Mnsure PDF
Mnsure PDF
Mnsure PDF
EVALUATION REPORT
Minnesota Health
Insurance Exchange
(MNsure)
FEBRUARY 2015
PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION
Centennial Building Suite 140
658 Cedar Street St. Paul, MN 55155
Telephone: 651-296-4708 Fax: 651-296-4712
E-mail: legislative.auditor@state.mn.us Website: www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us
Through Minnesota Relay: 1-800-627-3529 or 7-1-1
Evaluation Staff
Joel Alter
Caitlin Badger
Valerie Bombach
Sarah Delacueva
Jody Hauer
David Kirchner
Laura Logsdon
Carrie Meyerhoff
Ryan Moltz
Judy Randall
Catherine Reed
Jodi Munson Rodriguez
Laura Schwartz
KJ Starr
Jo Vos
To obtain reports in electronic ASCII text, Braille,
large print, or audio, call 651-296-4708. People with
hearing or speech disabilities may call through
Minnesota Relay by dialing 7-1-1 or 1-800-627-3529.
To offer comments about our work or suggest an
audit, investigation, or evaluation, call 651-296-4708
or e-mail legislative.auditor@state.mn.us.
Printed on Recycled Paper
OL A
February 2015
Members of the Legislative Audit Commission:
The federal Affordable Care Act aimed to reduce the number of people without health insurance
and improve the ability of consumers to compare their insurance options. Rather than relying on
the federal governments online health insurance exchange for this purpose, Minnesota chose to
develop its own exchange. The Legislature created an agency (MNsure) to develop the
exchange, and MNsures web-based enrollment system opened in October 2013.
In Spring 2014, the Legislative Audit Commission directed the Office of the Legislative Auditor
to evaluate MNsure. In our view, the establishment of Minnesotas health insurance exchange
was well intended, but it was not well executed. For a variety of reasons, the online enrollment
system was seriously flawed, and MNsures customer service was inadequate. Our report
focuses mainly on MNsures first year of enrollment, and we recommend changes in the
governance of both the agency and its enrollment system.
Our evaluation was conducted by Joel Alter (project manager), Ryan Moltz, and Laura Schwartz.
We received full cooperation from MNsure, the Department of Human Services, and the Office
of MN.IT Services.
Sincerely,
James Nobles
Legislative Auditor
Room 140 Centennial Building, 658 Cedar Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55155-1603 Phone: 651-296-4708 Fax: 651-296-4712
E-mail: legislative.auditor@state.mn.us Website: www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us Minnesota Relay: 1-800-627-3529 or 7-1-1
Table of Contents
Page
SUMMARY
ix
INTRODUCTION
1. BACKGROUND
Federal Health Care Reform
Minnesotas Health Insurance Exchange
Context for Minnesotas Exchange
5
5
8
23
25
26
34
3. GOVERNANCE
Board Role
Board Policies
Compliance Issues
Governance of the MNsure Enrollment System
Communications Issues
General Governance Recommendations
47
47
48
50
51
53
55
4. ENROLLMENT
Total Enrollment
Enrollee Characteristics
Enrollment Projections
MNsures Impact on the Uninsured Population
Comparison with Other States
59
59
63
67
70
74
5. USER EXPERIENCES
User Expectations
Consumer Enrollment Process
Consumer Satisfaction with Products Purchased
Impacts on Key Stakeholders
77
77
79
92
95
6. OPERATIONS
Consumer Assisters
Contact Center
Advertising
Data Security
101
101
113
125
127
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
131
133
139
vi
Page
APPENDIX C: Health Insurance Rating Areas in Minnesota
APPENDIX D: 2014 Federal Poverty Guidelines
APPENDIX E: Current Assessment of Gruber-Gorman
Projections
APPENDIX F: MNsure Grants to Promote Enrollment and
Consumer Outreach, October 2013 to September 2014
143
145
AGENCY RESPONSE
155
169
147
151
List of Exhibits
Page
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Types of State Health Insurance Exchanges for Individuals, 2015
1.2 Statutory Purposes of MNsure
1.3 Key Differences between MNsure and Other State Agencies
1.4 Statutory Requirements for Composition of the MNsure Board
1.5 Nonelderly Adults Income Eligibility for Minnesotas Public
Health Care Programs and Federal Subsidies
1.6 MNsure 2014 Budget and Draft Budgets for Fiscal Years 2015
to 2017
1.7 Types of MNsure-Certified Consumer Assisters and State
Compensation per Enrollee, 2014
2. EXCHANGE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Key Actions Related to Creation of a Health Insurance Exchange
in Minnesota
2.2 Federal Grants Awarded to Minnesota to Plan and Establish a
Health Insurance Exchange
2.3 Key Steps Related to Health Insurance Exchange Contracts for
Technical Infrastructure
2.4 Subcontractors Responsible for Technical Components of
Minnesotas Exchange
2.5 Examples of Key Federal Rules Governing Health Exchanges
Issued in 2013
2.6 Independent Assessments of Overall Project Status for MNsure,
April 2013 to January 2014
2.7 Target and Actual Dates for Completion of MNsure System
Testing
2.8 Examples of MNsure Technical Problems Cited by Deloitte,
June 2014
3. GOVERNANCE
3.1 Reasons for Changing or Keeping the MNsure Boards Role
4. ENROLLMENT
4.1 Characteristics of MNsure Enrollees (October 1, 2013, to
June 30, 2014)
4.2 Enrollment of Nonelderly Adults as a Share of the Uninsured
Population by Region (October 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014)
4.3 Median Monthly Amount that MNsure Enrollees Selected for
Advanced Premium Tax Credit (October 1, 2013, to
June 30, 2014)
4.4 Projected and Actual Enrollments for the First Open Enrollment
Period (October 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014)
7
9
10
12
16
20
22
27
28
29
30
32
37
39
42
56
64
65
68
69
viii
Page
5. USER EXPERIENCES
5.1 Examples of Potentially Confusing Application Questions from
the First Open Enrollment Period
5.2 Perceptions of MNsure Enrollees Who Had Prior Experience
Buying Insurance, 2014
5.3 Satisfaction of Consumer Assisters with Tools MNsure Provided
to Consumers, 2014
5.4 User Perceptions of Information MNsure Provided on Health
Insurance Products, 2014
5.5 Consumer Assister Satisfaction with Information Provided by
MNsure on Specific Elements of Insurance Products, 2014
5.6 Enrollees Reasons for Buying Insurance through MNsure Rather
than Directly from an Insurer
5.7 Enrollee Perceptions of Positive and Negative Effects of MNsure,
2014
5.8 MNsure Enrollees Views of Certain Aspects of the Insurance
They Purchased, 2014
5.9 Enrollees Comparison of Insurance Purchased Through MNsure
with Insurance They Had Previously, 2014
6. OPERATIONS
6.1 Overview of MNsure Consumer Assisters
6.2 Average Amount of Time Consumers Spent Waiting on Hold,
October 2013 to August 2014
6.3 Percentage of Phone Calls to the MNsure Contact Center
Abandoned by Callers, October 2013 to August 2014
6.4 Projected and Actual Contact Center Staffing and Performance,
October 2013 to August 2014
6.5 Contact Center Staffing Levels, September 2013 to August 2014
6.6 Contact Center Call Volume, October 2013 to August 2014
6.7 MNsures Key Marketing and Outreach Contracts for First Open
Enrollment Period
85
86
87
88
89
90
93
94
95
102
114
115
118
119
121
126
Summary
But the initial enrollment process
was often lengthy, and technical
problems frustrated consumers,
insurers, and counties. (pp. 80, 81,
92, 95)
Key Facts
Key Findings
Key Recommendations:
Report Summary
In 2010, President Obama signed into
law the Affordable Care Act. Among
other things, the act authorized the
establishment of health insurance
exchanges to help people compare
and purchase insurance online.
Many states rely on the federal
governments exchange for this
purpose, but Minnesota established its
own exchange, called MNsure. In 2011,
Governor Dayton directed the
Department of Commerce to develop a
state-based exchange. Minnesota has
received $189 million in federal grants
for this purpose.
The exchange began enrolling
individuals in health insurance in
October 2013. Individuals who
purchase commercial insurance through
MNsure may qualify for tax credits that
are not available to individuals who
purchase insurance outside of MNsure.
Also, unlike most other states,
Minnesota relies on its exchange to
make eligibility determinations for its
publicly funded health care programs,
mainly Medical Assistance and
MinnesotaCare.
Multiple factors complicated the
already difficult challenge of building
a health insurance exchange by
October 2013.
In mid-2011, the Department of
Commerce solicited vendors to build an
online enrollment website. The
contracting process took longer than
expected, and exchange officials grew
dissatisfied with the lead vendor just
months into the contract.
The federal government required
Minnesota to establish legal authority
for its exchange. However, the
Minnesota Legislature did not formally
create MNsure until March 2013
about six months before the exchange
began enrolling people. In addition, the
SUMMARY
xi
xii
Introduction
T
We invited the former MNsure executive director to speak with us, and a second time we sent her
a subpoena, but she did not respond either time. Her attorney contacted us on several occasions,
but his conditions for an interview with the former director were not acceptable. Primarily, her
attorney said the former director would only cooperate if the Office of the Legislative Auditor paid
all expenses she incurred by cooperating, including her attorneys fees.
2
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange: MNsure; Internal
Controls and Compliance Audit, July 2011 through December 2013 (St. Paul, October 28, 2014),
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf/fad1421.pdf; Department of Human Services:
Oversight of MNsure Eligibility Determinations for Public Health Care Programs, October 2013
through April 2014 (St. Paul, November 12, 2014), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf
/fad1422.pdf; and MNsure: An Unauthorized Disclosure of Private Data; Special Review (St. Paul,
November 7, 2013), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf/fad1327.pdf.
3
Not counting members of our samples whose contact information was incorrect, we sent survey
invitations by e-mail to 313 navigators, 292 certified application counselors, and 547 brokers. We
received responses from 222 navigators (71 percent), 167 certified application counselors
(57 percent), and 295 brokers (54 percent). The survey results reported in this evaluation only
include those of respondents who said they did, in fact, work with MNsure applicants during the
first open enrollment period. The samples of respondents were large enough that we can be
95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who would have selected a
particular response to a survey question was within 5.4 to 7.5 percentage points of the survey
respondents answers, depending on the survey question and the group surveyed.
Not counting members of our sample whose contact information was incorrect, we sent survey
invitations by U.S. mail to 975 MNsure enrollees. We received responses from 281 enrollees
(29 percent). The sample of respondents was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that
the true percentage of the population who would have selected a particular response to a survey
question was within about 6 percentage points of the survey respondents answers.
INTRODUCTION
with federal databases, our use of the test version did not fully mirror the
experiences of actual users.
In addition, we examined existing literature regarding the design and
development of health exchanges under the Affordable Care Act. For other
states that operate exchanges with governing boards, we examined provisions in
state laws regarding those boards.
Our evaluation focused largely on development and implementation of
Minnesotas health insurance exchange up to Fall 2014. This represented the
period through MNsures first year of enrollment. We did not evaluate in depth
MNsure operations during the second open enrollment period (which started
November 15, 2014), and we did not independently assess the functionality of
MNsures enrollment system during that period. However, our report offers
comments about MNsure activities and operations as of late 2014 or early 2015
in a few areas we were able to examine.
Our review occurred too soon to fully assess some aspects of Minnesotas health
insurance exchange. For example, many of MNsures initial enrollment targets
were for 2016. We examined enrollments through 2014 and available evidence
about changes in Minnesotas number of uninsured individuals, but additional
researchover longer periodswill be necessary. Likewise, the achievement of
some statutory goals for MNsure, such as improvements in health insurance
affordability, quality, and competition, are not apparent from a single years
experience.
We focused primarily on MNsures efforts to enroll individuals and families
rather than businesses. MNsure has provided opportunities for small businesses
(with 2 to 50 full-time-equivalent employees) to sign up for insurance, but
relatively few did so during MNsures first year.
Our report briefly describes the ongoing exchange-related activities of the
departments of Commerce and Health, but we did not evaluate these activities.
For example, the Department of Commerce approves rates for insurers that offer
products through MNsure.
We have included a glossary of key terms at the end of this report (Appendix A),
as well as a timeline of selected events in MNsures history (Appendix B). These
may be of particular interest to general readers.
Chapter 1: Background
A
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/#, accessed November 22, 2014. Minnesotas
percentage of uninsured people was the third lowest among states.
2
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (March 23, 2010),
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Public Law 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (March 30, 2010).
Percentage
Covered
56%
16
17
6
<1
95%
5%
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimated that the ACA would reduce the
number of nonelderly people without health insuranceby 12 million in 2014,
19 million in 2015, and 25 million in 2016.5 Most of the increase in insurance
coverage was projected to occur as a result of enrollments in insurance exchanges
established by the ACA, discussed below.6
A health insurance exchange is a marketplace established under the Affordable Care Act to
facilitate the comparison and purchase of health insurance.
According to the federal government, exchanges (sometimes called
marketplaces) are:
As an example of 138 percent of the federal poverty level, this threshold for a family of four in
2014 was $32,913. The ACA said the federal government could withhold all of a states Medicaid
funds if the state did not expand the Medicaid program; however, the Supreme Court said this was
unconstitutionally coercive. See National Federation of Independent Business et al. vs. Sebelius,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 567 U.S. ____ (2012), 132 S.Ct 2566.
In January 2011, Governor Dayton issued an executive order that, starting by March 1, 2011,
expanded Medicaid to adults without dependent children who had incomes up to 75 percent of
federal poverty guidelines. In 2013, the Legislature further expanded Minnesotas Medicaid
program to cover additional populations.
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage
Provisions of the Affordable Care Act (Washington, DC, April 2014), 3-4.
6
For 2016, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 24 million additional people will be
covered by insurance obtained through insurance exchanges, and an additional 12 million through
Medicaid and the Childrens Health Insurance Program. These increases will be partially offset by
reductions in employment-based coverage and other coverage.
BACKGROUND
States
These states are considered to have state-based exchanges, but they are relying on the federal
governments online exchange for 2015 enrollments.
SOURCES: National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents
/Health/Health_Insurance_Exchanges_State_Profiles.pdf, accessed January 4, 2015; Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, http://kff.org/health-reform
/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/, accessed January 2, 2015.
exchanges in 2014 are now enrolling individuals using the federal exchange, and
one state (Idaho) that had a federal-state partnership in 2014 is using a statebased exchange in 2015.
Statutory Authority
In 2013, the Legislature authorized in law the states health exchange, which was
named MNsure.10 Exhibit 1.2 shows the purposes of MNsure specified in state
law. For example, the law says MNsure should simplify the comparison,
choice, enrollment, and purchase of health insurance.11
MNsure is governed by a seven-member board: six members appointed by the
governor, and the Commissioner of Human Services (or the commissioners
designee). The board is authorized by statute to:
Governor Mark Dayton, Executive Order 11-30, Establishing a Vision for Health Care Reform in
Minnesota, October 31, 2011. The term adverse selection refers to the greater likelihood of
unhealthy individuals than healthier individuals to purchase health insurance.
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, letter to Governor
Mark Dayton, December 20, 2012.
10
11
12
BACKGROUND
MNsure shares some similarities with executive branch state agencies, but it also has
important differences.
MNsure is subject to a number of state requirements that apply to other state
agencies. MNsure must comply with the Government Data Practices Act, and it
must employ individuals in accordance with the states personnel management
law and the Public Employee Labor Relations Act. MNsure Board members are
subject to state laws regarding conflicts of interest, and board members and
employees are subject to laws that govern receipt of gifts. Also, the MNsure
Board is subject to state laws requiring that it conduct meetings that are open to
the public, with some exceptions.13
Exhibit 1.3 shows key differences between laws that apply to MNsure and those
that apply to other state agencies. The governance of MNsure by a board is one
important difference. In contrast to MNsure, nearly all state agencies that have
far-reaching policy and administrative responsibilities are headed by a governorappointed commissioner.14 State law has established 17 departments of the
13
MNsure is subject to the state open meeting law, but the following types of MNsure meetings
may be closed: (1) meetings regarding compensation negotiations with the director or managerial
staff; (2) meetings regarding contract negotiation strategy; and (3) meetings regarding not-public
data or trade secret information.
14
The Legislature has also created agencies that have more limited functions. For example, some
state agencies license and regulate individuals in certain occupations, and these agencies are
generally governed by boards. In some instances, the Legislature has created corporations (such as
Enterprise Minnesota, Inc., and Minnesota Business Finance, Inc.) that follow laws established for
nonprofit corporations or business corporations.
10
Exemptions from certain laws: MNsure is exempt from many laws pertaining to
state procurement, Office of MN.IT Services oversight of IT projects, and various
Department of Administration requirements.
Employee classification: State law specifies that all of MNsures managerial staff
are in the unclassified service.
SOURCES: Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V, and Minnesota House of Representatives research staff.
The Legislature exempted MNsure from some laws that apply to most other
agencies. As discussed further in Chapter 2, MNsures information technology
projects are not subject to the full range of oversight by the states information
technology agency (the Office of MN.IT Services) that applies to other agencies
projects. Also, MNsure is authorized to follow an expedited rulemaking process
and is exempt from many of the states purchasing laws.16
Governing Board
We assessed how MNsures governing board compares with exchange boards in
other states. Specifically, we reviewed statutes and documents from the nine
states that, starting in 2013, operated exchanges governed by a board.17
15
The departments of the state are established in Minnesota Statutes 2014, 15.01.
16
Agencies may use an expedited rulemaking process only when authorized to do so by state law.
This process is shorter than the regular rulemaking process. For example, the expedited process
unlike the regular processprovides no opportunity for a public hearing on the proposed rule,
unless such a hearing is specifically required by law.
17
Besides Minnesota, these states were California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington.
BACKGROUND
11
18
The terms of the initial appointees to the MNsure Board differ, which allow for staggered
appointments subsequently. For future appointments, board members will serve four-year terms,
which is the most common length of terms in states with exchange boards.
19
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 10A.02, subd. 1. Members of the Board of Campaign Finance and
Public Disclosure must be confirmed by 60 percent of House and Senate members, while MNsure
Board members must be confirmed by a simple majority. For other Minnesota agencies with
officials subject to confirmation, the Senate is typically responsible for these approvals.
12
an insurance agency, or a health care provider.20 Of the nine states that had
exchange boards starting in 2013, two others (California and Connecticut)
prohibited employees or representatives of these professions from appointment to
their exchange boards. Three other states prohibited certain industry
professionals from being appointed to their exchange boards, but these states
provisions were less restrictive than Minnesotas.21
The other three states with governing boards did not ban representatives of any
professions from serving on their boards. Rather, they limited the number of
industry-affiliated people who could serve on the exchange board (Oregon and
Colorado) or simply required them to abide by conflict of interest requirements
(Hawaii).
Minnesota law requires appointed members of the MNsure Board to represent
certain groups or to have certain types of expertise, as shown in Exhibit 1.4.
One member representing the interests of individual consumers eligible for individual
market coverage;
One member representing individual consumers eligible for public health care
program coverage;
One member representing small employers;
One member with demonstrated expertise, leadership, and innovation in health
administration, health care finance, health plan purchasing, and health care delivery
systems;
One member with demonstrated expertise, leadership, and innovation in public
health, health disparities, public health care programs, and the uninsured;
One member with demonstrated expertise, leadership, and innovation in health policy
issues related to the small group and individual markets; and
The Commissioner of the Department of Human Services or a designee.
Organization
Minnesotas health insurance exchange has had three different locations within
the executive branch of state government during its short history. When planning
for the exchange started in January 2011, the exchange was part of the Minnesota
Department of Commerce. In September 2012, the Governor announced that he
20
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.04, subd. 4. The law also prohibits lobbyists, navigators (defined
later in this chapter), and spouses of health insurer executives from serving on the board.
21
Maryland did not prohibit health insurance providers from being appointed, and Massachusetts
did not prohibit providers or insurance agents from being appointed. Washington prohibited
appointment of anyone whose board membership could benefit their financial interests or those of
the entities they represent.
BACKGROUND
13
Governor Mark Dayton, letter to Senator David Senjem, Senator Thomas Bakk, Representative
Kurt Zellers, and Representative Paul Thissen, September 18, 2012.
23
MNsure also sells health insurance for employees of small businesses and stand-alone dental
insurance. These types of insurance are not discussed in this report.
14
Nationally, all of the health insurance exchanges implemented under the ACA are
expected to determine whether an individual purchasing commercial insurance is
eligible for federal tax credits and cost-sharing reductions. However, most states
have separate processesinvolving agencies outside of the exchangethat
determine whether individuals qualify for public programs such as Medicaid.
Specifically, in 27 states, the exchange makes only a preliminary assessment of
whether an individual qualifies for a public program; the individual is then
transferred to a human services agency for a final determination. In contrast,
Minnesotas enrollment system determines eligibility for public programs, in
addition to determining eligibility for federal tax credits and subsidies.
Qualified health plans are classified by metal levels: bronze, silver, gold, or
platinum. Assigning metal levels to qualified health plans is intended to help
consumers compare plans offering similar coverage. These metal levels reflect
the percentage of total essential health benefit costs the plan is expected to cover,
based on actuarial assessments. For example, a bronze plan would cover 60
percent of the expected value of the essential health benefits; at the other
extreme, a platinum plan would cover 90 percent.26 Chapter 4 discusses the
percentage of people who bought various types of qualified health plans through
MNsure.
24
Also, with certain exceptions, health plans that are sold in the small group and individual markets
outside of MNsure must meet market rules specified in Minnesota Statutes 2014, chapter 62K.
25
Certain insurance products that already existed at the time the ACA was signed into law are not
required to cover the essential health benefits mandated by the ACA.
26
Health insurers may also sell plans that offer catastrophic coverage, which may have an
actuarial value below 60 percent. Catastrophic plans meet the same requirements as other qualified
health plans, but they do not cover any benefits other than three primary care visits per year until a
high deductible is reached. Catastrophic plans are only available to individuals who are (1) under
the age of 30 or (2) deemed by MNsure to have a hardship exemption from the ACAs individual
mandate to purchase health insurance because the available coverage is unaffordable.
BACKGROUND
15
Insurers who want to sell products through MNsure must offer qualified health
plans in all of the metal levels and insurance markets in which they offer
coverage outside of MNsure.27 Also, premiums must be the same for the same
plans sold inside and outside of MNsure.
Minnesota law required the MNsure Board to allow all insurance products
meeting federal certification requirements to be offered through MNsure in
2014.28 In subsequent years, the board may limit which products are sold
through MNsure.29 During each of MNsures first two years of operations, five
insurers offered products through the exchange to individuals.30 There was a
small increase in the total number of qualified health plans offered to individuals
and families through MNsure in the second year of open enrollment (84)
compared with the first (78).
People purchasing commercial insurance through an ACA exchange (such as MNsure) may
qualify for tax credits or other subsidies that are not available to people buying insurance
outside of the exchange.
The Affordable Care Act authorized the federal government to provide subsidies
to make commercial health insurance purchased through exchanges more
affordable. As shown in Exhibit 1.5, households with annual incomes between
201 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level may be eligible for an
advanced premium tax credit.31 In such cases, the U.S. Treasury Department
sends monthly payments to the individuals health plan to cover all or part of the
persons monthly insurance premium. Alternatively, an individual may receive
the tax credit when filing federal income taxes. A person who buys the same
insurance product outside of an exchange is not eligible to receive a tax credit.
People with incomes between 201 and 250 percent of the federal poverty level
may also qualify for cost-sharing reductions authorized by the Affordable Care
Act. With a cost-sharing reduction, a persons health insurance product has
27
As used here, insurance markets refers to the individual market and small group market.
The individual market is insurance not associated with a group health plan. Employers with 50 or
fewer employees may obtain employee coverage through small group market health plans.
28
29
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.05, subd. 5(e). The MNsure Board decided to allow all insurance
products meeting federal certification requirements to be offered through MNsure in 2015. State
law requires the board to adopt policies and procedures that will govern its selection of products to
be offered through the exchange.
30
The most noteworthy change from the first to second year was that the insurer (PreferredOne)
that had the most enrollees in qualified health plans during the first years open enrollment chose
not to participate in MNsure during the second year. Four insurers that offered products through
MNsure in 2014 (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, HealthPartners, Medica, and UCare)
continued to do so in 2015, and one additional insurer (BluePlus) also did so.
31
Besides income requirements, there are other criteria to qualify for an advanced premium tax
credit through MNsure. Notably, one must not be eligible for public health care programs; must
not have access to employer-sponsored insurance that is affordable and covers at least 60 percent of
the employees medical costs within the benefit categories covered by the employer; must file
income taxes jointly, if married; must be a U.S. citizen or qualified noncitizen; and must be a
Minnesota resident.
16
0-138%
Medical Assistance
139200%
MinnesotaCare
201-400%
201250%
Cost-Sharing Reductions
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
32
Cost-sharing reductions are available to people who purchase a silver planthat is, one that
would cover 70 percent of the expected value of the essential health benefits. The subsidy
effectively increases the silver plans expected coverage of health care costs from 70 to 73 percent.
Also, people who qualify for cost-sharing reductions have lower out-of-pocket maximum costs than
other people.
BACKGROUND
17
Only 213 people enrolled in CHIP through MNsure during MNsures first seven months.
34
Laws of Minnesota 1992, chapter 549, art. 4. MinnesotaCare was originally called Health Right.
35
Modified adjusted gross income is a households adjusted gross income (AGI) plus any
tax-exempt Social Security, interest, or foreign income. For some people covered by Medical
Assistancesuch as the elderly and people with disabilitieseligibility is not based on modified
gross income, so they are not required to enroll through MNsure.
37
The 2013 Legislature made changes in MinnesotaCare eligibility, covered services, and service
delivery that would allow it to qualify as a Basic Health Program. Many of these changes took
effect in January 2014.
38
For states implementing a Basic Health Program, the federal government pays 95 percent of the
premium tax credit and cost-sharing reductions for which the individuals would have qualified if
they had enrolled through a health insurance exchange in a qualified health plan.
18
Health Program allows individuals to keep health insurance if their incomes rise
above the maximum for Medicaid eligibility (138 percent of the federal poverty
level). In Minnesota, the MinnesotaCare program functions as the states Basic
Health Program. Most MinnesotaCare recipients pay a sliding-scale premium,
ranging from $4 to $50 monthly. As of early 2015, Minnesota was the only state
with a Basic Health Program.39
DHS is accountable for ensuring that individuals eligibility for each of the
states three public health care programs is determined correctly.40 DHS worked
closely with other state officials on the development of the MNsure information
technology system that enrolls and determines the eligibility of applicants for
public programs. DHSs goal has been to use the MNsure system to validate
applicant-provided information, including income, Social Security number,
citizenship or immigration status, and Medicare enrollment.41
MNsures online system started processing new applications for the states public
health care programs on October 1, 2013. Individuals who were already enrolled
in these programs on that date were supposed to have their eligibility reviewed
annually through MNsure, but many of these reviews were postponed (see
discussion in Chapter 2).
Minnesota law clarifies that a person who meets MinnesotaCare eligibility requirements is not
eligible to enroll in a qualified health plan offered through MNsure. See Minnesota Statutes 2014,
256L.04, subd. 1c.
40
DHS has not delegated responsibility for public program eligibility determinations to MNsure.
However, DHS uses a shared information technology systemthe MNsure enrollment systemto
determine eligibility for public programs. For people enrolling in commercial insurance, this
system also determines eligibility for tax credits and cost-sharing reductions.
41
For the public programs that enroll individuals through MNsure, Minnesota Statutes 2014,
62V.05, subd. 7(a)(2), requires MNsure to have an agreement with DHS that outlines services and
cost responsibilities for eligibility and enrollment activities.
42
BACKGROUND
19
Budget
Exhibit 1.6 shows MNsures adopted budget for calendar year 2014 and its draft
budgets for fiscal years 2015 through 2017. MNsure recently changed from a
calendar year budget to a state fiscal year budget (from July to June). The exhibit
reflects the budget revisions MNsure proposed after it received an additional
$34 million in federal revenues in December 2014. Below, we further discuss
MNsures revenues and expenditures.
Revenues
To plan and build health insurance exchanges, states have relied largely on
federal funds. Initially, states could apply for $1 million planning grants;
49 states (including Minnesota) and the District of Columbia received such a
grant. These grants helped states research and plan how their exchanges would
operate. Later, states could apply for larger establishment grants to continue
planning for their exchanges; 37 states (including Minnesota) and the District of
Columbia received such grants. Most states that received establishment grants
eventually decided not to operate their own exchanges. Other states advanced
further in their planning and established governance structures for state-based
exchanges; they were eligible to receive additional (Level 2) establishment
grants. Fourteen states (including Minnesota) and the District of Columbia
received Level 2 establishment grants.
Minnesota has received $189 million in federal grants to plan and establish its health
insurance exchange, but these grants will be a diminishing revenue source for MNsure.
Chapter 2 provides details on the timing and amount of individual federal grants
Minnesota has received. The total amount Minnesota received (through October
2014) was the fourth lowest among the 14 states (plus the District of Columbia)
that opened state-based exchanges in 2013.44 Also, Minnesotas total federal
grants for its exchange per capita ($28.60) was among the lowest for states that
built their own exchanges.45
43
44
As of October 2014, total federal grants awarded for state-based exchanges ranged from
$90.8 million (Nevada) to $1.07 billion (California); the median among states that opened
exchanges in 2013 was $178.9 million.
45
As of October 2014, total federal grants per capita ranged from $26.02 (New York) to $275.51
(Vermont); the median among states that opened exchanges in 2013 was $38.16.
20
Calendar
Year 2014
Federal Grants
Premium Withhold
Department of Human Services
Carry Forward
Total
$ 94,162
2,194
36,535
0
$132,891
$ 60,668
5,314
52,507
537
$119,026
$ 28,278
10,647
56,103
405
$95,434
$
0
16,003
28,713
400
$45,116
Calendar
Year 2014
$ 10,744
$ 13,337
$ 8,437
$ 8,437
3,794
8,510
29,279
68,692
$121,019
1,805
5,714
24,608
73,157
$118,621
650
3,887
20,585
61,475
$95,034
650
3,887
16,745
14,134
$43,853
Administrative
Regulatory (Departments of
Health and Commerce)
Communications
Customer Servicea
Technology System
Total
NOTES: The MNsure Board adopted a fiscal year 2015 budget in October 2014, but MNsure
received $34 million in additional federal grant money in December 2014. In January 2015, the board
considered the revised fiscal year 2015 budget and the fiscal year 2016 and 2017 budgets shown
here. As of early February 2015, the board had not taken action on the proposed financial plan
covering these three years.
a
Customer service includes the MNsure contact center, the assister programs, eligibility and
enrollment services, the small business options program, and plan management and reporting.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, summary of information from MNsure, October 2014 and
January 2015.
The ACA required states running their own exchanges to be financially selfsustaining by 2015. However, the federal government has authorized some states
(including Minnesota) to continue using unspent federal grants beyond 2014. As
shown in Exhibit 1.6, MNsure estimated that revenues from federal grants would
decline from $94.1 million in 2014 to $28.3 million in fiscal year 2016, with no
federal grant revenues in fiscal year 2017.
MNsure is authorized in state statute to retain or collect a portion of the
premiums for products sold through MNsure.46 Initially, MNsure was authorized
by statute to collect up to 1.5 percent of premiums for individual and small group
market health plans and dental plans. For calendar years 2015 and beyond, the
statutes authorize MNsure to collect up to 3.5 percent of health plan premiums.
Exhibit 1.6 shows that revenues from the premiums sold through MNsure were
projected to increase from $2.2 million in 2014 to $10.6 million in fiscal year
2016 and $16.0 million in fiscal year 2017. This increase reflects that (1) a larger
portion of the premium will be withheld in the years following 2014 and
(2) MNsure projects growth in the number of enrollees whose premium revenues
will be withheld.
46
BACKGROUND
21
Starting in fiscal year 2016, the largest revenue source for MNsure is expected to
be DHS payments to MNsure. These payments help to pay for MNsures
assistance in enrolling individuals in public programs. As shown in Exhibit 1.6,
DHS payments are projected to account for over half of MNsures revenues in
fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
Spending
In the period leading up to the launch of MNsures online enrollment system,
MNsure spent most of its money on technology. For example, in fiscal year
2013, information technology contracts, software support, and software licenses
accounted for 75 percent of MNsures spending.47
MNsure anticipates spending reductions in all areas of its budget through fiscal year 2017.
As shown earlier in Exhibit 1.6, technology-related spending is expected to
remain a significant share of MNsures total spending in the future, but the dollar
amount of these expenditures is declining. MNsure budgeted $68.7 million for
its technology system in 2014; it anticipates technology spending of
$14.1 million in fiscal year 2017. Likewise, as shown in Exhibit 1.6, MNsure is
in the midst of declining spending for customer service, communications,
administrative services, and regulatory services (provided by the departments of
Health and Commerce).
Consumer Assisters
As required by federal rules, MNsure uses various consumer assisters to help
individuals enroll through MNsure. Exhibit 1.7 provides an overview of the
different types of assisters and the compensation they receive for enrolling
someone through MNsure. Chapter 6 discusses MNsures assister program in
more detail. Assisters must obtain certification from MNsure before helping
individuals enroll in health insurance through MNsure. All three types of
assisters are required to complete specialized training before they can become
certified by MNsure.
Navigators receive state payments for helping consumers enroll through MNsure,
while brokers receive compensation from insurers for enrolling consumers
through MNsure. Certified application counselors can, as a part of their jobs,
help individuals enroll in MNsure, but they do not receive compensation from the
state or insurers for doing so.
47
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange: MNsure, Internal
Controls and Compliance Audit, July 2011 through December 2013 (St. Paul, October 28, 2014), 6.
This analysis did not include $33 million in MNsure spending funded from DHS revenues, all of
which MNsure spent for information technology systems development.
22
Certified Application
Counselor (CAC)
Insurance Brokerb
Typical
Employer
Community
organization
Hospital
Insurance
agency
In this table and throughout our report, we use the term navigators to refer to (1) individuals who
help enroll people in public programs and are not eligible to be paid from federal grants; and
(2) individuals (sometimes called in-person assisters) who help enroll people in qualified health
plans and are eligible to be paid from federal grants. This is consistent with how the term has been
used by MNsure.
b
In this report, we use the term broker to refer to an insurance agent or producer licensed under
Minnesota Statutes 2014, chapter 60K.
According to the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, in 2010 brokers in Minnesota earned an
average of $97 per enrollment or renewal, or 3.9 percent of premiums in the individual market.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor.
Oversight
The 2013 Legislature created the MNsure Legislative Oversight Committee to
monitor MNsure. According to statute, the committee shall review the
operations of MNsure at least annually and shall recommend necessary changes
in policy, implementation, and statutes to the board and to the legislature.48 The
committee consists of five Senators and five House members, with three
members appointed by each bodys majority leadership and two members
appointed by each bodys minority leader. Between MNsures creation in state
law in March 2013 and the end of 2014, this committee met eight times.
State law also requires the Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) to review
MNsure. The law says OLA shall audit the books, accounts, and affairs of
MNsure once each year or less frequently as the legislative auditors funds and
personnel permit.49 Since 2013, OLA has issued a financial audit of MNsures
expenditures of federal funds, a financial audit of MNsure eligibility
48
49
BACKGROUND
23
determinations for public health care programs, and a special review of a MNsure
data security breach, in addition to this evaluation.50
50
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange: MNsure; Internal
Controls and Compliance Audit, July 2011 through December 2013 (St. Paul, October 28, 2014),
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf/fad1421.pdf; Department of Human Services:
Oversight of MNsure Eligibility Determinations for Public Health Care Programs, October 2013
through April 2014 (St. Paul, November 12, 2014), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf
/fad1422.pdf; and MNsure: An Unauthorized Disclosure of Private Data; Special Review (St. Paul,
November 7, 2013), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/fad/pdf/fad1327.pdf.
51
The Standish Group, Chaos Manifesto 2013: Think Big, Act Small (Boston, 2013), 1 and 4. The
Standish Group recommended that organizations find ways to break large projects into a series of
smaller ones.
52
Michael Bloch, Sven Blumberg, and Jurgen Laartz, Delivering Large-Scale IT Projects
On Time, On Budget, and On Value, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology
24
The Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) failed at a previous attempt to develop
a large automated system to determine eligibility for the states health care programs.
In 2003, DHS entered into a contract with a vendor to develop a system called
HealthMatch. This automated system was supposed to determine applicant
eligibility for nearly all of Minnesotas publicly funded health care programs.
But DHS and its vendor underestimated the projects complexity, resulting in
implementation delays.53 DHS terminated its contract with the vendor in 2008.
The system was never implemented, and DHS continued to rely on manual
enrollment processes and decades-old information technology systems. When
Minnesota later decided to build a health insurance exchange that would include
automated methods for determining eligibility for publicly funded health care,
state officials wanted to avoid the problems that HealthMatch encountered.
As Minnesota began developing its health insurance exchange, state government
consolidated its information technology operations.
The 2011 Legislature passed a law that brought all of the executive branchs
information technology resources into one department under the direction of a
chief information officer.54 Previously, information technology staff were
employed by a variety of state agencies. Under the new law, these staff were
employed by the Office of Enterprise Technology (later renamed to the Office of
MN.IT Services). The law required a transfer of authority, duties, staff, and
assets to the consolidated office by October 1, 2011. Among the responsibilities
of the office was oversight of state agency information technology projects, to
ensure their successful completion and avoid the fate of projects such as
HealthMatch.55 Despite this, the Office of MN.IT Services played a limited role
in the development of the MNsure enrollment system, as discussed in Chapter 2.
innesota opted to develop its own health insurance exchange under the
federal Affordable Care Act, rather than rely on the federal exchange.
This chapter examines planning and implementation of the exchanges automated
enrollment process. Later in the report, we discuss the role the MNsure Board
played in this process (Chapter 3) and the development of other MNsure
operations, such as the consumer assister programs, customer service activities,
and marketing (Chapter 6). Appendix B provides a timeline of key events in
MNsures development and implementation.
Minnesotas health insurance exchange has been one of the largestand most
troubledinformation technology projects in the history of Minnesota state
government. This chapter discusses many factors that contributed to the
exchanges difficulties. Lack of effort was not among them.
Minnesotas health insurance exchange encountered numerous problems despite hard work
by many staff.
Staff from MNsure, the Office of MN.IT Services, the Department of Human
Services, and vendors worked diligently to develop the exchange.1 We heard
accounts (and saw evidence) of staff working long days and nights to build and
1
Many otherssuch as insurers, counties, community organizations, and the state departments of
Health and Commercealso devoted considerable time to the exchanges planning and
implementation.
26
implement the exchange. One exchange official described working 22-hour days
after the MNsure enrollment system starteddoing her regular job for part of
that time, and addressing consumer problems during the remainder. Staff and
vendors sometimes held daily conference calls in the middle of the night. After
problems with the exchanges functionality came to light, staff and vendors
worked hard to identify possible solutions.
TIMELINESS ISSUES
When the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in March 2010, it
required state-based health insurance exchanges to be operational by January 1,
2014.2 Subsequent federal guidance said that exchanges would need to be ready
to begin operations October 1, 2013, for the purpose of accommodating an open
enrollment period that would start on that date.3 This section examines issues
that have affected the timeliness of Minnesotas development of its exchange.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148, sec. 1321(c)(1).
Governor Tim Pawlenty, State of the State Address: A Better Minnesota, January 17, 2007.
Governor Tim Pawlenty, Executive Order 10-12, Directing State Departments and Agencies
Regarding Discretionary Participation in the Federal Health Care Law, August 31, 2010.
27
Action
Governor Pawlenty advocated creation of a health insurance exchange
in his State of the State speech.
The Legislature mandated a study (issued in 2008 by the Department of
Health) to examine how an exchange would function.
President Obama signed the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law.
The Legislature established a health care reform task force in response
a
to the ACA.
Through executive order, Governor Pawlenty prohibited state agencies
from applying for federal planning grants related to the ACA.
Governor Dayton rescinded Governor Pawlentys August 2010 order.
Minnesota applied for (and subsequently received) a federal planning
grant to explore the possibility of establishing an exchange.
Through executive order, Governor Dayton directed the Commerce
Commissioner to develop a health insurance exchange, and he restarted
the health care reform task force that met in 2010.
The Legislature passed and Governor Dayton signed legislation that
created MNsure in state statutes.
Shortly after taking office in 2011, Governor Mark Dayton rescinded Governor
Pawlentys order.7 Minnesota subsequently received a $1 million federal
planning grant in February 2011. Later in 2011, Governor Dayton issued an
executive order that directed his Commerce Commissioner to develop an
exchange.8 The Governor also directed his Commerce Commissioner to convene
a task force to provide advice on health care reforms, including the creation of a
health insurance exchange. Legislators from both parties were among those
invited to serve on the task force, but only Democrats did so. During 2011 and
2012, several bills were introduced in the Legislature that would have created a
health insurance exchange. Only one received a hearing (in 2012), and none
passed. At the state and national levels, there were strong philosophical
disagreements (often along party lines) about the merits of the ACA.
In addition, many states halted exchange planning or postponed efforts to get
legislation for exchanges while the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the federal
laws constitutionality. In June 2012, the court upheld Congress authority to
enact most provisions of the ACA.9
Governor Mark Dayton, Executive Order 11-02, Removing Ban on Requests for Federal
Assistance; Rescinding Executive Order 10-12, January 5, 2011.
Governor Mark Dayton, Executive Order 11-30, Establishing a Vision for Health Care Reform in
Minnesota, October 31, 2011.
National Federation of Independent Business et al. vs. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 567 U.S. ____ (2012), 132 S.Ct 2566.
28
Minnesota executive branch officials did a considerable amount of planning for an exchange
before MNsure was statutorily created in 2013.
After receiving the initial federal planning grant in February 2011, Minnesota
applied for and received four federal exchange establishment grantstotaling
$113 millionbefore the Legislature created MNsure in law. Exhibit 2.2 shows
the history of federal grants for Minnesotas exchange. The largest areas of
expenditure from these grants were for information technology contracts and
software support and licenses.10
Minnesota also submitted a blueprint for its exchange to the federal
government in November 2012. This blueprint was based partly on input from
the states Health Insurance Exchange Advisory Task Force and its technical
work groups, which met dozens of times. The blueprint outlined how
Minnesotas exchange would comply with federal requirements. The federal
government approved Minnesotas blueprint in December 2012, contingent on
several conditions.11
Award Date
February 25, 2011
August 12, 2011
February 22, 2012
September 27, 2012
January 17, 2013
October 23, 2013
December 22, 2014
Award Amounta
$
1,000,000
4,168,071
26,148,929
42,525,892
39,326,115
41,851,458
34,343,062
$189,363,527
NOTE: States received planning grants to assess whether to establish a state-based exchange.
States received Level 1 Establishment grants for activities associated with the states exchange
model. States received Level 2 Establishment grants if they had committed to establishing a statebased exchange and had completed certain steps, such as getting legal authority for the exchange.
a
Does not include federal money provided separately to the Department of Human Services for
modernization of systems to determine eligibility in publicly funded health care programs.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, notices of awards.
10
Between July 1, 2011, and December 31, 2013, 26 percent of exchange expenditures were for
information technology contracts, and 32 percent were for software support and services. See
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange (MNsure), Internal
Controls and Compliance Audit (St. Paul, October 28, 2014), 6.
11
The federal government required that Minnesota (1) demonstrate the ability to perform activities
outlined in the blueprint, (2) comply with regulations and progress milestones, and (3) demonstrate
by March 31, 2013, legal authority (beyond existing authority) for the exchange to operate.
29
Action
Department of Commerce issued request for proposals seeking
vendors to bid on development of prototypes of various pieces of the
health insurance exchange technology.
Department of Commerce selected several vendors to develop
prototypes.
Department of Commerce informed three vendors they had been
selected to develop different parts of the exchange.
State officials changed the contracting strategy. They decided to
seek a contract with one primary vendor, rather than the previous
plan of multiple vendors.
After trying to contract with Deloitte Consulting as the primary vendor,
exchange officials selected a different primary vendor (Maximus,
Incorporated).
Exchange officials began the process of making contract changes to
downgrade Maximus role and enhance the role of state staff and a
subcontractor (EngagePoint, Incorporated).
Contract amendments initiated in February 2013 took effect.
Exchange officials had problems (1) selecting vendors to develop the exchanges technical
components and (2) getting the performance they expected from the lead vendor.
After reviewing the prototypes, the Department of Commerce informed three
companies in early 2012 that they had been selected to build parts of the
exchange.14 But two months later, the department suspended the best of breed
approach and decided instead to seek a contract with a single primary vendor.
12
13
14
Ibid. The department selected certain respondents to receive stipends to develop the prototypes.
Maximus, Incorporated, was selected to develop four modules of the exchange, while IBMCuram Software was selected for two modules, and Deloitte Consulting was selected for one. The
letters, dated February 27, 2012, said the department would begin negotiations with each company
for purposes of entering into contracts.
30
The department negotiated with Deloitte Consulting to be the primary vendor but
could not reach agreement, partly because it considered Deloittes price to be too
high. The department turned its attention to a different vendor, and in July 2012
it entered into a contract with Maximus, Incorporated. Maximus subcontracted
with various vendors to help develop parts of the exchange (see Exhibit 2.4). A
Maximus official told us the selection of subcontractors was an arranged
marriage by state officials; in other words, Maximus did not have full latitude to
pick its subcontractors.
Subcontractor
IBM-Curam
Connecture
Connecture
Connecture
Connecture
EngagePoint
EngagePoint
No contract
NOTES: These are the eight modules for which state officials sought prototypes in a July 2011
request for proposals. Ultimately, state officials chose not to pursue development of a mobile
application and did not enter into a contract for one. Responsibility for integrating the various
components was initially the responsibility of the general contractor (Maximus); following a May 2013
contract amendment, it was the responsibility of EngagePoint.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, based on a review of MNsure documents.
Overall, this contracting process took somewhat longer than expected. This
mostly reflected (1) the Department of Commerces decision to change from an
approach that sought multiple vendors (the best of breed) to one that relied on a
single primary vendor, and (2) the time it took to reach agreement with Maximus
following the aborted efforts to contract with Deloitte.
During the first six months of the Maximus contract, state officials working on
the exchange developed doubts about Maximus ability to deliver. For example,
state officials did not believe Maximus produced a satisfactory project plan, and
they thought that Maximus progress on project details was too slow. Some
vendor and state staff told us that Maximus focused on identifying system
requirements from scratch, despite the fact that subcontractors had been selected
largely on the basis of the off-the-shelf software they could provide to the
exchange.15 Thus, there was concern that Maximus was not spending scarce time
15
Off-the shelf products are generally presumed to be ready for use with limited tailoring. Such
products are an alternative to developing fully customized products from scratch.
31
Federal Guidance
The Department of Commerces Health Insurance Exchange Advisory Task
Force began meeting and making plans for the exchange in November 2011, and
it continued into early 2013. Much of its work occurred before the federal
16
Maximus acknowledged to us that it had differences of opinion with exchange staff about
development of system requirements. Maximus said exchange staff focused on the requirements
for each module, while Maximus wanted to look at processes end-to-end to make sure the various
products would fit together effectively. Maximus also told us it submitted a timely project plan but
that exchange staff provided inadequate feedback.
17
The amendment said the State will take over program management, methodology, and
responsibility for building the Solution.
18
MNsure board and federal relations manager, e-mail to MNsure Board members, MNsure
Maximus Background for Committee, January 3, 2014.
32
20
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges
and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers (2012). In the meantime, state
governments and private sector officials said that uncertainty about the federal rules contributed to
lack of progress on the exchanges; see Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings,
Aligning Public and Private Sector Timelines for Health Insurance Exchange Implementation
(Washington, DC, December 2011), 2-3.
21
Government Accountability Office, Seven States Actions to Establish Exchanges Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Washington, DC, April 2013), 24.
33
22
Michael Tutty and Jay Himmelstein, Establishing the Technical Infrastructure for Health
Insurance Exchanges Under the Affordable Care Act: Initial Observations from the Early
Innovator and Advanced Implementation States (Washington, DC: National Academy of Social
Insurance, September 2012), 5.
23
Deloitte Consulting, MNsure Phase II Project: Deliverable #5, Technical Assessment, July 16,
2014.
34
its state-based exchange was completed. Federal authorization for such a plan
would have been required several months in advance of October 1, 2013, to
ensure that the state could properly connect to the federal exchange. Two states
that had committed to building state exchanges (Idaho and New Mexico) used the
federal exchange instead during the first year of open enrollment. Second, a state
could have implemented a manual system of enrollment, without a functional
online enrollment option. Oregonwhich had an inoperable enrollment website
and never enrolled anyone through itdid all of its enrollments through manual
processes. We are not aware of federal guidance that clearly communicated the
option of an entirely manual enrollment process.
Minnesota never requested an exemption from its plan to start online enrollment
through its exchange in October 2013. State officials made some decisions in
early 2013 that narrowed the exchange projects scope somewhat, and they
remained hopeful that technical problems could be addressed prior to or shortly
after October 1, 2013. In the end, however, they miscalculated their ability to
deliver a well-functioning exchange by the federal deadline.
24
Amanda Kowalski, The Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act by State (Washington, DC:
Economic Studies at Brookings, September 2014), 28-29.
25
Kowalski found that insurance costs in the individual market were higher than they would have
been had the Affordable Care Act not been implemented and state-level trends in coverage,
premiums, and costs since 2008 had persisted. The study also assumed no change in the generosity
of the insurance products sold. The individual market is insurance sold directly to individuals
rather than insurance sold to a group or provided through an employers health plan.
26
The other states experiencing severe glitches were Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada,
and Oregon. Due to data anomalies, Massachusetts was omitted from the statistical analysis. The
author estimated that individual market participants in the states that experienced the worst
technical problems, including Minnesota, were $750 worse off on an annualized basis compared
with individual market participants in other states with their own exchanges.
35
27
The governance structure included an Executive Steering Committee, which provided overall
project direction and oversight. The structure also included a Solutions Architecture Team, a
Business Architecture Committee, a Technical Architecture Committee, and a Security
Architecture Committee.
28
Deloitte Consulting, MNsure Phase II Project: Deliverable #2, Program and Project
Management Assessment, July 11, 2014.
36
Although the Office of MN.IT Services inserted itself into many exchange
discussions and decisions, the offices role was eclipsed in 2013 by a change in
state law. Legislators passed statutory language that exempted MNsure from
much of the Office of MN.IT Services authority. For example, the Office of
MN.IT Services is required by law to evaluate whether information technology
projects proposed by state agencies will meet users needs and assess the
projects costs and benefits against other options.29 This statutory requirement
was part of the 2011 Legislatures effort to ensure proper oversight of large
information technology projects in state government. However, the Legislature
passed legislation in 2013 that said this section (and many others related to the
Office of MN.IT Services) did not apply to MNsure.30
Because the Office of MN.IT Services ultimately assumes responsibility for
supporting the software developed by agencies and vendors, it is important for
this office to be a key partner in the development process. But, during the
development of MNsure, vendor staff were generally not paired with
counterparts at the Office of MN.IT Services so the state staff could learn about
the vendor-designed systems; this was in contrast to practices on many other state
information technology projects. In addition, some Office of MN.IT Services
staff told us that the MNsure vendors did not fully communicate the nature of the
data that would reside in the systems. Thus, as of late 2014, Office of MN.IT
Services staff were still learning what they needed to know to support this system
when the vendors finish their work.
RECOMMENDATION
The Legislature should amend Minnesota Statutes 2014, chapter 62V, to ensure that MNsures
future information technology work is subject to oversight from the Office of MN.IT Services.
The 2011 Legislature integrated the states information technology staff and
authority into a single agency, partly to help ensure the success of difficult
projects. We think it was unwise for MNsure to undertake a large information
technology project in 2011 without forging a close working relationship with the
Office of MN.IT Services. It was also unwise for the 2013 Legislature to exempt
MNsure from ongoing oversight by the Office of MN.IT Services. While there
were many reasons for the technical problems MNsures enrollment system
encountered, a state law that limited the Office of MN.IT Services project
oversight and decision-making authority did not help.
During the past year, a stronger working relationship has developed between
MNsure, DHS, and the Office of MN.IT Services. These agencies have jointly
designed an information technology governance structure to facilitate orderly
decisions on the health insurance exchange and modernization of Minnesotas
enrollment systems for public health care programs.
29
30
37
4/19/2013
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Good
Marginal
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Good
Marginal
Marginal
1/31/2014
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Good
Marginal
Marginal
NOTES: The reports that assessed the overall health of the MNsure project also rated the health of
the project aimed at modernizing the Department of Human Services eligibility and enrollment
systems. The ratings shown in this table are only the ratings for the MNsure project.
SOURCES: Software Engineering Services, Minnesota Insurance Exchange and Eligibility and
Enrollment System Modernization Internal Verification and Validation (Bellevue, NE, May 28, 2013,
August 30, 2013, December 11, 2013, and March 20, 2014).
31
In addition to these ratings of overall project health, the reports presented ratings for a variety
of more specific project activities.
38
32
33
Software Engineering Services, MNsure IV&V Urgent Time Critical Notice, September 12, 2013.
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Minnesota Operation Readiness Review Summary
(September 2013), unpublished.
39
The project schedule for Minnesotas health insurance exchange called for the
state to approve a testing plan by mid-December 2012, but the testing plan that
Maximus produced was not finalized until February 26, 2013. It was then
reworked by a different vendor (EngagePoint) when exchange staff amended the
duties of the contractors. The revised testing plan was completed in late May
2013.
Actual tests of the exchanges enrollment system also occurred later than
expected. This reflected delays in development of the software and other parts of
the system, as vendors made ongoing changes to their products and the federal
government continued to issue new exchange rules well into 2013. Key tests
were not completed until immediately prior to the start of open enrollment, and
the results were not summarized until open enrollment was already underway.
Exhibit 2.7 shows the dates when tests were supposed to be completed and when
they actually were.
Type of Testing
Integration Testing
Load Testing
User Acceptance Testing
6/28/13
7/5/13
9/9/13
8/15/13
9/15/13
9/15/13
Actual
Completion
10/1/13
10/2/13
10/1/13
NOTES: Testing is completed when the test results have been compiled into a report. According to
the testing reports, load testing and user acceptance testing ended September 30, 2013, while
integration testing ended August 5, 2013.
SOURCES: MNsure, Project Schedule, http://www.mnsure.org/images/MNHIX-ProjectSchedule11
-19-12.pdf; accessed June 15, 2014; Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange (MNsure) Test Report,
Release 1 (October 1, 2013); Nick Richardson, SOASTA CloudTest Summary Report (October 2,
2013); Maximus, Inc., Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange Final Testing Plan (February 26, 2013);
and EngagePoint, Testing Plan, Version 2.04 (May 30, 2013).
The results of the tests showed significant problems. For example, load testing in
late September 2013 found that the MNsure website could not handle more than
1,000 simultaneous users. This was well short of the goal (10,000 users) set by
system developers. Tests showed that when the number of users surpassed
1,000, people trying to access the system would receive error messages or be
logged out of the system. Another test looked at the enrollment systems ability
to accurately handle a variety of scenarios. For example, a scenario might test
whether the system worked as intended for a user with specific demographic
characteristics. Of 143 scenarios that testers examined, 53 (37 percent) failed.
Based on this and other testing results, an October 1, 2013, report concluded:
[User Acceptance Testing] overall status is red. This meant that the system
defects shown by the testing were a significant problem.
People involved in the exchanges development generally agreed that an
inadequate amount of testing occurred. A top official with the Office of MN.IT
40
Services said that perhaps 40,000 scenarios should have been tested before
October 1, 2013, given the wide variety of individual and household
characteristics among potential applicants. The number of scenarios actually
tested was less than 1 percent of this amount. Consequently, as one MNsure
Board member told us, MNsure ended up testing on the citizens in
Minnesota.34
The inadequacy of testing partly reflected time constraints, but it also reflected a
general inadequacy of MNsures provisions for quality assurance. The exchange
did not have a quality assurance manager until May 2013, just five months before
open enrollment started. According to the Office of MN.IT Services, the quality
assurance manager and his staff largely performed business support tasks rather
than quality assurance work. An Office of MN.IT Services manager told us that
the quality assurance leadership was inexperienced and hindered by constant
changes in the exchange software.
34
In addition, testing of the MNsure site often occurred in what is called the production
environment, which is a version of the system that consumers use. Testing in this environment
can disrupt users, and the cost of fixing a problem identified in this environment is typically greater
than the cost of fixing a problem identified earlier in the process.
35
MNsure delayed opening its website until the afternoon of October 1 so that it could conduct
additional testing of the system.
41
document review, the number of MNsure cases affected by this problem peaked
in December 2013 and again in March 2014.36
In mid-December 2013, Governor Dayton sent a letter to the chief executive
officer of the IBM Corporation, expressing concerns about the functionality of
the IBM product used for MNsures eligibility determinations. The Governor
asserted that IBMs product was not as ready out-of-the-box as IBM had
conveyed to exchange officials in 2011, and other state officials agreed that the
product needed many modifications. The Governor said the IBM product did
not properly perform eligibility determinations or verify individuals application
information, as required under federal law.37 Office of MN.IT Services experts
we spoke with said the software used for IBMs portion of the exchange was
immature, suggesting that it needed substantial modification for use in
MNsure. IBM said that most of the concerns raised in the Governors letter were
not attributable to IBMs product or had been resolved prior to the Governors
letter. However, IBM sent a team of staff to St. Paul in December 2013 to help
address issues with the functionality of its software.38
In January 2014, MNsure contracted with a health care consulting firm (Optum)
to give an external assessment of MNsures problems. Regarding MNsures
software, Optum said a large gap exists between required functionality and what
has been delivered.39 Optum highlighted weaknesses in the MNsure systems
technical capabilities, such as the following:
MNsure did not have a way to link all data related to a given consumer.
It is important for an enrollment system to specify an authoritative data
sourceoften called a system of recordespecially when the system
relies on data from multiple sources. This helps to ensure the integrity of
the data. A system of record was not built into the MNsure enrollment
database until late 2014.
36
This application limbo was known as the Process Instance Error (PIE) queue. Records we
obtained from the Office of MN.IT Services were not available for all dates, but there were 1,800
cases in the PIE queue as of December 15, 2013. Records show that the number declined sharply
in January 2014, but it climbed to more than 2,500 in March 2014 before declining to near zero in
late April 2014.
37
Governor Mark Dayton, letter to Virginia Rometty, Chairman, President, and CEO, IBM
Corporation, December 13, 2013.
38
Although IBM asked the state to have 200 workstations available for its staff, and some media
reports said IBM sent dozens of staff to St. Paul, we were told the actual number sent was about
nine.
39
42
In April 2014, MNsure contracted with Deloitte Consulting for a more in-depth
assessment of MNsures technical functionality and its information technology
governance and management. In addition, Deloitte became the lead primary
point of contact with all vendors as it helped MNsure make necessary fixes.40
Deloitte assessed the status of 73 functions that it said are expected in a robust
Health Insurance Exchange.41 Some of these functions (such as renewals of
insurance coverage) were ones MNsure did not need to implement for its first
enrollment year, but many should have been functional in October 2013. In June
2014, Deloitte reported that only 26 of the 73 functions worked as expected.
Exhibit 2.8 shows examples of issues Deloitte identified.
Deloitte observed that:
Several aspects of the MNsure system architecture are
contemporary and consistent with industry practices. The
systems foundation, however, centers on the integration of four
unique and independent [commercial off-the-shelf] products.
The system architecture is complex, with eachproduct
presenting a separate user interface, a separate rules engine, and
a separate database architecture. The resulting architecture
requires a high level of effort to maintain the system on an
ongoing basis.42
40
MNsure, Professional and Technical Services Contract with Deloitte Consulting LLP, April
2014.
41
Deloitte Consulting, MNsure Phase II Project: Deliverable #3, Phase 1 Functional and
Technical Assessment, June 18, 2014, 7.
42
Deloitte Consulting, MNsure Phase II Project, Deliverable #5, Technical Assessment, July 16,
2014, 7 and 13.
43
43
Due to technical problems with the MNsure website, the volume of paper
applications MNsure received was larger than anticipated.43 During
MNsures first year of enrollment, it received more than 85,000 paper
applications. Until November 2014, staff from the Minnesota
Department of Human Services manually processed most of these paper
applications. The department billed MNsure for a portion of the costs.
The creation of an online health insurance exchange was never intended to eliminate the option
of paper applications for people seeking to enroll in public health care programsfor example, for
people without access to a computer. However, exchange and DHS officials hoped that the ability
of individuals to access MNsures online enrollment process at counties or by working with
assisters (such as navigators) would limit the number of cases requiring paper applications.
44
44
Laws of Minnesota 2011, First Special Session, chapter 9, art. 9, sec. 17, directed DHS to issue a
request for information regarding an integrated service delivery system. DHS entered into a
contract with a vendor in August 2012 to conduct planning related to system modernization. In
earlier years, DHS initiated development of a failed eligibility system without legislative direction.
45
45
DHS did not ensure that the records of individuals who enrolled through
MNsure in public programs were accurately and completely transferred
from MNsure to DHSs medical payment system. Inadequate controls
over such data transfers increased the risk that data could have been lost
or altered during the transfer process or accessed by people without
authorization.
DHS did not charge premiums for MinnesotaCare recipients for the first
three months of 2014, and MNsures enrollment system did not properly
calculate premiums after this time.47
Ibid., 29-31. The audit said DHS had not billed MinnesotaCare recipients for the January to
March 2014 premiums as of September 2014. In its response to the audit, DHS said it intended to
identify calendar year 2014 billing errors and send statements to enrollees by June 2015.
48
Ibid., 51.
49
The Affordable Care Act and state legislation changed the basis on which income is evaluated to
determine eligibility for public health care programs. Effective January 1, 2014, modified
adjusted gross incomeas defined for federal income tax purposesis the income measure used.
Some people qualify for public health care programs using other criteria, such as disabilities; these
individuals do not enroll in these programs through MNsure.
50
See fiscal notes for H.F. 5-8E, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess. (MN); and S.F. 1-7E, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess.
(MN).
46
51
DHS has obtained federal approval to temporarily keep cases in its old eligibility system
(MAXIS) and, starting in late 2014, conduct determinations there until cases can be transitioned to
MNsure.
52
The analysis was limited to individuals (1) whose enrollment occurred prior to October 1, 2013,
and (2) whose continuing eligibility would likely be based on modified adjusted gross income.
As noted in Chapter 1, this income measure is used to determine eligibility for most enrollees in
public health care programs, as of January 2014.
Chapter 3: Governance
M
MNsure staff withheld key information from the board and other
state officials during 2013.
BOARD ROLE
MNsures statutory authority resides with the MNsure Board, except in cases
where this authority has been formally delegated to staff. However, state law did
not give the board significant authority until several months after the board was
created.
Due to statutory provisions, the MNsure Board had little influence over exchange operations
prior to the start of open enrollment in October 2013.
The Governor signed MNsures enabling legislation in March 2013 and
appointed board members on April 30, 2013. However, the board was required
by statute to adopt internal bylaws, policies, and procedures before it could
assume its authority.1 The board developed various policiesfor example, a
fiscal policy and a policy on public involvement in the boards decision-making
48
BOARD POLICIES
Because the boards main focus between May 2013 and September 2013 was
adopting a set of internal policies, we examined whether these policies have been
followed.
Some of the MNsure Boards initial policies have not been implemented on schedule.
Deloitte Consulting, MNsure Phase II Project: Deliverable #2, Program and Project
Management Assessment, July 11, 2014, 18.
GOVERNANCE
49
First, MNsure staff have not prepared monthly and quarterly financial reports for
the board, contrary to board policy.5 As of September 2014, the board had
received only one quarterly financial report (for January to March 2014), and it
had received no monthly financial reports. MNsure finance staff told us that,
initially, their time was needed to help individuals who were encountering
enrollment problems. However, MNsures financial status merits close and
ongoing attention. Legislators of both parties expressed concern to us about the
brevity of the budget MNsure presented to legislators in 2014. Also, MNsures
financial viability will be important to monitor as MNsures federal grants are
exhausted.
Second, board policy called for staff to submit a set of annual goals for MNsure
to the board, but this has not occurred.6 Measures were supposed to address at
least the following categories: (1) access to health insurance, (2) affordability of
health insurance, (3) consumer experience, (4) health plans, and (5) finance.
Staff were supposed to set start-up goals initially, with longer-term goals
related to strategic priorities in subsequent years. In October 2013, the board
heard suggestions from several external groups about possible measures. As of
early 2015, MNsure leadership has not proposed goals in each of the required
areas to the board.7
Third, board policy requires that the board receive, for approval, a three-year
financial plan based on critically evaluated assumptions that are provided to the
Board along with an operations plan.8 The three-year plan presented to the
board in December 2014 provided limited information on the plans underlying
assumptions. The plan included assumptions regarding MNsures number of
enrollments in qualified health plans (which affect the amount of premium
revenues MNsure collects), but it did not discuss other assumptions regarding
revenues or expenditures.
Fourth, the board adopted a policy in August 2013 that required the board to
initially evaluate its own performance no later than April 2014.9 The evaluation
was supposed to consider ten dimensions of performance and would involve
either a board survey or structured interviews. As of early 2015, the board has
not conducted a self-evaluation.
MNsure Board Policy #07.1 (Fiscal Policy: Financial Planning, Budgeting, Financial Reporting
and Asset Protection).
MNsure Board Policy #09 (Reporting, Measurement and Evaluation for MNsure).
MNsure staff presented a three-year financial plan to the board in December 2014, which included
forecasts of revenues and expenditures. Because the plan was based partly on assumptions about
enrollments in qualified health plans, it contained some measures related to health insurance access
and finance, as required by the boards policy.
MNsure Board Policy #07.1 (Fiscal Policy: Financial Planning, Budgeting, Financial Reporting
and Asset Protection).
MNsure Board Policy #10 (Reporting, Measurement and Evaluation for Board of Directors).
50
RECOMMENDATION
The MNsure Board should ensure implementation of its policies or, if necessary, revise policies
that are not realistic to implement.
After October 1, 2013, the board spent much of its time trying to ensure that
MNsures operational issues were addressed. This was appropriate, in our view.
Still, we are concerned that implementation of some of the boards key policies
related to financial management and organizational accountability have been
deferred. If board members believe that some of the previously adopted policies
are no longer reasonable, this should be the subject of board discussion. Where
necessary, the board should adopt new schedules for implementing its policies
and adhere to them.
COMPLIANCE ISSUES
MNsures governing statutesadopted by the Legislature in 2013establish a
framework for the exchanges operations. We examined MNsures compliance
with key requirements.
Three state requirements of the MNsure Board were not properly implemented.
First, the board has not yet established formal policies for the operation of
MNsures Navigator Program, call center, and customer service provisions
(discussed in Chapter 6), contrary to state law. State law required the
implementation of board policies and procedures for these activities by
January 1, 2015.10 The board delayed establishing navigator policies to
(1) prevent a disruption to the Navigator Program during the open enrollment
period that ended February 15, 2015, and (2) allow for potential legislative action
in 2015.11 It intends to initiate a rule-making process regarding navigator
policies later in 2015, with rules to take effect in Fall 2015. The board has not
outlined a plan for establishing call center or customer service policies.12
Second, the board has not fully complied with state rules regarding assister
compensation rates. State rules require the MNsure Board to (1) annually set
compensation rates for consumer assisters and (2) publish the initial
compensation rates and any changes in rates in the State Register.13 The MNsure
Board did not set the assister compensation rates used in the second open
10
11
MNsure Board Policy #15 (Consumer Assistance Program: Roadmap for Designing a Navigator
Program for the Future).
12
The board adopted a call center policy related to vendor contracting, but it has not established
policies related to training standards, working with other state customer service resources, or
customer service measures.
13
GOVERNANCE
51
enrollment period.14 Also, for the first year of open enrollment, a notice that the
rates would be posted on MNsures website was published in the State Register,
but there was no subsequent publication in the State Register when MNsure staff
changed the rates prior to the first open enrollment period. MNsure belatedly
published rates in the State Register for the second open enrollment period in
early February 2015.
Third, MNsure did not establish until 2015 an interagency agreement with the
Office of MN.IT Services required by state law. MNsures enabling statute,
which was enacted in March 2013, required the MNsure Board to establish an
agreement with the chief information officer of the Office of MN.IT Services for
information technology services that ensures coordination with public health care
programs.15 An agreement between the two agencies was executed in February
2015.16
RECOMMENDATIONS
The MNsure Board should:
Adopt consumer assister compensation rates annually and ensure that changes in the rates
are published in a timely manner in the State Register; and
14
For the first open enrollment period, MNsure issued the initial assister compensation rates in
April 2013, before the MNsure Board was appointed. MNsure officials are not sure whether the
Commissioner of Management and Budgetin his capacity to fulfill the duties of the MNsure
Board before that board assumed its full statutory dutiesauthorized those rates.
15
16
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.05, subd. 7(a)(2), separately requires the MNsure Board to
establish an agreement with DHS for cost allocation and services regarding eligibility
determinations and enrollment for public health care programs. Also, MNsure has a data-sharing
agreement with the Office of MN.IT Services. However, these agreements are different than the
one between MNsure and the Office of MN.IT Services required in statute regarding coordination
of public health care programs.
52
RECOMMENDATION
The Legislature should establish in state law a structure for governing MNsures online
enrollment system.
At a minimum, this structure should include representatives from MNsure, DHS,
the Office of MN.IT Services, and counties. We offer no recommendations on
the exact make-up of this structure, but the Legislature should carefully consider
its composition and leadership. Even if the Legislature adopts a structure that
closely resembles the one informally implemented by executive branch agencies
17
The other governance bodies include a Project Management Team and Change Control
Board, each comprised of MNsure, DHS, and Office of MN.IT Services staff. As of late 2014,
there were no written policies outlining the functions of the various governance components.
GOVERNANCE
53
COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
The development of a state-based health insurance exchange was a large
undertaking, with many risks. For this reason, it was important for exchange
staff to effectively convey information about the projects status to state leaders
and project stakeholders.
Before the first open enrollment period, MNsure staff withheld key information from the
board and other state officials.
Key officials told us they did not know until shortly before October 1, 2013, (or
later, for some officials) about many of the system difficulties that staff were
struggling to address. For example, the MNsure Board chair and the
Commissioner of the Department of Management and Budget told us they do not
recall being shown the Independent Verification and Validation reports that
raised concerns about the exchanges readiness. (We discussed these reports in
Chapter 2. MNsure hired a contractor to prepare these reports for the federal
government on system readiness.) Some MNsure Board members said that the
information on exchange operations they received from staff in the early months
following their appointment was not very detailed; one said that staff responses
to deep questions posed by the board tended to be brief. The board was
unaware of some key staff decisionssuch as the decision not to contract with
an overflow call center before the online enrollment system started.18
In public meetings just prior to October 1, MNsures executive director did not
emphasize the systems remaining risks or incomplete testing. There was no
mention in these meetings of contingency plans, in case the system did not work
as intended. When asked by the co-chair of the MNsure Legislative Oversight
Committee if the system was ready, MNsures executive director said she was
aware of no smoking guns that would argue for deferring the start of online
enrollment within the next week.19 The next day, when asked by the chair of the
MNsure Board whether the system was ready, the executive director said: At
this point, we feel that weve mitigated all of the areas that weve been tracking,
and that we will be ready to go.20 People we talked with said the executive
director usually presented a fairly positive view of the systems readiness in
public and private discussions. Board members did not believe they received
18
In Summer 2013, MNsure sought an overflow call center to assist MNsures contact center if
there was a large volume of calls. However, MNsure staff decided not to enter into a contract. As
we discuss in Chapter 6, MNsures contact center was overwhelmed by calls in Fall 2013.
19
MNsure Executive Director April Todd-Malmlov, comments to MNsure Legislative Oversight
Committee (September 24, 2013). She also said staff would seriously consider any issues that
came to light in their final reviews of the system.
20
MNsure Executive Director April Todd-Malmlov, comments to MNsure Board (September 25,
2013).
54
enough information about system readiness, and some felt misled by MNsure
staff leadership.
Officials in the Governors Office told us they were surprised to learn in the
weeks leading up to October 1 that there were significant issues that could
threaten the new enrollment systems functionality. They said that, before the
Governor was told in September 2013 of possible technical problems with the
website, the exchanges executive director provided limited information about
the exchanges progress. An official in the Governors Office said the
exchanges statutory governance structurewhich gave the Governor less direct
authority over the exchange than he had for other state agenciesmay have
contributed to MNsures weak communication with the Governors Office.
We also heard concerns from key stakeholders about communication during the
exchanges planning stages. For example, insurers said exchange staff were not
always forthcoming about known problems and did not listen enough to the
advice insurers offered.21 Likewise, county officials said the functionality of
MNsures new enrollment system was more limited than what they were
expecting, and some said their concerns had not received sufficient attention
from MNsure and DHS.
MNsure leaders made greater efforts in 2014 to keep the MNsure Board and key
stakeholders apprised of exchange developments than MNsure leaders did in 2013.
This largely reflected the change in MNsures executive director in December
2013. Many people praised the intelligence and hard work of MNsures first
executive director but said she did not always communicate effectively with
others about the exchange. Her replacement received better marks from people
we talked with for soliciting input from various groups and trying to make
MNsures activities more transparent.
Counties expressed continued frustration to us well into 2014 that MNsure and
DHS were not giving sufficient attention to their concerns about the exchanges
functionality.22 However, MNsure, DHS, and the Office of MN.IT Services
included a county representative on the Executive Steering Committee of the
information technology project governance structure they recently established,
which was a useful step.
21
While insurers expressed concern about their communication with exchange staff at MNsure and
its predecessor agency (the Department of Management and Budget), they expressed no significant
concern about communicationsbefore or after the enrollment system openedwith the
departments of Commerce and Health, which also perform exchange-related tasks.
22
During planning for the MNsure enrollment system and after its implementation, counties had
opportunities to discuss the system at DHSs County Roles and Responsibilities Workgroup. In
early 2014, DHS hired a MNsure Implementation Director who had extensive experience working
with counties.
GOVERNANCE
55
RECOMMENDATION
The Legislature should amend state law to give the governor, rather than the MNsure Board,
authority to appoint the MNsure chief executive officer.
In our view, an agency with the importance and visibility of MNsure should be
directly accountable to the governor. At a minimum, we recommend that the
Legislature make MNsures top administrative position one that is appointed by
the governor. MNsure is an agency with widespread public impacts, and some of
MNsures problems in its short history have had profound impacts on consumers
trying to apply for health insurance. We think the staff leader of MNsure should
be accountable to the states highest elected official and not just to an unelected
board. Establishing this direct line of accountability might also promote better
communication between the governor and MNsure.
56
Ibid., subd. 2.
GOVERNANCE
57
Also, MNsure could consider ways to use private health insurance exchanges or web-based
brokers, which sell insurance from multiple insurers through their websites, in the enrollment
process. Federal regulations authorize private exchanges and web-based brokers to provide
enrollment assistance, although exchanges still must perform eligibility determinations before
people can enroll in qualified health plans.
58
individuals into public health care programs and qualified health plans.
Alternatively, the work group said, DHS could become the lead agency for
enrolling individuals into public programs. The latter option would be a
fundamental governance modification and would require statutory changes. As
of late 2014, these options were still in the early stages of board consideration.
If the Legislature retains the MNsure Board in either a governing or advisory
capacity, it may wish to consider whether there is any need to change the boards
composition. We offer no recommendation on the proper composition of the
board. There was legislative debate in 2013 about whether health care industry
professionals (such as people working for insurers) should be allowed to serve on
the board. This remains a reasonable topic for discussion. Current MNsure law
prohibits certain categories of people from serving on the MNsure Board.26
Some people maintain that such a prohibition is unnecessary because state laws
regarding conflict of interest provide sufficient protection against board members
making decisions based on their economic interests. For example, the statutes
governing the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency do not prohibit
representatives of regulated businesses from serving on the MPCA Board, but
members of this board are required by state rules to recuse themselves from
certain decisions in which they have a financial or employment interest.27 In
addition, some people think there would be value in having knowledgeable
people from the health care industry serving on the MNsure Board.
26
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.04, subd. 4(a), states: Within one year prior to or at any time
during their appointed term, board membersshall not be employed by, be a member of the board
of directors of, or otherwise be a representative of a health carrier, institutional health care provider
or other entity providing health care, navigator, insurance producer, or other entity in the business
of selling items or services of significant value to or through MNsure.
27
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 116.02, subd. 3. The law says that no MPCA Board member other than
the commissioner shall be an officer or employee of the state or federal government. The law
limits to two the number of members who are officials or employees of a municipality or
governmental subdivision; neither may be a member ex officio or otherwise on the management
board of a municipal sanitary sewage disposal system. Minnesota Rules, 7000.9000, subp. 1,
posted April 20, 2004, established a policy for MPCA members regarding conflict of interest.
Chapter 4: Enrollment
M
MNsure met its overall enrollment target for the first enrollment
period, but this target was seriously flawed due to a Department
of Human Services error that significantly underestimated
Medical Assistance enrollment.
TOTAL ENROLLMENT
Before discussing MNsures total number of enrollments, it is important to
discuss how MNsure counts enrollments for reporting purposes. We think there
are several distinctions worth making.
First, what it means to be enrolled by MNsure depends on whether one obtains
public or commercial insurance. For public programs, MNsure considers a
person to be enrolled from the point at which the person is deemed eligible for
that program. For qualified health plans (that is, commercial insurance), MNsure
considers individuals to be enrolled when they select an insurance product.
MNsure also sells health insurance for employees of small businesses and stand-alone dental
insurance. These types of insurance are not discussed in this chapter.
60
See the Introduction for a description of the survey. Some MNsure enrollees may never have
actually obtained insurance coverage, although we were unable to determine the extent of this. In
our survey of enrollees, 8 respondents (out of 281) indicated in written comments that they had
never received insurance coverage through MNsure. Because respondents did not provide this
information in response to a direct question about ever receiving insurance coverage from MNsure,
there may have been others we surveyed who never obtained coverage.
3
Thus, about 47,500 persons would have been enrolled in qualified health plans as of Fall 2014,
compared with the cumulative 55,900 qualified health plan enrollments reported by MNsure.
A disenrollment was defined for these purposes as someone who was eligible for Medical
Assistance in the previous month but not eligible for Medical Assistance in the current month (for
example, eligible in January 2014 but not in February 2014).
ENROLLMENT
61
MNsure reports that there were 196,027 cumulative Medical Assistance enrollments as of
September 8, 2014. There were 1,695 MNsure-processed Medical Assistance disenrollments by
the end of August 2014 not accounted for in the cumulative enrollment number.
62
RECOMMENDATION
MNsure should develop ways to improve its access to the applicant and enrollee data it
collectsfor the purpose of assessing MNsure performance, generating management reports,
and responding to public inquiries.
We recognize that development of a data warehouse has not been MNsures top
priority, given the need to address the basic functionality of the MNsure
enrollment process. But, for management and accountability purposes, it is
important for MNsure to more readily access the information it collects.
Until late 2014, MNsure did not have what information technology experts call a
system of record in its enrollment data that would have provided
comprehensive and authoritative documentation of consumers ultimate
enrollment choices. In late 2014, the Office of MN.IT Services developed a
system of record within the MNsure enrollment system. As of early January
2015, however, MNsure was not able to transmit electronic enrollment records of
acceptable quality to insurers in the expected format (known as an 834EDI file).
Such files normally require little manual processing by insurers, but the files they
received from MNsure were delayed by weeks and contained what insurers
believed to be obvious errors and duplicated enrollment data. To ensure
accuracy, insurers had to rely on supplemental data provided by MNsure in an
alternate format (known as an 834ST file), which required extensive manual
processing. The recent development of a system of record within MNsures
enrollment system should help MNsure to track the records associated with
individual consumers who have applied or enrolled through MNsure. We
suggest that MNsure develop additional improvements in its ability to extract and
analyze applicant and enrollee data.
Duplicate records in MNsures data have made it more difficult for MNsure to accurately
report on enrollment.
While analyzing MNsures enrollment data, we saw many instances of duplicate
records. Some appeared to reflect real duplications of individual enrollments,
while others did not. For example, some individuals went through the
application and enrollment process more than once because of technical problems
they encountered. Also, some individuals submitted more than one application in
an effort to amend information submitted in previous applications. As a result,
some individuals actually had multiple records within MNsures data.
Information on dependents (spouses and children) sometimes appeared in
MNsure records as duplicates of the person who submitted the application. In
such cases, MNsure had to manually enroll the dependents because the
enrollment system had lost their enrollment information. Because of uncertainty
ENROLLMENT
63
about the nature of duplicate records in MNsures data, we had to make certain
assumptions when analyzing enrollee characteristics.6
Some of the duplicate records hindered MNsures ability to publicly report on its
enrollments. For instance, some duplicate enrollments indicated that an
individual had selected more than one insurance product, perhaps on the same
date. Thus, for purposes of reporting the products individuals purchased,
MNsure had to make an effort to deduce which product the person ultimately
selected. MNsure often used payment data to make this determination, but
sometimes even these data did not enable MNsure to determine this conclusively.
In these cases, MNsure relied on communications with the insurers or the
consumers to determine which product the individuals actually purchased.
ENROLLEE CHARACTERISTICS
We used enrollee data obtained from the Office of MN.IT Services, MNsure, and
the Department of Human Services to examine some characteristics of enrollees,
such as where they lived, whether they received subsidies, and their age and
gender. We did not examine the racial and ethnic characteristics of enrollees
because enrollees were not required to provide race/ethnicity data and often did
not.7 Thus, although MNsure set enrollment goals for racial/ethnic groups and
developed strategies to achieve these goals, MNsure cannot (and we could not)
evaluate MNsures success in this area.8 Exhibit 4.1 shows those characteristics
that we could reliably measure for most enrollees based on the available data.
Enrollments by Region
For each region of Minnesota, we examined the number of MNsure enrollees
(ages 18 to 64) as a percentage of the number of uninsured people (ages 18 to 64)
If an individual had multiple enrollment records, we looked only at the record corresponding to
the latest date of enrollment. If there were multiple enrollments on the latest date of enrollment, we
chose any one of that persons records to examine, but treated any information that differed across
records from that same date as unknown. For example, if someone enrolled with more than one
insurer on the same last date, we treated that persons insurer as unknown.
7
The application questions on race and ethnicity allowed respondents to write in a response. Those
responses included many that were not amenable to standard categorization. The written responses
further revealed that many people experienced website difficulties with the race question.
Specifically, some users commented that the box for Japanese was already checked for them, and
those users who wished to uncheck the box were not able to do so.
As discussed below, the overall enrollment projection was seriously flawed. Any derivative
projectionssuch as those for race and region of the statewere likewise flawed.
64
Medical Assistance
MinnesotaCare
51.3%
48.7
100.0%
51.3%
48.7
100.0%
53.3%
46.7
100.0%
9.7%
5.8
19.1
14.9
19.3
31.0
0.3
100.0%
35.7%
13.7
20.8
10.8
10.3
8.6
0.1
100.0%
2.4%
11.5
27.4
17.0
18.6
20.7
2.4
100.0%
6.5%
6.0
3.8
1.7
3.4
3.6
8.0
66.0
1.0
100.0%
7.2%
5.9
4.5
2.0
3.8
4.1
9.0
62.3
1.3
100.0%
6.7%
6.3
4.0
1.8
3.6
3.9
8.9
63.6
1.2
100.0%
26.8%
12.1
34.2
25.3
0.9
0.8
100.0%
22.5%
12.0
4.6
58.9
1.4
0.6
100.0%
54,026
152,671
56,654
NOTES: Our total enrollments may differ from what MNsure had reported as of July 10, 2014, due to
differences in when the data were extracted and in how we removed duplicate enrollment records.
Duplicate records are instances when two or more observations in the data have the same identifying
information. Unknown categories represent individuals for whom the data contained duplicate
records from the same (most recent) enrollment date that did not all report the same metal level or
insurer.
a
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, analysis of MNsure enrollment data provided by the
Office of MN.IT Services.
ENROLLMENT
65
in that region. 9 Appendix C shows a list of counties in each region. Our analysis
was not intended to indicate how many uninsured people enrolled in MNsure.
Rather, we used the number of uninsured people as a rough measure of the
relative size of MNsures potential customer pool in each region. Results are
shown in Exhibit 4.2.
Uninsurance
Rate,
Overall
Uninsurance
Rate,
Ages 18-64
Overall
Enrollmenta
Qualified
Health Plan
b
Enrollment
Medical
Assistance
c
Enrollment
7.9%
8.6
7.9
8.7
8.6
8.0
10.3
8.5
9.6
10.7%
11.4
10.1
12.3
11.4
10.9
13.9
11.0
12.9
48.7%
56.9
51.2
42.3
50.3
52.5
50.3
54.7
36.4
20.2%
24.8
21.5
16.6
17.4
19.1
18.3
23.3
11.0
58.2%
63.1
54.5
49.3
66.0
67.5
61.8
66.5
52.3
53.8%
68.9
61.3
50.4
59.9
67.3
63.1
65.1
45.0
0.1 - 0.6
0.2 - 0.8
0.9 - 2.7
0.6 - 1.7
2.2 - 7.1
3.0 - 9.3
MinnesotaCare
Enrollmentd
NOTES: These calculations were derived from aggregated, county-level data, making it difficult to estimate a precise standard error. We
show the approximate range of margins of error for each column to indicate that there is some degree of uncertainty around the
estimates.
a
Overall enrollment is expressed as the ratio of the number of people in the region ages 18 to 64 enrolled in any plan or program through
MNsure to the number of uninsured people ages 18 to 64 in that region.
Qualified health plan enrollment is expressed as the ratio of the number of people in the region, ages 18 to 64, enrolled in a qualified
health plan through MNsure to the number of uninsured people of any age in that region with incomes at least 200 percent of the federal
poverty level. For a single adult with no dependent children, 200 percent of the federal poverty level was equal to $23,340 in annual
income in 2014.
Medical Assistance enrollment is expressed as the ratio of the number of people in the region, ages 18 to 64, enrolled in Medical
Assistance through MNsure to the number of uninsured people of any age in that region with incomes between 0 and 138 percent of the
federal poverty level. For a single adult with no dependent children, 0 to 138 percent of the federal poverty level was equal to $0 to
$16,105 in annual income in 2014.
MinnesotaCare enrollment is expressed as the ratio of the number of people in the region, ages 18 to 64, enrolled in MinnesotaCare
through MNsure to the number of uninsured people of any age in that region with incomes between 139 and 200 percent of the federal
poverty level. For a single adult with no dependent children, 139 to 200 percent of the federal poverty level was equal to $16,106 to
$23,340 in annual income in 2014.
SOURCES: Office of the Legislative Auditor, analysis of MNsure enrollment data and uninsurance rates from the 2009-2013 American
Community Survey.
The regions are the nine rating areas as defined by the departments of Commerce and Health.
This analysis included all public program and qualified health plan enrollees who were ages 18 to
64 as of June 30, 2014. We used county-level data on the uninsured population from the
2009-2013 American Community Survey (ACS); we aggregated those data into regional-level data.
The ACS is conducted annually by the U.S. Census Bureau and is representative of the civilian,
noninstitutionalized U.S. population. Use of the five-year pooled sample achieves a sample size
that permits estimation of the number of uninsured people for all Minnesota counties.
66
The number of MNsure enrollees relative to the size of MNsures potential pool of customers
was lowest in northwest and southwest Minnesota.
For example, the number of MNsure enrollees in northeast Minnesota was
57 percent of the number of uninsured people in that part of the state. In contrast,
the number of MNsure enrollees in northwest Minnesota was about 36 percent
of the number of uninsured people in that part of the state. Similarly, the number
of Medical Assistance enrollees in the Twin Cities metropolitan area was
67 percent of the number of uninsured people with incomes below 138 percent of
the federal poverty level in that part of the state. In contrast, the number of
Medical Assistance enrollees in northwest Minnesota was about 52 percent of the
number of uninsured people with incomes below 138 percent of the federal poverty
level in that part of the state, and in southwest Minnesota it was about 49 percent.
Receipt of Subsidies
We also examined the extent to which qualified health plan enrollees obtained
subsidies through MNsure. As described in Chapter 1, people who enrolled
through MNsure in a qualified health plan may have been eligible for (1) an
advanced premium tax credit (APTC) or (2) a cost-sharing reduction (CSR).
These subsidies help to lower premium costs or out-of-pocket health care
expenses.10
Qualified health plan enrollees can be divided into two categories: those who
requested that MNsure check their eligibility for subsidies, and those who did
not. We estimate that the former group, which includes both people who are
determined eligible for a subsidy and those who are determined ineligible for a
subsidy, constituted approximately 82 percent of qualified health plan enrollees.
We estimate that 18 percent of qualified health plan enrollees chose not to check
their eligibility for subsidies while enrolling.11 The extent to which these persons
would have qualified for subsidies had they completed the eligibility
determination process is unknown.
Our analysis found that at least 41 percent of qualified health plan enrollees received the
advanced premium tax credit, and 13 percent received a cost-sharing reduction.
MNsure reported that 45 percent of current qualified health plan enrollees
received the advanced premium tax credit and 14 percent received cost-sharing
reductions, as of August 2014. This was based on data MNsure obtained from
health insurers, and it reflected persons enrolled at the time the data were
collected. We made our own estimate, using data on individuals who enrolled in
a qualified health plan at any time from October 2013 through June 2014. Our
10
The availability of tax credits was one of the most-cited reasons by survey respondents when
asked why they purchased health insurance through MNsure rather than directly from an insurer.
That response was given by 37 percent of survey respondents.
11
Consumers had the option to answer additional application questions to determine their eligibility
for subsidies and public insurance programs, or not.
ENROLLMENT
67
ENROLLMENT PROJECTIONS
It was challenging for MNsure to project participation in the health insurance
exchange, given that the state had no prior experience running an exchange.
MNsure contracted with experts to help it project participation levels, and it
refined projections over time. Most of MNsures enrollment projections were for
2016; our analysis focused on MNsures projections for 2014.
12
The insurers do not need such data because the consumer is paying the entirety of his or her
premium.
13
When consumers were deemed eligible to receive a tax credit, they were shown the maximum
amount of tax credit for which they qualified. They then had to select how much of that tax credit
they wanted to apply toward their monthly premiums; they could choose any amount from $0 up to
the maximum.
14
Another group that is shown in the data as having a selected tax credit of $0 is persons who met
the eligibility requirements for the tax credit but received a maximum credit of $0 because the
benchmark plan in their service area costs less than their required contribution. The benchmark
plan is the second-lowest-cost silver plan in a given service area.
68
Median Advanced
Premium Tax Credit
Gender
Female
Male
$146
154
Age (years)
0-17
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
$100
69
41
57
118
199
213
$344
195
201
201
166
154
161
116
138
Metal Levelb
Platinum
Gold
Silver
Bronze
$137
146
184
122
Insurer
Blue Cross Blue Shield
HealthPartners
Medica
PreferredOne
UCare
$208
117
256
132
111
Overall Median
$154
NOTES: The data in this exhibit are representative of qualified health plan enrollees who were
identified in their MNsure application as head of household. The median amounts presented here
refer only to heads of household who qualified for a tax credit and who chose to accept at least some
of that tax credit as a monthly reduction in premiums. (N=14,505)
a
MNsures data showed that the median amount of a tax credit selected by people who enrolled in
catastrophic plans was $10. However, people who enrolled in a catastrophic plan were not eligible
for subsidies. It is unclear why the data showed that some of these people received subsidies.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, analysis of MNsure enrollment data provided by the
Office of MN.IT Services.
ENROLLMENT
69
During the first open enrollment period, MNsure enrolled more persons than it had
projected, but only because the projection for Medical Assistance enrollment was a flawed
underestimate.
MNsure staff presented 2014 enrollment projections to the MNsure Board in
October 2013. The projections were broken out by those that would occur during
the first open enrollment period (ending March 31, 2014) and those that would
occur during the remainder of calendar year 2014. In Exhibit 4.4, we compare
the projected and actual enrollments for the first open enrollment period.
Projection
Actual Enrollment
69,904
8,925
44,084
12,240
135,153
47,902
726
37,985
99,531
186,144
NOTES: Projections were presented to the MNsure Board on October 16, 2013. Actual enrollment
reports enrollments as of April 13, 2014. The figures for SHOP represent individuals, not businesses.
SOURCES: MNsure staff documents presented to MNsure Board, specifically 2014 Enrollment
Goals (St. Paul, October 16, 2013) and Enrollments by Program, April 13, 2014 (St. Paul, April 16,
2014).
70
Gruber-Gorman Reports
In 2011, the Minnesota Department of Commerce hired Jonathan Gruber,
professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the
firm Gorman Actuarial to estimate the impact of the ACA and a state-based
health insurance exchange on Minnesota.16 Together, the amount of the contracts
was $560,000.
The Gruber-Gorman estimates of the Affordable Care Acts impacts on Minnesota were for
2016, making it premature to fully assess their accuracy.
Legislators and legislative staff have posed some questions about the accuracy of
the Gruber-Gorman projections. Appendix E compares the 2013 Gruber-Gorman
projections for 2016 with what is known as of early 2015. In some cases, the
projections appear to be quite different from what has actually occurred.
However, we think that a fair assessment of the projections cannot be made until
the full period of the projections has passed.
15
In November 2014, DHS started processing Medical Assistance enrollee renewals in MAXIS,
based on modified adjusted gross income. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has
approved this type of eligibility determination process for Minnesota and some other states.
16
Professor Gruber worked as a consultant for Massachusetts when that state implemented its
health reforms in 2006. Those reforms became a basis for the Affordable Care Act, and Professor
Gruber served as a consultant to the federal government during the crafting of that legislation.
ENROLLMENT
71
occurring between September 30, 2013, and May 1, 2014.17 The analysis used a
methodology that has been employed by the Minnesota Department of Health
since the early 1990s of taking the total state population and subtracting from it
the number of people known to have various types of insurance. After all types
of insurance have been taken into account, the remaining share of the population
is assumed to be uninsured.
The number of uninsured Minnesotans fell significantly after MNsure opened for business,
but the impact of MNsure on this reduction is unclear.
SHADAC determined that the number of uninsured Minnesotans decreased by
180,520 over the seven-month period of analysis. This represented a
40.6 percent decline in the uninsurance rate, which fell from 8.2 percent to
4.9 percent of the states population. As of May 1, 2014, SHADAC estimated
that 264,480 Minnesotans remained uninsured.
Most of the drop in the uninsurance rate occurred because Medical Assistance
enrollment grew by about one-third, from 11.5 percent of the states population
in September 2013 to 15.3 percent in May 2014.18 As discussed in Chapter 1, the
expansion of Medical Assistance, Minnesotas Medicaid program, was a state
policy decision authorized by the ACA. Gains in Medical Assistance enrollment
may have been due to the expanded eligibility criteria for the program, increased
efforts through MNsure to enroll individuals in public programs, the possibility
of a tax penalty for not complying with the ACAs mandate to purchase health
insurance, or a combination of these factors. The Minnesota Department of
Health (MDH) estimated that 67 percent of the states 2013 uninsured population
was eligible for a public health insurance program under the criteria that were in
effect at the time.19
MDH and SHADAC conduct a statewide survey every two years to determine,
among other things, the health insurance coverage status of Minnesotas
population. That survey, known as the Minnesota Health Access Survey, was
last conducted between August and November 2013, during the weeks leading up
to and the first few weeks of MNsures first open enrollment period. To get a
sense of how the distribution of insurance coverage had changed for some groups
since MNsure opened, MDH and SHADAC conducted a follow-up survey,
known as the Minnesota Health Insurance Transitions Study (MN-HITS), from
17
Julie Sonier, Elizabeth Lukanen, and Lynn Blewett, Early Impacts of the Affordable Care Act on
Health Insurance Coverage in Minnesota (Minneapolis: State Health Access Data Assistance
Center, University of Minnesota, June 2014).
18
Enrollment in MinnesotaCare fell by 43 percent during this time period. Combined with the
increased Medical Assistance enrollment, there was a net increase of 20.6 percent in the share of
the population enrolled in a state public health insurance program.
19
Health Insurance Coverage in Minnesota: Results from the 2013 Minnesota Health Access
Survey (St. Paul: Health Economics Program, Minnesota Department of Health, May 2014).
72
ENROLLMENT
73
Many newly insured qualified health plan enrollees had been uninsured for two years or
more.
Our survey found that 23 percent had been uninsured for at least two but less
than five years; 29 percent had been uninsured for five years or more. The
remainder had been uninsured for less than two years.
23
There were 281 valid responses to the survey out of 975 valid mailings. To produce
representative estimates, survey results have been weighted to reflect both the probability of the
respondents selection into the sample, which differed by region, and the probability of responding
to the survey, based on age and gender.
24
Following the definition used by the National Center for Health Statistics, uninsured includes
both those who reported that they had no insurance at all and those who reported having only a
single-service plan, such as dental or hospitalization insurance. The uninsured category would also
have included anyone who reported being enrolled in the Indian Health Service, but no respondents
reported that type of coverage.
25
Liz Hamel, Mira Rao, Larry Levitt, Gary Claxton, Cynthia Cox, Karen Pollitz, and Mollyann
Brodie, Survey of Non-Group Health Insurance Enrollees (Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, June 19, 2014).
26
These results should be interpreted with caution. Research shows that consumers self-reports of
health insurance status are most reliable when stating whether or not they have any health
insurance. Their reports about what type of insurance they have are considerably less reliable.
Coverage through Medicaid, in particular, tends to be underreported in population surveys.
74
Angoff Study
This analysis found that Minnesota ranked 37th out of 51 states (including the
District of Columbia) on exchange cost per enrollee.27 At the time of the study,
Minnesota had enrolled 48,495 people in qualified health plans. The study
assumed that Minnesota had spent $155 million, which was the total amount of
federal grants Minnesota had received for the exchange at the time, resulting in a
per-enrollee cost of $3,197. The median cost per enrollee for all states was
$1,715.28
However, Minnesotas enrollment figures as presented in this study are not
comparable to those of other states. MinnesotaCare enrollees would, in any other
state, be eligible to enroll in subsidized qualified health plans. Similarly, many
children who are covered by Medicaid in Minnesota would be eligible to enroll
in subsidized qualified health plans in some other states. (Some states have less
generous Medicaid eligibility rules for children than Minnesota.) About 38,000
people had enrolled in MinnesotaCare through MNsure at the time of this
analysis; adding this number to Minnesotas qualified health plan enrollment, the
per-enrollee cost is reduced to approximately $1,792. That revised calculation
would move Minnesota from 37th to 27th on exchange cost per enrollee out of all
states plus the District of Columbia, and the 5th lowest cost per enrollee out of
states operating their own exchanges in 2014.29
Moreover, this studys figures on the total amount spent on each exchange are
somewhat misleading. First, Minnesota had spent only a portion of its federal
grants at the time of the analysis, and the same may have been true of other
27
Jay Angoff, Cost-per-Enrollee in Each States Exchange (Washington, DC, May 7, 2014),
http://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/5-7-14-exchanges-report.pdf, accessed
December 29, 2014.
28
This analysis reported that the state with the lowest cost per enrollee was Florida ($76 per
enrollee), and the state with the highest was Hawaii ($23,899 per enrollee).
29
It is not feasible to do a similar correction based on Medicaid eligibility levels for children, as
any such correction would need to be applied to all states, and we did not have data on Medicaid
enrollment by age for each state.
ENROLLMENT
75
30
USER EXPECTATIONS
Before discussing users actual experiences with the MNsure website, it is
important to consider what expectations users may have had. To some extent,
these expectations reflected the way state officials described the exchange to the
media, in their publications, and on the exchange website.
MNsure created unrealistic expectations about the experience that users of the health
insurance exchange would have.
On a number of occasions, exchange officials likened the process of purchasing
health insurance through a state exchange to the process of making purchases at
popular consumer websites. For example:
1
2
MNsure Board Policy #01 (Charter and Bylaws), Article 1, Section 1.2.
MNsure, Minnesota Receives $1-Million Federal Grant to Plan Health Insurance Exchange
(February 25, 2011), https://www.mnsure.org/news-room/news/news-detail.jsp?id=486-53893,
accessed October 6, 2014.
78
Comparisons with other consumer websites may have helped people understand
that an exchange would provide an online shopping experience. However,
buying insurance is a more complex transaction than buying many other
products. For example, insurance purchases may require a consumer to provide
income and family information to determine whether the consumer qualifies for
public programs or tax credits. In addition, insurance products have many
variablesthe extent of coverage, the breadth of the provider networks available,
the quality of health care provided, premium costs, and out-of-pocket costs. As
we discuss below, the actual user experience was not as simple as MNsure
suggested it would be.6
3
Mike Rothman, Get Started on Minnesotas Own Health-Insurance Exchange, Pioneer Press,
April 27, 2011, http://www.twincities.com/alllistings/ci_17933791?source=rss, accessed
October 14, 2014.
4
Minnesota Department of Commerce, 2012 Integrated Marketing Communications Plan (St. Paul,
August 2012), 2.
Problems with the MNsure website contributed to the complexity of the enrollment process. As
one MNsure-certified assister told us: People came into our office extremely exasperated when
trying to do it themselves at home. The advertisement [that] you can easily complete an application
at home is completely false! Browser incompatibilities, web server down, programming
incomplete made it a complete mess.
USER EXPERIENCES
79
Complexity
As noted earlier, MNsure created expectations that its enrollment website would
be relatively simple to use. In fact, the website proved to be challenging for
many consumers.
Not counting members of our samples whose contact information was incorrect, we sent survey
invitations by e-mail to 313 navigators, 292 certified application counselors, and 547 brokers. We
received responses from 222 navigators (71 percent), 167 certified application counselors
(57 percent), and 295 brokers (54 percent). The survey results reported in this evaluation only
include those of respondents who said they did, in fact, work with MNsure applicants during the
first open enrollment period. Each sample of respondents was large enough that we can be
95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who would have selected a
particular response was within 5 or 6 percentage points of the survey respondents answers,
depending on the question.
Not counting members of our sample whose contact information was incorrect, we sent survey
invitations by U.S. mail to 975 MNsure enrollees. We received responses from 281 enrollees
(29 percent). The sample of respondents was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that
the true percentage of the population who would have selected a particular response to a survey
question was within 6 percentage points of the survey respondents answers.
80
MNsures enrollment website was difficult for some people to navigate and the enrollment
process was often lengthy.
The enrollment process often took a considerable amount of time. In our survey
of consumers who purchased qualified health plans, 58 percent reported that they
spent at least four hours on the enrollment process.9 In addition, majorities of
consumer assisters said the enrollment process took what they considered to be
an unacceptable amount of the consumers time. Specifically, 52 percent of
navigators, 56 percent of certified application counselors, and 86 percent of
brokers said the process was unacceptably long.
People who helped individuals enroll through MNsure generally said the process
was not an easy one. In our surveys of MNsure-certified assisters, 62 percent of
navigators said the process was not simple; 74 percent of certified application
counselors and 96 percent of insurance brokers said likewise.
Among the consumers we surveyed who enrolled in a qualified health plan,
64 percent said the MNsure website was not easy to use. Consumer difficulties
are illustrated in the following comment from a MNsure enrollee:
The insurance we ended up with, after MONTHS of effort, is a
product that we are glad to have. However the process and
experience we had with MNsure was HORRIBLE! My wife and
I both have extensive experience with computer software and
applications. MNsure was not ready for deployment, and we
spent over 150 hours trying to apply and trying to resolve
multiple problems with our application. We were without
insurance for two months because of the problems we
encountered.
The complexity and length of the enrollment process did not necessarily mean
that consumers struggled to understand the application questions. In our surveys
of consumer assisters, a majority of navigators and certified application
counselors said that, in general, MNsures application questions were written in
language that was easy for consumers to understand; most brokers disagreed.10
Consumer assisters we surveyed generally reported spending less than this amount of time, on
average, with the people they helped. Our surveys of assisters asked for the average amount of
time it took to complete the online portion of the enrollment process; in contrast, our survey of
consumers asked for the total time spent online, on the phone, or with an assister. The median
response for navigators and certified application counselors was one to two hours; we did not ask
this question of brokers.
10
The percentage of assisters who said the application questions were written in language that was
easy for consumers to understand was 58 percent for navigators, 67 percent for certified application
counselors, and 38 percent for brokers. The percentage that disagreed was 41 percent for
navigators, 30 percent for certified application counselors, and 60 percent for brokers.
USER EXPERIENCES
81
Technical Issues
One reason that the enrollment process was time-consuming and complex is that
the MNsure website did not work as well as intended.
Consumers and MNsure-certified assisters experienced numerous technical problems with
the MNsure website during the first open enrollment period.
Even individuals who successfully enrolled in a qualified health plan had
difficulties with the MNsure website. Among people we surveyed who enrolled
through MNsure in a qualified health plan, 75 percent reported having
significant technical problems with the website.11
Assisters who helped consumers enroll also experienced many technical
problems. When asked whether MNsures enrollment website was generally
free of technical problems and glitches during the first open enrollment period,
only 7 percent of navigators said it was, as did 8 percent of certified application
counselors, and 1 percent of brokers. When asked how often they experienced
technical problems that caused significant delays, a majority of brokers (62
percent) said this happened in 76 to 100 percent of the applications with which
they assisted. Navigators and certified application counselors reported somewhat
better experiences but 50 and 56 percent of respondents, respectively, said they
had significant technical problems with at least half of the applications they
handled.
The MNsure enrollment website was not equally compatible with all web
browsers. For a while, MNsures customer service staff who answered phone
and e-mail questions directed consumers to complete the first part of their
application in one browser and then switch to a different browser to complete the
application. MNsure had some information on its website about which browsers
to use when enrolling, but this guidance was not particularly easy to locate.
Once applicants accessed the online enrollment system, they encountered a
variety of technical problems. For example, one person who purchased insurance
through MNsure said:
Im very thankful that MNsure exists. It allowed me to start my
own company and insure my family with a much better plan than
I thought was possible for a reasonable price. However, the
entire website was a disaster top to bottom. Disjointed
navigation, basic website features found everywhere online were
missing or broken, slow, error prone, different user experience
across sections of the websiteincredible that such a bad
product could come from such a huge expenditure.
11
On the survey, 75 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following
statement: During the enrollment process, I did not encounter any significant technical problems
with the MNsure website.
82
Website Content
Consumers who tried to enroll in insurance through MNsure expected a website
without technical problems; they also expected the website to have clear,
understandable guidance. For people purchasing a qualified health plan through
MNsure, the process consisted of multiple steps:
12
Individuals were not required to request an eligibility determination for subsidies or public health
care programs, but most people who enrolled did.
13
Also, MNsures anonymous shopping process was more complex than those of other exchanges,
according to a website that helps consumers find health insurance. This website said that among
single web site exchanges with anonymous health plan comparisons, testers found Minnesotas
exchange, MNsure, had the most steps at 18. It noted that more steps increase the risk of web
site visitors abandoning the shopping process. See Healthpocket, Healthpocket Compares State
Health Insurance Exchanges, October 17, 2013, http://www.healthpocket.com/healthcare-research
/infostat/ranking-state-health-insurance-exchanges#.VH3D5smZiSo, accessed December 1, 2014.
USER EXPERIENCES
83
Account Creation
For people seeking to purchase a qualified health plan, the first real step in the
enrollment processcreating a MNsure accountprovided ample opportunities
for consumer confusion or frustration. The initial webpage was titled
Introduction to Identity Proofing and Obtaining an Account. The process of
authenticating the identity of a MNsure applicant is an essential one; however,
the term identity proofing was not defined on this page, and it was jargon that
many users might not immediately understand. Furthermore, the MNsure
website did not provide clear assistance or instructions for persons with limited
English proficiency who were trying to create an account.
When creating an account, users were asked to provide personally identifying
information, including name, address, contact information, birthdate, and Social
Security number. Users then encountered a visual security test (known as a
CAPTCHA) that is intended to ensure that the account is being created by a
person rather than a computer.14 This type of test is used by many websites, but
it can be frustrating even for users who have encountered them before.
To complete the account creation process, users were asked to provide answers to
several security questions and a shared secret. The security questions were
intended to help MNsure verify the identity of someone trying to access a users
account at a later date. A person creating a MNsure account was given eight
options for security questions (such as What city would you like to retire to?)
and had to provide responses to five. Some of the security questions were
vaguely worded or prompted responses that might have been hard for a user to
recall at a later date.15 A user was then asked to provide a shared secret to
MNsure, with no guidance about the nature or topic area of the secretperhaps
making the shared secret hard for the consumer to remember later.16 Also,
while these types of security provisions are used by many websites that store
personal information, the requirement for MNsure users to provide a shared
secret plus responses to five security questions may have taxed a consumers
patience.
Some individuals who successfully completed the account creation process later
encountered problems if they needed to get their password reset or did not recall
their responses to the security questions. For example, a MNsure-certified
consumer assister was told by MNsure customer service staff in late 2014 that
14
CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart. The user is typically shown a distorted image of letters and numbers and is asked to type in
what he or she sees. Sometimes the distortion makes it difficult for users to provide an accurate
response. CAPTCHAs have also been criticized for providing a difficult challenge for some people
with disabilities.
15
For example, a question asking for the city in which someone would like to retire might be
difficult for a young adult to answer. A question that asked the consumer to specify your
grandfathers occupation did not specify which grandfather it referenced. A question asking for
the most memorable date in your life may have been intended to solicit a calendar date, but it did
not specify the proper format for entering the date.
16
MNsure uses the shared secret to help verify user identity during phone contacts with MNsure
contact center staff.
84
there was no recourse if consumers did not recall the answers to security
questions.
Application Questions
A person seeking to enroll in either a subsidized qualified health plan or in a
publicly funded health care program was required to complete a lengthy series of
application questions. Some of these questions were clear and well explained. In
our view, other questions were potentially confusing. Exhibit 5.1 shows
examples.
The application process did not make sufficient accommodations for consumers
with limited English skills. A question about whether the applicant needed an
interpreter occurred well into the application process. Also, MNsures website
provided a sortable directory of in-person assisters for the first open enrollment
period, but website users could not sort this directory by language. This may
have made it harder for some limited English speakers to find an assister who
spoke their language at a nearby location.
MNsure had potentially helpful advice on its website, but it was not always easy
to find. The website had separate Get Help, Learn More, Frequently Asked
Questions, and glossary sections. It was not always clear which of these
sections contained answers to particular questions.
USER EXPERIENCES
85
The application had separate paths for persons applying for health insurance with
discounts and without discounts. However, the term discounts was not
adequately explained. Users may have been confused about whether discounts
referred to tax credits, public programs, or specially priced insurance products.
When checking for discounts, consumers were asked some questions without being
clearly told the reason for the questions and what bearing their answers may have for
eligibility determinations. For example: Is anyone getting services from the Center
for Victims of Torture?
Some questions asked for information but did not clearly specify the format in which
the consumer should replyfor example, whether Social Security numbers should
include dashes, or the proper format for reporting birthdates. Consumers had to click
on a separate help button to find the proper format.
Regarding income, the applicant was prompted to enter Amount in one question,
and then Frequency in the next. This was potentially confusing. Frequency was
intended to refer to the periodsuch as Annualfor which the Amount question
was answered, not the frequency of the consumers pay periods.
The application asked the consumer to report current taxable income. It urged
consumers to check their tax forms to see how this was defined or to visit the IRS
website. Consumer assisters told us there was considerable confusion over this
question.
One question in the application was a run-on sentence, which should have been
corrected during the editing process: Does [the primary applicant] pay for certain
things that can be deducted on an income tax return, telling us about them could
make the cost of health insurance a little lower.
The application contained the following statement: I know Ill be asked to cooperate
with the agency that collects medical support from an absent parent. If I think that
cooperating to collect medical support will harm me or my children, I can tell the
agency and wont have to cooperate. Below this statement, there was a box that
simply said Medical Support. The box had to be checked to proceed with the
application, but the application did not clearly indicate what a marked box indicated.
There were several other checkboxes that had similar problems.
If consumers appeared to be eligible for Medicaid or the Childrens Health Insurance
Program (CHIP), the application asked them to answer a number of questions to
ensure that [they got] the right services. (Medicaid and CHIP were not explained.)
Some of these questions were very personal. For example, consumers were asked
whether any members of the household have a communicable disease (HIV, AIDS,
tuberculosis, hepatitis, etc.)? or Have any of these people been determined as being
seriously and persistently mentally ill or as being severely emotionally disturbed? This
part of the application had no further explanation about why this information was being
collected, whether this information was relevant to the MNsure application, how
respondents would be directed to the right services, or with whom this information
would be shared for the purposes of getting people to the right services.
In our survey of consumers who purchased a qualified health plan, we asked about
the value of MNsures online shopping tools. We focused on responses from
individuals who had previous experience purchasing health insurance. As shown
in Exhibit 5.2, those who said MNsure made the shopping experience easier than
what they had previously experienced outnumbered those who said MNsure made
it harder (48 percent vs. 31 percent). Likewise, among persons with previous
experience shopping for insurance, 62 percent said MNsure made it easier to find
insurance that fit their budget, and 19 percent said MNsure made it harder.
86
31%
19%
MNsure
made
MNsure made
MNsuremade
MNsuremade
shopping for
shopping for
theshopping
and
comparing theshopping
and comparing
experience
experience
insurance
insurance
harder
easiereasier
harder
MNsure made
MNsure made MNsuremadeit
MNsuremadeit
it harder to
it easier to
easiertofind hardertofind
find insurance find insurance
insurancethat
insurancethat
that fits my
that
fits my
fitmybudget
fitmybudget
budget
budget
NOTES: The survey was conducted in September to November 2014. Respondents who offered no
opinion or said that MNsure made no difference are not shown. Overall, the sample of respondents
was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who
would have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 6 percentage points of the
survey respondents answers.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, survey of heads of households who enrolled in qualified
health plans (N=205).
We also asked assisters about the adequacy of online tools MNsure provided for
making comparisons among qualified health plans. As shown in Exhibit 5.3,
navigators and certified application counselors were generally more favorable in
their assessments than brokers. For example, 45 percent of navigators,
39 percent of certified application counselors, and 26 percent of brokers said
MNsure provided useful tools for helping consumers select the best available
insurance for a given price. In our discussions with MNsure board members and
administrators, several told us they would like to see improvements in the
consumer shopping experience on the MNsure website. However, much of
leaderships focus during the websites first year was on addressing the sites
technical problems.
USER EXPERIENCES
87
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Navigators
Certified
Application
Counselors
Brokers
NOTES: The surveys were conducted from July through October 2014. The sample of respondents
was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who
would have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 5.0 to 6.6 percentage
points of the survey respondents answers. The percentages of assisters who offered no opinion on
these questions ranged from 17 to 21 percent for navigators, 25 to 27 percent for certified application
counselors, and 4 to 5 percent for brokers.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, surveys of navigators (N=203), certified application
counselors (N=124 to 125), and brokers (N=252 to 253).
Most consumers we surveyed said that the MNsure website provided adequate information
on the insurance products for sale, while consumer assisters had mixed opinions.
We surveyed a sample of individuals who purchased qualified health plans. As
shown in Exhibit 5.4, 54 percent of respondents said MNsures online
information on health insurance products was easy to understand. Likewise, our
surveys of MNsure-certified consumer assisters asked whether MNsure provided
information about health insurance products in language that was easy for
consumers to understand. The percentage who said MNsure did so varied among
the assister groups surveyed50 percent of navigators, 61 percent of certified
assistance counselors, and 30 percent of brokers.17
17
The percentages of respondents who said that MNsure did not provide information on health
insurance products in understandable language were 44 percent for navigators, 34 percent for
certified application counselors, and 66 percent for brokers.
88
54%
50%
42%
44%
34%
Enrollees
Navigators
Certified Application
Counselors
30%
Brokers
NOTES: Survey respondents who offered no opinion are not shown in the graph. The surveys were
conducted in July through November 2014. The samples of respondents were large enough that we
can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who would have selected a
particular response to a survey question was within 5.3 to 6.3 percentage points of the survey
respondents answers.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, surveys of heads of households who enrolled in qualified
health plans (N=268) and surveys of MNsure-certified navigators (N=203), certified application
counselors (N=128), and insurance brokers (N=256).
18
Insurance plans with embedded deductibles include individual deductibles and a family
deductible. Having the individual deductibles embedded within the family deductibles allows for
each member of the family to have expenses covered before the entire amount of the family
deductible is reached. Insurance plans with a non-embedded deductible require the policy holder to
incur expenses equaling the entire amount of the family deductible before the insurer will pay for
any medical bills.
USER EXPERIENCES
89
Topic
46%
35
57
47
46
33%
27
42
36
37
31%
23
61
50
47
47
39
29
50
34
37
NOTES: The surveys were conducted from July through October 2014. The samples of respondents
were large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the populations
who would have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 4.9 to 6.6 percentage
points of the survey respondents answers.
a
Respondents had a choice of Always or almost always, Often, Sometimes, Rarely or never, or
No opinion. This exhibit shows the total percentage that provided one of the first two responses.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, surveys of navigators (N=202 to 203), certified
application counselors (N=124 to 126), and brokers (N=249 to 253).
Consumer Notifications
Consumers who shop online expect businesses to provide prompt confirmation
that their purchases were successfully processed. In the case of MNsure,
consumers expected to quickly learn what benefits they were eligible to receive,
whether their applications were processed, and whether they were successfully
enrolled in a health insurance plan or public program.
19
90
37.4%
31.0%
14.6%
12.0%
7.8%
Did not
Did not
know direct think they
purchase
would
was an
qualify for
option
direct
purchase
7.6%
MNsure
Availability
MNsure
Referred to
MNsure
was less
of tax
was easier MNsure by facilitated
expensive
credits
to use
someone comparison
than direct
through
than direct
of insurance
purchase
MNsure
purchase
products
NOTES: Respondents could select more than one option. Respondents who responded No
opinion or who wrote in another response are not shown. The sample of respondents was large
enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who would
have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 6 percentage points of the survey
respondents answers.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, September to November 2014 survey of heads of
households who enrolled in a qualified health plan (N=281).
In many cases, MNsure customers received inadequate information about (1) the status of
their application for insurance or (2) their eligibility for public programs or tax credits.
When people make online purchases, they usually get confirmation of their
purchase at the end of the process and receive a confirmation e-mail. But, for the
first open enrollment period, and even into the second one, the MNsure website
did not provide a confirmation page to individuals at the end of the application,
stating that they had successfully enrolled in public or commercial plans. In
addition, MNsure did not send consumers a confirmation e-mail. Our survey of
insurance brokers asked whether the MNsure website provided sufficient
confirmation that the enrollment process had been completed; two-thirds said it
did not.20 As one broker suggested to us, Brokers should be able to print online
applications with a confirmation number showing the application successfully
was completed and went through the system.
20
Two other groups of assisters we surveyed were less critical than brokers of MNsures online
confirmations. Still, 32 to 40 percent of navigators and certified application counselors said the
confirmations were not sufficient (depending on the type of enrollees we asked about).
USER EXPERIENCES
91
21
In early 2014, a MNsure vendor (EngagePoint) told DHS that it was sending notices of pending
applications to DHS to be mailed to consumers. Months later, however, a DHS official said the
vendors internal review showed that notices may not have been printed since January 7, 2014.
Staff in some counties told us that, on occasions prior to June 2014, they expressed concern to DHS
about the apparent lack of notices being sent to program applicants. High-level DHS officials said
they were unaware that pending notices were not being mailed until June 2014.
22
In addition to 14,467 cases pending as of June 2014 that had not yet been notified by DHS, there
may have been other individuals whose pending issues were resolved during the first six months of
2014, thus negating the need for DHS notification of pending status in June 2014.
23
DHS sent counties lists of pending cases on three occasions during the first half of 2014 and
asked counties to follow up with these individuals to obtain the necessary information.
92
See a discussion of the method in Frederick Reichheld, The One Number You Need to Grow,
Harvard Business Review 81, n. 12 (December 2003), 46-54. Under this approach, ratings of 9 and
10 are considered promoters of a product, and ratings of 0 through 6 are considered detractors.
Persons rating a product as 7 or 8 are considered passively satisfied.
USER EXPERIENCES
93
survey respondents who cited any of the benefits shown in the exhibit
(63 percent) outnumbered those who cited any negative impacts (42 percent).
Interestingly, the most common benefit mentioned by the enrollees was lower
costs (cited by 43 percent of respondents), while the most common negative
effect mentioned was higher costs (cited by 26 percent of respondents).
Percentage of
Surveyed Enrollees
Who Cited this
Benefit
43%
25
23
11
8
63%
Percentage of
Surveyed Enrollees
Who Cited this
Negative Effect
26%
16
11
9
6
42%
NOTES: The survey was conducted in September to November 2014. The sample of respondents
was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who
would have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 6 percentage points of the
survey respondents answers.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, survey of heads of households who enrolled in qualified
health plans (N=281).
In addition, we asked people who bought qualified health plans through MNsure
about specific aspects of the product they purchased. As shown in Exhibit 5.8, at
least two-thirds of surveyed enrollees said (in response to separate questions) that
the product they purchased through MNsure had met their expectations regarding
choices of health care providers, policies regarding deductibles, policies
regarding copayments, and coverage of products and services.
For enrollees who had health insurance immediately before enrolling in MNsure, survey
respondents reported mixed views on their MNsure product compared with their previous
insuranceparticularly regarding premiums and out-of-pocket costs.
94
Deductibles
Copayments
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Exhibit 5.9 shows how people who purchased insurance through MNsure
compared this insurance with what they had previously. Forty-eight percent of
consumers who had been insured immediately prior to MNsure reported that their
premiums (after tax credits) were lower through MNsure than they were
previously; 32 percent said their MNsure premiums were higher. In addition, 43
percent of previously insured people said they paid higher out-of-pocket costs
with the insurance they bought through MNsure than with the insurance they had
previously. Most people reported no change in the options their new insurance
offered for primary care doctors.
USER EXPERIENCES
95
Insurance Characteristic
16%
30
9
48
48%
23
69
14
30%
43
15
32
NOTES: The survey was conducted in September to November 2014. The sample of respondents
was large enough that we can be 95 percent confident that the true percentage of the population who
would have selected a particular response to a survey question was within 6 percentage points of the
survey respondents answers. Respondents who said dont know are not shown in this table. This
survey question was not asked of individuals who said they did not have insurance immediately prior
to purchasing insurance through MNsure.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor, survey of heads of households who purchased a quality
health plan through MNsure (N=202 to 204).
Health Insurers
Once a person signs up for health insurance through MNsure, MNsure notifies
the insurer of the enrollment. This enables the insurer (also known as a carrier
96
25
This notification of the insurer is known in the insurance industry as an 834 EDI transmission.
It is not a new process; it is used by employers, insurance brokers, health insurance exchanges, and
governments to provide insurance companies with descriptive information on individuals that have
purchased or enrolled in policies.
26
During the latter part of the first open enrollment period, insurers assumed responsibility from
MNsure for collecting initial premium payments from individuals. One insurer said MNsure
assessed its limited abilities to handle payments and made the right decision to give this
responsibility to insurers that have long experience with customer billing.
USER EXPERIENCES
97
Insurers have produced monthly reports for the federal government that
indicate the number of individuals enrolled through MNsure receiving
premium tax credits or cost-sharing reductions. MNsure originally
intended to prepare this report.
Overall, the insurers did not think the MNsure enrollment process for their
customers in public health care programs was an improvement over the process
used previously. Additionally, insurers participating in MNsure that also sold
commercial products outside MNsure said that MNsures enrollment process for
commercial customers was more difficult. One insurer told us that it spent at
least $500,000 to modify its information systems in response to changes MNsure
made in its original plans.
27
Some insurers told us that consumers were given retroactive coverage for the period when their
applications were stuck, but in the meantime enrollees may have postponed health care visits or
worried about the status of their coverage.
28
Examples of problems cited with MNsures process for handling paper applications were: lack
of systems for tracking which applications had been received or the status of these applications; no
option on the paper applications for applicants to select the health plan they wanted; and no process
for applicants to verbally authorize an application when missing application information was
provided by phone.
98
Counties
Counties are the front lines for Minnesotas public health care insurance
programs. The state sets overall health care policy for these programs, operates
statewide information and eligibility determination systems, and oversees
program implementation, while the counties assist with the enrollment process,
manage individual cases, and troubleshoot issues that arise for enrollees. A
recent estimate said that the 2011 county cost of administering health care
programs on behalf of the state was about $100 million dollars.29
Due to weaknesses in MNsures enrollment system, counties have not been able to
effectively manage the MNsure cases for which they are responsible.
Perhaps the largest county frustration has been the absence of a well-functioning
caseworker portal into the MNsure enrollment system. The portal was
supposed to provide a special point of entry for county staff, allowing them to
view the status of MNsure applications and enrollments so they could actively
manage these cases. However, county officials told us the portal does not show
staff how many Medical Assistance cases are on their caseloads at a given time.
In addition, the MNsure caseworker portal provides information to counties on
tasks that need to be completed (such as closing the case of a person who has
moved out of state), but it only allows county staff to view 500 tasks at a time.
This may be a small fraction of a large countys total case-related tasks.30
Furthermore, county staff have had limited ability to address the tasks identified
in the caseworker portal, due to problems with MNsures technology. For
example, county staff could not add a newborn to a MNsure-enrolled case until
mid-2014. Over time, DHS has developed manual workarounds for counties so
staff can perform tasks they were initially unable to perform through the portal.
But the time it now takes for a county to add a newborn to a MNsure case is 60 to
90 minutes; such a task required only a few minutes in the case management
system (MAXIS) that DHS previously used to manage Medical Assistance cases.
There continue to be many tasks in the MNsure caseworker portal that county
staff are not authorized to complete. For example, as of late 2014, when MNsure
enrollees died or moved, or when their incomes rose to a level above eligibility
thresholds, county staff could not close the enrollees cases.
Other concerns we heard from county staff about their experiences as users of the
MNsure system included the following:
29
30
The MNsure system has not given counties the ability to determine how
many MNsure applications involving their residents were pending at a
given time. (As noted earlier, a pending application is one that is
incomplete and requires additional information from the applicant.)
Because of this limitation in the system, DHS offered to send counties
Fiscal note prepared for H.F. 5-8E, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess. (MN), 20.
For example, as of mid-2014, Hennepin County had over 20,000 tasks to perform in order to
complete enrollment for that countys MNsure applicants.
USER EXPERIENCES
99
lists of their pending cases monthly. But county staff told us they only
received these lists once or twice in all of 2014.
County staff expressed concern that they had minimal training for using
the MNsure enrollment system and little participation in the systems
testing.
Some county staff expressed optimism that the new enrollment system, when
fixed, may be an improvement over previous processes. Counties like the fact
that some people enrolling in public programs through MNsure have been able to
complete the entire process on their own, without county help. But, on balance,
county staff we talked with were more negative than positive about MNsures
functionality so far. County staff work on the front lines of the enrollment
process, answering consumers questions and confirming their enrollment in
public programs. Because of limited access to the MNsure enrollment system
and inability to fix certain types of problems, it has been hard for county staff to
do their jobs.
31
At a November 2014 meeting of the MNsure Legislative Oversight Committee, the Director of
the Anoka County Economic Assistance Department testified that his countys administrative costs
for people in public health care programs rose $1 million in 2014 and is expected to increase
another $1 million in 2015.
Chapter 6: Operations
F
ederal rules require that states provide resources to help consumers make
informed decisions when obtaining health insurance through an exchange,
including: application assistance, a toll-free phone number, and outreach and
education.1 In this chapter, we discuss the design, implementation, and
performance of these resources. We also examine other operational issues from
the first year of enrollment, including advertising and data security.
CONSUMER ASSISTERS
MNsure provides consumers with application and enrollment assistance through
its partnerships with external organizations and individuals. Exhibit 6.1 defines
MNsures three types of application assistersnavigators, certified
application counselors, and brokersand highlights some of the differences
between them.2
Navigators, which are typically employed by community-based organizations,
help consumers enroll in both public health insurance programs and commercial
products offered through MNsure. When consumers need help with an
application, they locate navigators through MNsures online assister directory.
MNsures contact center also refers consumers to navigators for help. Navigators
must help any MNsure user that requests their assistance and provide information
in a fair, accurate, and impartial manner.3 In order to maintain their impartiality,
navigators may not receive any compensation from an insurance company.4
Throughout this report, we use the term consumer assisters to refer to all three types of
application assisters: navigators, certified application counselors, and brokers.
45 CFR, sec. 155.210(e)(2) (2014); and Minnesota Rules, 7700.0040, subp. 1B, posted July 11,
2013.
45 CFR, sec. 155.210(d) (2014); and Minnesota Rules, 7700.0030, subp. 1B, posted July 11,
2013.
102
Navigators must help consumers understand the differences between their health
insurance options, but they may not offer advice about which commercial
product to select.5
Per-enrollment
compensation
Certification
requirements
Certified Application
Counselors
Brokersb
Hospitals or clinics
Insurance agencies
Providing MNsure
application assistance
to clients as part of
regular job duties
None
Same as navigators
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Throughout this report, we use the term navigator to refer to both in-person assisters and navigators. County workers may be certified
as in-person assisters and be paid for enrolling consumers in commercial plans, but they may not serve as navigators or be paid for
enrolling consumers in Medical Assistance or MinnesotaCare. Counties workers that serve as in-person assisters are not listed in
MNsures Assister Directory.
b
In this report, we use the term brokers to refer to agents and insurance producers licensed under Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.
45 CFR, sec. 155.210(e) (2014); Minnesota Rules, 7700.0040, posted July 11, 2013; and MNsure and the Minnesota Department of
Commerce, Consumer Assistance Partner Bulletin 2013-1 (St. Paul, 2013).
d
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.05, subd. 3; Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.32; and Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.31, subds. 6, 12, 14,
and 15.
e
According to the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, in 2010, brokers in Minnesota earned an average of $97 per enrollment or renewal
that they facilitated, or 3.9 percent of premiums in the individual market.
SOURCES: Office of the Legislative Auditor; 45 CFR, sec. 155.210 (2014); 45 CFR, sec. 155.215 (2014); 45 CFR, sec. 155.220 (2014);
45 CFR, sec. 155.225 (2014); and Minnesota Rules, chapter 7700, posted July 11, 2013, and September 26, 2013.
45 CFR, sec. 155.210(e)(2-3) (2014), requires navigators to clarif[y] the distinctions among
health care options, including [commercial plans] and to facilitate selection of a [commercial
plan]. According to Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.32, and Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.31,
subd. 15, individuals must be licensed as brokers in order to urg[e] a person to apply for a
particular kind of insurance from a particular company. Also, see MNsure and the Minnesota
Department of Commerce, Consumer Assistance Bulletin 2013-1 (St. Paul, 2013).
OPERATIONS
103
During the first year of operations, MNsures Navigator Program operated under the policies of
the Minnesota Community Application Agent Program, Minnesota Statutes 2014, 256.962.
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.05, subd. 4, required the MNsure Board to establish policies for the
Navigator Program that would have become effective January 1, 2015. However, as of early
February 2015, the board had not adopted formal policies for the Navigator Program.
DHS stopped contracting with organizations under the Minnesota Community Application Agent
Program during the first year of the MNsure Navigator Program.
Federal rules prohibit the exchange from using federal grant funds to pay navigators for enrolling
consumers in insurance through MNsure but allow the exchange to use them to pay in-person
assisters. As a result, MNsure operates parallel navigator and in-person assister programs that are
identical except for their funding mechanisms. Internally, MNsure uses the term in-person
assisters to refer to organizations paid by MNsure using federal funds for enrolling consumers in
qualified health plans, and the term navigator to refer to organizations paid by DHS for enrolling
consumers in public programs. Most organizations serve as both navigators and in-person assisters.
Counties, however, are only paid for in-person assister services. Publicly, MNsure uses the term
navigators to refer to both types of assisters, and our report follows this practice, too.
10
Because of problems with MNsures enrollment and assister data, we could not independently
verify the exact number of consumers enrolled with the help of navigators. These figures represent
our best estimates given the data made available to us.
11
12
45 CFR, sec. 155.225(g)(2) (2014); and Minnesota Rules, 7700.0020, subp. 5, posted July 11,
2013.
13
45 CFR, sec. 155.220(d) (2014); and Minnesota Statutes 2014, 62V.05, subd. 3(a). In this report,
we use the term brokers to refer to insurance agents or insurance producers licensed under
Minnesota Statutes 2014, 60K.
104
14
According to data compiled by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, brokers in Minnesota
earned, on average, $97 per enrollment or renewal, or 3.9 percent of premiums in the individual
market in 2010.
15
16
17
18
Organizations also had to sign a contract with the state before their employees could be certified
as navigators.
19
We received responses from 222 navigators (71 percent response rate), 167 CACs (57 percent
response rate), and 295 brokers (54 percent response rate).
OPERATIONS
105
MNsures online application. As one navigator said, The first time I saw the
application was with my first applicant.
Many assisters said they wanted more training on how to answer MNsures
application questions related to household income. Consumers trying to find out
if they qualified for public health insurance programs, tax credits, or cost-sharing
reductions had to estimate their taxable income for the coming year and disclose
it on MNsures application. But it can be challenging for individuals in certain
professions or life circumstances to estimate taxable income. For example,
farmers may have negative income over the course of a year, and seasonal
workers may not know how much they will make over the coming months.
Assisters said they were not adequately prepared to help consumers with these
types of questions. One certified application counselor said, We are not
accountants that know all tax deductions [available] for consumers.
MNsure had limited success getting assisters certified by the October 1, 2013,
launch date. On the first day of open enrollment, MNsure estimated that around
450 brokers and no navigators were certified.20 This meant that application
assistance was not available for many consumers when the exchange first
opened.
MNsure did not have an adequate method for tracking assister certification in its first year of
operation, and this hindered its ability to make accurate payments.
State rules require MNsure to maintain documentation of certification training for
navigators and CACs.21 MNsure staff provided us with the records they kept of
individuals that had been certified. Upon inspection, we found the records to be
incomplete. They did not properly document which individuals had successfully
finished various portions of the certification process and by what date. We also
could not distinguish individuals who had been certified and later dropped out of
the program from individuals who were never certified; both types of individuals
were labeled inactive in the records. Because MNsure did not have an
adequate method for tracking assister certification, we could not conclusively
determine the total number of assisters who were certified by MNsure during its
first year of enrollment.
Weak recordkeeping also made it difficult for MNsure to ensure that it made
accurate payments to navigator organizations. For example, MNsure intended to
give each navigator a unique identifier so it could (1) track enrollments that were
facilitated by navigators and (2) make payments to navigator organizations. But
MNsure assigned some identifiers to navigators that it had already allocated to
other navigators. This made it hard for MNsure to determine which navigator
should get credit for an enrollment. Also, at least two organizations were paid
20
These numbers are based on internal MNsure communication that could not be verified
independently by our office.
21
106
over $6,000 for services provided by navigators that were not certified.22
MNsure was aware of a number of these issues, plus some others. The agency
intends to reconcile any over- or under-payments that were made to navigator
organizations, but staff told us this process might not be complete for a while.23
Staff told us they discovered that dozens of navigators helped consumers enroll before they
were certified. They said these navigators will not be paid for these enrollments.
23
When calculating payments owed to navigator organizations, MNsure compared its records of
assister certification with reports that were generated by its online enrollment system which
identified which consumers used assisters. Staff told us that problems with the online enrollment
system also contributed to the payment errors.
24
25
OPERATIONS
107
to clarify the kind of assistance navigators are allowed to offer consumers. The
guidance said that navigators could describe the benefits, terms, or conditions of
commercial health products, but they could not recommend a specific product or
make a decision on behalf of a consumeronly licensed brokers could do that.
If consumers who had sought help from a navigator wanted help with product
selection, they had to schedule another in-person visit with a broker.
The distinction between the help navigators could and could not give consumers
enrolling in commercial products was difficult for some consumers, contact
center staff, and assisters to grasp. As one navigator explained:
I send people to brokers when they need help in comparing and
choosing plans. Sometimes I get the idea that people are told by
those they call at MNsure that navigators are supposed to be able
to help them. I cant. I dont know insurance, and I dont want
to be a broker, I want to be a navigator. Sometimes folks are a
bit angry about this because theyve been told to contact a
navigator for all aspects of getting insurance.
Consumers who met with a navigator may have needed to visit a broker at a later
date. For example, some consumers did not know before they met with a
navigator and entered information into MNsures application whether they would
qualify for a public program. (If they did not qualify, they had to schedule a
separate meeting with a broker if they wanted help choosing a commercial
product.) Also, in some households, certain members of the household were
eligible for public programs while others were not. If households with mixed
eligibility wanted help enrolling in a public program and help choosing a
commercial product, they had to visit both a navigator and a broker.
Similarly, if consumers initially chose to meet with a broker instead of a
navigator, they could not be sure they would receive all the help they needed in
one visit. MNsure-certified brokers were required by federal rules to take
consumers through the application questions related to eligibility for public
programs, tax credits, and cost-sharing reductions before they could sell the
consumers a product.26 So, if consumers were deemed eligible for public
programs, some brokers referred them to navigators to complete the enrollment
process.
Some brokers helped consumers enroll in public programs, although they received no
compensation for doing so.
This was one of the most frequently cited concerns among brokers who
submitted written comments to our survey. One broker said, I think I assisted
about 15 to 20 individuals during the open enrollment period, none of which
[purchased] a [commercial insurance product]. I worked for hours without
making a dime. Another said:
26
45 CFR, sec. 155.220(c)(1) (2014). Consumers completing MNsure applications on their own
had the option of skipping these eligibility questions and simply enrolling in an unsubsidized
commercial health insurance product; brokers helping consumers did not have this option.
108
Clients came into the agency not knowing until we were into the
application process that they would qualify for public assistance.
I did the work, I provided the information, and I received no
compensation.
One reason brokers helped enroll so many people in public programs was
because it was the contact centers policy to refer callers whose incomes were on
the edge of public program eligibility to brokers, rather than navigators, when
they needed application assistance.
Also, brokers were not compensated for their assistance in cases where consumers
purchased commercial products through MNsure that the brokers were not authorized to
sell.
According to state law, brokers must be appointed (authorized) by an insurance
company before they are allowed to sell the companys products, for which they
are paid a commission.27 In the first year of the exchange, five insurance
companies sold products through MNsure. Neither state law nor MNsure
required each insurance company selling products through the exchange to
appoint each MNsure-certified broker. Some consumers who were receiving
help from a broker decided to purchase products their particular brokers were not
appointed to sell. As a result, some brokers did not earn a commission for their
services. For example, of the 295 MNsure-certified brokers we surveyed, only
34 percent were appointed with PreferredOne, the company that sold a majority
of the products during MNsures first year.28
Some brokers had the impression they would automatically be appointed by all of
the insurance companies selling products on MNsure once the brokers received
their MNsure certification. As one broker said:
I am extremely disappointed that we were not compensated by
the companies that we were not appointed with. [It] was not
made clear that we would only be paid if the consumer chose a
product through our appointed companies. I uploaded and
helped over two dozen families and was compensated for one of
them.
Overall, during the first year of the exchange, brokers were frustrated when they
were not compensated for assistance they gave to some public program and
commercial product enrollees. Some brokers told us they did not plan to seek
MNsure certification in the second open enrollment periodas one said, We
lost money trying to assist people. According to MNsures count, the number of
certified brokers dropped from about 2,300 in April 2014 to about 500 at the start
27
28
Seventy-eight percent of MNsure brokers we surveyed were appointed to sell products for Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota, 63 percent for Medica, 40 percent for HealthPartners, and 13
percent for UCare.
OPERATIONS
109
of the second open enrollment period.29 It is unclear what impact this decline
will have on MNsure enrollments. But, if MNsure determines that this smaller
number of brokers does not provide consumers with enough access to application
assistance and insurance advice, MNsure and DHS should consider whether to
pursue changes.
RECOMMENDATION
MNsure and DHS should ensure that brokers are fairly compensated for enrolling consumers in
insurance through MNsure.
A first option would be for DHS to use existing state law to pay MNsure-certified
brokers for public program enrollments. Under the Minnesota Community
Application Agent Program, brokers are eligible to receive $25 from DHS for
each person they enroll in Medical Assistance or MinnesotaCare.30 This program
is still authorized in state law, although DHS no longer operates it now that the
Navigator Program has taken its place. We were told that few brokers took
advantage of reimbursement under the Minnesota Community Application
Program. Perhaps brokers were not widely aware of this compensation option; if
so, DHS or MNsure could take steps to better publicize it to brokers. If the
compensation rate offered through this program is too low to attract brokers,
DHS or MNsure could seek an increase through legislative action.31
Second, the MNsure Board could consider requiring each insurer that sells plans
through MNsure to appoint each MNsure-certified broker to sell its products.
Currently, each insurer decides whether or not it will appoint a given broker to
sell its products. If the board decides to pursue this option, it could make this
requirement part of its approval process for insurers selling plans through
MNsure, or it could ask the Legislature for a change in state law.
29
According to MNsures reports, the number of brokers rose during the second open enrollment
period, reaching around 820 in January 2015.
30
31
This compensation rate is lower than others offered to brokers. In 2010, Minnesota insurers paid
brokers $97, on average, for a years enrollment or renewal in the individual market, according to
data we obtained from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Under the Minnesota
Comprehensive Insurance Act (the former program for people who could not find insurance
elsewhere), brokers received $50 per enrollee from insurers. Also, Minnesota insurers paid brokers
from $120 to $410 per Medicare enrollee, according to data published in 2013 by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services.
110
able to view an account if the consumer they were assisting was physically
present to log in through MNsures website.32
Assisters and MNsure staff told us that many problems resulted from the lack of a functional
navigator-broker portal.
Because assisters could not use the navigator-broker portal, it was difficult for
them to provide follow-up services. Follow-up is required, for example, when
the enrollment system does not produce an immediate determination of public
program eligibility. In such cases, assisters often had to schedule follow-up inperson appointments. The largest share of navigators and CACs said it took one
to two hours, on average, for them to complete the online portion of enrollment
for consumers enrolling in Medical Assistance or MinnesotaCare.33 Forty
percent of navigators said it took more than two hours, on average, to enroll
consumers in commercial health plans.34 But as one navigator explained, the
application did not account for all of their time; they also spent a lot of time
following up on consumers applications:
My major gripe is that navigators were not warned that there
would be considerable follow-up required. I work with nonEnglish speaking people and we continue to spend time calling
[various help lines] trying to get status updates and figure out
why things are delayed. Navigators become the clients primary
contact, which shifts a lot of work to us. I would say the
applications themselves only account for a third [of] the time
navigators put [in] trying to get the application processed.
At times, assisters had to schedule multiple appointments to finish an enrollment, which
was a burden for some consumers.
Sometimes a single appointment was not sufficient to complete a MNsure
application. For example, some assisters encountered long contact center wait
times, problems connecting with the Federal Data Services Hub (which verified
consumers identities), or problems with the MNsure website. One navigator
described the toll this took on consumers, saying, We are working with clients
who have low income, most often with transportation barriers. These clients
cannot afford additional visits to our office. Another said:
32
33
Fifty-one percent of navigators and 53 percent of CACs said it took, on average, one to two hours
to complete the online portion of enrollment in Medical Assistance through MNsure. Fifty-three
percent of navigators and 56 percent of CACs said it took this amount of time for MinnesotaCare
enrollments. Also, 50 percent of navigators and 51 percent of CACs said it took one to two hours
for enrollments in qualified health plans.
34
Navigators said commercial plan enrollments generally took longer than public program
enrollments. Sixteen percent of navigators said it took more than two hours for Medical Assistance
enrollments and 18 percent said it took more than two hours for MinnesotaCare enrollments
through MNsure.
OPERATIONS
111
35
Organizations could be certified as navigator organizations without receiving grant funds; most
did not receive grant funds during MNsures first year.
36
112
people in insurance using MNsure, which was 211 percent of its goal.38 Portico
Healthnet enrolled by far the most people for a single organization (6,162).
Some organizations, like Minnesota Community Action Partnership, enrolled a
large number of people (2,786), but still fell far short of their goalsperhaps
indicating the challenge organizations had setting goals during the first year of
the Navigator Program. Grantees enrolled about 70 percent of the consumers
that received assistance from a navigator between October 2013 and September
2014.
Some grantees simply did not enroll many people. For example, the National
Association of Mental Illness (NAMI Minnesota), the Confederation of Somali
Community in Minnesota, Springboard for the Arts, and the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe together received more than $400,000 but together enrolled only
175 people, according to MNsure records. Each of these organizations enrolled
fewer than 10 percent of its individual goal. For the second year of open
enrollment, MNsure awarded another $4.6 million in grants to 28 organizations.
Several organizations that performed poorly during the first year were awarded
funds again for the second year, as seen in the first table in Appendix F.
Grantees contracts also included outreach goals. Grantees used a variety of
methods to achieve their outreach goals. For example, Springboard for the Arts
produced a series of informational videos which were distributed to its members.
Other organizations staffed booths at community events, gave presentations to
organizations, visited food shelves, sent out mailings, wrote articles for
newsletters, and performed door-to-door canvassing. Grantees submitted
monthly and final reports listing the outreach events they held, the number of
people reached, and the number of people they helped to enroll.
MNsure provided insufficient oversight of its consumer assister grants.
Even though 30 grantees failed to meet their outreach or enrollment goals,
MNsure did not withhold any grant payments for performance reasons.39 Staff
told us that when MNsure made final payments to grantees at the end of 2014,
they did not take into account grantees contracted enrollment goals or their
enrollment performance. Staff said they did consider organizations outreach
performance when making final grantee payments. But even grantees that did
not meet their outreach goals received their full award by the end of the grant
period.
In addition, the grantee data related to outreach activities were self-reported and,
during the first year of operations, MNsure did not verify the occurrence of the
outreach events listed in grantees reports, the actual number of people reached
38
As noted earlier in this chapter, problems with MNsures enrollment and assister records
prevented us from independently verifying the exact amounts earned by navigator organizations.
The figures cited in this section represent our best estimates.
39
MNsure and one grantee (Small Business Minnesota) mutually agreed to terminate the grantees
contract in June 2014 because problems with the functionality of MNsures small business
application would have made it difficult for the organization to fulfill its grant duties. Small
Business Minnesota returned all of the funds it was awarded.
OPERATIONS
113
by the events, or the quality of such efforts. Some of the grantees self-reported
data, which is shown in Appendix F, seemed implausible. For instance,
Minnesota Community Action Partnership, whose contract included 15 partners,
estimated that it reached 2.8 million people through its outreach eventswhich is
over half of the states population. This figure also represented 28,000 percent of
the organizations contracted outreach goal. Women Venture, which did not
have any grant partners, reported that it reached 674,000 people, or 48,000
percent of its outreach goal.
We think MNsure should have provided more oversight of grantees outreach
activities. MNsure staff told us they acknowledged this shortcoming and for the
second year of operations, MNsure hired three additional staff to oversee grant
activities and provide grantees with greater support services. We also think
MNsure should have considered grantees performance in relation to both their
contracted outreach goals and their contracted enrollment goals when evaluating
grantees final performance.
CONTACT CENTER
According to federal rules, MNsure must provide a toll-free call center to address
the needs of consumers requesting assistance.40 In this section, we review the
development and performance of the MNsure contact center and the various
problems it has faced since opening on September 3, 2013. We also review how
the contact center functions within the states existing network of customer
service resources.
40
114
Goal
0
Oct.
2013
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
2014
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
NOTES: These figures include wait times for both MNsures contact center agents and contracted
agents. They do not include the amount of time consumers spent waiting on hold after their calls
were answered. The contact centers goal was to answer 85 percent of calls within 2 minutes.
Contracted customer service agents were supposed to answer 85 percent of calls within 30 seconds,
according to the vendors contract with MNsure.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor.
On December 20, 2013, the average wait time was 1 hour and
49 minutes, the longest average over the course of a single day.
On 78 percent of the
Assister Responses to the Following Survey
days the contact
Statement: Wait times to speak with a call center
representative were reasonable.
center was open
between October 1,
Navigators
CACs
Brokers
2013, and August 29,
Always or almost always
2%
6%
3%
2014, the average
Often
7
10
2
daily wait time
Sometimes
35
30
14
exceeded MNsures
Rarely or never
52
47
77
two-minute goal. Not
surprisingly, MNsure users were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with wait times. A
majority of brokers and navigators we surveyed said wait times were rarely or
never reasonable.
OPERATIONS
115
MNsures second customer service goal was to have less than 5 percent of callers
hang up before speaking to a customer service agent. MNsure failed to achieve
this goal for abandoned calls.
Many people abandoned their calls before speaking to a customer service representative.
With such long wait times, many people hung up before speaking to a contact
center agent. Between October 2013 and August 2014, about one-third of callers
abandoned their calls. Exhibit 6.3 shows the percent of calls abandoned each
month, compared with MNsures goal during that time period. Only in May
2014 did the call abandonment rate fall below 5 percent. In January 2014,
35,000 calls (60 percent) were abandoned. The highest rate of abandoned calls
for a single day occurred on January 3, 2014, when 81 percent of calls were
abandoned. On the last day of open enrollment (March 31, 2014), 4,063 calls
were abandonedthe most calls for a single day.41
Goal
0%
Oct.
2013
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
2014
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
NOTES: MNsures goal was to have less than 5 percent of callers hang up before their calls were
answered.
SOURCE: Office of the Legislative Auditor.
41
The data we reviewed did not capture the number of calls that were disconnected because the
contact center was too overloaded to handle them.
116
Design
A number of factors contributed to the contact centers customer service failures
during its first year of operation. One factor was that state officials did not
accurately predict the number of staff the contact center would need when
designing MNsures customer service strategy.
In February 2013, the Department of Human Services (DHS) assigned three staff
(which it called the Customer Service Team) to develop a customer service
strategy for the exchange that could be ready by September 2013.42 One of the
teams guiding principles was to design a customer service system that
provided the same level of service to all consumers, whether they purchased
commercial health insurance products through MNsure or enrolled in public
programs.43 The team reviewed existing state and county call centers and
technologies and found systemic problems that often result in poor service for
program participants. In response, they recommended that MNsure build a
state-operated call center that could serve as a front door and one-stop shop
for all of the exchanges health insurance options. In this model, they
recommended that MNsure and DHS collaborate to provide seamless service
between the contact center and existing customer service resources at DHS.
The Customer Service Team
Initial Plan for Contact Center Staffing, 2013
also designed the contact
Tier I
centers staffing structure.
15
basic contact center agents
They recommended that the
contact center transfer a
Tier II (specialists)
portion of its calls using an
2 Tribal enrollment specialists
1 Medical Assistance enrollment specialist
interactive voice response
1 Tax credits, brokers, and small employers specialist
(IVR), which routes calls
1 Public programs and childrens benefits specialist
based on a consumers
1 Complaints, grievances, and appeals specialist
selection from a menu of
1 Pharmacy and carrier network specialist
options. The rest of the calls
Total
would be handled or
22 contact center agents
transferred by customer
service agents, separated into two tiers. According to the teams design, Tier I
agents were supposed to answer basic questions and refer callers to consumer
assisters or other call centers. Tier II specialists were supposed to handle more
complicated cases and complaints and be trained in specific areas, like tax credits
or childrens benefits.
The team recommended that MNsure hire a total of 22 customer service agents,
with up to 7 specialists. They based this number on: historical call data from
42
43
These guiding principles were laid out in Minnesota Health Insurance Blueprint Application:
2.0 Consumer and Stakeholder Engagement and Support (St. Paul, November 2012), 2. MNsure
Customer Service Recommendations Focused on Contact Center (St. Paul, April 2013), 3.
OPERATIONS
117
DHS call centers; assumptions about MNsures usage rates; and standard
forecasting methods, which assumed calls would be answered in two minutes or
less, on average. Overall, the team projected that the call center would receive
around 1,060 calls per day during the open enrollment period.
State officials underestimated contact center call volumes and staffing needs during the first
year of the exchange.
In June 2013, MNsure hired a contact center manager to implement the Customer
Service Teams plans and recommendations. Early on, contact center staff were
concerned about the accuracy of the teams call volume and staffing projections.
Staff noted, for example, that MNsures contact center was slated to handle calls
from a wider variety of programs, with more complex cases, than the DHS call
centers the Customer Service Team used as points of comparison. The teams
plan also did not consider how staffing might be affected if the exchange
experienced any technical problems, which, by this point, MNsure staff knew
was a possibility. When contact center staff expressed their concerns to
MNsures leadership, they were given authority to hire five additional customer
service agents. But contact center staff told us that even if the online application
had worked perfectly, MNsure probably would have needed more than the
number of customer service agents it initially hired.
Exhibit 6.4 shows the call volume and staffing levels the Customer Service Team
projected for MNsures first open enrollment period and for the remainder of the
year, compared with actual levels. It also shows the contact centers actual
customer service performance (in terms of wait times and abandoned calls)
compared with the Customer Service Teams projections. As shown in the
exhibit, the contact centers actual call volumes and staffing needs were much
higher than the Customer Service Team projected. Over the course of open
enrollment, for example, MNsure received more than twice as many calls per
month, on average, as it anticipated. Actual wait times and call abandonment
rates were also much higher than the team predicted.
MNsure waited until well into the first open enrollment period to contract with a vendor to
provide extra customer service staff.
The Customer Service Team developed its staffing recommendations under the
assumption that MNsure would hire a vendor to provide extra agents during the
initial open enrollment period, and as needed thereafter. MNsure staff
considered one vendors proposal before October 2013, but they deemed it too
expensive. The agency did not hire a vendor to provide extra customer service
staff until February 2014, less than two months before the end of the first open
enrollment period.44
44
The vendors customer service agents began training on February 5 and answering calls on
February 13. However, MNsures contract with the vendor was not officially signed until
February 21, 2014. All of these agents were trained at the Tier I level and answered calls at a
separate site.
118
27,560
22
0.5
8.8%
58,143
a
80
24.3
37.5%
3,782
6
0.6
9.3%
37,269
76a
11.3
25.8%
NOTES: MNsure projected the contact center would receive 1,060 calls per day during open
enrollment and 163 calls per day during the remainder of the year. Between October 1, 2013, and
March 31, 2014, the contact center was open on 156 days; between April 1 and August 29, 2014, the
contact center was open on 116 days. We did not include September 2013 data in these figures
since the exchange had not yet opened.
a
This figure includes both MNsure contact center agents and vendor agents.
The month before the back-up vendor was put in place, callers were waiting on
hold an average of 40 minutes, and nearly 60 percent gave up before ever talking
to a customer service agent. As seen in Exhibit 6.5, the new vendor added over
100 agents at the end of February and in March 2014, and fewer in April, May,
and June. Although wait times and abandon rates greatly improved in these
months, as seen in Exhibits 6.2 and 6.3, the contact center still failed to achieve
its customer service goals for most of this period.
OPERATIONS
119
Estimated
Number of
Staff Needed
6
22
22
22
22
22
22
6
6
6
6
6
108a
102
69
49
31
-
27
30
29
42
58
162
160
124
97
76
43
42
NOTE: MNsures contact center opened on September 3, 2013, in advance of the first day of the
exchange, October 1, 2013.
a
Vendor staff did not begin taking calls until February 13, 2014.
SOURCES: Estimated Number of Staff Needed was taken from Customer Service
Recommendations focused on Contact Center (St. Paul, April 2013). Actual staffing data were
provided by MNsure.
contact center agents accessed MNsures system for the first time when the
exchange opened on October 1, 2013.45
In our surveys of
Assister Responses to the Following Survey
consumers and
Statement: Call center representatives were
knowledgeable.
consumer assisters,
we asked them about
Navigators
CACs
Brokers
their experiences with Always or almost always
8%
9%
2%
MNsures over-theOften
27
25
13
46
phone help. While
Sometimes
49
40
48
Rarely or never
11
19
31
most navigators and
brokers we surveyed
said customer service representatives were courteous, a majority said they were
sometimes or rarely or never knowledgeable.47 As one certified application
counselor said, Call center representatives [were] polite but initially only able to
45
As of mid-September 2014, contact center agents still did not have access to a training version of
MNsures online application.
46
As we discuss later in this chapter, some navigators and certified application counselors did not
understand the difference between the MNsure contact center and the Assister Resource Center (a
phone support line for navigators and CACs). So, in our surveys, we asked them to evaluate their
experiences with any of the phone support they received. We asked brokers to evaluate their
experiences with the Broker Line at the MNsure contact center.
47
Seventy-one percent of navigators, 70 percent of CACs, and 63 percent of brokers said customer
service representatives always or almost always or often provided courteous service.
120
offer empathy rather than answers. The majority of consumer assisters also said
customer service representatives sometimes or rarely or never resolved their
questions or concerns the first time they called.48
In addition, more consumers rated the help
Surveyed Consumers Ratings of
they received from the contact center as
the Help They Received from the
poor or very poor than good or very Contact Center
good.49 Many people also told us they
Very good
6%
Good
12
received conflicting information from
Fair
14
various customer service agents. As one
Poor
11
consumer described, [Each representative]
Very poor
25
told me a different answer and often passed
Did not use/no opinion
31
me along with no direct answers or, worse
yet, inaccurate information. Contact center agents struggled to provide callers
with helpful information, at least in part, because MNsure leadership did not
provide agents with talking points or solutions related to callers technical
problems.
Technical Calls
During the first year of operations, MNsure did not have an adequate strategy for handling
callers technical questions.
When consumers began experiencing major technical problems with MNsures
online application in the fall of 2013, the contact center became inundated with
calls. Exhibit 6.6 shows the volume of calls MNsure expected compared with the
actual number of calls it received from October 2013 to August 2014. When call
volume skyrocketed, the contact centers two-tiered staffing structure dissolved
and all available staff began handling as many calls as possible.
Even if the contact center had more agents, they would not have been able to
resolve callers technical questions because none of the Tier II specialists were
trained to handle them. In fact, MNsure had no available technical staff to which
contact center agents could refer technical calls. As a result, contact center
agents with no technical training were left helping consumers with technical
problemswhich, from October 2013 to April 2014, was the contact centers
second most common type of call.
48
Sixty-one percent of CACs, 67 percent of navigators, and 85 percent of brokers we surveyed said
call center representatives sometimes or rarely or never resolved their concerns so they did not
have to make a second call.
49
Thirty-one percent of consumers said they did not use the contact center or had no opinion about
it in their survey responses.
OPERATIONS
121
Actual
60,000
Projected
40,000
20,000
0
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug.
2013
2014
Contact center staff were not satisfied with the temporary strategies MNsure
leadership employed over the course of the first year to deal with these types of
calls.50 Starting in November 2013, contact center agents could notify a technical
team of DHS, Office of MN.IT Services, and Maximus staff about callers
technical issues.51 If a consumer called in after receiving an error message or
getting stuck, contact center agents recorded the issue (which they called
creating a ticket) and sent the ticket to the team. But contact center staff said
this arrangement did not work well because the technical team did not directly
take calls. In addition, when the team resolved issues, they did not inform the
contact center or the callers. Contact center staff said they struggled throughout
the first open enrollment period to get information from technical staff about
fixes that had been developed. At one point, contact center agents were
instructed to simply tell callers to call back in two weeks in the hopes that their
technical issues had been resolved.
By December 2013, MNsure relocated some technical team members to the
contact center to help track technical issues and improve communication about
solutions that were available. But the technical team members still did not
50
MNsure hosted a temporary conference call (called a bridge) that contact center leadership
could call during the first week of the exchange to get answers to technical questions. When the
exchange opened, this was the only support system the contact center had for handling callers
technical questions.
51
Maximus was one of the firms in charge of building MNsures technical infrastructure.
122
handle calls directly, and contact center staff said this was not very effective. By
April 2014, the technical team left the contact center, and customer service
agents remained without adequate technical support during the summer of 2014.
Contact center staff told us that establishing an adequate mechanism for handling
callers technical issues was their biggest priority for MNsures second year.
Shortly before the second open enrollment period began, MNsure made available
two e-mail addresses the contact center leadership could use to get answers about
callers technical issues. But contact center staff told us in January 2015 that this
strategy was still insufficientdescribing it as a last minute Band-Aid again this
year.
MNsures contact center was not well coordinated with other customer service resources.
Minnesotas health insurance exchange is connected to several public programs
as well as private health insurers, so the contact centers referral protocols are
complex. For example, the contact center refers calls about Medical Assistance
to DHSs Minnesota Health Care Programs Member Help Desk, calls about
MinnesotaCare to the DHS MinnesotaCare Operations call center, and calls
about specific health insurance products to insurers.53 It also refers consumers to
hundreds of individual brokers and navigators and to many other state and county
resourcesall of which adhere to different hours, policies, and customer service
52
Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange Blueprint Application Documentation, 2.0 Consumer and
Stakeholder Engagement and Support: Contact Center (St. Paul, November 2012), 2; and MNsure
Customer Service Recommendations Focused on Contact Center (St. Paul, April 2013), 3.
53
Contact center agents transfer and refer callers to many different customer service resources,
including: all of the health and dental plans sold on MNsure; health care providers; hundreds of
brokers, CACs, and navigators; the County Line (which refers callers to county human service
agencies); tribal agencies; the Disability Linkage Line; the Senior LinkAge Line; LinkVet; the
Assister Resource Center; the Minnesota Health Care Programs Member Help Desk;
MinnesotaCare Operations; the Provider Help Desk; the Managed Care Ombudsman; the MMIS
Resource Center; the Minnesota Family Planning Program; and the State Medical Review Team.
OPERATIONS
123
standards. This makes it challenging for the contact center to provide seamless
referrals and to ensure that all callers received the same level of service.
Many consumer assisters we surveyed said there was not enough coordination
between the contact center and other customer service resources. As one broker
explained, The disconnect between the carriers, MNsure, and the county was
very painful. Similarly, a navigator said, DHS would tell us one thing and
MNsure another. For example, when consumers went through the application
process, were determined eligible for a DHS-administered public program, and
then got stuck in the online system, DHS often referred them back to MNsures
contact center for help. But MNsure staff told us that once consumers were
deemed eligible for a public program, they were sent to DHS. Thus, there was a
lack of clarity about which agency was responsible for handling these issues.
The majority of navigators and brokers said customer service representatives
only sometimes or rarely or never provided appropriate referrals when they
did not know the answer to a question.54 Some navigators and brokers said call
center representatives from various agencies referred consumers to them when
representatives did not know the answer to a question. One navigator said, Call
centers often just passed the buck. [They] would refer clients to navigators when
they should have answered clients questions.
One source of the confusion between MNsures contact center and other call
centers was that each had different degrees of access to consumers information.
For example, although DHS and MNsure have an agreement to share consumers
data, DHS had notas of January 2015granted contact center agents access to
the DHS public program information systems that contained the data. This
access would make it easier for MNsure contact center staff to identify and
resolve some callers issues without transferring them to another call center.55
Counties also had a different degree of access to consumers case information.
As one certified application counselor explained, The countycant see what
MNsure sees [on an application].
RECOMMENDATION
MNsure should improve its referral guidance for customer service staff in its contact center and
in DHS and county call centers.
Over the course of the contact centers first year, staff developed dozens of
protocols diagramming when, where, and in what manner calls should be
transferred to and from the contact center. They also developed some guidance
about the kinds of calls other call centers could handle. But, judging from
concerns we heard from users, these efforts were insufficient.
54
Forty-nine percent of certified application counselors, 57 percent of navigators, and 75 percent of
brokers said customer service representatives sometimes or rarely or never made appropriate
referrals when consumers asked questions for which they did not have answers.
55
Also, when MNsure contact center staff have called DHS for information on specific cases, DHS
has not provided this information verbally.
124
Changes
The contact center failed to provide adequate customer service to callers during
the first year of the exchange, but MNsure made changes to address some of its
problems for the second year. For example, by November 15, 2014, the first day
of the second open enrollment period, MNsure had a total of 239 customer
service agents taking callsa dramatic increase from the 27 agents that started in
the fall of 2013. A majority of the customer service agents answering calls in the
56
The Broker Line was staffed by MNsure contact center agents and was a part of the contact
center.
57
Before the exchange was implemented, the Assister Resource Center supported the Department
of Human Services Minnesota Community Application Agent Program, the precursor to MNsures
Navigator Program.
58
Also, some assisters unwittingly dialed into the Broker Line or ARC and incorrectly thought they
were speaking to regular contact center agents.
59
As of January 2015, MNsure considered ARCs relocation to the contact center a pilot project.
OPERATIONS
125
ADVERTISING
MNsure was created to help enroll uninsured people and, more generally, to help
Minnesotans make informed choices about health insurance. Consequently,
MNsure leaders tried to find ways to convey their messages to a wide array of
Minnesotans. During planning for the exchange, a work group offered advice on
possible approaches:
The Outreach Work Group acknowledges the value of utilizing
all marketing tactics to ensure an effective marketing campaign
across the entire audience. The group strongly feels a larger
effort should be expended on grassroots outreach through
organizations that already serve their community rather than
mass advertising.62
Earlier, we discussed MNsures consumer assistance grants, which provided
some of the grassroots outreach referenced above.
In addition, exchange officials entered into other contracts for marketing and
outreach in preparation for the first open enrollment period. The main contracts
are shown in Exhibit 6.7. For example, the exchange spent more than $200,000
to research, test, and develop a brand. As stated in law, a purpose of the
exchange is to establish and modify as necessary a name and brand for [the
exchange] based on market studies that show maximum effectiveness in
attracting the uninsured and motivating them to take action.63 Exchange
officials hired a vendor that developed options for the exchanges name and
designed possible logos.64
60
According to MNsure staff, about 75 MNsure contact center agents and 164 vendor agents were
taking calls when the second open enrollment period began on November 15, 2014. At that time,
the contact center also had about 23 permanent staff performing work other than answering calls.
61
In the second open enrollment period, the contact centers automated voice recordings no longer
provided callers with estimated wait times, in contrast to contact center practice during much of the
first period. Also, the contact centers prerecorded messages in the second period gave some
inaccurate information. For example, on December 13, 2014, a recorded call center message said
that over 3,000 assisters were available to help consumers. But on that date, according to
MNsures online assister directory, MNsure only had 1,335 certified assisters.
62
Outreach, Communications and Marketing Work Group, Report to the Health Insurance
Exchange Advisory Task Force (St. Paul, December 11, 2012), 29.
63
64
The 2013 law that created the exchange called it the Minnesota Insurance Marketplace. The
Legislature adopted the MNsure name into law later in the 2013 session.
126
Contract Dates
Salter Mitchell
Himle Rapp
Haberman
BBDO
SideDish
Total
Key Focus
Research on potential
audiences and messages
Public relations plan
Branding the exchange
Outreach, especially the
advertising campaign
Testimonial radio/TV ads
Amount
$ 165,901
34,000
210,000
1,592,047
112,900
$2,114,848
The largest contract shown in Exhibit 6.7 (about $1.6 million) was primarily for
development and purchase of advertising.65 Shortly before open enrollment
began in October 2013, MNsure began publicizing itself through television,
radio, and other ads featuring state icons Paul Bunyan and Babe the Blue Ox.
The ads showed Paul sustaining injuries, with the message: Minnesota: Land
of 10,000 Reasons to Get Health Insurance. Because MNsure was completely
new, the ads were intended to create a general awareness of MNsure. The
original plan was to run the Paul and Babe ads through the entire open enrollment
period (ending in March 2014). But, in late 2013, MNsure management decided
to discontinue the ads. Some testimonial adsfeaturing consumers who had
enrolled in MNsureaired during the final two months of open enrollment.
MNsures advertising campaign during the first open enrollment period helped to increase
awareness of the exchange, but the campaigns effectiveness was undermined by MNsures
technical problems.
The contractor that developed the original advertising campaign hired a firm to
conduct an evaluation of the campaign; this evaluation did not examine the
testimonial ads. The evaluation was based on surveys given to samples of
Minnesotans before and after the ad campaign. The evaluation showed that
75 percent of respondents were aware of MNsure after the ad campaign
(compared with 20 percent before the campaign), and more than half the
respondents said they had seen a MNsure ad multiple times. But, the evaluation
65
The original BBDO contract (for $666,590) was increased to about $1.6 million, but this
amendment occurred after the additional work was completed. This resulted in an audit finding in:
Office of the Legislative Auditor, Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange: MNsure, Internal
Controls and Compliance Audit, July 2011 through December 2013 (St. Paul, October 28, 2014),
11-13. Also, one component of the BBDO contract was a $70,000 subcontract for an outreach
plan. This plan was issued in May 2013, but many of its recommended strategies were not used in
the first year of enrollment.
OPERATIONS
127
said, The enormous gains in awareness did not translate into intention to enroll
in MNsure.66 This suggested that the ads probably did not have much impact on
enrollment.
The Paul and Babe ads were memorable, but they provided little information
about MNsure. The evaluation of the ads reported that the commercials lacked
the educational value.67 In addition, only 28 percent of survey respondents who
were shown a Paul and Babe commercial said they could relate to the ad.68
The evaluation said that the ad campaign also showed an increase in negative
impressions of MNsure. It said that problems with the websites functionality
and related media coverage contributed to the negative impressions.
DATA SECURITY
Information that MNsure collects, creates, or maintains regarding individuals
who apply for health coverage is classified by law as not public.69 During the
application process, individuals may be required to provide sensitive information,
such as birthdates, Social Security numbers, and income. An applicant may also
be asked to provide information about which, if any, family members have
communicable diseases, terminal illnesses, or mental illnesses. Because there is
considerable legislative interest in the protection of these data, we examined
some issues related to data security.
In 2013, as the Legislature discussed bills to establish MNsure, legislators asked
many questions about the security and privacy of data that would be provided to
the exchange. MNsures 2013 enabling legislation contained a section that
specified how MNsure should handle the data it collected.70 For example, the
law makes MNsure subject to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act,
which defines various types of data and specifies who has access to each type of
data.71 State law says MNsure may share data with other state or federal agencies
to help verify individual identities, determine eligibility, process enrollments,
process premiums, or investigate fraud, but it must have data-sharing agreements
with those agencies before this occurs.72
The Affordable Care Act required the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to develop standards and protocols to ensure security and privacy when
individuals enroll in federal and state health care programs. The department
66
Ibid., 20.
68
Ibid.
69
70
71
Ibid., subd. 1.
72
Ibid., subd. 5(a). State law also authorizes MNsure to share information with nongovernmental
entities for these purposes, provided that MNsure has contracts with these entities that comply with
the states government data practices provisions.
128
73
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Minimum Acceptable Risk Standards for ExchangesExchange Reference Architecture
Supplement, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC, August 1, 2012), 2.
74
WIPFLi, MNsure Security Assessment Report, August 29, 2013. The report is not a public
document.
75
76
Jane Kim, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, [Chief Information Security Officer]
Reviewer Overall Comments & Recommendations, September 28, 2013. The document said this
was based on various considerations, including 110 security controls not documented or
incomplete.
OPERATIONS
129
77
WIPFLi, MNsure Security Assessment Report, June 6, 2014. The report is not a public
document. The report said: Due to the limited nature of this assessment, and the fact that it is a
point in time assessment, we cannot provide an opinion as to the overall security posture of the
MNsure system and organizational environment (p. 2). This assessment excluded review
of (1) security controls that had been implemented before the first review and did not have
moderate or high risks at that time; and (2) security controls deemed not critical.
78
However, there was an incident in September 2013 in which a MNsure employee inadvertently
sent not-public information about a large number of insurance brokers to a broker. See Office of
the Legislative Auditor, MNsure: An Unauthorized Disclosure of Private Data, Special Review
(St. Paul, November 7, 2013).
79
80
Ibid.
130
At a September 2013 legislative hearing, MNsure was asked about the status of
its audit trail capabilities.81 A MNsure official described how MNsure
intended to analyze a large volume of data for the purpose of tracking every
single view or modification to any piece of personally identifiable data within
[the] system. The official seemed to indicate that this capability was still under
development, so a legislator asked if there was a timeline for putting this in place.
The MNsure official responded, in part: The audit trail is fully functional within
the system.
To better understand the functionality of MNsures audit trail system, we talked
with Office of MN.IT Services staff. We learned that, prior to October 1, 2013,
the plan to install a system-wide, integrated analytics system to help MNsure
monitor access to data and identify possible privacy breaches was postponed
indefinitely. We were told in late 2014 that action on this system has been
postponed until at least 2015.
Without such a system, MNsure still has the ability to review who has accessed
not-public data, but in limited ways. For example, if an individual wants to know
who has accessed his or her private data, MNsure can look at its records to
determine this. However, MNsure does not currently have the ability to do
large-scale reviews of its entire enrollee database to identify red flags that
might indicate inappropriate access.
In our view, MNsures response to a 2013 legislative question on this topic did
not provide a sufficiently clear picture of MNsures audit trail capabilities. We
have no reason to think that MNsures response was intentionally misleading.
Nevertheless, we think it is important to clarify that while MNsure has
established the data audit trail required by state law, MNsures ability to
identify and investigate possible cases of inappropriate access is, at this time,
somewhat limited.
81
List of Recommendations
The Legislature should amend state law to give the governor, rather than the
MNsure Board, authority to appoint the MNsure chief executive officer.
(p. 55)
MNsure should develop ways to improve its access to the applicant and
enrollee data it collectsfor the purpose of assessing MNsure performance,
generating management reports, and responding to public inquiries. (p. 62)
MNsure and DHS should ensure that brokers are fairly compensated for
enrolling consumers in insurance through MNsure. (p. 109)
MNsure should improve its referral guidance for customer service staff in its
contact center and in DHS and county call centers. (p. 123)
134
APPENDIX A
135
136
APPENDIX A
137
140
Governor
Pawlenty
prohibits
ACA-related
planning
Affordable
Care Act
signed into
law
2010
JAN
Governor Dayton
authorizes state
to seek ACA
planning grants
2011
JUL
Minnesota
receives first
ACA planning
grant
State
issues RFP
seeking
vendors for
technical
prototypes
Department of
Commerce
establishes
Minnesota
Health
Insurance
Exchange
Advisory Task
Force
JAN
JUL
Exchange task
force issues initial
recommendations
Commerce
contracts with
vendors to
develop
exchanges
technical
infrastructure
2012
Governor
Dayton
elected
Legislatively
mandated
task force
says
Minnesota
well
positioned to
develop an
exchange
JAN
JUL
Governor
Dayton directs
Commerce to
build
exchange
Governor
Dayton
announces
plan to move
exchange to
different
agency (MMB)
Minnesota
submits its
blueprint for
exchange to
federal officials
Minnesotas
exchange is
conditionally
approved by
federal officials
APPENDIX B
141
2013
MNsureenabling
legislation
signed into
law by
Governor
Dayton
Governor
Dayton
appoints
MNsure Board
JAN
MNsure board
assumes its
full authority
from MMB
2014
Launch of
MNsure
website
JUL
MNsure hires
Deloitte as lead
contact with its
technology
vendors
MNsure hires
Optum for
external
assessment
MNsure
receives
authority to
connect to
federal data
hub
Second open
enrollment
period begins
First open
enrollment
period
ends
JAN
JUL
MNsure
executive
director
resigns;
replacement
named
Rating Area
Number
Region
South East
North East
South Central
South West
Mid Central
West Central
North Central
Twin Cities
North West
2
7
6
5
4
8
3
Counties
Dodge, Fillmore, Freeborn, Goodhue, Houston,
Mower, Olmsted, Steele, Wabasha, Winona
Carlton, Cook, Itasca, Koochiching, Lake,
Lake of the Woods, Saint Louis
Blue Earth, Faribault, Le Sueur, Martin, Nicollet,
Rice, Waseca, Watonwan
Brown, Cottonwood, Jackson, Lincoln, Murray,
Nobles, Pipestone, Redwood, Rock
Big Stone, Chippewa, Kandiyohi, Lac qui Parle,
Lyon, McLeod, Meeker, Renville, Sibley, Swift,
Yellow Medicine
Becker, Clay, Douglas, Grant, Otter Tail, Pope,
Stevens, Traverse, Wilkin
Aitkin, Beltrami, Cass, Chisago, Crow Wing,
Hubbard, Isanti, Kanabec, Mille Lacs, Morrison,
Pine, Roseau, Todd, Wadena
Anoka, Benton, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin,
Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne, Stearns, Washington,
Wright
Clearwater, Kittson, Mahnomen, Marshall, Norman,
Pennington, Polk, Red Lake
The federal Public Health Service Act, as amended by the Affordable Care Act,
requires states to establish geographic divisions known as rating areas.1 A
health insurance enrollees rating area of residence is one of four factors that may
be considered by health insurers when varying the premium to be paid by the
enrollee for any given insurance product sold in the individual or small-group
market, whether through MNsure or not.2 To be presumed adequate by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the number of rating areas in
a state must not exceed one more than the number of metropolitan statistical
areas in that state.3 State law requires that geographic rating areas contain no
fewer than seven counties that create a contiguous region.4 Minnesotas rating
areas were defined by the states departments of Commerce and Health.
The other factors that may affect the premium are the age of the enrollee, whether the enrollee
uses tobacco products, and whether the insurance product covers an individual or a family.
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
as having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants. Portions of Minnesota are
included in eight MSAs, some of which have their principal cities in North Dakota or Wisconsin.
Therefore, Minnesota could have a maximum of nine rating areas.
100%
138%
200%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
8
$11,670
15,730
19,790
23,850
27,910
31,970
36,030
40,090
$16,105
21,707
27,310
32,913
38,516
44,119
49,721
55,324
$23,340
31,460
39,580
47,700
55,820
63,940
72,060
80,180
250%
$ 29,175
39,325
49,475
59,625
69,775
79,925
90,075
100,225
275%
$ 32,093
43,258
54,423
65,588
76,753
87,918
99,083
110,248
NOTE: The 2014 Federal Poverty Guidelines are used to make eligibility determinations for coverage year 2015.
a
For families/households with more than 8 persons, add $4,060 to the 100 percent column for each additional person.
400%
$ 46,680
62,920
79,160
95,400
111,640
127,880
144,120
160,360
Projection 1
The 2013 Gruber-Gorman report projected that if MinnesotaCare were
implemented as the Basic Health Program, the number of uninsured people in
Minnesota under the ACA would drop by between 298,000 and 340,000 people
(up to 68 percent) in 2016 from the projected uninsurance rate without the ACA
(10.9 percent). This would mean that there would be as few as 159,000
uninsured Minnesotans in 2016.
In fact, a 2014 study estimated that the number of uninsured people in Minnesota
fell by 180,520 people (40 percent) from the Fall 2013 uninsurance rate of
8.2 percent.1 As of May 1, 2014, there were an estimated 264,480 uninsured
Minnesotans. Thus, as of mid-2014, Minnesotas number of uninsured people
was greater than the number that Gruber-Gorman projected for 2016.
Projection 2
The Gruber-Gorman report projected that the individual insurance market would
cover 530,000 individuals in 2016. It said there would be little change in the
number of people covered by employer-sponsored insurance. Projection 2 did
not contemplate the availability of MinnesotaCare as the Basic Health Program.
Julie Sonier, Elizabeth Lukanen, and Lynn Blewett, Early Impacts of the Affordable Care Act on
Health Insurance Coverage in Minnesota (Minneapolis: State Health Access Data Assistance
Center, University of Minnesota, June 2014).
148
Projection 3
The 2013 Gruber-Gorman report projected that Minnesotas health insurance
exchange would enroll 1.3 million people in 2016. The report estimated that
qualified health plans would account for 35 percent of total enrollments through
the exchange, assuming that the state retained MinnesotaCare as the Basic Health
Program. In fact, the exchange enrolled approximately 371,000 people as of
November 11, 2014. About 15 percent of these enrollments were in qualified
health plans.
Projection 4
The Gruber-Gorman report projected that overall premium costs in the individual
marketinside and outside the exchangewould fall by 34 percent on average
after accounting for subsidies, relative to what premiums in that market would
have been in 2016 had the ACA not been implemented. The report estimated
that 70 percent of the individual market would experience no change or a
decrease in premiums. Projection 4 did not contemplate the availability of
MinnesotaCare as the Basic Health Program.
In fact, an analysis by Yale University economist Amanda Kowalski,
supplemented by our own research, showed that, as of mid-2014, premium costs
in the overall individual market in Minnesota averaged 5 percent higher,
accounting for tax credits received through MNsure, than what premiums in that
market would have been in mid-2014 if the Affordable Care Act had not been
implemented and there were no changes in plan characteristics.3
Specifically, the Kowalski study projected that, without the ACA, average
premiums in the individual market in Minnesota would have been $230 per
month if trends since 2008 had persisted into the second quarter of 2014. Actual
average premiums in Minnesotas overall individual marketboth inside and
outside of MNsureas of mid-2014 were $256 per month, not accounting for
subsidies. This represented an increase of 11 percent over Kowalskis estimate
of average premiums without the ACA.
We extended Kowalskis analysis using enrollment data from the Office of
MN.IT Services to account for the average advanced premium tax credit taken by
qualified health plan enrollees who received it, which amounted to around $203.
That tax credit was only taken by about 7 percent of the overall individual
market. After weighting to account for that, the average monthly premium paid
in the overall individual market was $242 as of mid-2014, a 5 percent increase
2
3
Ibid., 6.
Amanda Kowalski, The Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act State-by-State (Washington, DC:
Economic Studies at Brookings, September 2014).
APPENDIX E
149
over what Kowalski estimated individual market premiums would have been
without the ACA.
It is not currently known what percentage of the overall individual market
experienced no change or a decrease in premiums. Our survey of MNsure
qualified health plan enrollees found that 69 percent of those who had previously
purchased insurance directly from an insurer said that their MNsure premiums,
after subsidies, are better than or about the same as their previous insurance
premiums.
152
Grantee
Arrowhead Economic Opportunity Agencya
C.A.R.E. Clinic
Central MN Jobs and Training Services
Centro Cultural Chicano
Children's Dental Services
Communicating for Americaa
a
Community Resource Connections
Comunidades Latinas Unidas en Servicio (CLUES)a
Confederation of Somali Community in MN
Dakota County
Family Tree Clinic
Generations Healthcare Initiativesa
a
Health Access MN
HealthFinders Collaborative
a
Hmong American Partnership
International Institute of MN
McDonough Organization with Respect and Equality for
People (MORE)
Minneapolis Urban Leaguea
MN Adult and Teen Challenge
MN AIDS Projecta
MN Chippewa Tribea
MN Community Action Partnership
MN Council of Churches
MN Recovery Connection
a
National Alliance on Mental Illness
NorthPoint Health and Wellness Centera
a
Pillsbury United Communities
Planned Parenthood MN, ND, SDa
a
Portico Healthnet
ResourceWest
a
Somali Health Solutions
Southside Community Health Servicesa
Springboard for the Arts
Stairstep Foundationa
Sub-Saharan African Youth and Family Services in MN
West Side Community Health Servicesa
a
Western Community Action
Women's Health Center of Duluth, P.A.
Total
Grant Award
Number of
People Enrolled
People Enrolled,
as a Percentage
of Enrollment
Goal in Contract
$128,000
20,000
118,836
47,293
35,000
38,836
141,600
99,120
50,000
190,367
30,000
230,369
326,606
31,662
153,552
128,560
864
142
1,080
124
18
221
337
350
47
0
142
2,024
1,729
516
2,196
1,419
229%
29
63
41
18
44
65
101
3
0
142
174
29
172
211
71
2,407
100,000
56,640
192,576
192,573
424,150
159,830
45,000
125,000
138,052
100,000
150,333
377,592
45,974
149,421
94,400
50,032
100,000
25,000
75,000
257,183
21,385
75
118
379
649
66
2,786
240
166
31
1,992
375
572
6,162
133
1,721
946
31
173
83
493
1,183
191
29,774
33
59
24
43
7
70
75
66
6
203
94
11
103
76
143
20
9
58
55
66
59
76
58%
NOTES: This exhibit only includes the 28 grantees that set enrollment goals in their contracts with the state. The enrollment figures
presented here represent our best estimates of the number of consumers successfully enrolled with the help of a navigator, based on our
analysis of MNsures payment reports. Because of MNsures weak recordkeeping and problems with MNsure's enrollment system, we
could not independently verify the exact number of navigator-aided enrollments, as explained in Chapter 6. Enrollments facilitated by
navigator organizations that did not receive grant funds were not included in this table. Enrollments facilitated by subcontractor
organizations were included in the primary grantees total enrollments.
a
Grantee received additional funds for outreach and enrollment activities in the 2014-15 enrollment year through another round of
MNsure grant awards.
SOURCES: MNsures grant contracts and Office of the Legislative Auditors analysis of MNsures enrollment payment reports.
APPENDIX F
153
Grantee
Accountability MN
Arrowhead Economic Opportunity Agency
C.A.R.E. Clinic
Central MN Jobs and Training Services
Centro Cultural Chicano
Children's Dental Services
Communicating for America
Community Resource Connections
Comunidades Latinas Unidas en Servicio
Confederation of Somali Community in MN
Dakota County
Family Tree Clinic
Generations Healthcare Initiatives
Health Access MN
HealthFinders Collaborative
Hmong American Partnership
International Institute of MN
Minneapolis Urban League
MN Adult and Teen Challenge
MN AIDS Project
MN Chippewa Tribe
MN Community Action Partnership
MN Council of Churches
MN Recovery Connection
National Alliance on Mental Illness
NorthPoint Health and Wellness Center
Pillsbury United Communities
Planned Parenthood MN, ND, SD
Portico Healthnet
ResourceWest
Somali Health Solutions
Southside Community Health Services
Springboard for the Arts
Stairstep Foundation
Sub-Saharan African Youth and Family
Services in MN
West Side Community Health Services
Western Community Action
Women Venture
Women's Health Center of Duluth, P.A.
Reported
Outreach
Events, as a
Percentage
of Goal in
Contract
Grant
Award
Number of
Outreach
Events, as
Reported
by Grantee
$ 41,337
128,000
20,000
118,836
47,293
35,000
38,836
141,600
99,120
50,000
190,367
30,000
230,369
326,606
31,662
153,552
128,560
100,000
56,640
192,576
192,573
424,150
159,830
45,000
125,000
138,052
100,000
150,333
377,592
45,974
149,421
94,400
50,032
100,000
526
114
52
150
93
42
26
22
56
15
23
550
204
294
60
161
349
42
119
208
125
1369
158
68
76
129
109
560
413
45
140
121
108
25
1,052%
146
325
313
2,325
420
130
92
193
125
192
4,583
1,569
74
120
847
241
700
66
114
179
1,521
93
1,700
117
33
95
1,120
25,000
75,000
257,183
45,746
21,385
63
65
950
24
19
252
346
280
242
360
417
a
7,917
104
127
Number of
People
Reached,
as Reported
by Grantee
24,195
333,398
42,043
6,071
4,478
1,562
5,000
1,322
5,656
3,500
63,228
5,000
97,721
11,034
1,500
15,528
4,460
37,036
1,187
115,571
5,489
2,769,505
3,287
10,219
71,437
1,849
28,370
37,755
30,814
465
51,000
2,272
46,102
200,000
2,143
10,212
9,869
673,647
876
Reported
People
Reached,
as a
Percentage
of Goal in
Contract
144%
1,334
210
467
110
312
100
26
377
58
315
100
244
46
107
2,724
1,025
7,407
37
770
253
27,695
1,027
204
1,587
66
142
95
a
116
173
45
115
4,000
11
101
164
48,118
219
NOTES: The performance data listed in this table were self-reported by grantees at the end of the grant period and were not
independently verified by MNsure or the Office of the Legislative Auditor. MNsure and its grantees defined an outreach or education
event broadly. For example, grantees considered radio or Internet-based ads and direct mailings to be outreach events. Also, the
McDonough Organization with Respect and Equality for People (MORE) is not included in this exhibit because it neither set outreach
goals with the state nor reported on any outreach activities at the end of the grant period.
a
SOURCES: Office of the Legislative Auditors review of MNsures grant contracts and grantees final reports to MNsure.
February 9, 2015
James Nobles
Legislative Auditor
Centennial Office Building, Room 140
658 Cedar Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
Dear Mr. Nobles:
Thank you for conducting a program evaluation of MNsure. We appreciate the professionalism shown
by you and your staff throughout this process. As you know, we welcome your review and view it as
part of an ongoing process of improvement for the organization. MNsures response to the specific
findings is attached.
First, we measure success thus far in several distinct ways. Since October 1, 2013, the uninsured rate
in Minnesota has dropped by 40 percent to less than five percent. Now, 95 percent of Minnesotans
have comprehensive, affordable health insurance coverage.
Second, MNsure has been instrumental in the enrollment of hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans in
comprehensive, affordable health coverage. Many of those who enrolled had previously not had
health insurance coverage. MNsure has added competition to the insurance market and transparency
to price comparison which, combined, drive down costs for Minnesotans. This is evidence of success.
Furthermore,MNsure has made dramatic improvements to the consumer experience in less than 24
months of operation. MNsure has completed its second open enrollment period and in contrast to year
one
Consumers are enrolling through the website with relative ease.
Call volume is high and call wait times are on average less than five minutes.
A robust statewide network of navigators, brokers and other assisters is in place to help
consumers enroll.
Consumers are saving money. Minnesotans who enrolled in qualified health plans saved over
$30 million as a result of tax credits on health insurance plans sold through MNsure.
We have a stong, multi-agency project management team and decision-making process in
place to set priorities.
We have a deep commitment to transparency and accountability.
We are listening, and our partners and stakeholders are informed and engaged with us as we
continue to grow and improve.
I appreciate your frequent mention of the hard work of the MNsure team in your report. Our entire
teamincluding our partners at MN.IT Services and the Department of Human Servicesis
extraordinarily dedicated to the mission and success of MNsure.
Scott Leitz
Chief Executive Officer
Attachments
OLA Summary Conclusion: In its first year of operations, MNsures failures outweighed
its achievements.
MNsure Response
To the extent this statement was intended to be the overall conclusion of this report, MNsure
strongly disagrees with this conclusion. Since October 1, 2013, the uninsured rate in
Minnesota has dropped by 40 percent with 95 percent of Minnesotans having
comprehensive, affordable health insurance coverage. To date, the MNsure IT system has
been instrumental in enrolling hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans in affordable health
coverage. Many of those enrolled did not previously have coverage. Minnesotans who
enrolled in qualified health plans through MNsure saved over $30 million as a result of tax
credits on health insurance plans sold through the Exchange.
For further context, all of this was accomplished as MNsure worked to stand up, from
scratch, a brand new state agency-developing and improving all of the business functions
necessary to support its mission outlined in Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 62V.
Significant improvements have been made to the enrollment process and customer service.
Minnesotans have received and continue to receive considerable benefits from the
existence of MNsure. For all of these reasons, MNsure cannot agree with the statement that
its failures outweighed its achievements.
Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS) in which the agencies presented Minnesotas
approach to Medicaid eligibility determinations going through the MNsure IT system.
Specifically, the agencies described the approach that the MNsure IT system would
simultaneously serve as the automated eligibility system for both the DHS (the state Medicaid
agency) and MNsure (the Exchange), and thus, would not fit neatly into the binary framework
suggested by the regulations and guidance which presumed one automated eligibility system
maintained by a State Medicaid agency and another separate automated eligibility
system maintained by an Exchange. Both MNsure and DHS explained that the approach
being built into the MNsure IT system most likely complies with the assess and hand-off
option for Medicaid eligibility, but the mechanics of the assessment and hand-off are
unique in that the system doing the assessment and the hand-off is the same system that
is being handed-off to.
Federal officials acknowledged that this approach appropriately met the regulatory
requirements, and that even though MNsure and DHS would be working very closely and that
the work of each agency could have benefits that accrue to the other (i.e. MNsure contact
center staff would field calls from public program enrollees requesting status updates) the
approach identified by the two agencies did not require a delegation of authority from DHS to
MNsure to conduct eligibility determinations because it was clear that DHS was continuing to
make the eligibility determinations for Medicaid, albeit on a shared IT system.
We believe that readers of this report would have a more accurate understanding of the
unique relationship of MNsure (the state agency), DHS, and the MNsure IT system if those
entities and terms were used in their correct context. In some cases an attempt has been
made to use the term MNsure enrollment system but the term is undefined and used
inconsistently throughout the report.
2. Scope of the time period being reviewed
MNsure appreciates that some mention was made of the time period being evaluated, but
believes that this reference was insufficient to give readers proper context for the sweeping
statements or findings made in this report. No mention is made of several key improvements
put in place for the second open enrollment period, even though information on these
improvements has been publicly disclosed and discussed. For example, functionality and
experience testing occurred prior to the release of new system functionality for the open
enrollment period; robust technical information and training was available to staff in advance
of the open enrollment period; public website was updated to make specific information
easier to access; and information about assisters and enrollment events was updated and
provided in a searchable format.
Chapter 1: Background
OLA Key Finding 1: Minnesotas health insurance exchange (MNsure) has some
important differences from other executive branch state agencies.
MNsure Response
MNsure generally agrees with this finding, but it is more accurate to characterize MNsure as
being a state agency subject to all the same requirements other state agencies with some
key exemptions and some additional requirements not applicable to any other state
agencies.
OLA Key Finding 2: In contrast to practices in many other states, Minnesotas exchange
provides a single website at which individuals eligibility for tax
credits and public health care programs can be determined.
MNsure Response
As has been explained above in this response, it is important to distinguish between the
roles played by MNsure (the state agency) and DHS and to clarify the co-development and
co-ownership of the MNsure IT system by the two agencies. MNsure (the state agency) has
no legal authority to determine eligibility for public programs. However, the two agencies
share an automated eligibility system in the MNsure IT system.
OLA Key Finding 2: Serious technical deficiencies plagued MNsures enrollment system
throughout its first year of operations.
MNsure Response
The limited functionality of the MNsure IT system on October 1, 2013, resulted in a
frustrating experience for many consumers who attempted to use the system. However, as
the impact of the system limitations became evident to the MNsure Board, it authorized
MNsure staff to quickly identify and implement solutions. There was an immediate focus on
identifying system issues, bringing appropriate resources to bear to address the issues, and
implementing fixes to address the issues.
In early 2014, MNsure leadership commissioned an end-to-end review of the MNsure IT
system by Optum Health. Based on the recommendations of the review, MNsure hired
Deloitte Consulting LLP as the lead vendor to assist the State in managing and
implementing MNsure IT system improvements. State operations and IT staff from MNsure,
DHS and MN.IT Services have worked tirelessly over the past year to make improvements
to provide consumers a better experience. As a result, the MNsure IT system is more stable
and is operating in a consumer-friendly manner for the 2015 open enrollment period.
OLA Key Finding 3: MNsure did too little testing of the technology it developed, and it
did not make sufficient use of state governments information
technology experts.
MNsure Response
It is generally true that too little testing was performed on the MNsure IT system prior to go
live in October1, 2013, but this should also be understood in the context of a non-negotiable
federal deadline of October 1, 2013, by which Minnesota was required to have the system
go live. As the MNsure IT system project has continued, improving the management of the
release schedule which includes allocating sufficient time for testing- has been a focus of
the project and significant improvements have been made. Initially vendor staff and
consultants were brought on board to expand the quality assurance effort. Over the past few
months, MN.IT Services has hired a state quality assurance manager and a team of quality
assurance staff to coordinate quality assurance on the project.
MNsure takes no position on the opinion of certain MN.IT Services officials that state IT
experts were not sufficiently involved in the development and implementation of the MNsure
IT system. However, MNsure does want to address the suggestion that this report provides
5
that MN.IT Services staff had no involvement in the development and implementation of the
MNsure IT System. To suggest this directly contradicts the facts of this project. While MN.IT
Services project management and oversight expertise may not have been utilized in the
early stages of this project, MN.IT Services staff have been deeply engaged in this project
and MNsures current coordination with MN.IT Services is robust. MNsure, MN.IT Services
and DHS are all focused on improving the functionality of the MNsure IT system.
OLA Key Finding 4: Because of technical problems with MNsures online enrollment
system, many Medical Assistance recipients did not receive timely
reviews of their eligibility.
MNsure Response
MNsure takes no position and defers to DHS (the state Medicaid agency) on this finding.
However, it is important to note that the appropriate reference in this finding should be to
MNsure IT system and not MNsure (the state agency).
OLA Recommendation: The Legislature should amend Minnesota Statutes chapter 62V to
ensure that MNsures future information technology work is
subject to oversight from the Office of MN.IT Services.
MNsure Response
MNsure takes no position on this recommendation.
Chapter 3: Governance
OLA Key Finding 1: The MNsure Board had little influence over the exchange operations
prior to the launch of the MNsure enrollment website.
MNsure Response
The MNsure enabling legislation directed an initial appointment of MNsure Board members
but did not provide those Board members with the authority to direct the actions of MNsure
until certain preconditions were met. These preconditions were fulfilled in late summer of
2013, and for this reason, MNsure generally agrees with this finding.
OLA Key Finding 2: MNsure staff withheld key information from the board and other
state officials during 2013.
MNsure Response
Since early 2014, MNsure leadership has placed a great emphasis on keeping the MNsure
Board and other key stakeholders informed of key developments related to agency
operations and the development of the MNsure IT system.
OLA Key Finding 3: MNsure leadership has not implemented some internal policies and
statutory requirements.
OLA Recommendation 1: The MNsure Board should ensure implementation of its
policies or, if necessary, revise policies that are not realistic to
implement.
OLA Recommendation 2: The MNsure Board should:
Adopt consumer assister compensation rates annually and
ensure that changes in the rates are published in the State
Register;
Adopt navigator, call center, and customer services policies
in 2015.
MNsure Response
As described in the report and further elaborated in this document, the Board and MNsure
staff took steps to address technical and operational issues during the first year of
operations as they became evident. For this reason, MNsure generally agrees with the
finding that it has not implemented some internal policies and statutory requirements, but
MNsure disputes the finding that certain policies and procedures have not been established
as required under Minnesota Statutes, section 62V.05, subdivision 4, paragraph a. The
business operational units with responsibility for these functions have implemented policies
and procedures to govern their day-to-day management of these functions as authorized by
the MNsure Boards Delegation of Authority Policy, and the statute places no further
requirements upon the establishment of these policies and procedures. Thus, the claim that
the policies and procedures have not been implemented is inaccurate. MNsure has
implemented this statutory requirement.
OLA Recommendation 3: The Legislature should amend state law to give the governor,
rather than the MNsure Board, authority to appoint the MNsure
chief executive officer.
MNsure Response
MNsure takes no position on this recommendation.
OLA Key Finding 4: The multi-agency governing structure for MNsures online
enrollment system lacks formal authority.
OLA Recommendation: The Legislature should establish in state law a structure for
governing MNsures online enrollment system.
MNsure Response
MNsure strongly supports the existing interagency governance structure for the MNsure IT
system. MNsure takes no position on the establishment by statute of a formal governance
structure for the MNsure IT system.
Chapter 4: Enrollment
OLA Key Finding 1: MNsure met its overall enrollment target for the first enrollment
period, but this target was seriously flawed due to a Department of
Human Services error that significantly underestimated Medical
Assistance enrollment.
MNsure Response
MNsure agrees that its overall enrollment target was accurate, but that the actual mix of
public and private consumers differed from the estimates.
OLA Key Finding 2: Survey results showed that 28 percent of individuals who enrolled in
commercial insurance through MNsure were uninsured immediately
before they enrolled.
MNsure Response
MNsure lacks the information to comment on the validity or accuracy of the survey results
presented in this finding, but can comment that the survey results appear to be generally
consistent with other third-party surveys showing a significant decrease in the rate of
Minnesotans without health insurance coverage.
OLA Key Finding 3: MNsures data reporting capabilities are weak, limiting its ability to
produce information for management and decision-making
purposes.
MNsure Response
MNsure, along with other state agencies, are focusing significant efforts on the development
and improvement of reporting capabilities. MNsure, DHS, and MN.IT Services are working to
develop and implement a data warehouse for the MNsure IT system and MNsure has
appointed a reporting manager within the Policy and Plan Management team to coordinate
the development and implementation of reporting at MNsure. MNsure generally agrees with
this finding.
8
OLA Recommendation: MNsure should develop ways to improve its access to the
applicant and enrollee data it collects- for the purpose of
assessing MNsure performance, generating management
reports, and responding to public inquiries.
MNsure Response
In the past few months, MNsure has worked with MN.IT Services to develop and implement
an Enrollment System of Record (ESOR) that will greatly improve MNsures ability to provide
reports to management, insurance carriers, and regulators. Additionally, as described
above, MNsure is collaborating with DHS and MN.IT Services on the development and
implementation of a data warehouse for the MNsure IT System to address this issue.
MNsure generally agrees with this finding.
OLA Key Finding 2: Individuals who enrolled through MNsure generally reported more
satisfaction than dissatisfaction with the products they purchased.
MNsure Response
MNsure lacks the information to comment on the validity or accuracy of the consumer
survey results presented in this finding but can comment that the survey results appear to
be generally consistent with other third-party surveys showing consumer satisfaction.
OLA Key Finding 3: Problems with MNsures enrollment system had a significant impact
on the ability of insurers and counties to manage individuals cases.
MNsure Response
With respect to insurers, MNsure has continued to work on improving the process of
enrollment data transmission. These efforts have included the construction of an Enrollment
System of Record (ESOR) that will better meet MNsures reporting needs, including the
submission of enrollment data to insurers and regulators. In addition, it is anticipated that the
current development and implementation of a data warehouse for the MNsure IT System will
assist in addressing this issue. MNsure generally agrees with this finding.
10
Chapter 6: Operations
OLA Key Finding 1: Many consumers were referred back and forth between brokers and
navigators, due to differences in the roles and compensation
practices for these assisters.
MNsure Response
MNsure has improved and continues to improve the experience through new referral
processes, enrollment tools, and communications with navigators, brokers, and counties.
Our experience has been that most brokers will assist consumers regardless of whether the
consumer obtains public or private insurance. Likewise, our experience has been that most
consumers who sought assistance from navigators, were able to complete enrollment
without consulting a broker. State law prohibits navigators from providing advice on the
selection of insurance products and under federal law brokers cannot be navigators.
Navigators may guide the consumer through the selection process and assist consumers in
using the selection tools and information available through MNsure. Consumer questions on
the merits of one insurance product over another must be referred to a licensed insurance
broker. Due to this nuanced distinction, consumers occasionally must work with multiple
assisters. For these reasons, MNsure does not dispute that some referrals occurred that
were disruptive to a customer service experience, but it disagrees with the suggestion that
these were common or widespread.
OLA Key Finding 2: MNsures contact center failed to provide adequate customer
service during the first open enrollment period.
MNsure Response
Call volume in the first open enrollment period was higher than expected. Many of the calls
were in relation to technical issues. MNsure contact center staff rose to this unexpected
challenge.
Since January 2014, MNsure has built out its customer service operations and now provides
a number of ways consumers can receive assistance. For many customers, the MNsure
Contact Center toll-free line is their first stop and their issue is usually resolved in the first
call. The number of calls to the MNsure Contact Center has dramatically increased, while
the average hold times have remained low. For example, for the week of December 14,
2014 (a high volume week because of a deadline), the MNsure Contact Center received
35,598 calls with the average hold times remaining under 10 minutes.
11
OLA Key Finding 3: MNsure has some -but not complete- ability to analyze who has
accessed private data on enrollees.
MNsure Response
MNsure is providing no response to this finding because doing so would likely result in the
disclosure of security information as defined by Minnesota Statutes, section 13.37,
subdivision 1, paragraph a, and MNsure is prohibited from making such a disclosure under
Minnesota law.
OLA Recommendation 1: MNsure and DHS should ensure that brokers are fairly
compensated for enrolling consumers in insurance through
MNsure.
MNsure Response
MNsure takes no position on this recommendation.
OLA Recommendation 2: MNsure should improve its referral guidance for customer
service staff in its contact center and in DHS and county call
centers.
MNsure Response
Contact center staff are constantly updating their reference materials and are working with
contact centers at DHS to improve transfers of calls related to public programs.
12
Health
Minnesota Health Insurance Exchange (MNsure),
February 2015
Financial Management of Health Care Programs,
February 2008
Nursing Home Inspections, February 2005
Agriculture
Agricultural Commodity Councils, March 2014
Green Acres and Agricultural Land Preservation
Programs, February 2008
Pesticide Regulation, March 2006
Criminal Justice
Health Services in State Correctional Facilities, February
2014
Law Enforcements Use of State Databases, February 2013
Public Defender System, February 2010
MINNCOR Industries, February 2009
Substance Abuse Treatment, February 2006
Education, K-12, and Preschool
Special Education, February 2013
K-12 Online Learning, September 2011
Alternative Education Programs, February 2010
Q Comp: Quality Compensation for Teachers,
February 2009
Charter Schools, June 2008
Education, Postsecondary
Preventive Maintenance for University of Minnesota
Buildings, June 2012
MnSCU System Office, February 2010
MnSCU Occupational Programs, March 2009
Energy
Renewable Energy Development Fund, October 2010
Biofuel Policies and Programs, April 2009
Energy Conservation Improvement Program, January 2005
Environment and Natural Resources
Recycling and Waste Reduction, February 2015
DNR Forest Management, August 2014
Sustainable Forest Incentive Program, November 2013
Conservation Easements, February 2013
Environmental Review and Permitting, March 2011
Natural Resource Land, March 2010
Watershed Management, January 2007
Government Operations
Councils on Asian-Pacific Minnesotans, Black Minnesotans,
Chicano/Latino People, and Indian Affairs, March 2014
Helping Communities Recover from Natural Disasters,
March 2012
Human Services
Medical Assistance Payment Rates for Dental Services,
March 2013
State-Operated Human Services, February 2013
Child Protection Screening, February 2012
Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, March 2011
Medical Nonemergency Transportation, February 2011
Personal Care Assistance, January 2009
Housing and Local Government
Consolidation of Local Governments, April 2012
Jobs, Training, and Labor
State Protections for Meatpacking Workers, 2015
State Employee Union Fair Share Fee Calculations,
July 2013
Workforce Programs, February 2010
E-Verify, June 2009
Oversight of Workers Compensation, February 2009
JOBZ Program, February 2008
Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors,
November 2007
Miscellaneous
The Legacy Amendment, November 2011
Public Libraries, March 2010
Economic Impact of Immigrants, May 2006
Liquor Regulation, March 2006
Gambling Regulation and Oversight, January 2005
Transportation
MnDOT Selection of Pavement Surface for Road
Preservation, March 2014
MnDOT Noise Barriers, October 2013
Governance of Transit in the Twin Cities Region,
January 2011
State Highways and Bridges, February 2008