Risk Assessment of Underbalanced and Managed Pressure

Drilling Operations
Mari Oma Engevik
May 31, 2007

1 of 3
Date

Our reference

2007-01-04

MAR/LMS

Faculty of Engineering Science and Technology

Department of Production and Quality Engineering

MASTER THESIS
Spring 2007
for
stud. techn. Mari Oma Engevik

RISK ASSESSMENT OF UNDERBALANCED AND MANAGED PRESSURE

DRILLING OPERATIONS
(Risikovurdering av underbalansert boring og boring med styrt trykk (managed
pressure drilling))
In recent years, underbalanced drilling (UBD) and managed pressure drilling (MPD) have been
developed as alternatives to the traditional overbalanced drilling technique. The new techniques have
several advantages, but the blowout risk is yet not fully understood. The main objective of the current
master thesis is to develop a blowout risk model for UBD and MPD that is compatible with the
blowout frequency assessment model (BlowFAM) that has been developed by Scandpower.
As part of this thesis, the candidate shall:
1. Give a detailed presentation of the technology and procedures that are used for UBD and
MPD. The presentation shall be based on a detailed literature survey and contacts with drilling
operators and their consultants.
2. Identify, describe and document hazardous events during the various steps of a UBD and an
MPD operation. The hazard identification shall be carried out by using analytical tools and
supplemented by interviews with relevant personnel and analyses of available field
performance data.
3. Extract descriptions of relevant well control incidents from available data and identify and
describe root causes and causal distributions.
4. Establish formulas for relations between the causes in para. 3 and formation characteristics.
5. Establish a generic blowout frequency model that is compatible with BlowFAM.

Following agreement with the supervisor, the various items may be given different weights.

2 of 3

Master Thesis Spring 2007 for

Date

Our reference

2007-01-04

MAR/LMS

stud. techn. Mari Oma Engevik

Within three weeks after the date of the task handout, a pre-study report shall be prepared. The report
shall cover the following:

An analysis of the work task's content with specific emphasis of the areas where new
knowledge has to be gained.

A description of the work packages that shall be performed. This description shall lead to a
clear definition of the scope and extent of the total task to be performed.

A time schedule for the project. The plan shall comprise a Gantt diagram with specification
of the individual work packages, their scheduled start and end dates and a specification of
project milestones.

The pre-study report is a part of the total task reporting. It shall be included in the final report.
Progress reports made during the project period shall also be included in the final report.
The report should be edited as a research report with a summary, table of contents, conclusion, list of
reference, list of literature etc. The text should be clear and concise, and include the necessary
references to figures, tables, and diagrams. It is also important that exact references are given to any
external source used in the text.
Equipment and software developed during the project is a part of the fulfilment of the task. Unless
outside parties have exclusive property rights or the equipment is physically non-moveable, it should
be handed in along with the final report. Suitable documentation for the correct use of such material
is also required as part of the final report.
The student must cover travel expenses, telecommunication, and copying unless otherwise agreed.
If the candidate encounters unforeseen difficulties in the work, and if these difficulties warrant a
reformulation of the task, these problems should immediately be addressed to the Department.
Two bound copies of the final report and one electronic version are required.

3 of 3

Master Thesis Spring 2007 for

Date

Our reference

2007-01-04

MAR/LMS

stud. techn. Mari Oma Engevik

Responsible professor/supervisor at NTNU

Professor Marvin Rausand

Telephone: 73 59 25 42
E-mail: marvin.rausand@ntnu.no

Local supervisor at Scandpower Risk

Management AS offices will be

Aexander Solberg, senior consultant

Scandpower Risk Management AS
P.O.Box 3
NO 2027 Kjeller
Telephone: 64 84 45 43
E-mail: als@scandpower.com

DEPARTMENT OF PRODUCTION
AND QUALITY ENGINEERING

Asbjrn Rolstads
Professor/Head of Department

Marvin Rausand
Responsible Professor

Preface
This master thesis was has been written during the spring semester 2007, at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU.
The main objective of the master project was to developed a generic blowout frequency model
for underbalanced and managed pressure drilling operations. The work was performed in cooperation with Scandpower, and the model developed was supposed to be compatible with their
blowout frequency assessment model for conventional overbalanced drilling operations. According to the consulted companies, only two blowouts during MPD operations have occurred. Because of lack of data, it was not possible to develop a blowout frequency model. The focus of the
thesis was therefore shifted toward a description of underbalanced and managed pressure drilling
technology, and various risk assessment methods and their use during these operations.
It is assumed that the readers of this report have basic knowledge in drilling technology.
I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Marvin Rausand at NTNU and Senior Consultant Alexander Solberg at Scandpower for their assistance during the preparation of this report. I
would also like to thank Michael Golan, Dave Samuelson, Per Holand, Arild Rdland, Alf Breivik,
Harald Tveit, Johan Eck-Olsen for their contributions to this thesis.

Mari Oma Engevik

Trondheim June 8, 2007

Management summary
25% to 33% of all remaining undeveloped oil and gas reasources can not be utilized by means of
conventional overbalanced drilling. In addition, there are wells still containing oil and gas which
could have produced more if alternative technologies to overbalanced drilling technology where
utilized.Since 1990 underbalanced and managed pressure drilling has become increasingly used
alternative technologies to conventional overbalanced drilling technology. With proper use these
technologies may; eliminate or minimize formation damage, minimize costs related to the well,
and increase safety during the drilling operations. However, the risk during these operations are
yet not known.
During overbalanced drilling operations fluid from the reservoir is prevented from flowing into
the well by a static mud pressure. This pressure is a result of the mud which is used during a
drilling operation to carry cuttings from the formation to the surface. The pressure at surface is
at atmospheric pressure. In underbalanced and managed pressure drilling, a lighter drill fluid
can be used because a surface pressure is imposed. The main difference between overbalanced
drilling and the alternative drilling technologies, is the use of a surface pressure during the drilling
operation.
Numerous accidents have been documented with use of overbalanced drilling technology. By
evaluating earlier accidents and their cause, the risk these operations exposed to human, environment and assets, are fairly well known. In order to learn more about the risk during underbalanced
and managed pressure drilling operations, earlier incidents should be collected and analyzed in a
proper way.
To collect data of well incidents during underbalanced and managed pressure drilling operations, authorities and companies in th U.S., Canada, and Norway were contacted. Only two incidents have occurred, both with use of managed pressure drilling technology. No reports were
found on the well incidents.
A hazard analysis was performed on a managed pressure drilling operation. This operation is
at the moment performed on Kvitebjrn. Kvitebjrn is a field operated by Staoil, located in the
North-Sea. The purpose was to identify hazards, and evaluate the most risk contributing factors
during the operation. The analysis was made on a procedure the personnel follows during the
connections of pipes operation. Connections of pipes are made in order to drill to further depths.
With new technology it is important to train personnel involved in the operation, and make sure
that the level of competence is high. During the operation, external managed pressure drilling
personnel will be involved. The communication will be in English. The internal personnel usually
communicates in Norwegian. Extra focus on the communication is needed. In addition, it is important that the personnel, the internal as well as the external, have clear responsibilities and that
the procedures they follow are sufficient.
In order to state causes leading to incidents, and prevent future accidents from occurring during drilling operations, a numerous of accident investigation methods has been developed. Four
different methods were evaluated on behalf of their; scope, user friendliness, and resource need.
One of the methods were utilized on an accident to evaluate the course of events, and to develop a set of precautions to prevent similar accident form occurring. The accident occurred on
a well drilled overbalanced. During the drilling operation, the pressure of the mud column became lower than the pressure from an unexpected gas containing pocket in the formation, and
unwanted gas flowed into the well. The crew managed to regain and maintain control over the
well the following days. The accident may have been prevented if; better equipment were utilized
to detect gas pockets in the formation, analysis of the formation had been better, or if alternative
3

drilling technologies were utilized.

In overbalanced drilling operations, the probability of having an uncontrolled release of formation fluid is known. This is not the case for underbalanced and managed pressure drilling operations. By gathering information of the fluids flow rate through critical equipment during underbalanced and managed pressure drilling operations, the probability of release of formation fluids
can be calculated. An uncontrolled release of formation fluids may occur if more than one of the
well safety equipment should fail to function properly. The probability of uncontrolled release of
formation fluid, can be calculated by combining the critical equipments probability.

Part 1 Introduction

Introduction
During the last 17 years underbalanced drilling, UBD, and managed pressure drilling, MPD, have
become increasingly used alternatives to conventional overbalanced drilling, OBD, technology.
The new techniques provide several advantages, but the blowout risk during these operations is
yet not fully understood.
Since the rotary drilling technology was introduced early in the last century, it has been the
most used drilling technology in the oil and gas industry [2, 5]. The technique is well-established,
and a number of well incidents have been documented. This has made the risk picture during OBD
operations fairly well known. As for UBD and MPD operations the well incident data is limited, and
the risk picture is not complete.
Scandpower has developed a blowout frequency assessment model, BlowFAM. The model is a
data tool for qualitative and quantitative safety evaluation of blowouts during OBD and well operations. BlowFAM reflects the actual elements; the technical, the operational and the organisational
as well as reservoir conditions, that play an important role for the blowout risk. The program does
not include UBD and MPD operations, and it is of interest to implement these techniques into the
program.
Few well incidents have occurred during UBD and MPD operations. Hazard analysis and risk
evaluations of well projects that utilize these technologies have been performed, but there has not
been developed any worldwide accident investigation to state causal distributions and blowout
statistics. Because there has been an increasingly use of UBD and MPD technology world wide, it
is important to understand the risk during these operations.
On the Norwegian continental shelf one UBD operation , and five MPD operations have been
performed. In 2004, Statoil successfully performed an UBD operation on Gullfaks well C-05. One
MPD operation was made by British Petroleum (BP) in the late 90s by use of coiled tubing. ConocoPhillips used MPD on Tommeliten, and Statoil has performed 3 operations on Gullfaks and is
at the moment using the technology on Kvitebjrn. All of the wells were drilled successfully. In
addition, Statoil is planning to use MPD on Kristin [4].
In order to collect well incident data during UBD and MPD operations, different people were
contacted, working for; Minerals Management Service (MMS), Canadian Association of Oilwell
Drilling Contractors (CAODC), British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (OGC), Weatherford
Canada, ENFORM the petroleum industrys commitment to training and safety, Alberta energy &
utilities board (EUB), and Exprosoft.
Two well incidents with use of MPD were revealed in Alberta.
The objectives of this paper is to; learn and describe technology and procedures used for UBD
and MPD operations, identify and describe hazardous events during various steps of UBD and
MPD operations, perform accident investigations of relevant well control incidents, and establish formulas between incident causes and formation characteristics. The lack of data limited the
possibility to develop a causal distribution and relations between causes and formation characteristics. In addition, no detailed UBD or MPD well incident was found. The accident investigation
performed is on a well incident during an OBD operation.
Deviations from the master thesis main objectives, has been settled in co-operation with supervisor, Marvin Rausand.
This report consists of four parts; 1) Introduction to the master thesis, 2) An article on risk
assessment of UBD and MPD operations, 3) Description of the data gathering, and a quantitative approach of blowout frequencies during UBD and MPD operations, and 4) Conclusion and
recommendations for further work. The preparatory report and progress report can be found in
6

appendix..... The main objectives of the article in part two, are to a) give a technical description
of UBD and MPD operations, b) identify hazardous events during a MPD operation, and c) perform an accident investigation with use of Haddons matrix and the 10 strategies on an OBD well
incident.
A literature study has been carried out covered by relevant books, articles, Internet cites and by
attending a MPD course held by Statoil. Data collection has mainly been gathered by contacting
relevant companies, authorities and persons. In addition to this, searches on the Intrenet has been
made.
The master thesis has been performed over a period of 20 weeks. The main limitations during
this thesis has been; the availability of relevant data, and finding relevant literature.

Part 2 Hazard identification and SAFOP analysis of a MPD connection

Risk Assessment of Underbalanced and Managed Pressure

Drilling Operations
Mari Oma Engevik
May 31, 2007

1 Abstract
Since 1990 underbalanced and managed pressure drilling have become increasingly used alternatives
to conventional overbalanced drilling. The new techniques provide several advantages, but the blowout
risk during these operations is yet not fully understood. The main objective of this article is to evaluate
the risk during underbalanced and managed pressure drilling operations.
With use of a continuous circulation system during a managed pressure drilling connection, the safe
operability analysis revealed the blind ram as the most critical component. The continuous circulation
system is a fairly new, and the operation requires special personnel. Communication, clear responsibilities, and good procedures are of great importance in order to prevent unwanted situations or to
mitigate the consequences.
Haddons matrix in combination with Haddons ten strategies, gives a detailed accident description
and provides risk reducing measures to prevent future accidents. The method covers all socio-technical
aspects, and does not require hands-on experience. In formations containing potential gas pockets;
detailed pre-hazard analysis of the geotechnical properties of the specific area should be performed,
equipment capable of detecting the gas pockets as early as possible should be utilized, and alternative
drilling technologies should be considered.

2 Introduction
According to studies made by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), 25% to 33% of all remaining undeveloped reservoirs are not drillable using conventional
overbalanced drilling, OBD, methods. This is due to increased likelihood of well control problems such
as differential sticking, lost circulation, kicks, and blowouts [3]. In addition, many depleted wells which
still contain petroleum reserves could be utilized with alternative technologies to OBD.
The challenge to the industry is to seek an efficient method to drill and develop these reservoirs in a
manner that is no less safe than the overbalanced drilling method.
With the right use, UBD and MPD may [14];
eliminate or minimize formation damage
minimize well costs by;
- increasing the rate of penetration
- extending the bit life
- drilling in formations with small drilling windows
- avoiding fluid loss
- minimizing differential sticking
- reducing the drill time

 increase safety during drilling operations

The Underbalanced Drilling Sub-Committee [9] did in 1994 define UBD; "When the hydrostatic
head of a drilling fluid is intentionally designed to be lower than the pressure of the formation being
drilled, the operation will be considered underbalanced drilling. The hydrostatic head of the drilling
fluid may be naturally less than the formation pressure or it can be induced. The induced state may be
created by adding natural gas, nitrogen, or air to the liquid phase of the drilling fluid. Whether induced
or natural, this may result in an influx of formation fluids which must be circulated from the well and
controlled at surface." [13]
The International Association of Drilling Contractors, IADC, subcommittee define managed pressure drilling, MPD, as; "An adaptive drilling process used to precisely control the annular pressure profile throughout the wellbore. The objectives are to ascertain the downhole pressure environment limits
and to manage the annular hydraulic pressure profile accordingly" [27, 22].
UBD and MPD are used globally to drill new wells and to deepen or side-track from existing well
bores [44]. UBD is as much a completion technology as it is a drilling technology [13].
During UBD and MPD the bottom hole pressure is lower than during OBD. In conventional OBD,
well control is performed by controlling the density of the drill-fluid. Because of the significant difference in friction and static pressure during OBD operations, friction pressure does not specifically
influence the bottom hole pressure. The pressure at the top of the mud columns is at atmospheric pressure and does not contribute to regulate the bottom hole pressure. As opposed to conventional rotary
drilling, UBD and MPD utilize surface pressure during the operations. The bottom hole pressure is controlled by a back-pressure choke which allows the use of lighter drill fluids. In UBD and MPD there are
three ways to control the bottom hole pressure. It is done by controlling; the top pressure, the friction
pressure (when fluid is circulated), and the static mud weight pressure.
UBD and MPD utilize relatively light fluids with low static pressure and the circulated flow friction
will have a greater impact during these operations.
The two main differences between UBD and MPD operations are the bottomhole pressure and the
influx of formation fluid. In UBD operations, the bottomhole pressure is below the reservoir pore pressure as in contrast to MPD operations where the bottom hole pressure is slightly above or equal to the
reservoir pore pressure. Because the bottom hole pressure during UBD operations are lower than the
pore pressure, influx of formation fluid is induced into the wellbore. In MPD operations influx of formation fluid is an unwanted situation.
It is important to understand the risk during operations and be aware of potential dangers in order to prevent unwanted events from occurring and mitigate potential consequences. UBD and MPD
technologies are utilized on a world wide basis. This makes it important to understand the risk these
operations contribute to human, environment, and assets.
Safe operability, SAFOP, analysis evaluates procedures and operational sequences in order to identify hazards and causes of existing or planned operations. The method has its origin in the hazard and
operability, HAZOP, analysis developed in 1963. SAFOP is suitable for detailed assessment and preliminary assessment. During examination of the operation, the operation procedures are divided into
various steps. Relevant guide-words are further applied to the steps in order to reveal deviations from
the design intent. The result of the analysis is usually a list of preventive actions in order to improve
operations and procedures.
By analyzing accidents that have occurred during UBD and MPD operations, the risk during these
operations can be better understood and precautions can be taken.
The main objective of this article is to evaluate the risk during UBD and MPD operations. This is
accomplished by collecting possible accident data during UBD and MPD operations, identify hazards
related to a MPD operation, and by performing an accident investigation based on an accident investigation report of a well incident.
The hazard analysis is made on a connection with use of MPD. The method used is a SAFOP analysis.
The system consists of a continuous circulation system, CCS. The main focus of the analysis has been
on the pressure chamber utilized during the operation.
To collect information of accidents related to UBD and MPD operations, authorities in the U.S.,
Norway, and Canada were contacted. Two accidents has been revealed related to MPD operations, but

no reports of the accidents were found. The accident investigation is performed on a well drilled with
use of OBD technology.
This paper consists of three different parts. The first gives a technical description of UBD and MPD
operations. In the second part a SAFOP is performed on a MPD connection operation, performed with
use of CCS. The last part concerns accident investigation methods of UBD and MPD operations. An
accident investigation is performed on a well incident during an OBD operation. The accident investigation is performed with use of Haddons matrix and Haddons 10 strategies to prevent harmful energy
of getting in contact with individuals or objects.

3 Underbalanced Drilling
Figure 1 illustrates the different bottom hole pressures with use of a low or high density drill fluid, and
with use of a low density drill fluid with top side pressure. We note that the top side pressure makes it
possible to use light density drill fluids to achieve the wanted bottom hole pressure. By utilizing lighter
density fluids, it is possible to drill sections with narrower drilling windows.

Figure 1: Illustration of bottom hole pressure during OBD and UBD operations
During OBD operations, the bottom hole pressure should be below the formations fracture pressure
and above the pore pressure, see figure 2. If the pressure exceeds the fracture pressure the formation will
start cracking and drill fluid will be lost to the formation. In a worst case scenario the loss of drill fluid
can lead to a kick or even a blowout. If the pressure goes below the pore pressure, influx of formation
fluid to the wellbore will occur. In UBD operations the bottom hole pressure is below the pore pressure
and influx of formation fluid is a normal situation. However if the bottom hole pressure drops too much
the invasion of formation fluid may exceed the platforms capacity to handle it, or the hole may even
collapse, see figure 2. Because the bottom hole pressure in UBD operations is below the pore pressure
the probability of exceeding the fracture pressure is of a lower probability than in an OBD operation. In
UBD operations influx of formation fluid is a normal situations and kicks are therefor defined different
for OBD and UBD operations. According to the American Petroleum Institute (API) a kick during UBD
operations are defined when the system is designed in a manner where it is not capable of handling
the formation pressure or flow rate that is experienced. This can be a result of engineering errors, poor
choke control or formation characteristics [6].
There are basically 4 different methods to drill UB related to the drill fluids used [21];
1. Drilling mud (flow drilling); uses liquid mud where no gas is added. The mud can either be water
based mud or oil based mud. It is a homogeneous liquid and incompressible with constant den3

Figure 2: Pressure margins in OBD and UBD operations adapted from [21]

sity. The liquid may however become compressible if it is mixed with formation hydrocarbon in
the annulus of the well. With use of drilling mud, mud is pumped through the drill string as in
conventional drilling. This kind of technology is limited to few particular cases of high formation
pressure. It is used in formation where the pressure is rather high and the liquid is light enough
to provide the desired UB conditions [21].
2. Gaseated fluid; can either consist of a mixture of liquid and gas, or gas with liquid mist.
- Mixture of liquid and gas. Gas is entrained in liquid mud which makes it lighter. The gas
used can be; nitrogen, natural gas, air, and exhaust gas. The liquid can be water or oil based.
Gasified mud can be introduced in two manners; surface mixing (introduced into the top
of the drill string) or downhole mixing (introduced through parasite pipe string or parasite
casing). This technology is used to drill in formations with low hydrostatic pressure.
- Gas with liquid mist (wet gas). Basically gas drilling with injection of very small quantities
of liquid in the gas stream. Typical mist systems have <2,5% liquid content. Mist flow is
injected in the drill string and runs down the drill pipe and up the annulus. Liquid mist
is introduced to assist in; cleaning the face of the drill bit, and lift very small and powered
particles, like cutting surrounding the bit, through the annulus.
3. Stable foam; uses a homogeneous emulsion generated by mixing liquid gas and surfactant, an
emulsifying agent. The gas used in this process is normally nitrogen, but other gases might also
be utilized. Typical foams systems range from 55% to 97,5% gas. With use of stable foam, foam is
generated at the surface and introduced to the top of the drill string.
4. Gas-air drilling system; uses dry gas. The use of air and natural gas for drilling in tight sandstone
began over 30 years ago in the Arkoma Basin of western Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma [23]. In
an gas-air drilling system dry gas is used as a medium. The gas utilized might be air, nitrogen, natural gas, and exhaust gas. When drilling with air or gas, the gas is compressed downhole through
the drill string. When formation fluids are mixed with the dry gas at the bottom of the well gas
returns through annulus as a mist flow where small liquid droplets are suspended in the gas like
a spry. Gas drilling is probably the most used UBD method world wide [21].
The introduction and circulation of light fluids during an UBD operation can be done in three different ways;
Drill string injection; the medium is run through the drill string and up the annulus.
Parasite pipe string; during casing a separate injection string is implemented in the cement. In
these cases the drill fluid is introduced through the parasite string and flows up the annulus.
Parasite casing (only in vertical wells); separate "injection-annulus" which makes is possible to
insert fluid into the annulus while drilling. The fluid runs down the "injection-annulus" and up
the annulus.

3.1 UBD Equipment

UBD operation can be conducted using a conventional drilling rig, or as a rig-less operation [21].
UBD operations may vary in equipment, fluid, procedures and purpose. Common for all UBD operations are; the drilling operations are performed with an UB pressure ratio, the wellbore at the top of the
well is sealed around the drill string while drilling and tripping, and the surface equipment is designed
to remove formation fluid from the well and working area.
UBD equipment systems are composed of all systems required to safely allow drilling ahead in geological formations with pressure at surface and under varying rig and well conditions. These systems
include: the rig circulating equipment, the drill string, drill string non return valves, surface blowout
preventer (BOP), control devices (rotating or non-rotating) independent of the BOP, choke and kill lines,
UBD flow lines, choke manifolds, hydraulic control systems, UBD separators, flare lines, flare stacks and
flare pits and other auxiliary equipment. The primary functions of these systems are to contain well fluids and pressures within a design envelope in a closed loop system, provide means to add fluid to the
wellbore, and allow controlled volumes to be withdrawn from the wellbore [44].
There are different layouts and equipment used depending of fluid in use and the drilling site. Figure
3 an example of a UBD systems flow loop is given. The system can be divided into a well system and a
surface separation package system.

Figure 3: Illustration of a UBD system

The surface separation package includes separators, pumps, mud processing area and rig pits. The
amount of separators may vary some. In this example the system is designed with one 1st stage and
a 2nd stage separator, able to handle four phase fluid. In the 1st stage separator high pressure gas is
separated. Low pressure gas is extracted in the 2nd stage separator. From the 2nd stage separator oil
and gas goes to a test separator where they are separated. The mud and solid is separated in the mud
processing area. Mud returns to the mud pit, before it once again is circulated into the well.
In the well system drill fluid is introduced either through the drill string, a parasite string or a parasite casing. Drill fluid is mixed with formation fluid and flows back through the BOP stack to the ESD
valve, the flow spool, the choke manifold before it enters the SSP system.
5

In UBD operations the top of the well is continuously pressurized and the drillstring has to rotate
and move axially through the seal at the top of the well. A rotating diverter is used as a seal element
in the annulus to allow rotation and movement of the drillstring. The rotating diverter is basically an
annular BOP where the seal element is in constant contact with the rotating drill string and rotates
together with the string [21, 36, 44]. There are basically two different rotating diverters [21, 36];
Rotating Control Head, RCH; uses the elasticity of the rubber element with added energy from
the well pressure, to maintain the seal around the drill string. It is a low pressure diverter, designed
to rotate with drill pipe and used mainly in air drilling.
Rotating Blowout Preventer, RBOP; rotating annular preventer designed to rotate with pipe and
seal on both pipe and kelly while allowing upward and downward movement of the pipe. It is
energized by hydraulic pressure.
Emergency Shutdown Valve refers to a remotely controlled, full opening valve that is installed on
the flow line usually as near the BOP stack as possible [44].
3.1.1 UBD surface equipment
The surface equipment during UBD operations may vary from use of simple rotating control device
with a combination of all or some of the UBD equipment listed below [15, 23, 10, 14];
Rotating Control Device RCD; maintains a dynamic seal on the annulus enabling chokes to
control the annular pressure at the surface while drilling proceeds.
Downstream choke-manifold system; choke and choke manifold
Atmospheric or pressurized separation system including downstream fluid-separation package
3-phase or 4-phase separation system
Geological sampler
Emergency shutdown system
Alarm system
Chemical injection unit; added to the circulation system. May include corrosion inhibitors, hydrate suppressors, foam inhibitors, emulsion breakers, inhibitors of H2 S embitterment [21]
Evacuation of gas, oil, water and mud cuttings
Pressure relief systems and unloading, and hydrocarbon disposal facilities in cases of emergency
Mud pits in order to re-use mud
Mud pumps
Metering devices
Flowlines
The surface part of the circulation system treats the evacuated fluid, separate and disposes the drill
cuttings, separate the produced formation fluids and drilling fluids, and pumps the drilling fluid to the
top of the injection system and into the well.

3.1.2 UBD subsurface equipment

As mentioned earlier in section 3, there are three ways to inject fluid during UBD operations; through
the drill string, a parasite string or a parasite casing.
The downhole equipment in UBD consists of the following elements [21];
Drill string
Bottom hole assembly of the drill string
String and wellbore isolation valves particular to the UB operations
Drill string There exist two categories of UBD drill strings which are;
A conventional jointed drill string which has a full drilling rig scale, or
A small sized drill string or coiled tubing which respectively is methods for slim hole drilling and
through tubing drilling.
Bottom hole assembly The bottomhole assembly with use of liquid based drilling mud is the same as
in OBD, consisting of; drill bit, steer-able motors in cases with direction drilling, measure while dilling
and logging while drilling packages. With use of other medium in the drill fluid special logging and measuring equipment needs to be used because of difficulties transmitting information as incompressible
mud pulses through the drill string. A possible solution to this problem is to use low frequency electromagnetic signals which runs through the geological formations.
String and wellbore isolation valves particular to UB operations String and wellbore isolation valves
particular to UB operations are;
Downhole check valves in the drill string prevent backflow into the drill string, enable light fluids
to be pumped through the drill string, and prevents gas from blowing back to the drill floor when
pipe connections are made.
Formation Isolation valves are designed to allow tripping in and tripping out of the wellbore. The
wellbore is isolated from the formation pressure, and there is no pressure at the top of the string.
Lower Kelly cock is a manually operated quick closing block valve. It is normally used at the Kelly
or below the top drive.

3.2 UBD Barriers

According to NORSOK standard D-010, which regulates the minimum requirements to safety barriers
during drilling and well operations on the Norwegian continental shelf, there should be two well barriers available during all well activities and operations [5].
This is a specialized drilling technique used where conditions are well known, predictable and risks
can be managed. In UBD, the primary well control function of the mud column, is replaced by a combination of flow and pressure control. Bottom-hole pressure and return well flow are continuously
measured and controlled by means of respectively, pressure while drilling (PWD) measurements and
a closed-loop system. The complete UBD system comprises of the DP circulating system, a rotating
control device (RCD), a UBD choke manifold (not the rigs well control choke manifold), a four-phase
separator and a flare stack or flare pit. In addition, non-return valves (NRVs) are installed in the BHA
and drill string to prevent flow up the DP. The rigs BOPs are still considered secondary well control
equipment and contingency plans to return to an overbalanced condition must be in place under certain predefined conditions or operational problems. Automated systems are also available that allow a
fairly constant bottom hole pressure to be maintained while drilling and making up connections [44].
During conventional drilling the primary barrier is the mud column, and the secondary barrier is
the BOP . In UBD operations the hydrostatic pressure is lower than the formation pressure, and thus not
7

working as a barrier. The primary barrier during UBD operations is made by a combination of flow and
pressure control [5, 37]. The flow control system consists of; rotating control device, choke manifold,
flowline, emergency shutdown valve (ESDV), and the surface separation system. In addition to this
non-return valves (NRV) are installed in the bottom hole assembly and drill string to prevent flow up
the drill pipe when a work string is run UB [5]. The secondary barrier during UBD operations is made
by the BOP consisting of the wellhead connector and drilling BOP with kill/choke line valves.

3.3 Pro and Cons with use of UBD technology

Reservoir criteria which favor an UBD process:
Easily damaged reservoirs
Fractured reservoirs
Pressure Depleted reservoirs
Poorly understood complex geological formations
Prone to damage [14]
Hard rock [14]
Drilling criteria which favor an UBD process:
Loss circulation potential.
Severe pressure depletion.
Poor ROP.
Mechanical drilling problems.
Potential for fluid trapping.
Known fluid sensitivity issues.
Contra-indications to an UBD process:
Technical issues.
Safety issues.
Logistics.
Depth/Location constraints.
Borehole stability issues.
UBD provides advantages as to reduced formation damage, reduced lost circulation, increased rate
of penetration, reduced drilling time, reduced differential sticking, extended bit life, get a rapid indication of productive reservoir zones, and it has the potential for dynamic flow testing while drilling which
might make it a safer operation [35, 20, 41, 33, 14, 2].
Under balanced drilling is however not appropriate in all formations e.g. in a lot of shale formations,
salt formations, shattered coal sections, unconsolidated sections, in wellbore that are not stable or in
wellbores with risk of high levels of sour gas on surface [4, 14, 2].
Potential downsides and damage mechanisms associated with UBD are increased cost and safety
concerns, mechanically induced wellbore damage, and difficulties in maintaining a continuously UB
condition Bennion et al., 1998 cited in [20]

4 Managed Pressure Drilling

MPD has evolved since the mid-sixties [22], and is according to IADC subcommittee defined as; "adaptive drilling process used to precisely control the annular pressure profile throughout the wellbore. The
objectives are to ascertain the downhole pressure environment limits and to manage the annular hydraulic pressure profile accordingly".[27, 22]
The primary difference between conventional drilling and MPD is that in general MPD relies upon
a closed circulating system whereby flow and pressure in the wellbore can be controlled [44].
The level of planning and actual equipment requirements for MPD depends on the specific technique, whether the application of the technology is for drilling enabling, reservoir damage reduction
or reservoir characterization; whether hydrocarbons are present in the section being drilled, and in the
case of drilling in the reservoir section, whether the intent is to produce hydrocarbons or not, the complexity and risk level associated with the section being drilled and finally, whether the well is onshore or
offshore and deepwater or shallow water [44].
MPD is a form of drilling which allows greater and more precise wellbore pressure control than
conventional drilling. The technology is suitable for wells with narrow margins. [7, 22, 15] The fluids
used are non-compressible and as opposed to UBD, MPD does not invite influx of hydrocarbons. The
technology exploits the opportunity to drill in a effective overbalanced state and makes it possible to
join pipes without interrupting circulation. [15, 34] The mud weight used will be lower than for the
conventional mud weight and a secondary choke or frictional pressure will be applied on surface to
create a combined annular pressure profile withing the well. [18]
Compared with UBD MPD is better suited for drilling operations in severely depleted reservoirs
where there is a small margin between formation fracture and hole stability. [18]
MPD provides advantages as to [22, 18, 14];
Deeper open holes
Deeper, fewer, or smaller casings
Fewer Mud Density Changes to TD
Less NPT
Enhanced control of the well
Control of formation gas flow rates
Improved well control procedures
Minimized risk of circulation losses and stuck pipe
Increased ROP
Avoid fluid invasion and fraction
Reduced drilling time
Has potential to be a more reliable operation
No influx of formation fluids
Reduced chances of hydrate plugs forming at seabed
Extended bit life

4.1 MPD Technology

There two categories of MPD;
1. Reactive when MPD technology is used on a well with conventional casing set points and fluid
programs.
2. Proactive the well is special designed for the MPD operation. Casing, fluids and open-hole program takes fully advantage of the MPD opportunities
In addition to these two categories there exist variations of the MPD technology. In Marine environments there are said to be four main variations of MPD. The four variants each containing several under
groups representing some differences e.g. variations in equipment [15, 22, 27];
Constant Bottomhole Hole Pressure
- e.g.Continuous circulation system (CCS), dynamic annular pressure control (DAPC), low density
drilling fluid (with choke valve for back pressure control), and Secondary annulus circulation using a mud with varying density.
Pressurized Mud Cap Drilling (PMCD)
- e.g. Low riser return system (LRRS), and
Dual Gradient (DG)
- e.g. Gas lift in riser (GLIR), equivalent circulating density reduction tool (ECDRT), and secondary
annulus circulation.
HSE or Returns Flow Control
Where constant bottom hole pressure, PMCD and HSE are the most commonly applied methods.
The dual gradient drilling (DGD) technique used in deepwater drilling is the result of a joint industry projects effort to develop a practical solution to the problems associated with dynamic overpressure
on the formations due to the long column of mud in the riser between seafloor and rig floor. In a conventional offshore drilling operation, mud is circulated down the drill string, through the bit and back
up to the rig floor through a riser. The exposed formations see an equivalent circulating pressure that
includes frictional pressure and the hydrostatic pressure equal to the entire mud column from bit to
surface. In a normally pressured formation, its pore pressure is generally equal to a column of seawater
and therefore, the pressure it sees during drilling operations is the difference between the hydrostatic
pressure of the mud column and a column of seawater. While this may not be a problem in shallow
water, it is a real concern in deep water and often prevents reaching target reservoirs. The use of DGD
may enable reaching targeted TD with fewer, larger-diameter casing strings. The equipment required
to create a dual-gradient condition is a pump with intake for the mud at the seabed and discharges it
to the rigs mud handling system at surface. The pump mechanically isolates the mud return line from
the intake line (wellbore annulus) and maintains the annulus pressure equal to the seawaters hydrostatic pressure, thereby creating the dual (seawater/mud) pressure gradient on the annulus side of the
well. Note: the technique can be applied with or without a riser [44]. Mud Cap Drilling This is a drilling
technique that can be applied when a well is experiencing total dynamic mud losses to a thief zone at
or near the bottom of a section and it is not safe and/or practical to drill completely blind. However, no
reservoir fluid flow to surface is intended. Drilling fluid (usually water), is pumped down the drill pipe.
A higher density fluid is also pumped down the annulus at a controlled rate to overcome hydrocarbon
migration. All of the pumped fluid, produced fluid and the cuttings are pumped into the fractures. It
is the safest method for drilling sour reservoirs with a loss zone above, because there are no returns to
surface. There are two types of mud cap drilling techniques: Floating mud cap - Annular fluid density
is high enough to force fluid and cuttings into loss zone. This requires large volume of mud materials
and is generally used in an open system, when a rotating control device is not available. Pressurized
mud cap - Utilizes annular pressure and fluid column, to divert drill fluid and drilled cuttings into the
10

loss zone. This allows lower density annular fluid (nitrogen gas can also be used in highly depleted sour
gas zones) to be used and annular injection rate to be optimized. Annular pressure provides direct indication of what is happening down-hole; therefore, less fluid is lost to formation. Viscosifiers can be
added to slow gas migration up the annulus. A rotating control device is a minimum requirement for
pressurized mud cap drilling. Continuous Circulation Systems The fluid circulation system is designed
such that the dynamic pressure profile in the wellbore is maintained during the drilling phase, including
connections. Low Head Drilling The low head drilling (LHD) technique is where the hydrostatic head
of the wellbore fluid column is reduced to be either in balance or slightly greater than the formation
pressure thus not planning to induce hydrocarbons or formation fluids into the wellbore. This can be
accomplished using either a non-weighted low-density fluid or a gasified fluid. In addition, techniques
(manual and automatic) are also available that allow drilling with an UB equivalent mud weight while
maintaining balance or predetermined overbalance by use of flow control devices. [44]

4.2 MPD Equipment

The surface equipment used in MPD operations may vary from just a rotating control device tied into
the flowlines, to include one or more of the equipment mentioned below;
Choke which controls the back-pressure during the drilling operation, may be manually or automatically controlled
Surface separation package able to handle unwanted influx
The Rotating Control Device RCD; maintains a dynamic seal on the annulus enabling chokes to control the annular pressure at the surface while drilling proceeds [10]. There exist three types of RCD
systems [37];
1. Passive systems; depends on the friction fit between the drill pipe and the rotating pack-off and
well bore pressure to affect the seal
2. Active systems; uses a hydraulic system to seal around the drill pipe
3. Hybrid system; uses a combination of passive elements and active elements and hydraulic closing
system.
RCD usually consist of three components [15];
- Body with flow line outlet flange
- Bearing assembly with a Stripper Rubber able to stripping drill pipe and tool joints
- Clamp or latch in order to connect and secure the bearing assembly and stripper rubber assembly
to the bowl
In addition to this the MPD system consists of auxiliary components as ESD system, pumps, data
systems etc.

4.3 MPD Safety

Because of MPD uses a closed pressure-controlled system it has a more sensitive kick detection and is
better suited to control kicks [7, 14, 37].
The pressure differential across the RCDs Bearing and Stripper Rubber Assembly are modest making MPD operations with use of RCD an operation with good reliability. [22]
training
seal failures
mud in system
11

 ballooning effects
Access to chromium
[27]
Should have a technological control device during MPD in HPHT it is not a demand, but for a human
to be intensed focus for several days is hard.
MPD will likely improve the well control capabilities, combined with predictive modeling.
MPD will probably require a smaller team and be done more quickly and to a lower cost than an
UBD operation [27].
Mud cannot be considered as a barrier during MPD operations [27].
On installations consisting of subsea BOP with marine riser and telescoping slip-joints, the slip-joint
with typically be the weakest link in the riser system relative to pressure containment [15].
Better prepared for invasion of influx than conventional drilling technology.
[15]
If the the riser and choke system in a "closed loop" MPD operation is filled with gas, a fast and
efficient down hole response is challenging. This problem is handled by CMC MPD operations [18]

5 Managed Pressure Drilling

MPD has evolved since the mid-sixties [22], and is according to IADC subcommittee defined as; "adaptive drilling process used to precisely control the annular pressure profile throughout the wellbore. The
objectives are to ascertain the downhole pressure environment limits and to manage the annular hydraulic pressure profile accordingly".[27, 22]
MPD is a form of drilling which allows greater and more precise wellbore pressure control than
conventional drilling. The technology is suitable for wells with narrow margins. [7, 22, 15] The fluids
used are non-compressible and as opposed to UBD, MPD does not invite influx of hydrocarbons. The
technology exploits the opportunity to drill in a effective overbalanced state and makes it possible to
join pipes without interrupting circulation. [15, 34] The mud weight used will be lower than for the
conventional mud weight and a secondary choke or frictional pressure will be applied on surface to
create a combined annular pressure profile withing the well. [18]
Compared with UBD MPD is better suited for drilling operations in severely depleted reservoirs
where there is a small margin between formation fracture and hole stability. [18]
MPD provides advantages as to [22, 18, 14];
Deeper open holes
Deeper, fewer, or smaller casings
Fewer Mud Density Changes to TD
Less NPT
Enhanced control of the well
Control of formation gas flow rates
Improved well control procedures
Minimized risk of circulation losses and stuck pipe
Increased ROP
Avoid fluid invasion and fraction
Reduced drilling time
Has potential to be a more reliable operation
12

 No influx of formation fluids

Reduced chances of hydrate plugs forming at seabed
Extended bit life

5.1 MPD Technology

There two categories of MPD;
1. Reactive when MPD technology is used on a well with conventional casing set points and fluid
programs.
2. Proactive the well is special designed for the MPD operation. Casing, fluids and open-hole program takes fully advantage of the MPD opportunities
In addition to these two categories there exist variations of the MPD technology. In Marine environments there are said to be four main variations of MPD. The four variants each containing several under
groups representing some differences e.g. variations in equipment [15, 22, 27];
Constant Bottomhole Hole Pressure
- e.g.Continuous circulation system (CCS), dynamic annular pressure control (DAPC), low density
drilling fluid (with choke valve for back pressure control), and Secondary annulus circulation using a mud with varying density.
Pressurized Mud Cap Drilling (PMCD)
- e.g. Low riser return system (LRRS), and
Dual Gradient (DG)
- e.g. Gas lift in riser (GLIR), equivalent circulating density reduction tool (ECDRT), and secondary
annulus circulation.
HSE or Returns Flow Control
Where constant bottom hole, PMCD and HSE are the most commonly applied methods.

5.2 MPD Equipment

The surface equipment used in MPD operations may vary from just a rotating control device tied into
the flowlines, to include one or more of the equipment mentioned below;
Choke which controls the back-pressure during the drilling operation, may be manually or automatically controlled
Surface separation package able to handle unwanted influx
The Rotating Control Device RCD; maintains a dynamic seal on the annulus enabling chokes to control the annular pressure at the surface while drilling proceeds [10]. There exist three types of RCD
systems [37];
1. Passive systems; depends on the friction fit between the drill pipe and the rotating pack-off and
well bore pressure to affect the seal
2. Active systems; uses a hydraulic system to seal around the drill pipe
3. Hybrid system; uses a combination of passive elements and active elements and hydraulic closing
system.

13

Table 1: Different MPD technologies with areas of application and characteristics adapted from [15, 22]
MPD technology

Area of Application

Characteristics

CBHP

Narrow pressure
environments

PMCD

Lost circulation
issues
Zones capable of
consume drilling
fluids and cuttings
Wells with grossly
depleted zones
Deepwater drilling
there. There exist
long section of mud
in the riser between
seafloor and rig floor

Pipe connections made with

surface pressure
Not exceed fracture gradient
during drilling
Process where heavy fluid is
added. The amount of lost
fluid is replaced with seawater, increasing ROP

DG

HSE

Typically on HPHT
wells
Drilling on platforms where simultanious production
is ongoing

two different annulus fluid

gradients

Closed mud return system on

the rig floor

RCD usually consist of three components [15];

- Body with flow line outlet flange
- Bearing assembly with a Stripper Rubber able to stripping drill pipe and tool joints
- Clamp or latch in order to connect and secure the bearing assembly and stripper rubber assembly
to the bowl
In addition to this the MPD system consists of auxiliary components as ESD system, pumps, data
systems etc.

5.3 MPD Safety

Because of MPD uses a closed pressure-controlled system it has a more sensitive kick detection and is
better suited to control kicks [7, 14, 37].
The pressure differential across the RCDs Bearing and Stripper Rubber Assembly are modest making MPD operations with use of RCD an operation with good reliability. [22]
training
seal failures
mud in system
ballooning effects
Access to chromium

14

[27]
Should have a technological control device during MPD in HPHT it is not a demand, but for a human
to be intensed focus for several days is hard.
MPD will likely improve the well control capabilities, combined with predictive modeling.
MPD will probably require a smaller team and be done more quickly and to a lower cost than an
UBD operation [27].
Mud cannot be considered as a barrier during MPD operations [27].
On installations consisting of subsea BOP with marine riser and telescoping slip-joints, the slip-joint
with typically be the weakest link in the riser system relative to pressure containment [15].
Better prepared for invasion of influx than conventional drilling technology.
[15]
If the the riser and choke system in a "closed loop" MPD operation is filled with gas, a fast and
efficient down hole response is challenging. This problem is handled by CMC MPD operations [18]

6 Comparison of UB, OB and MP drilling technologies

MPD vs UBD [14];
1. Because MPD operates with bottom hole pressure equal to or slightly higher than the pore pressure, the potential of hole collapse during UBD operations are greater.
2. Both UBD and MPD can reduce drilling-induced formation damage, but unlike MPD UBD has
the potential to eliminate the formation damage.
3. Reduced equipment is usually required during MPD operations, e.g. need for separators capable
of handling great amounts of mud, cuttings and formation fluids.
4. The production maximizing is greater for UBD operations than MPD operations because the formation damages are usually greater in MPD operations than in UBD operations.
5. Because UBD operations invite influx while drilling, formation characteristics can be fully evaluated during the operation. MPD use measurement tools as MWD (measure while drilling) etc. to
evaluate formation characteristics.
The scores represented under are made on a general basis of each drilling technology.
OBD MPD UBD
investment cost
++
+
safety
+
++
+
equipment
++
+
ROP
+
++
Drill long sections
++
Lost circulation
+
++
Cope with kicks
-+
++
Formation damage
+
+
Deep water wells
+
shallow water wells
+
Well control
+
++
+
Riser margin
++
+
-

7 Safe operability analysis of connection during MPD

Kvitebjrn is a HPHT well located in the North Sea. The reservoir consists of sandstones in the Middle
Jurassic Brent group, and lies at approximately 4 000 meters depth [11]. There are a total of 11 wells
where 7-8 at the moment is drilled.

15

Production in the Kvitebjrn field has lead to lower fracture and pore pressure in the formation.
Some places high pore-pressure zones are in the formation, leading to a narrow and difficult drilling
window to predict and drill [1]. For further development it will not be economical favorable, or in some
cases even possible, to drill conventional. In order to cope with the difficult conditions at Kvitebjrn,
MPD technology with use of a continuous circulation system, CCS, is planned.
CCS utilizes a circulation system in order to join drill pipes to the drill string without interrupting
the drilling process [29, 40].
The potential benefits with use of CCS are [29, 31];
Elimination of surges during start and stop of circulation
Continuous movement of cuttings in the annulus, no rig downtime to clean the bottom hole assembly
Reduced total connection time
Reduced chance of stuck pipe during a connection
No downtime in HPHT wells to circulate out connection gas
Improved hole conditions
Improved control of equivalent circulation density
Elimination of ballooning effects
Elimination of kicks while making connections
CCS technology might benefit from OBD connection technology, but there might also be potential
downsides. For Kvitebjrn this operation has never been performed before. With use of new technology there will always be a certain risk. In order to identify hazardous events, a SAFOP analysis was performed on a connection with use of a continuous circulation system. The SAFOP analysis is described
in appendix A.
In the following section a description of connection with CCS is made. During the analysis only only
examination and documentation will be performed, see 8 in appendix A. The examination will be performed by first identifying the various steps in the procedure before relevant guide words are applied to
one step of the procedure at a time. The guide words used in this section is listed and described in appendix A along with the procedure that was used during this SAFOP performance. The documentation
of the SAFOP results will be listed in work sheets in appendix B.

7.1 Connections with use of Continuous Circulation Systems

7.2 CCS connection description
The CCS consists of a pressure chamber containing two pipe and a blind ram which is placed in between
the two pipe rams. During a connection the chamber is filled with mud equalizing the pressure inside
and outside the drill string. Pipe rams will later on close around the drill pipe. After this is done the
pipes are disconnected and the blind ram is closed. The upper part of the chamber is bled of, and the
pipe removed. The circulation of mud is now made through the lower part of the pressure chamber and
down the drill pipe, see figure 4. New stands of pipes are prepared and inserted in the upper chamber.
The pipe ram is closed around the new pipe stand, and the chamber is pressurized. Mud is circulated
through the new joint of pipes, the blind ram is opened, and the drill pipes are connected.

7.3 CCS connection procedure

1. Lift the pipes
2. Activate the pipe rams and the pipe slips
16

Table 2: Description of equipment in CCS system adapted from [29]

Equipment

Description

Pipe guide
Snubber

Guides the pipes in right position

Its object is to control movement of drill pipes into and out of the
coupler. Operates with vertical and rotational forces and is connected
to the coupler by four hydraulic rams. Uses hydraulic motors to spin
the pipes into/out of connections and the hydraulic rams to apply make
up or break out torque.
A pressure chamber located on the rig floor over the rotary table.
It seals around the drill pipe pin and box during the connection
process. It consists of three pressure chambers; the upper with pipe
rams, the middle with blind rams, and the lower with inverted pipe
rams.
Holds the pipe in position.
Two are drain lines from the upper and lower coupler chamber and one
is fill line into the lower chamber connected to the mud diverter
manifold.
Switches mud flow between the top drive and the coupler during drill
pipe connections. It is connected into the discharge line between the
mud pumps and the standpipe manifold.

Coupler

Pipe slips
Flow paths

Mud diverter
manifold

(a) Activate the pipe rams

(b) Activate the pipe slips
3. Pressurize the chamber
4. Connect the snubbing unit
5. Disconnect the pipes
6. Lift the upper pipe
7. Close the blind ram
8. depressurize the upper chamber
(a) Seal the standpipe
(b) Open the drain valve to the upper chamber
(c) Bleed off the standpipe
9. Disconnect the snubbing unit and the upper pipe ram
(a) Disconnect the snubbing unit
(b) Open the upper pipe ram
10. Remove the pipe, and add new the pipe joint
(a) Remove the pipe
(b) Add new pipe joint
11. Close the pipe ram, and connect the snubbing unit
(a) Close the pipe ram
(b) Connect the snubbing unit

17

Figure 4: The upper chamber is fully depressurized (Step 8 in the procedure)

12. Close the drain valve to the upper chamber

13. Pressurize the upper chamber
14. Open the blind ram
15. Connect the pipe joint and the drillstring
(a) Lower the pipe joint
(b) Connect the pipe joint to the drillstring
16. Close the valve to the lower chamber
17. Bleed off the chamber
18. Close the drain valve
19. Disconnect the snubbing unit
20. Disconnect the pipe slips
21. Open the pipe rams

7.4 SAFOP of connection with use of CCS

The SAFOP work sheets can be found in appendix B. The consequences related to each step, is given a
score according to safety and operability considerations. The scores that are given;
L = low, and was given the value 1
M = medium, and was given the value 2
H = high, and was given the value 3
The main focus of this project is on safety and the rating of each procedure will therefor be regarding
the safety contributing factors. In order to find the procedures with the strongest influence on the safety,
the average value of each procedure was calculated by using the score values. The results from the
analysis can be found in figure 5
18

Figure 5: SAFOP results for each step in the procedure

7.5 SAFOP conclusion

The steps that are most critical to the safety, are listed in figure 6;
The blind ram is of great importance in the procedure. This component seals and separates the
two chambers from each other. For instance will the blind ram play an important role when the upper
chamber is drained. By separating the chamber into two separate chambers, the upper chamber can be
depressurized, and new pipe joints can be added. If the blind ram does not seal the lower chamber from
the upper chamber, the pressure will decrease. If this is not detected before the bottom hole pressure
becomes lower than the pore pressure, influx from the formation will occur. A kick will occur. In all
operations listed in figure 6, the pressure inside the chamber plays an important role. The pressure
inside the chamber should be easy to monitor and adjust when needed. Since it is the first time MPD
operations are performed on Kvitebjrn, it is important to train personnel and makes sure that the
level of competence is high. During the operation there will be MPD personnel involved in the drilling
operations. Because the communication will be in English, and not Norwegian as usual, extra focus on
the communication is needed. The personnel should be consistent when communicating, have clear
responsibilities, and have good procedures to;
prevent unwanted situations from occurring
handle unwanted situations in a controlled and good way to reduce the consequences.

19

Figure 6: Most risk contributing steps

8 Accident Investigation
There exist various descriptions of the accident investigation process, depending on the author.
The U.S. department of energy (DOE) divides the investigation process into three phases [12];
1. Evidence and fact collection
2. Analysis of the collected facts
3. Conclusion, development of needs, and the report writing
This paper will focus on different methods to analyse data.
There exist a great number of accident investigation methods, or techniques. Various methods are
listed in table 3.
Table 3: Accident investigation methods adapted from [17, 12]
Accident Anatomy Method
Action Error Analysis
Accident Evolution and Barrier Analysis
Change Evaluation/Analysis
Cause-Effect Logic Diagram
Causal Tree Method
Fault Tree Analysis
Hazard and Operability Study
Human Performance Enhancement System
Human Reliability Analysis Event Tree
Multiple-Cause, System-Oriented Incident
Investigation
Multilinear Events Sequencing
Management Oversight Risk Tree
Systematic Cause Analysis Techniques
Sequentially Timed Events Plotting
TapRootT M Incident Investigation System
Technique of Operations Review
Work Safety Analysis

Events and Causal Factors Charting and Analysis

Barrier Analysis
Change Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Managed Oversight and Risk Tree
Project Evaluation Tree Analysis
Time Loss Analysis
Human Factors Analysis
Integrated Accident Event Matrix
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Software Hazards Analysis
Common Cause Failure Analysis
Sneak Circuit Analysis
Materials and Structural Analysis
Design Criteria Analysis
Accident Reconstruction
Scientific Modeling

The selection of accident investigation method, depends on the nature of the accident being investigated, the object of the investigation, and the amount of available information [25]. The purpose of
the analysis may vary from company to company, and are either to [42, 16];
identify and describe the true course of the events (what, where, and when)
identify the direct and root causes/contribution factors of the accident (why)
identify risk reducing measures to prevent future, comparable accidents (learning)

20

 investigate and evaluate the basis for potential criminal prosecution (blame)
evaluate the question of guilt in order to assess the liability for compensation (pay)
Usually, major accidents are the result of multiple interrelated causal factors. Actors or decision
makers influencing the normal work process might also affect accident scenarios directly or indirectly.
According to the DOE, the causal factors in an accident, can be divided into three different types [12];
Direct cause; an immediate event or condition that caused the accident
Contributing cause; an event or condition that together with other causes increase the likelihood
of an accident but which individually did not cause the accident
Root cause; the casual factor(s) that, if corrected, would prevent the recurrence of the accident
The various methods scope, can be related to the socio-technical system involved in risk management. The different socio-technical levels are [42];
1. the work and technological system
2. the staff level
3. the management level
4. the company level
5. the regulators and associations level
6. the Government level
In appendix C, a presentation of the following four accident investigation methods is given;
Events and causal factors charting (ECFC)
Sequentially timed events plotting (STEP)
Man-Technology-Organisation analysis(MTO-analysis)
Haddons matrix
The MTO-analysis and Haddons matrix are not listed in table 3. MTO is a commonly used method
in several European countries. The method is utilized in different industries [42]. Haddons matrix has
its origin in accident investigations of traffic accidents, but is adapted in other industries.

8.1 Comparison of accident investigation methods

The aim of accident investigations should be to identify the event sequence and all causal factors influencing the accident scenario in order to suggest risk reducing measures which may prevent future
accidents.
ECFC, STEP and MTO are all primary methods, which means that they are techniques fully capable
of standing alone. In addition, the methods give graphical illustrations of the accident scenario illustrating the total accident scenario [42].
Haddons matrix is a method to sequential list multiple causes leading to an accident. By combining
the method with Haddons 10 strategies to prevent harmful energy from getting in contact with individuals or objects, the method is capable of standing alone, as a primary method.
All the methods are process models.
ECFC, STEP and Haddons matrix are all methods that do not demand hands-on experience. As
opposed to the MTO analysis, which require an experienced person or a specialist, the methods are
fairly easy to use.
ECFC and the MTO-analysis, cover level one to four on the socio-technical levels. STEP and Haddons matrix, cover level one to six.
In the following section an accident investigation is carried out. The investigation is performed with
use of Haddons matrix and his 10 strategies. The choice of method was based on;
21

 the methods scope

no-hands on experience is needed
required resources

8.2 Accident investigation of well no. 6 at South Tambier block

The main objective is to convert an accident investigation into Haddons matrix and his 10 strategies.
The result is dependent on the analysts understanding of the documented accident.
The analysis of the collected facts seeks to find out what happened, when and where it happened,
and why it happened. Haddons 10 strategies will give a list of actions that could have prevented the
accident from occurring, or mitigated the consequences.
The data collection was based on a prepared public accident report made by the MMS.
During the first of December 2005, a loss of well control occurred in the conductor hole section
on the South Timbalier Block Well No. 6 located on in the Gulf of Mexico. While drilling ahead beneath
drive pipe in open water at a depth of 1,027 ft, there was observed a background gas reading of 224 units
with corresponding mud weight loss from 9.8 pounds per gallon to 9.6 pounds per gallon. Mud was
weighted up to 10.2 pounds per gallon, and drilling continued. The prescribed mud weight up schedule
was followed. At a depth of 1,318 ft in the conductor hole section, the well became unstable and released
a pocket of gas. Personnel on the rig floor experienced that the gumbo box was overflowing. The driller
immediately stopped the operation to undertake a flow check. Within minutes of this action, mud was
seen flowing out of the rotary table. The well was placed on the diverter system. At the rig floor, it
occurred flow from both of the diverter lines. One of the diverter valves placed at the rig floor, was
closed because of the wind direction. Kill weight mud was circulated into the well. The well continued
to "burp" gas over the next five days. Heavy weighted mud was circulated, while washing to bottom and
back-reaming to prevent stuck pipe [47].
In Figure 7, the accident is analyzed by use of Haddons matrix. Figure 7, gives a description of failure
causes according to the accidental time axis.
The main causes of loss of well control, was the low margin of overbalance at a shallow depth with
structural overpressure coupled with an inadequate and an ill-defined pre-hazard study of the geotechnical properties of the area.
The 10 strategies should have been applied separately for each causal event revealed in Haddons
matrix. In this paper a set of strategies is developed on a general level. The different events have not
been analyzed one by one.
Because the well was successfully put on a diverter and controlled, Haddons 10 strategies is only
made on the preventive strategies.
Haddons 10 strategies;
1. Perform a proper analysis of the formation. Make sure that the formation data is based on actual
well geological and geophysical data. Look at earlier well incident cases in the South Timbalier
Block. There had been two well incidents in the early 70s, which had experienced similar problems with shallow gas. Use a drilling manager that has experiences within the South Timbalier
trench. Use better seismic equipment which most likely would discover present gas pockets.
2. Utilize a separator capable of handling influx from the formation.
3. Locate the measuring equipment as closed to the bit as possible. Gas pockets can be revealed,
before potential incidents occur.
4. Make sure the drive pipe is driven deep enough into the formation. This will give a better isolation
of shallow gas. Stop drilling when the background gas noted in the mud returns exceeds 200 units.
Have the operator set a casing at this point. Perform a casing operation before drilling into the
sand lens below 1,000 feet. Make sure that the mud weight is sufficient, and that the drilling is
performed in an overbalanced manner. Utilize a choke with back-pressure to controll the bottom
hole pressure.
22

Figure 7: Accident investigation with use of Haddons matrix

5. Develop better routines and utilize equipment capable of detecting deviations. Earlier reactions
could have reduced the flow of fluids. Mud with at higher weight should have been pumped into
the well at a earlier point in time to reduce the unwanted flow of fluids.

9 Conclusions and further work

Only two accidents have been revealed, both with use of MPD technology. The collection of data to
evaluate risk during UBD and MPD operations were concluded.
SAFOP is a tool made to identify hazards to prevent unwanted events from occurring, or to mitigate
the consequences. Because the risk during UBD and MPD operations are not fully known, pre-hazard
analysis is important to evaluate risk contributing factors during the drilling operations. The SAFOP
method is performed by a team of experts, and is applicable for both UBD and MPD operations. According to the SAFOP analysis made on the connection with CCS, the blind ram is the most important
risk contributor. It is the first time this operation is performed by Statoil, and specialized MPD operators are included in the drilling operation. To perform a safe operation it is important to have good
communication, well functioning procedures, and clear areas of responsibilities.
ECFC, STEP, and MTO are primary methods with graphical illustrations. Haddons matrix with use
of Haddons ten strategies is capable of standing alone as a accident investigation method. All the models are process models. MTO is the only method that requires hands-on experience. Haddons matrix
combined with Haddons ten strategies, along with the STEP, covers all the socio-technical levels as opposed to ECFC and MTO. Haddons techniques are fairly easy to use. As opposed to the STEP method,
Haddons techniques do no require a lot of available data. The techniques are suitable for accident
23

investigation of UBD and MPD operations.

In formations containing potential gas pockets; detailed pre-hazard analysis of the geothechniqal
properties of the specific area should be performed, equipment capable of detecting the gas pockets
as early as possible should be utilized, and alternative drilling technologies should be considered. For
instance with use of UBD technology, separators capable of handling shallow gas, and formation fluids are utilized. The shallow gas would most likely not have caused any problems if this was an UBD
operation.
Recommendations to further work would be to; collect data on a world wide basis, and include an
UBD and MPD profile in the SINTEF blowout database.

10 Acknowledgment
I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Marvin Rausand at NTNU and Senior Consultant Alexander Solberg at Scandpower for their assistance during the preparation of this paper. I would also like to
thank Michael Golan, Dave Samuelson Per Holand, Arild Rdland, Alf Breivik, Harald Tveit, Johan EckOlsen.

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27

A Safe operability analysis

A.1 Safe operability analysis history
SAFOP or procedure HAZOP is developed from the hazard and operability, HAZOP, analysis. HAZOP
had its origin in 1963, developed by the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). The beginning of todays
HAZOP was developed for use in assessing the hazards involved in the processes of chemical plants
[30]. The process was based upon review of system piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs). The
method further developed to review the safety and operability of more complex activities [46].
Different needs and industries has lead to various HAZOP approaches;
Process HAZOP; technique originally developed to assess plants and process systems.
Human HAZOP; focuses on the human aspect and risk contribution rather than the technical
failures.
Software HAZOP; Identifies possible errors in the development of software.
Procedure HAZOP or SAFOP (SAFe Operation Study); Evaluates procedures and operational sequences.
The HAZOP analysis is usually performed on a process or operation in an early phase in order to
influence the design. However it is also applicable on existing operations or processes to identify modifications that should be implemented in order to reduce risk and operability problems. It is a systematic
and qualitative method based on guide words to identify deviations from the design intent [28]. The
analysis is performed during a set of meetings by a HAZOP group consisting of; a leader, a secretary,
and 4-6 technical experts [39, 38, 45].
In the traditional HAZOP analysis the guide words; NO, NOT, DONT, MORE, LESS, OTHER THAN,
PART OF and REVERSE are used. In addition there are guide words related to sequences as; EARLY, LATE
BEFORE, and AFTER. These guide words may not be as applicable for all variations of HAZOP analysis,
and alternative guide words recommended by the HAZOP team can be used.

A.2 Safe operability analysis description

SAFOP is an examination of an existing or planned operation procedure to identify hazards and causes
of operational problems, quality problems, and delays [38].
The methodology used during a SAFOP analysis is the same as for a HAZOP analysis. The main
differences between the two methods are; variation in use of guide words, and SAFOPs consideration of
human errors in addition to technical failures.
SAFOP is best suitable for detailed assessment, but can also be used for coarse preliminary assessment. The result of such an analysis is usually a list of preventive actions in order to improve operations
and procedures [38, 8].
According to IEC 61882 there are four sequential steps in HAZOP, see figure 8. In this report the main
focus will be on step 3, see figure 8, which deals with the examination of the procedure. There will also
be a documentation of the results, see step 4 figure 8, but no follow up will be performed.
During the examination of the operation the procedure is divided into various sequences and further into operational steps. Deviation from the design intent are revealed by applying relevant guide
words to the various steps. For each step, potential human and technical failures are stated, and the
consequences of these failures are described. The examination of the various steps can be done either
by applying relevant guide words to one step at a time, or by applying one guide word to the relevant
steps. Figure 9 illustrates the first examination method, which will be use further in this report.
A set of guide words adapted from [8] is used during the case studies later in this report [46];
Documentation during the analysis is listed in SAFOP work sheets, see appendix B.
The different columns are;

28

Figure 8: HAZOPs four basic sequential steps according to IEC 61882, adapted from [28]

29

Figure 9: Flow chart of a SAFOP analysis adapted from [28]

30

Table 4: Guide words in SAFOP et al B. Kirwan adapted from [38]

Guide word
Description
Unclear
Step in wrong place
Wrong action
Incorrect
information
Step omitted
Step unsuccessful
Interference effects
from others

Column
No.
Work step
Guide word
Deviation
Possible cause
Consequences
Action required

Procedure is written in a hard way to understand and

might be confusing
The procedure does not imply the correct sequence of
actions that should be made.
The action presented in the procedure is incorrect
Information that are checked prior to actions are
incorrectly specified.
Step not performed
The step is performed incorrectly
The procedure performance is affected by other
personnel carrying out simultaneous tasks

Table 5: Work sheet explanation

Explanation
The SAFOP reference numbers.
The studied step in the procedure.
Guide words applied to the various steps.
Deviation from the desired output of the step.
The event causing the deviation.
Possible consequences from the deviation.
Pre-actions to prevent the deviation from
occurring.

A.2.1 Pros
Positive aspects of SAFOP analysis [39, 38, 45, 46, 28, 8];
Provides creative thinking. Specialists are gathered to review the system and identify failure modes
Includes both technical and human errors
The method gives a systematic examination
It is applicable in all phases on the facility
Identifies potential hazards before they are introduced to the system
Gives the different persons participating in the process, or procedure, insight to other areas of the
work process.
Provides flexibility in choice of guide-words
A.2.2 Cons
Negative aspects of SAFOP analysis [39, 38, 45, 46, 28, 8];
The results of the analysis depends on the knowledge, interaction and experience of the persons
involved
It is defendant on the availability and the detail description of the procedures
It is time consuming

31

 The study generates extensive information

The analysis is dependent on the extent of the investigation
Some team members may dominate more than others
It is not and "in-depth" review of causes and consequences
Does not consider common cause failures

32

B SAFOP of connection with use of a continuous circulation system

33

Sheet:

Procedure title:

Revision No:

Date

Team composition

Meeting date

Part considered

Instruction step

No.
1

Deviation
Pipes are in wrong position
The pipes are not lifted
Equipment and pipes are
damaged

Step

1. Lift pipes

Guideword
Unclear

Possible causes
The position is written in a
confusing way. Wrong
equipment is used because of
unclearance in the procedure.
Wrong force is applied, or
pipes are moved too fast due
to a confusing procedure.
The wrong force is specified,
Wrong action
Pipes are left in wrong
position.Pipes are lost to the either the force given is too
high or too low. The wrong
bottom of the hole.
equipment is specified.
Wrong force might be applied,
Incorrect information The pipes are lost,
or the wrong positions are
damaged or in wrong
given. The equipment used
position.
does not the needed strength
to lift the pipes in right position.
The pipes are not lifted
because the operation to lift the
pipes is not performed, or left
out in the procedure.
Wrong action is performed by
the personnel.

Consequence #
Safety
Operability

Study title:

Consequences
1 The operation is delayed
2 There are damage on the
pipes
3 Equipment is damaged
4 Surges might occur

Action required
Find the position, speed,
and tools that should be
used during the lifting of the
pipes, and make sure the
procedure is clear and easy
to understand.

#
1
2
3
4

S
L
M
M
H

O
M
M
H
H

1 Bit is damaged
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipes are damaged.
4 Surges might occur
1 Bit is damaged
2 Pipe rams are damaged
3 Pipes are damaged
4 Operation is delayed

Have a person check the

procedures to make sure
that the action stated in the
procedure is correct.
Review procedures and
make sure right equipment,
pressure and position is
given.

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

L
M
L
H
L
M
L
H

M
H
M
H
M
H
M
H

1 Bit is damaged
2 Pipe rams are damaged
3 Pipes are damaged

Train personnel and review

procedure to make sure all
the steps in the operation
are included.
Train personnel and make
sure that the work
environment is good.

1 L M
2 M H
3 L M

Step omitted

Pipes are left in wrong

position.

Step unsuccessful

Pipes are left in wrong

position. Pipes are lost
downhole.

Interference effects
from others

Operator is distracted, and fails 1 Bit is damaged

Pipes are left in wrong
2 Pipes are damaged
position. The pipes are lost to make the right action.
3 Equipment is damaged
downhole.

1 Bit is damaged
2 Pipes are damaged
3 Equipment is damaged

1 L M
2 M M
3 M H

Train personnel and review 1 L M

the work environment.
2 M M
3 M H

No.
7

Step

2 a) Activate pipe rams

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Possible causes
The pipe rams are not
The right terms are not used in
closed, or in wrong position. the procedure. The correct
pressure is not specified in a
clear manner.

Consequences
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe rams does not
support the pipes
4 The chamber is not
sealed, which might lead to
mud spill
1 Pipes are not supported 2
Step in wrong place Pipe rams are not closed, or The steps are in wrong
Pipes are damaged
they are closed before the sequnece in the procedure.
3 Equipment is damaged
pipes are lifted.
4 The chamber is not
sealed, which might lead to
mud spill
1 Pipes are damaged
Wrong action
Pipe rams are not closed, or Wrong action is given. The
2 Pipe rams are damaged.
closed too fast, too hard, or correct pressure is not
specified, or the right terms are 3 Pipe rams does not
too loose.
support the pipes
not used.
4 Chamber is not sealed,
which might lead to mud
spill

10

Incorrect information Pipe rams are in wrong

position

11

Step omitted

Wrong pressure and positions

are given.

1 Pipe rams are damaged

2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Pressure chamber is not
sealed, which might lead to
mud spill
Pipe rams are not activated Operator does not activate the 1 Pipes are not supported.
2 The chamber is not
pipe rams, or it is not
documented in the procedure. sealed, which might lead to
mud spill

Action required
Find right pressure, and
speed that should be
applied, and make sure
they are clearly stated in
the procedure.

#
1
2
3
4

S
L
M
L
L

O
M
H
H
M

Review procedure to make

sure that the steps are in
right order.

1
2
3
4

L
L
M
L

H
M
H
M

Find the right pressure, and

speed that should be used,
and make sure they are
applied to the procedure.

1
2
3
4

L
M
L
L

M
H
H
M

Review procedure before

starting the operation.

1 M H
2 L M
3 L H

Review the procedure and

train the operator.

1 L H
2 L H

13

Step

2 a) Activate pipe rams

No.
12

Guideword
Step unsuccessful

Deviation
Possible causes
Pipe rams are not activated, Operator fails to perform the
or they are in wrong position right action. The wrong amount
of pressure is applied or the
operator fails to leav the pipe
rams in the right positions.

Interference effects
from others

Pipe rams are left in the

wrong position

The operator fails to take the

right action because of
distractions from co-workers.

Consequences
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Pipe rams are damaged
3 Chamber is not sealed,
which may lead to mud
spill.
If the chamber leaks it
might lead to;
4 mud loss
5 Kicks if pressure inside
and outside the drillpipe is
not equalized before
disconnection is made
1 Pipe rams are damaged
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Pressure chamber is not
sealed, which might lead to
mud spill

Action required
Train personnel, and have
an extra person to make
sure the operation is
performed correctly.

#
1
2
3
4
5

S
L
M
L
M
H

O
M
H
H
L
H

Review the procedure

before performing the
operation.

1 M H
2 L M
3 L H

No.
14

Step

16

17

2 b) Activate pipe slips

15

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Possible causes
Pipe slips are not closed, or The terms used are unclear.
they are in wrong position. The pressure is given in a
confusing way.

Wrong action

Pipe slips are not closed, or The wrong action is given.

they are in wrong position. Correct pressure is not
specified. The right terms are
not used.

Incorrect information The pipe slips are in wrong Wrong speed and pressure is
position.
specified in the procedure.

Step omitted

Pipe slips are not activated. Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator .

Consequences
1 Operation is delayed.
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Equipment is damaged.
4 Pipe slips does not
support the pipes.
5 The chamber is not
sealed.
1 Operation is delayed.
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Pipe rams are damaged.
4 Pipe rams does not
support the pipes.
5 The chamber is not
sealed.
1 Equipment is exposed to
unnecessary wear.
2 Equipment is damaged. 3
Pipe is damaged
4 Pipes are not supported
1 Pipes are not supported.
2 Pipes might be lost
downhole or damaged
when disconnected.

Action required
Find the right pressure and
speed, and apply the
information to the
procedures.

#
1
2
3
4
5

S
L
L
M
M
H

O
M
M
H
H
H

The procedure should be

reviewed before the
operation is started.

1
2
3
4
5

L
L
M
M
H

M
M
H
H
H

Review procedure before

starting on the operation.

1
2
3
4

L
M
L
M

M
H
M
H

Review procedure before

starting on the operation,
and train personnel.

1 M H
2 M H

19

Step
2 b) Activate pipe slips

No.
18

Guideword
Step unsuccessful

Deviation
Pipe slips are not in right
position

Interference effects
from others

Pipe slips are not in right

position

Possible causes
Incorrect action is taken.
Operator does not supply the
right amount of pressure, or the
pipe slips are left in wrong
position.
Operator fails to take the right
action due to distractions

Consequences
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Equipment is damaged. 3
Pipe might be lost
downhole when
disconnection is made
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Equipment is damaged. 3
Pipes are not supproted,
and might be lost downhole
when disconnection is
made

Action required
Train personnel and have
an extra person check on
the operation.

#
1
2
3

S
L
M
M

O
M
H
H

Train personnel, and look

at the work environment

1 L M
2 M H
3 M H

21
22

Step

3 Pressurize chamber

No.
20

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Possible causes
Consequences
1 The chamber might burst
The valve to lower chamber The valve is not properly
named, or the correct pressure if the pressure becomes too
is not opened, or there is
high.
too much or too little flow . is not specified.
2 Operation is delayed.
3 Mud can be lost
4 Equipment is damaged.
5 Kicks might occur during
disconnection if the
chamber is not properly
pressurized.
Step in wrong place Valve is opened before the The sequence of operations is 1 Mud spill
pipe rams are closed.
wrong in the procedure
Wrong action
Chamber is not pressurized, The wrong valve is specified to The perssure is not equal
on the inside and on the
not fully pressurized, or over open in the procedure. The
flow rate given in the procedure outside og the drillstring.
pressurized.
1 Chamber might burst.
is either too high, too low, or
2 Operation is delayed.
the wrong end pressure is
Pressure might be too high
given.
or too low which can lead
to;
3 Mud loss.
4 Damage on equipment.
5 Kicks during
disconnection.

Action required
Control procedures before
starting the operation.

#
1
2
3
4
5

Review procedure before

action is taken.
Review procedures before
starting the operation, and
have an extra person
cheking it.

1 L M
1
2
3
4
5

S
H
L
M
M
H

H
L
M
M
H

O
H
H
L
H
H

H
H
L
H
H

No.
23

Step

25

26

3 Pressurize chamber

24

Guideword
Deviation
Incorrect information Chamber is not fully
pressurized, or it is
pressurized too much.

Possible causes
The wrong instruction and
information is given in the
procedure.

Consequences
The perssure is not equal
on the inside and on the
outside og the drillstring.
1 Chamber might burst.
2 Operation is delayed.
Pressure might be too high
or too low which can lead
to;
3 Mud loss.
4 Damage on equipment.
5 Kicks during
disconnection.
The pressure outside and
inside the drillstring is not
equalized.
1 Equipment is damaged.
2 Kicks might occur.
3 Operation is delayed.
1 Chamber might burst.
Pressure outside and inside
the drillstring is not equal,
which might lead to;
2 Mud spill
3 Mud loss or even
4 Kicks.

Step omitted

The chamber is not

pressurized.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

Step unsuccessful

Chamber is not fully

pressurized, or it is
pressurized too much.

The chamber is not

pressurized correctly by the
operator.

Interference effects
from others

Chamber is not fully

pressurized, or it is
pressurized too much.

Operator fails to take the right 1 Chamber might burst.

action due to distractions from Pressure outside and inside
the drillstring is not equal,
co-workers
which might lead to;
2 Mud spill
3 Mud loss or even
4 Kicks.

Action required
Make sure the pressure
inside the drillstring is given
and review the pressures
before action is taken.

#
1
2
3
4
5

S
H
L
M
M
H

O
H
H
L
H
H

1 M H
Review procedure, and
control the pressure inside 2 H H
the chamber. Have an extra 3 L M
person checking.

Train operator, and have a

second person looking over
the operation. Make sure
there is good
communication between
the involved personnel

1
2
3
4

H
L
M
H

H
M
L
H

Train personnel, monitor

the pressure constantly,
and review the work
environment

1
2
3
4

H
L
M
H

H
M
L
H

No.
27

Step

29

30
31

32

4 Connect snubbing unit

28

Guideword
Unclear

Possible causes
Consequences
Procedures are confusing and 1 Operation is delayed
misleading.
2 Snubbing unit is
damaged
3 Pipes are damaged
Wrong action
Snubbing unit is incorrectly Wrong instructions are given in 1 Delay
connected.
the procedure.
2 Damaged pipes
3 Damaged equipment
Incorrect information Snubbing unit is incorrectly Wrong torque is applied, either 1 Equipment is damaged
connected
it is used too much or too little. 2 Pipes might be damaged

Step omitted
Step unsuccessful

Interference effects
from others

Deviation
Snubbing unit is not
connecte, or connected in
the right way.

Snubbing unit is not

connected.
Snubbing unit is not
connected the right way.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator.
Wrong action is performed by
the operator.

1 Operation is delayed

1 Equipment is damaged. 2
Pipe is damaged.
3 Operation is delayed
because it is not possible to
disconnect the pipes.
Snubbing unit is incorrectly The operator is distracted, and 1 Equipment is damaged. 2
connected.
fails take the right action.
Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
because it is not possible to
disconnect the pipes.

Action required
Review procedures before
the operations is started.

#
1
2
3

S
L
L
L

O
M
H
M

Have an experienced
person checking the
procedure.
Make sure that the
specifications given on pipe
dimensions and torque are
right before the operation is
started.
Review procedure

1
2
3
1
2

L
L
M
M
L

M
M
H
H
M

1 L M

Train personnel and double 1 M H

check the operation.
2 L M
3 L M

Train personnel and make

sure that the work
environment is good.

1 M H
2 L M
3 L M

No.
33

Step

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
The pipes are not
disconnected, or they are
damaged

Step in wrong place Disconnection is made

before the chamber is
pressurized.

35

Wrong action

36

37

5 Disconnection of pipes

34

The pipes are not

disconnected. Equipment
and pipes are damaged.
Incorrect information The pipes are not
disconnected. Equipment
and pipes are damaged.

Possible causes
Consequences
Procedures are insufficient as 1 Pipes are damaged.
to what torque that should be 2 Equipment is damaged. 3
Operation is delayed
applied. Pipes might be
screwed in the wrong direction.

The wrong sequence given in

the procedure.

1 Pipes are damaged

2 Equipment is damaged
3 Mud loss
4 Kicks
The wrong torque is specified 1 Pipes are damaged
in the procedure.
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
Too much or too little torque is 1 Pipes are damaged
applied, or the pipes might be 2 Equipment is damaged. 3
screwed in the wrong direction Mud might be lost
due to incorrect information in 4 Kicks may occur.
the procedure.

Step omitted

The pipes are not

disconnected.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 Operation is delayed
because the pipes are not
disconnected.
2 Pipes are damaged
3 Equipment is damaged if
lifting is performed and the
pipes are not disconnected.

38

Step unsuccessful

The operator fails to take the

right action.

1 Pipes are damaged.

2 Equipment is damaged.

39

Interference effects
from others

The pipes are not

disconnected, or they are
damaged
The pipes are not
disconnected, or they are
damaged

Operator is distracted during

1 Pipes are damaged.
the operation, and fails to take 2 Equipment is damaged.
the right action.

Action required
Review procedures before
starting on the operation,
and make sure the
pressure outside the
drillstring is equal to the
one inside the drillstring.
Review procedure before
starting on the operation.

#
1
2
3

S
L
M
L

O
M
H
M

1
2
3
4
Check procedure before
1
the operation is started.
2
3
1
Make sure that the
pressure outside and inside 2
the drillstring is equal, and 3
4
that the right amount of
torque is given before
action is taken.
1
Review procedure and
2
have a second person
making sure the pipes are 3
disconnected.

L
M
M
H
L
M
L
L
M
M
H

M
H
L
H
M
H
M
M
H
L
H

L M
L M
M H

Train personnel.

1 L M
2 M H

Train personnel, and

evaluate at the work
environment.

1 L M
2 M H

No.
40

Step

41
42

6 Lift upper pipes

43

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Possible causes
Pipes are in wrong position. Equipment that should have
Equipment is damaged.
been activated is not clearly
specified. The end position of
the pipes and the speed used
to move the pipes with are not
clearly defined.
Step in wrong place The pipes are lifted before Wrong sequence is given in
pipe ram is disconnected.
the procedure.
Wrong action
Pipes are in wrong position. Wrong position is given in the
procedure.
Incorrect information Pipes are in wrong position. Wrong position is given in the
procedure.
Equipment and pipes are
damaged.

Consequences
Action required
1 Equipment is damaged. 2 Review procedures before
starting on the operation.
Pipes are damaged.
3 Operation is delayed.

#
1
2
3

S
M
L
L

O
H
M
M

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipes are damaged
1 Operation is delayed.
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipes are damaged
1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipes are damaged

1
2
1
2
3
1
2

M
L
L
M
L
M
L

H
M
M
H
M
H
M

Review procedure before

action is taken.
Review procedures before
starting on the operation.
Review procedure before
starting on the operation.

Step omitted

Pipes are not lifted.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator.

1 Pipes are damaged if the Review procedure, and

have an extra person to
blind ram is closed.
Lost control of the pressure check on the operation.
downhole. The pressure
might exceed/undergo the
drilling window which might
lead to;
2 Mud loss
3 Kicks

1 L M
2 M L
3 H H

45

Step unsuccessful

46

Interference effects
from others

Upper pipes are in wrong

position.
Upper pipes are in wrong
position.

Operator fails to take the right

action.
Operator is distracted, and fails
to make the right action.

1 Pipes are damaged

2 Equipment is damaged
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Equipment is damaged

1
2
1
2

44

Train personnel
Train personnel, and
evaluate the work
environment

L
M
L
M

M
H
M
H

No.
47

Step

48

50

7 Close blind ram *

49

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Possible causes
Blind ram is not closed, or it The terms used are unclear.
is in the wrong position.
The correct pressure that
should have been applied is
given in a confusing way.

Step in wrong place Blind ram is closed before

the pipes are connected.
Wrong action
Blind ram is not closed, or it
is in wrong position.

The wrong sequnece is given

in the procedure.
Wrong action or position is
given in the procedure.

Wrong position and closure

Incorrect information Blind ram is in wrong
position, or the blind ram is pressure is given.
damaged.

Consequences
1 Blind ram is damaged
Blind ram does not seal
between the upper and
lower chamber which might
lead to;
2 Mud loss
3 Kicks
1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipes are damaged
1 Blind ram is damaged
Chamber is not fully divided
and sealed in two separate
parts which might lead to;
2 Mud loss, or even
3 Kicks
1 Blind ram is damaged.
The chamber is not divided
in two parts, and the blind
ram does not seal between
the two separate parts. This
can create wrong pressure
downhole, which might lead
to;
2 Mud loss or even
3 Kicks

Action required
Find the right pressure and
speed that should have
been applied, and make
sure that this is stated in a
clear manner in the
procedure.

#
1
2
3

S
M
M
H

O
H
L
H

Review procedure before

action is taken.
Make sure the right
positions are given before
starting on the operation

1
2
1
2
3

M
L
M
M
H

M
H
H
L
H

Make sure that the right

position and closure
pressure is given before
starting on the operation.

1 M H
2 M L
3 H H

* Operation is not delayed for a long time. The valves are rather easy to open and close leading to a lower operation cost than for e.g. the snubbing
unit displacement

No.
51

Step

Step unsuccessful
7 Close blind ram *

52

Guideword
Step omitted

53

Interference effects
from others

Deviation
Blind ram is open.

Possible causes
The step is omitted in the
procedure or by the operator

Consequences
The chamber is not divided
into two separate parts.
This might lead to wrong
pressure downhole and
further to;
1 Mud loss, or even
2 Kicks
Blind ram is not fully closed, The operator fails to leave blind Chamber is not divided into
or it is damaged.
ram in right position.
two separate parts. The
blind ram does not seal the
chambers, which might
lead to the wrong pressure
downhole and further to;
1 Mud loss or even
2 Kicks

Action required
Review procedure, and
have an extra person to
check the operation.

# S O
1 M L
2 H H

Train personnel and have a 1 M L

2 H H
second part to control the
operation.

Blind ram is not fully closed, Operator fails to take the right Chamber is not divided into Train personnel, and
evaluate the work
or it is damaged.
action because of distractions. two separate parts. The
blind ram does not seal the environment
chambers, which might
lead to the wrong pressure
downhole and further to;
1 Mud loss or even
2 Kicks

* Operation is not delayed for a long time. The valves are rather easy to open and close leading to a lower operation cost than for e.g. the snubbing
unit displacement

1 M L
2 H H

No.
54

Step

8 a) Seal standpipe

55

56

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Valve is not closed, or it is
not fully closed.

Wrong action

Valve is not closed, or it is

not fully closed.

Incorrect information Standpipe is not sealed

Possible causes
Consequences
Description of the operation or 1 Operation is delayed. *
Mud continues flowing
marking of the valve is
through the standpipe and
insufficient in the procedure.
into the chamber. Too
much pressure might lead
to;
2 Leak through blind ram.
3 Leak of mud.
4 **Upper chamber might
burst.
The valve is marked wrong in 1 Operation is delayed. *
Mud continues flowing
the procedure. The wrong
closure pressure is given in the through the standpipe and
into the chamber. Too
procedure.
much pressure may lead to;
2 Leak throgh blind ram.
3 Leak of mud.
4 Upper chamber might
burst **.

Wrong pressure is given

Action required
Review procedures before
starting on the operation.

#
1
2
3
4

S
L
M
L
H

O
L
H
M
H

Review procedures before

starting on the operation.

1
2
3
4

L
M
L
H

L
M
M
H

Review closing pressure

1 Operation is delayed. *
before action is taken
Mud continues flowing
through the standpipe and
into the chamber. Too
much pressure may lead to;
2 Leak in the blind ram
3 Leak of mud

* Operation is not delayed for a long time. The valves are rather easy to open and close leading to a lower operation cost than for e.g. the
snubbing unit displacement
** Because of the amount of mud and pressure inside the chamber the consequences will be severe

1 L L
2 M M
3 L M

58

59

Step

8 a) Seal standpipe

No.
57

Guideword
Step omitted

Deviation
Possible causes
The standpipe is not sealed. The valve is not closed due to
missing step in the procedure
or because the step is omitted
by the operator.

Consequences
1 Operation is delayed. *
Mud continues flowing
through the standpipe and
into the chamber. Too
much pressure might lead
to;
2 Leak in blind ram.
3 Mud leak.
4 Upper chamber might
burst. **
1 Leak of mud.
2 Leak in blind ram.

Action required
Review procedure, train
operator, and have an extra
person to check the
operation.

Train personnel.
The valve is not fully closed. Wrong action is taken by the
operator. The person fails to
close the valve completely.
1 Leak of mud.
Train personnel, and
Interference effects The valve is not fully closed. Wrong action is taken by the
evaluate the work
from others
operator. The operator fails to 2 Leak in blind ram.
environment.
fully close the valve because of
distractions
* Operation is not delayed for a long time. The valves are rather easy to open and close leading to a lower operation cost than for e.g. the
snubbing unit displacement
Step unsuccessful

** Because of the amount of mud and pressure inside the chamber the consequences will be severe

#
1
2
3
4

S
L
M
L
H

O
L
M
M
H

1 L M
2 M M
1 L M
2 M M

61

62

Step
8 b) Open drain valve to the upper chamber

No.
60

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
The chamber is not
depressurized, or not fully
depressurized. The drain
line is damaged.There is too
much flow through the drain
valve.

Step in wrong place The pressure is not bled of

before pipe ram is opened.

Wrong action

Possible causes
The drain valve in the
procedure is marked in a
confusing way. Flow rate is not
specified clearly in the
procedure.

Consequences
1 Operation is delayed
Pressure is build up. Too
much pressure may lead to;
2 Leak of mud through the
blind ram
3 Mud spill
4 Damage on equipment

Action required
Make sure that the valve is
marked in the same
manner in the procdure,
and on the control panel.
Review procedure and
specifications before action
is taken.

#
1
2
3
4

Wrong sequence is given in

the procedure.

1 Operation is delayed
2 Mud is spilled

Review procedures before

starting on the operation.

1 L M
2 M M

1 Operation is delayed.
2 Damage on equipment
3 Mud spill

1 L L
Review procedure and
make sure that the valve is 2 M H
marked correctly, and make 3 L M
sure that the right flow rate
is given, before starting on
the operation.

The valve is marked wrong.

The chamber is not
depressurized. There is too The flow rate is specified
much flow through the drain wrong.
valve.

S
L
M
L
M

O
L
M
M
H

64

65

66

Step
8 b) Open drain valve to the upper chamber

No.
63

Guideword
Deviation
Incorrect information The chamber is not
depressurized.

Step omitted

The valve is in a closed

position.

Step unsuccessful

The chamber is not

depressurized, or there is
too much flow through the
drain valve.
The chamber is not
depressurized.

Interference effects
from others

Possible causes
The valve is not fully opened.
The wrong amount of mud that
is supposed to be drained is
given.
The valve is not opened due to
missing step in the procedure,
or because the step is omitted
by the operator.

Consequences
1 Operation is delayed
2 Mud is spilled

Action required
Review procedure before
starting the operation.

# S O
1 L L
2 L M

1 Operation is delayed
Pressure is build up. Too
much pressure may lead to;
2 Leak of mud through the
blind ram
3 Mud spill
4 Damage on equipment

Review the procedure, and

have a second person to
check that the valve is in
right position.

1
2
3
4

Operator fails to leave the

valve in right position.

1 Operation is delayed.
2 Damage on equipment
3 Mud spill

Train the operator.

1 L L
2 M H
3 L M

Operator is distracted during

the operation

1 Operation is delayed
2 Mud is spilled

Review the work

environment, and train
personnel.

1 L L
2 L M

L
M
L
M

L
M
M
H

No.
67

Step

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
There is mud in the
standpipe.

Step in wrong place Standpipe is bled of before

the drain valve is opened.

69

Wrong action

70

8 c) Bleed of standpipe

68

There is mud in the

standpipe.

Possible causes
The standpipe is not bleed of
properly because the
procedure does not give a
clear description on how to
perform the operation.
Wrong sequence is given in
the procedure.

Consequences
1 Mud is in the standpipe.
This might lead to mud
spill.

Chamber is not pressurized

properly, which might lead
to;
1 Chamber bursting
2 Operation is delayed
1 There is mud in the
The amount of mud in
standpipe, and the dimensions standpipe. This might lead
to mud spill.
of the standpipe given in the
procedure is wrong.

# S O
1 L M

Review procedure before

the operation is started.

1 H H
2 L H

1 L M
Make sure the right
measures are made before
starting on the operation.

Make sure the right

measures are given and
applied to the procedure,
before action is taken.
Review procedure and
calculations before taking
action. Make sure that the
pressure is fully bled off.

1 L M

1 There is mud in the

standpipe. This might lead
to mud spill.

Train personnel.

1 L M

1 There is mud in the

standpipe. This might lead
to mud spill.

Train personnel, and review 1 L M

the work environment.

Incorrect information There is mud in the

standpipe.

The wrong amount of mud is

given in the procedure.

1 There is mud in the

standpipe. This might lead
to mud spill.

Step omitted

The standpipe is not bled

off.

Step is omitted in the

procedure, or by the operator

1 There is mud in the

standpipe. This might lead
to mud spill.

72

Step unsuccessful

There is mud in the

standpipe.

Operator fails to take the right

action.

73

Interference effects
from others

There is mud in the

standpipe.

Operator fails to take the right

action, because he is
distracted.

71

Action required
Review procedures before
starting on the operation.

1 M M

No.
74

Step

76

77

78

79

Wrong action
9 a) Disconnect snubbing unit

75

Guideword
Unclear

Deviation
Snubbing unit is not
disconnected, or it is
disconnected wrong.
Snubbing unit is not
disconnected correctly.

Incorrect information Snubbing unit is not

disconnected correctly.

Possible causes
The operation is not clearly
specified in the procedure.
The step specified in the
procedure is wrong.

Incorrect information as to the

pressure and operation is
given in the procedure.
Step is omitted in the
procedure, or by the operator

Step omitted

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected.

Step unsuccessful

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected correctly.

The wrong action is taken.

Interference effects
from others

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected correctly.

Operator is distracted during

the operation.

Consequences
1 Operation is delayed
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipes are damaged
1 Pipes are damaged
2 Equipment is damaged

Action required
Check procedures and
clarify the steps before
starting on the operation.
Check the procedure and
make sure the steps are
right before action is taken.

#
1
2
3
1
2

S
L
M
L
L
M

O
M
H
M
M
H

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Check procedure before

starting on the operation.

1 L M
2 M H

1 Operation is delayed
If the pipes are removed
before the snubbing unit is
removed, there will be;
1 Damage on pipes
2 Damage on equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Review procedure and

check, and make sure that
the equipment is properly
disconnected.

1 L M
2 L M
3 M H

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Train personnel, and review 1 L M

at the work environment.
2 M H

Train personnel, and

1 L M
double check the operation. 2 M H

No.
80

Step

81

85

86

9 b) Open upper pipe ram

84

Deviation
Upper pipe ram is not
opened. Not opened fully

Consequences
Not cleared from the pipe,
or in wrong position, might
lead to damage on;
1 Pipe
2 Equipment
1 Mud spill

Action required
Check procedures and
clarify the steps and
pressures before starting
operation

The wrong pipe ram is given in Not cleared from the pipe,
or in wrong position, might
the procedure or the wrong
lead to damage on;
position is given.
1 Pipe
2 Equipment
Incorrect information Upper pipe ram is tightened. Pressure and position is
Not cleared from the pipe,
Not opened fully
incorrect specified
or in wrong position, might
lead to damage on;
1 Pipe
2 Equipment
Step omitted
Upper pipe ram is closed
Step is omitted in the
Not cleared from the pipe,
procedure or by the operator
might lead to damage on;
1 Pipe
2 Equipment
Step unsuccessful
Upper pipe ram in wrong
Operator fails to take the right 1 Pipe is damaged
position
action.
2 Pipe ram is damaged

Review procedure before

starting operation

Step in wrong place Pipe ram is opened before

the chamber is
depressurized
Wrong action
Upper pipe ram is not
opened. Not opened fully

82

83

Guideword
Unclear

Interference effects
from others

Possible causes
Not clearly specified in the
procedure. Wrong ram is
opened. Pressure given in an
confusing way
Wrong sequence in the
procedure

# S O
1 L M
2 M H

1 H H

1 L M
2 M H

Review information given in 1 L M

procedure, and make sure 2 M H
they are right before action
is taken.
Review procedure and
make check that the right
position is achieved.

1 L M
2 M H

Train personnel, and

1 L M
double check the positions. 2 M H

Pipe ram is not closed, or in Distraction leads to wrong pipe Not cleared from the pipe,
wrong position
ram is opened, or pipe ram is or placed in wrong position
might lead to damage on;
placed in wrong position
1 Pipe
2 Equipment

* If the pipe ram is damaged without being detected, kicks might occur. This is due to difficulties to maintain the right pressure inside the chamber.

1 L M
2 M H

Unclear

Not in right position

Not clearly described in

procedure

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed

88

Wrong action

Pipes in wrong position

Wrong position is given.

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
1 Operation is delayed.

89

90
91

10 a) Remove pipe

87

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed

Train personnel, and make

sure the communication is
good

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
Pipes in wrong position
Distraction leads the operator 1 Equipment is damaged
to get pipes out of position
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
Wrong pipes. Not in correct What kind of pipes not clarified 1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
position
in the procedure. Not clearly
3 Operation is delayed
described in the procedure

94

Wrong action
10 b) Add new pipe joints

H
M
M
H
M
M
H
M
M

Step unsuccessful

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator
Operator fails to take the right
action.

Unclear

97

M
L
L
M
L
L
M
L
L

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
Operation is delayed

1
2
3
Make sure there is a good 1
work environment and train 2
3
personnel
1
Check procedures and
clarify the steps, equipment 2
3
and positions before
starting operation
1
Review procedure and
2
make sure the right pipes
3
and positions is given
before starting operation
Review procedure
1
2
3
Train personnel
1

Pipe is not removed

93

96

H
M
M
H
M
M
L

Step omitted

Interference effects
from others

95

M
L
L
M
L
L
L

Wrong positions are given

92

Wrong pipes are added.

Pipes in wrong position

Incorrect information Wrong pipes are added.

Pipes in wrong position
Step omitted
Step unsuccessful

New pipe joints are not

added
Wrong pipes are added.
Pipes in wrong position

Wrong pipes are listed in the

procedure. Wrong position and
dimensions are given in the
procedure
Wrong pipes are listed in the
procedure
Step is omitted in the
procedure or by the operator
Wrong actions are made

1 M H
2 L M
3 L M
1
2
3
1
2
3
1

Incorrect information Pipes in wrong position

Pipes in wrong position

Check procedures and

clarify the steps and
positions before starting
operation
Make sure the right
positions is given before
starting operation
Review procedure
information before action is
taken
Train personnel

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed

Train personnel

M H
L M
L M
M
L
L
L

H
M
M
L

1 M H
2 L M
3 L M

Interference effects
from others

Pipes in wrong position

Wrong pipes are added

99

Unclear

Ram is not closed

Ram is not in right position
Equipment is damaged
Pipe is damaged

100

Step in wrong place Closed before pipes are in Step is listed in the procedure
in the wrong sequence
position
Closed after the connection
of snubbing unit

101

Wrong action is given. Correct 1 Operation is delayed.

Pipe rams are not closed.
Closed too fast, too hard, or pressure is not specified. The 2 Pipes are damaged
3 Pipe rams are damaged
right terms are not used
too loose.
4 Pipe rams does not
support the pipes,
equipment is damaged
5 Chamber leaks if
pressurized, leading to
mud spill
Incorrect information Pipe ram in wrong position Wrong pressure and positions 1 Pipe rams are damaged 2
are given
Pipes are damaged.
3 Does not support the
pipes, equipment is
damaged
4 Pressure chamber is not
sealed (may lead to mud
spill)

11 a) Close pipe ram

102

Wrong action

Distraction leads the operator

to get pipes out of position or
fails to add the right pipes
The terms used are unclear.
Correct pressure is given in a
confusing way.

1 Equipment is damaged
2 Pipe is damaged
3 Operation is delayed
1 Operation is delayed.
2 Pipes are damaged
3 Pipe rams are damaged
4 Pipe rams does not
support the pipes,
equipment is damaged
5 Chamber leaks if
pressurized, leading to
mud spill
1 Damage on pipes
2 Equipment is damaged

98

M
L
L
L
L
M
M
L

H
M
M
M
M
H
H
M

Make sure there is a good

work environment and train
personnel
Find right pressure, and
speed that should be
applied, and apply to the
procedures

1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5

Review procedure

1 L M
2 M H

Find right pressure, and

speed that should be
applied, and apply to the
procedures

1
2
3
4
5

L
L
M
M
L

M
M
H
H
M

Review procedures before

starting the operation.

1
2
3
4

L
M
M
L

M
H
H
M

103

Step omitted

Pipe ram is not activated

Operator does not activate the 1 Pipes are not supported, Review procedure and train 1 M H
2 L M
operator. Have an extra
equipment is damaged
pipe ram or it is not
person checking.
2 The chamber is not
documented in the procedure
sealed which may lead to
mud spill

104

Step unsuccessful

Pipe ram is not fully closed

105

Interference effects
from others

Pipe ram in wrong position

106

Unclear

Operator fails to leave pipe ram 1 Pipe rams are damaged 2

in right position.
Pipes are damaged.
3 Does not support the
pipes, equipment is
damaged
4 Pressure chamber is not
sealed (may lead to mud
spill)
1 Pipe rams are damaged 2
Distraction from other
Pipes are damaged.
operators leads to wrong
3 Does not support the
action.
pipes, equipment is
damaged
4 Pressure chamber is not
sealed (may lead to mud
spill)
Procedures are confusing
1 Operation is delayed.
2 Damage on equipment
3 Pipes are damaged
Step in wrong place in the
1 Damaged pipes
procedure
2 Damaged equipment
3 Mud spill

Snubbing unit is not

connected. Not connected
the right way.
Step in wrong place Snubbing unit is not
connected when the
chamber is pressurized

107

Wrong action

unit

108

Snubbing unit is connected Wrong instructions

wrong

1 Damage on equipment
2 Pipes are damaged

L
M
M
L

M
H
H
M

Train personnel. View work 1 L

environment.
2 M
3 M
4 L

M
H
H
M

L
M
M
M
M
L

M
H
M
M
H
M

Train personnel

Review procedures before

starting the operation
Review procedure and
have an extra person
looking over it before
operation is started.
Have an experienced
person checking the
procedure

1
2
3
4

1
2
3
1
2
3

1 M H
2 M M

11 b) Connect snubbing u

Wrong torque is applied, too

much or too little.

1 Damage on equipment
2 Pipes are damaged

Step omitted

Snubbing unit is not

connected

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

Review procedure
1 Operation is delayed
If this is not detected before
the chamber is pressurized
this might lead to;
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipes are damaged
4 Mud spill

1
2
3
4

111

Step unsuccessful

Snubbing unit is not

correctly connected

Wrong torque is applied, too

much or too little.

1 Damage on equipment
2 Pipes are damaged

1 M H
2 M M

112

Interference effects
from others

Snubbing unit is not

correctly connected

Distraction from other

1 Damage on equipment
operators leads to wrong action 2 Pipes are damaged

113

Unclear

Valve is not closed

Valve is not fully closed

Procedures are confusing.

Valve marked in a confusing
way

1 Delay because the drain

valve is open or leaks

114

Step in wrong place Valve is open when the

chamber is pressurized
Wrong action
Valve is not closed
Valve is not fully closed

Wrong sequence in the

procedure
Wrong thermology is used.
Wrong position is given

Operation is delayed

Incorrect information Valve is not fully closed.

The wrong positions and

closuring pressures are given

1 Delay because the drain

valve leaks

110

115

116

1 Delay because the drain

valve is open or leaks

Have an experienced
person checking the
procedure

1 M H
2 M M

Incorrect information Snubbing unit is not

correctly connected

ain valve to upper chamber

109

Have an experienced
person checking the
procedure

L
M
M
L

M
M
H
M

Train personnel and look at 1 M H

the work environment
2 M M

Review procedures before

starting the operation.
Check pressure inside the
chamber
Review procedure
Review terminology and
closing pressure before
starting the operation.
Check pressure inside the
chamber
Review procedure, and
check pressure inside the
chamber

1 L L

1 L L
1 L L

1 L L

12 Close dra

Step omitted

Valve is not closed

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 Delay because the drain

valve is open

Step unsuccessful

Valve is not fully closed.

Operator fails to leave the

valve in right position.

1 Delay because the drain

valve leaks

119

Interference effects
from others

Valve is not fully closed.

Valve is open

Operator is distracted, and fails 1 Delay because the drain

to make the right action
valve is open or leaks

120

Unclear

Valve in standpipe not

opened
Too much flow
Too little flow
Not the right pressure

Valve not properly named.

Correct pressure is not
specified. Procedures are
insufficient with respect to the
correct pressure. Can not verify
the right pressure

121

Step in wrong place Chamber is not pressurized

when blind ram is opened

122

Wrong action

118

per chamber

117

Chamber is not
depressurized. Not fully
depressurized, or over
pressurized

1 L L
Review procedure, and
check pressure inside the
chamber
1 L L
Have a second person
checking the position of the
valve
Look at the work
1 L L
environment

1 The chamber might burst Review procedures before

starting the operation.
2 Operation is delayed.
Pressure may be too high
or too low which during
connection might lead to;
3 Mud loss
4 Damage on equipment
5 Kicks

1 Mud loss
2 Damage on equipment
3 Kicks
Right valve is not specified to 1 The chamber might burst
open. Flow rate is too high or 2 Operation is delayed.
too low. Wrong end pressure is Pressure may be too high
or too low which during
given.
connection might lead to;
3 Mud loss
4 Damage on equipment
5 Kicks

Review procedure

Review procedures before

starting the operation, and
have an extra person
checking pressure in the
upper chamber

1
2
3
4
5

H
L
M
M
H

H
M
L
H
H

1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5

M
M
H
H
L
M
M
H

L
H
H
H
M
L
H
H

13 Pressurize upp

123

The wrong instruction and

Incorrect information Chamber is not fully
pressurized, or pressurized information is given in the
procedure
too much

1
2
3
4

H
M
M
H

H
L
H
H

Review procedure. Control

the pressure inside the
chamber. Have an extra
person checking.

1
2
3
4

L
M
M
H

M
L
H
H

1
2
3
1
2
3

M
M
H
M
M
H

L
H
H
L
H
H

Step omitted

125

Train operator and have a

second part checking the
operation
Have a second part
Interference effects Chamber is not correctly
checking the operation, and
from others
pressurized
look at the work
environment
Check procedures and
1 Operation is delayed
Unclear
Lower and upper chamber Blind ram is not opened. Not
Chamber is still in an upper clarify the steps and
fully opened. Not clearly
not connected, or not
pressures before starting
and lower part. Not
connected in the right way specified in the procedure.
Pressure given in an confusing connected in the right way, operation
which might lead to;
way
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Review procedure
Step in wrong place Blind ram is opened before Wrong sequence in the
1 Mud loss
the chamber is pressurized procedure
2 Damage on equipment
3 Kicks

126

127

128

Chamber is not correctly

pressurized

1 Operation is delayed
If the blind ram is opened
before detection of the
omitted step, this will lead
to;
2 Mud loss
3 Damage on equipment
4 Kicks
1 Mud loss
Operator fails to make the
wrong action. The chamber is 2 Damage on equipment
3 Kicks
not correctly pressurized.
The operator is distracted, and 1 Mud loss
fails to pressurize the chamber 2 Damage on equipment
3 Kicks
correctly

Make sure the right

pressure is given and
review the pressures before
action is taken

124

Step unsuccessful

Chamber is not pressurized Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 The chamber might burst

Pressure may be too high
or too low which during
connection might lead to;
2 Mud loss
3 Damage on equipment
4 Kicks

1 L L
2 M H
3 M M

1 M L
2 M H
3 H H

129

132

133

14 Open blind ram

130

131

1 Operation is delayed
Chamber is still in an upper
and lower part. Not
connected in the right way,
which might lead to;
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Wrong pressure and position is 1 Operation is delayed
Incorrect information Blind ram is in wrong
given in the procedure
Chamber is still in an upper
position. Blind ram is
and lower part. Not
damaged
connected in the right way,
which might lead to;
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Step omitted
Blind ram is not opened.
Step is omitted in the
1 Operation is delayed
procedure or by the operator
Chamber is still in an upper
and lower part, which might
lead to;
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Step unsuccessful
Blind ram in wrong position Operator fails to leave the blind 1 Operation is delayed
ram in right position
Chamber is still in an upper
and lower part, which might
lead to;
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Interference effects Blind ram in wrong position Operator is distracted, and fails 1 Operation is delayed
from others
to make the right action
Chamber is still in an upper
and lower part. Not
connected in the right way,
which might lead to;
2 Damage equipment
3 Damage on pipe
Wrong action

Wrong action or information is

Blind ram is not opened.
Upper and lower chamber is given in the procedure.
not connected the right way

Control procedures before

starting the operation.

1 L L
2 M H
3 M M

Control procedures before

starting the operation.

1 L L
2 M H
3 M M

Review procedure, train

operator

1 L L
2 M H
3 M M

Train personnel

1 L L
2 M H
3 M M

Train personnel and look at 1 L L

the work environment
2 M H
3 M M

134

Unclear

136

137

138
139

15 a) Lower the pipe joint

135

Pipes are in wrong position. Equipment that should be

Pipes are moved too fast
activated are not specified.
Position and speed is not
clearly defined.
Step in wrong place Lowered before the blind
Wrong sequence in the
ram is closed
procedure
Wrong action
Pipes in wrong position.
Wrong position is given in the
Pipes are moved too fast
procedure. Wrong speed and
force is given.
Incorrect information Pipes in wrong position.
Wrong position is given in the
procedure. Wrong speed and
force is given.
Step omitted
Pipes are not lowered
Step is omitted in the
procedure or by the operator
Step unsuccessful
Pipes in wrong position.
Operator fails to make the right
action.

140

Interference effects
from others

Pipes in wrong position

141

Unclear

Pipes are not connected

properly.

142

Step in wrong place Pipes are not connected

before the drain valve is
opened
Wrong action
Pipes are not properly
connected.

144

ct pipe joints

143

Incorrect information Pipes are damaged

1 Operation is delayed
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe is damaged
1 Pipe is damaged
2 Equipment is damaged
1 Operation is delayed
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe is damaged
1 Operation is delayed
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe is damaged
1 Operation is delayed

1 Operation is delayed
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe is damaged
Operator is distracted, and fails 1 Operation is delayed
to make the right action
2 Equipment is damaged
3 Pipe is damaged
Procedures are insufficient as 1 Pipes leak
2 Pipes are damaged.
to torque that should be
applied. Too much or too little 3 Equipment is damaged. 4
Operation is delayed
torque is applied.
Wrong sequence in the
1 Pressure decrease, and
procedure
kicks might occur.

Wrong torque is given in the

procedure, too much or too
little. Wrong rotation way is
given
Wrong force is specified.

1 Pipes leak
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Equipment is damaged. 4
Operation is delayed
1 Pipes leak
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Equipment is damaged. 4
Operation is delayed

Review procedures before

starting the operation.

Review procedures before

starting the operation.
Review procedures before
starting the operation.
Review procedure, train
operator
Train operator

Train operator, and look at

the work environment
Review procedures before
starting the operation.

Review procedure before

starting the operation
Review the procedure
before the operation is
performed
Review the procedure
before the operation is
performed

1 L M
2 M H
3 M M
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
3
1

M
M
L
M
M
L
M
M
L

M
H
M
H
M
M
H
M
L

1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
1

L
M
M
L
M
M
M
M
M
L
H

M
H
M
M
H
M
L
M
H
L
H

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

M
M
M
L
M
M
M
L

L
M
H
L
L
M
H
L

15 b) Conne

145

Step omitted

Pipes are not connected

146

Step unsuccessful

Pipes are not properly

connected.

147

Interference effects
from others

Pipes are not properly

connected.

148

Unclear

Valve is not closed

Valve is not fully closed

149

Step in wrong place Valve to lower chamber is

closed before blind ram is
opened
Wrong action
Valve is not fully closed

151

lve to lower chamber

150

Incorrect information Valve is not fully closed.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 Operation is delayed.
2 Pressure downhole may
increase and mud be lost. 3
If lower drain valve is
opened, the pressure will
decrease and kicks might
occur.
Operator fails to make the right 1 Pipes leak
action.
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Equipment is damaged. 4
Operation is delayed
Wrong sequence in the
1 Pipes leak
procedure
2 Pipes are damaged.
3 Equipment is damaged. 4
Operation is delayed
Insufficient procedures and
Flow of mud continues.
marking of valves.
May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst
Wrong sequence in the
Problems controlling the
procedure
BHP leading to kicks

Wrong position is given

Flow of mud continues.

May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst
Flow of mud continues.
The closuring pressure or
position is not correctly given in May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
the procedure
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst

Review procedure, train

operator

Train personnel, and have

a second person checking

1 L L
2 M L
3 H H

1
2
3
4
Train personnel, and look
1
at the work environment
2
3
4
Review procedures before 1
starting the operation. Keep 2
an extra eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber
Review procedure
1

Review procedures before

starting the operation. Keep
an extra eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber
Review procedures before
starting the operation. Keep
an extra eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber

M
M
M
L
M
M
M
L
L
H

L
M
H
L
L
M
H
L
M
H

H H

1 L M
2 H H

1 L M
2 H H

16 Close val

152

Flow of mud continues.

May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst
Flow of mud continues.
May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst
Flow of mud continues.
May lead to a higher
pressure than wanted;
1 Mud spill
2 Chamber might burst
1 Operation is delayed
Pressure build up. Too
much pressure may lead to;
2 Leak of mud through the
blind ram
3 Mud spill
4 Damage on equipment

Review procedures before

starting the operation. Keep
an extra eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber. Train personnel
Train operator, and always
keep an eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber

1 L M
2 H H

Train operator, look at the

work environment, and
always keep an eye on the
pressure inside the
chamber
Check marking and review
procedure and
specifications before
operation is started

1 L M
2 H H

Wrong procedure sequence

2 Kicks

Review procedure before

the operation is started.

1 H H

Valve is not correctly marked.

Flow rate specified wrong,
diameter opening in valve is
too small or too wide in the
procedure

1 Operation is delayed.
2 Damage on equipment
3 Mud spill

Review procedure and

make sure valve is marked
in the right way in the
procedure, and right
pressure for the drain line
and opening of the valve is
given before starting
operation.

1 L L
2 M H
3 L M

Step omitted

Valve is not closed

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

153

Step unsuccessful

Valve is not fully closed.

Operator fails to make the right

action.

154

Interference effects
from others

Valve is not fully closed.

Operator is distracted, and fails

to make the right action

155

Unclear

Chamber is not
depressurized. Not fully
depressurized. Drain line is
damaged. Too much flow

Valve in procedure is marked

in a confusing way. Flow rate is
not specified, opening in valve
not specified

156

Step in wrong place Depressurize of the

chamber starts before the
connection is made
Wrong action
Chamber is not
depressurized. Too much
flow
ed of chamber

157

1 L M
2 H H

1
2
3
4

L
M
L
M

L
M
M
H

17 Blee

Incorrect information Chamber is not

depressurized

Valve is not fully opened.

1 Operation is delayed
Wrong amount of mud is given 2 Mud is spilled

159

Step omitted

Valve is not opened

Review procedure and

The valve is not opened due to 1 Operation is delayed
have a second person
missing step in the procedure Pressure build up. Too
or omitted step by the operator much pressure may lead to; checking.
2 Leak of mud through the
blind ram
3 Mud spill
4 Damage on equipment

160

Step unsuccessful

Operator fails to leave the

valve in right position.

161

Interference effects
from others

Chamber is not
depressurized. Too much
flow
Chamber is not
depressurized

162

18 Close drain valve

158

Step in wrong place Drain valve is closed before Wrong sequence in the
procedure
the chamber is
depressurized.

Unclear

164

Wrong action
t snubbing unit

163

165

Operator is distracted during

the operation

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected, or not
disconnected right
Snubbing unit is not
disconnected correctly

Not clearly specified in the

procedure.
The steps are wrong

Incorrect information Snubbing unit is incorrectly Incorrect information of

disconnected
pressure and procedure

1 Operation is delayed.
2 Damage on equipment
3 Mud spill
1 Operation is delayed
2 Mud is spilled

Review procedure before

starting operation

1 L L
2 L M
1
2
3
4

L
M
L
M

L
M
M
H

1
2
3
View the work environment 1
and train personnel
2

L
M
L
L
L

L
H
M
L
M

Train operator

Review procedure before

Pressure builds up. Too
much pressure may lead to; starting the operation
2 Leak of mud through the
blind ram
3 Mud spill
4 Damage on equipment

1 M M
2 L M
3 M H

L
M
L
L
M

M
H
M
M
H

1 Operation is delayed
2 Damage on equipment
3 Damage on pipes
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Check procedures and

clarify the steps before
starting operation
Check procedure and make
sure the steps are right
before action is taken

1
2
3
1
2

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Check procedure before

starting the operation.

1 L M
2 M H

19 Disconnect

Step omitted

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

167

Step unsuccessful

Wrong action is taken.

168
169

Interference effects
from others
Unclear

170

Wrong action

Snubbing unit is not

disconnected correctly
Snubbing unit is not
disconnected correctly
Pipe slips are not
disconnected, or not
disconnected right
Pipe slips are not
disconnected correctly

171

20 Disconnect pipe slips

166

Operator is distracted during

the operation
Not clearly specified in the
procedure.
The steps are wrong

1 Operation is delayed
If the pipes are removed
before snubbing unit is
removed, it will be
2 Damage on pipes
3 Damage on equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
1 Operation is delayed
2 Damage on equipment
3 Damage on pipes
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

1 L M
Review procedure and
check that the equipment is 2 L M
3 M H
disconnected.

Train personnel, double

check operation.
Train personnel, and look
at the work environment
Check procedures and
clarify the steps before
starting operation
Check procedure and make
sure the steps are right
before action is taken

1
2
1
2
1
2
3
1
2

L
M
L
M
L
M
L
L
M

M
H
M
H
M
H
M
M
H

1 L M
2 M H

Incorrect information Pipe slips are incorrectly

disconnected

Incorrect information of
pressure and procedure

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Check procedure before

starting the operation.

Step omitted

Pipe slips are not

disconnected.

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 L M
Review procedure and
check that the equipment is 2 L M
3 M H
disconnected.

173

Step unsuccessful

Wrong action is taken.

174

Interference effects
from others
Unclear

Pipe slips are not

disconnected correctly
Pipe slips are not
disconnected correctly
Pipe rams are not opened.
Not opened fully

1 Operation is delayed
If the pipes are removed
before pipe slips are
removed, it will become;
2 Damage on pipes
3 Damage on equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

172

175

Operator is distracted during

the operation
Not clearly specified in the
procedure. Pressure given in
an confusing way

Train personnel, double

check operation.
Train personnel, and look
at the work environment
Check procedures and
clarify the steps and
pressures before starting
operation

1
2
1
2
1
2

L
M
L
M
L
M

M
H
M
H
M
H

Wrong sequence in the

Step in wrong place Not opened before the
procedure
procedure continues.
Opened before the pressure
is bled off

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
3 Mud spill

1 L M
Review procedure and
monitor the pressure inside 2 M H
3 M M
the chamber

Wrong action

Wrong position is given in the

procedure.

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

Review procedure before

starting operation

1 L M
2 M H

Incorrect information Pipe rams are tightened.

Not opened fully

Pressure and position is

incorrect specified

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

1 L M
2 M H

179

Step omitted

Pipe rams are closed

Step is omitted in the

procedure or by the operator

1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment

180

Step unsuccessful

Pipe rams in wrong position Operator fails to make the right 1 Damaged pipes
action.
2 Damaged equipment

Review information given in

procedure, and make sure
they are right before action
is taken.
Review procedure and
make check that the right
position is achieved.
Train personnel

181

Interference effects
from others

Pipe rams in wrong position Operator fails to make the right 1 Damaged pipes
2 Damaged equipment
action, because of disturbing
factors

177

178

21 Open pipe rams

176

Pipe rams are not opened.

Not opened fully

1 L M
2 M H
1 L M
2 M H

Train personnel and look at 1 L M

the work environment
2 M H

C Description of various accident investigation methods

C.1 Events and causal factors charting
Events and causal factors charting (ECFC) is a method to identify multiple failure causes. It gives a
graphical illustration of event sequences necessary and sufficient for an accident to occur.
The method is used to determine causal factors by identifying events and conditions that lead to the
accident.
Figure 10 presents symbols and guidelines used to prepare the events and causal factors chart. An
illustration of the chart is given in figure 11. The elements used in this illustration, are explained in
figure 10. The graphing is a dynamical process to ensure that the investigation is done in a best possible manner, and that the investigators have a clear representation of accident chronology for use in
evidence collection and witness interviewing [12].

Figure 10: Guidelines and symbols for preparing an events and causal factors chart, adapted from [12]

Figure 11: Illustration of events and causal factors chart, adapted from [12]

34

C.2 Sequentially timed events plotting

STEP was developed in 1987 by Hendrick and Benner. The method is a multi-linear method, with parallel time bases. Different activities, performed by different actors, can take place at the same time. An
actor is a person or an item that directly influence the flow of events leading to an accident. The investigation follows a process view and consists of a STEP-worksheet illustrating different events that occur
and the time they take place, see figure 12 [42].

Figure 12: Illustration of a STEP-worksheet, adapted from [42]

Arrows combine the different event relations in the accident chain. The arrow gives an overview of
the events leading to an accident.
The STEP-method also includes the following truth-testing procedures [42];
1. The row test, which makes sure each actor is broken down sufficiently and that all the events are
included.
2. The column test, which makes sure the sequences of events are paired with the relevant actions of
other actors. The event is checked by making sure that it is placed right on the time scale relative
to the other events.
3. The necessary-and-sufficient test, which looks at the events leading to next action. It makes sure
the relations between events are right. That the event studied is a result of one or more of earlier
events, and which ones.
STEP focuses on actions that leads to the accident rather than the causes [43]. The method is suited
for systematization of incidents contributing to an accident with respect to time and persons involved
[25].
The STEP methodology also includes a recommended method for identification of safety problems
and development of safety recommendations. STEP event set approach is a method which might be
used to identify safety problems inherent in the accident process. The analyst follows the chain and
marks on the time line where safety problems occur, and safety recommendations are created [42].

C.3 Man-technology-organisation-analysis
The MTO approach was developed for the Swedish nuclear power industry. The method focuses on
technical, human and organisational factors.
The method consists of the following elements [26, 42];
1. Description of the chain of events in a block diagram
2. Identification of what caused the accident
3. Identification of barriers that were meant to reveal abnormal situations, but failed to. The barriers
can be technical, human or organisational.
4. Deviation description
35

The first two elements listed above, results in an event and cause chart, the third is a barrier analysis
and the fourth is a change analysis. For further explanation of barrier and change analysis see [42].
The method starts by identifying the chain of events and illustrate these in a block diagram. Further
the analyst should identify possible technical and human causes for each event and dedicate these
vertically to the relevant events in the diagram, see figure 13. After this is done a barrier analysis of
technical, human and organisational barriers that have failed, or were not present, should be listed.
These are illustrated and placed on the bottom of the worksheet, see figure 13. Deviation description is
the last step that is performed. The deviations and the normal situation is illustrated at top of the event
and cause chart [42].

Figure 13: Illustration of a MTO-worksheet, adapted from [42]

The MTO-analysis includes a checklist to identify failure causes. The checklist contains the following factors [42];
1. organisation
2. work organisation
3. work practice
4. management of work
5. change procedures
6. ergonomic / deficiencies in the technology
7. communication
8. instructions / procedures
9. education /competence
10. work environment
For each failure cause, there exists a detailed checklist for basic or fundamental causes e.g. deviation
from work instruction, poor preparation or planning, lack of self inspection, use of wrong equipment,
or wrong use of equipment [42].
In the end of the MTO-analysis, recommendations are given. These can be either technical, human
or organisational [42].
36

C.4 Haddons Matrix

Haddons matrix was developed by W. Haddon in the 1970s, and is a process method. Accidents are
described as a chronological sequence of events [43]. The method was developed for traffic accidents,
where the accident was revealed as a result of system failure between driver (human), vehicle (machine),
and road and surroundings (environment). The method evaluates the system failures according to an
accidental time axis. This axis is divided into; before, during, and after the event occurred [32]. Haddons
matrix consist of columns representing the three different system failures, and the rows represent the
accidental time axis [43, 19]. The method is used mainly to map the accident. By combining the matrix
with Haddons accident prevention strategies the method can be used for both preventive precaution
and minimization of possible consequences if an accident should occur [32].
The accident prevention strategies are based on the "energy - barrier model". The model is a strategy
to prevent harmful energy getting in contact with individuals or objects. The 10 strategies are listed
below, copied from [24];
1. Prevent the build-up of energy
2. Modify the characteristics of the energy
3. Limit the amount of energy
4. Prevent the uncontrolled release of energy
5. Modify the rate and concentration of the energy
6. Separate the source of energy and the potential victim in time or space
7. Separate by means of physical barriers
8. Improve the targets ability to endure an energy flow
9. Limit the development of injury/damage
10. Stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate
The five first stages are related to the energy source, the sixth and seventh to the barriers, while the
last three are related to the target [24]. The method states in a more detailed manner why the accident
happened, and is used to reveal precautions that could have prevented the accident from occurring or
mitigated the consequences.

37

Part 3 Data collection and a quantitative approach of blowout frequencies during UBD and MPD operations

1 Data collection
To collect well incident data during UBD and MPD operations, authorities and companies in the
U.S., Canada, and Norway, were contacted. To develop a frequency assessment model for UBD
and MPD operations, collection of well incidents during these operations were of interest. By analyzing accident reports, accident contributing factors along with reservoir characteristics could
have been identified. A model could have been developed on behalf of these facts, which would
have contributed to a better risk understanding of UBD and MPD operations.
In table 1 a list of persons that have contributed information to this paper is given.

Contact person

Table 1: List of contacts

E-mail address

Per Holand
Dave Samuelson
Don Buckland
Melinda Mayes
Mildered Williams
Murray P. Sunstrum

per.holand@exprosoft.com
dave.samuelson@gov.ab.ca
don.buckland@gov.bc.ca
melinda.mayes@mms.gov
gulfpubl@mms.gov
msunstrum@enform.ca

Company
Exprosoft
EUB
OGC
MMS
MMS
Enform

Per Holand, at Exprosoft, is responsible of frequently updating a blowout database owned by

SINTEF. This database documents blowouts and well releases world wide. According to him, no
blowouts are recorded in the database during UBD or MPD operations. Accident investigation
reports from 2003 until present were examined, but no well incidents with use of UBD or MPD
technology was found.
No blowouts during UBD operations has been revealed. Dave Samuelson from EUB stated that
there have occurred two well incidents with use of MPD.
In Canada, far more wells have been drilled with use of UBD and MPD technology than on the
Norwegian continental shelf. On the Norwegian continental shelf, the use of UBD and MPD have
been in cases that are not technologically possible to drill OB. This is not necessary the case in
Canada. The risk is greater in UBD and MPD operations performed on the Norwegian continental
shelf. Regardless of this, data from Canada was evaluated during this project.
Well incidents that has occurred in Canada with use of MPD technology;
1. One incident occurred in 2002, and was the result of the bottom hole assembly separating
from the drill string during tripping. The rig crew was unaware of this when they became
pipe light with 3 joints left. The string hydraulicked out of the hole.
2. The other incident occurred in 2003, also while tripping. This incident was caused by the
crew shutting in the well with the rotating blowout preventer. The rotating blowout preventer failed due to excessive pressure build up. Well control was regained almost immediately by closure of the annular preventer. The accident was classified as a blow, and not a
blowout.
EUB have not got a record how many UBD and MPD applications that have taken place in
Alberta. It was not until September 2003, EUB revised their well licensing process to include a
question where the applicant would indicate if UBD operations were planned for the well. This
has still not been done for MPD operations. Since the question was added, and up to December
10

2006, only 175 applicants indicated they would be conducting UBD operations. The actual number
is expected to be much higher due to rate of penetration application, and air drilling for barefoot
completions. Barefoot completions are open hole completions, which are very common for the
Canadian sweet shallow gas targets.
In a period from 2001-2006, the total amount of wells drilled in Alberta were 106 600 according
to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) [6]. EUBs official number for the same
period is 103 163. The number of wells drilled in this period, does not correspond to the CAPPs
number due to a variety of reasons such as; reentries, resumption of drilling, spud timing (a well
might be spudded one year, while the rig is released the following year) etc., but they are reasonably
close. The number of spuds EUB have for 2002 and 2003 is respectively 13 193, and 17 108. It was
not stated how many of these that were drilled with use of MPD.

2 A quantitative approach of blowout frequencies during UBD and MPD

operations
An other way to quantify the blowout risk during UBD and MPD operations is to look at uncertainties related to the fluid flow rate. Fluid flows through a variety of equipment. A blowout might
occur if critical equipment in the process is incapable of handling the fluid rate. The probability of
a blowout can be calculated by establishing the probability of exceeding critical equipments fluid
rate capacity. For instance may the separators flow rate capacity be exceeded. Figure 1 illustrates
the fluid flow from the well into the separator.It is possible to look at reservoirs containing oil, gas
and water. To simplify, this discussion will only consider a reservoir containing a low compressible
fluid.

Figure 1: Pressures and flow during UBD operations

The fluid rate running through the separator is given by [3];

11

q = J (p R p w ) = J p

(1)

p R is the reservoir pressure, p w is the bottom hole pressure in the well, and J is the productivity
index. The productivity index for oil is given in equation 2. To account for a mixture of liquids, the
productivity index must be modified.
Jo =

2kh
o B o (l n rrwe 34 )

(2)

k is the permeability, h is the formation thickness, o is the oil viscosity, B o is the oil formation
volume factor (oil shrinks on the way up), r e is the external drainage radius of the well, and r w is
the wellbore radius. It is assumed pseudo steady state, which is applicable for the beginning phase
of the production [3].
The maximum rate a specific separator can handle, q max , is known. This gives the maximum
pressure drawdown, p max ;
p max =

q max
J

(3)

It is assumed that p max does not exceed the pressure difference between the hole collapse
pressure and the pore pressure. If this had been the case, the hole would have collapsed before the
separator capacity was exceeded.
There are uncertainties related to the bottom hole pressure in the wellbore and in the formation
pressure. These might be a result of for instance inaccuracies in the measuring equipment and in
the geological estimation of the pore pressure. The uncertainty related to the permeability, k, in
equation 2, is disregarded in this paper. The productivity index is assumed constant.
Because there are uncertainties related to the reservoir pressure and the bottom hole pressure,
they both have a probability distribution. To determine the pressure drawdown uncertainty, the
uncertainties related to the reservoir pressure and the bottom hole pressure needs to be combined.
The reservoir pressures and the bottom hole pressure are independent of each other. If X and
Y are independent stochastic variables, the variance of a X + bY will be;
V ar (aX + bY ) = a 2V ar (X ) + b 2V ar (Y )

(4)

The variance in the pressure drawdown p, see 1, is;

V ar (P ) = V ar (P R ) + V ar (P w )

(5)

The separator can burst if the pressure drawdown, p, exceeds the allowed pressure drawdown
p max , see equation 3. The probability of a exceeding the separators capacity is;
P r (P > p max )

(6)

In MPD operations p max equals zero.

In MPD operations where the drilling window often is narrow, formation fracture can be a
problem. If the bottomhole pressure exceeds the fracture pressure, the formation will start cracking. This might in an extended view, lead to a blowout. Uncertainties are related to the bottom hole
pressure and the analyzed fracture pressure. The variance of the distribution is found by equation
4. The probability of exceeding the fracture pressure is;

12

P r ((P f P w ) < or = 0)

(7)

In addition to the flow rate, equipment might have constraints to fluid pressures. The maximum pressure, p max , equipment can handle, is known. The top pressure is given in equation 8.
p t = p w g h

1 2
f v
2 d

(8)

p t is the top pressure, is the mud density, g is the gravity force, f is the friction force, and d
is a combination of the well diameter and the annulus diameter [1].
Where the velocity, v, is given by;
q
2q
v= =
(9)
A d 2
A is the areal in the annulus.
Equation 8 and 9 gives;
1

p t = p w g h f 5 2 q 2 h
(10)
2 d
A blowout might occur if the top pressure exceeds the max pressure of critical equipment. The
probability of exceeding the max pressure of the equipment is;
Pr(P t > p max )

(11)

The same equations 8 - 10 will apply for equipment that is not placed on top of the well. The
only difference will be the value of the hight, h. The probability calculation in these cases, will be
more complicated.
For a blowout to occur a set of barriers that prevents unwanted situations from happening,
must fail. The barriers can be configured in a serial or parallel structure. In figure 2, a fictitious
barrier example is illustrated.

Figure 2: Barrier diagram

The blowout probability will be in this case will be;
P r (bl owout ) = (q A + q B q A q B )qC

(12)

By combining the barrier diagram for an actual UBD or MPD operation, with the probabilities
of exceeding equipments capacity related to fluid flow and pressures, the blowout probability of a
UBD or MPD operation can be found.

13

Reservoir properties

Table 2: Data
Value

Permeability, k
Oil viscosity, o
Oil formation volume factor, o
Well bore radius, r w
External drainage radius, r e
Separator flow rate capacity, q max
Formation thickness, h

1000 mD
0.5 c p
1.4 m 3 /Sm 3
7 in
3000 f t
1000 Sm 3 /d
100 f t

SI value
1E-12 m 2
5E-4 N s/m 2
1.4 m 3 /Sm 3
0.1764 m
914.4 m
1.1547E-3 Sm 3 /s
30.48 m

Table 3: Probability data

Reservoir pressure, mean value
Reservoir pressure, standard deviation
Bottom hole pressure, mean value
Bottom hole pressure, standard deviation

300 bar
1 bar
299 bar
0.5 bar

2.1 Example; probability of exceeding the separators capacity

To illustrate the quantitative approach , an example of the probability of exceeding the separator
capacity during an UBD operation is given.
Data presented in table 2 and table 3, are normal reservoirs values in the North-Sea. The separators flow rate capacity value, is assumed.
The probability of exceeding the separator capacity is 0.02. The drawdown probability distribution plot is given in figure 3.

Figure 3: Probability plot

14

Table 4: Calculations
Drawdown, mean value
Drawdown, standard deviation
Productivity index, J o
Maximum drawdown, p max
Probability of exceeding the separator capacity

1 bar
1.12 bar
3.506E-3 m / sbar
3.3 bar
0.02

3 Conclusion and further work

Recommendations to further work on the quantitative approach of blowout frequencies during
UBD and MPD operations, are to;
1. gather uncertainty data.
2. include multiphase flow in the model.
3. develop blowout probabilities for fluid pressure.
4. develop a blowout model for UBD and MPD operations.

References
[1] H.
A.
Asheim.
Brnnproduktivitet

http://www.ipt.ntnu.no/sheim/info.html, 29.05.2007.

strmning

produksjonsryr.

[2] E. Framnes. Plattformtyper og boreutstyr, 4th edition. 2000.

[3] M. Golan and C. H. Whitson. Well Performance, Second Edition. 1996.
[4] Johnny Gundersen. Johnny.gundersen@ptil.no. Works in Petroleum Safety Authority Norway,
07.05.2007.
[5] F. Jahn, M. Cook, and M. Graham. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production. 1998.
[6] The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). Statistical handbook. The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), Calgery, Canada, May 2007.

15

Preparatory study
Master Thesis

Risk Assessment of Underbalanced and Managed

Pressure Drilling Operations

Stud.techn. Mari Oma Engevik

Preface
This report was carried out as a preparation plan for the Master thesis the final year of the
Master degree program at NTNU (Norwegian University of Science and Technology). The
study was a required task, made to support the work methodology during the projects
development.
The projects title is; Risk Assessment of Underbalanced and Managed Pressure Drilling
Operations and was carried out in co-operation with NTNU and Scandpower. Prime and
secondary teaching supervisor Marvin Rausand, NTNU, and Alexander Solberg, Scandpower,
will be available during the period this project is ongoing.

Table of contents
1

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 4
1.1
Background ................................................................................................................ 4
1.2
Main Goal................................................................................................................... 4
1.3
Approach .................................................................................................................... 4
1.4
Success criteria........................................................................................................... 4
2 Project planning and control .............................................................................................. 5
2.1
Activity plan Work Breakdown Structure............................................................... 5
2.2
Work Load.................................................................................................................. 5
2.3
Work Task Analysis ................................................................................................... 5
2.4
Project plan Gantt diagram...................................................................................... 5
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3

Work Breakdown Structure................................................................................. i

Work Task Analysis ........................................................................................... ii
Gantt diagram.................................................................................................... xi

Introduction

During the 5th year of master study at NTNU, a Master Thesis will be carried out. In the
following report a plan on how the project will be performed is presented.

1.1 Background
In recent years, underbalanced drilling (UBD) and managed pressure drilling (MPD) have
been developed as alternatives to the traditional overbalanced drilling technique. The
techniques have many advantages compared to overbalanced drilling, but the blowout risk
during these operations has not fully been understood

1.2 Main Goal

The main object of this thesis is to establish a risk evaluation model for UBD and MPD
operations compatible with BlowFAM.

1.3 Approach
In order to achieve the main goal there will be performed literature studies on UBD and MPD
in conformity with incident investigation during these operations. In order to create a generic
blowout frequency model compatible with BlowFAM, it is necessary to understand how the
program is operates, and the way it works. Because of the scope, not all variants of UBD and
MPD operations will be covered in this thesis.

1.4 Success criteria

Success criteria related to the project is based on my understanding of technical systems,
analytical abilities, and the availability of data and relevant literature.

Project planning and control

2.1 Activity plan Work Breakdown Structure

Work Breakdown Structure, WBS, gives a segmentation of the different work tasks involved
in the project and explains how the project is built up. Appendix 1 contains WBS for this
project.

2.2 Work Load

The duration of this project is 20 weeks with an estimated consumption of 37, 5 hour each
week. According to this the total amount of workload will be 750 hours. A preparatory plan is
not a final statement. The project actual performance may vary some from the plan.

2.3 Work Task Analysis

Appendix 2 gives a work task description of the activities in WBS.

2.4 Project plan Gantt diagram

A Gantt diagram is a useful tool in order to plan resources and distribute the time available
and purposed each project task. The diagram is presented in appendix 3.

Appendix 1

Work Breakdown Structure

Figure 1 WBS diagram

Appendix 2

Work Task Analysis

Note that in this section the literature study, activity 3, also is included in the duration of
activities number 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Activity
1 Preparatory Study
Problem:
Perform a preparatory study of the project in order to analyse problems and give a
description of work that has to be done in order to produce a good result. The study will
contain the project tasks and when they are due in time.
Purpose:
Create an overview of the workload
Define each activities goals
Distribute each activities time consume and the amount of work that needs to be done
Create a plan for further following-up
Content:
Preparatory Study with problems to be addressed, goals and demarcations
Literature:
Rolstads, A, Praktisk Prosjektstyring, 2001
Various literature
Method of work:
Create a plan on how the project will be completed
Give a problem description
Create WBS, CTR and Gantt-diagram
Challenges:
Create a functioning preparatory study where the work amount for each activity is
properly managed.
Results:
Plan on how to perform the project
Definition of problems and work load for each activity
Duration:
Hours
22,5

Start
22.01.07

Finish
24.01.07

ii

Activity
2 Progress Report
Problem:
Prepare a report considering the projects progress, time consumes and modifications
compared with the preparation plan.
Purpose:
View the projects progress, consider derogations and prepare corrections
Content:
Status report; gives an overview of the projects progress.
The report will also show variances that might have occurred regarding the paper and
project goals.||
Literature:
Rolstads, A, Praktisk Prosjektstyring, 2001
Various literature
Method of work:
Compare the preparation report with the projects actual progress
Challenges:
Create good solutions as for how to solve possible derogations.
Result:
A report considering the projects progress along with possible derogations compared
to the preparation plan. If derogation, these will be explained, and correction plans
will be stated.
Duration:
Hours
7,5

Start
16.03.07

Finish
16.03.07

iii

Activity
3 Literature Study
Problem:
Gather and seek literature for use in the project
Purpose:
Find and present relevant literature
Content:
Gather information from different sources. The literature should be of high quality
and create a good foundation in the project.
Literature:
Method of work:
Seek information from Internet
Seek information on BIBSYS
Communicate with competent persons
Technical and Scientific literature
Gather information from reports
Challenges:
Gather the literature of high quality
Sort and select relevant and good literature
Result:
Create a technical and professional basis for the project
Duration
Hours
352,5

Start
15.01.07

Finish
11.05.07

iv

Activity
4 Describe UBD and MPD
Problem:
Learn and describe, on a theoretical level, technology and procedures that are used for UBD
and MPD.
Purpose:
Look at different methods and technologies used in offshore industry
Get provided with information on how things work and how they are performed
Content:
Description of UBD and MPD technology and procedures
Literature:
Research papers
Various literature regarding the subject
Persons with competence
Method of work:
Read relevant literature and meet with competent experts.
Get an overview of the technology and different methods and equipment that is need.
Get familiar with UBD and MPD procedures
Challenges:
Understand the various technologies and technical terms
Get an overview of the different UBD and MPD operations
Find relevant literature
Results:
An overview of different methods and technologies that exist on UBD and MPD.
Describe procedures during these operations
Duration:
Hours
127,5

Start
15.01.07

Finish
09.02.07

Activity
5 Hazardous events during UBD and MPD
Problem:
Identify and describe hazardous events during various steps of a UBD and MPD operation.
Purpose:
To create a risk picture of UBD and MPD operations.
Establish hazardous events
Content:
Hazard identification by use of an analytical tool
Literature:
Various literature on risk analysis method
Communication with experts
Available field performance data
Method of work:
Choose an analytical method suitable for hazard identification
Perform a hazard identification and description by using the analytical tool, interview
relevant persons, and analyse available field performance data
Challenges:
Evaluate which method that is best suited
Perform a good hazard identification
Results:
Identification and description of hazardous events during UBD and MPD operations
Create a basis for activity 8
Duration:
Hours
187,5

Start
12.02.07

Finish
15.03.07

vi

Activity
6 Description of relevant well control incidents
Problem:
Investigate different well control incidents related to UBD and MPD operations, and describe
the root-causes and causal distributions
Purpose:
Get a better risk picture of UBD and MPD operations and establish which events that are
most risk contributing.
Content:
Incidents during UBD and MPD operations
Root-causes and causal distributions related to these incidents
Outline the most important risk contributors
Literature:
Various literature
Incident documentations
Communicate with experts and competent persons
Method of work:
Range different incidents according to size and consequences
Identify root causes and causal distributions
Establish the most important risk contributors
Challenges:
The scope of the analysis
Find data
Find relevant incidents and arrange them into different groups
Create a realistic risk picture in UBD and MPD operations
Result:
What causes well control incidents during UBD and MPD
Causal distributions
Ranking of risk contributing events
Duration:
Hours
105

Start
19.03.07

Finish
13.04.07

vii

Activity
7 Establish formulas between causes and formation characteristics
Problem:
Establish formulas for relations between the causes of well control incident, in activity 6, and
formation characteristics.
Purpose:
Create a plant specific risk picture of UBD and MPD operations
Content:
Formulas reflection relations between incident causes, in activity 6, and formation
characteristics
Literature:
Various literature
Competent persons
Method of work:
Look at relation between consequences of well control incidents related to the
formation characteristics
Use a regression program to create a formula reflecting these relations
Challenges:
Get enough data
Results:
Formula reflecting relations between causes of well control incidents and formation
characteristics
Duration:
Hours
75

Start
16.04.07

Finish
27.04.07

viii

Activity
8 Establish generic blowout frequency models compatible with BlowFAM
Problem:
Create a blowout frequency model for UBD and MPD which is compatible with BlowFAM
Purpose:
Further development of BlowFAM in order to include UBD and MPD operations
Content:
Blowout frequencies during UBD and MPD operations
Question list in order to identify plant specific performance
Weighting of different plant specific aspects
Literature:
BlowFAM
Various literature
Literature from activity 5,6 and 7
Competent persons
Method of work:
Learn how BlowFAM operates
Use results from activity 5, 6 and 7
Create question lists and weight different outcome
Challenges:
Establish the right questions and give each the right weight
Results:
Blowout frequency model for UBD and MPD operations in BlowFAM
Duration:
Hours
187,5

Start
30.04.07

Finish
01.06.07

ix

Activity
9 Collocation and printing of project thesis
Problem:
Complete and hand in the project thesis and make sure the report is consistent
Purpose:
Make sure the report is consistent, and it is well written
Content:
Collocation of the report
Print and hand in the project
Literature:
Method of work:
Examine the report and make sure it is consistent and grammatically correct.
Challenges:
Make sure there is none mistakes or defects in the report
Results:
Hand in a well written report within the time limit.
Duration:
Hours
37,5

Start
04.06.07

Finish
11.06.07

Appendix 3

Gantt diagram

Figure 2 Gantt diagram

xi

Progress Report
Master Thesis

Risk Assessment of Underbalanced and Managed

Pressure Drilling Operations

Stud.techn, Mari Oma Engevik

Progress
According to the preparation study report the following activities should have been
completed;
Activity 1; Preparation study
Activity 2; Progress report
Activity 4; Describe UBD and MPD
Activity 5; Hazardous events during UBD and MPD
Activity 6; Description of relevant well control incidents
At the present moment only activity 1, 2 and is finished. According to the preparatory study
the progress report should have been carried out 16/03-07, but the activity was not performed
until 16/04-07. Activity 4 and 5 is mainly finished, but some final writing still has to be done.
The activities progress is shown in Table 1 below.
Task name
Master Thesis
Preparatory study
Preparatory studty hand in
Progress report
Progress report hand in
Literature study
Report writing and analysis
Final Report commissioning
Final report hand in

Duration
[hrs]
750,0
22,5
0,0
7,5
0,0
352,5
330,0
37,5
0,0

% Work Planned
Completed
65
100
100
100
100
68
55
0
0

Planned Work % Work

Actual Work
Progress [hrs] Completed Progress [hrs]
490,3
62
464,1
22,5
100
22,5
0,0
100
0,0
7,5
100
7,5
0,0
100
0,0
239,7
55
193,9
181,5
40
132,0
0,0
0
0,0
0,0
0
0,0

Table 1 Work progress (19/04-07)

As you cans see from Table 1 the progress has not been as good as planned, but instead of
making a new plan I will stick to the original one and try to catch up the undone work.

Deviation
The reason the activities are not completed is that the amount of time needed to complete the
various tasks has been greater than first assumed. The reason for this is mainly because it has
been hard finding relevant literature and getting access to data and procedures.

Figure 1 Gantt-diagram of work progress (19/04-07)