Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163609

November 27, 2008

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF
KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the
MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the
driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Polomolok, Cotabato City, Branch 39, insofar as defendant
Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned. The CA absolved Mayor Miguel from
any liability since it was not he, but the Municipality of Koronadal, that was the
employer of the negligent driver.
The Facts
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on
board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the
Municipality of Koronadal.2 The pick-up truck was registered under the name
of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan.3 Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel
to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.4

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the
National
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.5 The intensity of the collision sent Marvin
some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving
at a very high speed at the time of the accident.6

Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused
cerebral contusion.7 He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial
Hospital.8 Due to the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo
Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treatment.9Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.10
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin,
filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents.11 In their
complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their
loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was
Lozano's negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They prayed for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation
expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin's death.
Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their
consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden sprint
across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel
denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The Municipality of
Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel. As for First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted that its
liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured. Since
the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period, any cause of
action against it had prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Municipality of
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other
defendant (sic) being an agency of the State performing a (sic)
governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes

Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of

any liability. The complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding
Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no
cause of action against said insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor
Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums:
1. One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One Hundred One and
Forty Centavos (P173,101.40) Pesos as actual damages with
legal interest of 12% per annum computed from February 11,
1989 until fully paid;
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney's fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Marvin
Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the
CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he
was Lozano's employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latter's negligent
act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver's true
and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due
care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident, although
unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the appeal, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is
concerned, and the complaint against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.13
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the
death of Marvin Jayme. Said the appellate court:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the
employer of Lozano. Thus, paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that
the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both Mayor
Miguel and Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel
could not thus be held liable for the damages caused by the
former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at
the time of the accident.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a
vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred
by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to the
CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF MARVIN JAYME WHICH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO
LAW AND THE SETTLED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE TRIBUNAL;
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON

CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL
FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S
SUPERVISION.15
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application
in the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor
Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct control
and supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident. According to
petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated by the fact that
Lozano's employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor Miguel, being
Lozano's superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle was operated.
Article 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for
one's own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is
responsible for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed
liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees,
the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to
be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority
to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.17
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article
2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed
at the time the employee was performing his functions.18
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence. In Belen v. Belen,19 this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant
to deny an alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no
obligation to prove the negative averment. This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving
the action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show
the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in harmony with the

provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that

each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.20
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel
is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts
of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We
rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's power of selection;
(2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control
the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or
dismissal.21
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality
of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the
accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the
time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several occasions,
held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee
was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over
the employee subsists.22 In the case under review, the Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding Lozano's
assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and
control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up
during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions
or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson v.
Sorrell,23 the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions
to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the
vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court,
in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,24ruled in a similar vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the
client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned
and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or
directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in
the contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x
x25 (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee

although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's
operation.26 In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing
vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.27 Whatever
right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself
to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v.
Lombardi28 is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only
an intermediate and superior employee or agent. This being so, the
doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly
applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as
master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by
Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he was delegated
Kruse's authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this
state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or
subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only
to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297,
269 Pac. 425; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528; Ellis
v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52 S. E.
228; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac.
588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277,
and particularly that part commencing at p. 290.) We can see no logical
reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between actionable
negligence and contributory negligence. x x x29
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30 and again
in Sichterman v. Hollingshead Co.31
In Swanson v. McQuown,32 a case involving a military officer who happened to
be riding in a car driven by a subordinate later involved in an accident, the
Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a public official is
not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since
the relationship is not a true master-servant situation.33 The court went on to
rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of,
or direct or encourage it.34
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him

and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the
driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the
passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts.35The driver's duty is not one
that may be delegated to others.36
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is
the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the
municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,37 where this
Court held:
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.38
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his
direct employer. The CA observation along this line are worth restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and
third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its
operation x x x.39
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents.
However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
accountable for Marvin's demise. Justice can not sway in favor of petitioners
simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law on the matter is clear: only the

negligent driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle
are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation
of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice