robertson, a veteran of the wartime Air Force OR program
(see Tidman, Operations Evaluation Group, p. 100).
75Bradley, OR in the Armed Services, p. 7. The original charter
for WSEG provided that it should function under sponsorship of RDB
until it should have proved its worth, at which time it would become a
component of the JCS. Stang of WSEG with suitable scientic personnel
proceeded slowly, and, in December 1949, the decision was made to retain
WSEG under RDB sponsorship until at least 1 July 1950. See Memo, R.
F. Rinehart (acting chairman, RDB) to JCS, Washington, 6 Dec 49, sub:
Extension of RDB Sponsorship of WSEG (RDB 150/9.1; JCS 1812/24,
6 Dec 49, pp. 11517 inclusive), in RG 319, Entry 153, Box 543, Folder
334 R&D B; Memo, Gen Omar N. Bradley (chairman, JCS) to Sec Def,
Washington, 6 Jan 50, sub: Extension of Research and Development
Boards Sponsorship of the WSEG, RG 319, Entry 153, Box 643, Folder
334 Munitions Board Petroleum Committee to R & D B.
76Bradley, OR in the Armed Services, p. 8 (based on DOD
Instruction No. 5128.8, 13 Apr 56, which reproduced earlier DOD
instructions essentially unchanged).
77Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Def, Jul 1Dec 31, 1949, pp. 7980.
78Ibid., p. 80. One of the uniformed consultants was the noted Army
military historian, Col. Vincent Esposito.
79Bradley, OR in the Armed Forces, p. 8.
80Ibid.
81WSEG Status Rpt, p. 1.
82Ibid.
83Second Rpt of the Sec Def, p. 16.
84Ibid., pp. 4344.
86Ellis Johnson, JHU ORO, Record of ProceedingsSocial Science
Conference, 1921 Sep 49, OROS7. (Fort McNair, D.C.: JHU ORO,
10 Nov 49), p. 5, located in RG 319, Entry 153, Box 519, Folder P&O
020 ORO.
87For a brief summary of the measures taken to retain an operational
research capability in the British armed forces after the war, see U.K. Air
Ministry, Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air
Force, Air Publication 3368 (London: Her Majestys Stationery Oce,

1963), pp. 18688 (hereafter cited as OR in RAF).
89Emmette Y. Burton, Jr., The Role of Operations Research in
the Army, student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Penn., 1955, p. 4.
90Trefethen, History of OR, pp. 20, 24. See also G. Neville Gadsby,
The Army Operational Research Establishment, Operational Research
Quarterly 16, 1 (1965): 518; and the papers by Dr. J. S. Hey and Dr. O.
H. Wansborough-Jones presented at the Second Tripartite Conference on
Army Operational Research, in ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. II.
91J. W. Mayne, History of Canadian Army Operational Research
Establishment, Defence Research Analysis Establishment Rpt 15, vol.
1 (Ottawa: Defence Research Establishment, Department of National
Defence, 1970), p. 2.
92Joseph F. McCloskey, Organization for Operations Research in
the United States, in Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational
Research in Practice: Report of a NATO Conference (New York: Pergamon
Press for Advisory Group of Aeronautical Research and Development,
NATO, 1958), pp. 16970.
93The postwar history of the Canadian Army Operational Research
Establishment (CAORE) to 1965 is covered in some detail in Mayne,
History of Canadian Army OR. See also the paper by Maj. F. G. B. Maskell
titled The Canadian Defence Research Board and Its Operational
Research Groups, in ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. II, pp. 147
49.
94Mayne, History of Canadian Army OR, p. 6.
95Ibid. At rst, the OEG analyst assigned to the oce of the
U.S. Naval Attach in London lled the role (see Everett, Operations
Evaluation Group, in ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. II, p. 163.
96Rumbaugh, Look at US Army OR, p. 3. The agreement was later
extended to include Australia.
97Ibid. The Tripartite Conferences were later renamed the ABC
Discussions on Army Operational Research.
98The conference summary, remarks of invited guests, and conference
papers were published in ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vols. I, II.
99ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. I, p. 21. The Tripartite
Agreement as conrmed at the October 1950 conference in Washington
is set forth in Appendix D of volume I, pp. 1822.
100Inasmuch as a good working knowledge of the evolution of Army
R&D is necessary to a thorough understanding of the development of
Army OR after WWII, a brief outline of Army R&D history is provided
in Appendix C of this volume. The history of Army R&D activities in the
postwar period is well documented, although most of the sources have not
been published commercially. Of particular value to this study are Eklund,
Science and the Soldier; U.S. Army, R&D in the Department of the Army;
U.S. DOD, Oce of the Asst Sec Def for R&D, Resources Div, The
Growth of Scientic Research and Development, RDB 114/34 (Washington:
OASD [R&D], Resources Div, 1953); U.S. Department of the Army,
Oce of the Chief of Research and Development, Path of Progress: U.S.
Army R&D Organizational Changes, 19241960 (Washington: OCRD,
HQDA, 1960); L. Van Loan Naiswald, The History of the Army R&D
Organization and Program, Part I: Organization (draft) (Washington:
OCMH, DA, ca. 1963).
101The Research Section, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacic
Area, was deactivated on 13 September 1945, and the OR section at Lt.
Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.s, headquarters in the Pacic Ocean Area
was closed down in September 1945.
102OR was also embedded in the work of the test and evaluation
boards reporting to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces (later the Oce
of the Chief of Army Field Forces).
36171_03OR 2.indd 80
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103Jae, Quantitative
Analysis, pp. 78.
104For example, the Operational Analysis Branch in the Signal Section
of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, was deactivated on

20 May 1945, and the Operational Research Branch in the Oce of the
Chief Signal Ocer, led by Dr. William L. Everitt, was deactivated on 1
April 1946.
105The major elds of R&D interest for each of the technical services
are laid out in U.S. Army, R&D in the Department of the Army, pp. 14
17.
106ORO, Record of ProceedingsSocial Science Conference, 1921 Sep
49, p. 3.
107Oral history interview of Floyd Hill by Wilbur Payne, 7 Mar 89,
conducted as part of the Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the
Army for Operations Research Oral History Project.
108Eugene P. Visco, The Operations Research Oce (PB-20-96-3),
Army History 38 (Summer 1996): 25; McCloskey, Organization for OR,
p. 165.
109Selwyn D. Smith, Jr., An Evaluation of Army Operations
Research, student individual study, U.S. War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn., 1957, Annex 6, p. 59; and Seymour I. Gilman, The Role of
Operations Research in the Army, student individual study, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1954, p. 20. The focal point of
embedded OR activities at BRL was in what would become formally
the Weapons Systems Laboratory in January 1953 with a sta of fourteen
civilians and two military personnel and a budget of $435,000 for FY
1954. Only about 15 percent of its eort was devoted to OR analysis; the
rest was experimental in nature (see Gilman, Role of OR in the Army,
Annex 2, p. 42).
110Oral history interview with George Schechter by Eugene Visco
and James Williams, 15 May 93, conducted as part of the Oce of the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral
History Project.
111U.S. Army, R&D in the Department of the Army, pp. 1718. The
division of responsibility for various types of equipment and the functions
of the boards are laid out in that volume, pp. 1820. In general, Board No.
1 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, dealt with airborne and communications
equipment and heavy weapons; Board No. 2 at Fort Knox, Kentucky, dealt
with wheeled and tracked vehicles; Board No. 3 at Fort Benning, Georgia,
dealt with small arms and individual equipment; and Board No. 4 at Fort
Bliss, Texas, dealt with antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles.
112Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 20.
113Jae, Quantitative Analysis, p. 8; Thomson, Research Analysis
Corporation, p. 7.
114Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 4; Trefethen, History
of OR, p. 15. See Memo, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower
(Army chief of sta ) to directors and chiefs of War Dept General and
Special Sta Divs and Bureaus and the commanding generals of the Major
Commands, Washington, 30 Apr 46, sub: Scientic and Technological
Resources as Military Assets, U.S. Army CMH, HRC020R&D, Fort
Lesley J. McNair, Washington; also reproduced in Eklund, Science and the
Soldier, Tab 18.
115Quoted in Memo, Maj Gen Anthony C. McAulie (deputy
director for R&D, Logistics Div), Washington, probably Mar or Apr
48, sub: Department of the Army General Research Program, p. 2, JHU
Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder
47.2 ICR/ORO, MayDec 1948.
116Perhaps best known as the acting commander of the 101st
Airborne Division who delivered a notably curt reply to German demands
for the surrender of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, Maj. Gen.
McAulie had long experience in Army R&D work. A 1919 graduate
of West Point, McAulie served in the Developments Branch of G-4 at
the beginning of WWII. He parachuted into Normandy on D-Day as

commander of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery. Following the Battle
of the Bulge, he commanded the 103d and 79th Infantry divisions. He
then served in the Army section of the Joint Research and Development
Board (Aug 1946Dec 1947) and as the deputy director of logistics for
R&D from January 1948 until his assignment as commander of the 24th
Infantry Division in Japan. On 1 October 1949, McAulie became the
chief of the Chemical Corps, in which position he served until 31 July
1951. He subsequently served as the assistant chief of sta, G-1, personnel,
and deputy chief of sta for administration (1 August 195122 October
1953) before returning to Europe as commander of the Seventh United
States Army and commander in chief, United States Army Europe (1
February 19551 May 1956). McAulie retired in 1956 and died on 11
August 1975.
119Seymour I. Gilman, Operations Research in the Army, Military
Review 26, 4 (1956): 60.
120Burton, Role of OR, p. 23.
121Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 8; OTA History, pp.
1617.
122Memo, Maj Gen McAulie, sub: Department of the Army
General Research Program, p. 13, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce
of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, MayDec 48.
123Ibid., p. 1.
124Ibid.
125Ibid., pp. 23.
126Ibid., p. 2.
128Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 8. The advantages
of JHU were also set forth in Memo, Dr Arthur E. Ruark (asst director,
ICR, JHU) to Isaiah Bowman and P. S. Macaulay, Baltimore, 5 May 48,
sub: Check Sheet for Discussion on May 6, p. 3, JHU Archives, Records
of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO,
MayDec 48.
129Memo, Dr Arthur E. Ruark (asst director, ICR, JHU) to Isaiah
Bowman, Baltimore, 2 May 48, sub: Operations Research for the Army
and the Navy, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President,
Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, MayDec 48.
130Memo, Ruark to Bowman and Macaulay, 5 May 48, pp. 19.
131Ibid., pp. 12.
132Ibid., p. 5.
133Ibid., pp. 89.
134To date, no copy of the original contract between the Army and
JHU has been found in the National Archives, the JHU Archives, or other
repository. That contract was apparently signed in June 1948 and covered
a period of one year, expiring on 30 June 1949 (see Ltr, Dr. Detlev Bronk
[president, JHU] to Archibald S. Alexander [asst sec Army], Baltimore,
29 Dec 49, p. 2, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President,
Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 49).
135Memo, Dr Arthur E. Ruark (asst director, ICR JHU), Baltimore],
5 May 48(?), sub: Tentative Outline of Terms for Army Contract, pp. 15,
JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33,
Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, MayDec 48.
136Ibid., pp. 45.
137Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, pp. 1213.
138U.S. Department of the Army, Memo No. 3502: General
Research Oce (Washington: DA, 20 Sep 48).
139Ibid., pp. 1, 2.
140Ibid., p. 4.
141Ibid., pp. 3, 6.
36171_03OR 2.indd 81
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142U.S.
Department of the Army, Special Regulations No. 70555:

Research And DevelopmentOperations Research Oce (Washington:
DA, 13 Jan 49). SR 70555 underwent minor revisions on 24 October
1949 and was subsequently superseded by Army Regulations No. 15480:
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEESOperations
Research Oce, dated 30 Jun 1952.
143Ibid., pp. 1, 4.
144Ibid., p. 2.
145Army Sets Up Johns Hopkins Research Unit, Baltimore Evening
Sun, 21 Aug 48.
146Ibid.
147Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 10. Ellis Johnson was
not the rst GRO employee. That honor belongs to Dorothy Hoover, who
served for many years as secretary to the director (see Visco, The ORO,
p. 26).
148Thornton L. Page, George S. Pettee, and William A. Wallace
(assisted by Capt James Martin, USNR, and Alice L. Johnson), Ellis A.
Johnson, 19061973, Operations Research 22, 6 (1974), p. 1150.
149Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. iv.
150Memo, Ruark to Bowman and Macaulay, 5 May 48, pp. 56.
Ruark also assumed an annual expenditure of $15,000 for each technical
or administrative position, including overhead, supporting personnel,
travel, and so forth.
151ORO, Administrative Operations Report for the Two Quarters
Ending 30 June 1949, in Quarterly Report, vol. II, no. 1 and 2, 30 Jun
49 (Fort McNair, Washington: JHU ORO, 30 Jun 49), pp. 33, RG 319,
Entry 82, Box 2129, Folder Quarterly Rpt.
152Ibid.
153Memo for Lt Gen Thomas B. Larkin (director of logistics, Army
Sta ), Washington, JHU ORO, 10 Aug 49, sub: Condensation of the
Third and Fourth Quarterly Rpts of the JHU ORO, p. 1, RG 319, Entry
153, Box 519, Folder P&O 020 ORO.
155Herbert Yahraes, The Mysterious Mission of ORO, Saturday
Evening Post, 23 Feb 52. Rumbaugh joined ORO as associate director in
March 1950. Another distinguished alumnus of the wartime Navy mine
warfare OR unit, Thornton L. Page, an astrophysicist, joined ORO in
1951. Herbert Yahraes was also an ORO employee, and E. B. Vandiver
III (in 2006 the director of the Army Center for Army Analysis and a
past president of the Military Operations Research Society) has told
the anecdote about how reading Yahraes article on ORO in the Saturday
Evening Post as a child led him to a career in OR (related in Carl M.
Harris and Andrew G. Loerch, An Historical Perspective on U.S. Army
Operations Research, Military Operations Research 4, 4 [1999]: 13).
156Visco, The ORO, p. 27.
157Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1150. George S. Pettee
was born on 29 October 1904, and was educated at Harvard University,
where he received his Ph.D. in political science in 1937. From 1931 to
1941, he was an instructor at Harvard. During WWII, he served as
a civilian on the War Production Board (194142), the Intelligence
Division of the Oce of War Information (194243), and the Foreign
Economic Administration (194345). After the war, he taught at
Amherst College (194547) and was a sta member for the Committee
on Foreign Aairs of the U.S. House of Representatives. Pettee, who
wrote extensively on national security and intelligence issues, joined
ORO as an analyst in April 1949. He became deputy director in 1950,
assistant director in 1954, and chairman of the Advanced Planning
Group, RAC, in March 1962. He died at Bethesda, Maryland, on 17
November 1989.
158Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, p. 7. Lester De Long Flory was
born in 1899 and graduated from West Point in 1919. Commissioned
as a Coast Artillery ocer, he served with the American Expeditionary

Forces in France in 1919 and in routine inter-war assignments at West
Point, Fort Monroe (Va.), Washington, Panama, and Hawaii. During
WWII, he commanded the 63d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (194344)
and served with the Allied occupation forces in Austria (194546) as the
principal organizer of the U.S. military government in Austria. He was
deputy president of Army Field Forces Board No. 4 from November 1946
until his retirement from active duty on 1 July 1949. From October 1961
until his retirement in 1963, Flory was executive assistant to the president
of the successor to ORO, the Research Analysis Corporation. He died at
Walter Reed Army Hospital on 2 January 1990.
159McCloskey, Organization for OR, p. 165.
160See the oral history interview with Margaret Emerson, the longtime ORO technical librarian, conducted by Eugene P. Visco on 7 Nov
99, as part of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations
Research Oral History Project.
162Ibid.
163Memo, Dr Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to director, ICR
JHU, Fort McNair, Washington, 4 Mar 49, sub: Proposed Organization
for the ORO, p. 1, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President,
Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 49. It was anticipated
that some projects would be carried out by subcontractors, at the choice
of the project chairman.
164Ibid., p. 2. Each of the PSD groups would be headed by a senior
ORO member who would report directly to the deputy director. In eect,
PSD was a general support unit.
165ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, p. 31.
166Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with
Respect to Timeliness, OROTP16, Bethesda, Md., ORO, Nov 60),
p. 14, Table 5. Lt. Col. Farmer served from 1 July 1948 to 9 May 1949.
He was succeeded, during the period under consideration here, by Lt.
Col. Raymond Renola (9 May15 August 1949) and Lt. Col. Vincent M.
Elmore, Jr. (15 August 194921 November 1950).
167Memo, Dr Arthur E. Ruark (director, ICR JHU) to Isaiah
Bowman, Baltimore, 24 May 48, sub: Overhead and Personnel
Distribution on Proposed Contract, Army OR, pp. 14, JHU Archives,
Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/
ORO, MayDec 48.
168Ibid., p. 4.
169U.S. Army General Sta, Plans and Operations Div, Study on the
Operations Research Oce (Washington: Plans and Operations Div, U.S.
Army General Sta, 30 Sep 1949), Appendix A, p. 5, RG 319, Entry 153,
Box 517, Folder P&O 020 ORO. The quartermaster general was assigned
responsibility for the disbursement of funds allocated to the ORO-JHU
contract.
170Ibid.
171U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Appendix A, p. 2.
172Ibid.
173Ibid., Appendix A, Annex 3, p. 5.
174Ltr, Bronk to Alexander, 29 Dec 49, pp. 14.
175Ibid., p. 2.
176Ibid., p. 3.
177DA Memo 3502, 20 Sep 48, para. 4 (superseded essentially
unchanged by Army Special Regulations 70555 in 1949 and then Army
Regulations 15480 in 1952). The rst meeting of the Advisory Committee
took place at Fort McNair on 21 September 1948 (see Memo, Brig Gen
T. S. Timberman [chief, Operations Group, Plans and Operations Div]
to Lt Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer [director, Plans and Operations Div],
Washington, 28 Sep 48, sub: Ad Hoc Advisory Committee to the Dept of
the Army GRO, p. 1, RG 319, Entry 153, Box 4, Folder P&O 000.8.
36171_03OR 2.indd 82
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178Ibid., p. 3.
179See,
for example, Ltr, Maj Gen C. G. Helmick (deputy director

for R&D, Logistics Div) to Lt Col C. C. Noble (Plans and Operations
Division), Washington, 1 Nov 49, sub: ORO Project Advisory Groups, RG
319, Entry 153, Box 517, Folder P&O 020 ORO. This letter established
the PAG for Project ALCLAD, which dealt with the protection of
the individual soldier on the battleeld. The Project ALCLAD PAG
was chaired by a representative of the Logistics Division and included
representatives of the Organization and Training and the Plans and
Operations Divisions of the Army Sta, the chief of ordnance, the chief
of engineers, the surgeon general, the chief of the Chemical Corps, the
quartermaster general, and OCAFF.
180Ibid., p. 4.
181Ibid., p. 5.
182Burton, Role of OR, p. 15; Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p.
29.
184Ltr, Dr Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to Dr Detlev Bronk
(president, JHU), Washington, 15 Nov 49, pp. 12, JHU Archives,
Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICRORO, JanDec 49.
185Ibid.
186JHU, Organization Chart, Baltimore, 1952, JHU Archives,
Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder ICR/
ORO, Jul 52Dec 53.
190Ibid., p. 12.
191Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, pp. 1112. The extreme
version of the ORO position was embodied in the comment by Ellis
Johnson that . . . we have . . . a shing license to study everything that the
Army does (quoted in Burton, Role of OR, p. 27).
192Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program, p. 20.
193Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 13a. Ellis Johnson and other
ORO sta members were agreed on the need for basic research, that is,
the development of OR theory and methods. Johnson himself believed
that 1015 percent of the overall ORO eort ought to be dedicated to
such basic research (see Paul W. Ramee, Operations Research and Army
Problems, student thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn., 1962, p. 12).
194Whitson, Seminar Paper 2, p. 7; John C. Schermerhorn, The Role
of Operations Research in the Army, student individual study, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1956, p. 5; ORO, ORO Today: Why
the Operations Research Oce Has Been Reorganized and What It Is Doing
(Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, 1955), p. 1.
195Whitson (Seminar Paper 2, p. 7) pointed out that in contrast to
the rather specic problems which resulted in the organization of other
groups, ORO was faced with a very broad phalanx of problems. Trefethen
(History of OR, pp. 2627) noted that the range of problems it has
studied has been remarkably wide.
196ORO, ORO Today, p. 6. Project MAID was one of the highlights
of OROs career. ORO project codes (ANALAA, EVANAL, MAID,
POWOW, and so forth) are described below and in the Glossary to this
volume.
198Ibid.
199Ibid.
200Hugh M. Cole, Selection and Training of Operational Research
Scientists, in Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational Research
in Practice: Report of a NATO Conference (New York: Pergamon Press for
Advisory Group of Aeronautical Research and Development, NATO,

1958), p. 173.
49, p. I.
202Ibid., p. ii.
203Thomson, Research and Analysis Corporation, p. 11; ORO, ORO
Today, pp. 1, 4.
204The nature and status of approved and proposed ORO projects
are described in the quarterly and semiannual ORO reports previously
cited. A summary was included in U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Annex
3. The most comprehensive summary is ORO, Revised Summary of ORO
Projects, Special Studies, and Field Operations to May 31, 1952, Volume I
(Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, 28 Jul 52).
205On Project ANALAA, see ORO, Revised Summary, pp. 1321;
Memo for Lt Gen Larkin, 10 Aug 49, sub: Condensation of the Third
and Fourth Quarterly Rpts of The Johns Hopkins University Operations
Research Oce, pp. 911; ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. I, no. 2, pp.
815; ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, no. 1, pp. 1327, 55; and U.S. Army,
Study on the ORO, Annex 3, p. 1b.
206On Project EVANAL, see ORO, Revised Summary, pp. 6163;
Memo, Larkin 10 Aug 49, pp. 34; ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. I, no. 2,
pp. 1617; U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Annex 3, p. 1c.
207On Project MAID, see Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, p. 8; Memo,
Larkin, 10 Aug 49, pp. 1214; ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
1922; U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Annex 3, p. 1e.
208On Project ALCLAD, see Memo, Larkin, 10 Aug 49, pp. 56;
ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. I, no. 2, pp. 57; ORO, Semiannual Rpt
1950, no. 1, pp. 3745, 56; and U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Annex 3,
p. 1a.
209On Project GUNFIRE, see ORO, Revised Summary, pp. 6567;
Memo, Larkin, 10 Aug 49, pp. 1516; ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. I,
no. 2, p. 18; and ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, no. 1, pp. 47, 57.
210For Project POWOW, see ORO, Revised Summary, pp. 8594;
Memo, Larkin, 10 Aug 49, pp. 78; ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. I, no. 2,
pp. 2330; ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, no. 1, pp. 4954, 57; U.S. Army,
Study on the ORO, Annex 3, p. 1f.
211U.S. Army, Study on the ORO, Annex 3, para. 2.
212ORO, Revised Summary, pp. 4752. Project DONKEY was
assigned on 8 December 1949, as Project No. 99497 (see ORO,
Semiannual Rpt 1950, no. 1, p. 57). Project participants included ORO
employees W. G. Street, W. F. Druckenbrod, H. P. Griggs, and J. T.
McIntyre, as well as ve subcontractors (the Stanford Research Institute,
the Battelle Memorial Institute, Booz Allen and Hamilton, the Columbia
Research and Development Corporation, and the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory).
213ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, no. 1, pp. 2933, 56.
214Ibid., pp. 3536, 56. Project ATTACK was assigned on 27 April
1950.
215Ibid., pp. 511, 55. Project ARMOR was assigned on 28
September 1950 as Project No. 995010. There was also to be a
Project FREVO, the subject of which can not now be determined. It was
apparently never approved.
216The principal source for the details of Johnsons biography, insight
into his character, and a list of his achievements is the retrospective by Page
and others, Ellis A. Johnson, which appeared in Operations Research 22,
6 (1974), pp. 1141155. The following account is based primarily on that
article. See also Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, and Visco, The ORO, pp.
2425. The details of Ellis Johnsons life and career are contained in the
brief biographical sketch in Appendix A of this volume.
49, p. 3.
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218Yahraes, Mysterious
238ORO, Quarterly
219Page
239Ibid., pp. 12.
Mission, p. 7.
and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1149.
220Ibid.
240Ibid., p. 2.
221Harris
241Ibid.
and Loerch, Historical Perspective, p. 5.

222Remarks of Maj. Gen. Ward H. Maris, USA, Deputy Asst Chief
of Sta, G4, Research and Development, in ORO, Second Tripartite
Conference, vol. I, pp. 3536.
224Ibid., p. 1149; Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 9.
226Ibid., pp. 1148149.
227See Johnsons correspondence with JHU president Dr. Detlev
Bronk in JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series I,
Boxes 33 and 34.
228See Emerson interview, 7 Nov 99.
229Ibid.
230Ellis A. Johnson, The Operations Research Oce, US Army, in
ORO, Second Tripartite Conference, vol. II, pp. 16768.
231Gilman, OR in the Army, p. 60.
232Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, pp. 2425; Gilman, Role of
OR in the Army, p. 1; Burton, Role of OR, pp. 2728.
234Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 16.
236ORO, Quarterly Rpt 1949, vol. II, no. 1, 2, p. 3.
Rpt 1949, vol. II, no. 1, 2, p. 1.
242U.S. Army, Study

243Ibid.,
on the ORO.
pp. 12. The original paragraph numbers have been
retained.
49, p. 5.
245Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to Detlev Bronk (president,
JHU), Fort Lesley J. McNair, 11 Nov 49, JHU Archives, Records of the
Oce of the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR-ORO, JanDec
49.
246Ibid., p. 1.
247Ibid.
248Ibid.
249Ibid., p. 2.
250Ibid., pp. 23. Only four days later, on 15 November 1949,
Johnson wrote another anxious letter to Bronk regarding Project MAID,
the study of the military aid program that had evoked criticism by some
Army ocers for dealing with matters outside the traditional scope of
military operations (see Ltr, Johnson to Bronk, 15 Nov 49, p. 1).
251First Rpt of the Sec Def, p. 133.
253Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, pp. 3233.
36171_03OR 2.indd 84
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chapter three
The Expansion of Army Operations Research, 195062
he 1930s and 1940s saw the infancy and childhood

of military operations research (OR); the 1950s and
early 1960s saw its adolescence and young adulthood, characterized by rapid and extensive growth and increasing maturity as well as occasional missteps and attempts
to dene its boundaries. By 1950, many of the basic problems of military operations research had been successfully
resolved. Most commanders and sta ocers had come to
trust and value the support they received from OR analysts,
and the analysts had learned to understand the requirements
of the military and to communicate their ndings eectively
to the commanders and sta ocers who needed them.1
A successful partnership had been achieved, and, although
spots of friction remained, the soldier and the scientist were
able to work well together for common goals.2 Close cooperation between soldiers and scientists had grown more important than ever, for, as Secretary of Defense Thomas S.
Gates, Jr., noted in his 1959 report to the president, scientic
advances were occurring rapidly, and the timely application
of new inventions and technological improvements to military use has become a matter of national survival.3
Between 1950 and 1962, the Operations Research Oce
(ORO) remained the Armys principal operations research
establishment. OROand, after 1961, its successor, the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), expanded, took on new
and more-complex studies, and interacted in a positive manner with OR organizations in the other services, both abroad
and in the civilian community. The period also saw the creation of several new, independent organizations focused on
specic problem areas, such as human performance, special
operations, and wargaming, all of which relied heavily on
OR techniques.
The expansion of OR in the armed services between
1950 and 1962 was reected in the steady growth of Department of Defense (DOD) expenditures on OR and in
the number of OR analysts employed by the U.S. armed
services. In 1951, DOD spending on OR in all the services

amounted to more than $10 million; by 1954 that gure
had doubled to approximately $20 million, and it continued
to grow over the next ten years.4 The number of scientic
personnel engaged in DOD OR work also expanded exponentially during the period. In 1941, only some twentyve OR professionals worked for the armed services, but
by 1945 their number had grown to around four hundred.5
That number grew to approximately eight hundred to one
thousand by 1954, distributed among the services in the following proportion: DOD (Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group [WSEG]) 1, Navy 2, Army 10, and Air Force 20.6
The number rose to between fteen hundred and two thousand by 1957, and reached a total of ve thousand to eight
thousand by 1959, with every indication of continued rapid
growth, particularly in the technical services and the combat
developments eld.7
The tremendous expansion of Army OR organizations
between 1950 and 1962 resulted in large part from the demonstrated usefulness of OR in helping Army leaders make
the key decisions regarding the complex problems arising
from the hot war in Korea, the Cold War with the Soviet
Union, the rapid development of military technology, and
the increasing emphasis on economy. The doctrine of massive retaliation and the Army search for a role on the nuclear
battleeld, as well as the intense intraservice competition for
scarce resources of men and money, demanded ever more sophisticated decision-making tools, and OR was recognized
as one such important tool. As the techniques of OR grew
more sophisticated, the problems that OR analysts could address became larger and more complex. The emergence of
electronic digital computers and computer-assisted wargaming as important means for assessing weapons, organization,
and doctrine further enhanced the ability of OR to provide
the information needed for eective and ecient decisions.
By 1962, OR had reached young adulthood. It was no long
36171_04OR 3.indd 85
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er merely a useful tool for military decision makersit had
become an essential one.
The Operations Research Office,
In 1950, the Operations Research Oce, headed by Dr.
Ellis A. Johnson, was the Armys principal OR organization
and was fully engaged in a number of studies of interest to
the Army. The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 presented an opportunity for contributing directly to the solution of problems encountered in Korea, gathering eld data
for ongoing studies, and promoting the use of OR in the
Army. Johnson seized the opportunity, and, by the time of
the cease-re in July 1953, more than 150 ORO-connected men and women had served in Korea and had prepared
several hundred reports and technical memoranda, some of
which had a profound eect on the Army.
Meanwhile at home, ORO continued to grow and produced a stream of studies on problems of continuing concern
to the Army. ORO eld oces were established in Japan and
Germany, and at the Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The ORO research
program took on ever more complex problems, but with
mixed results in terms of pertinence and timeliness. Johnson
continued to advocate the expansion of ORO studies into
non-Army and nongovernmental elds. By the early 1960s,
the Army began to have doubts about Johnsons leadership
of ORO. When The Johns Hopkins University ( JHU) refused to replace him, the Army and JHU mutually agreed
to sever their relationship and an independent research organization, the Research Analysis Corporation, took over in
September 1961. Thus, Ellis Johnson, who had built ORO
from scratch, was ultimately the principal agent of its demise. However, ORO had established a recognized place for
operations research in the Army and had contributed handsomely to the solution of Army problems.
ORO in Korea, 195053
The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June
1950, and the ensuing eort by U.S. and United Nations
(UN) forces to repel the North Koreans and their Chinese
Communist allies led to a hard-fought conict that raged up
and down the Korean peninsula until a cease-re was arranged in July 1953. Ellis Johnson immediately recognized
that the hot war in Korea oered ORO the opportunity to
achieve three goals: to contribute directly to the solution of
problems encountered by UN forces in the eld, to obtain
actual eld data for ongoing projects, and to promote better understanding by the Army of the capabilities of OR.8
Accordingly, he proposed that a large part of the available
ORO sta go to Japan and Korea to support the Army in
the eld.9 The Department of the Army (DA) and the Far
East Command (FEC) quickly approved the plan, and Johnson and a team of four ORO analysts arrived in Korea in
early September 1950, just before the breakout from the
Pusan perimeter.10 Johnsons personal task was to establish
the ground rules and administrative structures needed to
support ORO teams working in the theater, and, by the end
of 1950, eight ORO teams consisting of the bulk of OROs
technical personnelsome forty scientists, social scientists,
historians, and engineers in allas well as several key members of its administrative sta were at work in Korea and
Japan in support of the Far East Command.11 The main
group was attached to the Oce of the G-3, Headquarters,
Eighth United States Army, Korea (HQ EUSAK), and in
June 1951 ORO formally established a eld oce at Headquarters, Far East Command, in Tokyo to supervise the work
of ORO personnel in the theater.12
By the time of the Korean cease-re in July 1953, more
than 50 percent of the entire ORO professional sta had
served in the combat zone.13 In all, more than 150 ORO
employees, subcontractors, and consultants served in Korea
and Japan between September 1950 and July 1953, and 113
of them earned the right to wear the UN Service Medal.14
Some ORO analysts came under enemy re, and at least
one was rescued after having been shot down behind enemy
lines.15 Ellis Johnson himself qualied for the UN Service
Medal by organizing ORO support in the Pusan, Taegu, and
Seoul areas for 58 days in 195051.16
The work of ORO analysts during the Korean War
fell into two main categories: studies and recommendations
concerning current operations, and the collection of data for
later and broader studies.17 Some of the problems faced by
ORO analysts in Korea were new and had not been encountered during World War II, but for the most part the ORO
studies conducted in FEC were of the familiar weaponsanalysis type or dealt with concrete practical problems such
as the design and use of winter clothing and equipment.18
However, the range of ORO studies was in fact quite broad
and included such major topics as the tactical use of atomic
bombs, close air support of ground forces, armor operations,
infantry weapons and tactics, airborne operations, mobilization and use of South Korean manpower, combat service
support, counterguerrilla operations, and psychological warfare operations.19
By the end of December 1950, ORO analysts had already produced a dozen memoranda and were at work on
another two dozen.20 In all, ORO analysts, subcontractors, and consultants produced several hundred technical
memoranda and completed studies on operations in Korea.
Among the more notable studies conducted by ORO analysts there was a study of close air support of ground forces
that recommended, surprisingly, that the Air Force could
36171_04OR 3.indd 86
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the expansion of army operations research,

make eective use of the heavy B29 strategic bomber for
tactical bombing at night.21 ORO analysts also studied
the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and
worked out the organization and procedures that would be
necessary for their use.22 The data, conclusions, and recommendations assembled by ORO analysts provided the basis
for all subsequent exercises and simulations for the use of
tactical nuclear weapons.
Also, ORO researchers systematically collected data
on every tank destroyed in Korea, thereby providing an invaluable database for later studies on tank vulnerabilities.
The results of the tank studies led by James W. Johnson
showed that fewer than half of the destroyed North Korean tanks were destroyed by aircraft; ground weapons such
as artillery, bazookas, and tanks accounted for most of the
remainder, except those lost to rough terrain, lack of fuel,
and breakdowns.23 By far the best tank killer was shown
to be napalm.
A considerable amount of the ORO research eort in
the Far East Command was devoted to the study of psychological warfare and its eects on Communist morale and
ghting power. ORO research on psychological warfare operations in Korea began during the rst months of the war
and quickly demonstrated that psychological operations at
a relatively low cost accounted for a large number of enemy
surrenders.24 Several ORO psychological warfare analysts
working for the Special Projects Oce of the HQ FEC G-2
under the direction of J. W. Green in Tokyo and at interrogation centers in Korea conducted extensive interviews
with North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners of
war.25 The analysts substantially improved the eectiveness
of UN psychological warfare eorts by recommending a
tighter focus on the enemy soldiers immediate problems of
survival and safety and the greater use of pictures and loudspeakers.26 As a result of ORO eorts, the Army sharpened
its psychological warfare eorts; psychological operations
in EUSAK were reorganized; and other important changes
were made in the organization, scale, and orientation of the
overall Army psychological warfare program.27
Many of the ORO studies conducted in Korea dealt
with practical matters of operations at low levels. One of the
best-known of the ORO consultants in Korea was the military analyst and historian, S. L. A. Marshall. Marshall studied small-unit infantry tactics and weapons and produced
a primer of Chinese tactics that was widely distributed to
United Nations Command units.28 Data on infantry operations and weapons use collected by Marshall from interviews
with combat troops in Korea in the winter of 195051 provided the basis for his critique of infantry tactics, weapons,
unit cohesion, and combat stress and led to changes in weapons design, organization, training, and supply economy.29
His popular books on the war in Korea, notably The River

and the Gauntlet and Pork Chop Hill, were based on work he
did for ORO in Korea.
In a little less than three years, ORO analysts made many
important contributions to the UN eort in Korea and developed a bank of important new data on combat operations
for use in further studies at home after the war ended. Moreover, the bulk of the ORO professional sta, which no longer
included a large proportion of OR analysts with World War
II experience, gained practical experience in the eld. Then,
too, as one historian has noted, OROs work during the Korean War thus demonstrated that operations research could
be successfully applied to land warfare just as it had been
applied to naval and air warfare in World War II.30
ORO at Home, 195061
The demand for ORO services in the Far East Command during the hot war in Korea absorbed a good deal
of the available ORO manpower and eort, but at home
ORO continued to grow and to take on an increasingly diverse work program. The number of professional personnel
increased substantially between 1950 and 1961, as did the
ORO budget. The balanced work program introduced in
1950 involved ORO analysts in a broad range of projects of
interest to the Army, and ORO produced several hundred
reports, technical memoranda, and other publications. At
the same time, ORO played a key role in eorts to coordinate projects and exchange information among the various
service OR programs, among the OR establishments of the
principal U.S. allies, and with the civilian OR community.
Despite signicant changes in the scope and magnitude
of the ORO research program and the growth of its peripheral activities, its basic mission as assigned in Army Regulations No. 15480 did not change between 1951 and 1961,
but remained
to undertake such analytical studies of military problems as
may be of interest to the Army in order to provide responsible
commanders and sta agencies with a scientic basis for decision on action to improve military operations.31
On the whole, ORO successfully fullled the tasks set

for it by the Army, but not without some criticism of the
focus and timeliness of its studies. Then, too, by 1961 the
somewhat imperious personality of Ellis Johnson, as well as
his continued eorts to expand ORO studies into nonmilitary areas, provoked a loss of condence in his leadership
among Army leaders. As a result, in August 1961, the Army
did not renew the ORO contract with The Johns Hopkins
University, preferring instead to place the contract with a
newly formed private corporation, the Research Analysis
Corporation, which took over the ORO work program along
with most of its personnel and physical plant.
36171_04OR 3.indd 87
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Organization
During its rst ve years there was a substantial increase in OROs workload and a gradual change in the
character of its work with a shift from weapons systems
analyses toward strategic and tactical studies. These changes reected the growing acceptance of OR as a key decision-making tool and of the oce itself as the Armys principal OR establishment.
Until 1954, ORO was organized on the basis of projects authorized by the Army, essentially along the lines of the
various weapons systems under study. The broadening of the
scope of ORO work to include more tactical and strategic
studies necessitated a reorganization. Accordingly, on 1 April
1954, the oce was reorganized on a functional, or mission,
basis to provide an eective organizational pattern for the required comprehensive approach to problems of operational
research in tactics and strategy.32 The reorganization created
ve new research divisions (Tactics, Strategic, Logistics, Intelligence, and Home Defense), as shown in Figure 31; gave
each division a mission broad enough to accommodate special
studies likely to be assigned; and increased the autonomy of
every division.33 Each new division was subdivided into several groups that were further broken down into studies, and
the Committees on Wargaming and Atomic Warfare coordinated work that crossed divisional lines. In addition, the April
1954 reorganization also created a Field Division to oversee
ORO branch oces in Tokyo, Heidelberg, and Fort Monroe,
as well as an Editorial Division and a Business Administration Division to carry out necessary administrative tasks. Two
new leadership positionsassociate director and assistant
directorwere also created to improve communications with
the Army and to conduct program planning. Above all, the
reorganization reected an intention to integrate the study
of weapons, tactics, and strategy by providing for greater emphasis on tactical and strategic studies.
BRAND, a special sta section that reported to the
director, was set up in April 1954 to conduct a continuous
evaluation of the Armys research and development (R&D)
program and to make recommendations for the most ecient use of available R&D funds, the stepped elimination
of obsolete weapons systems, and the gradual introduction
of new equipment and methods.34 By 1958, BRAND had
been replaced by the Management Systems Division, which
included a chief, eleven analysts, and six research aides organized as shown in Figure 32. The primary mission of the
new division was to examine Army management problems
in a framework of limited budget funds and accelerated impact of R&D on the useful service life of equipment, and to
concentrate on those types of decisions which are becoming
much more complicated than they were in the past.35
Under the April 1954 reorganization, the Oce of the

Director consisted of the director, the associate director, the
assistant director, the executive director, one or more sta assistants to the director, such other assistants as might be assigned, and the secretarial sta.36 The associate director was
responsible for the research program and chaired the Technical Council.37 The assistant director managed the system
of research management reports and oversaw the process by
which ORO publications were reviewed. The assistant director also planned the assignment of personnel in accordance
with the research program, although Johnson himself played
a key role in assigning analysts. The executive director was
responsible for the administrative activities of ORO and its
eld oces, and provided liaison between the ORO director and JHU on such matters. He also was responsible for
sta coordination between divisions and executed the policy
decisions of the director. A sta assistant to the director for
training and personnel recruited, counseled, and assisted in
the assignment of new professional personnel, coordinated
their orientation and training, and conducted personnel
studies regarding the professional sta.38
The heart of ORO was in the ve research divisions
that actually conducted studies and made recommendations.
Each division chief directed the work of his division, supervised his subordinate group chairmen, transmitted technical
memoranda and reports to Army authorities, and oversaw
personnel and budgetary matters. Each group chairman
planned and directed the work of his group and was responsible for the technical quality of papers prepared by group
members. He also steered the day-to-day administration of
his group.
The mission of the Tactics Division was to study combat
operations with the aim of nding new methods for increasing the eectiveness of combined arms in ground combat.39
Such methods encompassed not only improving the physical capabilities of weapons systems but doctrinal, organizational, and tactical matters as well. The studies carried out by
the Tactics Division fell into three general areas: the physical
characteristics and dynamics of our own and enemy combat
systems, the relative worth of re and movement in characteristic military situations, and communications for command
and control. The division was initially subdivided into ve
groups. The Infantry Group sought ways to improve infantry
weapons, organization, and tactics; the Armor Group studied the probable role of armor in a future war; the Support
Weapons Group studied the organization and use of artillery, guided missiles, aircraft, and other supporting weapons
systems; the TACSPIEL Group tested and synthesized the
ndings of the other groups and gave special attention to the
use of high-speed computer techniques for simulating battles;
and the Cost Group developed methods for measuring mili-
36171_04OR 3.indd 88
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Figure 31ORO Organization:
Note: ORO organization remained essentially unchanged from April 1954 to 1957.
Source: William T. Bradley, Operations Research in the Armed Services, student individual
study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1957, p. 59, Annex 5; John C. Schermerhorn,
The Role of Operations Research in the Army, student individual study, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1956, p. 54.
Figure 32ORO Management Systems Division:
Source: Thomas D. Scriggins, Management Systems Division, in ORO, A Discussion of the ORO Work Program, ORO
SP71, ORO, Chevy Chase, Md., October 1958, p. 57.
36171_OR 3 w-chgs_NEW.indd 89
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Figure 33ORO Tactics Division:

#HIEF
4ACTICS$IVISION
3UPPORT
7EAPONS
!RMOR
)NFANTRY
#HEMICAL
.UCLEAR
2EQUIREMENTS
!VIATION
4ACTICAL
'AMING
Source: Philip H. Lowry, Tactics Division, in ORO, A Discussion of the ORO Work Program, OROSP71, ORO, Chevy Chase,
Md., October 1958, p. 19.
tary value in terms of dollars, lives, critical resources, or other

criteria and assisted in comparative studies throughout the
division. By 1958, the Cost Group had been dropped and the
TACSPIEL Group had been renamed the Tactical Gaming
Group. A new Aviation Group had also been added as had
two short-term groups: a Chemical Group and a Nuclear Requirements Group.40 The Tactics Division then had a chief,
35 analysts, 9 research aides, and 2 active-duty military advisors, organized as shown in Figure 33.
The mission of the Strategic Division was: (1) to conduct operations research on strategic problems of interest
to the Army; (2) to carry out research in the methodology
of operations analysis in general, with special emphasis on
methodology at the strategic level; (3) to provide analytical
and computational support to the entire ORO sta.41 To
conduct its mission, the Strategic Division was initially organized in ve groups. The STRATSPIEL Group worked
on the development of strategic wargame techniques. The
OPSEARCH Group worked on basic OR methods and
techniques, and supported other ORO studies by applying OR methods and techniques. The COMPLAB Group
operated the computer laboratory that provided computer
and gaming facilities for all ORO divisions. The Electronics
Group operated an electronics laboratory supporting all the
divisions by constructing data-gathering devices, computer
accessories, and control and display devices, including those
for eld experiments. The COMPASS Group continued
an old ORO eort: the study of psychological warfare missions that would fall to the Army in time of war. By 1958,
the OPSEARCH Group had achieved independent status
and the COMPASS Group had been replaced by a Civil Affairs and Military Government Study Group. At that time,
the Strategic Division had a chief, twenty analysts, and seven
research aides, organized as shown in Figure 34.
The initial mission of the Logistics Division was to seek

solutions to problems of Army interest concerning the systems by which military forces are logistically operated.42 The
division was concerned primarily with the strategic aspects of
logistics, and was subdivided initially into four groups. The
Mobilization Group studied ways of improving the mobilization of personnel, supplies, and equipment. The Lines of
Communications Group investigated the transportability
of Army materiel and the capabilities and vulnerabilities of
Army transportation systems, maintenance, and the improvement of Army participation in civil aairs and military government.43 The Interdiction Group studied the use of unconventional warfare to deny goods and transportation facilities
to the enemy, and the vulnerability of road and rail nets in
western Europe to interdiction by a balanced weapons system. The LOGSPIEL Group developed analytical methods
and gaming techniques for testing logistics systems and introducing logistical considerations into ORO tactical and strategic wargames. The Logistics Division also continued work on
a special study, POWER, concerned with the use of atomic
energy. By 1958, the Logistics Division had been renamed the
Operations Division; had a chief, twenty-ve analysts, three
research aides, a full-time active-duty military advisor, and a
full-time Transportation Corps liaison ocer; and was organized with ve new groups, as shown in Figure 35.
The mission of the Intelligence Division was to study
problems associated with battleeld intelligence as related to
both conventional and atomic weapons, with the aim of improving intelligence devices, techniques, and procedures.44
To conduct its work, the division was subdivided into four
groups. The Acquisition Group studied the problem of obtaining accurate, timely information on enemy and friendly
dispositions, movements, and capabilities. The Communications Group investigated problems related to the ow of in-
OR 3 w/chgs.indd 90
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Figure 34ORO Strategic Division: 1958

Chief,
Strategic
Division
STRATSPIEL
COMPLAB
Civil Affairs and

Military
Government Study
Strategic
Concepts
Electronics
Source: Nicholas M. Smith, Strategic Division, in ORO, A Discussion of the ORO Work
Program, OROSP71, ORO, Chevy Chase, Md., October 1958, p. 71.
Figure 35ORO Operations Division:

Chief,
Operations
Division
Strategic
Lift
Logistic
Gaming
Nuclear Fuels
Production
Operational
Mobility
Lead Time
Source: Hugh M. Cole, Operations Division, in ORO, A Discussion of the ORO Work Program, OROSP71, ORO, Chevy Chase,
Md., October 1958, p. 41.
formation. The Decision Procedures Group was concerned

with the information needed by each echelon to make correct decisions and how that information should be transmitted and presented. The TELLSPIEL Group applied gaming
techniques to the solution of intelligence problems.
The mission of the Home Defense Division was to obtain
the best possible solutions to the problem of defending the
North American continent against air attack.45 The division
studied what we could buy in the way of defense, when, and
at what cost, and included consideration of Air Force weapons systems, civil defense procedures, and the psychological
eects of air attack. Initially, the division was organized with
four groups. The Weapons Group analyzed the eectiveness
of various defensive weapons systems, including early warning systems and interceptors as well as ground weapons. The
Costs Group determined the costs of various defensive systems at various levels and times. The Targets Group studied
the possible eects of damage on war potential; the vulnerabil-
ity of various types of targets by type of attack and munitions

used; and the optimum distribution of Army active defenses,
taking into account the eectiveness of other agencies such as
the Air Force, Civil Defense Administration, and the Oce of
Defense Mobilization, among others. The ZIGSPIEL Group
evaluated the enemy threat and possible enemy tactics and
developed wargaming techniques to test the eectiveness of
various proposed defense systems. By 1958, the Air Defense
Division had replaced the Home Defense Division, and it included a chief, ve analysts, and one research aide.46
The Field Division was created as part of the April 1954
reorganization to coordinate the planning, administration,
and conduct of operations research in the eldthat is, to
oversee the operations of the three ORO eld oces then in
existence.47 The most senior of the three oces was OROUSAFFE, established in June 1951 at Headquarters, United
States Army Forces Far East in Tokyo, to oversee ORO operations in Japan and Korea during the Korean War. Fol
36171_04OR 3.indd 91
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lowing that war, the Tokyo eld oce was concerned mainly
with assisting HQ USAFFE with simulations and wargaming and with completing two major projects: a study of the
tactical employment of atomic weapons in the Far East and
a study of the Korean War experience to determine the need
for revisions in Army logistics doctrine.48
A similar oce, ORO-USAREUR, was established at
Headquarters, United States Army Europe in Heidelberg,
Germany, in 1952. Its purpose was to perform similar functions with respect to simulations and wargaming and to conduct a critical analysis of the Army Group weapons system
for defense of a main line of resistance.49 Problems arose
with the conduct of some of the ORO civilian employees
initially assigned to the USAREUR oce, and the military
historian Hugh M. Cole was brought in to run the oce.
Cole brought with him his own team of distinguished historians, including Forrest C. Pogue (the biographer of George
C. Marshall), Roland Ruppenthal (the author of volumes
on logistics in the ocial Army history of World War II),
and Marcel Vigneras, a former French Army ocer who
had seen service in World War I and with the maquis in the
French Resistance movement during World War II.50 Another very distinguished military historian, Charles B. Macdonald, joined the team later. Although the others eventually
left to pursue other interests, Cole remained for some time as
the senior manager of ORO, and later served as president for
its successor, the Research Analysis Corporation.
As of 1955, ORO-USAFFE and ORO-USAREUR
each employed four to six analysts to assist their respective
G-3 sections with the preparation of war plans and exercises and to collect data and provide advice.51 Their work
was coordinated with the overall ORO work program but
was designed to meet the needs of the theater commander
who controlled them. The main ORO oce in Washington,
D.C., retained responsibility for selecting and rotating ORO
analysts to the eld oces.
The third eld oce, ORO-OCAFF, was established
in late 1952 at the Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces,
at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Its primary mission was to assist
that headquarters with the design of eld tests and exercises and to conduct simulations and wargames.52 Among
the projects undertaken by ORO-OCAFF were the design
of eld tests to determine the eect of atomic weapons on
tactics and, in collaboration with the Tactics Division, the
development and application of wargaming methods to
specic tactical problems.
In addition to overseeing the ORO eld oces in Tokyo,
Heidelberg, and Fort Monroe, the Field Division had a Maneuver and Exercise Group and a THEATERSPIEL Group.
The Maneuver and Exercise Group planned, coordinated,
and supervised ORO participation in maneuvers and exercis-
es. The THEATERSPIEL Group developed methods and

techniques for the use of wargames as a means of analyzing
theater-scale operations.
The general organization of ORO changed over time in
response to the changes in the scope and number of tasks
assigned by the Army. By 1960, the Home Defense and Logistics divisions had been replaced by the Air Defense and
Operations divisions, respectively; BRAND had been supplanted by the Management Systems Division; the Field
Division had been eliminated; and a Special Studies Division had been added. The resulting organization of ORO is
shown in Figure 36.
OROs Relationship with The Johns Hopkins University
Until 1 July 1951, ORO was administered by The Johns
Hopkins University through its Institute for Cooperative
Research (ICR). On 1 July 1951, action by the JHU Board
of Trustees made ORO a separate division of the university
on the normal pattern.53 The plan for establishing ORO as a
separate JHU division included provisions for two university
groups to oversee ORO activities, as shown in Figure 37.54
On 24 October 1951, the JHU president, Dr. Detlev
Bronk, formed a JHU advisory board for ORO to discuss
ORO policies in their relationship to the University.55 The
advisory board was composed of the president and provost
of JHU; three JHU faculty members; the director, associate
director, assistant director, and executive director of ORO;
three ORO sta members; and the chief of OROs Administrative Division who acted as secretary of the board.
On 3 December 1951, the executive committee of the JHU
Board of Trustees appointed a trustees committee for ORO
to meet with ORO management at regular intervals to consider germane policy matters.56 The trustees committee included Robert W. Williams (chairman), Thomas S. Nichols, and Stuart S. Janney; the president of the JHU Board
of Trustees, Carlyle Barton, was an ex-ocio member. The
committee advised the JHU Board of Trustees as to whether
ORO work was up to university standards.57
There is little evidence that either the JHUORO Advisory Board or the JHU Trustees Committee for ORO became involved in routine administrative, personnel, and scal
matters. Substantive issues, such as the quality and direction
of the ORO work program and the relationship of ORO
with the Army, were no doubt discussed in both bodies and
their advice was provided to the president of JHU who dealt
directly with Ellis Johnson and Army ocials. For example,
at its rst meeting, held at the ORO oces in Chevy Chase,
Maryland, on 12 June 1952, the advisory board discussed
the establishment of a seminar on operations research to be
held on the JHU campus, and recommended that ORO obtain an unclassied contract for OR work and then conduct
36171_04OR 3.indd 92
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Figure 36ORO Organization:

/FFICEOFTHE$IRECTOR
$IRECTOR
!SSISTANT$IRECTOR
!SSOCIATE$IRECTOR
4ECHNICAL#OUNCIL
-ANAGEMENT#OMMITTEE
%XECUTIVE$IRECTOR
#OMMITTEESON7ARGAMING
AND!TOMIC7ARFARE
3TAFF!SSISTANTTOTHE$IRECTOR
OF4RAININGAND0ERSONNEL
,IAISON/FFICESAND
&IELD%XERCISES
%DITORIAL$IVISION
!DMINISTRATION$IVISION
4ACTICS$IVISION
3TRATEGIC$IVISION
)NTELLIGENCE$IVISION
/PERATIONS$IVISION
-ANAGEMENT3YSTEMS$IVISION
!IR$EFENSE$IVISION
3PECIAL3TUDIES$IVISION
Source: William L. Whitson, The Growth of the Operations Research Oce in the U.S. Army,
Operations Research 8, 6 (1960): 818, Figure 7.
Figure 37ORO Relationship to JHU: After July

JHU
Board of
Trustees
JHU Trustees
Committee for
a
ORO
JHU
Office of
the President
JHU-ORO
b
Advisory Board
Operations Research
Office
a. Appointed by the president of the JHU Board of Trustees.

b. Appointed by the president of JHU.
Source: William L. Whitson, The Growth of the Operations Research Oce in the U.S. Army, Operations
Research 8, 6 (1960): 811, Figure 2. See also the organization chart in JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the
President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, Jul 52Dec 53.
OR 3 w/chgs.indd 93
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that work on the JHU campus, partly to train OR candidates
and partly to develop OR as a science.58 Other issues taken
up by the two groups were the acquisition of property for the
building of ORO oces, pay and benets for ORO employees, and the appointment of senior ORO managers.
Army Oversight of ORO
Throughout OROs existence, the chief of research and
development (CRD) on the Army Sta was responsible for
overseeing its research program.59 The Oce of the Chief
of Research and Development (OCRD) itself underwent
several reorganizations between 1950 and 1965, notably the
transfer of responsibility for R&D from the Oce of the Assistant Chief of Sta (ACS) G-4, Logistics, to the Oce of
the ACS G-3, Operations, on 22 January 1952, and from the
ACS G-3 to the CRD on 1 July 1956. The successive oces
within the Army Sta responsible for oversight of ORO are
shown in Table 31.
The CRD exercised his responsibilities for oversight of
the ORO research program through three agents: the Department of the Army Advisory Committee for the Operations Research Oce, the Department of the Army Project Advisory Groups for the Operations Research Oce,
and the active-duty military advisors assigned to ORO. AR
15480 prescribed the composition and functions of the
Department of the Army Advisory Committee for the Operations Research Oce, which was chaired by the CRD
and included as members representatives of the ACS G-1,
ACS G-2, ACS G-3, deputy chief of sta for logistics, the
comptroller of the Army, and the chief of Army eld forces
(later the commanding general, United States Continental
Army Command [CONARC]).60 The committee met periodically to review current and proposed ORO work programs to ensure they met Army needs, to establish priorities
for specic studies and projects as necessary, and to review
the ORO budget estimates.
A Department of the Army project advisory group
(PAG) was established for each ORO project or research
area.61 Every PAG included representatives from each of the
sta agencies that had an interest in a particular study, and
they met periodicallyat least quarterlyto review the current and future ORO work, to advise ORO, and to inform
the CRD on the progress of the project in question.
As prescribed by AR 15480, the CRD assigned one or
more active-duty military ocers to ORO for the purposes
of advising the ORO director on the tactical applications of
ORO research, interpreting Army policy and procedures,
and making pertinent recommendations to the ORO director and the CRD. As of the end of 1960, nine Army ocers
were assigned to ORO.62 The senior of the assigned ocers
was designated as the senior military advisor. All assigned
ocers were trained in OR methods and participated actively in the ORO research program as mutually agreed by
the Director, ORO, and the senior military advisor. The ocers who served as the senior military advisor to ORO from
1948 to 1960 are listed in Table 32.
Although the principal Army contact with ORO was
through OCRD, ORO relied on a number of other government agencies for various services. For example, ORO contract between the Department of the Army and JHU was
administered by a contracting ocer in the Oce of the
Quartermaster General at Cameron Station, Virginia; the
Navy provided auditing services; Walter Reed Army Medical Center supplied motor transport and quarters for Army
enlisted personnel assigned to ORO; and the Military District of Washington provided some security services.63
Personnel
In response to a constantly increasing workload, the
ORO professional technical sta grew steadily from 1948
to the oces demise in August 1961. As the nature of the
ORO work program expanded into areas that were not hard
sciencepolitical science, economics, and psychologythe
academic disciplines represented by the ORO sta increased
in scope as well. Many ORO analysts continued to be drawn
from the traditional hard sciences, but life scientists, social scientists, retired military ocers, and people trained
in other disciplines played an increasingly important role.64
Throughout the period, the selection, retention, and training of technical personnel remained one of the most dicult
problems facing the ORO leadership. Nevertheless, many
ORO analysts and consultants were distinguished men and
women in their own right and brought special skills and abilities to the operations research program.
In general, personnel strength grew at an average rate of
fewer than two analysts per month between 1948 and 1954.65
In 1951, ORO had roughly sixty professional sta members
and an equal number of administrative employees.66 By 31
May 1952, the number of professional sta members had
increased to approximately one hundred.67 The number
again increased slightly to 111 in 1953.68 The following year
the total reached 158.69 The number of ORO technical personnel, both analysts and research aides, as of 31 December
of each year from 1955 to 1960 is shown in Table 33. By
1963, two years after RAC had taken over, the number of
professional sta members had reached 169and a signicant number were women.70
As of 1956, roughly 70 percent of the ORO technical
sta had served in uniform, and a few others had served as
civilian OR analysts with Army units in the eld.71 Ellis
Johnson was convinced of the need for interaction between
mature civilian OR analysts and the professional soldiers
36171_04OR 3.indd 94
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Table 31Army Staff Responsibility for ORO Research Programs: July August
Oce
Dates
Deputy Director for R&D, Logistics Division
1 July 19481 July 1950
Deputy Assistant Chief of Sta G-4, for R&D
1 July 195022 January 1952
Assistant Chief of Sta G-3, Operations
22 January 195223 December 1954
Chief of R&D, Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Plans and Research
23 December 19541 November 1955
Chief of R&D, Oce of the Chief of Sta
1 November 195529 December 1958
Chief of R&D
29 December 195831 August 1961
Source: Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness, OROTP16, ORO, Bethesda, Md.,
November 1960, p. 14, Table 4.
Table 32Department of the Army ORO Senior Military Advisors:

Name
Dates
Lt. Col. William C. Farmer
1 July 19489 May 1949
Lt. Col. Raymond Renola
9 May 194915 August 1949
Lt. Col. Vincent M. Elmore, Jr.
15 August 194921 November 1950
Lt. Col. William P. Brooks
21 November 195021 July 1952
Col. M. W. Schewe
21 July 19521 June 1954
Col. Selwyn D. Smith
1 June 19541 July 1956
Col. Roland P. Carlson
1 July 195615 April 1958
Lt. Col. J. M. Gaustad (acting)
15 April 19589 June 1958
Col. John V. Roddy
9 June 19581 February 1960
Lt. Col. J. M. Gaustad
1 February 196029 July 1960
Lt. Col. Oran K. Henderson
29 July 196015 August 1960
Col. Charles B. Hazeltine
15 August 196031 August 1961
Source: Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to
Timeliness, OROTP16, ORO, Bethesda, Md., November 1960, p. 14, Table 5.
Table 33ORO Analysts and Research Aides:

Year
Analysts
Research Aides
Total
1955
133
11
144
1956
115
18
133
1957
114
30
144
1958
119
31
150
1959
118
19
137
1960
143
20
163
Source: Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness, OROTP16, ORO, Bethesda, Md., November 1960, pp.
11 (Table 2), 23.
36171_04OR 3.indd 95
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whom they served.72 Accordingly, he hired a number of
retired military ocers as analysts and consultants and encouraged the Army to assign active-duty ocers to the ORO
sta.73 As part of the Armys oversight of ORO, the chief
of research and development was authorized to assign three
active Army ocers, normally three combat arms ocers, to
ORO for full-time duty.74 That number expanded to nine
by 1960, and both the Signal Corps and the Transportation
Corps maintained a full-time liaison ocer at the operations
research oces.75 During and following the Korean War,
eighteen Army enlisted men, most with advanced degrees in
mathematics or the sciences, were also assigned to ORO and
were integrated into the work program as analysts.76
Recruiting and training adequate numbers of suitable
OR analysts was a continuing problem. As the demand
for both military and civilian analysts increased during the
1950s, the number of suitable candidates for ORO employment declined, and it became more and more dicult to
recruit experienced analysts.77 At the same time, OR itself
grew more complex and required greater training. The average annual turnover in the ORO technical sta was approximately 20 percent, and it took at least eighteen months
for a new analyst to become productive and as much as four
years before he or she could be rated superior.78 By 1957,
principally because of rising costs and stringent security requirements, ORO was struggling to overcome the loss of
trained personnel and the diculty of recruiting competent replacements necessitated by the ever-growing ORO
research program.79 For the most part, ORO had to select
promising candidates from various disciplines and conduct
its own on-the-job training with some assistance from the
academic community.80
There has long been intense debate about the qualities
required in a good operations research analyst. In January
1959, a questionnaire was sent to all ORO analysts asking
them to rate the desirable characteristics of ORO candidates. The results were published in ORO-SP-124, Fields of
Knowledge and Operations Research, along with statements
about the contributions to OR that could be made by people
in the various disciplines.81 The following list of eight qualications that a prospective ORO analyst should have was
gleaned from the questionnaires. He or she should:
1. be fairly mature, with ve or more years of professional experience in his or her eld;
2. have a genuine interest in OR;
3. be able to get to the heart of a problem;
4. have better-than-average mathematics skill and the
ability to show results in quantitative form;
5. be able to get along well with the clients representatives;
6. be resourceful and able to get along with a minimum

of support;
7. be willing to go anywhere, at any time, and do anything ethical; and
8. have a strong sense of loyalty to country, employer,
and client.82
In general, ORO tried to form a true mixed team of
both physical and social scientists, and, in 1960, the technical
sta of more than 125 analysts represented some twenty-ve
dierent disciplines and professions.83 In general, the analysts who prospered at ORO were trained as chemists, physicists, biologists, philosophers, mathematicians, engineers,
historians, economists, political scientists, and psychologists,
in that order.84 But as Ellis Johnson himself stated:
we have found no correlation between competence in operational research and previous research experience in the traditional sciences. The only correlation is with years of experience
at ORO and the amount of education. Possession of a doctorate
doubles the probability of being in the rst quartile at ORO.85
As the scope of OR applications increased and the proportion of the ORO work program devoted to pure weapons
analysis declined, the traditional reliance on candidates from
the hard sciences was diluted by the need to nd analysts
competent in such non-scientic elds as history, economics,
political science, psychology, sociology, and military science.
As one leading ORO analyst has noted, there is reason to
believe that the lawyer, social scientist or historian is better
equipped professionally to evaluate evidence which is derived from the mind and experience of the human species.86
Nevertheless, the proportion of the various disciplines represented by the technical sta remained relatively stable, as
shown in Table 34.
Many ORO employees and consultants had distinguished careers and an amazingly wide range of interests before, during, and after their service with ORO in the 1950s
and early 1960s.87 As already noted, Ellis Johnson had served
with distinction in the Navy OR program during World War
II and had designed the strategic mining campaign against
Japan. Dr. Richard Parmenter was the coordinator of research at Cornell University when he was appointed associate director of ORO in April 1951. He had led the Austin
Sub-Arctic Expedition to Ban Bay in 1927 and had served
with distinction as a Navy antisubmarine warfare ocer in
World War II.88 George S. Pettee, who had earned a doctorate in political science from Harvard University in 1937,
enjoyed a distinguished academic and government service
career and published several books before joining the ORO
sta in 1949 and becoming assistant director in 1954.89 The
executive director, Brig. Gen. Lester D. Flory, United States
Army (ret.), was a 1919 graduate of the United States Military Academy and earned a 1930 master of science degree
36171_04OR 3.indd 96
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Table 34Distribution of ORO/RAC Personnel, by Discipline: and

Discipline
Mathematics, engineering, and sciences
Social sciences, history, business, literature, and law
1953 Percentage
1963 Percentage
56.8
59.4
43.2
40.6
Source: Based on Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at US Army Operations ResearchPast and Present, RACTP102,
RAC, McLean, Va., April 1964, p. 8, Table 1.
in electrical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology (MIT) before serving with distinction in World
War II and as the deputy commissioner and chief of section,
U.S. Element, Allied Commission in Austria, from 1945 to
1946.90 Brig. Gen. Flory became executive director of ORO
in August 1949.
Dr. Wilbur B. Payne, a 1955 Louisiana State University
Ph.D. in physics, joined the oce in 1955 and later became
the rst deputy under secretary of the Army for operations
research before moving on to head the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Analysis
Agency at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. He subsequently established the TRADOC Operations Research
Organization (now the TRADOC Analysis Center).91 The
annual prize awarded by the secretary of the Army for excellence in Army OR is The Wilbur B. Payne Memorial Award
for Excellence in Analysis in honor of his many contributions to Army operations research.
Gen. Thomas Handy, USA (ret.), a 1914 graduate of
the Virginia Military Institute, was the righthand man to
Army chief of sta Gen. George C. Marshall, and served as
the chief of the Operations Division of the Army General
Sta during most of World War II. Handy retired from active duty in 1954 and became an ORO consultant in 1955.92
He joined the ORO sta full-time in January 1959.
Other notable OROns include Dr. Hugh M. Cole,
the author of the ocial U.S. Army histories of the World
War II campaigns in Lorraine and the Ardennes, who
joined ORO in 1952 and became its resident expert in
logistics; Dr. Dorothy Kneeland Clark, a 1937 Radclie
Ph.D., who did groundbreaking analysis on the eects of
casualties on combat unit performance; James W. Johnson,
a 1948 Harvard bachelor of arts in economics, who was responsible for analysis leading to the design of the pentomic
and pentagonal division structure in the mid-1950s; and
Richard E. Zimmerman, a 1950 Purdue University master
of science graduate, who wrote the seminal paper on Monte
Carlo simulation and who is considered the father of Army
combat modeling.93 One ORO luminary, the astronomer
Thornton L. Page, became embroiled in the controversy
over unidentied ying objects (UFOs) after serving briefly on a Central Intelligence Agencysponsored committee
of scientists assembled in Washington, D.C., on 1418
January 1953 to study the available evidence on UFOs.94
Among the many distinguished ORO consultants was Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger, who served briey in 1951, before
going on to fame as a presidential advisor, U.S. secretary of
state, and Nobel Prize laureate.95
Physical Facilities
As ORO tasks and sta size increased, new quarters
were needed. In mid-June 1951, ORO moved from Fort
McNair to a new home at 7100 Connecticut Ave. in Chevy
Chase, Maryland.96 The National 4-H Club owned the site
(a former junior college for young women) and it was persuaded to lease the facility to ORO. The campus had three
buildings. The directors oce, administrative oces, the library, and many of the analysts were located in the former
classroom building. One of the major study project groups
was accommodated in the former presidents house, and
the so-called science building was used by analysts.97 More
space was required, and ORO leased additional oce space
at Chevy Chase Circle and near Wisconsin Avenue and
East-West Highway in Bethesda, Maryland. When ORO
acquired its rst computer, it was housed in a former plumbing supply warehouse, a Quonset hutlike building near
the railroad tracks in Bethesda that was known as the Pearl
Street building. The building had no central air conditioning,
and the heat generated by the vacuum tubes in the primitive
Sperry-Rand 1103A computer was so great that the computer had to be shut down frequently during the summer
months. Eventually, in June 1957, the National 4-H Club
reclaimed its facilities, and ORO leased a four-story oce
building on Arlington Road in Bethesda, where it remained
until it went out of business in August 1961.
From 1954 until August 1961, Ellis Johnson and other
ORO leaders struggled in vain to patch together a deal between the Army and The Johns Hopkins University for the
construction of a purpose-built facility for ORO.98 The university purchased land for the proposed ORO building near
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Shady Grove, Maryland, on the east side of what is now Interstate 270.99 However, the Army and the university were
never able to come to an agreement on cost sharing for the
proposed facility, and it was never constructed. For a short
time in the summers of 1960 and 1961, the ORO sta used
the land for vegetable gardening.100
Budget
During the Korean War period, the ORO budget quadrupledfrom about $1 million in FY 1949 to just more
than $4 million in FY 1954and remained relatively stable
thereafter.101 In May 1953, ORO budgets for FY 1955 and
FY 1956 were projected at $4.4 and $4.0 million, respectively.102 The actual annual appropriation for ORO as well
as the amounts paid to consultants and subcontractors from
FY 1956 to FY 1960 are shown in Table 35. During the
period covered in Table 35, the cost per project undertaken
declined steadily from $106,000 per study in FY 1956 to just
$68,000 per study in FY 1960.103 By 1960 the Department
of the Army chief of research and development was spending about $11 million per year on OR contracts with some
twenty-ve to thirty companies; about half that amount was
paid to ORO.104
ORO Work Program, 195061
Despite generous scal allocations, ORO took three or
four years from its creation to reach full production, and it
took even longer to develop a good feel for what kind of studies were useful to the Army and to develop adequate quality
control measures.105 During the entire course of its existence,
ORO produced 632 publications based on 1,666 studies (or
study phases), which addressed 98 problems of interest to the
Army, including the defense of the continental United States
against strategic nuclear attack, the role of nuclear weapons in
ground warfare, the racial integration of the armed forces, the
concept of cost eectiveness in evaluating weapons systems,
the application of computers to OR, the use of wargaming,
psychological and guerrilla warfare, technological forecasting,
the concept of air mobility, and the performance and reliability of weapons and supporting equipment.106
Until 1951, the projects undertaken by ORO were limited in number and unbalanced in scope.107 Each project had
to be approved by the Army in advance, and changes in the
work program were cumbersome. As a result, there were a
number of problems related to policy and nance as well as
diculties in ensuring that analysts with the requisite skills
were on hand to begin newly assigned projects promptly. On
22 May 1950, Ellis Johnson proposed to the Army deputy
assistant chief of sta, G-4, for research and development,
Maj. Gen. Ward H. Maris, what came to be called the balanced program, a slate of projects or research areas covering
all the elds in which the Army was likely to require OR

support. Johnson argued that the balanced program would
permit the recruitment of a balanced sta, realistic budgeting and cost accounting, and exibility in the research eort.
Detailing planning and direction of research would be the
responsibility of ORO, and each project, as well as the overall work program, would be reviewed annually to ascertain
the suitability of its scope, progress, and costs and to ensure
a proper balance among the various projects in accordance
with the Armys needs. It was also intended that the list of
projects in the balanced program would change as Army
needs changed.
The proposed balanced program was approved by the
Army in principle in 1950. The original list of projects in the
balanced program was based on 5 projects then authorized,
3 projects that were pending, and 12 new projects proposed
by OROa total of 20 projects. In February 1951, the
Army approved eight of the twelve proposed projects. Two
additional projects added later brought the total number of
projects in the balanced program to seventeen (one of the
original eight projects having been completed).108 The seventeen subject areas/projects in the balanced program from
1951 through 1954 were these109:
air defense (ANALAA)

armored warfare (ARMOR)
atomic weapons (ATTACK)
balance of weapons systems (BALANCE)
cost eectiveness (CAPWAR)
chemical, biological, and radiobiological warfare
(COBRA)
guided missiles (DONKEY)
infantry weapons (DOUGHBOY)
military government (LEGATE)
OR methodology (OPSEARCH)
guerrilla warfare (PARABEL)
psychological warfare (POWOW)
artillery (REDLEG)
human factors (SHOP)
intelligence (TACIT)
air support of ground operations (TEAR)
logistics and mobility (TREMABASE)
Each project was divided into a number of separate

tasks, and priorities were set for each task based on a fourlevel scheme. Group I tasks addressed operations considered
immediately critical to the successful prosecution of a major
war. Group II tasks addressed operations considered critical
to the successful prosecution of a major war. Group III tasks
addressed operations considered of lesser importance than
those in Groups I or II. Group IV tasks addressed matters
that could be dealt with at leisure.
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Table 35ORO Appropriations and Expenditures: FY FY

Fiscal Year
ORO Appropriation ($)
Paid to Consultants ($)
Paid to Subcontractors ($)
1956
4,470,000
58,652
513,004
1957
4,800,000
94,689
187,595
1958
5,226,500
92,030
383,373
1959
4,994,344
42,865
217,873
1960a
4,662,054
6,534
99,627
a. Figures are through 30 June 1960.

Source: Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness, OROTP16, ORO, Bethesda, Md.,
November 1960, p. 11, Table 2.
The new demands on ORO caused by the Korean War

sidetracked the balanced program aimed at long-term Army
problems, but progress continued on all fronts.110 Over
time, the shift away from weapons-evaluation studies toward
more-comprehensive studies of tactics and strategy made
the balanced program obsolete, and in April 1954 ORO was
reorganized into ve major research divisions (Tactics, Strategic, Logistics, Intelligence, and Home Defense) and the
special BRAND section described previously.111 In eect,
the balanced program was abandoned with the approval of
the FY55 ORO work program, but the principles on which
it was based (standing areas of interest; ORO responsibility for details of project planning; and annual Army reviews
of scope, costs, and progress) were retained.112 The ensuing
number of ORO research projects and their topical distribution is shown in Table 36.
In fact, the topic areas addressed by the ORO research
program changed very little over the thirteen years of its existence. There was a gradual shift from pure weapons analysis
studies toward more-comprehensive tactical and strategic
studies, but generally the research program exhibited stability of focus, as shown in Table 37.113 As Lynn Rumbaugh,
one of the ORO analysts, has pointed out:
The principal trends were: (a) a gradual decrease from 47 to
39 percent in publications on combat operations; (b) a corresponding increase from 21 to 29 percent in publications on logistics and costs; and (c) a modest increase from 2 to 7 percent
in publications on methodology. The decrease in publications
on troop training and psychological warfare is due, of course,
to the entry of HUMRRO [the Human Resources Research
Oce] and SORO [the Special Operations Research Oce]
into these elds.114
The determination of what projects to pursue was made

on the basis of a number of inputs. The ORO work program
was reviewed annually at the time the ORO contract was
renewed.115 Ongoing projects were reviewed, new proposals were considered, and work eort was reallocated as necessary. Before the annual review, both the Army and ORO
worked up lists of proposed studies that were then reviewed

by a committee comprising both ORO and Army representatives. Those projects agreed on by both sides, up to approximately 60 percent of the available funding, became the
ocial ORO work program. About 10 percent of the available funding was reserved to support projects wanted by the
Army for which ORO saw little value, and another 10 percent was reserved to support projects that ORO wanted but
for which the Army saw no need.116 Another 1020 percent
of the ORO eort was reserved for unprogrammed studies,
and the remainder, if any, was set aside for studies aimed at
furthering OR techniques.117
Beginning in 1952, ORO instituted a series of so-called
search studies that went by the name PISGAH conferences.118 From 1952 ORO hosted lengthy meetings (as long as
two months) of selected military and civilian experts at some
remote location (usually in Maine) to discuss current trends
and ways in which ORO could meet the Armys emerging
needs. The results of the PISGAH conferences were fed into
the process for developing the annual ORO work program.
The rst PISGAH conference, in 1952, led to the important
decision to make a concerted eort to use wargaming as a
method for solving major problems.119
Most of the 1,666 studies and 632 publications completed by ORO between September 1948 and August 1961
were of only average quality and had minimal impact on Army
equipment, organization, or doctrine.120 However, a few studies were of substantial quality, broke new ground, and had a
signicant eect. As Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.,
noted in his semiannual report for the period JanuaryJuly
1952, The Operations Research Oce studies have provided
the Army with candid self-criticism which has led to corrective action and improvement in complex areas of Army operations.121 Among the most prominent of the successful ORO
studies were those on nuclear warfare, desegregation, psychological operations, cost eectiveness, marksmanship training,
and the selection of the M16 rie as the standard Army rie.
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Table 36Distribution of ORO Projects, by Division or Topic Area: FY FY

ORO Division/Project
FY 1956
FY 1957
FY 1958
FY 1959
FY 1960
Tactics
11
Operations
Strategic
Intelligence
Air defense
Management systems
Basic research
TOTAL
28
30
36
34
38
Note: One additional project, identied only as SANDY but not otherwise described, was undertaken in FY
1959 and FY 1960. The gures do not include projects undertaken by ORO eld oces or special studies.
Source: Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness, OROTP16,
ORO, Bethesda, Md., November 1960, p. 22, Table A1.
Table 37Distribution of ORO Studies, by Topic: July June

July 1948
June 1951
July 1951
June 1954
July 1954
June 1958
July 1958
June 1961
Weighted
Thirteen-Year
Average
Combat operations: weapons

and equipment; intelligence;
organization, tactics, and doctrine
47
41
45
39
43
Logistics and costs
21
17
24
29
23
Background studies:
social, cultural, and civil aairs
environment; international strategy,
economics, and politics
12
11
10
General studies:
personnel selection, training,
and performance; psychological
warfare; special warfare and
counterinsurgency
14
21
10
12
Special studies:
R&D management; OR
methodology; miscellaneous
10
15
19
13
Study Topic
Source: Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at US Army Operations ResearchPast and Present, RACTP102, RAC, McLean,
Va., April 1964, p. 9, Table 2.
Beginning in 1949, ORO conducted a number of

groundbreaking in-depth studies of nuclear warfare. The
major ORO study on the defense of the continental United
States against nuclear attack was published in August 1957 as
ORO-R-17, Defense of the US Against Attack by Aircraft and
Missiles.122 The 718-page study addressed all aspects of such
an attack and the possible defensive measures to be taken to
prevent or attenuate it. The study evoked a formal critique
by the RAND Corporation, against which OROs George
S. Pettee made a spirited defense.123 Having been vetted in

open debate, ORO-R-17 proved a valuable aid to U.S. leaders
in working through some of the very dicult problems and
trade-os involved in protecting the nation against Soviet
nuclear attack. Beginning in 1949 and continuing through
the Korean War and later in Germany, ORO completed a
number of studies on the tactical use of nuclear weapons.124
These studies delineated for the Army an important role in
nuclear warfare and contributed signicantly to the develop-
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ment of the Armys pentomic organization and doctrine for
nuclear warfare operations.125 ORO also did the rst study
on the use of atomic warheads for air defense missiles, as well
as several studies on nuclear powerplants.126
In every major conict since the Civil War, the United
States Army has turned to black soldiers to supplement the
available numbers of white soldiers. In July 1948, President
Harry Truman issued two executive orders prohibiting racial discrimination in the executive branch and the armed
forces, and the Army Reorganization Act of 1950 subsequently removed the requirement for segregated units in the
Army.127 The retreat of UN forces from the Yalu River in
late 1950 was followed by a scarcity of white replacements
for U.S. units, and the Army began to assign black soldiers
to previously all-white units. Based on the request of Army
chief of sta Gen. J. Lawton Collins in March 1951, ORO
was tasked to study the question of the utilization of Negro
manpower in the Army.128 The study was assigned to a team
of ve ORO analysts led by Dr. Alfred H. Hausrath and
aided by a number of other ORO personnel, consultants,
and subcontractors who used demographic analysis, opinion
and attitude surveys, content analysis, critical incidents technique, statistical analysis, and community surveys to gather
and analyze data.129 ORO submitted interim reports on 1
July and 1 November 1951, and the full, nal report was
published in three volumes in April 1955, titled Utilization
of Negro Manpower in the Army.130 The study, focused on
combat units in Korea, concluded that
rst, integrated units allow more eective use of the manpower
available through a more even distribution of aptitudes than
is possible in segregated units; second, that performance of integrated units is satisfactory; and third, that the resistance to
integration is greatly reduced as experience is gained.131
The ORO study on desegregation was widely circulated

and, by providing objective arguments in favor of integration, had a signicant eect on the decision to integrate the
armed forces after 1952 and on the way that integration was
carried outa process that had important positive eects
on the eciency of Army units and racial relations in the
United States.
From 1949 until 1957, when responsibility for studies
on psychological warfare was transferred to the newly established Special Operations Research Oce, ORO played an
important role in the development of psychological warfare
in the U.S. Army. Between 1949 and 1954 alone, ORO published sixty-three technical memoranda (5,613 pages) on the
subject of psychological warfare.132 In 1957 the Armys chief
of psychological warfare made an audit of ORO studies on
the topic and found that 55 percent of the studies had been
accepted as doctrine and for study, 10 percent had been accepted in principle, 4 percent were deferred for additional
study, 2 percent were rejected, and the remainder (approximately 29 percent) were not considered.133
ORO studies addressed psychological warfare at both
strategic and tactical levels, and the eect of those studies
was noteworthy.134 As a result of Project POWOW, which
included studies conducted on the frontlines in Korea, the
Army recognized psychological operations (PSYOPS) as
an important aspect of modern warfare; shifted responsibility for psychological warfare from G-2 (intelligence) to G-3
(operations); and, on 15 January 1951, created an Oce of
the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special sta division of the Army Sta.135 At the tactical level, ORO was responsible for the concept of tailoring the psychological operations message to its intended audience and, among other
innovations, the introduction of airborne loudspeakers for
such operations.136
ORO was among the rst to apply operations research
to the study of methods for determining the costs of future
military equipment and operations, and its costing methods subsequently became the standard for the Department of Defense.137 This was important because applying
a standard method for arriving at a reasonably accurate assessment of relative costs is key to making rational choices
among alternatives.
Finally, ORO played a prominent role in the development of a new program of marksmanship training for the
Army and in the development and selection of the M16
rie.138 Beginning in 1948 with Project ALCLAD (a study
on the protection of the individual soldier from missile
weapons on the battleeld), ORO conducted a number of
important studies on the eects of various small arms and
their use by soldiers in battle.139 From those studies arose
two interesting concepts. The rst was the duplex rie projectilein eect, two bullets contained in the same cartridge
and propelled by the same powder charge. The idea was to
increase the probability of a hit on a man-size target at the
usual range of infantry combat.140 Although the Army accepted the results of the studies and standardized a duplex
projectile for the 7.62-mm. M14 rie, the concept never really caught on. The second concept developed by ORO was
much more successful. It involved an attempt to improve
Army marksmanship training by using an array of simulated
battleeld targets, man-size cardboard cut-outs placed at
various distances on the ring range. The targets were rigged
to pop up unexpectedly at various ranges, thereby testing the soldiers reaction time and accuracy. The details of
the new training method were subsequently worked out by
the Human Resources Research Oce and adopted by the
Army as the TRAINFIRE system.141 TRAINFIRE was a
signicant improvement over the old known-distance ring
range as a means of providing realistic infantry training, and
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it was used very successfully to train several generations of
Army personnel in rie marksmanship.
ORO studies on casualties caused by small-arms re,
small-arms design and characteristics, and marksmanship
led to several conclusions: (1) Accurately aimed rie re was
no more eective in producing enemy casualties than was
the volume of re, (2) the rie was seldom used at ranges
beyond 300 meters, and (3) most rie kills were made at
less than 100 meters. ORO analysts thus found that what
the Army needed was a low-recoil weapon ring a number
of small projectiles. In 1957 the CONARC asked various
arms manufacturers to help design a new 5.56-mm. military
rie capable of high-velocity re in both full- and semiautomatic modes. Studies conducted by ORO and several subcontractors under Project SALVO eventually determined
that the AR15, designed by the Armalite Division of the
Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation of Costa Mesa,
California, was the best design. The AR15 weighed only 6.7
pounds, used a .223-caliber (5.56-mm.) cartridge ring a
55-grain projectile at 3,300 feet per second, incorporated
many of the best features of existing designs, and was relatively cheap to manufacture. The Armalite AR15 was subsequently adopted with a few modications as the M16 rie,
the standard U.S. infantry weapon from the mid-1960s to
the present.
Although many ORO studies were well received and
made major contributions to the stated goal of improving
Army weapons, organization, and doctrine, Army users of
ORO products had some complaints. Those complaints
generally fell into ve main categories: the failure to address
problems of immediate interest and usefulness to the Army;
the lack of quality; the inability of ORO authors to communicate their results to Army decision makers in a clear,
concise, and tactful manner; the lack of timeliness; and the
personal conduct and attitude of individual ORO researchers who sometimes ignored Army custom and were disrespectful to senior ocers. Such shortcomings remained a
challenge for ORO leaders throughout the organizations
existence despite gallant eorts to correct them.
Complaints about ORO products and the conduct of
ORO personnel must be seen in the context of the time. As
one Army War College student observed in 1957:
Criticism of Army operations research, as typied by the Operations Research Oce, is not entirely without foundation.
However, criticism is traceable primarily to the comparative
newness of operations research and the attendant problems
of management and supervision, both of which have shown
marked improvement.142
In fairness to ORO it must be pointed out that the studies

undertaken in the 1950s and early 1960s were much broader
in scope and complexity than the simpler analytical studies of
World War II; moreover, there were no accurate, generally accepted means for measuring ORO performance precisely.143
Then, too, throughout its existence ORO was inadequately
staed and funded for the workload the Army imposed on it.
ORO also faced many administrative challenges that aected
the quality and timeliness of its research program. The diculties of administering a sta of some three hundred people
in various disciplines scattered in half a dozen inadequate
facilities while safeguarding an enormous collection of classied documents were sometimes overwhelming.144
Many of the early ORO studies failed to address matters of immediate interest to the Army and were criticized
accordingly. In part, that problem can be attributed to the
Armys failure to provide adequate guidance and to articulate its needs. In the end, the real test of the usefulness of
a given ORO study was how many of its recommendations
were actually adopted by the Army. One Army chief of research and development, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, stated
that most ORO recommendations were adopted within a
few years of publication, and OROs own estimate was that
about 80 percent of all recommendations were adopted
eventually.145
Ellis Johnson and other ORO leaders were acutely
aware of the criticisms regarding the usefulness and quality of ORO studies. In the early days, some of the studies
produced were quite poor and represented work that may
not be correct or is of no use to the Army and is scientically of low quality.146 The quality of about 80 percent of
ORO studies produced between 1951 and 1954 was rated
excellent or good, but the remaining 20 percentfair
and poor reportscaused signicant problems with the
customer.147 In an eort to increase the quality of studies,
in 1954 Johnson introduced a system of murder boards
and a post-publication review board to review ORO work.
The murder boards, one for each study, comprised ORO
sta members who conscientiously evaluated and criticized
the ongoing work of their colleagues. Each completed study
went to the post-publication review board at the same time
it was sent to the Army, and the board independently evaluated the quality of the study and reported its results to the
director, who could then take internal corrective action as
necessary. The murder boards and the review board were
successful in signicantly reducing the number of studies
rated fair or poor. By 1957 almost 100 percent of ORO
studies were rated excellent or good.148
It was not necessary only to produce quality studies;
the results of the studies also had to be conveyed to the
Army in a clear, concise, and tactful manner. In 1958 Johnson confronted head-on the problem of eectively providing Army decision makers with study results. He did so
in a pamphlet directed to ORO managers and analysts.149
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Noting that even though our work is excellent we need to
communicate it in time much better than we do now, Johnson set forth a number of measures to be taken by ORO
supervisors and authors to improve the quality and eectiveness of both published and oral ORO presentations
to the Army.150 He instructed the research sta members
to ensure that their recommendations were practical and
to accompany their studies with a draft directive, using
Army language, for consideration by the Army executive
responsible for decisions about the studys recommendations. The purpose of the draft directive, which in every
case was to be vetted by the senior military advisor at
ORO, was to facilitate adoption of the recommendations
included in the study by making them stand out loud and
clear and by identifying in advance those people who had
the authority to take action. Johnson recognized the risk
in seeming to dictate to the Army what should be done
with any given set of ORO recommendations, but he was
convinced that there will be no serious resentment at any
level in the Army if ORO results are well substantiated and
are presented without bias or emotion.151 Furthermore, he
insisted that each study and its draft directive be sent forward under a well-composed letter of transmittal.
Johnson also prescribed certain measures to improve
oral briengs presented by the ORO sta. He prescribed
that all research sta members be trained in eective briefing techniques, that only the best briefers be used to present study ndings, and that all briengs be well-practiced,
simple, direct, and devoid of extraneous technical detail.152
ORO sta members presenting papers or briengs at meetings and symposia as well as speeches were enjoined to have
a prepared, practiced, and good presentation.153 Finally,
Johnson encouraged all sta members to make a special effort to present ORO research results on a personal basis to
Army ocers and civilians.154 Doing so, he noted, involved
making a real eort to meet and become friendly with our
colleagues in the Army who might be able to make use of
ORO research results.155
The problem of voluminous, overly academic studies
couched in dense quantitative formats and academic jargon
was compounded by the frequently uncompromising and
forthright tone of some of the OROs reporting.156 Not
only did some authors lack tact in the presentation of their
results, but there also was dissatisfaction in the Army regarding the tendency of some ORO leaders to report major
ndings rst to top ocials and only then to the lower-level
stas. As one historian wrote, If ORO reports dealt with
issues already controversial within the Army, one side or another was almost certain to question the ndings, and counterattacks were launched not only against OROs work but
its concept as an organization as well.157 Ellis Johnsons as-
sertion that the canons of scientic procedures justied the

widespread, simultaneous distribution of ORO ndings and
recommendations met with little acceptance among some
Army personnel.158
The most persistent criticism of the studies was that
they took too much time to produce and often appeared long
after they were needed. As the Armys chief of research and
development, Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, wrote to Johnson
on 30 July 1958:
Lack of timeliness is the most common criticism of ORO studies. ORO studies have made many important contributions to
the Army, but these contributions would be greatly enhanced
if the substance of ORO ndings were made available to the
Army more quickly. It appears that timeliness of ORO studies
might be improved by the following measures:
a. Early publication and distribution of draft research reports.
b. Reduction of extensive editorial and art work on publication of
nal reports.
c. Fuller use of briengs for dissemination of research ndings.
d. Terminating research when there is an obviously low probability
of uncovering signicant additional data.
I realize that getting research results quickly is always a critical problem to the researcher, but it has been the Armys experience that
study cycles of two or more years result in greatly reduced payo to
the Army.159
Continued criticism of the timeliness of ORO studies

prompted Johnson to assign to the ORO executive director,
retired Brig. Gen. Lester D. Flory, the task of conducting a
thorough analysis of the timeliness of all ORO studies published between 1 November 1955 and 31 October 1960.
The results of Florys in-depth analysis were published in
November 1960 as ORO-TP-16, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness. Flory expressed
the opinion that the ORO feels the criticism leveled at it
has not always been justiable and has been made without
an examination of the whole operation.160 He pointed to a
number of factors causing delays in the ORO research program, including the
eect of special and crash studies, diculty of problem, insucient personnel assigned, specic skills not available, delays encountered in getting data, diversions of personnel on other assignments, delays in improving quality and validity of the study,
lack of supervision or direction, changes in scope or objectives,
and a host of other factors.161
As Flory pointed out, even with a full complement of analysts and no diversions there will always be a normal slippage, inherent in any research in a long-range research
study, which will be reected in changes of the estimated
completion date.162
The problem for ORO was that a study rated excellent not
only had to be timely; it also had to meet high standards of scien
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tic quality and eective communication.163 With respect to the
timeliness of ORO studies, Johnson himself noted that
we could cut down the number of projects and get each one
done more quickly. In doing that we would lose balance in the
program. . . . Planning the ORO work program is the problem of
an optimum and balanced synthesis vs a quicker but incomplete
and narrow set of piecemeal solutions arrived at without proper
consideration of their interactions.164
In a letter to the Army chief of research and development,

Brig. Gen. Andrew P. OMeara, on 31 August 1955, Johnson
attempted to justify the practice of not assigning an estimated
completion date to each project on the grounds that hastily
done studies only had to be reworked at an even greater loss
of time.165 Unconvinced, Brig. Gen. OMeara replied:
The usefulness of ORO studies to the Army sta depends to
some extent on the knowledge that a particular phase of a study
will probably be available on a certain date. Such knowledge increases the assurance that the ORO studies will be used in the
decision process. Conservative estimates of completion dates
may somewhat alleviate your problem which I recognize.166
Given high-quality, pertinent, and timely studies presented in a clear and tactful manner, there remained some
aspects of ORO operations that constituted an irritant to
some Army personnel. In the early days, some of the ORO
personnel were inexperienced in dealing with the Army and
some of their actions were contrary to accepted behavior
and interfered unnecessarily with urgent ongoing Army sta
work.167 Other ORO researchers were particularly cavalier
about the handling of classied material, ignored the chain
of command, or outed Army procedures and thus caused
considerable consternation among their military contacts.
The solution, of course, was to thoroughly indoctrinate new
ORO personnel in Army procedures and mores before turning them loose.168 Even so, with an annual personnel turnover
of roughly 20 percent, it was a constant struggle for Johnson
and his subordinate managers to ensure that overeager and
inexperienced researchers did not oend the sensibilities and
break the established rules of their Army customers.
As noted previously, the shortcomings of studies were
not entirely the fault of ORO. The Army failed to provide
timely evaluation of ORO products and maintained a persistent ignorance of the purposes, capabilities, and limitations of operations research. The Armys advisory committee system for ORO oversight proved weak, in part because
the military members of both the ORO advisory committee and the project advisory groups had other pressing
duties and devoted only intermittent attention to their supervisory functions.169 For one thing, Department of the
Army letters of evaluation of ORO studies tended to be
too general in nature and too long in preparation.170
Despite almost a decade of attempts to inform and indoctrinate Army ocers about the benets of operations
research, ignorance persisted and resulted in rejection of
OR recommendations and in opposition to the use of such
research in general. In 1957, one Army War College student concluded, There is not present among the ocers
of the Army an appreciation of OR to the degree required
for the most eective functioning of OR.171 To solve the
problem, he made the following ve recommendations:
(1) The Department of the Army should establish, in conjunction with ORO, a course in Appreciation of Operations Research. This course should initially be given ocers having the
following assignments: ORO duty designees; Project Advisory
Groups; Appropriate sections of the oces of: The Director
of Research and Development, Technical Services R&D, Combat Development in D/A, CONARC, Technical Services, and
Service Schools; Other eld grade ocers as time and space
permit.
(2) A lecture, or lectures, on the purpose, capabilities and limitations of OR be included in the curriculums of the Army War
College and the Command and General Sta College.
(3) A moderate, dignied program of Army-wide recognition
of ORO be initiated in service aliated publications such as
Army, Military Review, Army Digest, and the Military Engineer.
(4) The Department of the Army authorize ORO to detail annually one analyst as a student at the Army War College, and
one at the Command and General Sta College.
(5) There be established at the headquarters of the Seventh
and Eighth armies, small detachments of ORO to provide OR
services at the eld army level. That continued consideration
be given toward the establishment of similar detachments in
other agencies.172
To some degree the problem was that Army personnel

held a general expectation of quick results and instant gratication coupled with a lack of understanding of the time
required to produce an accurate and thorough operations
research study. The result was a tension between sound, thorough scientic research and limited, short-term projects that
could easily be completed on schedule and within budget.173
One shortcoming that could only be placed at the feet
of the Army was the lack of provisions for General Sta supervision and coordination of all Army operations research
matters, either in the sta or throughout the Army as a
whole.174 The ORO chain was relatively clear, but there was
no oversight or coordination of the OR work program, organizations, or budgets in the Army Sta, eld commands, or
technical services. One recommended solution was that OR
analysts be assigned to the various Army general and special
sta sections as required and that the authority of the Army
chief of research and development be extended to cover all
Army OR establishments.175
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Other ORO Activities, 195061
In addition to its approved annual program of research
and publication, ORO conducted a wide variety of other
activities, including a number of innovative in-house programs.176 ORO personnel were loaned to the Executive Ofce of the President, the Department of Defense, and other
Army agencies to participate in special studies, scientic
advisory groups, and high-level joint panels. Personnel also
served as lecturers in service schools and war colleges, reviewed studies prepared by other Army agencies or subcontractors, and aided other organizations in the United States
and abroad in setting up OR establishments. Ellis Johnson
and his senior sta played a major role in the exchange of
information and coordination among the OR organizations
of the various services, with OR establishments in allied
countries, and with OR elements in academia and business.
The oce also sponsored, chaired sessions at, and presented
papers at conferences, symposia, and professional meetings,
both in the United States and abroad.
Internal Programs
ORO conducted a number of innovative internal programs to stimulate its personnel and promote an interest in
operations research among various constituencies. For most
of the oces existence, a weekly internal seminar was conducted, and in 1952 Ellis Johnson convinced the dean of
the Engineering School at The Johns Hopkins University to
initiate a graduate operations research seminar led by ORO
personnel.177 One of the most successful programs initiated to stimulate interest in such research was a program of
summer internships at ORO for high school students. The
program was supervised by Jean G. Taylor, an ORO analyst
and a psychologist by training.178 Each year, students at local
high schools were interviewed and selected for the internship program. Rather than performing routine administrative tasks, the student interns were organized into teams and
set to work on meaningful analytic programs, generally as
part of a larger ORO study underway for the Army.179 The
Army was amazed to learn that, properly guided, the young
students were capable of preparing such viable studies as a
civil defense plan for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area.180 During the ve years of its existence, the internship
program was extraordinarily successful, and approximately
75 high school students participated, some of whom joined
the sta as full-edged analysts after attending college.181
ORO Relationships with Other DOD OR Agencies
ORO took the lead in supporting the development of OR
organizations in the technical services and elsewhere in the
Army, actively participated in conferences on OR organized
by the Ordnance Corps, and hosted a number of conferences

for Army operations researchers. ORO also played a major
role in assisting the Army chief of research and development
in dening the Armys R&D needs by bringing together
ORO specialists, military personnel, consultants, and operations research analysts from the other services in the series of
so-called PISGAH conferences already mentioned.182
As ORO grew and matured, so too did the operations research programs in the Department of Defense and the other
services. Johnson intended that ORO should take the lead informally in coordinating the various military OR programs.
To that end, the oce participated actively in liaison visits,
meetings, conferences, and other methods of contact that included representatives of OR groups in the technical services,
the Department of Defense WSEG, the Navy Operations
Evaluation Group (OEG), the Air Force Operations Analysis
Division (OAD) and major command Operations Analysis
Oces, and the RAND Corporation. For a time in the 1950s,
the directors of the various Department of Defense OR organizations met regularly to discuss mutual problems and to
eect informal coordination of their research programs.183 As
OROs director, Ellis Johnson was an active participant, along
with the directors of WSEG, OEG, OAD, and RAND.
International Relationships
Since World War II, American military operations research organizations had cooperated closely with their counterparts in Britain and Canada. ORO personnel worked
closely with British and Canadian operations analysts in
Korea, and the oce maintained a full-time liaison ocer
with the British Army Operational Research Establishment
(AORE).184 Another important means of maintaining contact with the British and Canadian OR organizations was the
series of annual Tripartite (later Quadripartite, with the addition of the Australians) Conferences on Army Operations
Research, the rst of which was held in London in April 1949
and the second of which was hosted by ORO in Washington
in October 1950.185 Each conference concentrated on a specic major topic and was attended by representatives from
ORO, AORE, and the Canadian Army Operational Research
Establishment (CAORE), as well as representatives from the
OR organizations of the other services in all three countries.
The British and Canadians also frequently participated in conferences sponsored by other U.S. Army agencies, such as the annual Army OR symposium sponsored
by the Ordnance Corps Army Research Oce (Durham).
At the second such symposium in March 1962, G. Neville
Gadsby of AORE explained that his organization included
a small element with the director of operational science and
research in the War Oce and the main AORE, located at
West Byeet a few miles outside London, which included
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an integrated sta of military and civilian analysts divided
into subelements covering weapons, tactics, eld studies, general studies (logistics, economics, communications,
and so forth), human factors, and clothing and equipment
physiology.186 As Gadsby explained, AORE was on a level
with two other British Army OR groups, one in Germany
(Operational Research Section, British Army of the Rhine)
and one in southeast Asia (Operational Research Unit, Far
East). At the same symposium, Henry H. Watson discussed
the CAORE, which then was physically located at Canadian
Army Headquarters in Ottawa and reported directly to the
scientic advisor to the chief of the General Sta.187 Watson
also explained that the entire sta of CAORE, which included military personnel, was in Ottawa and that CAORE
conducted a program of research projects (1015 percent of
which were self generated) that fell into two main groups:
tactical studies and systems studies.188
In the 1950s, the other nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) also began to set up OR organizations, as did NATO itself.189 In the mid-1950s, an
international OR group composed primarily of the British
and the Canadians was established under Headquarters,
Allied Air Forces Central Europe, at Fontainebleau, France,
and a group led by Dr. H. F. Robertson was organized at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).190
From 1953 the NATO Advisory Group on Aeronautical
Research and Development (AGARD) (and later the OR
group at SHAPE) was active in promoting lectures on operations research and helping interested nations form their
own OR groups.191 Robertsons team at SHAPE also organized a number of conferences on OR in the various NATO
member nations. The rst conference, in 1955, had 30 participants from only four nations, but the third gathering, held
in November 1956, had 120 participants representing all
but two of the NATO countries.192 In April 1957, the fourday NATO conference on operational research sponsored
by AGARD was held at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris.193
The chief aims of the conference were to interest high-level
NATO administrators in the need for OR and to familiarize NATO technical and operating personnel with the latest
research methods.194 As the supreme allied commander in
Europe, U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad, told attendees at the conference:
Operational research, by revealing methods for more eective
utilization of our manpower, our skills, our material and our
resources, is making a signicant contribution to the military
potential of the Atlantic Alliance. This is of utmost importance,
for our strength depends not alone on what we have but to a
large extent on what we do with what we have.195
The attendees at the second SHAPE operations research conference, held at HQ SHAPE on 1415 Febru-
ary 1956, noted that most NATO OR groups were in the

central geographical area, with few in the NATO ank
countries.196 In March 1956 AGARD organized a threeman teamThornton Page (from the ORO eld oce in
Heidelberg), Tony Sargeaunt (from the SHAPE scientic
advisory sta ), and Glen D. Camp (from Melpar, Inc.)to
conduct a two-week trip to Italy, Greece, and Turkey to
promote OR and help organize OR groups.197 The Italian
General Sta expressed interest and asked for a followup
visit, and, on 1 June 1956, the Turks established an OR
group within the Turkish General Sta Scientic Advisory
Board comprising ten reserve ocers with mathematics and
scientic training under the direction of Turkish Air Force
Col. Fuat Ulug.198
As of 1956, allied OR groups in NATO included those
at the headquarters of the British Army of the Rhine, the Second Allied Tactical Air Force, and the Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (all near Dusseldorf ); a RAND representative
and elements of the Oce of Operations Analysis at Headquarters, United States Air Forces Europe, in Wiesbaden;
the ORO eld oce at Headquarters, United States Army
Europe; Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Air Force at Ramstein;
Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe at Fontainebleau; two Navy analysts at Headquarters, Commander
SOUTH near Naples; the Air Defense Technical Center in
The Hague; SHAPE near Paris; and the Turkish OR group
under Col. Ulug.199 By 1963, Norway had an OR group of
approximately 450 people concentrated in the Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment (NDRE).200 By that time,
operations research in NATO was focused in the SHAPE
Air Defence Technical Center (SADTC), roughly 40 percent
of whose scientic sta (thirty-ve analysts) were assigned to
OR tasks.201 The SADTC analysts generated 7080 percent
of their own projects, and, as with the NDRE, military ocers were seconded to participate in specic projects.202
Industry and Academia
The use of OR in industry and the study of it as a separate discipline in American universities took o in the 1950s.
As one historian wrote:
By the mid-1950s, OR was becoming increasingly popular
among managers of private rms, somebut not allof which
were military contractors. . . . It would be dicult to overstate
the importance of government support in the postwar growth
of operations research.203
Ellis Johnson closely monitored the trends in both industry and academia and maintained close contacts with the
leaders in both sectors. He also encouraged experienced military analysts to move into the industrial operations research
eld and newly established industrial OR groups to become
involved in military operations research.
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The use of OR in industry spread most rapidly in Britain after World War II, perhaps because British industry
continued to suer from severe shortages of manpower and
raw materials and thus had to operate on a most-ecient
basis if it were to survive at all.204 American industry also
adopted OR in the late 1940s. By 1953, 75 percent of all industrial R&D expenditures were for OR, and 65 percent of
industrial OR in the United States was concentrated in six
industries: aircraft, electrical machinery, chemicals, instruments, machinery, and petroleum.205 By May 1954, following a spurt of growth on the order of 50 percent in fteen
months, there were twenty to twenty-three American industrial rms with operational research sections.206
The study and teaching of OR as a separate, formal
discipline in American universities also expanded rapidly
in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Ellis Johnsons eorts
to promote the discipline at The Johns Hopkins University have already been noted. MIT, also long involved in
the management of military OR organizations, established
in 1948 (in conjunction with the Navy) a course in the
nonmilitary applications of OR.207 In November 1951, the
Case Institute of Technology held a conference on the applications of OR in business and industry and subsequently
became the rst American university to oer the degree of
master of science in operations research.208 Columbia University oered its rst course in OR in the spring of 1952,
and Johns Hopkins began a graduate OR seminar in the fall
of that year.209 By 1954, twelve American universities were
presenting seminars in the discipline: Case Institute, Johns
Hopkins, MIT, Columbia, University of CaliforniaLos
Angeles (UCLA), Penn State, Illinois Institute of Technology, Stevens Institute of Technology, Tufts, American,
the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Wright Field Air
Development Center.210 MIT and Johns Hopkins awarded
the rst doctorates in OR in 1955, and the Case Institute
admitted a number of doctoral candidates in the discipline
the following year.211
Operations Research Societies
Meeting at the Athenaeum Club in London in the fall
of 1947, several of the distinguished scientists who had been
active in the wartime British OR programincluding Sir
Charles Goodeve, Prof. P. M. S. Blackett, Dr. C. Gordon,
and Sir Charles Tizardformed the Operational Research
Club.212 The club was formally established in April 1948,
with an initial membership of fty, and it met periodically
in the rooms of the Royal Society in London.213 In March
1950 the club began to publish the Operational Research
Quarterly, edited by Max Davies and Roger T. Eddison; the
rst article was Blacketts Operational Research.214 In 1953
the Operational Research Club was renamed the Operation-
al Research Society and it dened qualication standards for

new members. By 1964 it had approximately 1,250 members.215 The society now runs a comprehensive training program; holds an annual conference and a series of meetings
for young operations research workers; publishes OR Insight,
which contains readable accounts of OR in action; and sponsors other activities for people interested in the eld.216
In the United States, the National Research Council in
1948 created the Committee on Operations Research, with
Dr. Horace C. Levinson as chairman, to foster interest in
nonmilitary OR and to disseminate information about it.217
In January 1952, ten people interested in the topic met in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a somewhat larger group
assembled the following March.218 From these preliminary meetings the Operations Research Society of America
(ORSA) was formed on 26 May 1952 at Columbia Universitys Harriman House in Arden, New York. Dr. Philip M.
Morse was its rst president.219 In November 1952, ORSA
began regular monthly meetings and published the rst issue
of its quarterly Journal of the Operations Research Society of
America ( JORSA), which quickly became the preeminent
journal of OR in the United States.220
Ellis Johnson and other ORO personnel played prominent roles in the founding of the society. Of the seventy-one
people who attended the founding meeting in May 1952,
nine were from ORO, and numerous OROns subsequently
served on the various ORSA committees.221 An ORO division chief, Thornton Page, was the rst editor of JORSA, and
the ORO editorial sta provided support.222 When Page
was assigned to the ORO facility in Heidelberg, Charles P.
Chadsey, the ORO managing editor, took over as the editor
of JORSA. Johnson also played an important role in funding
the annual Lanchester Prize, established in the early 1950s,
to honor the best operations research work published in the
previous year.223
The rst national meeting of ORSA was held at the
National Bureau of Standards in Washington, D.C., on
1718 November 1952, with more than four hundred
members and guests attending.224 Within two years, ORSA
had 870 members and was growing at the rate of 40 new
members per month, drawn from the military OR organizations, industry, and academia.225 Of the 870 members in
1954, more than one third were engaged directly in operations research for the military services: 48 military personnel; 74 with the ORO; 41 with OEG; 30 with OAD; 20
with RAND; 5 with WSEG; 40 in research laboratories; 3
at the Naval Postgraduate School; 7 at Scientic Research,
Inc.; 7 with other government agencies; 15 individual consultants; 14 foreign members; and 33 others.226 Following
the rst joint national meeting of ORSA and The Institute
of Management Sciences (TIMS) in November 1961, re
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lations between the two groups grew closer, and, in 1995,
ORSA merged with TIMS to form the Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS),
an international scientic society with more than ten thousand members in 2002.227
The needs of professional operations researchers working in the military OR eld were unique. By 1963 more than
ve thousand professional scientists were working full-time
in military OR.228 Of those ve thousand, only about one
third were members of ORSA, the principal deterrent to
membership being the fact that 7585 percent of all military
OR studies were classied, and thus the work of most military analysts could not be discussed in an open forum.229 To
meet the special needs of military OR analysts, in August
1957 the Oce of Naval Research branch oce in Pasadena, California, began a series of military operations research
symposia (MORS), which subsequently became important
venues for the exchange of ideas among military OR managers and analysts.230 The rst symposium was a one-day
meeting held on 14 August 1957 at the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory in Corona, California. Four invited papers and
panel discussions on the theme of air defense were presented to eighty-three attendees.231 The ninth MORS, hosted
by the U.S. Continental Army Command at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, in April 1962, was the rst truly national meeting.
With the eleventh MORS, held at the United States Naval
Academy in April 1963, sponsorship of the symposia was
transferred to the Oce of Naval Research in Washington,
D.C., and the MORS Executive Committee was joined by
Operational Logic Corporation, which provided the workforce essential for preparing and running the symposia.232
Following the seventeenth MORS, the executive committee
was phased out and the Military Operations Research Society, incorporated in Virginia, took responsibility for achieving the objectives of MORS:
1. To provide media for professional expression of both clased
and unclassied military OR;
2. To improve the quality of military OR through exchange of
information and other interaction among professionals;
3. To increase the eectiveness of military OR by stimulating
interaction between OR professional and military ocers
and civilians whose duties bear upon the conduct of OR;
4. To foster the development of the students of military
OR.233
New Organizations Using

Operations Research,
The early work of the Operations Research Oce in
such areas as troop motivation, training, and performance;
psychological operations; and political, economic, and social
conditions in foreign nations stirred interest in such elds

within the Army and prompted the creation of several new
research organizations to deal specically with such elds of
emerging interest. Chief among the new research organizations created by the Army in the early to mid-1950s were the
Human Resources Research Oce and the Special Operations Research Oce. ORO continued to conduct studies in
the areas assigned primarily to the new organizations, but it
cooperated actively with them.
Human Resources Research Oce
Several ORO projects conducted during the late 1940s
and early 1950s both reected the growing interest within
the Army and stimulated additional Army interest in improving troop motivation, training, and performance.234
For some time, the Army had recognized the need to concentrate responsibility for operationally diverse activities of
human resources research and to create additional research
units capable of fullling requirements not currently met by
existing research activities.235 Accordingly, a Human Resources Research Section was established in the Research
and Development Division of G-4 on the Army Sta, and
a sta study titled An Integrated Program in Human Resources Research was prepared.236 The sta study recommended that the Army contract with a recognized educational institution to set up a Human Resources Research
Oce with primary responsibility for research in training
methods, troop motivation and morale, and psychological
warfare. The proposed organization would conduct studies,
grant and monitor contracts for studies, and provide civilian sta and technical supervision for research units at selected Army installations. The study was presented to Army
chief of sta Gen. J. Lawton Collins on 21 June 1951, and
to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the following day,
and it was approved.237 The Army then persuaded George
Washington University to form the new HumRRO, and a
contract was signed on 27 July 1951. A distinguished psychologist, Dr. Meredith P. Crawford, was appointed director
on 2 August 1951.238 In July 1951, Army Sta supervision
of HumRRO was lodged in the Research Section of the Research and Development Division, Oce of the ACS, G-4
Logistics. With later changes in the Army Sta, responsibility for HumRRO migrated with the Oce of the CRD.
HumRRO was charged with four main functions: research
planning and analysis, supervision of contract research, provision of sta members to conduct human factors research at
various Army installations as needed, and technical supervision and support for the human factors research units at various Army installations.239 As Director Crawford explained,
the dominant theme of HumRRO research eorts was the
improvement, primarily through training and education, of
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the performance of individuals and units, and the oce had
two general goals:
First, to establish productive working relations between HumRRO and the Army, at appropriate echelons and at locations
where research skills could be applied to practical problems.
Second, to foster the growth of a strongly integrated,

though geographically dispersed, organization that would
promote professional development and a high quality of
research capability in our assigned area.240
The oce supplemented the existing Army human resources research eorts of ORO; the Personnel Research
Section of the Adjutant Generals Oce; the Army element
in the Navy Special Devices Center; the Oce of the Quartermaster General and research units at the Quartermaster
Climatic Research Laboratory and Food and Container Institute; the Medical Department Field Laboratory at Fort
Knox, Kentucky; and the Ordnance and Signal Corps.241
HumRRO was initially organized with a central oce
composed of an administrative section and three research
sections (Training Methods; Motivation, Morale, and
Leadership; and Psychological Warfare and Intelligence),
all located on the campus of George Washington University
in Washington, D.C.242 Provision was also made for establishing three eld research laboratories located at various
Army installations, but that plan soon changed. The Training Methods Section in Washington became HumRRO
Division No. 1, and during FY 1952 two new elements,
called Army human research units, were activated, at Fort
Knox, Kentucky, and at the Presidio of Monterey, California. Division No. 1 subsequently provided small detachments of civilian scientists to form additional Army human
research units. All of the Army human research units were
later redesignated as HumRRO divisions. In 1954, the responsibilities of the HumRRO Motivation, Morale, and
Leadership Section were spread over the other existing
divisions. The following year, responsibility for psychological warfare studies was transferred from HumRRO to
the newly created Special Operations Research Oce, and
the Psychological Warfare and Intelligence Division was
phased out.
An initial $500,000 was provided from held-over
FY51 funds for the support of HumRRO at its founding
on 30 July 1951, and a request was made later for an additional $700,000 from FY52 emergency funds.243 The FY53
HumRRO budget request was for $2,900,000, of which
$700,000 was to be for research in psychological warfare
and intelligence with the remainder divided about evenly between training methods research and research in motivation,
morale, and leadership. Approximately 50 percent of the
FY52 and FY53 HumRRO budgets was allocated to con-
tract research and the remainder to in-house projects, with

the intention that the percentage distribution would shift toward in-house research as the HumRRO sta was built up.
Subsequently, the total HumRRO annual budget hovered at
approximately $3.5 million per year.244
Because HumRRO was established less than six weeks
before the beginning of the 1951/52 academic year, there
was some diculty in recruiting qualied sta, but as of 1
November 1951, eleven scientists had been hired. It was
anticipated that full strength would be reached by January
1954.245 The subsequent growth in the HumRRO sta during the 1950s is shown in Table 38.
HumRRO was a combined militarycivilian agency.
The majority of the professional civilian staoriginally envisioned to be approximately one hundred scientistswere
psychologists, and a relatively high proportion of them held
doctoral degrees.246 Specialists in sociology, anthropology,
linguistics, military science, engineering, computer technology, and publications/graphics were also represented. All
HumRRO civilian personnel were members of the sponsored-research sta of George Washington University. They
participated in the universitys retirement, benets, and leave
programs, but their salary scales were set by an annex to the
ArmyGeorge Washington University contract from FY
1959 onward.247 As Director Crawford acknowledged, it was
the professional competence, vision, and dedication of the
sta that is the key ingredient for solving practical problems
in the improvement of human performanceHumRROs
broad objective.248
HumRROs in-house and contract research work programs were governed by AR 708: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTHuman Factors and Social Science Research,
and the primary document used to disseminate the results of
HumRRO research was the Technical Report, prepared in
compliance with AR 7031. HumRRO also produced two
kinds of special reports (interim reports and consulting reports), quarterly status reports, research and technology rsums (DD Form 1498), bibliographies of publications, and
research bulletins. The HumRRO work program originally
consisted of a set of so-called work units (or tasks) organized
and presented in sections, with each section representing the
work planned for a division. The rst full-scale research project undertaken by HumRRO was planning and coordinating the psychological evaluation of troop behavior in Project
DESERT ROCK, an atomic bomb test conducted in Nevada in November 1951.
Thereafter, HumRRO production grew rapidly. In FY
1952 just 1 presentation was produced, but in FY 1962
HumRRO produced 93 separate items, including 8 technical reports, 2 research reports, 1 research bulletin, 20 research memoranda, 28 journal articles (plus 1 reported else
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Table 38HumRRO Personnel Strength: FY FY

End of FY
Strength
End of FY
Strength
1952
66
1957
237
1953
198
1958
260
1954
224
1959
263
1955
236
1960
270
1956
205
1961
278
Source: Meredith P. Crawford, A Perspective on the Development of HumRRO (Alexandria, Va.: George
Washington University HumRRO, 1968), p. 6.
where), 30 presentations (including 7 reported elsewhere),

and 4 other items.249
It was not until 1957 that the Army developed a system for commands and agencies to submit their requirements for human factors research annually. Before FY 1956
each HumRRO research proposal and Army approval was
handled individually, but, when supervision of HumRRO
passed from the ACS, G-1, to the Oce of the Chief of Research and Development in January 1955, an annual work
program cycle was established, and the Army Human Factors Research Advisory Committee was set up.250 To regulate the HumRRO research program, key sta members of
the directors oce and the directors of the research divisions met twice a year to establish general policy, discuss the
development of procedures, plan the annual work program,
and conduct long-range planning.251
HumRROs inuence on the Army has been called deep
and fundamental and the major catalyst in changing traditional training and task assignment procedures from those in
eect during World War II to new ones based on the concept of the soldier as part of an overall system.252 Many of
the personnel, training, and leadership programs and procedures familiar to those who have served in the Army since the
mid-1950s had their origins in HumRRO studies. Included
in that group are the TRAINFIRE I and II marksmanship
training programs, the Noncommissioned Ocer Leader
Preparation schools conducted at Army training centers, the
techniques for teaching land navigation, and procedures and
miniature devices for armor training.253
Special Operations Research Oce
The global responsibilities assumed by the United
States in the postwar period, stemming from the Cold War
with the Soviet Union and, particularly, the emergence of
Communist-inspired wars of national liberation in the late
1940s and early 1950s, spurred U.S. Army interest in area
studies, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency techniques,
and psychological operations. That interest led directly to the
establishment in the Army Sta of the Oce of the Chief of
Psychological Warfare on 17 January 1951.254 The chief in

turn led eorts to establish a research organization to study
psychological warfare and special operations.255
Early ORO work, such as Project MAID (which included political, economic, and social assessments of various potential candidates for U.S. military aid) and Project
POWOW (on psychological warfare), demonstrated the
utility of systematic studies of foreign countries and psychological operations, but there was a growing sentiment in the
Army Sta that such studies should not have to compete
for funding with the more-elaborate studies of weapons systems. That view was reinforced by the Harlow Committee
appointed by Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens in
1955.256 The Harlow Committee recommended that a separate agency designed for the purpose address psychological
warfare and special operations research.
Already in 1954 the Department of the Army had contracted with the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) of
New Haven, Connecticut, to prepare area handbooks to support special warfare operations, but HRAF could not meet
Army needs and the contract was canceled.257 At the request
of the Army, in 1956 The American University (AU) in Washington, D.C., established the nonprot SORO to support the
Armys psychological and unconventional warfare operations.
SORO was managed by AU under the terms of contracts
with the Army that called for SORO to conduct non-materiel research in support of the Department of the Armys
missions in such elds as counterinsurgency, unconventional
warfare, psyops, and military assistance programs.258
The SORO was an integral part of AU, and its director
reported to the president of the university through the dean
of faculties for everything except business matters, which
were handled by the AU treasurer and business manager.259
All SORO employees were considered AU sta members
and participated in the universitys insurance, pension, and
medical programs.260 SORO professional sta members
were eligible for faculty rank without tenure at AU.261
Initially, SORO was organized with the usual supervisory, administrative, and support elements and two techni-
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cal divisionsthe Research Division and the Foreign Area
Studies Division (FASD)each of which was governed by
a separate contract and reported to a dierent agency of the
Army Sta. As of 1 March 1962, the Research Division was
organized with a director, two branch chiefs, and six interdisciplinary research teams, and was responsible for conducting
research on a broad range of topics, including psychological
operations and guerrilla/counter-guerrilla warfare.262 The
activities of this division were overseen by the Oce of the
Chief of Research and Development on the Army Sta, in
accordance with AR 7032: Special Warfare Non-Materiel
Research, dated 3 April 1957.263 Support for the division
came from the Army Research and Development/Test and
Evaluation funds under Contract DA49092ARO7,
amounting to $225,000 in FY 1957, $300,000 in FY 1958,
$380,000 in FY 1959, $400,000 in FY 1960, and $350,000
in FY 1961.264
The Research Division work program was based on requirements submitted by Department of the Army agencies
and approved by the chief of research and development (later
by the director of the Army Research Oce). By 1964, the
SORO Research Division had produced some fty research
reports and a wide range of quick response studies and
advisory services.265 Among the SORO projects were the
development of tested appeals and symbols for communicating propaganda messages to specic audiences in selected
countries (Project PROSYMS), a study of word-of-mouth
communications in selected countries (Project PROPIN), a
study of the psychological operations vulnerabilities of the
Soviet Union (Project EXPLOIT-USSR), and publication
of A Casebook on Revolutionary Warfare and A Selected Bibliography on Counter-Unconventional Warfare.266
The Foreign Area Studies Division became part of
SORO on 1 July 1958.267 FASD was organized with a division chief, two deputy chiefs, and four interdisciplinary
research teams, plus several historians and geographers and
an editorial sta.268 The division was responsible for the
preparation of country and regional studies that included
material on political, economic, sociological, and military
matters. In accordance with AR 708, FASD activities were
overseen by the chief of psychological warfare (later the chief
of special warfare, and after 1958, the director of special
warfare in the Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Military Operations). Funding for FASD was provided from
Operations and MaintenanceArmy funds under Contract
DA49083OSA2427, and it amounted to $430,000 in
FY 1958, $340,000 in FY 1959, $400,000 in FY 1960, and
$420,000 in FY 1961.269 The FASD goal was to produce six
to eight new or revised area handbooks each year, and, as of
1 March 1962, it had completed forty-seven special warfare
area handbooks.270
Computers and Wargaming

The increased interest in operations research and the
tremendous growth in Army OR organizations in the 1950s
and early 1960s were accompanied by signicant advances in
both the theory and the techniques of OR. New mathematical formulae were developed, new applications of OR were
created and tested, and new ways of looking at old problems
ourished. But no development in OR during the period
was more signicant than the invention of the high-speed
electronic digital computer and its application to wargaming as a means of testing and evaluating weapons systems,
organization, and tactical and strategic doctrine. As one participant in the events wrote in 1964:
It has enabled us to plunge into areas, e.g., data processing, linear and nonlinear programming, simulation, and operational
gaming on a scale where sheer size and complexity would have
swamped us several years back.271
The Development of High-Speed Electronic

Digital Computers
The history of the high-speed electronic digital computer goes back at least to the work of Charles Babbage in
the early nineteenth century.272 Babbages analytical engine,
completed in 1835, is generally recognized as the rst general-purpose computer. Although it was steam powered, it
incorporated most of the aspects of modern electronic computers, including a calculating unit, a memory, an input device, a control section, and a printer.273 A version of Babbages
analytical engine was actually used by the British government
from 1859 to 1864 to compute actuarial tables for predicting life expectancy.274 But, for almost eighty years thereafter,
development of the computer progressed very little.
Interest in high-speed mechanical calculation was revived by the World War II demand for such complex and
time-consuming processes as computing ballistics tables,
inventory control, and cryptoanalysis. In response, Howard
Aiken of Harvard University, with the sponsorship of the
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), designed the rst successful electromechanical computer, the
Harvard Mark I, completed in 1943. The Mark I was controlled by instructions on paper tape, and the addition or
subtraction of two numbers took three tenths of a second.275
A few months later, the rst all-electronic computer, the Colossus, began operation at Bletchley Park in England. Colossus was a special-purpose computer specically designed to
aid in the code-breaking work at Bletchley Park. It had some
two thousand valves (vacuum tubes) and was fed by a paper
tape run through a photoelectric reader.276
Meanwhile, in the United States, work went forward
on what was to be the rst general-purpose electronic com
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puter, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator
(ENIAC).277 Not completed until 1946, ENIAC was designed by Dr. John W. Mauchly and Dr. J. Presper Eckert,
Jr., at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania to meet the needs of the U.S. Army
Ordnance Corps Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) at
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. BRL was charged
with the preparation of ballistic ring and bombing tables
for the Army and Army Air Corpstedious and time-consuming work that was done using various mechanical computation devices.278 On 5 June 1943, the Army awarded a
contract to the University of Pennsylvania for six months
of research and development of an electronic numerical integrator and delivery of a report thereon.279 ENIAC was
formally dedicated at the University of Pennsylvania on 15
February 1946 and was accepted by the Army in July. It was
then disassembled and rebuilt at Aberdeen Proving Ground
and became operational there in August 1947, subsequently
undergoing numerous modications.280
Although designed primarily to do the calculations necessary to produce ballistics tables, ENIAC had a number of
other applications including weather prediction, atomic energy calculations, cosmic ray studies, thermal ignition, random number studies, wind tunnel design, and other scientic uses.281 ENIAC, which worked in decimal rather than
binary mode, weighed 30 tons, had some nineteen thousand
vacuum tubes and fteen thousand relays, consumed enormous amounts of power (around 200 kilowatts), and ran
very hot.282 On the positive side, ENIAC greatly increased
the speed of calculating such problems as ballistic trajectories. A skilled human computer using a mechanical desk
calculator could compute a 60-second trajectory in about 20
hours. The same task using an analog dierential analyzer
took 15 minutes. ENIAC required only 30 seconds to complete the same set of calculations.283
The principal drawback to ENIAC was that it was necessary to rewire the computer to switch programs. Dr. John von
Neumann of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton
University, who had worked with the ENIAC team, solved
that problem by coming up with the idea of storing programs
in the computer itself.284 This concept was used in the construction of EDVAC (ENIACs replacement), which was
completed in 1951, as well as in all later electronic computers.
Having played a signicant role in the development of
electronic computers during World War II, the U.S. armed
forces continued to foster their development and use in the
postwar period. In fact, it was only in 1951 that the use of
computers in business and industry began to develop. The
rst business computer, LEO, was developed in Great Britain in 1951 by John Pinkerton for the food giant, J. Lyons,
and was soon followed in the United States by the rst com-
mercially successful computer system, UNIVAC I, designed

by ENIAC designers Mauchly and Eckert.285
The development of computers for business and scientific applications progressed rapidly in the 1950s, with a number of computer manufacturers competing for dominance,
a competition eventually won by IBM. In the early 1950s,
Remington Rand was the principal rival of IBM for the
emerging market in electronic computers. The Remington
Rand UNIVAC 1103, a commercial version of the ATLAS
II computer designed for the Armed Forces Security Agency
(a predecessor of the National Security Agency), became
available in the summer of 1952, and an improved version,
the UNIVAC 1103A, came out in September 1956.
Computers built in the 1950s were generally of the large
mainframe type and required expansive, air-conditioned
spaces and a multitude of well-trained operators and repairmen. Such machines were expensive and had to be carefully
scheduled for maximum ecient use. Time sharing became
common, and eventually remote entry and then online services were developed.
In the 1960s, developments in transistors generated a
revolution in computer design, with the production of smaller but much more powerful computers. By the 1970s, the
cost of such computers had been reduced to the point that
even medium-sized organizations were able to own one.286
Ultimately, the microcomputer, then the personal computer
(PC), emerged at a price and size such that even the individual scientist or operations research analyst could own and
operate it.
By 1960, the use of high-speed electronic computers
in operations research had become commonplace. The two
areas in which computers proved most useful for OR work
were linear programming and simulation.287 Until 1952,
most linear programming had been done using punch-card
calculators, but, beginning in 1952, W. Orchard-Hays and
George Dantzig developed linear programming computer
code, which enabled linear programming to become a practical OR tool.288 By the late 1950s it was possible to solve
sizable linear programming problems by computer, and attention shifted to the development of matrix generators for
improving data input and report writers for producing understandable output.289 By the mid-1970s such items had
been perfected and it was possible to solve larger, more-complex problems more easily.
The eect of the high-speed electronic digital computer
on simulationin particular, the military wargamewas
even more profound. By orders-of-magnitude increases in
the speed at which the eects of multiple variables could be
calculated, the computer enabled the design and use of much
more sophisticated wargames in which a multitude of factors
could be considered. The quick turnaround times achievable
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with a computer made it possible to play such games in reasonable time frames and eliminated the delays and downtime associated with manually or mechanically computed
game moves.
Early History of Wargames
The use of games to evaluate and predict the performance of military organizations in battle has a long history.290 The game of chess is believed to be the oldest form of
wargame, although the Chinese sage Sun Tzu is said to have
created a wargame called Wei Hei around 1,000 B.C.E. In
this game, each player maneuvered colored stones on a painted surface with the object of outanking his opponent.291 In
the West, however, games of the chess variety, such as the
Kings Game, developed by Christopher Weikhmann at
Ulm in 1664, were the dominant form until the late eighteenth century.292 By the late eighteenth century, the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment had produced increasing interest in warfare as an exact science, the rules of which
could be expressed precisely using mathematics. This interest was manifested in the development of wargamesstill
played on chess-like boards with pieces representing various
military formationsof increasing complexity with detailed
and lengthy rules. One such game was invented in 1780 by
Helwig, the Master of Pages at the Court of Brunswick, and
was played on a modied chessboard with 1,666 squares
tinted to represent varying terrain.293 The game was played
by two opponents, each of whom had his Fortication,
which replaced the traditional King. Another, even more
complex game, the New Kriegsspiel, was published in 1798
by Georg Vinturinus, a military writer and tactician from
Schleswig.294 Vinturinus game used a board with 3,600
squares and had some sixty pages of rules.
The revolution in warfare eected by Napoleon at the
beginning of the nineteenth century made earlier concepts
of warfare obsolete, and interest in the older wargames declined. However, in 1811, the Prussian Baron von Reisswitz
developed a new wargame played on a sand table rather
than a game board, and in 1824 his son, von Reisswitz the
Younger, a lieutenant in the Prussian Guard Artillery, came
up with a new type of wargame based on actual military
operations and played on a realistic map-like chart with a
scale of 1:8,000.295 Troop units were represented by movable pieces, a director or umpire provided a starting situation and made decisions regarding movements, and losses
and outcomes were determined by a throw of the dice. Von
Reisswitz the Youngers Instructions for the Representation of
Tactical Maneuvers under the Guise of a War Game attracted
the attention of Field Marshal Meing and King Wilhelm
III of Prussia, and was prescribed for play in the Prussian
army.296 However, von Reisswitzs game was dicult to learn
and tedious to play, and there was considerable opposition to

it in the Prussian army, although one of its enthusiasts was
Count von Moltke the Elder, the chief of the Prussian General Sta in the mid-nineteenth century.297
A major change in wargaming came with the publication
in 1876 of a booklet titled A Contribution to the War Game
by Col. von Verdy du Vernois, the chief of sta of the First
Army Corps of the Imperial German Army.298 Von Verdy
du Vernois greatly simplied the rules for wargaming and
introduced what came to be called Free Kriegsspiel, which
largely dispensed with set rules and detailed calculations,
relying instead on the experience and acumen of a director who made decisions regarding movement rates, combat
power, casualties, and so forth. A further important developmentthe use of a standard based on collected data but
modied by a multiplier to account for variations in conditionscame with the publication of Naumanns Das Regiments-Kriegsspiel in 1877.299
Because Von Verdy du Vernois Free Kriegsspiel was
relatively easy to learn and to play, and proceeded at a relatively fast pace, it became popular. The older, more-elaborate
form of the wargame involving abundant and complex rules,
tables, and data based on actual historical battles, which
came to be called Rigid Kriegsspiel, fell out of favor.300 The
Germans were particularly enthusiastic proponents of Free
Kriegsspiel, and it became a staple of German military instruction and war planning from the late nineteenth century
through World War II.301 The famous Schlieen Plan of
World War I was thoroughly gamed, as were the 1940 German Ardennes oensive, the abortive amphibious invasion
of Britain (Operation SEALION), and the invasion of Russia in 1941 (Operation BARBAROSSA), and when the Allies attacked in Lorraine and around Aachen in November
1944, Field Marshal Walther Model used the results of an
ongoing wargame to direct his countermoves.302
The Japanese were also enthusiastic wargamers, and the
Japanese Total War Research Institute, created in October
1940, conducted a series of in-depth games beginning in August 1941 that assumed a United StatesJapanese war beginning in mid-December of that year.303 The most important
games, involving nearly all the top Japanese naval ocers,
began on 2 September 1941 and covered two general problems: a surprise raid on the U.S. eet at Pearl Harbor; and the
schedule for Japanese forces occupying Malaya, Burma, the
Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and
the islands of the central Pacic, including Hawaii.304
American army ocers in the late nineteenth century were ardent admirers of all things Prussian, and Free
Kriegsspiel became popular along with such Prussian Army
accouterments as the Pickelhaube, or spiked dress helmet.305
A number of U.S. Army ocers published wargames, the
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most important of which was probably The American
Kriegsspiel, designed by Maj. W. L. Livermore of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in 1883.306 Using data from actual
Civil War battles as well as from the Prussian campaigns of
1866 and 187071, Livermore designed a game with extensive rules and planning factors covering the minute details
of the eects of re; the training, fatigue, and morale of the
troops; and the eect of variations in terrain.307 Livermores
contemporary, Lt. C. A. L. Totten of the 4th Cavalry, also
designed a game, called Strategos, played on a board with
blocks representing the troops and with messages and orders
issued by a director.308 A notable feature of Strategos was
that it came in two versionsa battle game for beginners
and an advanced game for more-seasoned players.
The games of Livermore and Totten were essentially
Rigid Kriegsspiel, and, being dicult to learn and play,
did not arouse much enthusiasm, although the Naval War
College codied the rules for an American Kriegsspiel in
1884, and wargaming was integrated into the Naval War
College curriculum from 1887.309 However, in 1897, Maj.
Eben Swift of the 5th Cavalry (and a leading instructor
at the Army School of the Line and Sta College at Fort
Leavenworth) translated von Verdy du Vernois A Simplied
War Game, and thus introduced Free Kriegsspiel to the U.S.
Army.310 Free Kriegsspiel was played at the Sta College at
Fort Leavenworth from 1904 and at the Army School of the
Line from 1907, but, although wargaming became commonly used for instructional purposes, it had little real inuence
until the 1930s when the Army War College used wargaming techniques to evaluate strategic war plans.311
Free Kriegsspiel remained the most popular form of
wargaming in both Europe and America until the development of operations research during World War II and
the subsequent development of the high-speed electronic
digital computer.312 Both OR and the computer revived interest in Rigid Kriegsspiel by providing an adequate means
for handling the massive amounts of data and computations required to make a complex Rigid Kriegsspiel exercise practicable. So much time was required to complete
each cycle of play and the number of game variables was
limited by the diculty of computing the necessary values
and eects quickly and accurately in the era of the stubby
pencil. Operations research, however, led to matrix mathematics by which the many variables and interrelationships
in a given situation could be dened, and the high-speed
electronic digital computer made it possible to store, relate,
and compute the eects of those variables quickly.313 Thus,
by the early 1950s it was possible to design and play a complex Rigid Kriegsspiel with numerous variables based on
data derived from actual operations with reasonable accuracy and speed. By the early 1960s, the use of computers in
wargaming had been further enhanced by the development

of new electronic display devices that made it possible for
players to visualize the ongoing action more clearly.314 As a
consequence, OR analysts turned increasingly to sophisticated computerized simulation as the principal tool for the
study of weapons systems, organization, and tactics.315
Computers and Wargaming at ORO, 195061
As in so many other areas of Army OR, the Operations
Research Oce under Ellis Johnson took the lead in the use
of wargaming supported by high-speed electronic digital
computers. ORO was among the rst military OR organizations to make full-time use of a high-speed electronic computer and to develop wargaming as a method for studying
military situations.316 Even before the advent of the highspeed electronic digital computer, ORO used the latest data
handling and mechanical computation devices, principally
programmable IBM punch-card machines.317 When highspeed electronic computers became available to government
oces in the early 1950s, ORO rented time on the UNIVAC I computers operated by various government agencies,
particularly the Bureau of the Census.318
In May 1955, ORO contracted for its own computer, an
ERA (UNIVAC) 1103 chosen over its competitor, the IBM
701, on the basis of cost and early delivery date.319 ORO
leased the 1103 on a single-shift, 40-hours-per-week basis,
with any downtime on one day being made up by extending time on another.320 The 1103 was used primarily for
wargame simulations. The wargames usually had long periods between inputs while the gamers determined their next
move, and the interrupt feature on the 1103 made it possible
to run other batch work between wargaming iterations.321
In 1957, ORO replaced the 1103 with a UNIVAC 1103A
having 4,096 words of core memory and added six Uniservo
tape drives to the system, for a total monthly rental fee of
$24,838.322 ORO was still using the UNIVAC 1103A at
the time of OROs demise in August 1961.
Computer operations at ORO were focused in the
Computing Laboratory (COMPLAB) that was part of the
Strategic Division. COMPLAB was a service organization
that assisted all the ORO divisions with matters pertaining
to computers. Its prescribed mission was to provide service
and assistance to other projects through equipment operation, instruction in the use of facilities, and the development
of applications to OR problems.323 The associated Electronics Laboratory also provided support services, including
the design, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of instrumentation for wargames, both map and computer types, and for eld experiments.
COMPLAB consumed a sizable proportion of the
ORO resources, and Ellis Johnson monitored it closely to
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ensure that there was an adequate balance between research
analysts and computer sta and machines.324 ORO computer operations grew from a sta of eight, some 1,000 hours of
operation, and an annual machine rental cost of $100,000
in 1955 to a sta of nineteen, an estimated 3,500 hours of
operation, and an estimated machine rental cost of $425,000
in 1958.325 Counting COMPLAB personnel costs, ORO
computing services consumed $650,000 in 1957, which was
1820 percent of the total ORO budget.326 By 1960, the direct cost of the Computing Laboratory was about 7 percent
of OROs gross income.327
Although all ORO analysts were required to attend a
short course on computers and learn to write a simple program,
by 1960 about 90 percent of the computing time available to
ORO was used for simulations and validation of mathematical models rather than straight analysis.328 Of eighteen major
computing programs completed in the period 195860, only
three were straight analysis, reduction of data from eld experiments, or the solution of mathematical equations.329
Wargaming was a major part of the ORO work program
throughout the 1950s. Each ORO division had its own set of
games, designed primarily as research tools, and ORO participated actively in wargames conducted by other government
agencies, from the National Security Council on down, as well
as in Japan, Korea, and Germany.330 The players of ORO
wargames were mostly military personnel, which helped the
oce achieve necessary military insights, but ORO analysts
also played active roles.331 As Ellis Johnson noted in 1958:
War games are used to give us insight. This allows us to design
practical combat models that we can usually solve on a digital
computer to nd the best combination of organization, weapons, materiel, and tactics. This usually leads to a need for more
detailed operations analysis and eld experiments, which lead
to revision of the war games. The results go continuously to the
Army, which in turn provides continuous guidance.332
The purpose of the STRATSPIEL Group in the Strategic Division was to develop wargaming at the strategic level
and integrate the gaming materials produced by the other
divisions into a comprehensive theater-level game.333 The
STRATSPIEL Group rst attempted to adapt the RAND
Corporations strategic game, SAWSPIEL, to ORO requirements by placing more emphasis on the ground war and by
introducing sociological considerations.334 The group then
passed on to the development of STRATSPIEL I, a strategic
generalization of the air defense game ZIGSPIEL, which explored the Army role, including air defense measures, during
and after a strategic nuclear attack.335 The Strategic Division
also controlled COMPLAB, which supported wargaming by
the other ORO divisions, and the divisions OPSEARCH
Group undertook studies on OR methodology related to
wargaming, published several papers on the application of
high-speed computers to wargaming, and developed a value

theory as a component of decision theory.336
The Tactics Divisions TACSPIEL Group focused on
tactical battle simulation using high-speed computer techniques, the quantication of the tactical eects of terrain
and weather, and battle decision criteria.337 The TACSPIEL
Group had two main games: FAME, a hand-played game,
and Carmonette, a computerized game.338 FAME was designed to enable the ORO tactical gamers to get a feel for the
situation and to suggest approaches to the gaming of a limited war in the Middle East, specically Jordan.339 Two questions that the ORO gamers hoped to answer with FAME
were To what extent can nuclear weapons compensate for
conventional inferiority? and Can an air-lifted division,
such as the 101st Airborne Division, stand up against a current [1958] Soviet mechanized division?
Carmonette was arguably the premier tactical game to
appear in the 1950s and 1960s.340 The game, a Monte Carlo
simulation, integrated the simulated eects of various weapons systems and military actions (such as ring and moving)
to produce a combat result. As originally designed in the mid1950s, Carmonette dealt with a company-level attack against
a defending Soviet rie company.341 The initial runs involved
a counterattacking Blue Force consisting of a medium tank
company (seventeen tanks) and three squads of infantry
mounted in armored personnel carriers with a battery of 4.2inch mortars in support, and a defending Red Force consisting of a company of ten medium tanks, a company of ve selfpropelled guns, and nine squads of dismounted infantry. In
the 1960s Carmonette was extended to represent battalionlevel operations with forty to fty systems on the defenders
side and three times as many for the attacking forces.
The Intelligence Divisions TELLSPIEL Group concerned itself with developing and applying mathematical
models and gaming techniques to the problems of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.342 The principal TELLSPIEL Group wargame was INDIGO, a twosided wargame played by experienced military ocers.343 In
INDIGO, the emphasis was on the solution of intelligencetype problems, one of which is the measuring of the relative
utility and eectiveness of various proposed acquisition devices.344 INDIGO was a hand-played game, but there were
plans to computerize it. The Intelligence Division also studied ways in which the high-speed electronic digital computer
could be used to simulate and calculate the eects of varying
the major components of an intelligence system.345
The LOGSPIEL Group in the Logistics (later Operations) Division developed gaming methods for comparing
the capabilities of various logistics systems and for evaluating the eects of changes in the logistic situation on strategic and tactical plans and operations.346 An ORO technical
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memorandum titled Gaming Strategic Logistics Studies was
published in March 1959.347
The ZIGSPIEL Group of the Home Defense (later Air
Defense) Division assessed the Soviet threat and then developed gaming methods for estimating the eectiveness of
various defense systems in a realistic framework and integrated the air defense of the continental United States into
the strategic wargaming work of the Strategic Division.348
The Air Defense Division also undertook operational simulations of various air defense missiles, such as the Nike,
Talos, and Hawk systems.349
The Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group
The rapid and substantial growth in the use of digital
computers and wargaming techniques to test and evaluate
Army weapons, organization, and doctrine prompted the
establishment in 1960 of a separate in-house Army agency
to develop and apply simulation techniques. Following concept approval by the Army vice chief of sta, Gen. George H.
Decker, on 28 July 1960, the United States Army Strategy
and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG) was established as a
Class II eld activity under the sta supervision of the deputy chief of sta for military operations (DCSOPS) on 11
August 1960, pursuant to Department of the Army General
Order No. 19.350 Col. Alfred W. DeQuoy was appointed as
chief of STAG eective 1 September 1960, but productive
operations did not begin for some time.351
The mission of STAG as prescribed in Army Regulations No. 1514 was to support Department of the Army
operational planning and evaluation activities by wargaming
and allied techniques.352 The tasks and functions associated
with that mission were to
a. Develop a land combat wargaming model for testing Army
plans. To the extent feasible, the model will be developed for
application to a large scale computer.
b. Conduct studies of Department of the Army problems using
wargaming and allied techniques as feasible.
c. Advise and provide technical assistance to other Army and
Army-supported agencies in wargaming matters on request.
d. Provide Army participation, to include wargaming models,
in joint wargames as required.
e. Maintain liaison with other agencies engaged in wargaming
activities as required in furtherance of STAGs mission.
f. Perform other duties as directed.353
STAG was organized functionally to provide the military, scientic, and computer integration necessary for the
solving of complex problems through gaming and other
techniques.354 The organization of STAG evolved quickly,
and, by the end of the rst quarter of FY 1963, STAG was
organized as shown in Figure 38.
The Oce of the Chief provided command, supervision, and technical direction, and the Sta Management Ofce was responsible for all support and coordination functions normally accomplished by an installation sta such
as operations and security, administrative services, drafting
and reproduction services, supply, and transportation.355
The Plans and Analysis Division was organized with three
branches (Plans, Joint and Special, and Analysis) and undertook long-range planning for STAG itself; conducted studies of Army problems to determine the feasibility and applicability of using wargaming or allied techniques for their
solution; provided advice and technical assistance to other
Army and Army-supported agencies in wargaming matters;
provided Army participation in joint wargames; and analyzed, evaluated, interpreted, and prepared technical reports
of wargames, wargaming methodologies, OR studies, and
other technical procedures.356
The Land Warfare Division, which performed the primary task of STAG, was organized with three branches
(Combat, Combat Support, and Control Group), and was
responsible for planning and developing a mathematical
land wargaming model of sucient size, scope, and exibility to make possible the computerized wargaming of
any and all phases of combat and combat support operations.357 The Gaming Division was organized with a Manual Gaming Branch and a Computer Gaming Branch, each
with a Control Team, a Blue Team, and a Red Team; the
division conducted manual, computer-assisted, and computerized wargames to test Army operational plans using
models developed by the Land Warfare Division or other
STAG elements.358 The Systems Division, consisting of a
Systems Analysis Branch, Programming Branch, and Computer-Display Branch, designed, developed, modied, and
implemented high-speed computational systems to be used
for simulating or wargaming ground combat and for solving
related Army problems for which mathematical models had
been prepared.359
It was envisioned that the orderly development of
STAG would take place over a period of three years by
gradually increasing its personnel strength.360 The authorized STAG personnel strength for FY 1961 was set at 74
(21 ocers, 14 enlisted personnel, 26 professional civilians, and 13 administrative civilians).361 However, as late
as 4 May 1961, STAG had only three ocers and seven
professional civilians assigned.362 Diculties were encountered in hiring qualied civilian OR analysts at civil
service grade GS13, and STAG had to pursue a vigorous nationwide eort to nd qualied personnel.363 Additional personnel were found, but many of them had no
background in OR or wargaming, and a long training program was necessary.
36171_04OR 3.indd 116
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Figure 38STAG Organization: End of First Quarter, FY

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Source: U.S. Army STAG, Fact Sheet, Bethesda, Md., ca. 1962, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 3, Folder 20304 OPPR Program Rpt
Files, 1962, Fact Sheets.
It was soon determined that the proposed stang for

FY 1963 (105 people) was inadequate, and STAG leaders
recommended a substantial increase in the FY63FY67
period.364 Army Table of Distribution No. 899826, dated 1
August 1962, increased the STAG personnel authorization
for the rst quarter of FY 1962 to 128 (40 ocers, 22 enlisted personnel, and 66 civilians), and the Personnel Increase
Justication Plan for FY 1963, approved by the Acting Chief
of Sta of the Army, provided for a strength of 162 people
at the end of FY 1963.365 The STAG personnel status, FY
1961FY 1963, is shown in Table 39.
The initial plans for STAG included awarding a civilian contract for technical support and physical facilities, and
funds for that purpose were included in the FY61 STAG

budget, which totaled $500,000.366 Booz-Allen Applied
Research, Inc., was awarded the contract, eective 1 October 1960, for three professional personnel and temporary
facilities for STAG at 4921 Auburn Ave. in Bethesda, Maryland.367 STAG occupied the temporary site on Auburn Avenue until 19 June 1961, when it moved to a leased oce
building at 4815 Rugby Ave. in Bethesda.368
During its rst year, STAG established contact with
other agencies in the OR and wargaming elds ,including ORO; Headquarters, United States Army Continental Army Command; Headquarters, United States Army
Pacic; and Headquarters, Eighth United States Army in
OR 3 w/chgs.indd 117
8/24/06 11:36:10 AM
Table 39STAG Personnel Status: FY FY

Authorized
FY 1961
Authorized
FY 1962
Actual,
8 June 1962
Proposed
FY 1963
Ocer
21
27
24
49
Enlisted
14
14
13
25
Professional civilian
26
34
Administrative civilian
13
17
35
88
TOTAL
74
92
72
162
Type Personnel
Source: U.S. Army STAG, Organization and Functions Manual (Bethesda, Md.: STAG, 1962), p. 1-1; Memo, DeQuoy to
Fisher and others, 14 Sep 61, sub: Proposed Reorganization for FY 6367, p. 2, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 1, Folder 20122 DA
Mobilization Program Planning Files, 1961; Col. Alfred W. DeQuoy (chief, STAG), Fact Sheet for Director, Strategic Plans and
Policy, Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Operations, Bethesda, Md., 8 Jun 62, sub: Mission, Organization, and Personnel
Status, STAG, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 3, Folder 20304 OPPR Program Report Files, 1962, Tactics Analysis Group
Korea. STAG representatives also participated in a variety

of professional meetings, including the Seventh Tripartite Conference on Operational Research in London on 29
May6 June 1961. To secure the assistance of eminent scientists, STAG established an Advisory Council, which met
for the rst time on 19 July 1961.369 The initial members of
the council included Dr. L. T. E. Thompson (Navy Special
Projects Oce), Dr. F. E. Bothwell (director, Laboratories
for Applied Sciences, University of Chicago), Dr. Richard A.
Leibler (deputy director, Institute for Defense Analyses), Dr.
H. A. Wilcox (director of research and engineering, Defense
Systems Division, General Motors Corporation), and Julian
N. West (director, Military Systems Engineering, Bell Telephone Laboratories).370
It was intended that STAG should have the best and
latest computer equipment with which to carry out its mission, and the FY61 STAG budget included funds for the
rental of an electronic computer. After studying the available
high-speed computers, in October 1960 STAG arranged to
lease an IBM 7090 system for delivery on 1 August 1961.371
During FY 1961, STAG also received proposals from civilian rms for supplying STAG with a large-screen display
system for use with the IBM 7090 computer, and in June
1961 STAG contracted with IBM for installation of a $1.3
million automatic display system by 1 May 1962.372 The
new electronic visual display system used color symbology
and alphanumeric characters projected on background reference maps.373
In March 1961, Col. DeQuoy, the chief of STAG, exchanged letters with Ellis Johnson regarding the possibility of
ORO sharing the cost and use of STAGs IBM 7090.374 By
letter of 20 March 1961, however, Johnson declined the oer,
although ORO subsequently did lease time on the STAG
IBM 7090 on an hourly basis as did its successor, RAC.375
In July 1962, Philip H. Lowry, the acting director, Combat
Systems, RAC, wrote to the DCSOPS noting the splendid

cooperation given RAC by the STAG computing sta. The
results obtained from the STAG computer have contributed signicantly to the RAC research program.376 The U.S.
Army Chemical Corps Operations Research Group also
used the STAG IBM 7090 on a non-reimbursable basis.377
STAG used both hand-played and computerized wargames, the latter being preferred because of the tremendous
advantages of computers in reducing time and expense.
STAGs rst major wargaming success was the Field Army
Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS) wargame
model approved for development by the Army vice chief of
sta on 26 August 1960.378 Because no contracting funds
were immediately available, Col. DeQuoy decided to begin
development of the model in-house.379 The model, which
was designed to support the evaluation of contractor proposals by the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency at
Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, was essentially an IBM 7090
mathematics simulation of FABMDS in operation against
an enemy ballistic missile attack in the post-1965 period, and
it involved more than twenty-four parameters and thus more
than fourteen thousand combinations involving those variables alone.380 In April 1961, a $15,750 contract was awarded to the Service Bureau Corporation for necessary programming, and the project subsequently went forward.381
In March 1961, the DCSOPS authorized STAG to
assist the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) in Korea
with its wargaming eorts. STAG subsequently examined
certain conclusions drawn from EUSA wargames by the
Synthetic Tactics system in Korea and prepared a model
that enabled future EUSA wargames to be played on a
computer.382 Out of STAGs work with EUSA came a land
warfare model, later extended to support any size force, that
could be used to analyze and evaluate EUSAs operational
and contingency plans.383
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CENTAUR was the computerized land warfare model
designed by STAG as a tool for the operational testing of
worldwide Army campaign and contingency plans.384 Described as a two-sided, free play, closed man-computer
simulation, CENTAUR was developed in two phases.385
In Phase I, the STAG Land Warfare Division prepared a
division-level game to test division operations orders against
specic objectives established by the division sta whose plan
was being tested. In Phase II, data from the division-level
game were used to expand CENTAUR to a eld armylevel
and then to a theater armylevel game (LEGION) to test
Army plans against criteria established by the Army Sta.
Work on CENTAUR began on 11 September 1961 with
projected completion of the division-level game in December
1963, and of the theater-level game in December 1965.386
Development of CENTAUR required signicant resources, including an interdisciplinary team of assigned ofcers, enlisted personnel, professional civilians, and administrative civilians, and contract analysts from Booz-Allen
Applied Research and contract programmers from Computer Concepts, Inc.387 The IBM 7090 was used to develop
and run CENTAUR, and a linked IBM 1401 was used as an
input/output device.388 Programming for CENTAUR was
an extension of FORTRAN known as CENTAUR Operating System, developed by Computer Concepts.389 CENTAUR was designed to be able to change the game parameters at any time as better information became available.
CENTAUR was played in four separate rooms: Red
War Room, Blue War Room, Control Room, and Computer
Room, and communication among players and umpires was
by message, telephone, or personal contact. The operations
plan to be test was provided to the Blue Team by the Control
Group. CENTAUR was a major advance over more-primitive wargames as a means of performing timely studies of
practical usefulness to the modern military planner.390
One unique feature of STAG model design was that
each model was accompanied by the complete and detailed
explanation of the logic and thinking that went into it, the
various courses of action and why each one was selected, and
why some elements were included and others were not.391
This was done in the hope that it would save the Army thousands of dollars and thousands of man-hours for restudying
existing undocumented models or the development of new
ones.392 Overall, STAG had signicant success in the military wargaming eld and soon became an indispensable and
permanent part of the Army OR program.393
Recruitment and Training of
Army OR Personnel
The expansion of ORO (and its successor, RAC) and
the establishment of many new Army OR organizations in
the 1950s and early 1960s created substantial challenges for

Army OR program managers. Among the most pressing and
persistent problems were the recruitment and training of adequate numbers of qualied operations research analysts. By
the early 1960s, the military services required approximately
thirty to fty new operations research analysts each year to
sustain the growth of military OR programs.394 Most candidates were drawn from the national pool of men and women
trained in mathematics and the physical sciences, and operations research programs had to compete with industry and
other government programs for the limited number of candidates available. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Army
and the other services faced a severe shortage of suitable engineering and scientic personnel, partly because American
universities produced too few such people and partly because
of the competition from industry and the diculties of hiring
and retaining scientic talent under the existing civil service
rules.395 Indeed, the demand for scientic talent by the government became so great in the 1950s that many observers
voiced concern about the constraint on national economic
growth and scientic work in industry caused by the drain of
scientists to government positions.396
Two factors served to alleviate the diculties of nding sucient numbers of qualied OR analysts trained in
mathematics and the physical sciences during the 1950s: (1)
the extension of OR to the study of political, economic, and
social issues and the consequent increase in the proportion
of analysts drawn from the social sciences and humanities,
and (2) a substantial increase in academic training programs
in operations research.
In the two decades after Pearl Harbor, the scope of OR
studies expanded tremendously and the traditional focus of
operations researchthe evaluation of weapons and equipment, eld organization of military forces, and tacticswidened to include the study of human behavior; higher-level
strategy and policy; and political, economic, and social issues.
Accordingly, the demand for analysts trained in the social sciences and humanities increased proportionately.397 The trend
toward hiring personnel from disciplines other than mathematics and the physical sciences was led by ORO, and. by
1953, more than 40 percent of the ORO sta was drawn from
the behavioral and social sciences.398 Between 1948 and 1962,
the percentage of natural scientists (biologists, for example)
hired by ORO/RAC remained fairly small and constant and
the number of engineers and physical scientists (physicists,
for example) declined, but the number of social scientists,
mathematicians, statisticians, and computer specialists increased substantially.399 Between 1953 and 1963, the ratio of
engineers, physical scientists, and natural scientists to behavioral scientists employed by ORO/RAC changed from 4:3 to
2:5.400 By 1963, the distribution of social scientists employed
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by Army operations research organizations was striking: RAC
employed 90 percent of the economists, HumRRO employed
80 percent of the psychologists, and SORO employed 67 percent of the political scientists.401 In general, the two groups
learned to cooperate and to complement one another, but
there continued to be a degree of tension between the hard
scientists and the soft scientists.402 The constantly increasing number of computer specialists employed by Army OR
organizations formed yet a third group.
Although the demand for new OR analysts increased
steadily throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the diculty
of recruiting qualied individuals was also eased somewhat
by substantial improvement in the United States in the
means and methods of training operations research analysts.403 Training for Army OR analysts took three general
forms: formal academic courses in universities; on-the-job
training; and seminars, conferences, and short-term training
sessions conducted by various organizations for both analysts and users of operations research.404
Formal academic training programs in operations research in the universities expanded signicantly in the 1950s.
Formal education in operations research began in 1951, and
the rst doctoral degrees in OR were awarded by MIT and
JHU in 1955.405 In 1954, only four universities (MIT, Johns
Hopkins, Case Institute of Technology, and the Moore
School of Electrical Engineering of the University of Pennsylvania) oered degree programs in OR, but, by 1959, nineteen universities oered doctoral programs in the eld.406
Once an OR analyst was employed by one or another of
the Army OR groups, his or her training continued in a variety of forms, including on-the-job training, mentoring, and
attendance at seminars, conferences, and training sessions
sponsored by universities, industry, or the military OR organizations themselves.407 On-the-job trainingthe classic
means of transmitting the theory, methods, and procedures
of military ORalso increased in sophistication over two
decades. By the early 1960s, the concept of assigning personnel from the supported organization to train and work as
analysts with the supporting OR group had become commonplace and produced promising results.408
The principal Army OR organizations, such as ORO,
conducted a wide range of in-house training, including
courses in basic mathematics, statistics, and computer science, courses in operations research theory and methods,
and orientation courses for new personnel and for clients.
There were also seminars at which the results of OR studies were presented.409 Considerable attention was given to
training the users of operations research to recognize its
benets, limitations, and general methods.
The increasing number of operations conferences, symposia, and seminars sponsored by universities, industry, and the
military OR groups provided additional opportunities for OR

training, and the activities and publications of the Operations
Research Society of America and the Military Operations Research Society did much to promote the sense of community
and the exchange of information among operations research
practitioners in the military, and to provide a forum for the
popularization of OR in the general community.410
Despite the substantial growth and improvement of
OR training programs, problems remained. In 1963, it still
took twelve to thirty-six months to produce an eective,
contributing OR analyst.411 And, although the training of
civilian OR analysts had expanded dramatically between
1941 and 1963, by the early 1960s few military ocers had
been trained and qualied as OR analysts. Moreover, despite
the urgent need for OR training, the Army seemed to oer
fewer opportunities than the other services and not all of
the opportunities available to Army OR analysts were being
used.412 There also remained an unmet need for a central
collection of information on military OR methodsa central library, abstracting service, and publicationthat would
have facilitated OR training and practice.413
The Demise of ORO,
The relationship of the Army, The Johns Hopkins
University, and ORO from 1948 to 1961 was not without
disagreement and controversy. Continued distrust of operations analysts by Army personnel, questions about the timeliness and focus of ORO studies, the ever-expanding scope
of ORO interests, and, above all, Ellis Johnsons irascible
personality caused tensions that led in August 1961 to the
cancellation of the Armys contract with JHU and the replacement of ORO with a new, independent research organization, the Research Analysis Corporation.
Despite the success of OR in many areas during the
1950s, there remained a number of Army ocers who were
unwilling to accept the meddling of operations analysts,
just as later there would be those who rejected organizational eectiveness or performance-based training. For the
most part, their visceral dislike of OR was based on nothing more than the belief that civilians should not be involved
in Army business. Others failed to see how Army interests
were served by an organization such as ORO that operated
with a good deal of independence and objectivity rather than
being a good Army team player.414
The issue of the timeliness and focus of ORO studies
that arose during the early 1950s remained a nagging problem into the early 1960s. The eorts of Johnson and his
management team at ORO had largely solved the timeliness
problem by 1960, although some Army leaders continued to
have unrealistic expectations about the time in which their
demands could be met. The question of the focus of ORO
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studies was a bigger problem. The oces work program had
gradually shifted during the 1950s from a focus on weapons
analysis and the evaluation of Army organization and tactics
toward questions of higher-level strategy and national policy.415 Army leaders, of course, were preoccupied with nding solutions to the pressing practical problems of mounting
an eective military response to an aggressive Soviet Union,
and they were less concerned about more-nebulous issues.
Moreover, many ORO studies had begun to touch on matters of policy, and the Army was determined to deal with
policy matters in its own way.416
Johnson believed that the future for OR in support of
the military was limited and he wished to keep ORO in the
front rank of OR studies.417 Moreover, based on his experience with the mining campaign against Japan in World
War II and more than a decade of dealing with the horrible possibilities of nuclear warfare, Johnson had come to
believe that there was more to be gained by directing ORO
eorts toward understanding the root causes of conict
and the development of national policies for avoiding war
or ending it quickly.418 Accordingly, he wanted to continue
the trend toward involvement of ORO in the study of such
topics as nation building, social policy, and the solution of
a variety of problems somewhat remote from the immediate, practical interests of his Army paymasters. The three
areas seen by Johnson as ripe for the future application of
OR were regional and world development, medicine, and
charity.419 To keep ORO on the cutting edge of operations
research, Johnson suggested in several letters to the president of JHU, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, that ORO ought
to expand its application of OR to the development of
large areas, and more specically, to underdeveloped areas,
particularly Africa.420
By the early 1960s, the Army had options other than
ORO for meeting its most pressing needs for operations
research support. Other contractors had entered the eld,
many originally as subcontractors for ORO. HumRRO,
SORO, and the Combat Operations Research Group
(CORG) (run by Technical Operations, Inc., at HQ CONARC) were in full operation, and the Armys in-house OR
organizations, STAG and the technical services OR groups,
were available. In fact, by FY 1962, at least eleven Army
agencies were sponsoring OR studies and at least twenty
in-house OR groups were attached to various Army commands and agencies.421 Such an array of alternatives made
it possible to gamble with the cancellation and transfer of
the ORO contract.
Many observers agreed that Johnsons personality was a
major factor in Army leaders dissatisfaction. Johnson had a
well-dened concept of where he wanted to take ORO, and
he promoted his vision vigorously and with perhaps less tact
than might have been prudent. He did not suer fools gladly
and could be very direct in his criticism of those who did
not share his vision. As a consequence, he was frequently at
odds with his Army Sta overseer, the chief of research and
development, regarding the direction of ORO research and
the use of its resources. Particular points of disagreement
were the degree to which ORO would be free to select and
conduct research projects of its own choosing and the secrecy requirements imposed by the Army.422 Although he frequently disagreed with Army leaders on the direction ORO
should take and on other matters, Johnson was respected; on
16 January 1958, he was awarded the Army Distinguished
Civilian Service Medal.423
Johnsons relationship with the leaders of JHU was always correct, but his demands could be exasperating, and
he was apparently deeply unhappy about the reluctance of
university ocials to support wholeheartedly his proposals
for an operations research center at JHU and the extension
of the ORO research into nation building and other sensitive social policy issues.424 For their part, university leaders
were beginning to question the wisdom of close contractual
relationships with the federal government and the military
in particular.425 There was growing concern throughout the
American academic community about the loss of independence and academic freedom associated with large-scale
governmentuniversity contracting.426 Many academics
rued their growing dependence on government funding,
particularly in the sciences and elds dealing with social
policy. There was also a growing opposition on campus to
the U.S. governments eorts in the elds of psychological
warfare and counterinsurgencyopposition that would
erupt in the 1960s in active protest against the war in
Southeast Asia.
The specic reason for the cancellation of the Army-JHU
contract for ORO remains unclear, but it certainly hinged on
the fact that the Army leaders concerned had lost condence
in Johnson as the director of ORO. The relationship between
Johnson and Army leaders worsened in 1960, and the matter
nally came to a head in the summer of 1961 when the Army
made the replacement of Johnson a condition for renewing
the contract with JHU. University president Dr. Eisenhower
was sympathetic to the Army point of view, but faced with
an Army ultimatum, he stood his ground and refused to be
bullied into dismissing Johnson.427 After trying unsuccessfully to convince Johnson to step down voluntarily and after
consulting senior members of the ORO sta, Eisenhower
concluded that the only solution agreeable to both parties
would be for the Army not to renew the ORO contract.428
Bowing to the inevitable, Johnson resigned in July 1961. Dr.
Lynn Rumbaugh became acting director and negotiated the
work program for the coming year.429
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Long before the actual cancellation of the Armys contract with JHU, the Army took steps to ensure that the work
of ORO would continue. A survey of the Armys long-range
requirements for scientic support conducted by the Army
Research Oce in 1960 resulted in a recommendation
that a nonprot organization take over the contract with
The Johns Hopkins University for ORO.430 The assistant
secretary of the Army (research and development), Finn J.
Larsen, proposed that a corporation be set up to assume the
ORO mission, and Army leaders agreed that a new corporation was the best way of preserving the needed combination
of competence, objectivity, independence from proprietary
biases, exibility, and responsiveness.431 As a result, the
Research Analysis Corporation was incorporated in Washington, D.C., on 6 June 1961, and the Army asked John T.
Connor, the president of Merck & Company, to assemble a
board of trustees for the new corporation.432 The next day,
Dr. Hector R. Skifter, president of Airborne Instruments
Laboratories, was named the rst chairman of the board.
Other board members included Connor, John F. Floberg
(general counsel, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company), J.
H. Pickering (Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering), Dr. Hendrik
W. Bode (vice president, Bell Telephone Laboratories), Gen.
James McCormack, Jr. (vice president, MIT), and General of
the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman of the board, Bulova
Watch Company).433 In July, Frank A. Parker, Jr., who had
served as a naval ocer in World War II and was a former
assistant director of defense research and engineering, was
elected president of RAC.434
The Army contract with JHU for ORO expired at 2400
hours, 31 August 1961. RAC began operations on 1 September 1961, following the signing of a contract by Assistant
Secretary of the Army Finn J. Larsen; the Army chief of research and development, Maj. Gen. William J. Ely; and RAC
president, Frank Parker, Jr.435 RAC took over OROs physical assets and contractual obligations, most of the ORO sta
of more than 300 technical and 135 administrative personnel, and OROs working relationships with other agencies.436
RAC made few early changes in the ORO organization, and
the ORO work program continued virtually unchanged.437
By the end of 1961, the takeover was complete.
The ocial Department of Defense explanation for the
change from ORO to RAC was that the Armys growing requirements for scientic support in the short range and long
range planning elds indicated the need for an independent
nonprot organization oering exibility and expansion
capability.438 Although the Army-JHU-ORO relationship
ended in acrimony, no one denied that during its thirteenyear life, ORO, which had published 648 studies containing thousands of recommendations, most of which had been
adopted by the Army, had compiled a substantial record of
achievement and had great inuence on many aspects of

Army weaponry, organization, tactics, and strategy.439
Conclusion
The shift of the Armys principal operations research
contract from the university-sponsored Operations Research Oce to the independent Research Analysis Corporation marked the end of an era in at least two respects. The
Army would no longer rely only on one OR organization to
meet its needs, and university-sponsored OR organizations
would no longer be the preferred form.
In 1950, ORO was the Armys only full-scale OR organization. By the early 1960s, in response to the demands of
the Cold War, the Army OR program had expanded to include a substantial number of OR groups spread throughout
the Army. In fact, in May 1963, there were six principal Army
OR organizations: the Research Analysis Corporation, the
Human Resources Research Oce, the Special Operations
Research Oce, the Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group, the
Combat Operations Research Group (operated by Technical
Operations, Inc.), and the Combat Developments Command
operations research element (operated by Stanford Research
Institute). Together, the six organizations employed more than
four hundred analysts and technical aides and were responsible for the bulk of the Armys OR activities.440 In addition,
other OR groups were active in the various technical services,
and eleven Army agencies supported some twenty in-house
OR groups in nine commandsgroups that ranged in size
from two to forty professional analysts and employed approximately two hundred civilian and military personnel.441
From World War II to the early 1960s, the U.S. armed
forces and the American academic community had a close
working relationship. But the growing opposition on campus
to government-sponsored research, which would erupt in the
disorder and active protest against such relationships in the
mid-1960s, led the armed forces to transfer the bulk of their
research contracting to private, independent organizations,
both nonprot think tanks and for-prot corporations.442
The RAND Corporation had long dominated the Air Force
OR program. In September 1961, the Army replaced the
ORO sponsored by The Johns Hopkins University with the
new RAC, and in July 1962, the Navy combined its several
OR elements under the Center for Naval Analyses administered by the Franklin Institute.443
Not only did the number of OR organizations serving
the Army increase and the nature of their sponsorship begin
to change between 1950 and 1962; signicant progress was
also made in developing more eective OR techniques and
methods and expanding OR into new elds.444 Indeed, OR
as a discipline itself evolved at high speed, and the eects of
that rapid evolution were seen in several important areas.
36171_04OR 3.indd 122
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First, as the Army chief of research and development,
Lt. Gen. Dwight E. Beach, told a gathering of Army OR personnel in March 1963, OR in the Army had expanded from
narrow specic projects of a hardware nature to broad theoretical problems involving complete segments of military operations.445 Whereas World War II operations analysts generally worked on very well-dened and immediate problems,
analysts in the 1950s and early 1960s found it necessary to
address aggregated rather than individual eects and to establish a broader concept of objectives.446 Under Johnsons
direction ORO had demonstrated the applicability of OR
techniques to the analysis of the political, economic, and social issues pertinent to military strategy and national policy.
Moreover, there was an increasing need for synthesis, particularly because OR analysts were becoming ever more specialized in the focus of their inquiries.447
Second, the nature of the problems that OR analysts were
called on to address also changed substantially in the postwar
period. During World War II the focus had been on optimizing the performance of existing systems, but by 1950 the focus
had shifted to guiding the development of future systems.448
By the mid-1950s, Army analysts had successfully applied OR
techniques to a large variety of problems, including
1. determination of the operational requirements for, and the
military characteristics of, new weapons and equipment; 2.
cost and eectiveness studies which involve the determination
of the relative costs in men, money, and materials to achieve
desired results with competitive weapons systems and aim to
ensure that research and development eort is placed on the
most promising weapons, instead of being dissipated across the
board; 3. weapons and equipment tests; 4. the tactical employ-
ment of new weapons systems; 5. economic and logistic studies

which involve determination of the impact of weapons production on national resources, the costs at various production rates,
and related logistics problems.449
Third, the lack of active combat operations following

the end of the Korean War in 1953, and the growing costs
of eld exercises, forced OR analysts to rely increasingly on
data derived from computer simulations and wargames.450
Consequently, computer simulations and wargames became
major methods in the combat development process and
prompted the creation of such organizations as STAG.
Finally, there was a shift from approaching problems on
a disciplinary basis to a focus on the problems of policy,
choice, and decision.451 OR studies of such matters were
best carried out by interdisciplinary teams, and OR analysts
were obliged to employ a rational, quantitative approach,
which joined the contributions of many disciplines in a cooperative eort.452
By 1962, the Armys operations research program had
passed through the throes of adolescence and had reached a
vigorous young adulthood. OR was generally accepted as a
useful tool for the military decision maker and had proven
itself in a wide variety of areas requiring analysis. The Armys
OR capability had expanded in terms of both the number
of active OR groups and the number of analysts employed.
The Army was increasingly eager to incorporate the recommendations of OR analysts into the continuing process of
development of weapons, equipment, organization, tactics,
and strategy. On the whole, operations research in the Army
was poised to make a mature contribution.
chapter three notes
1Larry R. Tinberg, Operations Research and the US Army, student

essay, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1983, p. 3; William
F. Whitmore, Military Operations ResearchA Personal Retrospect,
2Donald W. Meals, Trends in Military Operations Research,
3U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958,
to June 30, 1959, in U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense
and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy,
Secretary of the Air Force, July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1959 (Washington:
USGPO, 1960), p. 27.
4Edward M. Parker and David B. Parker, Trial by Combat:
Operations Research for the Army, Combat Forces Journal 1, 10 (51): 17;
Seymour I. Gilman, Operations Research in the Army, Military Review
26, 4 (1956): 56. DOD spending on OR was a part of the greatly increased
spending on R&D during the period. In 1950, DOD spent about $1.1
billion on R&D; by 1963 that gure had grown to some $12.4 billion
(see U.S. Congress, Oce of Technology Assessment, A History of the
Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
Background Paper OTA-BP-ISS-157 [Washington: USGPO, 1995],

p. 20 [hereafter cited as OTA History]).
5Ellis A. Johnson,The Long-Range Future of Operational Research,
Operations Research 8 ( JanFeb 60): 15; Ellis A. Johnson, A Survey of
Operations Research in the U.S.A., Operations Research 5, 2 ( Jun 54):
43.
6Johnson, Survey of OR, p. 43. In 1954, the government was
spending annually approximately $20,000 per OR analyst, including
salary, travel, technical and administrative support, and overhead (see
Gilman, OR in the Army, p. 56).
student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn., 1957, p. 6; Johnson, Long-Range Future, p. 15; Johnson, Survey
of OR, p. 43.
8ORO, Semiannual Report 1950, vol. III, no. 2 (Fort McNair,
Washington, 31 Dec 50), p. 5.
9Thornton L. Page, George S. Pettee, and William A. Wallace
(assisted by Capt James Martin, USNR, and Alice L. Johnson), Ellis A.
Johnson, 19061973, Operations Research 22, 6 (1974): 1150.
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10Ibid.;
Herbert Yahraes, The Mysterious Mission of ORO,

Saturday Evening Post, 23 Feb 52.
11Eugene P. Visco, The Operations Research Oce (PB20
963), Army History 38 (Summer 1996): 27; ORO, Semiannual Rpt
1950, vol. III, no. 2, p. 5; Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, p. 3.
12ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, vol. III, no. 2, p. 5.
13Visco, ORO, p. 27.
14William L. Whitson, The Growth of the Operations Research
Oce in the U.S. Army, ORSA Journal 8, 6 (1960): 812. ORO
personnel in the Far East Command were given simulated ranks and
served in uniforms with special badges.
15OTA History, p. 21. ORO analyst Sam W. Marshall (not to
be confused with S. L. A. Marshall) and his pilot, Maj. Edward G.
Kelly, were shot down 25 miles inside the North Korean lines but were
rescued (see Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, p. 10).
16Ltr, Lowell J. Reed (president, JHU) to Ellis A. Johnson (director,
ORO), Baltimore, 11 May 55,JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of
the President, Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 55.
17Selwyn D. Smith, Jr., An Evaluation of Army Operations
Research, student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
18Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 812; Yahraes, Mysterious
Mission, pp. 910; Florence N. Trefethen, The History of Operations
Research, JHU-ORO Informal Seminar in Operations Research,
195253, Baltimore, 1953, p. 17.
19ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, vol. III, no. 2, pp. 67; Parker and
Parker, Trial by Combat, p. 16.
20ORO, Semiannual Rpt 1950, vol. III, no. 2, p. 5.
21Trefethen, History of OR, in Joseph F. McCloskey and
Florence N. Trefethen, eds., Operations Research for Management
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), p. 27. The B29
was fully equipped with up-to-date navigation and radar equipment,
which made it well suited for night operations. Pertinent ORO studies
included Preliminary Evaluation of Close Air Support Operations in Korea
(OROR3FEC, Aug 51), A Study of the Eectiveness of Air Support
Operations in Korea (OROT13FEC, Nov 51), and Eectiveness of
Radar-Controlled Night Bombing (OROT33FEC, Nov 52). Close
air support was also studied by DOD WSEG. In early September
1950, then Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin led a WSEG team, including
the distinguished scientists Charles Lauritsen, William B. Shockley,
and Edward Bowles, to Korea to study close air support (see James M.
Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age [New York: Harper & Brothers,
1958], pp. 12930).
22Lorna Jae, Quantitative Analysis and Army Decision Making
Command Historical Oce, Dec 84), p. 10. The pertinent ORO study
was Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons (OROR2FEC, Jul
51).
23Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, pp. 1011. The pertinent ORO
study was The Employment of Armor in Korea (OROR1FEC, 2
vols., JulAug 51).
25Paul Linebarger, Possible Operations Research in FEC Psychological
Warfare, OROT2FEC, Tokyo JHU ORO, 16 Sep 50, p. 3.
26Trefethen, History of OR, p. 18. Among the many pertinent
ORO studies were An Evaluation of PSYWAR Inuence on North
Korean Troops (OROT12FEC, 1951), An Evaluation of PSYWAR
Influence on Chinese Communist Troops (OROT16FEC, 1951),
Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War (OROT17FEC,
1951), and Psychological Warfare and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender
of North Korean and Chinese Forces (OROT40FEC, 1953).
27Jae,
Quantitative Analysis, pp. 910. For example, one result of

the OROs eorts was that psychological operations came to be regarded
in FEC as a weapon rather than as an intelligence application, and the
responsibility for psyops was transferred from FEC G-2 (Intelligence) to
G-3 (Operations). See Trefethen, History of OR, p. 18.
28OTA History, p. 21. The several studies produced by Marshall
included Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea (OROT7EUSAK,
1951).
29Jae, Quantitative Analysis, p. 9.
30Ibid., p. 10.
31U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulations No. 15480:
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEESOperations
Research Oce (Washington: HQ, DA, 4 Apr 51), para. 2. AR 15480
was reissued several times during the period; the last version was issued
on 11 April 1961.
32ORO, ORO Today: Why the Operations Research Oce Has Been
Reorganized and What It Is Doing (Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, 1955), p. 15.
The details of the reorganization were laid out in an internal sta memo,
Reorganization of ORO, 1954 (OROS422; 1954).
33Ibid., pp. 1516.
34ORO, ORO Today, p. 13.
35Ibid.
36ORO, ORO Today, pp. 1415.
37The Technical Council was composed of all the ORO ocers down
through the division chiefs and other senior sta members designated
by the director. The council monitored research quality and advised the
director on problems of ORO policy aecting the research program.
38ORO, ORO Today, p. 15. For a time, Ellis Johnson experimented
with the use of analysts as personnel managers, but he soon shifted to
professional personnel managers (personal communication, Eugene P.
Visco to the author, Nov 03).
39The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Tactics
Division are outlined in ORO, ORO Today, p. 8.
40Philip H. Lowry, Tactics Division, in ORO, A Discussion of the
ORO Work Program, OROSP71, Chevy Chase, Md., ORO, 1958, p.
19.
41The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Strategic
42The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Logistics
43Responsibility for civil aairs and military government was
transferred to the Strategic Division by 1958.
44The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Intelligence
45The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Home
Defense Division are outlined in ORO, ORO Today, p. 11.
46James H. Henry, Air Defense Division, in ORO Discussion of
ORO Work Program, 1958, pp. 5154.
47The initial mission, organization, and functions of the Field
49Ibid., p. 28. There was apparently also an OR section at
Headquarters, United States European Command, in Stuttgart, Germany,
that was not an adjunct of ORO (see Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson,
p. 1151).
50On Hugh Cole and his team at the ORO-USAREUR, see the oral
history interview with Cole by Dr. Wilbur Payne, 8 Mar 89, conducted
as part of the Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for
Operations Research Oral History Project. Cole himself was the author
of the volume on the Lorraine campaign in the ocial Army history of
World War II.
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51Emmette
Y. Burton, Jr., The Role of Operations Research in

Barracks, Penn., 1955, pp. 1011.
52ORO, ORO Today, p. 29. The subsequent transformation of the
ORO eld oce at Fort Monroe into the Combat Operations Research
Group (CORG) is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this volume.
53Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to ACS, G-3, Operations,
U.S. Army, Washington 13 Feb 52, sub: Relation of ORO with the
University, p. 1, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President,
Series I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, Jan 51Jun 52.
54Memo, Baltimore, 26 Jun 51, sub: Plan for the Establishment of
ORO as a Separate Division of JHU as of 1 Jul 51, JHU Archives, Records
Jan 51Jun 52. The memo also addressed scal and personnel issues as
well as the responsibilities of the ORO director.
55Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 811, Figure 2.
56Ltr, Johnson to ACS, 13 Feb 52, p. 2.
57Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 811.
58Joseph DiMarzo (secretary, JHU Advisory Board for ORO), Min
of the First ORO-JHU Advisory Board Meeting, Chevy Chase, Md., 12
Jun 52, p. 2, JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series
I, Box 33, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, Jan 51Jun 52.
59Responsibility for ORO oversight was assigned by paragraph 3 of
the successive editions of AR 15480.
60See paragraph 4 of the successive editions of AR 15480.
61The organization and functions of the PAGs were prescribed in
paragraph 6 of the successive editions of AR 15480. PAG missions,
relationships, functions, and procedures were set forth in greater detail
in Ltr, Col Herbert W. Manseld (chief Operations and Personnel
Research Div, OCRD) to See Distribution, Washington, 18 Nov 55,
sub: Amplication of Functions, Department of the Army PAGs for the
ORO, College Park, Md., U.S. NARA II, RG 456 (formerly RG 337),
Entry 1033, Box 116 of 154, Folder 334 ORO. Normally, PAGs were
established to work with each ORO group (for example, the Infantry
Group in the Tactics Division).
63Ibid., pp. 81112; Ellis A. Johnson, Introduction, in ORO,
Discussion of ORO Work Program, pp. 10, 13, Figure 12.
64As early as 1953, the advertisements for ORO employment in
The Journal of the Operations Research Society of America listed anthropology, biology, economics, experimental psychology, geography, history,
international relations, medicine, political science, social psychology, and
sociology as elds or disciplines, among others, actively represented on
[OROs] professional sta (personal communication, Eugene P. Visco to
the author, Nov 2003).
65U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, Oce of Ordnance Research,
Proceedings of the First Ordnance Conference on Operations Research. Oce
of Ordnance Research Rpt No. 551 (Durham, N.C.: Oce of Ordnance
Research, Ordnance Corps, Jan 55), p. 86.
66Parker and Parker, Trial by Combat, p. 16.
67ORO, Revised Summary of ORO Projects, Special Studies, and Field
Operations to May 31, 1952, Volume I (Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, 28 Jul
52), p. iii.
(McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, Apr 64), p. 8, Table 1, n. b.
69Seymour I. Gilman, The Role of Operations Research in the
Army, student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn., 1954, p. 41, Annex 1.
70Rumbaugh, Look at US Army OR, p. 8, Table 1. At the same
time, the total number of professional OR analysts employed by the ve
principal Army OR establishments (RAC, HumRRO, SORO, CORG,

and the OR oce at CDEC) was 411. Of 272 analysts who joined ORO
between 1956 and 1961, thirtymore than 10 percentwere women
(see Visco, The ORO, p. 29).
71Hugh M. Cole, Selection and Training of Operational Research
Scientists, in Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational Research
in Practice: Report of a NATO Conference (New York: Pergamon Press for
Advisory Group of Aeronautical Research and Development, NATO,
1958), p. 175. The average age of ORO analysts in 1956 was 35, versus
40 for the rst analysts hired by ORO in 1948 (see Cole, Selection and
Training, p. 174).
73In 1955, the permanent ORO sta included one retired Army
general, three retired Army colonels, a retired Air Force general, and a
retired Navy admiral. Several high-ranking retired military personnel,
including General Thomas Handy, were employed as consultants (see
Burton, Role of OR, p. 10).
75Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 812; Burton, Role of OR, p. 10.
78Cole, Selection and Training, pp. 17677.
79Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 16; Cole, Selection and
Training, p. 172.
80Cole, Selection and Training, p. 176.
81ORO, Fields of Knowledge and Operations Research, OROSP
124, Bethesda, Md.: JHU ORO, Jan 60. The papers on the contributions
of various disciplines to OR were originally presented in the November
1958May 1959 Theoretical Panel Season at ORO.
82Macon Fry, Criteria for Selecting Operations Research Personnel,
in ORO, Fields of Knowledge, p. 5.
83William L. Whitson, The History of Operations Research (I),
Seminar Paper 2, 15 Oct 52, JHU-ORO Informal Seminar in Operations
Research, 195253, Baltimore, p. 7 (hereafter cited as Whitson, Seminar
Paper 2).
84Cole, Selection and Training, pp. 17374. For some reason,
according to Cole, sociologists did not make very good OR analysts.
85Johnson, Long-Range Future, pp. 1011.
86Cole, Selection and Training, pp. 17273.
87Many of the most famous ORO personalities are discussed by
Eugene Visco in The ORO, pp. 2830.
88Made Associate Director of Operations Research, New York
Times, 25 Apr 51.
89ORO, ORO Biographies, vol. II (Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, various
dates, 195763).
90ORO, ORO Biographies, vol. I.
91Visco, The ORO, pp. 2930.
92ORO, ORO Biographies, vol. I.
93Ibid., vols. I, II; Visco, The ORO, p. 29.
94Ltr, Thornton L. Page to Bill Pitts, Houston, Texas, after 30 May 87,
reproduced on the Computer UFO Network at http://www.cufon.org. The
committee was headed by Howard P. Robertson, a mathematical physicist
who had served in the AAF operations analysis program in WWII, and
included, among others, Luis Alvarez who subsequently won a Nobel Prize
in physics. Thornton Leigh Page was born in 1913 and was educated at
Yale University (B.S., 1934) and Oxford University (Ph.D. in astrophysics,
1938). Following WWII service as both a civilian and a lieutenant
commander, USNR, in the Navy OR program, he was a professor of
astrophysics at the University of Chicago (194650). Following his service
with ORO (195158), he taught astronomy at Wesleyan University
(195868) and was associated with the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
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in Houston, Texas; the Naval Research Laboratory; the University of
Houston and Wesleyan University; and several commercial aircraft rms.
A friend of the well-known astronomer Carl Sagan, Page became the
resident expert on UFOs at NASA after he moved to the Johnson Space
Flight Center in Houston in 1968. He died in 1996.
95Margaret Emerson, ORO technical librarian, remembered
Kissinger as sort of a Harvard graduate student in tennis shoes. See the
oral history interview of Margaret Emerson by Eugene P. Visco, 7 Nov
99, conducted as part of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for
Operations Research Oral History Project.
96Yahraes, Mysterious Mission, p. 5. Visco (The ORO, pp. 2728)
gave a very detailed account of the Chevy Chase and Bethesda facilities, an
account that I have followed closely here.
97The science in question was domestic science. One room in the
Science Building was elegantly equipped with a large crystal chandelier,
hung to about 7 feet from the oor. The room had been used to teach
young ladies how to set a formal dining table (personal communication of
Eugene P. Visco with the author, Sep 03).
98A summary of the early negotiations between the Army and the
university can be found in Report on Proposed Building for ORO,
(Chevy Chase, Md. [?], before 30 Jun 57), which contains copies of
correspondence on the matter among ORO, the Army chief of research
and development, and JHU (in JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of
the President, Series I, Box 34, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 57).
99Personal communication of Eugene P. Visco with the author, 25 Jul
03. Visco was an ORO employee at the time.
100Personal communication of Eugene P. Visco with the author, 11
Sep 03.
101Ordnance Corps, Proceedings, p. 86.
102U.S. Army RDB Project Card (RCS CSPRD1), OR, Project
No. 09701002, dated 31 Dec 55 (copy in Smith, Evaluation of Army
OR, Annex 7, pp. 6063).
103Lester D. Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect
to Timeliness, OROTP16, Bethesda, Md., ORO, Nov 60, p. 11, Table
2.
104Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 809. The $11 million did not
include direct costs and contracting costs for OR establishments in the
technical services.
105Ibid., p. 812.
106Charles A. H. Thomson, The Research Analysis Corporation: A
History of a Federal Contract Research Center (McLean, Va.: Research
Analysis Corporation, Jun 75), p. 14.
107The evolution of the ORO research program in the early 1950s is
covered in some detail in Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program,
pp. 2023. Unless otherwise noted, the following account is drawn from
Florys study.
108Project MAID dealing with the military aid program was
completed before the balanced program went into eect. The balanced
program is usually said to have had only fteen projects. That number
does not account for the two later additions.
109Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program, p. 21. Projects
ANALAA, ARMOR, TREMABASE, GUNFIRE, ALCLAD, POWOW,
and DONKEY were already under way as of 31 December 1950.
111A detailed description of the work projects pursued by each of
the ve ORO divisions and BRAND can be found in ORO, ORO Today,
pp. 1829.
112Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program, p. 23. The 17
standing projects were rescinded, and the FY55 program included 154
study projects, of which 40 were never initiated, were suspended, or
showed no progress.
113Ibid., p. 21.
114Rumbaugh, Look
at US Army OR, p. 7.
new annual ORO work program usually went into eect on
1 November of each year.
117Smith, Evaluation of Army Operations Research, p. 13a. Ellis
Johnson was convinced that approximately 1015 percent of the total
eort of major OR establishments should be devoted to long-range
investment in basic operational research (see Johnson, Long-Range
Future, p. 22), and one of his major achievements as director of ORO
was the creation of the OPSEARCH Group in the Strategic Division to
conduct such basic research in OR methods and techniques.
118Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 820; Johnson, Introduction, p.
11. The search was for the best direction to pursue to nd the solution
to a given problem. Put another way, search studies were about dening
the problem.
120In 1958, the ORO director estimated that about 80 percent
of ORO recommendations were eventually adopted by the Army (see
Johnson, Introduction, p. 5).
121U.S. Department of the Army, Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of the Army for the Period January 1 to June 30, 1952 (hereafter cited as
Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Army), in U.S. DOD, Oce of Public Aairs,
Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual Reports
of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force,
January 1 to June 30, 1952 (Washington: USGPO, 52), p. 86.
122Ellis A. Johnson and others, Defense of the US Against Attack by
Aircraft and Missiles, OROR17, Bethesda, Md., ORO, Aug 57.
123See Alfred Wohlstetter, An Appraisal of OROs Defense Study, R17 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, Feb 58), and George S.
Pettee, Comments upon an Appraisal of OROs Defense Study, OROR17
(Bethesda, Md.: ORO, May 58).
124Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1152; Johnson,
Introduction, p. 6.
125See, among others, Howard Brackney, Jerome B. Green, Lynn
H. Rumbaugh, and Solomon H. Turkel, Tactical Employment of Atomic
Weapons, OROR2FEC, Fort McNair, Washington, ORO, Jul 51; and
Lynn H. Rumbaugh, Jerome B. Green, Solomon H. Turkel, and Edward
G. Kelley, The Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons in the Defense of
Central EuropeSummary Report, OROR1EUCOM, Chevy Chase,
Md., ORO, Oct 54.
126See Vincent V. McRae and Philip H. Lowry, Requirements for
Army Air Defense Nuclear Weapons, OROT387, Bethesda, Md.,
ORO, Jun 60; Macon Fry and others, Volume I: Nuclear Reactor Power
Plants for Aircraft Control and Warning Stations in the Arctic, OROR15
(Chevy Chase, Md. ORO, Nov 54); and Kay Bartimo and others, Volume
II: Nuclear Power Plants for Military Use Overseas, OROR15 (Chevy
Chase, Md.: ORO, Jul 56).
127Alfred H. Hausrath, Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army,
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2, 1 (54): 1819.
128Burton (Role of OR, pp. 1720) provided a good outline of the
study and its results, which I have followed closely here. See also Page and
others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1152; Johnson, Introduction, p. 6.
129Hausrath, Utilization of Negro Manpower, pp. 17n, 2023. The
ORO team included Hausrath, S. G. Billingsley, Joseph F. McCloskey,
L. Van Loan Naiswald, N. K. Nierman, and Florence N. Trefethen.
Subcontractors included International Public Opinion Research, Inc.; the
American Institute of Research; and the Bureau of Applied Social Science
Research of Columbia University.
130Alfred H. Hausrath and others, The Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Army, OROR11 (Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, Apr 55).
115The
36171_04OR 3.indd 126
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Dr. Hausrath himself summarized the results of the study in Utilization
of Negro Manpower, pp. 1734 (reprinted in Joseph F. McCloskey
and Florence N. Trefethen, eds., Operations Research for Management
[Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954], pp. 35367).
131Hausrath, Utilization of Negro Manpower, p. 29.
132Murray Dyer and Julius Segal, The POWOW TMs: An Assessment
of ORO Psywar Research, OROSP51, Chevy Chase, Md., ORO, 13
Jun 56, pp. 1, 4. Dyer and Segal discussed in detail the ORO publications
on psychological warfare produced as part of Project POWOW.
134The most prominent of the ORO studies on psychological
warfare at the strategic level is Murray Dyer, Political Communication as
an Instrument of State, Volumes I and II, OROR18 (Bethesda, Md.:
ORO, Jun 57).
of the Army, for the Period January 1 to June 30, 1951 (hereafter cited
as Semiannual Rpt of Sec Army), in U.S. DOD, Oce of Public Aairs,
January 1 to June 30, 1951 (Washington: USGPO, 1951), p. 92.
136Johnson, Introduction, p. 7.
137Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1152; Johnson,
Introduction, p. 7.
138The role played by ORO in the development of the M16 rie
is described in Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rie ControversySearch for
the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War II through Vietnam and
Beyond (Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1984) and summarized on
the M16 Series Rie Webpage: http://mwilson.hypermart.net/views/
guns/m16.html ( David L. Velleux, 1997). See also Visco, The ORO,
pp. 3132.
139ORO research included extensive interviews with infantrymen in
Korea during the Korean War.
141See Howard McFann and others, Trainre I: A New Course
in Basic Rie Marksmanship, GWUHRROTR22 (Washington:
HumRRO-GWU, Oct 55). The pop-up targets, a key feature of the
TRAINFIRE system, were nicknamed Cocky Kens after Dr. Kenneth
Yudowitch, a member of the ORO team that did the initial analysis (see
Visco, The ORO, p. 32).
147Whitson, Growth of ORO, p. 815. Reports rated fair were
simply those that did not make a contribution.
148Ibid., p. 816, Figure 6.
149Ellis A. Johnson, Publications and Briengs for the Army: A Policy
Directive to Division ChiefsInformation to Research Sta (Bethesda, Md.:
ORO, 1959).
150Ibid., p. i.
151Ibid., pp. 67
152Ibid., p. 12.
153Ibid., p. 19.
154Ibid., p. 20.
155Ibid.
157Ibid., p. 15.
158Ibid.
159Quoted in Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program, p. 3.
160Ibid., p. 19.
161Ibid., pp. 915; Memo, Lester D. Flory (executive director, ORO)
to Division Chiefs, Bethesda, Md., 8 Jul 1960, sub: Analysis of Research

Program (reproduced in Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program,
p. 24, Appendix B).
162Flory, Analysis of the ORO Research Program, p. 19.
163Ibid., pp. 34.
165Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to Brig Gen Andrew P.
OMeara (CRD), Bethesda, Md., 31 Aug 1955 (quoted in Flory, Analysis
of the ORO Research Program, p. 5).
166Ltr, Brig Gen Andrew P. OMeara (CRD) to Ellis A. Johnson
(director, ORO), Washington, 19 Sep 1955 (quoted in Flory, Analysis of
the ORO Research Program, p. 5).
168Ibid., p. 28.
170Burton, Role of OR, p. 30. Burton noted that the time from
date of publication of a particular ORO study to the date of its evaluation
by Department of the Army has been too long. The longest time noted
in my examination was 1 1/2 years and the shortest was 5 months (pp.
2425).
171Bradley, OR in the Armed Services, p. 47.
172Ibid., pp. 4950.
175Ibid., p. 37.
176Some of the special services performed by ORO are listed in Flory,
Analysis of the ORO Research Program p. 28, Appendix D.
177Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1153. The internal seminars
were suspended during the summer months inasmuch as ORO generally
ran on a university-like schedule and because the ORO facilities were not
air conditioned.
179Ibid.
180Emerson interview, 7 Nov 99.
181Ibid.
184The ORO liaison ocer was a practicing analyst who participated
actively in ongoing studies. Ellis Johnsons collaborators included H.
Anthony (Tony) Sargeaunt and Owen Wansborough-Jones in Britain
and Omand Solandt in Canada (see Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p.
1151). For a brief but interesting summary of the relationship of British
and American OR teams in Korea, see K. Pennycuick, Army Operational
Research in the Far East, Operational Research 5, 4 (1954): 12029. The
small (three-man) British ORS Korea, which was informally combined
with the small Canadian OR team, was attached to the Operations
Research Oce at Headquarters, Far East Command, and worked mostly
on problems of equipment and weapons systems.
185The Tripartite Conferences were later renamed the ABC
Discussions on Army Operational Research.
186Comments of G. Neville Gadsby, Session III, The Organization of
an Operations Research Group for Military Service, in ARO (Durham),
Executive SummaryUnited States Army Operations Research Symposium
Conducted by Army Research Oce (Durham) at Duke University, 27,
28, 29 March 1962 (Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle
Institute for ARO [Durham], 1962), pp. 8789. On the organization of
military OR in the United Kingdom as of late 1957, see also G. Neville
Gadsby, Organization for Operational Research in the United Kingdom,
in Davies and Verhulst, Operational Research in Practice, pp. 15462; and
Pennycuick, Army OR, pp. 12029.
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187Comments of Henry H. Watson, Session III,The Organization of
an Operations Research Group for Military Service, in ARO (Durham),

Executive Summary, pp. 7881. See also R. H. Lowe, Operational
Research in the Canadian Department of National Defence, Journal of the
Operations Research Society of America 8 (Nov-Dec 60): 84756.
188Watson, Organization of an ORG, p. 80.
189For example, France established an OR group in every major
military sta (National Defense Sta, Armed Forces Sta, and the Army,
Navy, and Air Force stas) using scientists drafted for national service (see
the comments of Commandant Andr J. H. Mensch, in ARO [Durham],
Executive Summary, pp. 7577). For a summary of the status of OR in
various NATO countries as of late 1957, see The Status of Operational
Research in NATO Nations, in Davies and Verhulst, eds., Operational
Research in Practice, pp. 2022; Thornton Page, Letters to the Editor
Military Operations Research in NATO, Operations Research 4, 4 (1956):
48284; and H. A. Sargeaunt, Future Fields for Operational Research in
the NATO Countries, in Davies and Verhulst, eds., Operational Research
in Practice, pp. 18194.
190Bradley, OR in the Armed Services, pp. 56.
191The Meaning and Function of Operational Research, in Davies
and Verhulst, eds., Operational Research in Practice, p. 1. In addition,
NATO established an Advisory Panel on Operational Research that also
sponsored conferences on OR topics.
192Ibid.
193Thodore von Krmn (chairman, NATO Advisory Group,
Aeronautical Research and Development), Introduction, in Davies and
Verhulst, eds., Operational Research in Practice, p. ix; Page, Letters to the
Editor, p. 483.
194Meaning and Function, p. 1.
195Gen. Lauris Norstad, Foreword, in Davies and Verhulst. eds.,
Operational Research in Practice, p. vi.
196Page, Letters to the Editor, p. 482.
197Ibid.
198Ibid.; Status of Operational Research in NATO Nations, p. 22.
The Turkish OR group was supported by professional OR analysts from
the other NATO countries. For example, George Homan worked with
the Turks under the AGARD exchange program, as did Edward Paxson
from RAND. The Turks focused primarily on logistic support and air
defense problems.
199Page, Letters to the Editor, p. 482.
200Comments of Dr. Erik Klippenberg, in ARO (Durham), Executive
Summary, pp. 7174. The permanent members of the Norwegian OR group
were civilians, but military ocers formed approximately 1520 percent
of the scientic sta, being seconded to Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment for the duration of a given project. See also the comments of
Dr. F. Mller in Status of Operational Research in NATO Nations, p. 22.
201ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, pp. 7174.
202Ibid., pp. 7374.
203Erik Peter Rau,Combat Scientists: The Emergence of Operations
Research in the United States in World War II (PhD diss., University of
Pennsylvania, 1999), p. 339.
204See Trefethen, History of OR, pp. 3033.
205Johnson, Survey of OR, pp. 4546.
206Ordnance Corps, Proceedings, p. 81.
208Ibid., pp. 3334.
209Ibid.
210Johnson, Survey of OR, p. 47.
211Ibid.; ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 9.
212The history of the Operational Research Club is summarized
by Nigel Cummings in How the World of OR Societies Began, OR
Newsletter (Apr 1997). See the Operational Research Society Web site,
http://www. orsoc.org.uk.
213Cummings, How OR Societies Began; Trefethen, History of
OR, p. 34.
214Cummings, How OR Societies Began. In 1978, the ORQ
was renamed the Journal of the Operational Research Society, a monthly
publication.
215Ibid. Membership leveled out at around three thousand in ftythree countries in the early 1970s and has remained roughly the same
since then.
216Since 1984, the Society has been a co-sponsor with the U.K.
Ministry of Defence of an annual International Symposium on Military
Operational Research, established to replace the symposia once sponsored
by the NATO Advisory Panel on Operational Research.
217Trefethen, History of OR, p. 34. In April 1951, the NRC
Committee on Operations Research published Operations Research with
Special Reference to Non-Military Applications, which described OR, its
problems, and its personnel requirements. The committee also collected
the names of approximately seven hundred people interested in OR (see
Thornton L. Page, The Founding Meeting of the Society, Journal of the
Operations Research Society of America 1, 1 [1952]: 18).
218The founding fathers of the Operations Research Society of
America, all members of the Formation Committee, were Philip M.
Morse (chairman), John B. Lathrop (secretary/treasurer), Arthur A.
Brown, Bonnar Brown, William J. Horvath, Ellis A. Johnson, George E.
Kimball, Horace C. Levinson, Charles M. Mottley, George E. Nicholson,
Jr., Thornton L. Page, Robert F. Rinehart, Hugh M. Smallwood, Jacinto
Steinhardt, Frederick F. Stephan, Alfred N. Watson, and Lloyd A. Young
(see Philip M. Morse, The Operations Research Society of America,
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 1, 1 [1952]: 12).
219Page, Founding Meeting, p. 18. The society was subsequently
incorporated in the District of Columbia (see Morse, Operations
Research Society, p. 1).
220Trefethen, History of OR, p. 35. JORSA was later renamed
Operations Research and is now under the editorship of Dr. Lawrence
Wein of the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Operations Research
celebrated its ftieth anniversary in 2002 (see INFORMS news release,
Respected Journal Celebrates 50th YearGolden Anniversary of
Organized Operations Research in America [Linthicum, Md., 22 Mar
02]),
221Visco, The ORO, p. 28. The seventy-one members and their
aliation are listed in Members Attending the Founding Meeting,
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 1, 1 (1952): 2627.
223Ibid. An ORO analyst, Richard Zimmerman, won the Lanchester
Prize in 1956 for his important paper on Monte Carlo modeling of
combat.
224The First National Meeting of the Society, Journal of the
Operations Research Society of America 1, 2 (1953): 75.
225Johnson, Survey of OR, pp. 4344.
226Ibid.
227INFORMS news release, 22 Mar 02.
228M. C. Yovits and M. N. Chase, The Role of the Military
Operations Research Symposia (MORS) in the Operations Research
Community, paper presented at Twenty-fourth National Meeting of the
Operations Research Society of America, 78 Nov 63, pp. 15.
229Ibid., p. 2.
230The evolution of the Military Operations Research Symposia and
of the Military Operations Research Society is summarized in Military
Operations Research Society, IndexProceedings of Military Operations
Research Symposia, Eleventh Through Twentieth Inclusive (Military
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Operations Research Society, Oct 68), p. i. See also Yovits and Chase,
Role of Military OR Symposia, pp. 15.
231The topics addressed in the rst fourteen Military Operations
Research Symposia are listed in Yovits and Chase, Role of Military OR
Symposia, p. 4.
232The actual transfer of responsibility for the symposia to the Oce
of Naval Research took place in September 1962 (see Yovits and Chase,
Role of Military OR Symposia, p. 3). The Executive Committee consisted
of twenty-ve members representing all military OR groups, one fourth
of whom were replaced each year (see Yovits and Chase, p. 5). There were
two symposium chairmen up to September 1962, both of whom were
at ONR Pasadena: Dr. Charles DePrima (195760) and Dr. James E.
Garvey (May 1960September 1962) (see Yovits and Chase, p. 3).
233Yovits and Chase, Role of Military OR Symposia, p. 4.
234Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, 14. For example,
Project SITE investigated eective methods and organization for Army
training and education programs; Project TEAM sought to determine
the important factors in interpersonal relationships and organizational
motivation; and Project POWOW studied psychological operations.
235U.S. Department of the Army, Oce of the Under Secretary of
the Army, Annual Report of the Oce of the Under Secretary of the Army for
the Period of 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1951 (Washington: DA, Jun 1951),
p. 10.
236Ibid.; Meredith P. Crawford, A Perspective on the Development of
HumRRO (Alexandria, Va.: George Washington University HumRRO,
Apr 1968), p. 3. Dr. Crawford was the rst director of HumRRO and
served in that position for many years. His paper is a comprehensive
summary of the origin and operation of HumRRO through 1967, and,
unless otherwise noted, is the source of details in this account. The other
principal source for the following account is a presentation by Dr. Bruce A.
Braun to the Sixteenth Meeting of the Committee on Human Resources
of the DOD Research and Development Board, Washington, 12 Nov
51, pp. 2037 of the meeting transcript (in NARA II, RG 330, Entry
342, Box 24; also available at http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/
dir/mstreet/commeet/meet8/brief8/tab_f/br8f1h.txt) (hereafter cited
as Braun Presentation).
237Braun Presentation, p. 19.
238Meredith Pullen Crawford was born at Sweet Briar, Virginia,
in 1911, was an undergraduate at Vanderbilt University, and received
his doctorate in psychology from Columbia University. During WWII,
he served in the Armys aviation research laboratory. He was director
of HumRRO from 1951 to 1976, and was very active in the American
Psychological Association. He died in Washington, D.C., on 21 May
2002.
240Crawford, Perspective on HumRRO, p. 4.
241Annual Report, Under Secretary of Army, 1 Jul 50 to 30 Jun 51, p.
11.
242Braun Presentation, pp. 2223.
243Early HumRRO budget data are discussed in Braun Presentation,
p. 25.
244Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p.
148.
246Braun Presentation, p. 26; Crawford, Perspective on HumRRO, p.
10.
247The annual salary for a new Ph.D. in experimental psychology rose
from $6,000 in FY 1952 to around $11,550 in FY 1967 (see Crawford,
Perspective on HumRRO, pp. 911).
248Crawford, Perspective on HumRRO, p. 1.
249Ibid., p. 19.
250Ibid., pp. 1314.

251From
1965, the group was known as the HumRRO Policy

Council.
252Dickson, Think Tanks, pp. 14849.
253See McFann and others, Trainre I. As noted above, ORO also
played a key role in the development of the TRAINFIRE concept.
254James E. Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Organization
and Administration, 19001963 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 1975), p. 403. The Oce of the Chief of Psychological
Warfare was redesignated as the Oce of the Chief of Special Warfare
on 6 November 1956, and that oce was abolished and its functions
transferred to the Special Warfare Directorate of the Oce of the Deputy
Chief of Sta for Operations on 1 June 1958.
255The story of the development by the Army of a research capability
in the special warfare area is summarized in a thirteen-page sta study
enclosed with Memo, Col George S. Blanchard (director of Special
Warfare) to Maj Gen James D. Alger (ADCSOPS, HQDA), Washington,
10 Mar 64, sub: Special Operations Research Oce (SORO), U.S. Army
CMH, HRC, 400.112 SORO General (hereafter cited as SORO Sta
Study). See also American University, Special Operations Research Oce,
Fact Sheet on Special Operations Research Oce (SORO) (Washington:
SORO, American University, 1 Mar 62), CMH, HRC 400.112 SORO
General (hereafter cited as SORO Fact Sheet).
256SORO Sta Study, p. 2.
257Ibid., p. 1.
258Ibid., pp. 811.
259Ibid., p. 11.
260Ibid., p. 12; SORO Fact Sheet, p. 2.
261SORO Fact Sheet, p. 2; SORO Sta Study, p. 12.
262SORO Fact Sheet, p. 1.
269Notes prepared by Stetson Conn (chief historian, CMH), 28 Mar
1964, sub: Some Observations and Conclusions Concerning the Suggested
Assignment of SOROs Special Area Studies Division to the Oce of the
Chief of Military History, CMH, HRC 400.112 SORO General.
270SORO Fact Sheet, p. 2
271Rumbaugh, Look at US Army OR, p. 13.
272Considerations of space and focus permit only a brief synopsis
of the development of the computer here. An excellent summary of that
development (which I have followed closely) is provided by J. C. Ranyard,
A History of OR and Computing, Journal of the Operational Research
Society 39, 12 (1988): 107386.
273Ranyard, History of OR and Computing, p. 1073.
274Ibid.
275Ibid., pp. 107374.
276Ibid., p. 1074.
277On the development of ENIAC, see Ranyard, History of OR
and Computing, pp. 107374, and Martin H. Weik, The ENIAC Story,
Ordnance ( JanFeb 61), available at http://www.ftp.arl. mil/~mike/
comphist/eniac-story.html). See also Kevin W. Richey, The ENIAC,
available at http://www.ei.cs.vt.edu/~history/ENIAC.Richey.html.
278Before the advent of the electronic computer, calculations were
done by hand, mostly by university-trained women who were known as
computers.
279Weik, ENIAC Story. The initial contract was for $61,700, but
the total eventually reached just over $486,800.
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280Ibid.
As newer, more-powerful and more-rapid electronic

computers became available, ENIACs workload was shifted to them.
ENIAC was nally shut down at 11:45 p.m., 2 October 1955. It is now
preserved partly at the Smithsonian Institution and partly at the U.S.
Military Academy Museum.
281Ibid.
282Ranyard, History of OR and Computing, p. 1074; Richey,
ENIAC.
283Weik, ENIAC Story.
284Ranyard, History of OR and Computing, p. 1074.
285Ibid.
286For example, the Apple II computer cost 40 times less than the
1967 PEGAGUS computer at Leeds University (see Ranyard, History
of OR and Computing, pp. 108182).
287Ibid., pp. 107374.
288Ibid., p. 1076.
289Ibid.
290Again, considerations of space and focus preclude a detailed
history of the development of wargaming here. That development is
cogently summarized in John P. Young, A Brief History of War Gaming
(CORG Sta Memo No. 41, Fort Monroe, Va.: CORG, HQ, CONARC,
18 Oct 55), and I have followed it closely. See also Peter P. Perla, The Art
of Wargaming (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990); Robert D.
Specht, War Games, in Davies and Verhulst, eds., Operational Research in
Practice, pp. 14453; Howard C. Walters, Jr., The History of War Games,
Chemical Corps Ocer Career Course Historical Study (Fort McClellan,
Ala., U.S. Army Chemical Corps School, 3 Apr 61); and Scott J. St. Clair,
Barriers to Using Models and Simulations, available at http://www.
msiac.dmso.mil/journal/ltc_44_1.html). For a discussion of the technical
aspects of wargaming, see Dean S. Hartley III, Battle Modeling, in Saul
I. Gass and Carl M. Harris, eds., Encyclopedia of Operations Research and
Management Science, 2d (Centennial) ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001), pp. 5357. The terms simulation, model, and
wargame are used interchangeably here, although only the wargame
genuinely involves the existence of two or more opposing players.
291Perla, Art of Wargaming, p. 17.
292Young, Brief History of War Gaming, pp. 14.
293Ibid., p. 3.
294Ibid., pp. 34.
295Ibid., pp. 45.
296Ibid., pp. 46.
297Ibid., p. 6.
298Ibid., pp. 67.
299Ibid., p. 6.
300Ibid., pp. 79.
301Ibid., pp. 1213.
302Ibid., p. 13.
303Specht, War Games, pp. 14445.
304Ibid., p. 145.
305A few American wargames were produced in the early nineteenth
century, including Robert Smirks Review of a Battalion of Infantry (1811);
those of Capt. Douglas Brewerton during the Civil War; War Chess, or
The Game of Battle, published by C. R. Richardson and Company in 1866;
and the Reverend Wilhelms Militaire, published in 1876 (see Young,
Brief History of War Gaming, p. 9).
306Young, Brief History of War Gaming, pp. 911. The American
Kriegsspiel, A Game for Practising the Army of War Upon a Topographical
Map was published in Boston by the W. B. Clarke Company in 1898.
307Ibid., p. 9; Specht, War Games, pp. 14748.
308Young, Brief History of War Gaming, p. 10. Lt. Tottens game
was designed in 1880 but was not published until 1895.
309Ibid.; St. Clair, Barriers, p. 2.

310Young, Brief
History of War Gaming, p. 10.

a brief insight into the Armys use of wargaming in the 1940s
and early 1950s, see the Cole interview, 8 Mar 89.
312Walters, History of War Games, pp. 1718. Earlier, in 1927,
John von Neumann had developed the basic mathematics of gaming, and
in 1944, von Neumann and Oskar Morganstern published a complete
exposition of game theory in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, the
scientic underpinning for sophisticated operational gaming (see Young,
Brief History of War Gaming, p. 14).
313Walters, History of War Games, pp. 1718.
314Comments of Dr. Merrill M. Flood, Introduction, Session
VII, Application of Simulation Techniques to Tactical and Logistical
Problems, in ARO (Durham), Proceedings of the United States Army
Operations Research Symposium, 26, 27, 28 March 1963, Durham, North
Carolina, Part I, ORTAG25 (Durham, N.C.: ARO [Durham], 30 Sep
63), p. 165.
315Donald W. Meals, Trends in Military Operations Research,
Operations Research 9, 2 (1961): 25455; Young, Brief History of War
Gaming, p. 1.
316Page and others, Ellis A. Johnson, p. 1152. As noted in Chapter
2 of this volume, the mine warfare group at NOL, which included
Johnson, Lynn Rumbaugh, and Thornton Page (all of whom would later
be associated with ORO), had used wargaming techniques just before the
Pearl Harbor attack to study countermining techniques.
317Joseph O. Harrison, Jr., Robert G. Hendrickson, Arla E. Weinert,
Paul Iribe, and W. Bruce Taylor, The Capabilities of Computers and the
Use of Computers Operated and Maintained by ORO, ORO Sta Memo
OROS514, Chevy Chase, Md., ORO, 2 May 55, p. i.
318Ibid., p. ii; George Gray, The UNIVAC 1102, 1103, and 1104,
Unisys History Newsletter 6, 1 (2002).
319Gray, UNIVAC.
320The UNIVAC 1103 was frequently down for mechanical reasons.
Burnt-out vacuum tubes were a particular problem.
321Gray, UNIVAC.
322Ibid.
323Nicholas M. Smith, Strategic Division, in ORO Discussion of
ORO Work Program, p. 79.
324Ibid.
325Ibid., p. 80, Figure 77.
326Ibid., p. 79.
328Ibid., p. 822. Eugene P. Visco recalled that, in the fall of 1956,
the nal exam for the analysts computer course was to write a program
to compute the arithmetic mean of a set of about ten two-digit numbers
(personal communication with the author, Nov 03).
329Whitson, Growth of ORO.
330Ibid., p. 810; ORO, ORO Today, p. 14.
331Ellis A. Johnson,Conclusion and Summary, in ORO,Discussion
of ORO Work Program, p. 85.
333Smith, Strategic Division, pp. 7273; Johnson, Conclusion and
Summary, p. 85.
335Smith, Strategic Division, pp. 74, l7677.
336Ibid., pp. 7273.
338Lowry, Tactics Division, pp. 2526.
339Ibid., p. 26.
340The principal architect of Carmonette was Richard E.
Zimmerman (see Richard E. Zimmerman, A Monte Carlo Model for
311For
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Military Analysis, in Joseph E. McCloskey and John M. Coppinger, eds.,
Operations Research for Management, vol. II [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1956]).
341Seth Bonder, Army Operations ResearchHistorical Perspectives
and Lessons Learned, Operations Research 50, 1 (2002): 26.
343William J. Merchant, Intelligence Division, in ORO, Discussion
of ORO Work Program, p. 30.
344Ibid.
345Ibid., p. 32.
347Hugh M. Cole, Operations Division, in ORO, Discussion of
ORO Work Program, p. 43.
349James H. Henry, Air Defense Division, in ORO, Discussion of
ORO Work Program, pp. 5253.
350U.S. Army STAG, Organization and Functions Manual (Bethesda,
Md.: STAG, 1 Nov 62), p. 1-1 (hereafter cited as STAG Manual), in
NARA II, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 1, Folder Organization and Functions
Manual, 1962.
351Memo, Col Alfred W. DeQuoy (chief, STAG) to DCSOPS,
HQDA, Bethesda, Md., 7 Jul 61, sub: Rpt of the Activities of the U.S.
Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), pp. 12, RG 319,
Entry 100, Box 3, Folder 20304 Quarterly Rpt, 2d Quarter, FY 62.
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEESUnited States
Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (Washington: HQ, DA, 11 Sep
61), para. 2; STAG Manual, p. 2-1.
353STAG Manual, p. 2-1. The STAG Implementation Plan also
provided for the award of contracts by STAG to civilian research
organizations and other agencies to supplement its in-house capabilities or
to obtain services not otherwise available within the Army establishment.
354U.S. Army STAG, Fact SheetU.S. Army Strategy and Tactics
Analysis Group, Bethesda, Md., ca. 62, pp. 12, RG 319, Entry 100, Box
3, Folder 20304 OPPR Program Rpt Files, 1962, Fact Sheets (hereafter
cited as STAG Fact Sheet).
355STAG Manual, pp. 4-14-4.
356Ibid., pp. 4-54-7.
357STAG Manual, 4-84-10.
358Ibid., pp. 4-114-15.
359Ibid., pp. 4-164-18.
360Memo, Col Alfred W. DeQuoy (chief, STAG) to Lt Col Fisher,
Mr. Onufrak, Dr. Ling, and Mr. Hurd, Bethesda, Md., 14 Sep 61, sub:
Proposed Reorganization for FY 6367, p. 2, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 1,
Folder 20122 DA Mobilization Program Planning Files, 1961.
361Ibid.
362Memo, DeQuoy to DCSOPS, 7 Jul 61, p. 1.
363Ibid., pp. 45.
364Ibid., pp. 23.
365STAG Manual, p. 1-1.
366Memo, DeQuoy to DCSOPS, 7 Jul 61, pp. 23, 78.
367Ibid., p. 3. The contract termination date was 30 May 1961, but it
was later extended to 30 September 1961.
368Ibid., pp. 34. In April 1961, STAG had leased additional
temporary space at 7805 Old Georgetown Rd. in Bethesda.
369Ibid., p. 11.
370Ibid.
371Ibid., pp. 910.
372Ibid., pp. 67.
373STAG Fact Sheet, p. 2.
374Memo, DeQuoy to DCSOPS, 7 Jul 61, pp. 1011. See Ltr, Col
Alfred W. DeQuoy (chief, STAG) to Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO),

Bethesda, Md., 9 Mar 61, sub: Sharing of STAG IBM 7090 Computer,
RG 319, Entry 100, Box 4, Folder 30204 Alot Files, 1961.
375Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to Col Alfred W. DeQuoy
(chief, STAG), Bethesda, Md., 20 Mar 61, sub: Sharing of STAG IBM
7090 Computer, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 4, Folder 30204 Alot Files,
1961. See also the series of letters between Lynn H. Rumbaugh (director,
Combat Systems, RAC) and STAG regarding RACs use of the STAG
IBM 7090 computer on a shared-time basis, AprilMay 1962 (RG 319,
Entry 100, Box 4, Folder 30204 Alot Files, 1962).
376Ltr, Philip H. Lowry (acting director, Combat Systems, RAC) to
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, DCSOPS, HQDA, Bethesda, Md.,
30 Jul 62, sub: Request Approval of Increased Use of STAG Facilities by
RAC, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 4, Folder 30204 Alot Files, 1962.
377Disposition Form, Brig Gen C. E. Hutchins Jr. (director of strategic
plans and policy, DCSOPS, HQDA) to Chief, STAG, Washington, 21
Mar 62, sub: Use of STAG IBM 7090 Computer by U.S. Army Chemical
Corps Operations Research Group, RG 319, Entry 100, Box 4, Folder
30204 Alot Files, 1962.
378Memo, DeQuoy to DCSOPS, 7 Jul 61, p. 5; STAG Fact Sheet,
pp. 23.
379Memo, DeQuoy to DCSOPS, 7 Jul 61, p. 5.
380Ibid., pp. 56; STAG Fact Sheet, p. 2.
381Ibid., p. 6.
382Ibid., pp. 89.
383STAG Fact Sheet, p. 2.
384On CENTAUR, see Ltr, Col Alfred W. DeQuoy (chief, STAG)
to Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, DCSOPS, HQDA, Bethesda,
Md., 1 Dec 62, sub: Fact SheetLand Combat War Gaming Model
(CENTAUR), RG 319, Entry 100, Box 3, Folder 20304 OPPR
Program Rpt Files, 1962, Fact Sheets; Herbert Maisel, Charles Roberts,
John Albertini, and Robert Mason, The CENTAUR War Game, in
Session VI-A (Clinic), ARO (Durham) Proceedings, pp. 10728.
385Fact SheetLand Combat Wargaming Model (CENTAUR), p.
1; Maisel and others, CENTAUR War Game, p. 109.
386Fact SheetLand Combat Wargaming Model (CENTAUR), p. 1.
387Ibid., p. 2; Maisel and others, The CENTAUR Wargame, 117.
The estimated cost in FY 1963 of contract analysts was 45 man-months at
ca. $167,453 and of contract programmers 192 man-months at $578,860.
388Maisel and others, The CENTAUR Wargame, 118. Switchable
tape units were used to communicate between the two computers.
389Ibid., 120.
390Ibid., 108.
391Fact SheetLand Combat Wargaming Model (CENTAUR), 3.
392Ibid.
393In the early 1970s, STAGs theater-level analysis mission was
expanded, and the organization was renamed the Concepts Analysis
Agency (CAA). In 1998, CAA was renamed the Center for Army
Analysis.
394Philip M. Morse, Where Is the New Blood? Journal of the
395See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of the Army, January 1 to June 30, 1956, in U.S. DOD,
January 1 to June 30, 1956 (Washington: USGPO, 1957), pp. 12729.
396Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper & Row,
1964), p. 151.
397Russell L. Acko, The Development of Operations Research as a
Science, Operations Research 4, 3 (1956): 266.
36171_04OR 3.indd 131
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399Ibid.
425Raymond, Power
400Ibid.
426Ibid., pp. 14546.
401Ibid.
427Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 18; Visco, The ORO,
402Acko, Development
of Operations Research, p. 266.

F. McCloskey, Training for Operations Research, Journal
of the Operations Research Society of America 2, 4 (1954): 391. In general,
a good deal more attention was given to formal OR training in the United
States than in Great Britain where OR had originated.
404Ibid., p. 386.
405ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 9.
406McCloskey, Training for OR, p. 388; ARO (Durham), Executive
Summary, p. 9. In 1964, a senior OR practitioner, Lynn Rumbaugh,
observed that, to my knowledge the number of OR professors who are
alumni of Army OR exceeds the number of persons with OR degrees
working for the Army at present (Look at US Army OR, p. 7).
407McCloskey, Training for OR, pp. 39091.
408Ibid., p. 390.
409Ibid., p. 387.
410Ibid., pp. 38788.
411Ibid., p. 386.
412Highlights, in ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 2.
413Ibid.
414Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, pp. 1516. See also
Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, pp. 14546.
415W. Scott Payne, Political Science in Operations Research, in
ORO, Fields of Knowledge, p. 34.
416Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, pp. 1718.
417Johnson, Long-Range Future, p. 16; Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson
(director, ORO) to Dr Milton S. Eisenhower (president, JHU), Bethesda,
Md., 1960, sub: Application of OR by ORO to Developing Nations, p. 1,
JHU Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Box 34,
Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 60.
418Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, pp. 14344.
419Johnson, Long-Range Future, p. 17.
420See, inter alia, Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director, ORO) to Dr Milton
S. Eisenhower (president, JHU), Bethesda, Md., 14 Apr 58, sub: ORO
Performing Work for Other Than the Army, pp. 13, JHU Archives,
ORO, JanDec 58]); Ltr, Johnson to Eisenhower, 1960, pp. 12.
421Jae, Quantitative Analysis, pp. 1011.
422Dickson, Think Tanks, p. 150.
423Ltr, Wilber M. Brucker (secretary of the Army), to Dr Milton S.
Eisenhower (president, JHU), Washington, 9 Jan 1958, sub: Presentation
of Army Distinguished Civilian Service Medal to Ellis A. Johnson, JHU
Archives, Records of the Oce of the President, Series 1, Box 34, Folder
47.2 ICR/ORO, JanDec 58.
424On the long history of Johnsons attempts to create an Institute for
Operations Research at Johns Hopkins, see Memo, P. Stewart Macaulay
( JHU), Baltimore, 22 Mar 51, sub: Memo of a Conversation with Dr.
Ellis A. Johnson, ORO, on 21 Mar 51, pp. 13, JHU Archives, Records
Jan 51Jun 52; Min of the First ORO-JHU Advisory Board Meeting,
Chevy Chase, Md., 12 Jun 52, pp. 35; and Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson (director,
ORO) to Lowell J. Reed (president, JHU), Chevy Chase, Md., 2 Dec 53,
sub: Proposed Institute for Operations Research, pp. 14, JHU Archives,
ORO, Jul 52Dec 53.
403Joseph
at the Pentagon, p. 143.
p. 32.
428OTA
History, p. 21. See also the Cole interview, 8 Mar 89.

Analysis Corporation, p. 19.
430U.S. Department of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Army, FY 1961, in U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense
and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy,
Secretary of the Air Force, for Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington: USGPO,
1962), p. 144.
431Ibid., pp. 1819.
432Annual Report of the Sec Army, FY 1961, p. 144; Thomson,
Research Analysis Corporation, p. 19.
433Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, p. 19; Navy Veteran
Heads Army Research Oce; General Bradley Serves on the Board,
Army-Navy-Air Force Journal 99 (9 Sep 61): 26.
434Ibid.
435Research Analysis Corporation, RAC Highlights, 19611971,
The RAConteur 7, 11 (1971): 5.
436Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, pp. 19, 22; Navy
Veteran Heads Army Research Oce, p. 26.
437Thomson, Research Analysis Corporation, pp. 2122.
438U.S. DOD, Oce of Public Aairs, News Release No. 89361:
Army Announces Contract Award to R.A.C.Army Today Awarded $4.576
Million Contract for Operations Research to R.A.C., Bethesda, Maryland
(Washington: Oce of Public Aairs, DOD, 1 Sep 61).
439Dickson, Think Tanks, p. 150; Visco, The ORO, p. 32; Carl M.
Harris and Andrew G. Loerch, An Historical Perspective on U.S. Army
Operations Research, Military Operations Research 4, 4 (1999): 5.
440OTA History, pp. 2122.
441Ibid.
442Ibid., pp. 22, 28.
443Ibid., p. 23. Although the Center for Naval Analyses contract was
later administered by the University of Rochester, on 4 August 1983, the
Navy announced award of the Center for Naval Analyses management
contract to the nonprot Hudson Institute (see Keith R. Tidman, The
Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Operations Analysis
[Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984], p. xiii).
444Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 5; Trefethen, History of
OR, p. 35.
445ARO (Durham), Proceedings, p. 4.
446Tinberg, OR and the US Army, p. 3, quoting An Appreciation of
Analysis for Military Decisions (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
1959), pp. viiiix; Rumbaugh, Look at US Army OR, p. 12.
447Meals, Trends in Military OR, pp. 25657.
448Ibid., pp. 25354.
450Ibid., p. 253; Rumbaugh, Look at US Army OR, p. 15.
451Hugh J. Miser, Operations Research in Perspective, Operations
Research 11, 5 (1963): 675.
452Ibid.; Robert J. Weeks, The Armys Operations Research Training
Program, student essay, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn.,
1968, pp. 23.
429Thomson, Research
36171_04OR 3.indd 132
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W. Barton Leach, the Father of Army Operations

Research (as Brig. Gen., USAF Reserve, 1950)
Vannevar Bush, the chairman of the Oce of Scientic

Research and Development, opposed expansion of the
wartime Army operations research program.
National Defense Research Committee. Front Row (l. to r.): F. B. Jewett, President of the National Academy of Sciences; Rear Admiral
J.A. Furer, USN, Coordinator of Research and Development, Department of the Navy; J.B. Conant, President of Harvard University; R.C.
Tolman, Dean of the Graduate School, California Institute of Technology
Back Row (l. to r.): K.T. Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Roger Adams, Head of the Chemistry Department, University of Illinois; C.P. Coe, United States Commissioner of Patents; Irvin Stewart, Executive Secretary, Oce of Scientic
Research and Development
36171_Photo Sig.indd Sec1:1
8/4/06 6:20:52 PM
The main building of the Operations Research Oce complex at 7100 Connecticut
Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, in the mid-1950s
Brig. Gen. (USA Ret.) Lester D.

Flory served as the Executive
Director of the Operations
Research Oce, 194861.
Maj. Gen. John P. Daley greets Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Verona, Italy, 1960. Daley was later promoted
to Lt. Gen. and became the rst commander of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command.
Johnson was Director of the Operations Research Oce, 194861.
8/4/06 6:20:57 PM
Analysts from the Combat Operations Research Group measure the

distance a tank traveled after running over a simulated mine.
A distinguished astrophysicist and an expert

on UFOs, Thornton L. Page was one of the
better-known analysts and division chiefs in
the Operations Research Oce, 195158.
A war game in progress at the Combat Operations Research

Group.
Col. Alfred W. DeQuoy, the rst chief of the Strategy and

Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), 1960
8/4/06 6:21:00 PM
8/4/06 6:21:04 PM
chapter four
Operations Research and Combat Developments, 195062
ollowing the Korean War, the managers and analysts

of the Operations Research Oce (ORO) and of its
successor, the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC),
expanded the application of operations research (OR) into
new areas, such as human behavior, psychological operations,
and political and economic analysis. They also rened methods, such as modeling, wargaming, and the use of computers.
The extension of OR into new areas prompted the creation
of a number of new Army organizations, such as the Human
Resources Research Oce (HumRRO), the Special Operations Research Oce (SORO), and the Strategy and Tactics
Group (STAG), which focused on the investigation of those
new elds and the application of the new methods. However, the traditional core competency of ORthe analysis of
weapons systems, organization, and doctrineremained at
the heart of OR in the Army throughout the 1950s and into
the 1960s as the Army refocused its scientic research and
development (R&D) eorts and evolved the new concept of
combat developments.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, as weapons became
more sophisticated and more expensive and the pressures of
the Cold War on the American economy demanded more
bang for the buck, OR became an increasingly important
part of the new comprehensive combat developments process. While ORO, HumRRO, SORO, STAG, and other
agencies provided important inputs, particularly at the higher end, OR work at the sharp end of combat developments
was done in the OR groups created by the Armys technical
services, Army Field Forces (later U.S. Continental Army
Command), and the various test and evaluation agencies established during the 1950s and early 1960s.
By the 1950s, production capacity was no longer the
most signicant factor in military superiority; the ability to
reduce lead time in developing and deploying new weapons,
organization, and doctrine, and the ability to counter enemy
R&D advances had become more important.1 These were
just the sort of problems with which OR could deal eectively. Consequently, the nascent OR groups in the Armys
technical services grew into full-blown OR organizations
and assumed an important role. At the same time, the new
organizations created to manage the combat developments
process made extensive use of simulations (wargaming) and
other OR techniques to evaluate the eectiveness of the new
weapons, organizations, and doctrines.
The Emergence of Combat Developments
Given the large stockpile of weapons and equipment left
over from World War II and the new focus on nuclear weapons, Army R&D languished in the immediate postWorld
War II period. The onset of the Korean War, however, revived interest in developing new conventional weapons and
equipment, and congressional appropriations for Army
R&D projects increased substantially. Army leaders diered
on how Army R&D should be managed. The Technical
Services, supported by the Army Sta, favored the existing
system in which the deputy chief of sta for logistics held
primary responsibility for R&D, but most Army scientists
and many senior ocers directly involved in R&D wanted
to make R&D a separate function, independent of the Army
logistical system. The debate continued into the early years
of the Kennedy Administration, but ultimately the scientists
and senior R&D ocers prevailed. The Army R&D program gained independent status, bringing signicant changes to the Army OR program that was closely connected to
the R&D eort.
Even as the controversy over the higher-level organization and management of the Army R&D program proceeded, the Army began to refocus on a new concept that integrated research and development into a larger process that
tied the development of new weapons and equipment to the
development of new organizational and tactical concepts.
The shock of the Korean War and the pressing demands of
36171_04OR 4.indd 133
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the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union forced the
emergence of a comprehensive combat developments system to integrate the design of new weapons and equipment,
organizations, and doctrine, and their increasingly complex
testing under both simulated and actual eld conditions.
Organizations were created to perform the combat developments function, and OR played a prominent role in the new
process, just as it had long played an important role in the
narrower function of weapons design and evaluation.
The Need for an Integrated Combat Developments System
Until the 1950s, the eorts of the United States Army to
integrate the development of new weapons and equipment,
organizations, and doctrine were sporadic and largely ineective.2 The Armys system for doing so was fragmented, poorly
coordinated, and focused primarily on adapting new technology to the design of new weapons that were often produced
without a clear concept of how they would be used.3 Whereas
the design of new weapons and equipment generally kept pace
with emerging technology, developing new organizations and
doctrines to eectively use these weapons and equipment innovations was generally in the hands of agencies preoccupied
with current operations. Thus, it lagged behind.4 Moreover,
no single oce was responsible for the overall management of
the Armys diverse weapons programs, organizational change,
and doctrinal development.
The rapid technological changes initiated by World War
II (atomic weapons, guided missiles, and space vehicles, to
name only a few) as well as the threat to national survival
posed by the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the concurrent dramatic reduction in reaction time posed by the
Soviet nuclear threat, made clear the need for eective integration of the combat developments process.5 Moreover,
it was realized that it would be penny wise and pound foolish if the development of hardware were not preceded by
an equally extensive development of the organizations and
ghting techniques they implement.6
The focus of the new combat developments process was
on the future, and its primary function was to adapt military
operations to very rapid changes in technology and military
requirements.7 The Armys working denition of combat
developments was set forth by Headquarters, Army Field
Forces, in 1953 as
the research, development, testing and early integration into
units in the eld of new doctrine, new organization and new
materiel to obtain the greatest combat eectiveness, using the
minimum of men, money and materials.8
The denition of combat developments adopted by the

Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) stressed
the integration of developments in three distinct areas (weapons and equipment, organization, and tactical doctrine) and
thus encompassed functions formerly performed by the

OCAFF G-3 and the Research and Development Section.9
In fact, combat developments included a wide variety of activities, including the development of concepts and doctrine,
the design of force structure, the integration of materiel
developments, the analysis of threats, acting as the proponent for command and control, and independent testing of
proposed organizations and equipment.10 Throughout, the
focus was clearly on the development of eective concepts
for the army of the future.11
By 1950, it was clear that the continued military superiority of the United States depended on the speed and
soundness with which the Army reacted to adapt organization and doctrine to ever more rapid changes in technological developments and military requirements.12 It was soon
recognized that OR would be at the center of the eorts to
integrate new weapons, organization, and doctrine. As Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., then assistant secretary of the Army for
nancial management, told attendees at the Second Army
Operations Research Symposium, in Durham, North Carolina, in March 1963:
We will have to rely more heavily upon concurrent simulation,
operations analysis, wargames, and theoretical studies in all
phases to reduce lead time and produce the most eective force
structure consistent with current missions and state of the art
technology. To provide this increased capability, we must anticipate the need for qualied analysts who can apply modern
methods and obtain timely and reliable solutions; this will require more emphasis on operations research training of Army
personnel, military and civilian.13
Project VISTA
By 1950, many Army leaders and scientists recognized
the need for an integrated process of developing weapons,
organization, and doctrine. Among those calling for improvements in the Armys system for integrating new weapons, organization, and doctrine was Ellis Johnson, director of ORO,
who noted that the Army could no longer wait until the outbreak of conict before developing eective organization and
doctrine for employing the available weapons.14 Several agencies addressed the problem in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
but their work was uncoordinated and had little eect.15
The emergence of an integrated combat developments
program in the United States Army can be said to have
begun only with the award in early 1951 of a contract sponsored by all three services to the California Institute of Technology to study the problem of land and tactical air warfare.
The purpose of the study, called Project VISTA, was to conduct a broad study of ground and air tactical warfare with
particular attention to the defense of Western Europe in the
immediate future and to submit suggestions as to how the
services could improve their weapons, techniques, and tac-
36171_04OR 4.indd 134
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operations research and combat developments,

tics.16 Project VISTA was chaired by Dr. Lee A. Dubridge,
assisted by some of Americas top scientists, including William A. Fowler, Robert T. Bacher, C. C. Furnas, Charles C.
Lauritsen, Clark B. Millikan, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and
Howard P. Robertson.17
The nal report of Project VISTA was presented to
Secretary of the Army Pace and the other service secretaries in February 1952. The Project VISTA report noted that
America no longer enjoyed the long reaction time provided
by her relative isolation between two great oceans and that
the Army devoted too much time and eort to current operations and was thus unable to forecast the future and plan
for it properly.18 To provide for the necessary planning for
the future, Project VISTA called for the creation of a Combat Development Group, the purpose of which would be
to forge and develop the new tactics, techniques, and tools of
this new type of warfare . . . [and] to bring to an operational
state the newest tactics, ideas, and inventions having application to the kind of warfare envisaged for Western Europe.19
The Project VISTA report also noted that to ensure

its eectiveness the proposed Combat Development Group
had to have
a combat unit of sucient size to include all elements of a working combat team . . . [and] a permanent sta that includes civilian scientists; it must have access to specialists in all relevant
elds; and it must work in close coordination with Operations
Research Oce of the Army.20
The proposed Combat Development Group would thus

constitute both a research team and a laboratory for developing and testing new weapons, organizations, and doctrines,
and would be separate from the existing OCAFF schools
and boards.21 Although the chief of Army eld forces, Gen.
John R. Hodge, concurred with the general conclusions of
the Project VISTA report, he opposed the creation of a separate combat developments command, noting that the proposed responsibilities of the Combat Development Group
were already a part of the functions assigned to OCAFF, and
that the desired integration of weapons, organization, and
doctrine could be achieved more economically within the existing OCAFF system.22
Establishment of a Combat Developments
Element in OCAFF
General Hodges reservations regarding the establishment of an independent combat developments command
were noted and the issue was discussed by OCAFF and the
Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA) G-3, and in
June 1952 the Army chief of sta, Gen. J. Lawton Collins,
directed that a Combat Development Group be established
as part of OCAFF.23 The chief of Army eld forces was assigned a dual responsibility for both
evaluating the eect on our tactical doctrine of new scientic

developments . . . [and] developing requirements for new weapons, where necessary, to meet the demands of new tactical concepts. This dual responsibility calls for the application of the
methods of science [i.e., operations research, inter alia] to the
overall problems of ground warfare.24
The nal report of Project VISTA was approved by

Secretary Pace in July 1952 and, that same month, OCAFF
submitted a plan for taking over the functions listed by Project VISTA. The OCAFF plan was designed to take advantage of the existing OCAFF system of centers, schools, and
boards as well as the long-standing relationship between
OCAFF and the technical services.25 Major features of the
plan were the designation of the deputy chief of Army eld
forces as deputy for combat developments; the creation of a
Combat Developments Division in G-3, OCAFF; and the
establishment of combat developments departments in the
various combat arms and other branch schools and in the
United States Army Command and General Sta College
(CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The Army combat developments system was ocially inaugurated in September 1952, when the OCAFF
plan was approved with certain modications by Secretary
Pace.26 On 1 October 1952, the chief of Army eld forces
created the Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Combat
Developments as well as the Combat Developments Department in CGSC and in each of the four combat arms service
schools.27 In December 1952, another new groupthe Ofce of the Director of Special Weapons Developmentwas
established at Fort Bliss, Texas, under Brig. Gen. William P.
Ennis, Jr., to handle matters concerning atomic weapons. It
was the rst combat developments eld agency of the Army
to assist in developing and testing the military application of
atomic energy as it aects the doctrine, organization, equipment, and training of the Army in the eld.28
The essential elements of the new combat developments
system were in place by the end of 1952, and further improvements in coordination and clarication of roles and missions
were made during 1953. In February 1953, OCAFF issued
a Combat Developments Planning Guide to improve coordination and direction and to provide a set of objectives to measure
progress.29 The eectiveness of the new combat developments
departments in the Army service schools was reviewed and it
was found that the schools had become involved in routine
operational matters and thus contributed little to the combat
developments process.30 In an attempt to solve the problem
in May 1953, OCAFF directed each school to ensure that a
number of personnel were isolated from current operations to
focus more eectively on long-range developments.31
Problems similar to those found in the service schools
also began to arise in the HQ OCAFF combat develop
36171_04OR 4.indd 135
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ments elements. The initial combat developments organization at HQ OCAFF consisted of small elements in each
of the General Sta sections. The structure was inherently
weak and lacked coordination and central direction, and the
small combat developments elements soon became absorbed
in day-to-day business rather than planning for the Army of
the Future.32 Such eld experimentation as was conducted
was done in conjunction with traditional eld exercises and
maneuvers, an unsatisfactory method because such exercises
and maneuvers emphasized training, and observation under
controlled conditions was not possible.33
The principal fault was the placement of combat developments elements under the G-3 and the consequent diversion of their eorts to solve current problems.34 After about
a year of ineectual operations, the combat developments
elements in HQ OCAFF were reorganized in October
1953.35 The Combat Developments Division of OCAFF
G-3 was abolished and its personnel authorizations were
absorbed by a separate Combat Development Group (later
renamed the Combat Developments Section, then once
again renamed the Combat Developments Division) under
the deputy chief of Army eld forces.36 Two sections were
established. The Combat Developments Special Section was
small (only eight ocers) and concerned itself with guided
missiles, nuclear warfare, and chemical/biological warfare.
As an exception to the forward-looking focus of combat developments, the Combat Developments Special Section also
dealt with current problems of integrating missiles, nuclear
warfare operations, and chemical/biological operations. The
Combat Developments General Section had approximately
fteen ocers, one of whom was stationed at Ann Arbor,
Michigan, with Project MICHIGAN.37 The section focused
on long-range (at least ten years out) requirements for new
weapons and equipment.
The Haworth Report
By 1954, the combat developments system was functioning, and there was liaison among OCAFF and the Armys principal overseas headquarters in Europe and the Far
East.38 However, several important deciencies remained.39
Because of the continuing emphasis on missiles and atomic
weapons, the focus tended to be on the mid-range (ve-year)
period rather than the long-range future as originally envisioned. Also, the new system did not include active participation by the technical and administrative services (except
for the Engineer Development Board of the Chief of Engineers), and there was little capacity for eld experimentation
other than that provided by eld exercises and maneuvers
that focused primarily on training. Moreover, the number of
military personnel assigned to combat developments agencies was only about half of the number originally recom-
mended by OCAFF, too few to carry out an eective combat

developments program.
In early 1954, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens
established an ad hoc subcommittee of the Army Scientic
Advisory Panel to study the Armys combat developments
program.40 The committee comprised leading scientists and
businessmen and was headed by Dr. Leland J. Haworth, the
director of Brookhaven National Laboratory.41 The committees report, known as the Haworth Report and submitted in
October 1954, rearmed the ndings of Project VISTA and
made a number of recommendations for improvement of the
Armys combat developments programprincipally changes
in Army organization and a strengthening of interservice and
interagency relationships. The three principal conclusions of
the Haworth Report were that an intensive Combat Development program is essential to the establishment and maintenance of a combat-ready Army [and that] the focal points
of this program should be a Combat Development Organization, given broad responsibility for and wide freedom of
action in the exploration and evaluation of new concepts in
weapons, organization and tactics and their synthesis into an
eective ghting system; that the present eort was vigorous and useful but inadequate in scope and in magnitude;
and that an autonomous command at a special site possessing adequate sta, facilities, and troops for the execution of
all aspects of Combat Development . . . should be considered
as the ultimate goal.42 In line with those three major conclusions, the Haworth Report contained nine specic recommendations:
1. That the Armys over-all Combat Development program be
greatly expanded with drastically increased emphasis on eld
experimentation, including joint operations.
2. That the program be bold and imaginative and not limited
in concept by existing weapons or by the organization, roles,
and missions of the various military forces.
3. That the organization be placed in the Continental Army
Command.
4. That the Chief be given broad responsibility and allowed
wide freedom of action in the determination and execution of the over-all program, and that eective channels be
established to ensure prompt and careful consideration of
Combat Development ndings and recommendations at appropriate levels.
5. That the organization include (a) a central group responsible
for determining and coordinating the over-all program and
for conducting broad theoretical and experimental studies,
and (b) local groups, especially at the schools, which are
subject to the authority of the Chief and which conduct appropriate specialized studies and tests and partake in more
general programs.
6. That Combat Development stas include personnel from
the Technical Services assigned at the working level to assist
in the experimental program, to ensure maximum cooperation between agencies, and ultimately to take familiarity with
eld problems back to the Technical Services.
36171_04OR 4.indd 136
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Figure 41Combat Developments Section, HQ CONARC

#HIEF
#OMBAT$EVELOPMENTS
!SSISTANT#HIEF
%XECUTIVE
0ROGRAM
AND
2EVIEW$IVISION
7ARGAMES
$IVISION
0LAN
$IVISION
#OMBAT
3UPPORT
#OMBAT
/PERATIONS
2ESEARCH'ROUP
/FFICEOF
3PECIAL7EAPONS
$EVELOPMENT
#OMBAT!RMS
$IVISION
Source: Jean E. Keith and Howard K. Butler, United States Army Combat Developments Command: Origins and Formation (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Oce
of the Historian, Deputy Chief of Sta for Management and Resources, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 1972), p. 27.
7. That the Combat Development organization be provided adequate resourcestroops, equipment, and spacefor conducting eld experiments and tests.
8. That the Chief and his sta keep thoroughly familiar with
related activities in all parts of military and civilian life, particularly with combat units of the Army, other military agencies and contractors involved in research and development,
and the general progress of science and technology.
9. That specic budgetary provisions be made for Combat Development purposes and that they be protected from the per-
turbing eects of year-to-year uctuations.43
HQ CONARC and Responsibility for

Combat Developments
Implementing the recommendations of the Haworth
Report and the concurrent June 1954 reorganization of the
Army signicantly improved the eectiveness of the Armys
combat developments program. On 1 February 1955, the
United States Continental Army Command (CONARC)
replaced the Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces and assumed responsibility for training and combat developments
throughout the Army.44 In line with the recommendations
of the Haworth Report, the Combat Developments Section
of HQ CONARC was charged with broad responsibility
for developing and testing of equipment, organization, and
doctrine for units normally assigned to the eld army and,
with certain restrictions, for other Army units.45 Organized
as shown in Figure 41, the CONARC Combat Developments Section became the focal point for study, evaluation
and coordination of ideas from many sources.46 Further

positive steps were taken with the establishment of combat
developments elements in each of the technical and administrative services and in some overseas commands, in accordance with a DA letter of 26 July 1955.47
The mission and responsibilities of the Combat Developments Section of HQ CONARC were set forth in detail
in the 26 July 1955 HQ DA letter.48 As laid out in the HQ
USCONARC Organization and Functions Manual, the chief
of the Combat Developments Section had general sta responsibility for
a. Development of operational, organizational, and materiel
development objectives for the Army in the eld.
b. Coordination of recommended materiel requirements and
recommendation of their establishment to the Deputy Commanding General.
c. Conduct of selected combat development studies, eld experiments, and tests, particularly those pointed toward the
solution of problems generally in the periods 3 to 15 years
hence.
d. Design and conduct (or participation in) selected eld experiments and tactical troop tests and analysis of the results
of such experiments and tests.
e. Advice and assistance to the eld on the conduct of eld experiments and tests.
f. Participation in maneuvers and exercises to acquire quantitative data needed for the solution of combat development
problems.
g. Supervision of US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center.
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h. Developing broad guidance and coordinating the eorts of
USCONARC in determining the degree of automation
which may be employed in the Army in the eld.
i. Evaluating operational and organizational concepts by

war gaming, map exercises, and associated analyses;
devises techniques and procedures for war gaming to
improve the validity and eciency of war games.49
A parallel Material Developments Section at HQ CONARC set material development objectives and requirements for the eld army and coordinated and supervised
CONARC participation in materiel development (research,
development, and testing) for the Army in the eld.50 The
major functions of the commanding general, CONARC,
in the material development area included recommending
military requirements and military characteristics, providing
user advice and guidance to the developing agency and the
developer throughout development, conducting user tests,
recommending type classication, and establishing the basis
of issue.51
Combat Developments in the Army Schools
The combat developments system initiated in 1952
included combat developments elements at the Army War
College, CGSC, and the various branch service schools. Operations research techniques were used by the military and
civilian analysts in combat developments elements in each
of the various Army schools.52 Very-long-range concepts of
weapons, organization, and doctrine were the province of the
combat developments elements at the United States Army
War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and CGSC
at Fort Leavenworth. The combat developments stas at
both Carlisle Barracks and Fort Leavenworth included OR
analysts, and the long-range studies they produced incorporated the use of OR methods. Such studies set the scene for
the development of more-discrete concepts by combat developments agencies associated with the various Army service
schools operated by the combat arms and technical and administrative services.
At the Army War College, the responsibility for combat
developments activity was assigned to one of the subordinate
departments or divisions. By 1962, that responsibility was
focused in the Doctrine and Studies Division, which was
transferred to the new U.S. Army Combat Developments
Command as a Class II activity, on 1 July 1962, and renamed the United States Army Institute for Advanced Studies (USAIAS) on 1 August 1962.53 The stated goal of the
institute was to contribute to future Army eectiveness by
performing research in the eld of future Army operations
by preparing and evaluating broad military studies aecting
the national security.54 The commandant of the Army War
College was also the commanding general of USAIAS, the
sta of which consisted of both military and civilian person-
nel. The civilian sta included OR analysts and administrative personnel, and the institute was supported by contractors (notably Operations Research, Inc.) and other civilian
research organizations that provided personnel trained in
the physical and social sciences, the humanities, and OR.55
CGSC at Fort Leavenworth had a long history of involvement in the development of Army organization and
doctrine, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century.56 In November 1946, a Department of Analysis and
Research was formed at CGSC to publish Army doctrinal
manuals. The creation of the Army combat developments
system in September 1952 increased the emphasis on combat
developments at the college. In 1954, the commandant, Maj.
Gen. Garrison H. Davison, set up an Executive for Research
and Analysis to handle future doctrine based on a weapons
system approach. New organizations at CGSC created to
deal with combat developments included a Current Analysis Section, a Combat Developments Department, and an
Advanced Operations Research Department. The Combat
Developments Department worked out doctrine for a period ve years into the future, and the Advanced Operations
Research Department dealt with developments ten or more
years into the future. Maj. Gen. Davison devoted considerable ocer resources to the new combat developments mission, in part because he wanted the Army to have a capability
independent of defense contractors and think tanks.57 The
CGSC Oce of the Chief of Doctrine and the Department
of Combat Developments were later inactivated, and the
personnel were transferred, over the objections of HQ CONARC, to form the nucleus of the Combined Arms Group
(CAG) and the Combined Arms Group Combined Arms
Agency. Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson assumed command of
CAG on 1 July 1962, and the CGSC sta and faculty continued to write doctrine and work closely with CAG.58
One of the recommendations of the Haworth Report
was to improve the participation of the technical services in
the overall combat developments system.59 To provide HQ
CONARC with better control and coordination of the combat developments activities of the technical services, on 26
July 1955 HQ DA directed the seven technical services and
the three administrative services to create their own combat
developments agencies to maintain contact with the combat
developments elements in HQ CONARC, thereby forcing
those branches to consolidate their previously scattered combat developments functions in one agency.60 The resulting
agencies were to analyze general combat developments and
integrate them with the combat developments work in their
own eld and to review contemplated operational, organizational, and equipment development projects, determine their
relation to the general objectives and to existing projects,
and insure that all pertinent projects were included in the
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CONARC Combat Developments Objectives Guide.61 They
were also charged with ensuring that new technological developments in their eld were promptly exploited and made
known to other agencies and with overseeing the program of
testing new equipment, organization, and doctrine as well as
acting as the advisor to their respective DA sta and technical service chiefs on combat developments matters.62
The evolution of the combat developments system in the
Transportation Corps (TC) was typical of that in the other
technical services. Before August 1955, all combat developments functions and project reports were the responsibility
of the various divisions of the Oce of the Chief of Transportation, the Transportation Research and Development
Command (later the Transportation Research and Engineering Command), the Transportation School, and other TC elements.63 In August 1955, a Combat Developments Department was created in the Transportation School at Fort Eustis,
Virginia, and all TC combat developments work was concentrated there. The department was authorized a strength of 11
ocers, 4 enlisted men, and 9 civilians, and was organized in
four branches. However, personnel shortages made it necessary to form committees to handle the workload.
On 15 October 1955, the Combat Developments Department was separated from the Transportation School
and redesignated the Combat Developments Detachment
under the sta supervision of the assistant chief of sta, G3, Transportation Training Command. This reorganization
further concentrated and strengthened the TC combat developments program and eliminated duplication of functions
with the Transportation Board. The detachment was again
reorganized on 27 July 1956 in accordance with a CONARC
memorandum dening combat developments procedures.64
The resulting detachment consisted of a commanding ocer
and ve sections (Technical Advisory; Administrative; Review and Analysis; Project Study; and Planning, Program,
and Liaison) to which an army aviation liaison ocer was
later added. On 1 October 1956, the TC Combat Developments Detachment was abolished and replaced by the Transportation Combat Development Group, a Class II activity
under the chief of transportation located at Fort Eustis. On
3 January 1957, the functions, personnel, records, and equipment of the Transportation Board were transferred to the
Transportation Combat Development Group, and necessary
changes were made in the mission, organization, and operations of the Transportation Board.
Although there was a free exchange of ideas and information between all CONARC combat developments
agencies, matters of policy, doctrine, and concepts requiring
substantial actions or funds went through normal command
channels. After 1 October 1956, all TC combat developments were under the direction and control of the deputy
chief of transportation. The Transportation Combat Development Group established a liaison oce at Headquarters,
Combat Developments Experimentation Command, at Fort
Ord, California, on 1 November 1956, to coordinate eld
experiments involving transportation doctrine, organization,
and equipment. The Transportation Combat Development
Group coordinated laterally with the combat developments
agencies of the other technical services and combat arms,
and vertically with HQ CONARC, DA, and the Department of Defense.
The Combat Operations Research Group
From the beginning, operations research was a central
element of the combat developments process. Even before
the formal assumption of the combat developments mission
by OCAFF in October 1952, Gen. Mark W. Clark, the chief
of Army eld forces, had established a small group of ocers
who did operations analysis at the tactical level.65 The July
1952 OCAFF plan for establishing a combat development
group included provision for the employment under the
existing civil service rules of civilian scientists and analysts
to perform operations research.66 An attempt was made to
integrate OR analysts into all of the new combat developments elements in OCAFF, but the cumbersome civil service
regulations hampered recruitment. To ll the gap, Ellis Johnson was asked to provide a group of analysts to work at Fort
Monroe.67 The OR eld oce at OCAFF was established in
the late fall of 1952 with an initial complement of analysts
on loan from ORO and it was placed under the operational
direction of Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague, the OCAFF
chief of combat developments.68 Dr. William L. Whitson, a
veteran of the Navys World War II OR program and a longtime senior ORO employee, was designated as director of
the eld oce and Col. William L. Hardick (United States
Military Academy, 1931) was assigned as deputy director.69
A special study group of military ocers was assigned
to work closely with ORO analysts.70 Maj. Gen. Montague
himself told students at the Army War College, in November
1954, that the creation of a combined militarycivilian analyst group was intended to ensure that each element acted as
a brake on the other to make the military take the scientic
viewpoint to a certain extent . . . [and keep] . . . the scientists
from going o half cocked so to speak, and coming up with
an unworkable solution.71
As noted earlier, the new combat developments elements
in OCAFF were diverted by current operations and had difculty focusing on the future. This led to the eventual reorganization of the OCAFF combat developments elements.
In August 1953, the OCAFF OR team was reorganized.
The civilian analysts of the ORO eld oce were formally
merged with a group of ten ocers under the deputy chief of
36171_04OR 4.indd 139
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Army eld forces to form the Combat Operations Research
Group (CORG).72 Whitson continued as director of the new
CORG, and Hardick remained as deputy director. In the fall
of 1954, Dr. Whitson was replaced by Dr. Franklin C. Brooks,
former chairman of the Armor Group at ORO.73 Col. Hardick was replaced as deputy director in the spring of 1955 by
Col. Lauren W. Merriam.74 The CORG director reported to
the deputy chief of Army eld forces, and CORG soon became the focal point for application of OR in OCAFF.
Soon after CORG was established, CONARC replaced OCAFF as the agency responsible for Army training and combat developments. With the establishment of
CONARC it was anticipated that responsibility for the direction and control of operations analysis activities within
the continental United States and for all overseas theaters
in peacetime would be assumed by HQ CONARC (that is,
by CORG).75 HQ CONARC was to provide operational
analysis facilities for the combat theaters and eld armies
during actual hostilities. The existing missions of the CONARC development boards and the technical services were
to be relatively unchanged, and the emphasis was placed on
coordination rather than integration.
With the establishment of HQ CONARC, CORG
became an integral part of the Combat Developments Division under the deputy commanding general/chief of combat developments. Initially, CORG was organized with an
Administrative Section, a Wargaming Section, and a Field
Experimentation Section.76 By early 1956, it had been reorganized into an Administrative Section, an Art and Publications Section, a Tactical Analysis Department, and a Field
Experimentation Department.77 By 1 July 1956, CORG had
been reorganized again, as shown in Figure 42.
The Analysis Teams comprised civilian analysts assembled on an ad hoc basis to meet the needs of specic projects,
but the Research Teams were formed on a semipermanent
basis.78 The analysts assigned to the Research Teams were
temporarily assigned to Analysis Teams as required for a
specic project. The group also supplied a Wargames Analysis Team to assist other combat developments divisions of
HQ CONARC in studies using wargames procedures.79 A
small number of CORG personnel were also used on an occasional and temporary basis at the various service schools
and CONARC boards.80
Military ocers were assigned to the CORG Military
Advisor Team by the deputy chief of sta for combat developments in a ratio of one ocer to four CORG civilian analysts.81 The functions of the Military Advisor Team included
providing instruction for CORG scientists on military subjects; providing information on Army materiel, organization,
and doctrine; providing judgment based on experience in
military operations; assisting the scientists in contacting ap-
propriate information sources; and participating in eld activities with the scientists. The CORG Services Department
provided administrative, graphics, publication, and reference
services to support the CORG program.
In 1957, CORG was reorganized once again, as shown
in Figure 43. By 1 May 1959, the Organization Group had
been renamed the Support Branch, the Weapons and Materiel Group had been redesignated as the Weapons Branch,
the Military Advisor Team, the Wargames Methods Group
had been eliminated, and the Service Department had been
renamed the Service Branch.82 In late 1960, there was another reorganization of CORG into the Service Branch, the
Operations Analysis Branch, and the Wargames Methods
Branch.83 In August 1962, shortly before it was transferred
to the newly established Combat Developments Command,
the CONARC Combat Developments Division was abolished and CORG was made subordinate to the deputy chief
of sta for unit training and readiness.84
As of November 1954, approximately twelve ORO analysts and ten ocers were working for Maj. Gen. Montague,
the chief of the Combat Developments Division, OCAFF.85
In response to the Haworth Report and the creation of HQ
CONARC in 1955, the ORO personnel on temporary assignment to CORG were replaced with a more permanent
sta of civilian analysts from Technical Operations, Inc., a
rm from Arlington, Massachusetts.86 Following a transitional period, Technical Operations, Inc., became the prime
contractor for OR services for HQ CONARC in the fall
of 1955.87 It was anticipated that CORGs complement of
civilian analysts would increase to approximately seventy in
one or two years.88 As of 1957, CORGs strength had grown
to twenty-four civilian analysts, but the number of military
personnel had dropped to four ocers.89 All of the military
ocers were later withdrawn, and as of 1 November 1960,
CORG was staed by twenty-three professional civilians
and six administrative civilians.90
CORGs essential mission was to study changes needed
in Army materiel, organization, and doctrine as a result of the
introduction of atomic weapons.91 Its principal functions were
to apply scientic methods to solve short-term combat developments problems, conduct scientic research to produce
new methods and facts for the solution of long-term combat
developments problems, supply scientic assistance to other
divisions of HQ CONARC, and maintain a collection of
pertinent documents of interest to combat developers.92 The
CORG work program was built around two primary functions: (1) short-term technical analyses and scientic assistance to CONARC combat developments elements, and (2)
longer-term research on fundamental combat developments
problems.93 The annual CORG work program was mutually
agreed on by the CONARC deputy chief of sta for combat
36171_04OR 4.indd 140
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Figure 42Organization of CORG: July
Source: U.S. Army Continental Army Command, CORG, Combat

Operations Research Group Work Program Summary (Fort Monroe, Va.:
HQ CONARC, 1956) (reproduced in Selwyn D. Smith Jr., An Evaluation
of Army Operations Research, student individual study, U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1957, Annex 4, p. 53; Headquarters, U.S.
Continental Army Command, Sta Directory (Fort Monroe, Va., 1 Jul 56).
Figure 43Organization of CORG: May
Source: Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Sta Directory (Fort

Monroe, Va., 1 May 57).
developments and the CORG director with the eort divided

about equally between the two primary functions.94
Short-term analysis projects were those of immediate
importance to the combat developments program: they involved primarily the application of known facts and methods, had a high probability of a successful solution, and
could be scheduled with some degree of accuracy.95 Project
PINPOINT was a typical short-term analysis project. Conducted at Camp Stewart, Georgia, PINPOINT studied the
eects of ranges, angles of target, number of rounds red,
and type of weapons on antitank weapon position disclosure.96 The longer-term research projects were studies of
high importance in the long term, involved primarily the

search for new facts and methods, had a relatively low probability of success, and could not be scheduled with accuracy.97
In the main, CORG research projects focused on the tactical
eectiveness of weapons and equipment systems, principles
of eective combat organization, and the improvement of
wargaming methods for evaluating new organizational and
doctrinal concepts.98 Among the key questions addressed by
the group were the nature of warfare in the future; the eect
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the optimal organization of ground forces; and how ground commanders
should ght battles in the future.99
36171_OR 4_NEW.indd 141
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The results of CORG analyses and research projects
were published in a variety of formats (such as sta memoranda, reports, memoranda, and sta papers) similar to
those used by ORO.100 Of particular note are CORG publications on wargames; data on weapons performance and
eects gathered during eld tests; eld operations under
nuclear warfare conditions; Army aviation; and a memorable
series of studies by Virgil Ney in the 1960s on the evolution
of various types of Army units, of the Army eld manual,
and of military unit control.
Generally, CORG focused its attention on two particular methods of developing and testing weapons, organization, and doctrine: wargaming and eld experimentation.
The group sought to apply scientic analysis and objective
quantitative data to wargaming in place of professional opinion and subjective qualitative information.101 One of the
new wargaming techniques it developed was SYNTAC, or
synthetic tactics, a dynamic, two-sided map maneuver with
controlled intelligence ow.102 Although the mission assigned to OCAFF by the Department of the Army seemed
to dictate a focus on wargames at the corps and division levels, Maj. Gen. Montague and the CORG team decided to
focus rst on the battalion level as the foundation for later
division- and corps-level gaming.103 Initial emphasis was
also placed on assembling the basic combat data needed for
realistic gaming.
One of the principal functions of CORG was to design
tactical troop tests . . . with a view of obtaining maximum
objectivity and scientic control, and to participate in and
analyze the results of such tests.104 Field experiments were
designed by CORG joint militarycivilian teams.105 It soon
became obvious to CORG and CONARC wargamers that
the new games depended on assembling the basic combat
data needed to evaluate any proposed new weapon, organization, or doctrine, much of which was outside the experience gained in World War II and Korea.106
Establishment of the United States Army Combat
Developments Experimentation Command
The Armys combat developments system was focused
on the future, and eectively planning for the future required
adequate data on existing and proposed weapons systems,
organization, and doctrine. The rapid pace of technological
change meant that the data accumulated during World War
II and Korea were often insucient and outdated for looking into the future.107 The one tool available that could assist
in interpreting the existing data and helping make decisions
was operations research.
ORO had recognized the need for accurate, modern
data. In March 1954, Ellis Johnson recommended an extensive program of eld experimentation, and CONARC
concurrently developed a eld experiment called VULCO

to supply future wargamers with vital information on the
vulnerability of troops in nuclear warfare operations.108
Attempts were also made to obtain needed data from maneuvers and eld exercises, and CONARC combat developments elements produced additional requirements for objective performance data and for the systematic observation
of proposed concepts.109 It was recognized that the lack of
combat experience in many new areas must be oset by providing intensive study, and realistic eld experimentation, as
an arena in which new theories, weapons, and equipment can
receive the acid tests of practical eld application.110 Moreover, it was widely recognized that training maneuvers were
an unsuitable vehicle for testing new developments because
maneuvers were designed to train troops in existing weapons,
organization, and doctrine, and combat developments experimentation was designed to change and improve all three.111
Despite the progress made by OCAFF/CONARC in
integrating the Armys combat developments program, little
attention was given to the key area of eld testing. The Army
worked closely with science and industry in the R&D eld,
but until 1954 little had been done toward eld testing new
developments in weapons, organization, and doctrine. The
Project VISTA study (1952), the Haworth Report (1954),
and a report by ORO (1958) all emphasized the need for a
strong eld experimentation element to evaluate Army innovations.112 The Haworth Report in particular pointed out
the inadequacy of a eld testing system that would be tied
to training exercises and maneuvers, and established three
essential conditions for successful eld experiments:
Troops must be available for the sole purpose of experimentation.
Weapons and equipment must be obtainable for experimental purposes regardless of how such weapons and equipments
are normally procured, assigned, and employed.
Sucient funds must be provided and safeguarded against
other demands to permit experimentation to proceed at a
rate determined primarily by the capacity of the Combat Development personnel to work eciently and eectively.113
The CONARC plan to implement the Haworth Report

recommendations, submitted in February 1955, provided
for troops from the continental United States and overseas
commands to be made available for eld tests, and the strong
emphasis on eld experimentation in the Haworth Report
led ultimately to the creation of an establishment for such
experimentation.114 Following the recommendations of the
Haworth Report, the chief of sta of the Army approved
establishing an Army experimentation center on an interim
basis during FY 195758, and, on 5 October 1956, the commanding general of CONARC, Gen. Willard G. Wyman,
issued General Order No. 39, which established the Combat
Developments Test and Experimentation Center (CDTEC),
36171_04OR 4.indd 142
8/4/06 6:08:52 PM
Figure 44United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center:

3CIENTIFIC
!DVISORY0ANEL
#OMMANDING'ENERAL
#$%#
0ERSONAL3TAFF
-ILITARY$EPUTY
2ESEARCH$EPUTY
#HIEFOF3TAFF
3ECRETARYOFTHE
'ENERAL3TAFF
$IRECTOROF
2ESEARCH
$IRECTOROF&IELD
/PERATIONS
0ROJECT4EAM
$IRECTOROF0LANS
0ROGRAMSAND4RAINING
,ITERATURE
$IRECTOROF
3UPPORT
/PERATIONS
**
$IRECTOR
!DMINISTRATION
AND3UPPORT
#OMMANDING
/FFICER#ONTROL
(EADQUARTERS
Source: U.S. Continental Army Command, Report by USCONARC Ad Hoc Committee on Evaluation of the US Army Combat Development
Experimentation Center (Fort Monroe, Va.: Headquarters, CONARC, 4 Mar 58), Appendix II, p. 91. Cf. CONARC LOI (Fort Monroe, Va.: CDEC,
18 Oct 56), Appendix III, p. 95, Figure 12. Cf. CDEC, Developing Tomorrows Army Today (Fort Monroe, Va.: CDEC, 1 Dec 58), p. 10, Figure 2.
eective 1 November 1956.115 General Wyman followed up

with a letter of instruction regarding the mission, functions,
and support for the new organization.116 The commanding
general, Sixth U.S. Army, was assigned responsibility for
the administrative and housekeeping support of CDTEC,
which was activated at the Fort OrdCamp RobertsHunter Liggett Military Reservation complex in California, and
the 10th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, an element of
the 5th Infantry Division, was designated as the troop test
unit to support CDTEC.117
Prior to CDTECs actual activation on 1 November
1956, the decision was made to change the designation of the
new command to the United States Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center (CDEC) and direct references
to testing were dropped from the ocial statement of mission and functions, although testing clearly remained a major
function.118 It was envisioned that CDEC would provide the
experimental facilities needed in the combat development
system, a eld laboratory, combining a military experimental
group, a scientic advisory group, and a body of troops with
a trained experienced sta to conduct eld experiments.119
In general terms, the purpose of CDEC would be to serve
as a eld laboratory for the evaluation, by objective experimentation, of those concepts of organization, operations, and
logistics developed by the several agencies of the Combat

Development System as may be directed by Headquarters,
CONARC.120 CDECs ocial mission was to assist the
Commanding General, CONARC, in the discharge of his
responsibilities for the development of, and experimentation
with, concepts, organizations, doctrine, and procedures for
the Army in the eld.121 To conduct its mission, CDEC was
initially organized as shown in Figure 44.
The commanding general, CDEC, was specically
charged to
a. Prepare, conduct, and evaluate, with maximum objectivity
and scientic control, experiments with concepts, organizations, doctrine, and procedures for future combat, as directed
by the CG, CONARC. This function includes experiments
for the integration of new materiel into organizations.
b. Report results of experiments and recommend, as appropriate, revision of the concept, organization, doctrine, or materiel under consideration.
c. Design and establish experimentation methods and procedures for the accomplishment of function a above.
d. Apply scientic analysis to solutions of combat development
problems under consideration.122
CONARC General Order No. 39, on 5 October 1956,

authorized a CDEC headquarters strength of 36 ocers, 1
warrant ocer, 20 enlisted personnel, and 16 DA civilians,
OR 4.indd 143
8/24/06 11:43:37 AM
Figure 45Organization of ROEC:

$IRECTOR2/%#
!SSOCIATE$IRECTOR2/%#
2EVIEW"OARD
0ROGRAMS,IAISON
"USINESS
3ERVICES
0LANNINGAND
%XECUTION
!RT
$ATA!NALYSIS
&IELD3UPPORT
3UBGROUP
0UBLICATIONS
3ECRETARIES
3ENIOR0ROJECT
3CIENTISTS
Source: U.S. Continental Army Command, Report by USCONARC Ad Hoc Committee on Evaluation of the US Army Combat
Development Experimentation Center (Fort Monroe, Va.: Headquarters, CONARC, 4 Mar 58), Appendix III, pp. 9394, 97, 99,
Figure 13 and Figure 14.
plus 20 scientists hired under a contract with Technical

Operations, Inc., to sta the proposed CDEC Research Ofce.123 CDEC was activated on 1 November 1956, with two
ocers and sixteen enlisted men present for duty. It soon
grew.124 By 18 January 1958, the assigned strength of CDEC
had increased to 53 ocers, 2 warrant ocers, 41 enlisted
personnel, 24 graded civilians, and 7 ungraded civilians.125
Operations research was at the heart of all CDEC operations. An integral part of the planned CDTEC organization was the Research Oce of the Test and Experimentation Center (ROTEC), an agency staed by contracted
civilian scientists who would operate under the direction of
the commanding general, CDTEC.126 The 18 October 1956
CONARC Letter of Instruction (LOI) provided that
in FY 57, ROTEC will be supported under the contract which
provides for support of the Combat Operations Research Group
(CORG) at Headquarters CONARC. Operations will be in
accordance with provisions of that contract or any modication
thereof. Negotiations for the establishment, modication, and
renewal of any contract providing for ROTEC services will be
conducted by this headquarters in coordination with CDTEC.
The purpose of ROTEC is to assist the CG, CDTEC, in the
establishment of scientic methodology and objective analysis
of tests and experiments, and to conduct original research on
problems related to the CDTEC mission and functions.127
ROTEC was initially established in Monterey, California, and was later redesignated the Research Oce Experimentation Center (ROEC) and moved to Fort Ord.128 Ini-
tially, the scientic personnel to sta ROEC were provided

under the Technical Operations, Inc., contract with HQ
CONARC.129 However, the contract for supplying scientic
services to CDEC was soon shifted to the Stanford Research
Institute of Menlo Park, California, which maintained ofces at Fort Ord near HQ CDEC.130 The CDEC director of research, as the senior representative of the scientic
contractor, managed the operations of ROEC and ensured
that CDEC received such scientic services as are necessary
to accomplish through objectivity and scientic control, the
mission assigned CDEC.131 ROEC also served as a liaison
with the other OR agencies throughout the Army, the other
services, and the Department of Defense.132
The responsibilities of ROEC extended to designing experiments and experiment data evaluation plans, umpiring,
establishing data recording procedures, collecting weapons
eect data, analyzing experiment data, and preparing reports on experiments.133 To carry out its assigned functions,
ROEC was organized as shown in Figure 45.
The Programs Liaison oce provided coordination between the programming elements of CDEC and ROEC during the early stages of projects.134 For each project, a senior
project scientist in the Planning and Execution Group worked
with a senior project ocer from CDEC to prepare detailed
plans for the experiment. Selected members of ROEC constituted the Review Board that reviewed the proposed design
of experiments submitted by the senior project scientist. The
OR 4.indd 144
8/24/06 11:43:48 AM

Data Analysis Group supported the project scientists in preparing the experiment evaluation plan and assembling the
weapons eects data tables needed by the umpires. For each
ongoing project, a Field Support Subgroup checked the data,
assembled it in a convenient form, and prepared simple summary statistics for the project scientist. The Business Services
Group handled all administrative support for ROEC.
Employing civilian analysts was one means that CDEC
used to eliminate prejudice and opinion and to meet the
requirement to quantify, objectively measure, and analyze
the results of the battles [i.e., the experiments].135 In 1958,
the strength of ROEC under the contract with the Stanford
Research Institute was 20 civilian scientists, 6 technical assistants, and 11 administrative personnel.136 Increases of ten
additional scientists in FY 1958/59 and another ten scientists
for FY 1960 and beyond were contemplated.137 In addition
to the civilian scientic personnel provided by the Stanford
Research Institute, the commanding general, CDEC, also established a Scientic Advisory Committee of distinguished
scientists and industrialists from the West Coast who met
twice a year to examine the scientic objectivity and validity
of CDEC operations and to advise the commanding general,
CDEC, on needed corrections and improvements.138
CDEC was responsible for conducting eld experiments
on new materiel, organization, and doctrine developed by
CORG and other elements of the CONARC combat developments system. For the most part the methods and procedures for such eld experimentation had to be developed
by CDEC from scratch. The principal vehicle devised for
carrying out CDECs experimental work was the Experimental Project Team, comprising both military personnel
and civilian scientists. The military personnel for the teams
were drawn from the CDEC Directorate of Field Operations (later from the Directorate of Plans and Operations
and the Directorate of Logistics Liaison), and the scientic
personnel were furnished by the Research Oce (Stanford
Research Institute). Depending on the nature of the experiment, the team leader was either an ocer or a scientist.
CDECs initial experimentation program was based
on the CONARC LOI of 18 October 1956, which called
for completion of an integrated combat group experiment
by 1 July and experimentation on a continuing basis with
platoon-size combat forces.139 The results of the rst experiment in the programan examination of the repower
of the pentomic-type rie companywere unsatisfactory
because of faulty umpire techniques and procedures, and
so the focus of the experiment was converted to developing
techniques and procedures that could be used for umpiring
in all future CDEC experimentation.140 In 1957, CDEC
completed experiments on mortar gunnery, umpire techniques and procedures, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, howitzer
gunnery, the tactical application of passive antipersonnel

devices (the Claymore mine), PENTANA-type companies
in mobile operations, and PENTANA-type combat surveillance units.141
Creation of the United States Army Combat
Developments Command
The decade-long eort to organize and improve the
Army combat developments systems culminated in 1962
with the establishment of the United States Army Combat
Developments Command (CDC), a separate combat developments agency similar to the one originally envisioned in
the February 1952 Project VISTA report.142 The transfer of
combat developments functions and personnel to CDC from
HQ CONARC and CDCs absorption of CDEC marked
the success of those who had long advocated a centralized
Army combat developments system.
In 1961, the newly appointed secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, initiated a study of Department of Defense functions, organization, and procedures with a view to
consolidating various functions and, among other changes,
creating a functional structure for the Armys technical services.143 The study, known as Project 80, was led by Deputy
Comptroller of the Army Leonard W. Hoelscher, and its
nal report became known as the Hoelscher Report. One
of the chief recommendations of the Hoelscher Report was
that a new United States Army Combat Developments
Command be created to integrate the combat developments
activities of CONARC, the Armys technical and administrative services, and other Army agencies.144 Accordingly,
the United States Army Combat Developments Command
was activated at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on 20 June 1962 and
became operational on 1 July 1962, under the command of
Lt. Gen. John P. Daley. The principal mission assigned to the
new command was
to command all assigned eld agencies; to formulate and document current doctrine for the Army; and, in anticipation of the
nature of land warfare in the future, to determine the types of
forces and materiel needed in the future, and how these forces
and materiel should be employed.145
Speaking to the participants of the 1962 Army OR symposium, Lt. Gen. Daley indicated that there would be many
opportunities for operations research in the new command.146
He also referred to the usefulness of OR in evaluating new
materiel, organization, and doctrine; noted the importance of
selecting the right inputs for OR studies; and cautioned symposium participants to avoid overselling OR.147
As part of the consolidation of combat developments
activities under the Combat Developments Command in
late 1962, the Combat Operations Research Group at HQ
CONARC was transferred to the control of CDC, and after
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Figure 46Organization of CORG: January

Director,
Operations Research
and Experimentation, USACDC
Director, CORG
Assistant
Director, CORG
Assistant
Director, CORG
Security
Office
Analysis
Branch
Services
Branch
Systems
Branch
Data
Branch
Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command,

Sta Directory (Fort Belvoir, Va., 1 Jan 63).
reorganization it was made a part of the HQ CDC Operations Research and Experimentation Division, as shown in
Figure 46.148 On 1 July 1962, the Combat Developments
Experimentation Command, including its Research Oce
Experimentation Command operated by Stanford Research
Institute, also became part of the new Combat Developments Command.149
The changes in Army structure and methods ordered by
Secretary of Defense McNamara and his associates radically
transformed the Army R&D and combat developments systems. OR continued to be an integral and important part
of the R&D and combat developments processes, however,
and the new OR organizations created to support combat
developments in the 1950s, such as CORG and ROEC,
continued to prosper and provide critical insights for Army
decision makers well beyond 1962.
Technical Services,
Despite the tremendous strides in the Army R&D and
combat developments systems in the 1950s and early 1960s
and the creation of a number of vigorous new OR organizations, such as CORG and ROEC, the operations research
groups formed by the Armys technical services remained at
the sharp end of the R&D and combat developments process. The technical services, notably the Ordnance Corps and
Signal Corps, had employed OR methods as an integral part

of their R&D programs during World War II, but (except
for the Signal Corps in a brief period during the war) until
the 1950s the technical services did not formally establish
OR groups under that name. However, as early as 1950, the
total funds and personnel dedicated to OR by the technical
services exceeded those of ORO, and the increased emphasis
on integrating the development of weapons, organization,
and doctrine combined with the example of ORO prompted
the establishment of formal OR groups in the technical services during the 1950s.150
All of the technical service OR groups were relatively
limited in size and in the scope of their operations.151 For
the most part, they relied on civilian analysts hired under
the civil service, but some of them, most notably the Signal
Corps, made use of universities or nongovernmental private
research rms to perform OR work under contract.152 The
technical services OR groups generally focused on the traditional weapons analysis types of problems, including overall
weapons and equipment system studies from an engineering
viewpoint, determination of desirable characteristics for new
weapons and equipment, and technical feasibility studies.153
Although they appropriated the operations research title
and generally made use of techniques common in OR work,
the technical services programs were primarily engaged in
problem solving and remained relatively unconcerned with
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the more theoretical aspects of OR that organizations such
as the RAND Corporation and ORO had taken up.
Ordnance Corps
The Ordnance Corps used OR techniques extensively
for several years before forming a separate OR organization.
The focal point of ordnance OR activities was in the Ballistic
Research Laboratories (BRL) at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland. BRL was established by the Ordnance Department
in 1938 to perform engineering-type analyses of weapons and
ammunition to provide a scientic basis for the design and development of ordnance materiel. During World War II and
after, BRL used OR techniques to produce bombing pattern
analyses; develop ring tables for dierent types of ammunition; and study the vulnerability of various targets, notably aircraft and tanks, to the eects of dierent types of ordnance.154
The work performed at Aberdeen was used by the Army Sta,
OCAFF, the various arsenals, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the other
services to supplement their own research.155 Even ORO
made substantial use of the work done at Aberdeen.156
In January 1953, the Weapons Systems Laboratory
(WSL), a part of BRL, established an OR group that operated under the general supervision of the assistant chief of
ordnance who headed the Research and Development Division.157 In 1954, the sta of WSL engaged in OR studies
included two military and fourteen civilian professionals, the
latter under civil service.158 The annual budget for WSL OR
activities was $435,000, and only approximately 15 percent
of the laboratorys personnel and work eort was devoted to
analytical OR studies; the remaining work was experimental.159 WSL performed overall weapons systems studies
from an engineering and operations analysis viewpoint and
conducted applied research on factors aecting system performance to establish desirable characteristics and proposed
basic designs for new and improved weapons.160 Mathematical models and OR techniques were applied, and high-speed
digital computers and specially designed instruments were
used to predict the probability of success in the tactical employment of proposed or developmental weapons.161 Among
the specic tasks assigned to WSL were these:
(1) Conduct experiments, studies and analyses to determine the vulnerability of aircraft and missiles and the eectiveness of aircraft
weapons in order to provide a basis for the comparative evaluation
of the eectiveness of weapons under development, for the design
of future weapons, and for reducing the susceptibility of our own
aircraft and missiles to damage by ordnance items.
(2) Evaluate the eectiveness of antiaircraft weapon systems for defense of the continental U.S. and eld armies, and compare competing AA [antiaircraft] weapon systems in realistic air defense
problems on a cost-eectiveness basis.
(3) Conduct systems analysis studies on the eectiveness of atomic

explosive weapons for use against ground or aerial targets.
(4) Determine the lethality or lethal areas of artillery shell, mortar
shell and artillery type rockets in order to evaluate the eectiveness of these against personnel and materiel targets.
(5) Evaluate the overall battleeld eectiveness of tanks and make
recommendations on how tank designs can best be improved.162
OR was also used at the various ordnance commands

and arsenals, some of which (for example, Picatinny Arsenal
in Dover, New Jersey; Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; and, after 1954, Redstone Arsenal in Alabama)
established their own small OR groups.163 In the early 1960s,
the U.S. Army Weapons Command at Rock Island Arsenal
in Illinois formed an OR group to perform both long-range
and short-term studies. The Weapons Operations Research
Division at HQ, Army Weapons Command, provided OR
services to three subordinate installations and generated approximately 60 percent of its own studies.164
The Army Research Oce
In June 1951, the Ordnance Corps established the United States Army Oce of Ordnance Research (OOR) on the
campus of Duke University in Durham, North Carolina,
as its central oce for monitoring basic research programs
sponsored by the Ordnance Corps.165 OOR administered
scientic research conducted for the Ordnance Corps by universities, research institutes, and industrial laboratories and
oversaw research conducted by Ordnance Corps personnel
at arsenals and laboratories. At the time, about 70 percent of
Ordnance research work was done in-house, but most basic
research was parceled out to educational institutions and nonprot research organizations.166 In FY 1951, only $288,500
was devoted to ordnance basic research, but it was estimated
that around $4.6 million annually would be required to support the basic research to be overseen by the new OOR.167
The original OOR program focused on basic research in
ve principal areas: exploratory, ballistics, materials and construction, combustion, and friction and wear.168 To ensure
that the research projects were properly designed and scientically sound, in June 1951, the Ordnance Corps contracted
with the National Research Council for the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate proposals for basic research submitted to it by OOR.169 The rst technical paper sponsored
by OOR, prepared by Dr. Robert H. Cameron of Wayne
State University in September 1951, dealt with a solution to
a heat ow equation.170 By the end of 1951, 88 projects had
been initiated, and between 1953 and 1969 OOR steadily
supported some four hundred active projects each year.171
Interest in OR was high at OOR, and the oce included basic research in OR theories and methods among
the elds for which it provided support. For example, OOR
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funded a number of graduate assistantships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for basic work in
OR.172 The oce also sponsored the First Ordnance Conference on Operations Research, held at Frankford Arsenal
on 14 May 1954.173 The purpose of the conference was to
disseminate information on the methods and new developments in the eld of operations research to a large number of
government personnel in the hope that they might nd these
disciplines [that is, OR] applicable to many of their own
problems.174 Col. T. J. Kane, the commander of Frankford
Arsenal, opened the meeting, and some 150 attendees listened to presentations by Dr. T. J. Killian, the chief scientist
of OOR; Dr. Merrill M. Flood of Columbia University; Dr.
Robert M. Thrall of the University of Michigan; Dr. Philip
M. Morse of MIT; and Dr. George Shortley of ORO.
OOR proved to be a very successful agent for prioritizing, monitoring, and controlling the costs of scientic
research, and by early 1958 the Army Scientic Advisory
Panel was pressing the Armys chief of research and development, then Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, to extend the concept to all Army-sponsored research.175 As a result, on 24
March 1958, the Armys Research and Development Field
Oce at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was redesignated as the
U.S. Army Research Oce (ARO) and moved to Arlington, Virginia.176 Almost three years later, in January 1961,
OOR was transferred from the direct control of the Oce
of the Chief of Ordnance to the Oce of the Chief of Research and Development, was redesignated the U.S. Army
Research Oce (Durham), and was assigned responsibility
for research in the physical sciences Army-wide, to include
the technical services.177 The Arlington oce continued to
have responsibility for the life sciences, psychology, social
sciences, and earth sciences.178
The missions assigned to the newly created ARO included planning and directing the Armys various research
programs to ensure that they met the Armys needs, making maximum use of the nations scientic talent, providing a
single point of contact with the scientic community, coordinating the R&D programs of the Armys technical services,
and coordinating the Armys research programs with those
of the other services and other government agencies.179
The Army Research Oce (Durham) had an abiding
interest in the use of OR, and, beginning in March 1962,
ARO (Durham) sponsored a series of annual symposia on
OR in the Army, the rst of which was held on 2729 March
1962, in Durham, North Carolina.180 The commander of
ARO (Durham) at that time was Col. George W. Taylor.
Dean Marcus E. Hobbs of Duke University welcomed the
two hundred civilian and military participants, who enjoyed a
full program of professional papers and panel discussions on
all aspects of OR.181 The purposes of the symposia, as stated
for the Second Army Operations Research Symposium in

March 1963, were to
1.Emphasize the role of OR in improvement of military operations; 2. Acquaint key Army personnel with the Armys OR
projects and in-house capabilities; 3. Provide a forum for presentation and discussion of Army problems amenable to solution
through OR; 4. Inform Army operations analysts of new technological developments in OR; 5. Increase the applicability of
results obtained in OR studies; 6. Aord Army operations analysts an opportunity to become acquainted with their colleagues
and with nationally-known leaders in the eld of OR.182
As a result of the rst ARO-sponsored Army OR symposium, ARO took several actions to improve OR in the
Army. An Operations Research Technical Assistance Group
(ORTAG) was formed with representatives from all the Army
Sta sections to examine technical aspects of OR. The group
met for the rst time in September 1962 and established a
program of assistance visits to various Army commands that
proved useful to the newly formed Army Material Command,
the Combat Developments Command, and the Test and Evaluation Command, among others.183 An Operations Research
Steering Committee, headed by the director of Army research
(that is, the chief of ARO), was also formed and met semiannually to oversee requirements and allocation of resources
for OR and to advise the chief of R&D on the Armys overall
OR program.184 Meanwhile, the Research Planning Division
of ARO managed the day-to-day oversight and coordination of Army OR programs.185 A prototype was designed for
a formal one-year course leading to a masters degree in OR
for a limited number of ocers and civilians, and provision
was made for a number of orientation courses to make sta
ocers more familiar with the capabilities and limitations of
operations research, but little progress was made toward the
goal of creating a central repository of OR studies.186
ARO eorts to monitor and coordinate contracts for
Army OR studiesincluding the working of the Operations Research Steering Committee and the project advisory
groups established for each project or study contractwere
governed by Army Regulations No. 1110, which assigned
responsibility for the bulk of the Armys contract OR program to the chief of research and development.187 AR 1110
established overall policy guidance, procedures, responsibilities, and evaluation criteria concerning both management
advisory services and OR studies or projects performed
under contract (such as those prepared by ORO/RAC).188
The objectives of the Army operations research program, as
prescribed by AR 1110 were to
a. Improve the overall eectiveness of the Army through analysis of
various alternative solutions to major problems.
b. Assist in determining the most ecient use of resources in operations.
36171_04OR 4.indd 148
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Figure 47Organization of the Chemical Corps: June

Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
Chemical Corps Class II Activities
Washington, D.C.
Chemical Corps Commands
Chemical Corps
Operations Research Group
Chemical Corps Research

and Development Command
Army Chemical Center, Maryland
Washington, D.C.
Chemical Corps
Board
Chemical Corps
Materiel Command
Chemical Corps
Patent Agency
Chemical Corps
Engineering Command
Washington, D.C.
Chemical Corps
Intelligence Agency
Chemical Corps
Training Command
Washington, D.C.
Ft. McClellan, Alabama
Chemical Corps
Field Requirements Group
Chemical Corps
Historical Office
Ft. McClellan, Alabama
Source: U.S. Army, Chemical Corps School, Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps (Fort McClellan,
Ala.: Chemical Corps School, 1956), p. 21, Figure 1; U.S. Army, Oce of the Chief Chemical Ocer, Organization of
the Army Chemical Corps, 15 June 1956 (Washington, D.C.: Oce of the Chief Chemical Ocer, Department of the
Army, 1956), p. 21, Figure 1.
c. Promote, within the Chief of Research and Developments

area of responsibility and authority, optimum awareness
and prompt application of usable ndings of projects or
studies conducted by or for any element of the Department
of the Army.189
It should be noted that, although the chief of R&D was

charged with sta oversight of all Army contracts for OR services and studies as well as sta oversight of the OR programs
of the technical services (therefore, control of most Army OR
activities), he did not in fact exercise direct supervision of all
such activities. The deputy chief of sta for logistics retained
supervisory responsibility for the logistics OR program, including the logistical portion of the technical services programs; the chiefs of the technical services were responsible
for supervising their services OR programs; and the commanding general, CONARC, was responsible for overseeing
CORGs study program and other OR activities in the CONARC combat developments system (such as ROEC).190
The Chemical Corps
Like the Ordnance Corps, the Chemical Corps made
extensive use of OR-like methods for some time before
forming a formal OR group. The Chemical Warfare Service

was redesignated as the Chemical Corps on 2 August 1946,
and the title of chief of the Chemical Corps was changed
to chief chemical ocer by the Army Reorganization Act of
1950.191 In October 1951, the chief chemical ocer established three Chemical Corps eld commands: the Chemical
Corps Materiel Command, the Chemical Corps Research
and Engineering Command, and the Chemical Corps Training Command. The Chemical Corps was again reorganized
in 1956, and the resulting organization was as shown in Figure 47.The Chemical Corps Operations Research Group
(CCORG) was established at Edgewood Arsenal, a subpost
of the Army Chemical Center (later the Chemical Warfare
Center), Maryland, in May 1951 (before the four Chemical Corps commands) as a Class II activity under the direct
supervision of the chief chemical ocer. The distinguished
chemist, Dr. W. Albert Noyes, Jr., then a member of the
Chemical Corps Advisory Council, precipitated the creation
of CCORG when he recommended to the chief chemical ofcer, Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAulie (who had played a
prominent role in the creation of ORO in 1948) that a group
be assembled to study Chemical Corps problems.192
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The formal mission of the group was (1) To analyze and
evaluate problems connected with CmlC [Chemical Corps]
operations in areas as authorized and directed; (2) To provide the Chief Chemical Ocer with scientic data, technical
evaluations, and reports.193 The Chemical Corps senior scientic adviser, also located at Army Chemical Center, Maryland, reviewed the studies referred to CCORG and the reports prepared by the group for the chief chemical ocer.194
In 1954, CCORG had a strength of ve military and
eight civilian professionals under civil service, and an annual
budget of $46,500, a little more than one one-hundredth of
the ORO budget for that year.195 Two years later, the group
consisted of the director, Lt. Col. John A. Bacon, 6 ocers,
3 enlisted men, and 8 civilians.196 The three enlisted men
assigned to CCORG were draftees with doctorates in chemistry and were part of the Armys Enlisted Scientic and Professional Personnel program.
The directors of CCORG, Lt. Col. Bacon and his successors (Lt. Col. A. Bowker and Lt. Col. Jack F. Lane) served
mostly as administrators and facilitators, leaving the scientic direction of the group to the civilian scientic director.197 The CCORG director also served as an ex-ocio
member of the executive council of the Chemical Board,
which had its own operations research element, at least on
paper.198 The boardwith a principal mission of proving
long-range studies; eld testing Chemical Corps organization, weapons, and doctrine; determining the proper application of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare systems in future military operations; and providing support
and long-range guidance for the Chemical Corps Research
and Development Programwas organized with an Executive Oce, an Administrative Services Oce, and four divisions: Advanced Studies, Special Projects, Field Service,
and Operations Research.199
According to George Milly, who served as its scientic
director, CCORG fashioned its own work program on its
perception of the needs of the Chemical Corps and the
Army.200 The bulk of the work undertaken fell clearly into
the weapons analysis and evaluation category, assessments of
the properties and performance of various chemical agents
with a view to developing some consistent pattern that could
be used for planning purposes being the most common type
of task. A good deal of eort was also directed at studies of
the vulnerabilities of troops to various chemical agents. Restricted primarily to studies of chemical weapons, the work
of CCORG did not extend to any appreciable degree to
problems of Chemical Corps organization and doctrine. The
methods used by CCORG included mathematical modeling
but otherwise bore little resemblance to what is today dened as OR. At base, its work consisted of practical problem
solving rather than the application of sophisticated theories.
George Milly recalled that the inuence of CCORG

gradually permeated throughout the Chemical Corps, but
there was a certain degree of tension between the analysts at
CCORG and the sensitive scientists in the various Chemical Corps laboratories who saw CCORG as always second
guessing them. In fact, Milly also recalled that the CCORG
analysts could not always rely on the data obtained from the
labs and had to proof it themselves.
Although CCORG had little or no contact with the OR
groups in the other technical services, it did work closely with
ORO. In 1957, Milly and other members of CCORG prepared a comprehensive report on chemical weapons, known
as ORG 17, for Charlie Warner of ORO.201 ORG 17 was
a major contribution and is still consulted today. CCORG
also maintained some contact with the military OR groups
in Britain, Canada, and Australia through participation in
the annual tripartite/quadripartite OR conferences.
With the organizational changes in the Defense Department and the services instituted by Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara in the early 1960s, the Chemical Corps Operations
Research Group was broken up. Some personnel were transferred to Rock Island Arsenal, and others were reassigned to
the new Army Munitions Command. Milly, who by then was
the director of CCORG, elected to leave government service
rather than cope with the growing centralization of control over
research and the drastic reorganizations then taking place.
The Signal Corps
The Signal Corps was the only Army technical service to
establish a separate operations research organization before
the 1950s, but the wartime Operational Research Branch in
the Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer, led by Dr. William L.
Everitt, was deactivated on 1 April 1946. The Signal Corps,
however, continued to use integrated OR techniques in its
R&D activities and in the eld of communication trac engineering.202 The Signal Corps also maintained close contact
with ORO, which conducted several studies of interest to
the Signal Corps.
In May 1953, the chief signal ocer signed a contract
with a private electronics rm, Haller, Raymond and Brown,
Inc., to establish a Signal Corps Evaluation and Analysis
Group (SCEAG).203 Monitored by the Plans and Operations
Division in the Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer, the group
had one military and sixteen civilian professionals at work
in 1954, and the annual contract budget was $330,000.204
A Signal Corps Resident Liaison and Operational Research
Coordination Oce was established at the Haller, Raymond
and Brown oces in State College, Pennsylvania, to coordinate the OR program at the contractors site with ongoing research at the Signal Corps laboratories and the various
Army combat developments agencies.205
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In January 1954, SCEAG submitted a study of the Signal Corps problem areas that might be addressed protably
using OR methods.206 The SCEAG study led to the development of two OR proposals submitted to the Army Sta
by the Signal Corps in 1954. SCEAG participated actively
in the February 1954 tests conducted by the Combat Operations Research Group of the Oce of the Chief of Army
Field Forces at Fort Benning, Georgia, to study the infantry rie company, and it assisted in eld tests of new Signal
Corps organizations and equipment at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, during the mid-1950s.207
The Signal Corps supported the development of the
pentomic Army, which demanded improved command,
control, and communications (C3) capabilities and longrange improvement in Army communications and electronics equipment and methods.208 The chief signal ocer,
then Lt. Gen. James D. OConnell, responded by taking
a number of actions to ensure that the Signal Corps met
the challenges in the last half of the 1950s. Among other
measures, the Signal Corps revised and expanded its operations research and analysis eorts in an eort to nd
new concepts, systems and techniques in all areas of Signal Corps interest.209 The Signal Corps also expanded and
accelerated its scientic R&D and combat developments
programs and participated in Army eld exercises and tests
of new C3 systems, organizations, and doctrine at strategic
and tactical levels.
Throughout the 1950s, the Signal Corps maintained a
close working relationship with ORO. ORO provided both
studies pertaining to Signal Corps equipment, organization,
and doctrine and ideas for the expansion and improvement
of the Signal Corps own OR eorts.210 To facilitate the relationship, the Signal Corps maintained a full-time active-duty
liaison ocer at ORO, provided separate funds to ORO in
FY 1956FY 1958 to initiate and continue studies in communications and electronic warfare, and was represented on
all of the ORO project advisory groups.211
The Army Medical Service
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Army Medical Service
(AMEDS) conducted an active R&D program and more
than doubled its R&D expenditures between FY 1951 and
FY 1960.212 The AMEDS R&D program included not only
basic medical research but also extensive use of contracted
OR services to support the development and testing of new
concepts of equipment, organization, and operational doctrine for eld medical units. Beginning in FY 1960, AMEDS
greatly expanded its combat developments program, and the
AMEDS Combat Development Group, located at the Forest Glen Section of Walter Reed Army Medical Center in
Silver Spring, Maryland, was assisted by Operations Re-
search, Inc., to design new materiel and new organizational

and operational concepts for the eld medical service of the
future.213 Supported by the deputy chief of sta for logistics,
HQ CONARC, and the newly established Combat Developments Command, the AMEDS Combat Development
Group planned and conducted experiments at the CDEC
eld laboratory at Fort Ord to evaluate the new concepts.214
The AMEDS Combat Development Group established
close working relationships with other Army combat developments agencies and was assisted by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, which focused
on medical research and the development of medical materiel and techniques.215 The eorts of the AMEDS Combat
Development Group accelerated in FY 1961, and a number
of contracts were awarded to civilian OR agencies to provide scientic and dispassionate evaluation of the various
operational concepts which had been proposed.216 During
FY 1961, increased emphasis was placed on the use of OR
studies to evaluate the capabilities of AMEDS to accomplish
its mission. The initial study was an evaluation of eld army
medical support up to combat command level.217 A model,
suitable for computerization, was developed to indicate
the eect of various factors, such as the combat situation,
weather, terrain, unit stang, and logistics, on the provision
of medical support in the eld.
The AMEDS Combat Development Group moved to
Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas in July 1961, and
the AMEDS combat developments program, including the
use of OR, continued to expand.218 AMEDS expenditures
on R&D in FY 1962 increased to nearly $23.5 million, of
which $14.7 million was for research contracts (including
OR studies)nearly double the amount in FY 1961.219
The AMEDS R&D program included funding for a special
operations research project that involved studies analyzing
casualty distribution, location, design, construction, organization, patient care procedures, stang criteria, and medical materiel for military hospitals.220 The rst two phases of
these studies determined that simulation techniques were
feasible, and, subsequently, computerized simulation models were designed, the necessary data were assembled, and
preliminary studies involving a hypothetical battle situation
were conducted.221
Operations Research in the Other Technical Services
By the mid-1950s, the other technical services, including the Quartermaster Corps and the Transportation Corps,
as well as the Corps of Engineers and several of the combat
arms, had also created OR groups or contracted with civilian research organizations for OR services.222 Few details
remain of the nature and scope of these programs and contracts, but they almost certainly involved the use of OR tech
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niques to evaluate new weapons systems, new organizations,
and new operational doctrine.
Conclusion
The twelve years between 1950 and 1962 saw tremendous progress in the Armys ability to prepare for future war.
The Army restructured its R&D establishment and created
a number of eective new combat developments organizations responsible for the design of weapons, organization,
and doctrine for modern warfare. Operations research was
at the core of both the R&D and combat developments efforts, and a number of new Army OR groups were created
to handle the ever-expanding workload. In general, the new
OR organizations, such as the Combat Operations Research
Group and the Research Oce Experimentation Command,
were highly successful and made signicant contributions to
the Army and the nation.
The use of operations research in the Armys technical services also expanded substantially between 1950
and 1962, but, despite its signicant growth and increasing importance, OR in the technical services suered from
several defects. Whereas the agencies and procedures for
coordinating and evaluating the work of new organizations, such as CORG and ROEC, were clearly prescribed,
those for coordinating and evaluating operations research
work in the technical services were not clearly spelled out
in Army documents.223 In his 1954 War College study, Col.
Seymour I. Gilman noted that the growth of operations re-
search in the technical services was a healthy development

which will supplement the work of ORO and broaden the
base of qualied personnel in the Army, but the integration
of operational research agencies within the structure of the
Chemical and Ordnance Corps is not conducive to the best
results.224 Gilman went on to recommend that the Ordnance Corps and the Chemical Corps reexamine the status
of operational research groups integrated into the Corps
structure from the standpoint of providing improved results
by independent status [that is, a shift from civil service to an
ORO-like organization] and that those technical services
without operational research groups study the feasibility of
their early establishment.225
Although much remained to be done, particularly in the
area of recruitment and training of OR personnel, by 1962
the Army had in place an operations research program capable of dealing eectively with the many and varied problems faced by Army leaders. RAC, HumRRO, SORO, and
the newly formed STAG handled a wide variety of issues
in higher-level policy, strategy, and operations. CORG and
ROEC dealt with broad problems of R&D, combat developments, and eld testing. And, at the sharp end of the R&D/
combat developments system, the OR groups of the technical services addressed problems specic to their assigned
functions. Although the system lacked central coordination
and involved some duplication of eort, it performed well
and more than proved its value as an essential aid to Army
decision makers.
chapter four notes
1U.S. Congress, Oce of Technology Assessment, A History of the

Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
OTA-BP-ISS-157 (Washington: USGPO, 1995), p. 20 (hereafter cited
as OTA History).
2John L. Romjue, History of Field Experimentation Methodology
in the United States Army, 19561970 (Fort Ord, Calif.: U.S. Army
Combat Developments Command Experimentation Command, 1971),
p. 3; Jean E. Keith and Howard K. Butler, United States Army Combat
Developments Command: Origins and Formation (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Oce
of the Historian, Deputy Chief of Sta for Management and Resources,
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 1972), p. 2 (hereafter cited
as Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation).
3Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 3.
4Ibid.
5Marshall D. Moody, The Transportation Corps Combat Development
Program: Its Origin and Status, in the series TC in the Current National
Emergency: The Post-Korean Experience, Survey No. 11 (Washington:
Oce of the Chief of Transportation, DA, 1958), p. 1; Keith and Butler,
CDC Origins and Formation, 3; Romjue, Field Experimentation, pp. 34.
6U.S. Continental Army Command, Report by USCONARC

Ad Hoc Committee on Evaluation of the US Army Combat Development
Experimentation Center (Fort Monroe, Va.: HQ, CONARC, 1958), p. 12
(hereafter cited as CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt).
7Ibid., p. 17.
8Ibid., p. 215; Moody, Transportation Corps, pp. 23; James E.
Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,
19001963 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975),
p. 259. Moody noted that this is the denition given in the Final Report
on Project VISTA and in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the
Armys Combat Development Program (The Haworth Rpt) (Washington,
20 Oct 1954), p. 8. Curiously, despite the central importance to the U.S.
armed services of research and development and combat developments,
neither term is dened in the ocial dictionary of U.S. military terms,
Joint Chiefs of Sta, Joint Publication 102: Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: Oce of the
Chairman, JCS, 23 May 1994).
9Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 259.
10U.S. Army TRADOC, Historical Oce, TRADOC On-Line
36171_04OR 4.indd 152
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History (Fort Monroe, Va.: Historical Oce, HQ TRADOC), Chapter
7: Combat Developments, available at http://tradoc.monroe.army.mil
/historian.
11U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command,
Developing Tomorrows Army Today (Fort Ord, Calif.: U.S. Army CDEC,
1958), p. 5.
12Ibid., p. 8.
13Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Challenges in Army Operations Research,
in U.S. ARO (Durham), Proceedings of the United States Army Operations
Research Symposium, 26, 27, 28 March 1963, Durham, North Carolina,
Part I, ORTAG25 (Durham, N.C.: ARO [Durham], 30 Sep 63), p.
92.
14CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, p. 215.
15Moody, Transportation Corps, p. 3.
16James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 132; Moody, Transportation Corps, pp. 35;
Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 3.
17Gavin, War and Peace, p. 132. It should be noted that several of the
participating scientists, notably Howard P. Robertson, had been involved
in the wartime OR program.
20Ibid., p. 4.
21Ibid.; CDEC, Developing Tomorrows Army Today, pp. 67.
23Ltr, Gen J. Lawton Collins (Army chief of sta ) to Gen John
R. Hodge (chief of Army eld forces), Washington, 13 Jun 52, sub:
Establishment of Combat Development Agency (cited in Keith and Butler,
CDC Origins and Formation, pp. 45); CONARC Ad Hoc Committee
Rpt, p. 216.
24Ltr, Collins to Hodge, 13 Jun 52 (quoted in Keith and Butler, CDC
Origins and Formation, p. 5).
26Ibid. The principal changes were the use at HQ OCAFF of
operations analysts drawn on a rotational basis from ORO rather than
permanent civil service personnel (see the discussion of CORG below)
and a 50 percent reduction in the personnel increase for the service schools
recommended in the OCAFF plan.
27Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 5; TRADOC
On-Line History, Chapter 7.
29Ltr, chief of Army eld forces, Fort Monroe, Va., 21 Feb 53, sub:
Combat Developments Planning Guide (cited in Keith and Butler, CDC
Origins and Formation, p. 6). The Combat Developments Planning Guide
later became the Combat Developments Objectives Guide. It listed broad
problem areas and stated the objectives to be achieved.
31Ltr, chief of Army eld forces, Fort Monroe, Va., 15 May 53, sub:
Evaluation of Combat Developments Departments (cited in Keith and
Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 6).
33Romjue, Field Experimentation, p. 5; CDEC, Developing Tomorrows
Army Today, p. 7.
36Disposition Form, deputy chief (Combat Developments), OCAFF,
to Chiefs of OCAFF Sta Sections, Fort Monroe, Va., 2 Oct 53, sub:
Functions of Combat Developments Group, Oce, Deputy Chief (cited
in Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 7, n. 13).
37Project MICHIGAN involved the study of ways to improve the
Armys long-range combat surveillance capability (see Oliver R. Dinsmore,
Requirements for Operations Research Training of Army Ocers,
student research paper 664129U, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, Penn., 1966, p. 24).
38Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 8. In May
1954, HQDA authorized direct communication and sta visits between
OCAFF and the overseas theaters in order to improve the correlation of
combat developments in the continental United States with the actual
problems of the theaters.
39Ibid., pp. 78.
40On the constitution, recommendations, and impact of the Haworth
Committee, see Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, pp. 812;
Romjue, Field Experimentation, pp. 57; and Moody, Transportation Corps,
pp. 45.
43Incl (Haworth Rpt) to Ltr, Dr. Leland J. Haworth to Secretary of
the Army Robert T. Stevens, Washington, 20 Oct 54, sub: Final Rpt of
Ad Hoc Committee on Combat Development (cited in Keith and Butler,
CDC Origins and Formation, pp. 1011).
44Change No. 7 to HQ, DA, Special Regulations No. 1051:
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY (Washington, 11 Apr 50), Washington, 1 Feb 55 (reproduced in
John C. Schermerhorn, The Role of Operations Research in the Army,
1956, pp. 1830).
45Moody, Transportation Corps , pp. 45.
46Ibid., p. 5.
47Ltr, HQ, DA [AGAMP (M) 381 (19 Jul 1955) CS], Washington,
26 Jul 55, sub: Combat Developments Organization (reproduced in
CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, pp. 21921); Keith and Butler,
CDC Origins and Formation, p. 11.
49CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix III, p. 39. Note
that OR played a major role in most of the prescribed functions.
50CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, p. 8. The CONARC
Materiel Development System is outlined in Appendix V, pp. 5154 of
the CONARC Ad Committee Report.
51Ibid., p. 11; CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix V,
para. 2.a, p. 51.
52Joseph F. McCloskey, Organization for Operations Research in
the United States, in Max Davies and Michel Verhulst, eds., Operational
Research in Practice: Report of a NATO Conference (New York: Pergamon
Press for Advisory Group of Aeronautical Research and Development,
NATO, 1958), p. 165.
53U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Institute of
Advanced Studies, Change 1 to Organization and Functions Manual (Carlisle
Barracks, Penn.: IAS, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 12
Nov 68), p. 1. On 1 May 1963, the USAIAS was redesignated the U.S.
Army Combat Developments Command Institute for Advanced Studies
(USACDCIAS).
54Ibid.
55Ibid.; Dinsmore, Requirements for OR Training, p. 22.
56For the organization of combat developments at CGSC, see
TRADOC On-Line History, Chapter 7.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
60Ibid.; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, pp. 26061; Moody,
Transportation Corps, 5. Other DA Sta agencies, such as the Army
Logistics Management Center, the Army Intelligence Center, the Army
Security Agency Board, and the Finance Corps Field Service Board were
brought into the combat developments system at the same time.
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62Ibid., pp. 56.
63For a discussion of the Transportation Corps combat developments
organization and program, see Moody, Transportation Corps, pp. 614.

Unless otherwise noted, the following description is based on Moodys
discussion.
64HQ, CONARC, Memorandum No. 35, Fort Monroe, Va., 19 Jul
56 (cited in Moody, Transportation Corps, p. 7).
65Ellis A. Johnson, The Operations Research Oce, US Army,
in ORO, The Second Tripartite Conference on Army Operations Research,
2327 October 1950, vol. II: Technical Proceedings (Washington: ORO,
1950), p. 167. Gen. Mark W. Clark was chief of Army eld forces from 1
October 1949 to 5 May 1952 when he was replaced by Gen. John R. Hodge,
who served until 30 June 1953. Subsequent chiefs of Army eld forces and
commanding generals of CONARC included Gen. John E. Dahlquist (24
August 195329 February 1956), Gen. Willard G. Wyman (1 March
195631 July 1958), Gen. Bruce C. Clarke (1 August 195830 September
1960), and Gen. Herbert B. Powell (1 October 196031 January 1963).
67TRADOC On-Line History, Chapter 7.
68Selwyn D. Smith, Jr.,An Evaluation of Army Operations Research,
1957, p. 9. Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague (USMA 1919) had served in
the 83d Infantry Division in Europe during WWII. He served as deputy
chief of Army eld forces and OCAFF chief of combat developments
from 1952 to June 1955 when he was reassigned to command the U.S. I
Corps in Korea.
69HQ, OCAFF, Sta Directory (Fort Monroe, Va., 1 Mar 54)
(hereafter cited as HQ OCAFF Sta Directory).
70Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 260. As of 1 March 1954,
the combined group numbered 12 military personnel, 12 professional
civilians, and 6 administrative civilians (see HQ OCAFF Sta Directory,
1 Mar 54).
71Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague, Combat Developments and
Operations Research, paper presented at the U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 19 Nov 54, pp. 1314.
73Franklin C. Brooks and Lauren W. Merriam. CORG Plans
Tomorrows Army Today, Army 6, 7 (1956), p. 28. Dr. Brooks held a
Ph.D. in physics from Yale University and had just spent eight months on
loan to WSEG in Japan and Korea. In the spring of 1957, Dr. Donald W.
Meals replaced Brooks as director. Meals held a Ph.D. in psychology from
the University of Pennsylvania. He had served with ORO in Korea; was a
U.S. representative to the 4th Tripartite Conference on Army Operations
Research in 1953; and joined CORG in 1955, becoming assistant director
the following year. Meals was replaced by Dr. Martin N. Chase in 1960.
74Col. Merriam (USMA 1933) had served in the European Theater
of Operations during WWII and joined OCAFF in 1954 from Germany,
where he had been the G-1 of V Corps. Col. Merriam was replaced in turn
by Col. Herbert G. Sparrow (USMA 1933) in early 1956.
75Schermerhorn, Role of OR in the Army, p. 8.
76HQ, CONARC, Sta Directory, Fort Monroe, Va. (hereafter cited
as HQ CONARC Sta Directory), 1 Jun 55.
77HQ CONARC Sta Directory, 1 Apr 56.
78U.S. Army Continental Army Command, Combat Operations
Research Group, Combat Operations Research Group Work Program
Summary (Fort Monroe, Va.: HQ CONARC, 1956) (reproduced in
Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 52) (hereafter cited as CORG Work
Program Summary).
79Ibid., p. 51.
80Emmette Y. Burton, Jr., The Role of Operations Research in
81CORG
Work Program Summary, p. 52.

CONARC Sta Directory, 1 May 59.
83HQ CONARC, Sta Directory, 1 Nov 60.
84HQ CONARC, Sta Directory, 1 Aug 62.
85Burton, Role of OR, 10.
86Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, p. 11; Romjue, Field
Experimentation, p. 6.
88Ibid.
1957, pp. 1617.
90HQ CONARC Sta Directory, 1 Nov 60.
91Ibid., p. 15.
92Ibid., pp. 1516; CORG Work Program Summary, p. 50; Oce of
the Chief of Army Field Forces, Sta Memo No. 3, Fort Monroe, Va., 2 Feb
54, sub: Combat Developments (reproduced in Keith and Butler, CDC
Origins and Formation, p. 7); CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, p. 42.
93CORG Work Program Summary, p. 50.
94Ibid.
95Ibid., pp. 5051.
96Brooks and Merriam, CORG Plans, p. 30.
97CORG Work Program Summary, p. 51.
98Ibid.
100All of the publications produced by CORG up to June 1970 are
listed in Technical Operations, Inc., Combat Operations Research Group,
Final List of CORG Publications (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Technical Operations,
Inc., Combat Operations Research Group for Headquarters, U.S. Army
Combat Developments Command, 1970).
102Ibid., p. 29.
103Montague, Combat Developments and OR, p. 14.
104OCAFF Sta Memo No. 3 (reproduced in Keith and Butler, CDC
Origins and Formation, p. 7).
106Ibid.; CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, p. 9.
107U.S. Army Quartermaster Combat Developments Agency,
Operations Research Methods, Special Project 6241 (Fort Lee, Va.: U.S.
Army Quartermaster Combat Developments Agency, May 1962), p. ii.
108CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, pp. 910.
109Ibid., p. 10.
110CDEC, Developing Tomorrows Army Today, p. 6.
111CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, p. 13; Romjue, Field
Experimentation, p. 7.
112Ibid., Annex B, p. 57.
113Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Formation, pp. 1112.
114Ibid., p. 12.
115CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix II, p. 91; CDEC,
Developing Tomorrows Army Today, p. 7.
116Ltr, HQ CONARC, to commanding generals, Sixth United
States Army and Combat Developments Test and Experimentation
Center, Fort Monroe, Va., 18 Oct 56, sub: Ltr of Instructions for the
Combat Developments Test and Experimentation Center (reproduced in
Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, Annex 5, pp. 5559) (hereafter cited as
CONARC LOI, 18 Oct 56).
117Ibid., paras. 59.
118Subsequently, in 1959, CDEC was redesignated the U.S. Army
Combat Developments Experimentation Command (see Larry R.
Tinberg, Operations Research and the US Army, student essay, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1983, p. 8).
119CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix II, p. 91.
82HQ
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120CDEC, Developing
Tomorrows Army Today, p. 9.

Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix II, p. 91. Cf.
CONARC LOI, 18 Oct 56, para. 3.
122Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 9192; CDEC, Developing Tomorrows
Army Today, p. 9
123Ibid., Appendix II, p. 91.
124Romjue, Field Experimentation, p. 8.
125CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix II, p. 92.
126CONARC LOI, 18 Oct 56, p. 10.
127Ibid.
131Ibid.
133CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix III, pp. 9394,
97, Figure 13.
134The functions of the various ROEC elements are outlined in
CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Report, Appendix III, p. 94.
136CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Appendix III, p. 93.
137Ibid., Annex C, p. 191, 193.
138Ibid., p. 12.
139CONARC Ad Hoc Committee Rpt, Annex B, p. 57.
140Ibid., Annex B, p. 58.
141Ibid., Appendix VI, p. 113.
142Keith and Butler, CDC Origins and Functions, pp. 9, 12. The 1954
Haworth Committee did not recommend the immediate creation of a new
and separate Combat Development Command, but did note that such an
action might be the ultimate goal.
143TRADOC On-Line History, Chapter 7.
144Ibid.
145Ltr, Lt Gen John P. Daley (Com Gen, CDC), Brieng for the
Army Policy Council, 20 March 1963 (incl to letter, Lt Gen John P. Daley,
Fort Belvoir, Va., 25 Mar 63, sub: Status Rpt on US Army Combat
Developments Command), pp. 12, U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, Penn.
146ARO (Durham), Executive SummaryUnited States Army
Operations Research Symposium Conducted by Army Research Oce
(Durham) at Duke University, 27, 28, 29 March 1962 (Research Triangle
Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute for the Army Research Oce
[Durham], 1962), p. 4.
147Ibid.
148Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at US Army Operations
ResearchPast and Present, Combat Systems Technical Paper
RACTP102 (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, Apr
1964), p. 6. CORG continued to support CDC from 1962 until its
demise in 1970 (see Seth Bonder, Army Operations Research
Historical Perspectives and Lessons Learned, Operations Research 50,
1 [02]: 25).
149Ltr, Daley, Brieng, 20 Mar 63, p. 3. CDEC underwent a major
reorganization in December 1962.
150Johnson, The ORO, p. 167; McCloskey, Organization for OR,
p. 166.
151Seymour I. Gilman, The Role of Operations Research in the
Army, student individual study, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn., 1954, p. 20.
152Burton, Role of OR, p. 9; Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p.
20; Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 10.
154Eugene P. Visco, The Operations Research Oce (PB-20-96-3),
Army History 38 (Summer 96): 25.
121CONARC
155U.S.
Army Ordnance Corps, Ballistic Research Laboratories,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.:
Ordnance Corps, U.S. Army, 1955), pp. 1819.
156Johnson, The ORO, p. 167.
157Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex 2; Smith,
Evaluation of Army OR, p. 10.
158Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex 2.
159Ibid.
160Smith, Evaluation of Army OR, p. 59, Annex 6.
161Ibid.
162Ibid.
163Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex 2.
164Comments of Mr. Wells (chairman, Session VIB), ARO
(Durham), Executive Summary, p. 325.
165For a summary history of the Oce of Ordnance Research and
its successor, ARO, see ARO History, at http://www.arl.army.mil/aro/
history/history.htm. See also Raymond J. Snodgrass, Survey of Ordnance
Activities, September 1951December 1952 (Washington: Historical
Branch, Oce of the Chief of Ordnance, DA, 1953), Fort McNair,
Washington, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Oce of the Chief
of Military History, Historical Manuscript File 402.1 AA 195152.
166Snodgrass, Survey of Ordnance Activities, p. 53.
167Ibid., pp. 5556.
168Ibid., p. 55.
169Ibid., pp. 5455.
170ARO History.
171Ibid.
173See U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, Oce of Ordnance Research,
Proceedings of the First Ordnance Conference on Operations Research, Oce
of Ordnance Research Rpt No. 551 (Durham, N.C.: Oce of Ordnance
Research, Ordnance Corps, Jan 55).
174Ibid., Foreword.
176At the time ARO was established, the Armys newly assigned
CRD, Lt. Gen. Arthur Trudeau, expressed interest in co-locating ARO
with ORO, but he was apparently unable to guarantee the necessary
funding (see Memo, P. Stewart Macaulay [provost, JHU] to Dr Milton
S. Eisenhower [president, JHU], Baltimore, 15 Jan 59, JHU Archives,
ORO, JanDec 1959).
177U.S. Department of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Army for Fiscal Year 1961, in U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary
of Defense and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, for Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington:
USGPO, 1962), p. 136.
178The Arlington oce of ARO was disestablished in 1973, and the
Durham oce became the ARO. In 1974, as part of the STEADFAST
reorganization, ARO was transferred to the Army Materiel Command
as a separate reporting agency, and in April 1975, ARO moved from
the Duke University campus to oces in the Research Triangle Park,
North Carolina, and then to another location in the Research Triangle in
November 1984. ARO, which continues to oversee the Armys scientic
research programs, has been very successful, and twenty-seven Nobel
Prize laureates have been among the scientists supported by ARO (see
U.S. Army Research Laboratory Public Aairs Oce, ARO Celebrates
50th Anniversary, at http://www.aro.army.mil/news/50thanniv.htm).
180See ARO (Durham), Executive Summary.
181Ibid., p. 1.
182ARO (Durham), Proceedings, p. iii.
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183Remarks
of Col. Charles B. Hazeltine, Jr. (asst director, ARO),

Opening Session, ARO (Durham), Proceedings, pp. 56.
184ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 8; Hazeltine, ARO
(Durham), Proceedings, pp. 56.
185ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 8.
186Hazeltine, ARO (Durham), Proceedings, pp. 56.
ADMINISTRATIONContracting for Management Advisory Services
and Operations Research Studies and Projects (Washington: HQ, DA, 28
Jun 61). Changes and revisions to AR 1110 were issued from time to
time.
188Ibid., para. 1. The policies and procedures prescribed in AR 1110,
particularly those related to the PAGs, owed a great deal to the policies
and procedures worked out earlier for ORO and incorporated in Army
Special Regulations 70555: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Operations Research Oce and AR 15480: Boards, Commissions, and
CommitteesOperations Research Oce.
189AR 1110, 28 Jun 61, para. 8.
190Ibid., para. 9.
191Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the organization
and functions of the Chemical Corps is based on U.S. Army, Chemical
Corps School, Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps, Special
Text 3171 (Fort McPherson, Ga.: Chemical Corps School, Sep 56).
192Oral history interview of Dr. George H. Milly by Eugene P. Visco
and Charles R. Shrader, 8 Aug 03. Dr. Milly served in the Test Division
of the Army Chemical Center from 1947 to 1954, when he moved to
CCORG. He subsequently became scientic director and then director
of CCORG. Dr. William Albert Noyes, Jr. (18981980) was elected
president of the American Chemical Society in 1947 and served as editor
of the Journal of the American Chemical Society from 1950 to 1962. He was
also the head of Division 8 of NDRC and was a consultant to CCORG,
visiting Edgewood Arsenal on many occasions in the 1950s to review
projects and provide advice. Maj. Gen. McAulie served as chief chemical
ocer from 1 October 1949 to 31 July 1951.
193Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps, p. 42.
194Ibid., p. 29. According to George Milly (interview, 8 Aug 03),
CCORG generated its own work program and its reports were not subject
to review.
195Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex 2. George Milly
(interview, 8 Aug 03) recalled that when he joined CCORG in 1954,
there were only four or ve professional analysts, most of whom had been
recruited by Dr. Noyes and most of whom returned to academia in 1954
56, making way for new personnel.
196U.S. Army Chemical Center and Chemical Corps Materiel
Command, Army Chemical Center and Chemical Corps Materiel Command
(Baton Rouge, La.: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1956), CCORG
group photo (no page number). The same volume also contains a photo of
the groups building (Post Scenes, no page number).
197Milly interview, 8 Aug 03.
198Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps, p. 42. George
Milly (interview, 8 Aug 03) stated that, to his knowledge, the Chemical
Corps Board did not have an active OR element.
199Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps, pp. 3738.
200Milly interview, 8 Aug 03.
201Ibid.
202U.S.
Army, Signal Corps, Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal

Ocer, U.S. Army, May 1951April 1955 (Washington: Oce of the
Chief Signal Ocer, DA, 15 Apr 55), p. 10.
203Ibid., p. 11. Gilman stated that SCEAG was established in July
1952 (Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex 2).
204Ibid.
205Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal Ocer, May 1951April 55,
p. 11. The liaison oce at Haller, Raymond and Brown, Inc., was active
from August 1953 to February 1955.
206Ibid.
207Ibid. SCEAG found that the key personnel of the test rie company
spent nearly 30 percent of their time on some sort of communication
activity.
208U.S. Army, Signal Corps, Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal
Ocer, U.S. Army, May 1955April 1959 (Washington: Oce of the
Chief Signal Ocer, DA, 30 Apr 59), p. vi.
209Ibid.
210Ibid., p. 43.
211Ibid., pp. 4344.
212U.S. Army, Oce of the Surgeon General, Annual Report of the
Surgeon General, United States Army, Fiscal Year 1960 (Washington:
Oce of the Surgeon General, DA, 1960), p. 75, Table 12. Total AMEDS
R&D budgets grew from $7 million in FY 1951 to $15.9 million in FY
1960. The in-service portion of that budget grew from $2.6 million to
$7.1 million during the same period, and AMEDS contracting for R&D
grew from $4.4 million to $8.8 million.
213Ibid., p. 73.
214Ibid.
215Ibid., p. 74. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
Command was established in August 1958, as a Class II activity
commanded by a brigadier general, with the mission of improving
integration of Army medical research activities worldwide, management
of AMEDS research funds, and logistic support of its component units.
216U.S. Army, Oce of the Surgeon General, Annual Report of the
Surgeon General, United States Army, Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington:
Oce of the Surgeon General, DA, 1961), pp. 8182.
217Ibid., p. 93.
218Ibid., p. 82; U.S. Army, Oce of the Surgeon General, Annual
Report of the Surgeon General, United States Army, Fiscal Year 1962
(Washington: Oce of the Surgeon General, DA, 1962), pp. 9396.
219Annual Report of the Surgeon General, 1962, p. 93. The FY61
AMEDS R&D budget was approximately $15.5 million, of which $7.7
million was for research contracts. In FY 1962, the AMEDS expended
approximately $14.7 million on 461 research contracts and 41 research
grants.
220Ibid., p. 95.
221Ibid.
222See, inter alia, Gilman, Role of OR in the Army, p. 42, Annex
2, and the annual reports of the quartermaster general, the chief of
transportation, and the surgeon general for the scal years 195162.
225Ibid., p. 36.
36171_04OR 4.indd 156
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chapter five
The State of Army Operations Research, March 1963
n 26 March 1963, Army operations research (OR)

program managers and analysts assembled in Durham, North Carolina, for the Second U.S. Army
Operations Research Symposium sponsored by the Army
Research Oce (Durham).1 A number of senior Army leaders (including Lt. Gen. Dwight E. Beach, the Army chief of
research and development; Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, the commander of the newly formed U.S. Army Combat Developments Command; and Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., the commander of the newly formed U.S. Army Materiel Command)
also attended and spoke at the symposium. Participants in
the three-day conference listened to and discussed a wide
variety of papers, both general and technical, on operations
research. This assembly of Army OR specialists marked a
milestone in the history of OR in the Army and served to
sum up its tremendous progress over the previous two decades, the expanding scope of Army problems to which OR
was being applied, the many new organizations dedicated to
Army OR, the key issues remaining to be resolved, and the
bright prospects for the future.
The list of organizations represented at the 1963 symposium conrmed the degree to which operations research
had spread throughout the Army.2 From the tentative efforts in the Signal Corps, Army Air Defense, and the Pacic
theater in World War II, the number of Army OR groups
and the number of analysts employed by the Army had expanded enormously. By March 1963, the bulk of the Armys
OR work was being performed by contractor-operated organizations. There were also in-house programs that employed
both military and civil service analysts as well as some minor
activity at the Department of the Army sta level and at
headquarters sta level in major Army commands.
In FY 1962, the big ve Army contractor-operated OR
organizations (the Research Analysis Corporation [RAC],
the Human Resources Research Oce [HumRRO], the
Special Operations Research Oce [SORO], the Combat
Operations Research Group [CORG], and the Research

Oce Experimentation Center [ROEC]) alone employed
more than four hundred technical personnel and accounted
for the bulk of the Army OR eort.3 There were also some
twenty in-house OR groups, such as STAG and the Chemical Corps Operations Research Group, scattered among nine
Army commands and agencies and employing two to forty
professionals each for a total of some two hundred military
and civilian personnel.4 In addition, eleven Army agencies
supplemented their in-house OR capability with the work of
twenty dierent study contractors and fty research studies
of an OR nature.5 Those contractors included universities
and private research rms working on a broad range of topics
from computer support to eld medical systems to antimissile defense.
Although vigorous, the Army OR program was decentralized, with only the loosest central control at the level of
the Army Research Oce in the Oce of the Chief of Research and Development. Consolidation of combat developments agencies under the U.S. Army Combat Developments
Command and of R&D and logistics agencies, including the
technical services, under the U.S. Army Materiel Command
served to centralize OR work in those areas to a certain degree. There was some coordination of the various services
OR programs at the Department of Defense level, and some
coordination and cooperation with the British, Canadians,
Australians, and NATO allies. Connections were also maintained with university OR programs and with such OR professional organizations as the Operations Research Society
of America and the Military Operations Research Society.
In FY 1949, the Army budget included only $1 million
for operations research activities, but, by March 1963, the
Army was spending more than $20 million per year on OR
projects.6 About half of the total annual Army OR budget
went to contract research organizations such as RAC, Technical Operations, Inc. (CORG), the Stanford Research In-
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stitute (ROEC), and the Planning Research Corporation;
the remainder was about equally divided between in-house
operations and university contracts, such as those for SORO
and HumRRO.7 In and of itself, the use of nongovernment
contractors to provide essential OR services to the military
aroused little controversy. The participants in the 1962 Army
OR symposium had agreed that both in-house and contract
research oer advantages to the Army; neither appears to be
sucient by itself.8
Most participants at the 1963 symposium would also
have agreed that the Army was receiving fair value for its
money. By 1963, the OR groups in the United States armed
services were producing approximately three thousand reports per year.9 Increasingly, the characteristic OR product
was a general description of a broad problem such as ground
warfare; the analysis of a broad concept or objective such as
deterrence, and participants in the 1962 Army OR symposium had agreed that broad conceptual problems may be the
best targets for future Army operations research.10 The topic
areas addressed ran the gamut and included weapons evaluation studies, assessments of military organization and doctrine, strategic assessments, human behavioral studies, special operations and area studies, simulations and wargaming,
cost analysis, and a host of other matters. By March 1963,
one other primary application of OR was also beginning to
gather momentumthat of OR to the higher-level management of the Army itself. The extension of OR into such nontraditional elds as human behavior analysis; the study of
organizations; higher-level strategy; and political, economic,
and social issues was principally an American development.
Operations researchers in Great Britain and Canada continued to focus primarily on the types of problems that were
characteristic of World War II operations research.11
Despite agreement on the overall progress of Army
OR in the two decades since the beginning of World War
II and the many contributions of OR studies to Army decision making during that time, the participants at the 1963
symposium disagreed on a number of issues and pointed
out several areas in which problems in the Army OR program remained to be solved. The six major points of disagreement among the speakers at the 1963 symposium were
short-range versus long-range research, the level at which
OR teams should operate, the role of the soft sciences in
OR, the degree to which OR teams should be free to select
their own problems for study, the value of simulation; and
the proper use of eld test data.12 In fact, the most salient
disagreements and unsolved problems faced by Army OR
organizations in March 1963 concerned the dangers of the
increasing use of mathematical models and simulations and
the need to focus on practical problems rather than on the
theory of operations research.
As of 1963, approximately 25 percent of the three thousand reports produced annually by military OR groups in the
United States either used simulation/wargaming as a basic
tool or relied on the results of simulation/wargaming for their
conclusions.13 Although the increased use of high-speed digital computers as an aid to operations research was generally
accepted, the use of mathematical models and simulations,
including wargaming, raised some concerns. For one thing,
the new mathematical and statistical techniques, the use of
high-speed digital computers, and complex gaming made OR
more eective, but also increased the need for extensive and
sophisticated training.14 Many OR practitioners expressed
concern that the increased emphasis on simulation/wargaming caused operations researchers to loose sight of the importance of getting hard data on which to base the simulation/
game decisions.15 Others warned that the danger in the use
of simulations as large automatic systems for military control and decision . . . is that they get out of hand.16
From its rather primitive beginnings in World War II, operations research had progressed over two decades to include
a substantial body of very sophisticated theory and methods
based on advanced mathematics. By 1963, many OR analysts
worked at the cutting edge of this new theory and methodology, and there was a tendency for OR to be dened by its
complex mathematical theories and methodology. Even so,
at its base OR remained scientic problem solving and the
application of common-sense analysis (albeit using quantication when possible) to nd workable solutions to practical
problems in the development of weapons, organization, tactics, and strategy. The increasing sophistication of OR theory,
particularly the development of sophisticated mathematical
models and techniques, raised questions regarding the degree
to which OR practitioners were losing sight of the practical
problems needing to be solved and the interests and limitations of the customers whom Army OR organizations were
pledged to serve. Some participants in the 1963 symposium
warned that OR was a means for providing the military decision maker with reliable, practical solutions to real problems
and that the analyst must focus accordingly on solving problems rather than developing new theories.17
Given the increasing denition of operations research
by its theory and methodology, many leading operations
researchers became concerned about the degree to which
OR had become reliant on mathematical models and expressed the fear that OR might consequently nd itself
excluded from deliberative and decision-making circles.18
One founder of military OR in the United States, Philip M.
Morse, observed that operations research is an experimental
science, concerned with the real world. It is not an exercise
in pure logic. We must make our theories correspond to actual operations, and to do this we must compare predictions
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the state of army operations research, march

with actual occurrences in a quantitative manner.19 Reecting on forty years of work in OR, another senior member
of the American military OR community, Hugh J. Miser,
noted some unfortunate trends in OR, which included the
attempt to set boundaries on OR and the rapid increase in
the academic attention to models and theories, to the exclusion of the craft skills of professional practice that played an
important role in the successes of OR in World War II.20
Miser wrote that
this expanding body of theory has tended to dene the subject
. . . academic programs devote almost all of their time to this
burgeoning stream . . . many OR workers have begun to think
of their subject as a scientic discipline dened by this ow
of theory and models and their direct application. . . . Todays
widespread conception of operations research as a discipline
dened by its modelsand its emphasis on getting clients to
use modelsplaces it atop the hill of rigor, but at a great sacrice, both of relevance and breadth.21
The participants in the 1963 symposium were a diverse

lot, and they diered on many issues, such as the use of mathematical models and simulations. Most of them agreed, however, that OR in the Army had come of age and that Army
OR organizations were making substantial contributions to
national defense. They also agreed that operations research
had nally achieved general recognition as an important aid
to the military decision maker, although it remained a complex and somewhat mysterious science to some military ofcers. Few of the symposium participants doubted that the
future of operations research in the Army was bright or that
Army OR organizations would continue to proliferate and
prosper in the future.
chapter five notes
1See
U.S. ARO (Durham), Proceedings of the United States Army

Operations Research Symposium, 26, 27, 28 March 1963, Durham, North
Carolina, Part I, ORTAG25 (Durham, N.C.: U.S. ARO, 1963).
2Ibid., pp. 33543. Among the attendees at the 1963 symposium
were representatives of ARO; ARO (Durham); BRL, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Md.; CORG; HQ USACDC; Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia,
Penn.; HQ, USAMC; OCRD, HQ DA; HumRRO; Picatinny Arsenal,
Dover, N.J.; RAC; ROEC; SORO; STAG; USAIAS, Carlisle Barracks,
Penn.; U.S. Army CBR Combat Developments Agency, Fort McClellan,
Ala.; U.S. Army CBR Operations Research Group, Edgewood Arsenal,
Md.; U.S. Army Combined Arms Group, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.;
U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.;
U.S. Army Personnel Research Oce, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army
Weapons Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill.; and War Plans Division,
ODCSLOG, HQ DA.
3Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at U.S. Army Operations
ResearchPast and Present, RACTP102 (McLean, Va.: Research
Analysis Corporation, 1964), p. 6; U.S. Congress, Oce of Technology
Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, OTABPISS157 (Washington:
USGPO, 1995), p. 22.
5Ibid.
6Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Challenges in Army Operations Research, in
ARO (Durham), Proceedings, p. 91. In addition, there were other research
projects involving the use of OR techniques but they were not identied as
OR-related.
7Ibid.
8U.S. ARO (Durham), Highlights, in Executive Summary, United
States Army Operations Research Symposium, Duke University, 2729 Mar
62 (Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute for the
Army Research Oce [Durham], 1962), p. 2.
9Comments of E. W. Paxson, RAND Corporation, in Session XI,
2d Army OR Symposium, ARO, Proceedings, pp. 32122.
10Palmer
Osborn, Selecting Weapons Systems 1960The

Builders-eye View, Operations Research 9 (MarApr 1961): 265; U.S.
ARO, Highlights, ARO (Durham), Executive Summary, p. 2.
11Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a
Nonprot Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1966), p. 13.
12Critique by Robert M. Thrall (professor of mathematics and
operations analysis, University of Michigan) Session XI, ARO (Durham),
Proceedings, pp. 31819.
13Paxsons comments, Session XI, ARO (Durham), Proceedings, pp.
32122.
14U.S. ARO, Highlights, in ARO (Durham), Executive Summary,
p. 2.
15Paxsons comments, ARO, Proceedings, pp. 32122.
16Ibid.
17Thralls critique, ARO, Proceedings, p. 317.
18Osborn, Selecting Weapons Systems, p. 270.
20Hugh J. Miser, Presidents Symposium: Science and Professionalism
in Operations Research, Operations Research 35, 2 (1987): 315. Miser was
president of the Operations Research Society of America from 1962 to
1963.
21Ibid., pp. 31516. Among the corrective actions advocated by Miser
for the operations research community were these: 1. to develop a clear
conception of the domain dealt with by operations research; 2. to develop
more coherent and realistic views of science and professional practice;
3. to increase the attention given to professional practice, particularly in
educational programs; 4. to develop widely accepted standards of quality
for operations research work; 5. based on a close scrutiny of the craft of
professional practice, to develop and gain wide acceptance for a coherent
view of what constitutes practice and how it is done well (p. 318).
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36171_06OR 5.indd 160
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Epilogue
espite the signicant problems to be resolved, the

participants in the 1963 Army Operations Research Symposium in Durham, North Carolina,
were nearly unanimous in proclaiming the potential for operations research (OR) to meet the challenges of the future.
As Dr. Paul M. Gross, president of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science and the Pegram professor of
chemistry at Duke University, had told the attendees during
a dinner session at the rst Army OR symposium in 1962,
meeting the challenges of integrating the vast multidisciplinary projects of American science in the 1960s and beyond
would require operations analysis at its very highest level.1
The issues to be faced by Army OR program managers and analysts in the immediate future would indeed challenge them to contribute at the very highest level. Those
challenges were laid out clearly by the Hon. Edmund T.
Pratt, Jr., assistant secretary of the Army for nancial management, in a banquet address titled Challenges in Army
Operations Research at the Second Army OR symposium
on 26 March 1963:
With regard to [the Armys mission of preparing to wage any
type of war in the future], our major objective is to take maximum advantage of scientic and technological progress in the
development of our weapons, transportation, and communication systems.We do not have sucient time to conduct in
sequence the formulation of new concepts; the research, development and production of new materiel; the organization and
equipping of units; and the nal eld testing. Therefore, we will
have to rely more heavily upon concurrent simulation, operations analysis, war games, and theoretical studies in all phases,
to reduce lead time and produce the most eective force structure consistent with current missions and state of the art technology. To provide this increased capability, we must anticipate
the need for qualied analysts who can apply modern methods
and obtain timely and reliable solutions; this will require more
emphasis on operations research training of Army personnel,
military and civilian. . . . Operations research assignments will
be very demanding. They will require imagination tempered

with caution, and provide a real challenge to the operations researchers and to the military men working with him. But working side by side, and you must work as a pair all the way, I am
sure that you can and will meet this challenge.2
Indeed, the Army OR program managers and analysts

assembled to hear Dr. Pratts address would soon recognize,
if they had not done so earlier, that the future and its challenges were already upon them, precipitated in large part
by the administration of President John F. Kennedy, which
took oce in January 1961. Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara and his whiz kids were already introducing
radical changes in defense organization and procedures, and
these changes would require exibility and innovation on
the part of Army OR practitioners in order to help Army
leaders make key decisions on future weapons, organization,
and doctrine as well as on the organization and management procedures of the Army itself. In August 1962, nine
months before the second Army OR symposium convened,
the Howze Board had submitted the nal report of its comprehensive study of the role of air mobility in future warfare,
the largest and most complex study of its kind up to that
time and one that involved nearly all of the Armys contract
and in-house OR groups and hundreds of civilian and military OR analysts. And even as Army OR personnel met in
Durham, Army advisors and aviators were deeply involved
in helping the Republic of Vietnam counter a growing Communist insurgency. The long Vietnam War would pose yet
another opportunity for Army OR to demonstrate its value
on the battleeld itself rather than in the laboratory and on
the testing ground. The period of recovery and transformation that followed the war in Vietnam would test the mettle
of Army operations researchers. With two decades of experience and success behind them, Army OR managers and analysts would prove equal to the challenge.
1ARO
(Durham), Executive SummaryUnited States Army Operations Research Symposium Conducted by Army Research Oce (Durham) at Duke
University, 27, 28, 29 March 1962 (Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute for the Army Research Oce [Durham], 1962), p. 5.
2Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Challenges in Army Operations Research, in ARO (Durham), Proceedings of the United States Army Operations Research
Symposium, 26, 27, 28 March 1963, Durham, North Carolina, Part I, ORTAG25 (Durham, N.C.: U.S. ARO [Durham], 30 Sep 63), p. 92.
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36171_06OR 5.indd 162
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appendix a
Biographical Sketches
wo men dominated the development of operations

research (OR) in the United States Army from
1942 to 1962. Between 1942 and 1945, Col. Walter
Barton Leach, the chief of the Operational Analysis Division, Headquarters, United States Army Air Forces, tirelessly promoted the use of OR throughout the Army, recruited
analysts and managers, established operations analysis sections in the various Army Air Forces commands at home and
overseas, helped establish OR elements in the Army service
forces and Army ground forces, and argued for the retention
of an OR capability in the postwar Army and Air Force.
From the time of his appointment in August 1948 as
director of the newly formed General Research Oce (later
the Operations Research Oce [ORO]), administered by
The Johns Hopkins University until the demise of the ORO
in 1961, Dr. Ellis Adolph Johnson was the leading proponent
of the use of OR as an aid to Army decision makers. Johnson established the ORO, recruited and trained its sta, and
shaped its work program, constantly expanding the scope of
projects undertaken by the ORO into areas of growing interest to the Army. He was largely responsible for the extension of OR into matters of national and military strategy and
policy. He also actively supported the creation of other Army
OR organizations, the growth of OR programs in academia,
and the establishment of professional OR associations.
The character, actions, and accomplishments of both
Col. Leach and Dr. Johnson are described in some detail in
the text. What follows here are brief outlines of the basic
biographical details of the lives and careers of both men.
Walter Barton Leach ()
Walter Barton Leach deserves more than any other person the title of Father of U.S. Army Operations Research.1
He was born in Boston on 6 January 1900, the son of Walter Barton and Grace Winifred (Wise) Leach. After serving
in France as an infantry private in the United States Army
(191820), he briey attended the Universit de Grenoble

in the summer of 1920. Leach returned to the United States
to attend Harvard University, where he earned a bachelor of
arts degree cum laude in 1921. He went on to obtain a bachelor of laws degree cum laude from Harvard Law School
in 1924, and then clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes (192425). Leach was admitted to
the Massachusetts bar in 1925 and became a distinguished
attorney with the Boston law rm Warner, Stackpole, and
Bradlee (192530). In 1929, he became an instructor in law
at Harvard Law School and subsequently rose to assistant
professor of law (1930) and professor of law (193169) at
the school. An expert on real property law, Leach was the
author of several textbooks and journal articles on various
aspects of the law.
In June 1942, Leach accepted a commission as a major
in the Army of the United States. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel, Air Corps, in January 1943, and then to colonel, Air Corps, in August 1944. Leach was widely known
and highly respected in the elite circles of the government
and armed forces. Following submission of the extensive report he had prepared with Dr. Ward S. Davidson in August
1942, Maj. Leach was appointed chief of the Operations
Analysis Division, Headquarters, United States Army Air
Forces. He adopted the use of operations analysis in the U.S.
armed forces as his personal crusade and became involved in
every aspect of its development. His enthusiasm for OR was
unbounded, and his inuence extended to the Army service
forces and Army ground forces as well as to the Navy. Although several military and civilian Army Air Forces leaders were extremely enthusiastic and inuential in promoting
OR, none surpassed Col. Leach in spreading the word and
getting things done. Nearly every le box in the National Archives containing material on OR also contains some trace
of his activity and inuence. In 1945, he was awarded the
Legion of Merit for his wartime service.
Appendix A.indd 163
8/4/06 6:11:39 PM

After World War II, Leach resumed his career as a
Harvard Law professor, and eventually became the associate dean of Harvard Law School. He was Story professor of
law at the school from 1960 to 1969. He was a visiting professor of law at Oxford University in 1952, and a professor
in the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration
(195469). He was instrumental in founding the Defense
Policy Seminar at the Harvard Center for International Affairs in 1954. Leach was also an advisor to John F. Kennedy
during the 1960 presidential election campaign. A man of
many interests, he was well known for being among those
scholars who doubt the attribution of Shakespeares works
to the Bard of Avon.
Leach continued to serve as an Air Force consultant from
1946 to 1966, and was presented with the Exceptional Civilian Service Award in 1949. He also continued his service in
the U.S. Air Force Reserve, and was promoted to the rank
of brigadier general in 1949. He was chosen by Secretary of
the Air Force Stuart Symington to prepare the Air Forces
defense of the B36 bomber during the so-called revolt of
the admirals in the 1950s.
Leach married Florence T. Malcolm on 14 June 1924.
They had two children, Barbara and Richard Malcolm, and
were divorced in 1941. His second marriage, to Jane McIlwraith on 10 March 1944, produced one son, David, and
ended with her death in 1963. Leach was married a third time,
to Blanche C. Bartlett, on 3 January 1964. He was a member
of the American and Massachusetts Bar Associations, the Pi
Eta Society, the Lincolns Inn Society, and the Universalist
Church. He also held membership in the Harvard Club and
the Weston Golf Club (Boston, Massachusetts).
Walter Barton Leach died on 15 December 1971 in
Waltham, Massachusetts, and is buried in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Ellis Adolph Johnson ()
As director of The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Oce from 1948 to 1961, Ellis Adolph
Johnson was the leading proponent of Army operations
research during the postWorld War II period.2 He was
born in Quincy, Massachusetts, on 2 September 1906, the
son of Peter George and Elizabeth (Teklo) Johnson. He
earned his bachelor of science degree in physics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1928,
and went on to earn the master of science degree in physics
and the doctor of science degree in electrical engineering
from the same institution in 1929 and 1934, respectively.
He was a trainee at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and
the New York Telephone Company (192629) before serving as research assistant and instructor in the Department
of Electrical Engineering at MIT (192934). An expert
on terrestrial magnetism, Johnson worked for the United

States Coast and Geodetic Survey as an associate electrical
engineer (193435) and as physicist and section chairman,
geophysics of the crust, in the Department of Terrestrial
Magnetism at the Carnegie Institution in Washington,
D.C. (19350). Shortly before the United States entered
World War II, Johnson became a consultant and then associate director of research for the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at the Washington Navy Yard, and he played a central
role in early Navy OR work on mines and countermining
techniques (194042). In 1942, he accepted a commission
as commander, United States Naval Reserve, and went to
the Pacic theater to serve on the sta of the commander
in chief, Pacic. In that assignment, he developed and promoted the aerial mining campaign against Japan for the
Navy and the Army Air Forces.
Demobilized in 1946, Johnson returned to his former
position at the Carnegie Institution (194648) and served
briey ( JanuaryAugust 1948) as the technical director of
the U.S. Air Force Oce of Special Weapons before being
selected to head the Armys new General Research Oce
in August 1948. As the rst and only director of The Johns
Hopkins University Operations Research Oce, Johnson was active in promoting OR in the United States and
abroad. He helped found the Operations Research Society
of America and the International Federation of Operational
Research Societies (195154), and promoted close contacts
among the ocial military OR organizations in Australia,
Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.
In 1961, Johnson left the ORO to become a professor
and director of the Systems Research Center at the Case
Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio. He remained
at Case until 1965, when he became coordinator of scientic aairs for the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in Bethesda, Maryland (196567). He was later a
consultant to the National Bureau of Standards in Gaithersburg, Maryland (196770).
For his long and distinguished service to the U.S. armed
forces, both as a civilian and in uniform during World War
II and after, Johnson was awarded the Distinguished Civilian Service Citation (Navy), the Legion of Merit (Navy and
Air Force), Commendation Ribbon (Navy, two awards),
Commendation (Air Force), and the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal (Army). He was also awarded the United
Nations Korean Service Medal for establishing ORO operations in Korea in 1950. The Ellis A. Johnson Chair of Mine
Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, is named for him.
Ellis Johnson married Alice Gertrude Lagasse of Boston, Massachusetts, on 4 August 1934. They had two children, Betsy W. and Peter B. Johnson. He was a fellow of
Appendix A.indd 164
8/4/06 6:11:39 PM
biographical sketches
the American Physics Society and a member of the National Research Council (member, Geophysics and Operations Research Committees), the Oce of Naval Research
Committee on Arctic Research, the American Geophysical
Society, the Washington Philosophical Society, the American Optical Society, and the Cosmos Club (Washington,
D.C.). He was also the author of more than 120 technical

papers, principally in the elds of electronics, physics, geophysics, weapons development, and operations research.
Following a long and debilitating brain disease, Ellis
Johnson died at the Veterans Administration Center in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, on 16 December 1973.
appendix a notes
1A brief ocial wartime (circa 11 July 1942) biography of Leach

is housed in College Park, Maryland (NARA II, RG 218, Entry 343A,
Box 57, Folder OA). Leachs personal papers (some 34 linear feet of
them) are archived in the Harvard University Law School, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Additional details of his life are provided in Who Was
Who in America, Volume V: 19691973 (Chicago: Marquis Whos Who,
1973), p. 420.
2The principal sources for Johnsons biography include Who Was

Who in America, Volume VI: 19741976 (Chicago: Marquis Whos
Who, 1976), p. 214; Thornton L. Page, George S. Pettee, and William A.
Wallace (with Capt James Martin, USNR, and Alice L. Johnson), Ellis A.
Johnson, 19061973, Operations Research 22, 6 (1974), pp. 1141155;
ORO, ORO Biographies, vol. I (Chevy Chase, Md.: ORO, various dates,
195763).
Appendix A.indd 165
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Appendix A.indd 166
8/4/06 6:11:40 PM
36171_08AppendixB.indd 167
8/4/06 6:12:56 PM
Dec 41Fall 43
Sep 43Aug 45
Washington, D.C.
Long Island, N.Y.
Colorado Springs,
Colo.
Tampa, Fla.
San Francisco,Calif.
Washington, D.C.
Ashville, N.C.
Orlando, Fla.
Theater HQs
Europe, Pacic
New York, N.Y.
Ft. Worth, Tex.
England
England
Directorate of Air Defense, HQ AAF
I Bomber Commandb
Second Air Force
Third Air Force
Fourth Air Force
Continental Air Forcesc
AAF Weather Wing
AAF School of Applied Tactics
Air Evaluation boards
Strategic Bombing Survey
AAF Training Aids Division
AAF Technical Training Command
Eighth Air Force
VIII Fighter Command/VIII Air

Support Command
Jun 43Oct 44
Oct 42Jun 45
Jul 43Sep 45
Mar 44Aug 45
19441945
19441945
Sep 42Aug 45
Jan 45Aug 45
May 45Aug 45
Mar 44Aug 45
Jul 44Aug 45
Mar 42Sep 45
Dec 42Aug 45
Washington, D.C.
Operations Analysis Division, HQ

AAF
Dates Active
Station
Headquarters
1
48
7
Operationalbombardment
Operationalghter, training
Training
Training
Evaluation
Evaluation
Training
Weather
Training
Training
Training
46
NA
Antisubmarine
warfare
Training
Number of
Personnela
Air defense
Command
Mission
Jul 44Oct 44
Oct 44Jan 45
Jan 45Jun 45
Jun 45Aug 45
Mar 44Jul 45
Jul 45Aug 45
William M. Whyburn
Will H. Connelly (Acting)
Donald D. Durrell
Will H. Connelly
T. Stanley Warburton
Anders J. Carlson
Lauriston S. Taylor
Ralph P. Johnson
John M. Harlan
Leslie H. Arps
Jun 43Nov 43
Nov 43Oct 44
Oct 42Aug 44
Aug 44Jun 45
Jul 43Sep 45
Mar 44Apr 45
Jul 45Sep 45
Arthur E. Pierce
George P. Shettle
Deane W. Malott
Sep 44Jan 45
Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.
NA
Sep 43
Sep 43May 45
Robert L. Stearns
David W. Raudenbush
One operations analyst per board
Jan 45Aug 45
Joseph Kaplan
May 45Aug 45
Sep 43Dec 43
Dec 43Jan 45
Jan 45Aug 45
Deane W. Malott
Joseph Kaplan
Evan R. Collins
Lauriston S. Taylor
Spring 42Fall 43
Mar 42Sep 45
Dec 42Jul 45
Jul 45Sep 45
Dates of Service
as Chief
Philip M. Morseb
Cyril M. Jansky, Jr.
W. Barton Leach
Roscoe C. Crawford (Acting)
Chief of Section/Unit
Army Air Forces Operations Analysis Elements in World War II
appendix b
36171_08AppendixB.indd 168
8/4/06 6:12:57 PM
May 44Aug 45
Dec 43Aug 45
India
Washington, D.C.
Kansas, India,
China, Okinawa
Colorado Springs,
Colo.; Guam
Ie Shima
AAF, India-Burma Theater

(Tenth Air Force)
Twentieth Air Force

(USASTAF Rear)
XX Bomber Command
(Eighth Air Force, Pacic)
XXI Bomber Command
301st Fighter Wing, Very-Long-Range
11
27
Operationallong-range
bombardment
Operationallong-range
bombardment
Operationalvery-long-range
escort
Oct 44Aug 45
Jul 45Aug 45
Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.
Donald H. Loughridge
LeRoy A. Brothers
Hamilton M. Jeers
Dan B. Dyer
Jul 45Aug 45
Oct 44Apr 45
Apr 45Aug 45
Dec 43Mar 45
Mar 45Aug 45
May 44Jun 45
Jul 45Aug 45
Jan 44May 44
May 44Sep 44
Sep 44Aug 45
Fowler Hamilton
LeRoy A. Brothers
David Mayer
Robert L. Stearns
Livingston Hall
Jul 44Aug 45
Sidney K. Wolf
NA = not available.
Source: Based on LeRoy A. Brothers and others, Operations Analysis in World War II: United States Army Air Forces (Philadelphia: Stephenson-Brothers, 1949).
aThe number of personnel shown represents total analysts and supervisors; it does not include clerical and support personnel. Not all people served at the same time. bOperations analysis support provided by Navy ASWORG.
cAssumed control of numbered Air Forces in the continental United States in March 1945. dSeparated into the Operations Analysis Section (OAS) for the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces in October 1944. eTransferred to the
Fifteenth Air Force in November 1943. fAbsorbed OAS Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces in July 1944.
26
Operational-longrange
bombardment
20
13
Operational
Operational
Jan 44Aug 45
Jul 44Aug 45
Australia, New
Guinea, Philippines
Far East Air Forcesf
12
Oct 43May 44
May 44Jul 44
Operational
Robert L. Stearns
Livingston Hall
Oct 43Jul 44
Southwest Pacic
Area, Philippines
Thirteenth Air Force
Feb 44Jul 44
Sidney K. Wolf
Operational
Feb 44Jul 44
Australia
Fifth Air Force
Aug 44Dec 44
Dec 44Jan 45
Jan 45Aug 45
Douglas Shearer
Kenneth Lambert
Norman M. Newmark
10
Operational
Aug 44Aug 45
Hawaii, Guam,
Okinawa
AAF, Pacic Ocean Area (Seventh Air

Force)
Jul 44Oct 44
Oct 44Jul 45
Jul 45Aug 45
Seymour J. Janow (Acting)

George W. Taylor
Carl J. Rees
Operational
Jul 44Aug 45
China
Fourteenth Air Force
Operational
May 43Jul 45
Aleutian Islands
May 43Sep 43
Sep 43
Oct 43Aug 44
Aug 44Jul 45
Sidney K. Wolf
Hamilton M. Jeers
Clyde H. Bond
Ralph W. Anderson
Eleventh Air Force
Nov 43Jul 44
Jul 44May 45
Samuel G. Frantz
George W. Housner
Nov 43May 45
Tunisia, Italy
Fifteenth Air Force
Jul 43May 45
Dec 43May 45
Dec 43May 45
May 43Oct 43
Irving H. Crowne
Lauriston S. Taylor
Carroll Zimmerman (IX Tactical Air
Command)
Samuel G. Frantz
21
May 43Oct 43
Benghazi, Cairo
IX Bomber Commande
Jul 43May 45
Operational
Tunisia, Italy
Mediterranean. Allied Air Forcesd

(Twelfth Air Force)
Dec 43May 45
England, France,
Belgium
Ninth Air Force
appendix c
The Army Research and Development Program, 192462
rom the time of its introduction into the United

States Army during World War II, operations research (OR) was closely related to the process by
which weapons and other equipment were designed, tested,
and elded. Early Army OR work focused on improving
weapons design and performance, and although the use of
operations research soon spread to questions of organization, doctrine, and higher-level policy, its application to
concrete matters of weapons systems research and development (R&D) remained one of the primary uses of OR in
the Army. Accordingly, until the early 1960s the Army OR
organizations were managed as part of the overall Army
R&D/combat developments system.1
Army Research and Development,
Before World War I, the development of weapons and
equipment for the Army was almost entirely in the hands
of the supply services, each of which had its own system.
The competition for resources in World War I made it obvious that some coordination was required at the level of
the War Department General Sta, and the Armys rst
formal R&D program began with the publication on 15
December 1924, of Army Regulations No. 850-25: MIS
CELLANEOUSDevelopment, Classication of, and Specications for Types of Equipment.2 Under the provisions of
AR 85025, the War Department delegated responsibility
for R&D to the technical services, but the regulation was
revised in 1927 to charge the General Sta with preparing
plans and policy for R&D and with determining all types
of military equipment required. Per AR 85025, the chiefs
of the combat arms were responsible for initiating requests
for the development of new weapons and equipment and
for determining the desired military characteristics, whereas the chiefs of the supply services were responsible for actually designing and developing items within their sphere
of interest.3
The 1924 regulations made testing and evaluation an

integral part of the R&D process, but each arm and service
operated its own test and evaluation system. The two basic
types of tests were engineering tests conducted by the developing agency and service tests conducted by the using arm to
determine the suitability of the item for eld use. The users
nal evaluation normally dictated the decision on standardization, a decision formally rendered by the secretary of war
on the advice of the General Sta.4 Sta supervision over
the process was lodged in the Logistics Section of the War
Department General Sta.
Additional revisions of AR 85025 were made in the
1930s, and the Army G-4 was singled out to supervise the
Army-wide development program, but no General Sta
section or branch was specically charged with overseeing
R&D until 31 October 1940, when an R&D section was
organized in the Planning and Equipment Branch of G-4.5
The R&D Section was renamed the Developments Section
of the Requirements and Distribution Branch of G-4 in December 1940, and, several days after Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Developments Section was upgraded to a branch
headed by Col. A . W. Waldron, with four ocers and two
civilians.6 Under the Marshall Reorganization in March
1942, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, assumed overall
responsibility for coordinating the Armys R&D eorts, and
Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, inherited the functions
of the chief of the arms, including determination of military
needs and characteristics, the conduct of service tests, and
nal evaluation from the user viewpoint.
AR 85025 was revised on 30 June 1943, but the new
regulation was not substantially dierent from the earlier
versions.7 Meanwhile, the involvement of the Army in scientic matters had increased substantially, and the Army R&D
program had grown more complex and operated with a faster
pace. In September 1943, Dr. Vannevar Bush, the director of
the Oce of Scientic Research and Development (OSRD)
36171_09AppendixC .indd 169
8/4/06 6:14:00 PM

and chairman of the Joint New Weapons and Equipment
Committee ( JNWEC), and special consultant Harvey H.
Bundy urged Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to create a
new sta division to help monitor scientic matters.8 Their
recommendation was based on three factors: the inability of
Bushs JNWEC to meet Army needs fully; the selection by
Army Chief of Sta Gen. George C. Marshall in the spring
of 1943 of Col. William A. Borden, an experienced ordnance
ocer, to head eorts to expedite the development and deployment of weapons and techniques for jungle warfare; and
Secretary Stimsons own interest in keeping the War Department abreast of the latest scientic developments and in
acting forcefully to translate basic research into weapons for
use against the enemy.9
On 13 October 1943, Secretary Stimson overruled the
objections of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and established the New Developments Division (NDD) in the
War Department Special Sta.10 Maj. Gen. Stephen G.
Henry was named to head the new sta agency.11 The functions assigned to NDD by Secretary Stimson included responsibility to keep Army civilian and military leaders and
sta ocers informed of new technological developments
and to initiate, coordinate, or direct research, development,
standardization, and expeditious military application of
new or improved weapons, devices, and techniques and to
introduce and demonstrate to appropriate commanders or
organizations new developments which have not received
adequate consideration.12
A War Department circular issued on 15 August 1944
increased the scope of NDD to include the introduction of
new weapons to combat troops as a major function, and the
division subsequently played an important role in coordinating the introduction of new weapons and equipment in the
eld.13 Working closely with OSRDs Oce of Field Service, NDD consulted with the War Department and other
agencies on the selection and overseas assignment of scientists and technicians inducted into the service. It arranged for
trained teams to accompany new equipment to the theaters
of operations, to demonstrate and exploit its full usefulness
to the troops, and to observe its use in battle.14 NDD also
played a central role in the establishment and continued operations of the OR units formed in the headquarters of Gen.
Douglas MacArthurs Southwest Pacic Area and Lt. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr.s Pacic Ocean Area.
The rapid growth of military technology triggered by
World War II greatly increased the importance of scientic research and development, and the Army postwar R&D establishment expanded to deal with the new developmentssuch
as guided missiles, electronics, and nuclear weaponsthat
were needed to meet Americas new global commitments in

the growing confrontation with the Soviet Union. One result
was that research and development became big business in the
United States during and after World War II. Between 1941
and 1950, the number of scientists and engineers engaged
in research in the United States nearly doubled, rising from
87,000 to 151,000.15 In FY 1949, the Army alone employed
some 12,800 civilians and about 4,100 military personnel in
R&D activities.16 Slender budgets in the 1920s and 1930s
had restricted the Armys R&D program, and from 1924 to
1940, the annual Army R&D budget never exceeded $3.5
million.17 However, under wartime pressures Army R&D
expenditures had risen quickly to $20.5 million in 1941, $89
million in 1942, $180 million in 1943, and they peaked at
$164 million in 1944.18 Despite many new requirements,
postwar Army R&D budgets were signicantly lower. In FY
1949, $115.5 million was appropriated for Army R&D, some
21 percent of the total Department of Defense (DOD) R&D
budget of $550 million.19
Planning for the postwar Army R&D program began
even before the end of the war. Just before V-E Day, on 1
May 1945, the Army deputy chief of sta, Lt. Gen. Thomas
T. Handy, acting on the recommendation of NDD, published
the rst ocial Army policy on R&D, the essence of which
was that only operational needs should supersede R&D in
priority.20 The policy prescribed closer liaison between developers and users, and the Operations Division of the General Sta was charged with formulating future requirements
to guide the R&D process. All Army agencies were told to
plan their R&D programs on a permanent postwar basis.
Responding to the request of the board of ocers (the
Patch-Simpson Board, headed by Lt. Gen. Alexander M.
Patch) created by General Marshall on 30 August 1945 to
examine the reorganization of the War Department, Maj.
Gen. William A. Borden, director of NDD, sent forward his
recommendations on 1 October 1945. The most important
was a recommendation to create the position of assistant
secretary of war for research and development.21 Maj. Gen.
Borden also recommended that a General Sta R&D division be created, the duties of which would include:
supervision of post war graduate scientic and technical education; assignment and employment of scientists in the Army; War
Department action on inventions; the dissemination of information on War Department research and development which is
of value to other agencies of the government and to science and
industry; the coordination and integration of communications
and radar; and exploitation of psychological warfare.22
On 3 April 1946, the War Department created a War

Department Research Council to assist in coordinating
Army R&D policy.23 The council consisted of the director
of NDD as chairman; the assistant chief of sta for R&D,
8/4/06 6:14:01 PM
the army research and development program,

Headquarters, Army Air Forces; the chief of the Development Section, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces; the director, R&D Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces;
and the chiefs of R&D for each of the technical services. The
Research Council met for the rst time on 17 April 1946
and discussed the R&D organization in the War Department reorganization proposed by the Patch-Simpson Board.
At its next meeting, following the 11 June 1946 reorganization of the War Department, the council took up procedures
for handling atomic energy projects, legislation to allow increased salaries for top scientists in the War Department,
the R&D program and its budgetary implications, and the
pending revision of AR 85025.24
Meanwhile, the scope and objectives of the Army R&D
program began to solidify. The objective of all Army R&D
agencies was to apply the results of scientic analysis and
research to the development of the most advanced materiel,
techniques, and countermeasures in the execution of the military policy of the United States, and the rst priority was
to ensure that the materiel and techniques employed by our
forces in combat are superior in every way to those of a possible enemy.25 The basic principles governing the conduct of
postwar Army R&D were dened as freedom of direction in
basic research, the need for research in the Army programs,
free exchange of information, maximum assistance from civilian science and industry, economy in the operation of military facilities, evaluation of foreign developments, and the
need for long-range planning.26
The postwar Army R&D program received a substantial
boost on 30 April 1946 when General of the Army Dwight
D. Eisenhower, then the Army chief of sta, issued a memorandum that discussed the importance of scientic research
to the Army and set forth Army R&D policy.27 General
Eisenhowers memorandum is particularly interesting in
light of his later negative view of the so-called military-industrial complex. He wrote:
The recent conict has demonstrated more convincingly than
ever before the strength of our nation can best derive from the
integration of all of our national resources in time of war. . . .
The future security of the nation demands that all those civilian resources which by conversion or redirection constitute our
main support in time of emergency be associated closely with
the activities of the Army in time of peace. . . . The armed forces could not have won the war alone. Scientists and business
men contributed techniques and weapons which enabled us to
outwit and overwhelm the enemy. Their understanding of the
Armys needs made possible the highest degree of cooperation.
This pattern of integration must be translated into a peacetime
counter-part which will not merely familiarize the Army with
the progress made in science and industry, but draw into our
planning for national security all the civilian resources which
can contribute to the defense of the country . . . the Army . . . has
the duty to take the initiative in promoting closer relation between civilian and military interests. It must establish denite
policies and administrative leadership which will make possible

even greater contributions from science, technology, and management than during the last war.28
General Eisenhower then set forth ve general policies

to ensure the full use of our national resources in case of
emergency:
1. The Army must have civilian assistance in military planning
as well as for the production of weapons. . . . The most eective procedure is the letting of contracts for aid in planning.
2. Scientists and industrialists must be given the greatest possible freedom to carry out their research.
3. The possibility of utilizing some of our industrial and technological resources as organic parts of our military structure
in time of emergency should be carefully examined.
4. Within the Army we must separate responsibility for research and development from the functions of procurement,
purchase, storage and distribution.
5. Ocers of all arms and services must become fully aware
of the advantages which the Army can derive from the close
integration of civilian talent with military plans and developments . . . the Armys need for ocers well trained in the
natural and social sciences requires a thorough program of
advanced study for selected military personnel. . . . A premium must be placed on professional attainments in the natural
and social sciences as well as other branches of military science.29
He then concluded by noting:

In general, the more we can achieve the objectives indicated
above with respect to the cultivation, support, and direct use of
outside resources, the more energy will we have left to devote to
strictly military problems for which there are no outside facilities or which for special security reasons can only be handled
by the military.30
The day before issuing his statement on Army research

and development, General Eisenhower took action to upgrade General Sta oversight of R&D by abolishing the New
Developments Division and replacing it with a new General
Sta R&D Division to be activated on 1 May 1946.31 The
director of the R&D Division was designated as the chief
advisor to the secretary of war and the chief of sta on R&D
matters and the application of national scientic research to
the solution of military problems. Col. Gervais W. Trichel
was named acting director of the new sta division, pending
the assignment of Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand.32 On 18 September 1946, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson named
the president of George Washington University, Dr. Cloyd
H. Marvin, as deputy director of the R&D Division.33
The initial organization of the R&D Division was prescribed by General Sta Circular 56, dated 11 June 1946.
The division was subsequently reorganized several times,
with the third reorganization taking place on 9 April 1947.
The organization of the R&D Division as of 23 October
1947 is shown in Figure C1.
8/4/06 6:14:01 PM
Figure C1R&D Division, General Staff, U.S. Army: October

Director of
Research and Development,
General Staff, U.S. Army
Plans and
Program Office
Deputy Director
of R&D
(Civilian)
Army Research
Advisory Board
Control
Office
Deputy Director
of R&D
(Military)
Development Group
Research Group
Ordnance-Signal Branch
General Materiel Branch
Air Requirements Branch
Scientific Branch
Scientific Manpower Branch
Source: Lowell R. Eklund, Science and the Soldier: The Organization for Research and Development in the Army:
Past, Present, and Future (MS thesis, Syracuse University, 1947), Tab 24.
The creation of the R&D Division on a level with the

other major War Department General Sta divisions was a
signicant step toward eective control of the Army R&D
program. Writing to Dr. C. C. Lauritsen of the California
Institute of Technology on 3 May 1946, the acting director of the R&D Division, Col. Trichel, noted that, after
ghting an uphill battle during most of the war, it now appears that research and development activities are going to
be given the place in the War Department which they have
always deserved.34
Despite increased emphasis on R&D in the Army and
the recognition that an eective R&D program was essential to the nations security, the Army R&D program in the
immediate postwar years had many diculties. There was
a continuing problem in attracting and retaining top-notch
scientic personnel; working conditions were not always
rst-rate; and funding tended to be uncertain.35 In September 1947, Dr. Marvin prepared a study of the Armys R&D
problems at the request of the new Secretary of the Army
Kenneth C. Royall. In his study, Marvin recommended the
reorganization of the R&D Division and its subordination
to the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division of G-4;
he set forth the arguments for an assistant secretary of the
Army for R&D who would oversee scientic work in the
Army, ensure eective coordination and mutual support be-
tween the Army and other government agencies, and see that
proper weight was given to Army contacts with industry and
science on matters of mutual interest.36 He noted that
research and development will strengthen its own position in
the Army by encouraging the civilian economy to do as much
as possible of this work for it, and by doing itself only what the
civilian economy cannot or will not do.37
In November 1947, Marvin wrote to Secretary Royall

proposing a number of ways in which the principles and recommendations contained in his 24 September report might
be implemented.38 Noting the necessity of research as a vital
part of the development of a modern army, he proposed a
modernization of the Armys R&D program, including
greater integration of R&D with strategic, operational, and
logistical planning and the creation of an Army command in
which the formulation of tactical doctrine would take place
in conjunction with the determination of new requirements
and testing of materiel.39
For the most part, Marvins suggestions fell on sterile
ground, but some of them were implemented piecemeal.
The long-standing call for an assistant secretary of the Army
charged with establishing policy and directing and supervising R&D activities was answered in March 1948. Three
months earlier, as part of the December 1947 reorganization
of the Army, the R&D Division was eliminated as a separate
8/4/06 6:14:01 PM

entity and its functions were reassigned to an R&D group
in the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division (later the
Logistics Division).40 The chief of the R&D group was designated as the deputy director for R&D and was vested with
responsibility for sta supervision of R&D projects from
their inception to their completion or adoption as standard
Army materiel. Through the director of Logistics, he also
advised the assistant secretary of the Army, the chief of sta,
other General Sta divisions, and other DOD agencies on
R&D matters.41 He also acted for the director of logistics
in directing and controlling the R&D work and budgetary
activities of the technical services.
In part, the downgrading of the R&D Division was
prompted by the loss to the newly created Air Force of responsibility for Army Air Forces R&D, which amounted to
approximately two-thirds of the total Army R&D eort in
dollar terms.42 This downgrading of status came at a time
when other government agencies were giving their R&D activities greater prominence and freedom. It would take the
pressures of another war to revive the forward progress of
R&D in the Army.
Army R&D received only desultory attention in the immediate postWorld War II years. An enormous stock of
weapons and equipment, much of it unused, was left over
from the war, and at the same time the advent of nuclear
weapons seemed to make all possible conventional weapons obsolete. However, the Korean War demonstrated that
there was still a continuing need for conventional weapons
and tactics as well as the new tactical nuclear weapons and
doctrines. On 6 June 1950, less than three weeks before the
outbreak of the Korean War, Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace, Jr., told the graduating cadets at the United States Military Academy that
We and our allies can never hope to compete with our potential
enemies in numbers and masses of ground troops and weapons
of a conventional type. It is therefore obvious that we in the
Army must depend to a great extent upon intensive research
and development directed at equipping our ground forces and
the ground forces of our allies with such advanced and superior
weapons that they can overcome the overwhelming numerical
advantage of our potential enemies . . . the Army must continuously plan for the future.43
The renewed interest in Army R&D signaled by Secretary Paces address and accelerated by the war in Korea
was manifested in two ways. First, there was a substantial
increase in the annual appropriations by Congress for Army
R&D projects, including the construction of new research
facilities. Second, there was an internal battle within the
Army over how R&D should be managed. The Army Sta,
reecting the desires of the technical services, generally fa-
vored the status quo and the retention of R&D under the
Deputy Chief of Sta for Logistics. On the other hand,
the Armys civilian scientists and the senior ocers mostly
closely associated with the R&D process favored making
R&D an independent function outside the Armys logistical
system. The struggle continued from the Korean War into
the early years of the Kennedy administration, and the scientists and senior R&D ocers generally prevailed. A number
of organizational changes provided increased independence
and more-eective high-level Army sta supervision of the
Army R&D program, and several new oces were created
to handle growing Army R&D activities. Both the increase
in funding for Army R&D and the changes in Army R&D
management had a substantial eect on Army operations research programs, most of which were tied closely to R&D efforts and were supervised by senior Army R&D managers.
Army R&D Funding, 195062
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson wrote to the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services on 28 July
1950 to inform him that the aggregate amount appropriated
for the U.S. armed services for FY 1946 through FY 1950
totaled some $90 billion, of which research and development
on new weapons accounted for approximately 5 percent, or
an average of slightly more than $500 million per year.44 The
Korean War prompted a substantial increase in DOD R&D
expenditures. In FY 1950, DOD obligated some $520 million for military R&D, and the total obligation in FY 1951
was $1.1 billion.45 DOD obligation authority for R&D continued to increase in subsequent years as did the total costs for
Research and Development/Test and Evaluation (RDTE) of
new weapons, costs that were considerably higher than the
obligation gure for military R&D alone. For example, the
total DOD RDTE costs for FY 1957 were estimated at $5.3
billion, and constituted 14.5 percent of all the funds made
available to the Department of Defense for military functions.46 About 50 percent of the FY57 DOD RDTE appropriation was allocated to industrial contractors, 10 percent to
universities and other nonprot institutions, and 40 percent
to government laboratories that employed some 60,000 civilians and 50,000 military personnel.47 By FY 1962, DOD
RDTE programs accounted for approximately $7 billion, or
nearly 15 percent of the total defense budget.48
Army RDTE appropriations, obligations, and expenditures increased proportionately during the period 195062,
following a major jump during the Korean War. The Armys
preKorean War FY51 R&D budget was $131 million.49
However, the Army received two supplemental FY51 appropriations, bringing the total to $300 million, and another $61,120,225 was appropriated for new construction
at Army R&D facilities.50 The increased funding for Army
8/4/06 6:14:02 PM

R&D resulted in a signicant increase in the rate at which
new weapons and equipment were introduced. During FY
1951, 321 new items of equipment resulting from the post
World War II R&D program were put into production, and
an additional 300 items were expected to go into production
in FY 1952 when the Army share of the DOD RDTE budget was $377.5 million).51 By the beginning of the 1960s,
Army budgets for RDTE had grown much larger. Direct obligations totaled $1.072 billion in FY 1960, $1.163 billion in
FY 1961, and a planned $1.252 billion in FY 1962.52
The Reorganization of Army R&D
Although there was general agreement on the need for an
eective Army R&D systemand although the substantial
increases in funding for Army R&D during and after the Korean War provoked little controversy in Congress, the Executive Branch, or the Armythe question of how Army R&D
should be organized and managed proved to be a troublesome
matter. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, there was
intense debate within the Army leadership regarding the most
eective and ecient way of managing the Armys rapidly
growing RDTE activities.53 Most of the Army Sta, backed
by the still powerful chiefs of the technical services, viewed
R&D as a subordinate function of the logistics system and
sought to preserve the status quo.54 The traditional view was
opposed with increasing success by the ever-growing number
of civilian scientists working for the Army aided by a small
number of inuential general ocers assigned to important
R&D positions who wished to remove R&D from the control of agencies concerned primarily with procurement and
supply.55 At times, the struggle was intense and threatened to
slow the forward movement of the Armys R&D eorts, but
in the end the scientists and senior R&D experts prevailed
and a highly eective, independent Army RDTE structure
emerged and made a major contribution to the technological
superiority that the U.S. Army still enjoys today.
On 8 April 1950, shortly before he left oce, Secretary
of the Army Gordon Gray wrote for Army Chief of Sta
Gen. J. Lawton Collins a perceptive memorandum in which
he critically reviewed the entire Army R&D program and
declared that it deserved a radically greater degree of emphasis than we have heretofore conceived it to warrant.56
The secretarys concern led to a formal study of Army R&D
organization. In August 1950, Assistant Secretary of the
Army Karl R. Bendetson assigned the project to Leonard
W. Hoelscher.57 A rst draft was completed in November
1950, and the nal report was delivered on 12 January 1951.
The Kilgo Report, as it came to be called, concluded that the
Army R&D program needed stronger leadership at the top
and recommended establishing a separate assistant chief of
sta (ACS) for R&D with control over R&D funds, and a
deputy chief of sta (DCS) for development.58 The report

also noted that there should be a direct link between the
Army R&D programs and Army strategic planning, and it
proposed that the use of operations research be increased by
establishing OR groups in every major Army command.59
All twenty of the recommendations included in the Kilgo
Report were eventually adopted in one form or another, although some took longer to implement than others.60
When Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., circulated
the Kilgo Report in the Army Sta, he found that there was
strong opposition to the creation of the two proposed senior
sta positions. Most of the senior Army Sta ocers rejected any proposal for reorganization of Army R&D, although
Secretary Pace had made it clear that he favored transferring
Army R&D functions from the ACS G-4, Logistics.61 A
compromise was reached (primarily because of the work of
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, then the DCS for organization and administration), and pursuant to Department of the
Army General Order No. 4 (11 January 1952), on 15 January 1952, the DCS for plans became the DCS for plans and
research (DCSPR) and was assigned responsibility for coordinating the Army R&D activities with the Armys assigned
missions, plans, and tactical doctrines.62 General Order No.
4 also established the position of chief of research and development (CRD) within the Oce of the Army Chief of Sta.
The CRD, a general ocer with a civilian scientist as his
deputy, was to be the personal assistant of the chief of sta
on R&D matters and was designated as program director for
Army Primary Program 7 (Research and Development) with
responsibility for overseeing Army R&D activities and allocating R&D appropriations within the Army.63
In fact, the DCSPR and CRD shared the responsibilities for Army R&D planning formerly exercised by the Research and Development Division in the Oce of the ACS
G-4, Logistics, but because of severe personnel limitations
the new CRD was forced to delegate much of his authority
to other elements of the Army Sta, particularly the ACS
G-4, Logistics. For the time being, the ACS G-3, Operations, supervised the Operations Research Oce (ORO);
the ACS G-1, Personnel, oversaw the newly created Human
Resources Research Oce (HumRRO); and the much-reduced Research and Development Division in the oce of
the ACS G-4, Logistics, remained responsible for R&D
(and thus operations research) activities in the technical services.64 General Order No. 4 also directed that each of the
principal Army Sta agencies have a section responsible for
R&D matters in their eld of cognizance.65
Earlier, in November 1951, Secretary Pace also created the Army Scientic Advisory Panel (ASAP), a group
of twelve prominent scientists and businessmen whose
function was
8/4/06 6:14:02 PM

to assist the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Sta in
their joint responsibility to give this country a ghting force as
eective, economical, and progressive as our scientic, technological, and industrial resources permit.66
Dr. James R. Killian, a leader in the struggle to remove R&D

from G-4 control, was the rst chairman of ASAP.67
Although the changes eected by the Kilgo Report,
General Order No. 4, and the creation of ASAP greatly enhanced the status of R&D within the Army Sta, the compromise solution implemented in early 1952 soon proved
unworkable in that there was no single agency that could
oversee an R&D project from beginning to end, and the production and procurement element in the Army Sta continued to dominate the R&D program.68
Renewed interest in Army reorganization on the part
of Congress, the press, and the newly installed Eisenhower
Administration, as well as the blue-ribbon committee established in February 1953 and headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller to examine the organization and procedures of the
Department of Defense prompted the Army Sta to revive
the search for a viable R&D organization in March 1952.
The need to nd a solution was made more urgent by the
economy drives of the Eisenhower Administration. As
Under Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson pointed out,
the Army was the only service that had yet to consolidate
its R&D organization, and it would be much better for the
Army to act before an unacceptable solution was forced upon
it by outside agencies.69
On 18 September 1953, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens appointed the Advisory Committee on Army
Organization, headed by Paul L. Davies, to study and make
recommendations on Army organization in general.70 The
committee, assisted by Chicago management consulting rm
McKinsey and Company, interviewed 129 witnesses, including senior Department of the Army personnel, Army R&D
experts, and distinguished civilian scientists such as Vannevar Bush and James R. Killian.71 The committee rendered
its report on 18 December 1953, and recommended, among
other changes, the strengthening of the CRDs authority,
transfer of the R&D planning functions of the G-4 to the
Oce of the Chief of Research and Development, expansion of the scope of ASAP to include any and all problems
concerning Army R&D, and rejection of suggestions to form
an Army Research and Development Command.72
In June 1954, Congressional subcommittee hearings on
the organization and administration of military R&D programs considered eight principal problem areas: the incompatibility of military organizations and civilian scientists,
control and domination by the military, lack of an optimum
climate for civilian scientic research, lack of technical and
scientic capability in the military, limitations of rotation,
the question of civilian control over research, the extent of

research functions that should be accomplished by civilian
agencies, and the desirability of a civilian organization to
administer military R&D programs.73 During the hearings
only Dr. James R. Killian, the chairman of ASAP, raised the
subject of operations research, noting that ORO was insufcient, that other university contracts provided research
projects rather than analysis, and that the Army needed an
organization similar to the RAND Corporation.74
The recommendations of the Davies Committee, particularly the creation of an Army Supply Command, were
opposed by the new ACS G-4, Lt. Gen. Williston P. Palmer,
and others, and their implementation was delayed. After
considerable maneuvering and additional studies, the recommendations of the Davies Committee were nally put into
eect in June 1954, when Secretary Stevens issued his plan
for the reorganization of the Army Sta.75 Called the Slezak
Plan, after the new Under Secretary of the Army, John
Slezak, Secretary Stevens reorganization scheme included
the creation of two additional assistant secretaries of the
Army, one for civilmilitary aairs and the other for logistics
(including R&D). At the insistence of Lt. Gen. Palmer, the
Army Supply Command was dropped and the R&D functions of the ACS G-4 were to be transferred to a DCS for
logistics. The position of chief of R&D was strengthened in
that the CRD was given the authority to stimulate, support,
and coordinate the planning and operational requirements
for research and development.76
The new organization left Army R&D subordinate to
logistics, and the reactions of key Army R&D personnel and
civilian scientists (such as Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the
new DCS for plans and research; Dr. James R. Killian, the
chairman of ASAP, which had been reorganized and expanded in the fall of 1954; and Dr. J. E. Vance, the Armys chief
scientist) were negative.77 Military opponents of the plan
argued their case through Lt. Gen. Lemnitzers oce to the
Army chief of sta, and ASAP sought through civilian channels to pressure Secretary Stevens to modify the plan.78 Dr.
Killian personally urged Secretary Stevens to separate R&D
from logistics and to elevate the CRD to DCS level.79 As a
result, Secretary Stevens agreed that the proposed transfer of
R&D functions from the ACS G-4 to the DCS for logistics,
the ACS G-1, and the ACS G-3 should be canceled, and,
pursuant to Department of the Army General Order No. 88
of 22 December 1954, those functions were centralized in
the Oce of the DCS for Plans and Research, although the
DCS for logistics retained control over the R&D elements
of the technical services.80 The order also provided for the
establishment of a new Army Sta division under the chief of
R&D to oversee the planning, supervising, coordinating, and
directing of all Army R&D under the supervision of the Of
8/4/06 6:14:02 PM
Figure C2Office, Chief of Research and Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans and Research, Headquarters, Department of the Army: circa March
$#3
0LANSAND2ESEARCH
#HIEF
2$
0LANSAND
0ROGRAMS/FFICE
$EPUTYFOR
$EVELOPMENT
)NTERNATIONAL
$IVISION
$EPUTYFOR
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3PECIAL7EAPONS
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$IVISION
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2ESEARCH"RANCH
Source: Emmette Y. Burton Jr., The Role of Operations Research in the Army, student individual study, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1955, Annex 1.
ce of the DCS for Plans and Research.81 The same general

order also transferred the Research and Development Division in the DCS for logistics to the Oce of the DCSPR and
assigned it to OCRD, thereby concentrating R&D planning
and policy responsibilities in OCRD. The resulting organization of OCRD was as shown in Figure C2.
In March 1955, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin became the
DCS for plans and research and asked Maj. Gen. Kenner F.
Hertford, then the CRD, to recommend necessary changes
in the R&D area.82 Maj. Gen. Hertford recommended the
creation of a senior Department of the Army civilian position (an assistant secretary or special assistant to the secretary of the Army) to oversee R&D matters.83 He also recommended that the CRD be raised to DCS level and given the
authority to determine the requirements for developing new
weapons, equipment, and techniques; to supervise all aspects
of Army R&D, including engineering and user tests; to make
full use of R&D work performed by the other services and
foreign agencies; and to maintain close contact with the DCS
for logistics to facilitate the transition from development to
production and with the planning and combat development
agencies of the ACS G-3 to ensure the integration of R&D

with war plans.
No immediate action was taken on Maj. Gen. Hertfords recommendations, but on 3 August 1955, Maj. Gen.
Andrew P. OMeara, the new CRD, formally proposed to
the assistant secretary of the Army (logistics and R&D) the
establishment of the Oce of the DCS for R&D.84 The
concurrence of the Army Sta was obtained, and Secretary Wilbur M. Brucker and Chief of Sta Gen. Maxwell
D. Taylor approved the new position. The necessary organizational changes were incorporated in Change 11 (22 September 1955) to Special Regulations No. 1051, and later
conrmed by Department of the Army General Order No.
57 (6 October 1955).85 Accordingly, the position of chief of
research and development was separated from the Oce of
the DCS for Plans and Research and made an autonomous
agency at the DCS level with the CRD responsible to the
chief of sta for planning, coordinating, directing, and supervising all Army R&D.86 Although the position was considered equivalent to that of a deputy chief of sta, the title
of chief was used instead inasmuch as the Army Reorgani-
8/4/06 6:14:03 PM

zation Act of 1950 limited the Army to three deputy chiefs
of sta. The CRD was authorized to deal directly with the
technical services and technical sta ocers, but before issuing any directives he was required to coordinate closely with
the DCS for logistics, who retained control over the personnel and funds for R&D in the technical services.87
The reorganization became eective on 10 October
1955, and Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin became the Armys rst
true chief of research and development.88 Lt. Gen. Gavin
subsequently served as the CRD until 31 March 1958, when
he was replaced by Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, who served
as the CRD until 30 June 1962. He was relieved in turn by
Lt. Gen. Dwight E. Beach.89 As part of the October 1955
reorganization, the civilian position of director of research
and development was created to provide a principal assistant
to the secretary of the Army on R&D matters.90 Dr. William
H. Martin, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for applications engineering, was appointed to the position.91
As James E. Hewes, the leading historian of Army sta

organization, has noted:
The emergence of the Oce of Chief of Research and Development on 10 October 1955 as an independent General Sta
agency ended a strenuous ve-year campaign for recognition by
civilian scientists both within and outside the Army. It was also
part of the continuing struggle for control over the Technical
Services because they performed most of the research and development within the Army.92
Although the October 1955 reorganization marked the successful separation of R&D from logistics and gave the CRD
a direct channel to the chief of sta as well as to the R&D
elements of the technical services, the CRD still did not exercise full control over the R&D eorts of the technical services; the DCS for logistics continued to enjoy that authority.93 It was not until 1960, shortly before the abolition of the
technical services, that the chief of R&D nally gained full
control over all R&D programs.94
appendix c notes
1The history of Army research and development activities, particularly

in the postWWII period, is well documented, although most of the
sources have not been published commercially. Of particular value to this
study are Lowell R. Eklund, Science and the Soldier: The Organization
for Research and Development in the Army: Past, Present, and Future
(MS thesis, Syracuse University, 1947); U.S. Army General Sta, Logistics
Div, Research and Development in the Department of the Army (Washington:
Logistics Div, General Sta, U.S. Army, 1948); U.S. DOD, Oce of the
Asst Sec Def for R&D, Resources Div, The Growth of Scientic Research
and Development, RDB 114/34 (Washington: OASD [R&D], Resources
Div, 1953) (hereafter cited as U.S. DOD, Growth of Scientic R&D); U.S.
Department of the Army, Oce of the Chief of Research and Development,
Path of Progress: U.S. Army R&D Organizational Changes, 19241960
(Washington: OCRD, HQDA, 1960); L. Van Loan Naiswald, The
History of the Army R&D Organization and Program, Part I: Organization
(draft) (Washington: OCMH, DA, ca. 1963); and James E. Hewes, From
Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 19001963
(Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975).
2The term research and development rst came into ocial
Army usage about the same time (see Naiswald, History of Army R&D
Organization and Program, p. 1).
3Robert W. Coakley, Richard C. Kugler, and Vincent H. Demma,
Historical Summary of Evolution of U.S. Army Test and Evaluation System
World War II to the Present (draft), 3 vols. (Washington: Histories Division,
OCMH, DA 1966), p. 1. The Army Air Corps, Corps of Engineers, and
Signal Corps had a dual position as both combat arm and supply service.
4Ibid., pp. 13. The conduct of service tests was assigned to a board,
normally co-located with and connected to the service school. There were
ve separate combat arms boards in 1940 (infantry, cavalry, eld artillery,
coast artillery, and armored forces), each under the direct control of
the chief of the arm. Seven new boards were added during World War
II (tank destroyer, 1941; antiaircraft, 1942; desert warfare and winter
warfare, 1942 [discontinued in 1944]; and landing vehicle, airborne, and
rocket, 1944).
5Ibid., p. 1; Eklund, Science and the Soldier, p. 13. The small R&D
section in G-4 consisted of just one ocer (see Naiswald, History of Army
R&D Organization and Program, p. 5).
6Naiswald, History of Army R&D Organization and Program, p. 8.
On 15 May 1944, the Developments Branch was redesignated the R&D
Division (see U.S. Army, Path of Progress, pp. 1112).
7Ibid., p. 9.
8Ibid., pp. 1011. Secretary Stimsons other special consultant on
scientic matters, Dr. Edward L. Bowles, was also inuential.
9U.S. War Department Special Sta, New Developments Div,
History of the New Developments Division, War Department Special Sta,
13 October 19431 September 1945 and Postwar Planning (Washington:
U.S. War Department Special Sta, 1946), pp. 714. In particular, the
success of the activities of the Borden group highlighted the need for a
new Army General Sta agency to oversee the development and elding
of new weapons and equipment.
10Memo, Henry L. Stimson (sec war) to director, New Developments
Division, Washington, 13 Oct 43, sub: Organization and Functions, New
Developments Division, War Department, College Park, Md., NARA II,
RG 107, Entry 113, Box 67, Folder New Developments Division. The
establishment of NDD was conrmed by War Department Circular 267,
dated 25 October 1943.
11Maj. Gen. Henry served as director, NDD, from 23 October 1943
to 17 August 1944. He was replaced by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)
8/4/06 6:14:03 PM

William A. Borden, who served from 18 August 1944 to 27 March 1946.
Maj. Gen. Borden was replaced by Col. Gervais W. Trichel, who served
as acting director from 28 March 1946 to 9 June 1946, when NDD
was discontinued and its functions were transferred to the new R&D
Division of the War Department General Sta (see Hewes, From Root to
McNamara, p. 402).
12Memo, Stimson, 13 Oct 43.
13Eklund, Science and the Soldier, p. 33.
14Brig. Gen. William A. Borden (then director, NDD), draft article
titled Army Research and Development, pp. 78, attached to Memo,
Harvey H. Bundy to Brig Gen William A. Borden, Washington, 15 Jan
45, sub: Comments on Bordens draft article, RG 107, Entry 113, Box 67,
Folder New Developments Division.
15U.S. DOD, Growth of Scientic R&D, p. 12, Table III.
16U.S. DOD, Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Second Report of
the Secretary of Defense and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force for the Fiscal Year 1949
(Washington: USGPO, 1950), p. 58.
17Naiswald, History of Army R&D Organization and Program, p. 2.
18Ibid., p. 10.
19U.S. DOD, Growth of Scientic R&D, p. 11, Table II; Second Report
of the Sec Def, p. 58.
20U.S. War Dept, History of New Developments Division, pp. 17982;
Naiswald, History of Army R&D Organization and Program, pp. 1213.
General Handy later became a key consultant and sta member of the
Army ORO.
21U.S. War Dept, History of New Developments Division, p. 18283.
22Ibid., p. 184.
23Memo, Col Gervais W. Trichel (asst director, NDD) to
commanding generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and
Army Air Forces, Washington, 3 Apr 46, sub: War Department Research
Council (reproduced in Eklund, Science and the Soldier, Tab 28).
24U.S. War Department General Sta, Research and Development
Div, Research and Development Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1947,
(Washington: Research and Development Div, U.S. War Department
General Sta, 30 Jun 47), p. 9, NARA II, RG 319, Entry 153. Box 434,
Folder R&D Annual Rpt, FY 47.
25U.S. Army, R&D in the Department of the Army, p. 1.
26Ibid., pp. 13.
27Memo, Gen of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower (Army chief of
sta ) to directors and chiefs of War Department General and Special
Sta divisions and bureaus and the commanding generals of the major
commands, Washington, 30 Apr 46, sub: Scientic and Technological
Resources as Military Assets, U.S. Army CMH, HRC020R&D,
Fort McNair, Washington; also reproduced in Eklund, Science and the
Soldier, Tab 18.
28Ibid., pp. 12.
29Ibid., pp. 23.
30Ibid., pp. 34.
31Memo, Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes (asst deputy chief of sta ) to
commanding generals of Army air forces, Army ground forces, Army
service forces and chiefs of all War Department General and Special
Sta divisions, Washington, 29 Apr 46, sub: Creation of Research and
Development Division, U.S. Army CMH, HRC321 R&D, Fort McNair,
Washington. The 29 April directive was conrmed by Executive Order
9722 of 13 May 1946, which reorganized the War Department, eective
11 June 1946. NDD was ocially redesignated as the R&D Division by
War Department Circular 138, dated 14 May 1946, and on 11 June 1946,
the R&D Division absorbed the R&D functions of Headquarters, Army
Service Forces, which was abolished by Executive Order 9722.
32Lt. Gen. Aurand took oce on 10 June 1946 (see press release,
War Department Public Relations Div, Washington, 13 Jun 46, sub:

General Aurand Named to Head General Sta Research Group, U.S.
Army CMH, HRC020 R&D, Fort McNair, Washington). A 1915
graduate of West Point, Lt. Gen. Aurand was originally commissioned in
the Coast Artillery but had been engaged in Ordnance work since 1917.
In WWII he had commanded logistical units in the United States, France,
and China.
33Press release, War Department Public Relations Division,
Washington, 18 Sep 46, sub: Dr. Marvin Named Deputy Director,
Research and Development Division U.S. Army CMH, HRC020
R&D, Fort McNair, Washington). Dr. Marvin had served as a captain in
the Army Aviation Service in WWI.
34Ltr, Col Gervais W. Trichel (acting director, R&D Div) to Dr C.
C. Lauritsen (California Institute of Technology), Washington, 3 May 46
(reproduced in Eklund, Science and the Soldier, Tab 3).
35U.S. Army, Path of Progress, p. 4.
36Marvin, extract from 24 Sep 47 report to the Secretary of the
Army, pp. 910 (reproduced in Eklund, Science and the Soldier, Tab
41). See also U.S. Army, Path of Progress, pp. 45; and Eklund, Science
and the Soldier, p. 121.
37Marvin, extract from 24 Sep 47 report to the Secretary of the
Army, p. 3.
38Memo, Dr Cloyd H. Marvin to the Secretary of the Army,
Washington, 26 Nov 47, sub: Army Research and Development
(reproduced in Eklund, Science and the Soldier, Tab 40).
39Ibid. In essence, Dr. Marvin was recommending the creation of
a functionally organized Army Combat Developments Command quite
similar to that formed in the early 1960s.
40U.S. Army, Path of Progress, p. 5. The R&D Division was abolished
by DA Circular 73, dated 19 December 1947. The R&D Group was again
designated the R&D Division on 1 March 1950, concurrent with the
redesignation of the Logistics Division as the Oce of the Assistant Chief
of Sta, G-4, Logistics, pursuant to DA Circular 12, dated 28 February
1950.
41U.S. Department of the Army, Oce of the Secretary of the Army,
Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1949, in Second Report
of the Secretary of Defense, p. 160; U.S. Army, R&D in the Department of
the Army, p. 13.
of the Army, January 1 to June 30, 1950, in U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the
Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to June
30, 1950 (Washington: USGPO, 1950), p. 67.
44Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Def, Jan 1Jun 30, 1950, pp. 4849.
45U.S. DOD, Semiannual Rpt of the Sec Def, January 1 to June 30,
1951, in U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and
the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy,
and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to June 30, 1951 (Washington:
USGPO, 1951), p. 6. The services were instructed to include at least $30
million in their FY51 R&D program for basic research.
46U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January
1 to June 30, 1956, in U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of
Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to June 30, 1956
47U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January
1 to June 30, 1957, in U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of
Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to June 30, 1957
8/4/06 6:14:03 PM

48U.S.
DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for FY 1962,

in U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Annual
Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the
Air Force, for Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington: USGPO, 1963), p. 33.
49U.S. Department of the Army, Oce of the Under Secretary of the
Army, Annual Report of the Oce of the Under Secretary of the Army for the
Period of 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1951 (Washington: DA, 1952), p. 8.
50Ibid., pp. 89.
51Ibid., p. 14; U.S. Department of the Army, Semiannual Report of
the Secretary of the Army, January 1 to June 30, 1951, in Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of Defense . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951, p. 86. The FY52
Army R&D budget included funds for OR (for example, ORO).
52Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1961,
in U.S. DOD, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Annual
Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the
Air Force, for Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington: USGPO, 1962), p. 137.
53The controversy is discussed by Hewes in From Root to McNamara,
pp. 24258 passim. See also Naiswald, History of Army R&D Organization
and Program; and U.S. Army, Path of Progress.
54The focal point of R&D in the Army logistics system was the
Research and Development Group created within the Service, Supply, and
Procurement Division of the Oce of the Assistant Chief of Sta G-4
in 1947. The Research and Development Group was redesignated as the
Research and Development Division (RDD) pursuant to DA Circular 12,
dated 28 February 1950.
55Hewes, From Root to McNamara, pp. 217, 258.
56Naiswald, History of Army R&D Organization and Program, pp.
2728.
57Ibid., p. 29.
58Ibid. Marvin M. Kilgo of the Army Comptrollers Oce did most
of the work of compiling the data for the report. At the time, responsibility
for R&D was split between the ACS G-4, Logistics, and the DCS for
Plans per Army Special Regulations No. 1051, dated 11 April 1950.
59Ibid., pp. 2930. See also Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p.
245; and Lorna Jae, Quantitative Analysis and Army Decision Making
Command Historical Oce, 1984), p. 10.
61Ibid.
62Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 247; U.S. Army, Path of
Progress, pp. 67.
of the Army, January 1 to June 30, 1952, in U.S. DOD, Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of
the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to
June 30, 1952 (Washington: USGPO, 1952), p. 85; Hewes, From Root to
McNamara, pp. 24748; U.S. Army, Path of Progress, p. 7.
66Semiannual Report of the Sec Army, Jan 1 Jun 30 52, p. 85.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 223. Davies was then
vice president of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation and
director of the American Ordnance Association. Other committee
members included Harold Boeschenstein, president of Owens-Corning
Fiberglass; C. Jared Ingersoll, director of the Philadelphia Ordnance

District in WWII and president of the Midland Valley Railroad; Irving A
Duy, a retired Army colonel and vice president of Ford Motor Company;
and Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the DCSPR.
72Ibid., pp. 22427. The Davies Committee also recommended the
creation of the position of assistant secretary of the Army for nancial
management, the establishment of a Continental Army Command
to assume responsibility for training from the ACS G-3, and the
establishment of a Supply Command that would relieve the ACS G-4 of
responsibility for the direction and control of the technical services as well
as all R&D operating responsibilities.
73John C. Schermerhorn, The Role of Operations Research in
Barracks, Penn., 1956, Appendix D, p. 74 (based on U.S. Congress, 83d
Cong, 2d Sess, Organization and Administration of the Military Research
and Development Programs, pp. 23).
74Ibid., Appendix D, p. 75 (based on U.S. Congress, Organization
and Administration, p. 436).
75Ibid., p. 9; Francis T. Julia, Jr., Army Sta Reorganization, 1903
1985, CMH Historical Analysis Series, Pub 936 (Washington: USGPO
for Analysis Branch, U.S. Army CMH, 1987), pp. 2426. The plan was
announced on 14 June 1954, and approved by the secretary of defense on
17 June.
76Schermerhorn, Role of OR in the Army, p. 9.
77Ibid., pp. 910.
78Ibid., p. 10.
81Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 252. Brig. Gen. Andrew P.
OMeara was named chief of research and development.
83Ibid.
85U.S. Department of the Army, Change 11 to Special Regulations No.
1051: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY (Washington: HQ, DA, 22 Sep 55).
86Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 238. Simultaneously, the DCS
for Plans and Research was redesignated the DCS for Plans.
87Change No. 11 to HQ, DA, Special Regulations No. 1051:
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY (Washington, 22 Sep 55), para. 29.1.
89Hewes, From Root to McNamara, pp. 39697. During most of
Lt. Gen. Gavins term as the CRD, his deputy was Maj. Gen. Andrew P.
OMeara, the chief scientist was Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, the director of
research was Brig. Gen. Theodore J. Conway, and the Operations Research
Division (which oversaw ORO) was headed by Col. Roland P. Carlson
and then Lt. Col. L. Fritter.
90U.S. Army, Path of Progress, p. 11. The position was titled director
of R&D rather than assistant secretary of the Army for R&D for the same
reason the CRD was not given the DCS designation.
92Ibid., p. 242.
93Ibid.
94Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1961,
in Annual Rpt of the Sec Def, FY 61, p. 136.
8/4/06 6:14:03 PM
8/4/06 6:14:04 PM
Glossary
AAF
AAFAC
AAORG
ACS
ADCSOPS
AFR
AGARD
ALCLAD
AMEDS
ANALAA
AORE
AORG
AR
ARMOR
ARO
ARO (Durham)
ASAP
ASW
ASWORG
ATLAS II
ATTACK
United States Army Air Forces

AAF Anti-Submarine Command
Anti-Aircraft Operations Research
Group (Navy)
Assistant Chief of Sta
Assistant Deputy Chief of Sta for
Operations
Air Force Regulation
Advisory Group on Aeronautical
Research and Development
(NATO)
ORO study on individual protective
equipment and measures
Army Medical Service
ORO study on air defense
Army Operational Research
Establishment (Britain)
Army Operational Research Group
(Britain)
Army Regulation(s)
ORO study on the role of armor in
future warfare
Army Research Oce
Army Research Oce, Durham,
North Carolina
Army Scientic Advisory Panel
antisubmarine warfare
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Operations Research Group
(Navy)
commercial version of the
Remington Rand UNIVAC
electronic computer, 1952
ORO study on the employment of
atomic weapons in Army
operations
AU
BALANCE
BRAND
BRL
BuOrd
CAA
CAG
Cal Tech
CAORE
CAPWAR
Carmonette
CCORG
CDC
CDEC
CDTEC
CENTAUR
CGSC
CINC
American University
ORO study on the optimum
weapons systems for ground
warfare
ORO section dealing with
continuous evaluation of Army
research and development
Ballistic Research Laboratories
Bureau of Ordnance (Navy)
United States Army Concepts
Analysis Agency; Center for
Army Analysis (after 1998)
Combined Arms Group, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas
California Institute of Technology
Canadian Army Operational
Research Establishment
ORO study on the relationship of
ground warfare requirements to
available resources
ORO computerized wargame
Chemical Corps Operations
Research Group
United States Army Combat
Experimentation Command/
Center
Combat Developments Test and
Experimentation Center
STAG computerized land warfare
model/game
United States Army Command and
General Sta College
Commander in Chief
36171_10Glossary.indd 181
8/4/06 6:16:19 PM

CINCPAC
CJCS
CMH, HRC
Commander in Chief, Pacic

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Sta
Center of Military History,
Historical Reference Collection
CmlC
United States Army Chemical
Corps
CMR
Committee on Medical Research
CNO
Chief of Naval Operations
COA
Comptroller of the Army
COBRA
ORO study on chemical, biological,
and radiological warfare
Cocky Ken
Man-shaped pop-up target used for
marksmanship training
Colossus
First all-electronic computer, housed
at Bletchley Park, England,
World War II
COMINCH/CNO Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations
COMPLAB
Computing Laboratory (ORO)
COMPLETE
ORO study on the defense of the
United States as a strategic problem
CONARC
United States Continental Army
Command
CORG
Combat Operations Research
Group
CPA
Central Pacic Area
CRD
Chief of Research and Development
CSA
Chief of Sta, U.S. Army
CSO
Chief Signal Ocer
DA
Department of the Army
DAME
ORO study on the cost of NATO
forces
DCS
Deputy Chief of Sta
DCSLOG
Deputy Chief of Sta for Logistics
DCSOPS
Deputy Chief of Sta for Military
Operations (195674)
DCSPER
Deputy Chief of Sta for Personnel
DCSPR
Deputy Chief of Sta for Plans and
Research
DOD
Department of Defense
DONKEY
ORO study on the use of surfaceto-surface missiles in support
of Army operations
DOUGHBOY
ORO study on infantry weapons
systems
DRB
Defence Research Board (Canada)
ENIAC
Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Calculator (early computer, 1946)
ETO
European Theater of Operations
EUSA
Eighth United States Army
EUSAK
Eighth United States Army, Korea
EVANAL
FABMDS
FAME
FASD
FEC
FY
GHQ
GHQ SWPA
GRO
Group M
GWU
HQ
HQ ETOUSA
HQ EUSAK
HRAF
HumRRO
IBM
ICR
INDIGO
INFORMS
JCS
JHU
JNWEC
JORSA
LEGATE
LEGION
LOGSPIEL
LOI
LORAN
MAID
MIT
MORS
ORO study on the operation of

equipment under various
environmental conditions
Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense
System (wargame)
ORO hand-played wargame
Foreign Area Studies Division
Far East Command
scal year
General Headquarters
General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacic Area
General Research Oce
Early name for World War II Navy
antisubmarine warfare group
George Washington University
Headquarters
Headquarters, European Theater of
Operations, United States Army
Headquarters, Eighth United States
Army, Korea
Human Relations Area Files
Human Resources Research Oce
International Business Machines
Corporation
Institute for Cooperative
Research (The Johns Hopkins
University)
ORO hand-played intelligence
wargame
Institute for Operations Research
and Management Sciences
Joint Chiefs of Sta
The Johns Hopkins University
Joint New Weapons and Equipment
Committee
Journal of the Operations Research
Society of America
ORO study on civil aairs and
military government
STAG theater-level computerized
wargame
ORO logistical wargame
Letter of Instruction
long-range navigation system
ORO study on military aid to
foreign countries
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Military Operations Research
Symposium
8/4/06 6:16:20 PM
glossary
MORU
MWORG
NACA
NARA
NAS
NATO
NDD
NDRC
NDRE
NME
NOL
NRC
NSA
NSF
OA
OAD
OAO
OAS
OASD (R&D)
OCAFF
OCMH
OCNO
OCRD
OCSigO
ODF
OE
OEG
OFS
OMA
ONR
OOR
Op Annie
Operation
STARVATION
Military Operational Research Unit

Mine Warfare Operations Research
Group (Navy)
National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics
National Archives and Records
Administration
National Academy of Sciences
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New Developments Division
National Defense Research
Committee
Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment
National Military Establishment
Naval Ordnance Laboratory
National Research Council
National Security Act
National Science Foundation
operations analysis
Operations Analysis Division (HQ,
USAAF)
Operations Analysis Oce
Operations Analysis Section
Oce of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and
Development
Oce of the Chief of Army Field
Forces
Oce of the Chief of Military
History
Oce of the Chief of Naval
Operations
Oce of the Chief of Research and
Development
Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer
(Army)
Operational Development Force
(Navy)
organizational eectiveness
Operations Evaluation Group
(Navy)
Oce of Field Service (OSRD)
Operations and Maintenance
Army appropriation
Oce of Naval Research
Oce of Ordnance Research
operations analyst (USAAF, World
War II)
World War II mining
campaign against Japan, 1945
OPSEARCH
ORO section dealing with basic

operations research methods
and techniques
OR
operations research
ORB
Operational Research Branch
(Britain)
ORC
Operations Research Center (Navy)
ORG
Operations Research Group (Navy)
ORO
Operations Research Oce
ORSA
Operations Research Society of
America
ORS POA
Operations Research Section,
Pacic Ocean Area
ORTAG
Operations Research Technical
Assistance Group
OSRD
Oce of Scientic Research and
Development
OTA
Oce of Technical Assessment, U.S.
Congress
P&O
plans and operations
PAG
Project Advisory Group
PARABEL
ORO study on paramilitary warfare
PASD
Project Analysis and Synthesis
Division
PISGAH
Series of ORO-sponsored OR
conferences
POA
Pacic Ocean Area
POWER
ORO study on the application of
nuclear power by the Army
POWOW
ORO study on psychological
warfare operations
Project AGILE
SORO counterinsurgency study
Project CAMELOT SORO study of revolution and
insurgency
Project MICHIGAN Study of Army long-range
surveillance
Project PINPOINT CDEC study of antitank weapons
that evolved into study of
experimentation methods
PSD
Project Studies Division
PSYOPS
psychological operations
PSYWAR
psychological warfare
R&D
research and development
RAC
Research Analysis Corporation
RAF
Royal Air Force (Britain)
RDB
Research and Development Board
RDD
Research and Development Division
RDF
radio direction nding (early name
for radar)
RDTE
Research and Development/Test
and Evaluation
8/4/06 6:16:20 PM

REDLEG
RG
ROEC
ROTEC
SADTC
SADU
SBC
SCEAG
SHAPE
SHOP
SITE
SORG
SORO
STAG
STRATSPIEL
SWPA
SYNTAC
TACIT
TACSPIEL
TC
TEAM
TEAR
TELLSPIEL
THEATERSPIEL
TIME
TIMS
TOE
TRADOC
TRAINFIRE
ORO study on artillery support

Record Group
Research Oce Experimentation
Center
Research Oce of the Test and
SHAPE Air Defence Technical
Center
Sea Search and Development Unit
Service Bureau Corporation
United States Army Signal Corps
Evaluation and Analysis Group
Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe
ORO study on human factors in
military operations
ORO study on Army training and
education
Submarine Operations Research
Group (Navy)
Special Operations Research Oce
United States Army Strategy and
Tactics Analysis Group
ORO strategic wargame
Southwest Pacic Area
STAG synthetic tactics wargame
system
ORO study on combat intelligence
ORO tactical wargame
United States Army Transportation
Corps
ORO study on human behavior and
interpersonal relationships
ORO study on air support of
ground operations
ORO intelligence wargame
ORO theater-level wargame
ORO study on the use of strategic
intelligence to determine the
imminence of hostilities
The Institute of Management
Sciences
Table of Organization and
Equipment
United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command
Army rie marksmanship training
program
TREMABASE
U.K.
UN
UNIVAC
U.S.
USA
USAAF
USACDCIAS
USACGSC
USACMH
USAFFE
USAFICPA
USAFMIDPAC
USAFPOA
USAIAS
USAREUR
USGPO
USMA
USMC
USN
USNA
USNR
USSBS
VISTA
WAC
WDGS
WSEG
WSL
WWI
WWII
ORO study on the logistical support

of Army operations
United Kingdom
United Nations
early Remington Rand electronic
computer (1950s)
United States
United States Army
United States Army Air Forces
Institute for Advanced Studies
United States Army Command and
General Sta College
United States Army Center of
Military History
United States Army Forces Far East
United States Army Forces in the
Central Pacic Area
United States Army Forces in the
Mid-Pacic Area
United States Army Forces Pacic
Ocean Area
United States Army Institute for
Advanced Studies
United States Army Europe
United States Government Printing
Oce
United States Military Academy
United States Marine Corps
Untied States Navy
United States Naval Academy
United States Naval Reserve
United States Strategic Bombing
Survey
Project study of Army research and
development/combat
developments
Womens Army Corps
War Department General Sta
Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group
Weapons Systems Laboratory
World War I
World War II
8/4/06 6:16:20 PM
Selected Bibliography of Works Cited

National Archives II,
College Park, Maryland
Materials from the following Record Groups are cited in the text:
Record Group 107 (Records of the Secretary of War)
Entry 113 (Records of the Oce of Special Assistant to Secretary of War Harvey H. Bundy, Subject File, 19411945), Boxes 67, 68
Record Group 111 (Records of the Oce of the Chief
Signal Ocer)
Entry 1024 (Classied Central Decimal Files,
19401948), Boxes 3026, 3027
Entry 1036A (Historians Files, 19081962), Box
51
Record Group 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Sta )
Entry 343A (Records of the Joint New Weapons
Committee), Boxes 9, 57
Record Group 227 (Records of the Oce of Scientic
Research and Development)
Entry 177 (OSRD, OFS, Mss Histories and Project Summaries, 19431946), Boxes 283, 284
Entry 179 (OSRD, OFS, Reports, Army and
Navy Projects, 19431945), Boxes 293, 301, 308,
310
Entry 182 (OSRD, OFS, ORG Pacic Ocean
Area, 1944), Box 331
Record Group 319 (Records of the Army Sta, 1903
1992)
Entry 82 (Assistant Chief of Sta G-2, Intelligence, Administrative Division, Document

Library Branch, Publications [P] Files, 1946
1951), Boxes 2129, 2136
Entry 100 (Deputy Chief of Sta G-3 OperationsStrategy and Tactics Analysis Group,
19601962), Boxes 1, 3, 4
Entry 153 (Plans and Operations Division Formerly Secret Decimal File, 19461948), Boxes 4,
434, 517, 519, 643
Record Group 330 (Records of the Oce of the Secretary of
Defense, 19211994), Entry 343, Box 24
Record Group 456 [formerly Record Group 337] (Records
of the United States Army Continental Army Command,
19491963)
Entry 1033 (Headquarters, U.S. Army CONARC, 1955), Box 116
The Johns Hopkins University Archives,
Baltimore, Maryland
Records of the Oce of the President, Series I, Boxes
33, 34, Folder 47.2 ICR/ORO
Oral History Materials
Cole, Hugh M. Interview by Wilbur Payne, 8 March 1989.
Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for
Operations Research Oral History Project.
Emerson, Margaret. Interview by Eugene P. Visco, 7 November 1999. Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the
36171_11Bibliography.indd 185
8/4/06 6:17:12 PM

Grubbs, Frank. Interview by Eugene P. Visco, 26 October
1994. Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the
Hill, Floyd. Interview by Wilbur Payne, 7 March 1989. Ofce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral History Project.
Milly, George H. Interview by Charles R. Shrader and Eugene P. Visco, 8 August 2003. Copy in possession of the
author.
Schechter, George. Interview by Eugene P. Visco and James
Williams, 15 May 1993. Oce of the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral
History Project.
Stein, Arthur. Interview by Eugene P. Visco and James Williams, 2 April 1992. Oce of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research Oral History
Project.
Publications of the U.S. Army Operations
Research Organizations
American University, Special Operations Research Oce.
Fact Sheet on Special Operations Research Oce (SORO).
Washington, D.C.: SORO, American University, 1962.
Brackney, Howard, Green, Jerome B., Rumbaugh, Lynn H.,
and Turkel, Solomon H. Tactical Employment of Atomic
Weapons. OROR2FEC. Fort McNair, Washington,
D.C.: JHU ORO, 1951.
Brothers, LeRoy A. Operations Analysis in the United States
Air Force. The Johns Hopkins University Operations
Research Oce Informal Seminar in Operations Research, 19531954, Seminar Paper 1. Baltimore: JHU
ORO, 1953.
Harrison, Joseph O. Jr., Hendrickson, Robert G., Weinert,

Arla E., Iribe, Paul, and Taylor, W. Bruce. The Capabilities of Computers and the Use of Computers Operated and
Maintained by ORO. OROS514. Chevy Chase, Md.:
JHU ORO, 1955.
Hausrath, Alfred H., and others. The Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Army. OROR11. Chevy Chase,
Md.: JHU ORO, 1955.
The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Oce.
Administrative Operations Report for the Two Quarters Ending 30 June 1949, in Quarterly Report, volume
II, numbers 1 and 2. Fort McNair, Washington, DC:
JHU ORO, 1949.
____. A Discussion of the ORO Work Program. OROSP
71. Chevy Chase, Md.: JHU ORO, 1958.
____. Fields of Knowledge and Operations Research. ORO
SP124. Bethesda, Md.: JHU ORO, 1960.
____. ORO Biographies. Two volumes. Chevy Chase, Md.:
JHU ORO, various dates, 19571963.
____. ORO Today : Why the Operations Research Oce Has
Been Reorganized and What It Is Doing. Chevy Chase,
Md.: JHU ORO, 1955.
____. Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report. Various
places, various dates, 19481961.
____. Record of ProceedingsSocial Science Conference, 19
21 September 1949. OROS7. Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: JHU ORO, 1949.
____. Reorganization of ORO, 1954. OROS422. Chevy
Chase, Md.: JHU ORO, 1954.
Crawford, Meredith P. A Perspective on the Development of

HumRRO. Alexandria, Va.: George Washington University HumRRO, 1968.
____. Revised Summary of ORO Projects, Special Studies,

and Field Operations to May 31, 1952, Volume I. Chevy
Dyer, Murray. Political Communication as an Instrument of

State. Two volumes. OROR18. Bethesda, Md.: JHU
ORO, 1957.
____. The Second Tripartite Conference on Army Operations

Research, 2327 October 1950. Volume II: Technical
Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: JHU ORO, 1950.
Dyer, Murray, and Segal, Julius. The POWOW TMs: An Assessment of ORO Psywar Research. OROSP51. Chevy
Johnson, Ellis A. Publications and Briengs for the Army: A

Policy Directive to Division ChiefsInformation to Research Sta. Bethesda, Md.: JHU ORO, 1959.
Flory, Lester D. Analysis of the ORO Research Program with

Respect to Timeliness. OROTP16. Bethesda, Md.:
JHU ORO, 1960.
Johnson, Ellis A., and others. Defense of the US Against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles. OROR17. Bethesda,
Md.: JHU ORO, 1957.
8/4/06 6:17:12 PM
selected bibliography
Linebarger, Paul. Possible Operations Research in FEC Psychological Warfare. OROT2FEC. Tokyo: JHU ORO,
1950.
Pettee, George S. Comments upon An Appraisal of OROs
Defense Study, OROR17. Bethesda, Md.: JHU ORO,
1958.
Research Analysis Corporation. RAC Highlights, 1961
1971, The RAConteur 7, 11 (1971): 119.
Rumbaugh, Lynn H. A Look at US Army Operations ResearchPast and Present. RACTP102. McLean, Va.:
Research Analysis Corporation, 1964.
Rumbaugh, Lynn H., Green, Jerome B., Turkel, Solomon
H., and Kelley, Edward G. The Tactical Employment of
Atomic Weapons in the Defense of Central Europe Summary Report. OROR1EUCOM. Chevy Chase,
Md.: JHU ORO, 1954.
Technical Operations, Inc., Combat Operations Research
Group. Final List of CORG Publications. Fort Belvoir,
Va.: Technical Operations, Inc., Combat Operations
Research Group, for Headquarters, U.S. Army Combat
Developments Command, 1970.
Thomson, Charles Alexander Holmes. The Research Analysis Corporation: A History of a Federal Contract Research
Center. McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation,
1975.
Trefethen, Florence N. A History of Operations Research,
in Joseph F. McCloskey and Florence N. Trefethen, eds.,
Operations Research for Management. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1954.
U.S. Continental Army Command, Combat Operations Research Group. Combat Operations Research Group Work
Program Summary. Fort Monroe, Va.: HQ CONARC,
1956.
Whitson, William L. The History of Operations Research (I).
Seminar Paper 2, JHU-ORO Informal Seminar in Operations Research, 195253. Baltimore: JHU ORO,
1952.
Wohlstetter, Alfred. An Appraisal of OROs Defense Study,
R17. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
1958.
Young, John P. A Brief History of War Gaming. CORG
Sta Memorandum No. 41. Fort Monroe, Va.: CORG,
Headquarters, CONARC, 1955.
Other Official United States

Government Publications
Bradley, William T. Operations Research in the Armed Services. Student individual study. Carlisle Barracks, Penn.:
U.S. Army War College, 1957.
Burton, Emmette Y. Jr. The Role of Operations Research in
the Army. Student individual study. Carlisle Barracks,
Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 1955.
Coakley, Robert W., Kugler, Richard C., and Demma, Vincent H. Historical Summary of Evolution of U.S. Army
Test and Evaluation SystemWorld War II to the Present
(draft). Three volumes. Washington: Histories Division,
Oce of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, 1966.
Conn, Stetson. Notes prepared 28 March 1964, subj: Some
Observations and Conclusions Concerning the Suggested
Assignment of SOROs Special Area Studies Division to
the Oce of the Chief of Military History. File 400.112
SORO General. Washington, D.C.: CMH HRC.
Dinsmore, Oliver R. Requirements for Operations Research Training of Army Ocers. Student research
paper 664129U. Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S.
Army War College, 1966.
Gilman, Seymour I. The Role of Operations Research in
Headquarters, Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces. Sta
Directory. Fort Monroe, Va.: 1954.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. Sta Directory. Fort Belvoir, Va.: Headquarters,
CDC, 1963.
Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. Sta Directory. Fort Monroe, Va.: Headquarters, CONARC,
various dates, 19551962.
Hewes, James E. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 19001963. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975.
Holley, I. B. Jr. The Evolution of Operations Research and
Its Impact on the Military Establishment; The Air
Force Experience, in Science, Technology, and Warfare:
The Proceedings of the Third Military History Symposium,
United States Air Force Academy, 89 May 1969, ed.
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D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce for the Oce of
Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, and the U.S.
Air Force Academy, 1983.
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Jae, Lorna. Quantitative Analysis and Army Decision Making. Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Materiel Development
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Smith, Selwyn D. Jr. An Evaluation of Army Operations

Research. Student individual study. Carlisle Barracks,
Jessup, John E. Jr., and Coakley, Robert W. A Guide to the

Study and Use of Military History. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1978.
Snodgrass, Raymond J. Survey of Ordnance Activities, September 1951December 1952. Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Oce of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army, 1953.
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Keith, Jean E., and Butler, Howard K. United States Army
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Montague, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Combat Developments
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Naiswald, L. Van Loan. The History of the Army R&D Organization and Program, Part I: Organization (draft).
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Schermerhorn, John C. The Role of Operations Research in
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Scott, Lloyd N. Naval Consulting Board of the United States.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce,
1920.
Thompson, George R., Raynor, George, and Harris, Dixie

R. The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 Through
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Tinberg, Larry R. Operations Research and the US Army.
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U.S. Army Chemical Center and Chemical Corps Materiel
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Materiel Command. Baton Rouge, La.: Army and Navy
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U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Oce of the Chief Chemical Ocer. Organization of the Army Chemical Corps,
15 June 1956. Washington, D.C.: Oce of the Chief
Chemical Ocer, Department of the Army, 1956.
U.S. Army Chemical Corps School. Organization and Functions of the Chemical Corps. Special Text 3171. Fort
McPherson, Ga.: Chemical Corps School, Fort McClellan, Ala., 1956.
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Institute of
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U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command. Developing Tomorrows Army Today. Fort Ord,
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U.S. Army General Sta, Logistics Division. Research and
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U.S. Army, Oce of the Surgeon General. Annual Reports
of the Surgeon General, United States Army Washington,
D.C.: Oce of the Surgeon General, Department of the
Army, various dates, 19601962.
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Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Aberdeen Proving
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U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, Oce of Ordnance Research.
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551. Durham, N.C.: Oce of Ordnance Research,
Ordnance Corps, U.S. Army, 1955.
U.S. Army Quartermaster Combat Developments Agency.
Operations Research Methods. Special Project 6241.
Fort Lee, Va.: U.S. Army Quartermaster Combat Developments Agency, 1962.
U.S. Army Research Laboratory Public Aairs Oce. ARO
Celebrates 50th Anniversary, available at http://www.
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U.S. Army Research Oce (Durham). Executive SummaryUnited States Army Operations Research Symposium
Conducted by Army Research Oce (Durham) at Duke
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Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute for Army Research Oce (Durham), 1962.
____. Proceedings of the United States Army Operations Research Symposium, 26, 27, 28 March 1963, Durham,
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U.S. Army Research Oce (Durham), 1963.
U.S. Army Signal Corps. Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal Ocer, U.S. Army, May 1951April 1955. Washington, D.C.: Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer, Department of the Army, 1955.
____. Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal Ocer, U.S.
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Army, 1959.
U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group. Organization and Functions Manual. Bethesda, Md.: STAG,
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U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC
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U.S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Regulation 207:

Operations Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters,
Department of the Air Force, 1953.
____. Air Force Regulation 209: Air Force Policy for the Conduct of Project RAND. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, 1954.
U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulations No. 1110:
ADMINISTRATIONContracting for Management
Advisory Services and Operations Research Studies and
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____. Army Special Regulations No. 70551: RESEARCH
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____. Change No. 7 to Army Special Regulations No. 10
51: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS, DE
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8/4/06 6:17:13 PM

U.S. Department of Defense. News Release No. 89361:
Army Announces Contract Award to R.A.C.Army
Today Awarded $4.576 Million Contract for Operations
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____. The Growth of Scientic Research and Development.
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Walters, Howard C. Jr. The History of War Games. Chemical Corps Ocer Career Course Historical Study. Fort
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Weeks, Robert J. The Armys Operations Research Training
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Baxter, James Phinney III. Scientists Against Time. Boston:
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Blackett, Patrick Maynard Stuart. Studies of War, Nuclear
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Crowther, J. G., and Whiddington, R. Science at War. New
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Cummings, Nigel. How the World of OR Societies Began,
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8/4/06 6:17:13 PM
Dickson, Paul. Think Tanks. New York: Atheneum, 1971.
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Eklund, Lowell R. Science and the Soldier: The Organization for Research and Development in the Army: Past,
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Hausrath, Alfred H. Utilization of Negro Manpower in
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Hitch, Charles J. RAND: Its History, Organization and Character. RAND B200. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
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8/24/06 11:55:11 AM
8/4/06 6:17:14 PM
INDEX
AR15 (rie): 102

AAF. See U.S. Army Air Forces
AAFASW. See U.S. Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command
Abajian, Henry: 37
ABC Discussions on Army Operational Research:
127n185
Aberdeen Proving Ground: 34, 35, 63, 112, 159n2
Research Division: 35. See also U.S. Army Ordnance Department
Advisory Committee on Bombardment: 27
Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD): 106
exchange program: 128n198. See also NATO
AGARD. See Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research
and Development
Air Defense Command: 45n74
Air Defense Technical Center (NATO): 106
Air Evaluation Boards: 26, 27
Air Force Regulation 20-7: Operations Analysis: 58, 59
establishes Operations Directorate of Air Force: 59
establishes Operations Analysis Oce (OAO): 59
and stang: 59
Air Force Regulation 20-9: Air Force Policy for the Conduct of
Project RAND: 60
and Project RAND Military Advisory Group: 60
Air Warfare Operations Research Group: 47n132
Airborne Instruments Laboratories: 122
Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (Lanchester): 5
Akin, Maj. Gen. Spencer B., USA: 37, 53n382
requests OR analysts: 38
Alexander the Great: 4
Alexander, Archibald: 69
Alexander, James: 19, 51n302
Alexander, Col. William, USA: 38
Alvarez, Luis: 125n94
Ambrose, W. A.: 47
American Association for the Advancement of Science: 161
American Chemical Society: 156n192

American Institute of Research: 126n129
American Kriegsspiel, The (Livermore): 114
American Power Jet Company: 71
American University: and OR as a discipline: 107
Special Operations Research Oce at: 110
Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect to Timeliness (Flory): 103
Analytics, Inc.: 64
Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., USA: 49n226: suggests use of
civilian OR analysts: 24
Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG): 21-23, 29, 57
Columbia University contract: 17, 28, 51n280
personnel: 21, 22, 48
sponsored by Oce of Field Service: 17
Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II (Sternhell and
Thorndike): 58
AORE. See Great Britain, Army Operational Research Establishment
AORG. See Great Britain, Army Operational Research
Group
Appleton, E. V.: 43n4
Archambault, Bennett: 15
Archimedes: 3, 6
Armalite Company: designs AR 15 (rie): 102
Armed Forces Security Agency: 112
Army Operations Research Symposium: 158, 161
Army Regulation No. 15-14: and STAG mission: 116
Army Regulation No. 15-480: establishes mission of Operations Research Oce: 87
Army Regulation No. 70-32: Special Warfare Non-Materiel
Research: 111
Army Table of Distribution No. 89-9826: and STAG personnel: 117
Arneson, Robert W.: OR analyst killed in action: 32
Arnold, Lt. Gen. Henry H., USAAF: 15, 30, 32, 36
forms Advisory Committee on Bombardment: 27
INDEX2.indd 195
8/24/06 11:56:05 AM

Arnold, Lt. Gen. Henry H., USAAFContinued
aerial mining of Shimonoseki Straits: 20
establishes Air Evaluation Boards: 26
and formation of OAD on Air Sta: 25
and postwar R&D for Air Force: 59
orders review of U.S. air defenses: 24
ARO. See U.S. Army Research Oce
Arps, Leslie H.: 51n302
ASWORG. See Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group
Atkins, Emery L.: and Project EVANAL: 72
Atlantic Fleet: 21
ASWORG: personnel attached to: 48n173
ATLAS II (computer): for Armed Forces Security Agency: 112
Aurand, Lt. Gen. Henry S., USA: 64
Australian National Academy: 11
Aydelotte, Dr. Frank: 28
Babbage, Charles: and computers: 111
Bacher, Robert T.: and Project VISTA: 135
Bacon, Lt. Col. John A., USA: 150
Baker, Rear Adm. Wilder D., USN: 15
recommends OR element for Atlantic Fleet: 21
Ball, George W: 26
Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL): 34, 63, 147, 159n2
Advisory Council: 35
ENIAC developed for: 112
mission of: 35
multidisciplinary approach: 35
studies of: 63, 147
Terminal Ballistics Laboratory at: 63
Weapons System Laboratory (WSL): 81n109, 147
See also under individual arsenals; U.S. Army Ordnance
Department
Bardeen, John: 19
Nobel Prize: 48n167
Barton, Carlyle: 92
Bath, Carl C.: 34
Battelle Memorial Institute: 64, 71, 83n212
Battle of Britain: 10, 12
Battle of the Atlantic: 13, 22
Bawdesy Research Station: 10, 44n9, n11
radar development: 10, 14
Baxter, James: Scientists Against Time: 45n77
Beach, Lt Gen. Dwight E., USA: 123, 157
Becich, J. P.: 38
Bell Telephone Laboratories: 15, 46n79, 48n167, 53, 122
Bell, Maurice E.: 21, 47n167
Bennett, Ralph D.: 19
Bergstein, Svend, Lt. Col. (Denmark): 3
Besson, Gen. Frank S., Jr., USA: 157
Best, Robert J.: 67, 72
Biggin Hill: radar development at: 10, 14
Bitter, Cdr. Francis, USN: 19, 47n132
Blackett, P.M.S.: 10, 11, 13, 19, 21, 43n4, 44n25
Nobel Prize: 11
Blackett, P.M.S.Continued
A Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of
Operational Research: 13 dening OR and codifying
scientic rules of: 11
forms Operational Research Club: 107
Recollections of Problems Studied, 1940-1945: 12
Scientists at the Operational Level: 11, 15
on Tizard Committee: 10
Bletchley Park: uses computer for code-breaking: 111
Bode, Dr. Hendrik W.: 122
Bombing accuracy: 42
Booz Allen and Hamilton: 83n212
Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc.: development of CENTAUR: 119
STAG contract: 117
Bothwell, Dr. F. E.: 118
Bowen, Ralph: 15
Bowker, Lt. Col. A., USA: 150
Bowles, Dr. Edward L.: 59
Bowman, Dr. Isaiah: 65
Bradley, General of the Army Omar T., USA: 122
Bramhall: Dr. Ervin H.: and Project ANALAA: 71
BRAND: reviews Army R&D: 88, 92. See also Operations
Research Oce
Brattain, Walter: Nobel Prize: 48n167
Brewerton, Capt. Douglas: War Chess, or The Game of Battle:
130n305
British Air Ministry Center of Operational Research: 26
Menzies heads: 12, 26
British Army Munitions Inventions Department, Anti-Aircraft Experimental Section: 5
British Central Scientific Office (Washington, D.C.):
15
British Commonwealth: OR organizations: 62
British Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Department, Princes
Risborough: 15, 17, 46
BRL. See Ballistics Research Laboratories
Bronk, Detlev: 69, 76, 84n250, 92
Bronowski, Jacob: contacts British OR analysts: 15
Brooke Army Medical Center: 151
Brookhaven National Laboratory: 47n165, 136
Brooks, Dr. Franklin C.: 140, 154n73
Brothers, LeRoy A.: 15, 58
relationship with Air Sta: 59
Brown, Arthur A.: 21, 22, 128n218
Brown, Bonnar: 128n218
Bulova Watch Company: 122
Bundy, Harvey H.: 18, 24, 36, 44n21, 53n378, 58
and Leach-Davidson Report: 25
Buonarotti, Michangelo: 4
Burchard, John E.: 17, 39, 46n97
Combat Scientists: 45n77
NDRC Division 2: 17, 53
Bureau of Applied Social Science Research (Columbia University): 126n129
36171_12INDEX.indd 196
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM
index
Bureau of Ordnance Research Division: 19, 20. See also Mine
Warfare Operations
Research Group
Bureau of the Budget: 56
Bush, Vannevar: 24, 28, 30, 38, 40, 70
and autonomy of American scientists: 16, 17, 29, 43, 64
heads Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee
( JNWEC): 61
creates Oce of Field Service: 17
on OA for ground forces: 36, 37
and OR in Army and Navy: 25
chairs National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics:
14
chairs National Defense Research Committee: 14
relations with Navy: 29
chairs Research and Development Board: 61
California Institute of Technology: Project VISTA: 135
and Institute for Defense Analyses: 61
Cameron, Dr. Robert H.: 147
Camp, Glen D.: 106
Canada: 105, 157, 158
Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment
(CAORE): 105
at Royal Military College, Kingston: 62
and Tripartite Conferences: 62
CAORE. See Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment
Caribbean Defense Command: 24
uses ASWORG: 49n226
Caribbean Sea Frontier: and ASWORG: 48n173
Carmonette (wargame): 115, 130n340
Carnegie Institution: 14
Case Institute of Technology: and Institute for Defense
Analyses: 61
and OR as a discipline: 107, 120
Casebook on Revolutionary Warfare, A: 111
Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J., USA: 38
Castra (eld camp): 4
Catapults: 3
Cavity magnetron: 14, 45n68
CCORG. See U.S. Army Chemical Corps Operations Research Group
CDEC. See U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center
CDTEC. See U.S. Army Combat Developments Test and
CENTAUR (wargame): development of: 119
Center for Army Analysis: 131n393
Center for Naval Analyses: administered by Franklin Institute: 122
contract with University of Rochester: 132n443
CGSC. See U.S. Army Command and General Sta College
Chadsey, Charles P.: 107
Charles, Archduke: 4
Chase, Dr. Martin N.: 154n73

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., USAAF: 50n257
Chess: as wargame: 113
Churchill, Winston: scientic collaboration with the U.S.:
14
Circular error probable: 5, 7n18, 51n330
Civil Defense Administration: 91
Clark, Dr. Dorothy Kneeland: 67, 97
Clark, Gen. Mark W., USA: 139, 154n65
Clarke, Gen. Bruce C., USA: 154n65
Clarkson, James A.: and bombardment accuracy: 32
Clausen, Svend: 3
Clausewitz, Carl von: 3, 4, 5
The Principles of War: 7n10
On War: 7n10
Cockcroft, John: 45n66
Cody, Donald D.: 21
Cole, Dr. Hugh M.: 41, 92, 97
Cole, I. H.: 10
Collbohm, Franklin: and RAND Corporation: 60
and Project RAND: 59
Collins, Gen. James Lawton, USA: 76, 108:
orders formation of Combat Development Group: 135
and study of Negro manpower in Army: 101
Colossus (computer): at Bletchley Park: 111
Columbia Research and Development Corporation: 83
Columbia University: 107
contract with ASWORG: 28, 51n280, 57
contracts with Navy: 21, 42, 57
contract with OSRD: 28, 48n197
and OR as a discipline: 107
Combat Developments Command: 122, 148, 151,
155n14
Combat Developments Element: structure: 135-36: See also
Oce of the Chief of Army
Field Forces; Combat Development Group
Combat Developments Group: established, 135: renamed:
136. See also Combat
Development Special Section
Combat Developments Planning Guide (OCAFF): 135
Combat Developments Special Section: projects of: 136
Combined Intelligence Oce Survey: 34
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government. See Hoover Commission
Committee for the Scientic Study of Air Defence: See Tizard Committee
Committee for the Scientic Survey of Air Warfare: 43n5
Committee on Medical Research: 15, 56
Committee on Operations Research: 107
Committee on Postwar Research (Wilson Committee): 56
COMPLAB. See Computing Laboratory
Compton, Dr. Karl T.: 16, 33, 53n378
creation of OSRD: 17, 37
on OR sections and eld research groups: 17-18, 29
visits Headquarters, Southwest Pacic Area: 38
and Pacic Branch-OSRD: 38, 46n97
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM

Computer Concepts, Inc: development of CENTAUR: 119
develops FORTRAN: 119
Computers and wargaming: 85, 111-119
development of: 111-13
linear programming: 112
matrix generation: 112
and Operations Research Oce: 114, 115
simulations: 112, 115
and wargames: 115
Computing Laboratory (COMPLAB): part of Strategic Division, ORO: 114-15
Conant, Dr. James B.: 15
establishes American oce for scientic research in
London: 15
leads delegation to Great Britain: 14
chairs National Defense Research Council: 14
supports OR program in U.S.: 16
CONARC. See U.S. Continental Army Command
Concentration, principle of: 5
Concept Analysis Agency: 131n393
Connor, John T.: 122
Contribution to the War Game, A (von Verdy du Vernois):
113
Copell, D. F.: 38
CORG. See U.S. Army Combat Operations Research
Group
Council of National Defense: 14
Covington, O. M.: 34
Craig, A. T.: 47n167
Crawford, Dr. Meredith Pullen: 108, 109, 129n236,n238
Crawford, Lt. Col. Roscoe C., USA: 49
CRD. See Department of the Army, Chief of Research and
Development, Army Sta
Crozier, William J.: 32
Curtiss-Wright Corporation: 71-72
Da Vinci, Leonardo: 4
Dahl, Norman: 39
Daley, Lt. Gen. John P., USA: 145, 157
Daniels, Josephus: 5, 6
Danish Defense Research Establishment: 3
Darlington, Dr. Sidney: 37, 38, 53n387
Darwin, Dr. Charles G.: 15
Davidson, Dr. Ward F.: 11, 18, 30
prepares Leach-Davidson report: 25, 36, 48n169
Davies, Max: 107
Davis, Robert N.: rst combat radar pictures: 32
Davison, Maj. Gen. Garrison H., USA: 138
DCSOPS. See Deputy Chief of Sta for Military Operations
Decision theory: 115
Decker, Gen. George H.: 116
Defense Dynamics: 3
Defense of the US Against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles:
100
Defense Research and Development Board: 64, 65
Defense Research Board (DRB): Canadian OR agency: 62

Defense Systems Division, General Motors Corp.: 118
Degaussing: 20, 46n121
Density method: 13, 42
Department of Defense: OR programs in: 60-62, 157
established: 56, 60, 61
funding: 85, 123n4
forms Joint Operations Research Group: 62
shift from ORO to RAC: 122
and Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG): 85,
105
Department of the Air Force: 62
Department of the Army: Ad Hoc Advisory Committee:
66
Advisory Committee for the Operations Research Oce:
94
Army Regulation 15-480 denes Advisory Committee: 94
Oce of the Chief of Research and Development: 94
Project Advisory Groups for the Operations Research
Oce: 94
Department of the Army Memorandum 3-50-2: creates Department of the Army Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee: 66
establishes General Research Oce: 66
denes work program of Operations Research Oce: 70
Deputy Chief of Sta for Military Operations (DCSOPS):
116
DeQuoy, Col. Alfred W., USA: chief of STAG: 116
Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob D., USA: 37, 70
Dickins, Dr. B.G.: 10, 30
Directorate of Air Defense: 51n281
Directorate of Logistics Liaison: 145
Directorate of Plans and Operations, 145
Directorate of Technical Services: 25
DOD. See Department of Defense
Dolan, Col. W. C., USA: 21
Donovan, Grace: 67
Doolittle, Maj. Gen. James, USAAF: commander, Eighth
Air Force: 51n308
Douglas, Donald: supervises Project RAND: 59
Douglas Aircraft: and establishment of RAND Corporation: 60
and Project RAND: 59, 64
Dowding, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh: 10, 12; OR study of
aircraft transfer: 12, 45n40
Dowker, Cliord H.: develops position ring: 32
DRB. See Defense Research Board
Druckenbrod, W. F.: 83n212
Dubridge, Dr. Lee A.: 70, 135
Duggan, Stephen P., Jr.: 26
Duke University: and U.S. Army Oce of Ordnance Research: 147
Dunlap and Associates: 72
Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C., USAAF: 30, 31, 32, 50n258, 51n308,
58
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM
index
Earle, Dr. Edward M.: 27, 50n253
Eastern Sea Frontier: ASWORG personnel attached to:
48n173
Eckert, Dr. J. Presper, Jr.: designs ENIAC: 112
designs UNIVAC: 112
Eddison, Roger T.: 107
Edgewood Arsenal: 149, 156n192
Edison: Thomas Alva: 7n20
tactical board game: 6
zigzagging: 6
Edlefson, Niels E.: 39
EDVAC (computer): 112
Eighth Air Force: 29, 30-31, 32, 51n308
VIII Bomber Command: 26, 30, 31, 49n266
VIII Fighter Command: 31, 32
Eighth United States Army (EUSA) in Korea: 86, 11718
Eisenhower, Dr. Milton S.: 121
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., USA: 64, 70
Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator. See
ENIAC
Electronics Laboratory: 114
Elmore, Lt. Col. Vincent M., Jr., USA: 82
Elwell, Lt. Col. R.E., USA: 37
Ely, Maj. Gen. William J., USA: 122
Engineer Development Board of the Chief of Engineers:
136
ENIAC: 112, 130n280
Enlightenment: 4
Ennis, Brig. Gen. William P., USA: 135
Ennis, Malcolm E.: 21
Epaminondas: 3, 6, 7n14
ERA (UNIVAC) 1103: 114
EUSA. See Eighth United States Army
Everitt, Dr. William Litell: 33, 34, 52n337, 150
Executive Order 8807: establishes Oce of Scientic Research and Development: 15
Executive Order 9913: abolishes NDRC and Committee on
Medical Research and Oce of Field Service: 56
FABMDS. See Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense
System
Fairchild Engine and Aircraft Corporation: 102
Fairchild, Brig. Gen. Muir, USA: 25
FAME (wargame): 115
Far East Command: and OR in Korea: 86
and psychological warfare, 87
Farkas, Lucien: 34
Farmer, Lt. Col. W. C., USA: 66, 68, 82n166
Farwell, J. W.: 38
FASD. See Special Operations Research Oce, Foreign
Area Studies Division
Fell, Maj. Charles F.: 33
Fermi, Dr. Enrico: 70
Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS):
STAG develops wargame for: 118
Field Manual 30-27: Regulations for Civilian Operations

Analysts, Scientic Consultants, and Technical
Observers Accompanying U.S., Army Forces in the
Field: 27
Fields of Knowledge and Operations Research: 96
Fifteenth Air Force: 32
5th Infantry Division: 143
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company: 122
First Army: 34
First Ordnance Conference on Operations Research: 148
Floberg, John F.: 122
Flood, Dr. Merrill M.: 148
Flory, Brig. Gen. Lester DeLong, USA: 67, 82n158, 96-97,
103
Food and Container Institute: 109
Forbush, Scott: 19
Ford Foundation: and RAND Corporation: 60
Foreign Economic Administration: 82n157
Forrestal, James V.: 57, 77, 79n67
rst Secretary of Defense: 60
Fort Leslie McNair: houses Operations Research Oce: 66,
97
FORTRAN: development of: 119
Foulis, Ronald J.: 26
Fourteenth Air Force: 32, 50
14th Anti-Aircraft Command: 37
Fowler, Ralph: 45n66
Fowler, William A.: and Project VISTA: 135
Fox, Robert A.: 34
France: OR groups: 128n189
Frankford Arsenal: 63, 147, 148, 159n2
Franklin, Benjamin: 4
Franklin Institute Laboratories for Research and Development: 72, 122
Free Kreigsspiel: 113, 114
Furer, Rear Adm. Julius A., USN: 21, 46n113
Furnas, C. C.: and Project VISTA: 135
Gadsby, G. Neville: 105, 106
Galilei, Galeileo: 4
Gaming Strategic Logistics: 116
Gardner, Dr. John H.: 72
Gates, Maj. Gen. Byron E, USA: 25, 27
Gates, Thomas S., Jr.: 85
Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., USA: 102, 148
Gay, Herman: at Terminal Ballistics Laboratory: 63
General Research Oce (GRO): 56, 65, 66
George Washington University: forms HumRRO: 108
Get That Fighter: 32
Gilman: Col. Seymour I., USA: and Project ANALLA:
71
Glennan, Capt. J. B., USN: 19
Goggin, K. M. M.: 11
Goodeve, Sir Charles: 12
forms Operational Research Club:107
Goodwin, Herbert F.: 38
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM

Gordon, Dr. Cecil: develops planned ying: 11, 12-13
develops planned maintenance: 11, 13
forms Operational Research Club: 107
Great Britain: Admiralty: 11
air defense: 9
Air Ministry: 11
Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE): 106
Army Operational Research Group (AORG): 62
Ministry of Home Defense: 11
Operational Research Section, British Army of the Rhine:
106
Operational Research Unit, Far East: 106
operations research: 11-14, 107
radar: 9
Greece: 106
Green, Alexander: 32
Green, J. W.: 87
Griggs, H. P.: 83n212
GRO. See General Research Oce
Gross, Dr. Paul M.: 161
Grubbs, Frank: 35
Guadalcanal: mining operations at: 20
Guerlac, Henry: 4
Gulf Sea Frontier: ASWORG personnel attached to:
48n173
Hafstad, Kay: 67
Hall, Capt. John M., USA: 28, 49n232: on training of analysts: 50n270
Haller, Raymond and Brown, Inc.: 150, 156n205
Handy, Gen. Thomas, USA: 97, 125n73
Hardick, Col. William L., USA: 139, 140
Harlan, John M.: 51n302
heads Eighth Air Force OA section: 29, 30, 50n271
Harlow Committee: and psychological warfare: 110
Harmon, Lt. Gen. Willard F., USA: 37, 53n376
Harrington, Maj., USA: 53
Harrison, Dr. George R.: 37, 53n383
Hart, Squadron Leader Raymund G.: 10
Harvard Mark I (computer): 111
Haworth, Dr. Leland J.: 136
Haworth Report: 136-37, 140, 155n142
and eld experimentation: 142
and Project VISTA: 136
Hayward, Roger: develops position ring: 32
Hazleton, Sgt. Eileen, USA: 51n311
Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe: 106
Headquarters, Combat Developments Experimentation
Command: 139
Headquarters, Commander SOUTH: 106
Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Korea (HQ
EUSAK): 86
Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force: ORO eld oce at: 106
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe: Oce of Operations
Analysis at: 106
Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe: 106
Helwig, Master of Pages: and wargames: 113

Henderson, Lt. Col., USA: 39
Hennington, Howard H.: 21
Henry, Dr. James H., USA: and Project ANALAA: 71
Henry, Maj. Gen. Stephen G.: 36, 41, 46n113
Herring, Dr. Pendleton: 70
Hill, Brevet Major Archibald Vivian: 5, 6, 44n25
Nobel Prize, 7n19, 43n4
Tizard Committee: 10, 14
Hill, Dr. Floyd: 63
Hitch, Charles J.: 15, 60
Hobbs, Dean Marcus E.: 148
Hodge, Gen. John R., USA: 135, 154n65
Hoelscher, Leonard W.: and Project 80: 145
Homan, George: 128n198
Hoisington, Dr. Laurence E.: 19
Holley, I. B.: 59
Holst, Helge: 39
Hoover, Dorothy: 82n147
Hoover, Herbert: 79
Hoover Commission: 60, 61, 79n68
second: 79n68
Horne, Vice Adm. Frederick J., USN: involvement of civilians in sensitive military work: 19
Horvath, William J.: 128n218
Housner, George W.: 32
Hovde, Frederick L.: 15, 45n70
Howard, Royal V.: 34
Howze Board: 161
HRAF. See Human Relations Area Files
Hubbard, E.B.: 37
Hull, Capt. George D., USN: 20
Hull, Lt. Gen. John E., USA: 61
Hulme, H. R.: studies Atlantic convoys: 13
Human Relations Area Files (HRAF): Army contract with:
110
Human Resources Research Oce (HumRRO): 108-10,
121, 122, 129n236, 152, 157
and AR 70-8: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Human Factors and Social
Science Research: 109
and AR 70-31: 109
creation of: 133
eld research laboratories: 109
nancing: 109
at George Washington University: 108, 109
An Integrated Program in Human Resources Research
108
mission of: 108-109
organization of: 109
personnel: 109, 120
Project DESERT ROCK: 109
publications of: 109
supervision of: 108
and TRAINFIRE I AND II: 110
and university contracts: 158
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM
index
HumRRO. See Human Resources Research Oce
Hunsaker, Jerome C.: 46n79
Hutchinson, Dr. Miller Reese: 7n20
I Bomber Command: 21, 49n226
IBM: 111
model 1401: 119
model 7090: 119
ICR. See Johns Hopkins University Institute for Cooperative Research
Illinois Institute of Technology: and OR as a discipline:
107
Imperial College of Science and Technology: 10
INDIGO (wargame): 115
INFORMS. See Institute for Operations Research and
Management Sciences
Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS): 108
Institute for Defense Analyses: 61, 118
Institute of Management Sciences, The: 107, 108
Institute of Radio Engineers: 52n337
Instructions for the Representation of Tactical Maneuvers under
the Guise of a War Game (von Reisswitz the Younger):
113
Integrated Combat Development Systems: 133, 134
Integrated Program in Human Resources Research, An:
108
Interior lines: principle of, 5
International Business Machines Corporation . See IBM
International Public Opinion Research, Inc.: 72, 126n129
International Symposium on Military Operational Research: 128n216
Italy: 4, 106
Janney, Stuart S.: 92
Jansky, Cyril Moreau, Jr.: 24, 26, 30, 33, 34, 49n206
denes operational analysis: 24
Memorandum on Operational Analysis in the War Department: 24
recommends OA include land forces: 36
Japan: defeat of Imperial Navy: 32: wargaming at Total War
Research Institute: 113
Jewett, Dr. Frank B.: 17, 24, 33, 46n79, 52n337
JNWEC. See Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee
Johns Hopkins University, The: 75, 86
Committee on Sponsored Research: 70
and Department of the Army: 64-66, 69, 70, 86, 87
Institute for Cooperative Research: 65, 66, 67, 92
and Navys Applied Physics Laboratory: 65
and OR as a discipline: 107, 120
and Operations Research Oce: 46n121, 56, 68, 92-94,
97-98, 105, 120, 122
forms trustees committee for ORO: 92
Johnson, Dr. Ellis A.: 70, 72, 74, 82n147, 92, 107, 128n218,
134, 139
Johnson, Dr. Ellis A.Continued

and Army Operations Research Oce: 46n121, 63, 7375, 76, 97-98, 104
and basic research: 83
and computers: 118
relationship with Johns Hopkins: 121
and Korea: 86
and mining: 19, 20, 21, 74, 130n316
murder boards: 102
naval commission of: 20, 47n144
and growth of OR: 86, 106, 107, 123, 142
personality of: 87
and Plans and Operations Division: 76
formation of Review Committee: 70
and XXI Bomber Command operations: 47n160
and need for interaction between military and civilian OR
analysts: 94, 96
on wargames: 115
Johnson, James W.: 87
Johnson, Louis A.: 79n67
Johnson, Lt. Gen. Harold K., USA: 138
Johnstone, Dr. J. H. L.: 62
Joint Chiefs of Sta: 16
and Vannevar Bush: 18
Joint New Weapons and Equipment Committee: 16, 18
and Joint Operations Analysis Committee: 26
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG):
47n165
Bush heads: 61
members: 18
and OR: 18: 25
and coordination of OSRD and military: 18
Joint Operations Research Group: 62, 76
Joint Research and Development Board: 81
Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri: 4, 5, 6: Prcis de lart de la
guerre: 7n10
Journal of the American Chemical Society: 156n192
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, The:
107, 125n64
Kane, Col. T. J., USA: 148
Kant, Immanuel: 4
Karman, Dr. Theodore von: 59
Katcher, David: 19
Kelly, Maj. Edward G., USA: 124n15
Kendall, Willmoore: 73
Kendrew, John C.: 11
Kennedy, John F.: 161
Kepner, Maj. Gen. W.E., USAAF: 32
Kilgore, Senator Harley: 78n7
Killian, Dr. T. J.: 148
Kimball, George E.: 57, 128n218
Methods of Operations Research: 58
and search theory: 22
King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., USN: 22, 57
King, Robert W.: 36
8/4/06 6:19:01 PM

Kings Game (wargame): 113
Kip, Arthur F.: 47n167
Kissinger, Henry A.: 97
Klopsteg, Dr. Paul E.: 37, 39
Knott, Widnell D.: analyst killed in action: 32
Knox, Frank: 22
Koopman, Bernard O.: and search theory: 22
A Quantitative Aspect of Combat: 48
Search and Screening: 58
Kroeger, Dr. William J.: 64
Laboratories for Applied Sciences, University of Chicago:
118
Lamar, Edward J.: 22
Lanchester, Frederick William: 3, 5, 6, 7n14
principle of concentration: 5
N2 Law: 5, 48n191
Lanchester Prize: 107
Lane, Lt. Col. Jack F., USA: 150
Lang-Brown, Hilary: 11
Larnder, Harold: 10, 12, 44n16, 45
Larsen, Finn J.: 122
Larson, Brig. Gen. Westside T., USAAF: 21
Lathrop, John B.: 128n218
Lauristen, Charles C.: and Project VISTA: 135
Lawrence, Dr. E. O.: 70
Leach, Col. Walter Barton, USAAF: 12, 18, 25, 30, 31, 34,
36, 37, 39, 44n31, 73
serves on Advisory Committee on Bombardment: 27
availability of information: 27
and OAD: 26, 49n234, 58
personnel and salaries: 27-28, 29, 30, 43, 47n166
views on postwar OA: 58
Leach-Davidson Report: 24-25
on British OR sections: 44
on civilian analysts: 28
employment policies for analysts: 49n208; 50n276
recommendations of: 25, 26, 49
Lee, Rear Adm. W. A., Jr, USN.: on Joint New Weapons and
Equipment Committee: 16, 18
Leet, Dr. L. D.: and Moreland mission: 53n392
LEGION (wargame): 119
and Booz-Allen Applied Research analysts: 119
and Computer Concepts Inc.: 119
FORTRAN: 119
IBM 1401: 119
Leibler, Dr. Richard A.: on STAG Advisory Council: 118
LeMay, Lt. Gen. Curtis, USAF: and low-level night bombing: 47n160, 59, 60
LEO (computer): 112
Levinson, Dr. Horace: 107, 128n218
Livermore, Maj. W. L., USA: The American Kriegsspiel: 114
LOGSPIEL Group (Logistics Division, ORO): 115-16
Gaming Strategic Logistics Studies: 116
Londonderry, Lord: 9
Lord Tivertons system of Bombing: report to Air Board: 5
Louis XIV: 4
Louisiana Polytechnic Institute: 71
Lowry, Philip H.: 118
Lusitania: 5
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, USA: 40, 53n389
oensive mining operations: 20
requests research section: 37
Macdonald, Charles B.: 92
Machiavelli, Niccol: 4
Magnuson, Senator Warren: 78n7
Mahan, Dennis Hart: 5
Management Control Division, Air Sta: OAD created in:
25, 26
Marcellus, Marcus Claudius, 3
Maris, Maj. Gen. Ward H., USA: 94
on Ellis Johnson: 74
Marquat, Maj. Gen. W.H., USA: 37
Marquis, Dr. Donald: 70
Marsh, Harold N.: establishes Special Services, Inc.: 28
Marshall, Dr. Lauriston: 39, 40
experience with Vannevar Bush: 40
Marshall, Gen. George C., USA: 27, 97
Army reorganization: 78n32
and OA for ground forces: 36, 37
Marshall, S. L. A.: 87
Pork Shop Hill: 87
The River and the Gauntlet: 87
Marshall, Sam W.: 124n15
Mason, Dr. Edward: 70, 71
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See MIT
Mathematics and War (conference): 3
Mauchly, Dr. John W.:
designs ENIAC: 112
designs UNIVAC: 112
McAulie, Gen. Anthony, USA: 71, 149, 156n192
and development of Army R&D program: 64, 65
on basic research and operations research: 65
R&D experience of: 81n116
McCain, Adm. John S., USN: 47n132
McCarthy, Phillip J.: 47n167
McClelland, Brig. Gen. Harold M., USAAF: 21, 25, 30
McCloskey, Joseph F.: 21
on density method: 13
McCormack, Gen. James, Jr., USA: 122
McIntyre, J. T.: 83
McKeehan, Cdr. L. W, USN.: 19
McKibben, Wayne E.: 72
McNamara, Robert S.: 146, 161
Project 80: 145
Meade, Col. Frank C., USA: 33
Meals, Dr. Donald W.: 154n73
Medical Department Field Laboratory: 109
Meing: Field Marshal: and wargames: 113
Memorandum on Operational Analysis in the War Department ( Jansky): 24
INDEX2.indd 202
8/24/06 11:56:51 AM
index
Menzies, Wing Commander A. C.: 12, 26
Merck & Company: 122
Merriam, Col. Lauren W., USA: 140, 154n74
Merton, T. R.: 43n4
Methods of Operations Research (Morse and Kimball) 58
Michels, Dr. Walter: 19, 47n132
Midwest Research Institute: 72
Militaire (Wilhelm): 130n305
Military District of Washington: 94
Military Operations Research Society: 82n155, 108, 120
Military Systems Engineering, Bell Telephone Laboratories:
118
Millikan, Clark B.: and Project VISTA: 135
Milly, Dr. George H.: 150, 156n192
Mine Research Unit. See Naval Ordnance Laboratory
Mine Warfare Operations Research Group (MWORG):
18-21, 47
and Bureau of Ordnance Research Division: 18, 19
degaussing: 20
mines: 19, 20, 21
and Naval Ordnance Laboratory: 19
personnel: 48n197
Ministry of Aircraft Production (Great Britain): Telecommunications Research Establishment: 11
Ministry of Home Defense (Great Britain): operations research: 11
Miser, Hugh J.: 159, 159n20
MIT: 122
contract with Navy: 57, 64
and Institute for Defense Analyses: 61
and OR: 107, 120
Radiation Laboratory at: 15
Sloan School of Management: 128n220
contract with WSEG to provide scientic personnel: 61
Model, Field Marshal Walther: and wargaming: 113
Mogensen, A. H.: 38
Moltke, Count Helmut von, the Elder: and wargames: 113
Montague, Maj. Gen. Robert M., USA: 139, 140, 142, 154n66
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law: 14, 36
Moreland, Dr. E. L.: on state of Japanese science: 38
Moreland mission: 53n392
Morganstern, Oskar: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior: 130n312
MORS. See Military Operations Research Symposia
Morse, Dr. Philip M.: 21, 22, 47n165,n167, 57, 80n74, 148,
158
heads ASWORG: 21, 29
heads Operations Research Group: 57
president Operations Research Society of America:
47n156, 107, 128n218
and WSEG: 61
MORU. See Great Britain
Moses, Brig. Gen. Raymond, USA: 16, 18
Mottley, Charles M.: 128n218
Mutual Defense Act of 1949: 72
MWORG. See Mine Warfare Operations Research Group
N2 Law: 5
NAS. See National Academy of Sciences
National 4-H Club: and Operations Research Oce: 97
National Academy of Sciences (NAS): 15, 46n79, 52,
56n337
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA):
14, 15, 46n79
National Bureau of Standards: 107
National Defense Research Committee (NDRC): 14, 1518, 23, 32
abolished: 56
Applied Mathematics Panel of: 17, 30, 36
Vannevar Bush chairs: 14
created by Council of National Defense: 15
data access: 18
divisions: 15, 17, 21, 32, 156n192
London liaison oce: 15
and Oce of Scientic Research and Development: 15
personnel: 15, 21, 29, 30, 43
training relationship with ORB OCSigO: 34
National Military Establishment: 60
National Physical Laboratory (Great Britain): 10, 15
National Research Council (NRC): 28, 46n79, 147
Committee on Operations Research: 56, 78n10, 107
National Science Foundation: 56: proposed: 78n7
National Security Act of 1947: 77
and Air Force: 78n32
creates Central Intelligence Agency: 60
creates Department of Defense: 55-56, 60
recognizes Joint Chiefs of Sta: 60
creates National Military Establishment: 60
creates National Security Council: 60
establishes Research and Development Board: 61
National Security Act of 1949: 61
National Security Council: 60
National War College: 57
NATO: Advisory Panel on Operational Research:
128n191,n216, 157
Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD): 106
members establish OR organizations: 106
RAND Corporation representatives to: 106
Naumann: Das Regiments-Kreigsspiel: 113
Naval Consulting Board: 5, 6, 7n20
Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL): 15, 47n132
hosts military operations research symposium: 108
Mine Research Unit: 19
mine warfare: 130n316
and wargaming: 19
Naval Postgraduate School: 107
Naval Special Projects Oce: 118
Naval War College: 57, 114
Navy Special Devices Center: Army element at: 109
NDRC. See National Defense Research Committee
Nettleton, Douglas: 41
Neumann, Dr. John von: 19, 112, 130n312
INDEX2.indd 203
8/24/06 11:56:52 AM

Newmark, Nathan: 26, 39
Ney, Virgil: CORG analyses: 142
Nichols, Thomas S.: 92
Nicholson, George E., Jr.: 128n218
Nimitz, Adm. Chester A., USN: 20, 38
Ninth Air Force: 31, 32
Ninth Army: 34
IX bomber Command: 32
NME. See National Military Establishment
NOL. See Naval Ordnance Laboratory
Nolan, Joseph E.: 26
Norstad, Gen. Lauris, USAF: on OR: 106
Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research, A (Blackett): 13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO
Norway: OR groups: 128n200
Noyes, Dr. William Albert, Jr.: 149, 156n192, n195
NSA 1947. See National Security Act of 1947
OConnell, Lt. Gen. James D., USA: 151
OMeara, Brig. Gen. Andrew P., USA: 104
OAD. See United States Army Air Force, Operations Analysis Division
OAO. See Operations Analysis Oce
Oblique order: 3, 7n14
OCAFF. See Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces
OCNO. See Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations
OCRD. See Oce of the Chief of Research and Development
ODF. See Operational Development Force
OEG Report 51. See Antisubmarine Warfare in World War
II
OEG Report 54. See Methods of Operations Research
OEG Report 56. See Search and Screening
OEG. See Operations Evaluation Group
Oensive mining: 20
Oce of Defense Mobilization: 91
Oce of Field Service (OFS): 29, 38, 37
demobilization of: 55, 56
established: 17, 29, 46
mission of: 17
and Navy: 17
personnel: 17, 18, 29
projects of: 17
and Signal Oce, Southwest Pacic Area: 38
Oce of Naval Research: 129n232
and military OR symposium: 108
and Operations Evaluation Group: 57
Oce of Scientic Research and Development (OSRD):
16, 18, 23, 29, 30, 37, 46n97
Administrative Order No. 1: 15
contract with Columbia University: 22
demobilization of: 55, 56
established: 14, 15
and Oce of Field Service: 17, 46
Oce of Scientic Research and Development (OSRD)

Continued
Pacic Branch: 38, 40
personnel: 15, 18, 42, 43
role in development of OR: 15-18
Oce of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF): 64, 86,
133, 136, 139, 140
denes combat developments: 134
Combat Developments Group: 135
Combat Developments Planning Guide: 135
personnel: 153n26, n38
and U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC): 137
Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO): 19, 20,
62
Oce of the Chief of Ordnance: 148
Oce of the Chief of Psychological Warfare: 129n254
Oce of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD):
and Army Research Oce: 94, 111, 148, 157, 159n2
Oce of the Chief of Special Warfare: 129n254
Oce of the Chief Signal Ocer: 150
Oce of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet
Operations and Readiness: New
Developments and Operational Evaluation Subsection of:
57
Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Military Operations:
and Foreign Area Studies
Division, Special Operations Research Oce: 111
Oce of the Deputy Chief of Sta for Operations: Special
Warfare Directorate: 129n254
Oce of the Deputy Chief of the Air Sta for Research and
Development: supervises Project RAND: 59
Oce of the Director of Special Weapons Development:
135
Oce of the Quartermaster General: 94, 109
Oce of the Secretary of Defense: 62
Oce of War Information: 82
OFS. See Oce of Field Service
Olmstead, Maj. Gen. Dawson, USA: 33
On War (Clausewitz): 7n10
101st Airborne Division Artillery: 81
OOR. See U.S. Army Oce of Ordnance Research
Op Annies. See Operations Analysis Division
Operation BARBAROSSA: and wargaming: 113
Operation Research Branch, Oce of the Chief Signal Ofcer (ORB OCSigO): 33-34
Operation SEALION: and wargaming: 113
Operation STARVATION: 20, 21, 47n158
Operational Analysis Branch, Signal Section, HQ European
Theater of Operations: 34 Operational Development
Force (ODF): 57
Operational Research (Blackett): 107
Operational Research Club: 107
Operational Research Quarterly: 107
Operational Research Section Air Defense of Great Britain.
See Operational Research
Section Royal Air Force Fighter Command
INDEX2.indd 204
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index
Operational Research Section, British Army of the Rhine:
106
Operational Research Section, Headquarters Pacic Ocean
Area: 38-40
Operational Research Section, Royal Air Force Anti-Aircraft Command (Blacketts Circus): 13
Operational Research Section, Royal Air Force Bomber
Command : 11, 13
Operational Research Section, Royal Air Force Coastal
Command: 11, 12, 15, 22
planned ying: 12-13
planned maintenance: 13
studies: 12, 13
Operational Research Section, Royal Air Force Fighter
Command: 11, 12, 13, 24
Operational Research Society: membership: 107
publishes OR Insight: 107
Operations Analysis Division (OAD): 23, 25, 26-27, 58
civilian analysts (Op Annies): 26, 28
formation of: 25-26, 29
functions of: 26, 27
independent of OFS: 29
organization: 29
personnel: 27-29, 55
relations with OSRD: 29-30
technical training for: 30; See also United States Army Air
Forces
Operations Analysis Oce: 59
Operations Directorate of the Air Force: 59
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG): 22-23, 57, 62, 105
contract with Columbia University: 42
established: 57
mission of: 57
contracts with MIT: 55
postwar sta reductions: 55
personnel: 57
projects of: 57-58
publishes reports: 58
postwar reductions, 55
and Second Tripartite Conference: 62
supervision of: 57
Operations Research Group (ORG): 22-23, 57
subgroups: 57. See also Anti-submarine Warfare Operations Research Group
Operations Research Oce (ORO): 62, 64, 66, 85, 86-92,
94, 96-97, 101, 105, 110, 120
and Army Ad Hoc Advisory Committee: 70
balanced program: 98, 99
BRAND: 88, 92, 99
closing: 120-22
computers: 114, 115
nances: 68-70, 98, 101
and The Johns Hopkins University: 56, 87, 88, 92-94, 120
role of E. Johnson: 66, 67, 73-75, 86
methods: 133
mission: 66, 87
Operations Research Oce (ORO)Continued

organization: 67-68, 88-92
personnel and training: 66-67, 94-97, 105, 119-20,
124n27, 127n184
physical facilities: 97-98
project advisory group (PAG): 70, 83n179
projects of: 66, 70-73, 86, 87, 90, 98-104
and STAG: 117
quality of studies: 102-104
search studies (PISGAH conferences): 99, 105
and wargaming: 99, 115. See also under individual projects
Operations Research Society of America (ORSA): 47n165,
78n10, 107, 108, 120, 128n218, 157, 159n20
publishes Journal of the Operations Research Society of America: 107
Operations Research Steering Committee: 148
Operations Research Technical Assistance Group
(ORTAG): 148
Operations Research: 128n220
Oppenheimer, J. Robert: and Project VISTA: 135
OPSEARCH Group (Strategic Division ORO): 115,
126n117
develops value theory: 115
ORB OCSigO. See Operation Research Branch, Oce of
the Chief Signal Ocer
ORG. See Operations Research Group
ORO. See Operations Research Oce
ORS RAF. See Operational Research Section, Royal Air
Force
ORSA. See Operations Research Society of America
ORTAG: See Operations Research Technical Assistance
Group
OSRD. See Oce of Scientic Research and Development
Pace, Frank, Jr.: 99, 108, 135
Pacic Warfare Board: 53n390
PAG. See Operations Research Oce, Project Advisory
Group
Page, Dr. Thornton L.: 15, 47n144, 82n155, 106, 107, 12526n94, 128n218
and mine warfare: 19, 20, 130n316
and NATO: 106
and unidentied ying objects: 97
Palembang Harbor, Sumatra: mining of: 20
Panama Canal Zone: defense of: 24
Parker, Charles A.: 24
Parker, Frank A., Jr.: 122
Parmenter, Dr. Richard: 96
Paxson, Edward: 128n198
Payne, Dr. Wilbur B.: 97
Pearman, J. P. T.: and ASWORG: 22
PEGASUS (computer): 130n286
Pellam, John R.: 47n167
Pennsylvania State University: and OR as a discipline: 107
Pentomic army: 101, 151, 157
Perera, Col. Guido R.: 27
INDEX2.indd 205
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Pettee, Dr. George S.: 67, 82, 96, 100
Phalanx: 3
Phillip II of Macedon: 3, 4, 6
Physical Review: 15
Picatinny Arsenal, 147, 159n2
Pickering, J. H.: 122
Piedem, Margaret: 41
Pinkerton, John: 112
PISGAH Conferences: 99, 105
Pittman-Dunn Laboratories: 63, 64
Planned ying: 11, 12-13, 42, 45n44
Planned maintenance: 11, 13, 42, 45n44
Planning Research Corporation: 158
Plans and Operations Division, Army General Sta: 76,
83
Pogue, Forrest C.: 92
Popper, Karl, 3
Pork Chop Hill (Marshall): 87
Position ring: developed: 32
Powell, Gen. Herbert B., USA: 154n65
Pratt, Edmund T., Jr.: 134
Challenges in Army Operations Research: 161
Prcis de lart de la guerre ( Jomini): 7
Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (RAND Corp.): 60
Priestley, Joseph: 4
Princes Risborough. See British Ministry of Home Security
Research
Princeton University: Institute for Advanced Studies: 27,
28
Station: 30
Principles of War, The (Clausewitz): 7n10
Project 80: recommends United States Army Combat Development Command: 145
Project ALCLAD: 72, 101
PAG for: 83n179
Project ANALAA: 71, 98
Project ARMOR: 73, 98
Project ATTACK: 73, 98
Project BALANCE: 98
Project CAPWAR: 98
Project COBRA: 98
Project DESERT ROCK: 109
Project DONKEY: 73
Project DOUGHBOY: 98
Project EVANAL: 71, 72
Project EXPLOIT-USSR: 111
Project GUNFIRE: 72
Project LEGATE: 98
Project MAID: 71, 72, 84, 110, 126n108
and Mutual Defense Act of 1949: 72
Project MICHIGAN: 153n37
and Combat Development Special Section: 136
Project PARABEL: 98
Project PINPOINT: 141
Project POWOW: 71, 73, 98, 110, 129n234
Project PROPIN: 111

Project PROSYMS: 111
Project RAND: 59-60, 62
converted to RAND Corporation: 55
divisions: 59
and Douglas Aircraft: 59, 64
established: 55
nancing: 69
Military Advisory Group: 60
sta of: 59
Project REDLEG: 72, 98
Project SALVO: 102
Project SHOP: 98
Project SITE: 73, 129n234
Project TACIT: 98
Project TEAM: 73, 98, 129n234
Project TRAINFIRE I and II: 110
Project TREMABASE: 73, 98
Project VISTA: 134-35
calls for development of Combat Development Group:
135
and eld experimentation: 142
studies land and tactical air warfare: 134
and U.S. Army Combat Developments Command: 145
psychological warfare: 87, 98, 101, 110, 124n27
Quantitative Aspect of Combat, A (Koopman): 48
Quartermaster Climatic Research Laboratory: 109
Quimby, Lt. Cdr. Shirley, USN: 19, 20, 47n144
RAC. See Research Analysis Corporation
Radar: 9, 12, 14, 45n43
National Defense Research Committee Division on: 14, 15
and origins of operational research, 9-10
Radar Operators and Maintenance School: 34
Radiation Laboratory, MIT: 34, 37, 45n68
contractor for National Defense Research Committee
Division: 15
and training for OAD personnel: 30
Radio Research Laboratory, Harvard University: 30, 34
RAF. See Royal Air Force
RAND Corporation: 60, 77, 80n74, 105, 147
and Air Force OR program: 122
areas of research: 60
divisions: 60
establishment of: 60
and NATO: 106, 128n198
critique of ORO: 100
personnel: 60
develops SAWSPIEL wargame: 115
and Second Tripartite Conference: 62
and ZIGSPIEL: 115
Rau, Erik Peter: 17, 24, 25, 29, 43
RDB. See Research and Development Board
Readiness Division, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief:
22
INDEX2.indd 206
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index
Recollections of Problems Studied, 1940-1945 (Blackett):
12
Redstone Arsenal: 147
Regiments-Kreigsspiel, Das (Naumann): 113
Reinke, Leonard H.: and target analysis: 32
Reisswitz the Younger: and charts for wargames: 113
Instructions for the Representation of Tactical Maneuver
under the Guise of a
War Game: 113
Reisswitz, Baron von: and sand tables for wargames: 113
Remington Rand: produces UNIVAC 1103: 112
Rendel, James M.: 11
Renola, Lt. Col. Raymond, USA: 82n166
Research Analysis Corporation (RAC): 82n158, 85, 118,
152, 157, 159n2
expands OR applications: 133
formation of: 86, 87, 120, 122
funding: 157
renes methods: 133
Research and Development Board (RDB): coordinates military R&D programs: 61
Research Oce Experimentation Center (ROEC): 152,
157, 159n2
liaison with OR agencies: 144
personnel, 144, 145
responsibilities of: 144, 145. See also United States Army
Combat Developments Experimentation Center
Research Section, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacic
Area: 37-38, 53n392
Review of a Battalion of Infantry (Smirk): 130n305
Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., USA: 38, 40, 53n396
and balanced team of OR and OFD experts: 39
Rigid Kreigsspiel: 114
Rinehart, Robert F.: 47n167, 128n218
River and the Gauntlet, The (Marshall): 87
Rives, Col. Thomas C., USA: 33
Roberts, G.A.: 10
Robertson, Dr. H. F.: 106
Robertson, Howard P.: 51n302, 80, 125n94. 153n17
and Project VISTA: 135
Robertson, John M.: 11
Rock Island Arsenal: 147, 150
ROEC. See Research Oce Experimentation Center
Roosevelt, Franklin: scientic cooperation with Great Britain: 14
Root, Elihu, Jr.: 27
Rowe, A.P.: 9, 10, 11
Royal Air Force: Air Ministry: 9, 10, 13. See also under individual units
Royal Army: 11, 13
Royal Australian Air Force: 20, 44
Royal Canadian Air Force: 44, 62
Royal Canadian Navy: 62
Royal Military College (Canada): 62
Royal Navy: 21
anti-submarine warfare studies: 13
Royal Navy Contiuned

Atlantic convoy studies: 13
Blackett and: 13
civilian analysts: 13
operations research: 11
studies of: 13
Royal Society: 11, 107
Ruark, Dr. Arthur E.: 65
on Operations Research Oce: 68-69, 82,150
Runer, Maj. Gen. Clark L., USA: 40
Rumbaugh, Lynn H.: 19, 67, 82, 99, 121, 130n316
Rumbough, Maj. Gen. William S., USA: 34
Ruppenthal, Roland: 92
Russell, J. A.: 38
Rutherford, Lord: U-boat campaign: 5
SADU. See Sea Search and Development Unit
Sargeaunt, H. Anthony: 106, 127n184
Sarissa: 3
Saville, Col. Gordon Philip, USAAF: 24, 25, 45n74
observed OR and Battle of Britain: 15
SAWSPIEL (wargame): 115
SCEAG. See Signal Corps Evaluation and Analysis Group
Schechter, George: 63, 64
Schlieen Plan: and wargaming: 113
Schonland, Brig. B. F. J., USA: 21
Science in World War II: 45n77
Scientists Against Time (Baxter): 45n77
Scientists at the Operational Level (Blackett): 11, 15
Sea Search and Development Unit: unit of Army Air Forces:
21
Search and Screening (Koopman): 58
Search theory: 22, 42, 48n190
Second Air Division: 32
Second Allied Tactical Air Force: 106
Secretary of War Administrative Order No. 50: 29
Selected Bibliography on Counter-Unconventional Warfare A:
111
Service Bureau Corporation: 118
Service Squadron Six, Pacic Fleet: 20
Seventh United States Army: 81
SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Shimonoseki Straits: aerial mining of: 20
Shockley, Dr. William Bradford: 19, 21, 22, 47-48n167
Shortley, Dr. George H.: 67, 148
Signal Corps Evaluation and Analysis Group (SCEAG):
151, 156n207
and Combat Operations Research Group: 151
directed by Haller, Raymond and Brown, Inc.: 150
and Plans and Operations Division: 150
and pentomic Army: 151
Simon, Lt. Col. L. E., USA: 35
Simplied War Game, A (von Verdy du Vernois):114
Sixth U.S. Army: 143
Skifter, Dr. Hector R.: 122
Smallwood, Hugh M.: 128n218
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Smeby, Lynne C.: 34, 52n343
Smirk, Robert: Review of a Battalion of Infantry: 130n305
Smith, Rear Adm. William Strother, USN: 7n20
Snow and Schule: 72
Social Relations of Science Movement: 44
Solandt, Omand: 127n1
SORO. See Special Operations Research Oce
Southwest Pacic Area. See also Research Section, General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacic Area
Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl: 3, USAAF1: commander, Eighth Air
Force: 30
Spangenberg, Karl R.: 34
Sparrow, Col. Herbert G., USA: 154n74
Special Operations Research Oce (SORO): 108, 109,
110-11, 121, 122, 152, 157, 159n2
American University: 110
and Army Regulation 70-8: 111
and Army Regulation 70-32: Special Warfare Non-Materiel
Research: 111
establishment of: 133
nonprot: 110
organization: 110-11
personnel: 120
and psychological warfare: 101
supervision of: 111
university contracts, 158
work program of: 111. See also under individual projects
Special Regulations No. 705-5-5: Research and Development
Operations Research Oce: 66
Special Services, Inc.: 28
Speier, Hans: 60
STAG. See U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis
Group
Stanford Research Institute: 71, 72, 83n212, 122
contract with CDEC: 144, 146
funding: 157-58
personnel 145
Stanmore Research Section: 10-11, 12, 13
radar development at: 14: See also Operational Research
Section, Royal Air Force
Fighter Command
Stark, Adm. Harold, USN: 15
STEADFAST: reorganization: 155n178
Stearns, Robert L.: 53n376
Stein, Arthur: on Ballistics Research Laboratories: 35
Steinhardt, Jacinto: 57, 128n218
Stephan, Frederick: 128n218
Stephens, Roderick: 39
Stephenson, Dr. H. Kirk: 37, 38
Sternhell, Charles M.: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War
II: 58
Stevens, Robert T.: 110, 136
Stimson: Henry L.: 18, 24, 27, 36
Strategic Air Command: OAO at: 59
Strategic bombing study: 5
Strategos (wargame): 114
STRATSPIEL Group (Strategic Division ORO):115

and SAWSPIEL wargame: 115
Street, W. G.: 83n212
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe: 106
Swift, Maj. Eben, USA: and wargaming: 114
Synthetic Tactics system (SYNTAC): wargames: 118, 142
TACSPIEL Group (Tactics Division, ORO): Carmonette:
115
FAME: 115
and tactical battle simulation: 115
Tannewald, Theodore, Jr.: 27, 50n251
Tate, Dr. John T.: 15, 21
Taylor, Col. George W., USA: 148: develops position ring:
32
Taylor, Jean G.: 67
Taylor, Lauriston S.: 31, 55
Technical Council, 124n37
Technical Operations, Inc.: 122, 144
runs Combat Operations Research Group: 121, 140
funding: 157
Teeter, John: 34
Telecommunications Research Establishment: 44
TELLSPIEL Group (Intelligence Division ORO): INDIGO (wargame): 115
Tenth Fleet: supervises ASWORG: 22
10th Regimental Combat Team: supports Combat Developments Test and Experiment Center: 143
Terminal Ballistics Laboratory. See Ballistics Research Laboratories
Test and Evaluation Command: 148
Tevis, Graham L.: 24
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and
Morganstern): 130n312
Theory of mining: 21
Thiesmeyer, Lincoln R.: Combat Scientists: 45n77
Third Army: 34
Thirteenth Air Force: 32, 53n376
Thompson, Dr. L. T. E.: 118
Thorndike, Alan M.: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War
I: 58
Thorndike, Albert: 47n167
Thrall, Dr. Robert M.: 148
Tiverton, Lord: 5, 6
Tizard, Sir Charles: forms Operational Research Club: 107
Tizard, Sir Henry E.: 10, 11, 14, 16, 43n4, 44n25, 45, 66
Tizard Committee on Air Defense: 10, 14
Tizard Scientic Mission: 14
Totten, Lt. C. A. L., USA: develops Strategos: 114
TRADOC. See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRAINFIRE System: 101-102, 127n141
I and II: 110
Transportation Board: 139
Transportation Combat Development Group: 139
Transportation Corps (TC): 151
combat developments in: 139
INDEX2.indd 208
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index
Transportation Corps (TC)Continued
Oce of the Chief of Transportation: 139
and Transportation Research and Development Command:
139
and Transportation Research and Engineering Command:
139
and Transportation School: 139
and Transportation Training Command: 139
Tripartite Agreements on Army Operations Research: 62
Tripartite Conferences on Army Operations Research: 105,
127n185
rst: 62
second: 62
fourth: 154n73
Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur G., USA: 155n176
on lack of timeliness of OR studies: 103
Truman, Harry: prohibits racial discrimination: 101
Tufts University: and OR as a discipline: 107
Tulane University: and Institute for Defense Analyses: 61
Turkey: 106, 128n198
Tuttle, W. Norris: 51n302
Twelfth Army Group: 34
XX Bomber Command: 20, 32
mines Palembang Harbor, Sumatra: 20
21st Army Group (RA): OR section of: 14, 36
XXI Bomber Command: 47n160
Tyson, James K.: 47n167
U.S. Air Force: 55, 58-60, 91
U.S. Army Ad Hoc Advisory Committee: 70
U.S. Army Adjutant Generals Oce: commissioning of
analysts: 50
Marshall Reorganization creates Service Forces: 32
Operations Research: 32-36, 62-77
pentomic organization: 101, 157
Personnel Research Section: 109
U.S. Army Air Defense: 157
U.S. Army Air Forces: 23-32
1st Anti-submarine Squadron: 22
aerial mining program: 20
airborne ASW: 21
Directorate of Air Defense: 21, 24, 26, 30, 36, 51n281
establishes Project RAND: 55
I Bomber Command: 21
Operations Analysis Division (OAD): 23, 25-32, 105
origins of OR in AAF: 24
personnel: 24, 50
retains most wartime analysts: 55
2d Anti-submarine Squadron: 22
Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for OA sections: 27
Watson-Watt recommendations: 24
U.S. Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command (AAF
ASW): 21, 22
U. S. Army Air Forces Directorate of Air Defense: 21, 24,
26, 30, 33, 36, 51n281
U.S. Army Air Forces Operations Analysis sections: 21: accomplishments of: 31-32
U.S. Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics: 34
U.S. Army CBR Combat Developments Agency: 159n2
U.S. Army CBR Operations Research Group: 159n2
U.S. Army Chemical Center. See U.S. Army Chemical Corps
U.S. Army Chemical Corps: 32, 35, 149-50, 152, 156n192
Chemical Board: 150
Chemical Corps Advisory Council: 149
Chemical Corps Operations Research Group (CCORG):
118, 149, 150, 157
Chemical Corps Research and Engineering Command:
149
Chief Chemical Ocer: 149, 150
oces of: 150
Research and Development Program: 81n116, 150
U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Service. See U.S. Army Chemical Corps
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command: 138, 157
creation of: 145-46
mission of: 145
Research Oce Experimental Command: 146
U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center
(CDEC): 142-45
and CONARC General Order No. 39: 143-44
contractors from Technical Operations, Inc.: 144
Experimental Project Team: 145
mission: 143
personnel: 145
Research Oce: 144
role of: 145. See also U.S. Army Combat Developments
Command
U.S. Army Combat Developments Test and Experimentation Center (CDTEC): administered by Sixth U.S.
Army: 143
established: 142, 143
10th Regimental Combat Team test unit for: 143
Research Oce Experimentation Center (ROEC): 144
Research Oce of the Test and Experimentation Center
(ROTEC): 144
See also U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center
U.S. Army Combat Operations Research Group (CORG):
121, 122 139-42, 152, 152, 157, 159n2
departments: 140
Military Advisor Team: 140
mission of: 140
personnel: 140
Project PINPOINT: 141
publication of results: 142
reorganization of: 140
sections: 140
and Technical Operations, Inc: 121, 122, 140
work program: 140-41
wargaming: 142. See also U.S. Army Combat Developments Command
INDEX2.indd 209
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U.S. Army Combined Arms Group: 159n2
U.S. Army Command and General Sta College (CGSC):
138
Departments: 135, 138
study of very-long-range combat developments, 138
Oce of the Chief of Doctrine: 138
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 151
U.S. Army Enlisted Scientic and Professional Personnel
program: 150
U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Studies (USAIAS): and
combat developments: 138
U.S. Army Intelligence Center: 153n60
U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory: 159n2
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center: 153n60
U.S. Army Material Command: 148, 155n178, 157
U.S. Army Medical Department. See U.S. Army Medical
Service
U.S. Army Medical Service (AMEDS): 32, 36, 151
Combat Developments group: 151
Medical Research and Development Command: 156n215
U.S. Army Munitions Command: 150
U.S. Army Oce of Assistant Chief of Sta: G-4, Logistics:
94
U.S. Army Oce of Ordnance Research (OOR). See U.S.
Army Ordnance Corps
U.S. Army Operational Research Group: 13
U.S. Army Operations Research Oce: 63
U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium: 134, 148, 157
U.S. Army Ordnance Corps: 19, 32, 34-35, 52n355, 63, 109,
146, 152
Ballistics Research Laboratories (BRL), Aberdeen Proving
Grounds: 34, 35, 147
and conferences: 105
contract with National Research Council: 147
Research Oce: 105
establishes U.S. Army Oce of Ordnance Research
(OOR): 147, 148
Weapons Systems Laboratory: 35
U.S. Army Personnel Research Oce: 159n2
U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps: 151
U.S. Army Reorganization Act of 1950: 101, 149
U.S. Army Research and Development Field Oce. See U.S.
Army Research Oce (ARO)
U.S. Army Research and Development/Test and Evaluation:
funds Special Operations Research oce: 111
U.S. Army Research Oce (ARO) 122
and Army Regulations No. 1-110: 148
disbanded: 155n176
established: 128n2, 148, 155n176
missions: 148
forms Operations Research Technical Assistance Group
(ORTAG): 148
Research Planning Division of: 148
sponsors OR symposia: 148
U.S. Army School of the Line and Sta College: and
wargaming: 114
U.S. Army Scientic Advisory Panel: 136, 148

U.S. Army Security Agency Board: 153n60
U.S. Army Signal Corps: 32, 109, 146, 150-51, 157
Operational Analysis Branch, Signal Section, HQ European Theater: 34
Operation Research Branch, Oce of the Chief Signal Ofcer: 33-34
Radar Division: 33
Signal Supply Service: 33
training: 34
U.S. Army Sta of the Oce of the Chief of Psychological
Warfare: establishment of: 110
U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG):
117-18, 121, 122, 123, 157, 159n2
Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc. contract with: 117
Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS)
wargame: 118
formation of: 116, 133
IBM 7090: 118, 119
Implementation Plan: 131n353,n393
mission: 116
Oce of the Chief: 116
organization: 116
personnel: 117
and Service Bureau Corporation: 118
Sta Management Oce: 116
wargames: 118, 119
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
System Analysis Agency: 97
U.S. Army Transportation Corps Combat Developments
Detachment: 139
sections within: 139. See Transportation Combat Development Group
U.S. Army War College: 104
Doctrine and Studies Division: 138
and very-long-range combat developments: 138
U.S. Army Weapons Command: 147, 159n2
U.S. Combat Developments Command: 157
U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC): 117, 133,
137-38, 140
Combat Developments Section: 137
Combined Arms Agency: 138
Combined Arms Group (CAG): 138
and CORG study program: 149
established: 137
eld experimentation center: 142
Material Development Section: 138
responsibilities: 137
hosts symposia: 108
and U.S. Army Combat Development Experimentation
Center (CDEC): 143
U.S. Eighth Air Force: 21-22, 25, 29, 46n89
U.S. Element, Allied Commission in Austria: 97
U.S. European Command: 124n49
U.S. Army Finance Corps Field Service Board: 153n60
INDEX2.indd 210
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index
U.S. Naval Academy: 108
U.S. Navy: 41, 94
Applied Physics Laboratory: 65
contracts with MIT: 55
Operations Research Group: 57
personnel: 48n173
U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance: 15
U.S. Oce of Scientic Research and Development: 41
U.S.S. Hornet: and mining operations: 20
U.S.S. Terror: and mining operations: 20
UCLA: and OR as a discipline: 107
Ulug, Col. Fuat: 106
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: works with Air
Evaluation Boards: 27
UNIVAC: model 1103: 112, 114,130n320
model 1103A: 114
model I: 112
University of California-Los Angeles. See UCLA
University of Chicago: 73
University of Pennsylvania, Moore School of Engineering:
OR training: 120
University of Rochester: contract for Center for Naval Analyses: 132n443
University of Washington: 72
USAIAS. See U. S. Army Institute for Advanced Studies
USSBS. See United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army: 101
Value theory: 115
Vandiver, E. B., III: 82n155
Variable-time fuze: 14
Vauban, Sbastien Le Prestre de: 4, 6
Vernois, Col. Von Verdy du: A Contribution to the War Game: 113
Veth, Lt. Kenneth L., USN: 20
Vietnam War: 161
Vigneras, Marcel: 92
Vinturinus, Georg: and wargames: 113
VULCO: eld experiments; 142
Waddington, Conrad H.: 11
Wallace, Lt. (jg) William F., USN: 20
Walter Reed Army Medical Center: 94, 151
Wansborough-Jones, Owen: 127n184
War Can Be Calculated (Clausen): 3
War Cannot Be Calculated (Bergstein): 3
War Chess, or The Game of Battle (Brewerton): 130n305
War Department: issues Field Manual 30-27
New Developments Division: 36, 40, 41, 46n113
Regulations for Civilian Operations Analysts, Scientic
Consultants, and Technical Observers Accompanying
U.S. Army Forces in the Field: 27
Operations Division: 36, 49n323
War Plans Division, ODCSLOG: 159n2
War Production Board: 56, 82n157
Wargames: 19, 85, 113-16, 133, 158
Warner, Charles: 150

Waterman, Dr. Alan T.: 17, 29, 46
Watson, Alfred N.: 128n218
Watson, Henry H.: 106
Watson-Watt, Sir Robert: 10, 11, 24, 32, 44n25
Weapons Operations Research Division: 147
Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG): 56, 61, 62,
77, 80, 85, 88
Weapons Systems Laboratory (WSL): 147. See also individual arsenals
Weaver, Warren: 17, 30
Weikhmann, Christopher: and wargames: 113
Wein, Dr. Lawrence: 128n220
West, Gerald M.: 32
West, Julian N.: 118
Whitehead, J. H. C.: studies Atlantic convoys: 13
Whitmore, William W.: 26
Whitson, Dr. William: 67, 72, 139, 140
Wilbur B. Payne Memorial Award for Excellence in Analysis: 97
Wilcox, Dr. H. A.: 118
Wilhelm III of Prussia: and wargames: 113
Wilhelm, Prof. J. O.: 62
Wilhelm, Rev. Militaire: 130n305
Wilkinson, Roger I: 32
Williams, Eric: study of aircraft transfer to France: 10, 12
Williams, Evan J.: 11, 21
depth charge study: 13
Williams, John D.: and RAND Corp.: 60
Williams, Robert W.: 70: 92
Wilson, Caroll: 15
Wilson, Charles E.: heads Committee on Postwar Research: 56
Wilson, Dr. J. T.: heads Royal Canadian Army Operational
Research Group: 62
Wilson Committee. See Committee on Postwar Research
Wimperis, H.E.: 9, 10, 43n4
Woodforde, J.: 10
Woodward-Nutt, A. E.: 45n66
World War I: 5
Wright Field Air Development Center: teaching OR: 107
WSEG. See Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
WSL. See Weapons Systems Laboratory
Wyman, Gen. William G., USA: 142, 143, 154n65
Yamato: 32
Yarnold, Kenneth W.: 73
Youden, W. John: 32, 51n302
Young, Dr. Donald: 70
Young, Lloyd A.: 128n218
ZIGSPIEL Group (Home Defense division, ORO): 115
Zimmerman, Richard E.: father of Army combat modeling: 97
develops Carmonette: 130n340
Zornig, Col. H. H., USA: director, BLR: 35
INDEX2.indd 211
8/24/06 11:56:54 AM
8/4/06 6:19:03 PM

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36171_Frontmatter.

History of Operations Research

UNITED STATES ARMY

For those who served, 19421962

CMH Pub 701021

Written under contract DASW01-02-D-0016; DO 3

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that oers

perations research (OR) emerged during World

calculations and models, the reality is that many of the best

This study deals primarily with the rst two applications

cult. The materials on Army OR preserved in the National

1Operations research is also known as operational research,

3In fact, the problem is continually reassessed and redened

Chapter one / Operations Research in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter two / Operations Research in the Postwar Era, 194550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter three / The Expansion of Army Operations Research, 195062. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter four / Operations Research and Combat Developments, 195062 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter five / The State of Army Operations Research, March 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix A / Biographical Sketches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix B / Army Air Forces Operations Analysis Elements in World War II . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix C / The Army Research and Development Program, 192462 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 37ORO Relationship to JHU: After 1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

History of Operations Research

the attacks of the Roman siege methods. His best-known

history of operations research in the u.s. army

the physical universe but all human activities, including the

Scientific Analysis of the Wars of Napoleon

of the main strength of his forces, whether naval or military,

history of operations research in the u.s. army

ocers to ignore or even actively discredit the results of his

1Draft conference program, Dept of Mathematics and Physics,

For Machiavelli, see Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the

error probable describes the mathematical probability of the distribution

Operations Research in World War II

he story of the development of operations research

the war and were applied to an increasing variety of military

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:9

history of operations research in the u.s. army

the Biggin Hill experiments are important historically for two

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:10

operations research in world war ii

vanced mathematical training, and that such knowledge and

Like Gordon, many of the British and Commonwealth

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:11

history of operations research in the u.s. army

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:12

operations research in world war ii

also reduced the overall number of crossings by one-third

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:13

history of operations research in the u.s. army

United States, the two men developed a plan for a full-scale

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:14

operations research in world war ii

tegic bombing, and antisubmarine warfare activities. They

36171_02OR 1.indd Sec1:15

history of operations research in the u.s. army

A few months later Bush wrote to Sir Henry Tizard:

Bush continued to hope that OSRD could avoid direct