Queer Texts, Bad Habits, and The Issue of A Future

Queer Texts, Bad Habits,
and the Issue of a Future

Teresa de Lauretis
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and
that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they
destroy syntax in advance, and not only the syntax with which
we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which
causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another)
to hold together.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things
My reflections on some themes of this special issue on queer bonds, sexuality
and sociability, negativity and futurity, are indebted to the research and thinking
involved in my recent book about the figuration of sexuality as drive in Freud and
in literary and film texts.1 One of those texts, Djuna Barness Nightwood (1936),
has received much attention in feminist criticism and in the history of literary
modernism but has been strangely disregarded in queer studies. My own psychoanalytic-literary reading of the novel did not specifically address its place in a
possible archive of queer literary writing, a project that also exceeds the scope of
this essay.2 Were I to undertake such a project, however, I would begin by broaching the question, when can literary writing be called queer?
A recent characterization of Barnes as a queer late modernist at the centre of the modernist movement suggests that, to the literary historian, the qualifier queer refers to the person(a) of the author rather than to the authors texts. 3
Interesting as it might be to speculate on the relation between the queerness of an
authorial persona and the queerness of her or his writinga relation by no means
to be taken for grantedit is the latter that concerns me here.
GLQ 17:23
DOI 10.1215/10642684-1163391
2011 by Duke University Press
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GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN and GAY STUDIES
Queer Texts
For the purposes of this discussion, I may provisionally call queer a text of fiction
be it literary or audiovisualthat not only works against narrativity, the generic
pressure of all narrative toward closure and the fulfillment of meaning, but also
pointedly disrupts the referentiality of language and the referentiality of images,
what Pier Paolo Pasolini, speaking of cinema, called the language of reality.4
The ability of language and images to refer to the phenomenal world is still
operative in works of fiction, however compromised or even residual: of course we
know that its only a story, its only a movie, but just the same . . . The unnegotiable
demands of most readers, viewers, or listeners to identify and to identify withto
make sense of whats happening, to know whos who in the diegesis, to find some
incitement to fantasy or some versions of oneself in the mirror of the text, be it only
the egos sense of mastery over the object-textare the normative requirements
with which fiction is expected to comply. That Barness novel was so unpopular in
the United States in the 1930s, despite being hailed by T. S. Eliot and widely canonized, may be attributed partly to the shockingly sexual imagery of its ending,
but the main reason why it is still widely unread today is that it is difficult to read.
It is not that a plot is missing, for there is a narrative, but the texts syntactical
and rhetorical density, its unusual lexical choices, and the kaleidoscopic storytelling embedded in its elliptical narration frustrate both narrative and referential
expectations.
Some time ago, though not in reference to Barnes, Tim Dean suggested that
difficult art may be queerer than popular art forms in that it is more resistant
to [the] normalizing imperatives of easily intelligible and consumable texts such
as those of lesbian- and gay-friendly popular culture. Although I might agree
with this, my reading of Nightwood as a queer text is not based purely on the aesthetic challenges [it poses] to intelligibility.5 These challenges, undeniably, might
qualify it as high art. They would not qualify it as queer, in my current view, if
they did not prompt a reader to ask, as Emily Coleman did of Eliot, Can you read
and not see that something new has been said about the very heart of sex?6 Here,
then, is a further and, to my mind, not sufficient but necessary specification: a
queer text carries the inscription of sexuality as something more than sex.
The new at the heart of sex in Nightwood is that something more.
And it is queer not simply because of all the far-from-normative sexual interactions between and within human bodies alluded to in the doctors monologues,
or because the novels characters are homosexuals, transvestites, possibly transsexual, circus freaks, and even nonhuman animals. The heart of sex in Nightwood
QUEER TEXTS, BAD HABITS, AND THE ISSUE OF A FUTURE
is sexuality as enigma without solution and trauma without resolutionsexuality

as an unmanageable excess of affect that can find textual expression only in a figural, oracular language, in hybrid images and elaborate conceits, or in the stream
of allusions, parables, and prophesies with which the doctor attempts to fill the
chasm between language and the real.
The novels closing passage comes at the end of a very short chapter seemingly offered as narrative conclusion of the multiyear lesbian relationship that
involves or preoccupies the five main characters. Nora loves Robin; Robin, who is
married to Felix, leaves him for Nora, then leaves Nora for Jenny, and then returns
to Nora in the last chapter; the doctor, Matthew, is both witness and oracle to their
impossible relationship. Robin is most often presented from the others viewpoints.
What we know of her is through the effect she has on them: she is the empty center
around which their lives and passions spin. When Nora at last meets up again with
Robin by following her dog to an abandoned country chapel, she sees Robin on all
fours inciting and inviting the dog, crawling after him and barking, the text says,
in a fit of laughter, obscene and touching.
The dog began to cry then, running with her, head-on with her head, as if
to circumvent her; soft and slow his feet went padding. He ran this way and
that, low down in his throat crying, and she grinning and crying with him;
crying in shorter and shorter spaces, moving head to head, until she gave
up, lying out, her hands beside her, her face turned and weeping; and the
dog too gave up then, and lay down, his eyes bloodshot, his head flat along
her knees.7
This enigmatic ending, shocking in its unequivocal simulation of a sexual
act from frenzied crescendo to (failed) orgasmic release, has likely contributed to
the ostracism Nightwood suffered in Barness native country. The novel refuses to
explain the scene or to rationalize Robins behavior. It merely describes in her the
physical manifestations of an excess of affect that cannot be bound to its immediate object (the dog), as it cannot be bound to a suitable object (lover or child)
throughout the novel. In Freuds metapsychology, psychic affect is the essence of
the drive, and it is the function of the ego to maintain its quantity constant by
binding affect to objects or to the ego itself (in narcissism). By denying psychological explanations for Robins actions and leaving the reader with only the doctors
obscure pronouncements as a guide, the text inscribes in the narrative the figure
of sexuality as an undomesticated, unsymbolizable force, not bound to objects and
beyond the purview of the ego, a figure of sexuality as, precisely, drive.
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This final scene in the chapel and the references to animals of all sorts that
punctuate the text, like the metaphors and similes that typically color the doctors
parables with biblical or surrealist overtones, have been read as alluding to an
instinctive animality in Robin and suggestive of a pre-Freudian view of sexuality
in which animal is opposed to human as instinct is to drive, body to mind, or the
carnal to the spiritual. Even a reader as attentive to language as Kenneth Burke
interprets the ending as Robins translation into identity with sheer beast.8 I
think that this is too conventional a reading. The actual, diegetic animals the narration presents in conjunction with Robin, for example, Noras dog and the circus
lioness that stops in front of Robin and Nora at their first meeting, have the status
of charactersnonhuman characters in that they are living beings without language, but characters nonetheless in that they interact with Robin.
There is between Robin and them a sort of communication that is highly
charged with affect, though not verbal or otherwise symbolically coded, a kind
of exchange that takes place on the sensory register alone, without recognizable
meaning, which is to say, outside representation. Consisting of inarticulate sounds,
bodily movements, looks, or gestures expressive less of conscious emotions than of
intensities of affect, the exchange between them is entirely outside the symbolic
and imaginary registers, as if it were carried out through the primary process
alone. Robins interactions with the animals, which the text stubbornly refuses to
anthropomorphize, figure what in the human responds to something before language or, as the text says, something not yet in history (44). The enigma that
Robin is to Nora and Felix, as well as to the text overall, is the odor of memory
she carries (the text says), like a person who has come from some place that we
have forgotten and would give our life to recall (118). That place is the mental
site in which Freud locates the drive, a psychical locality between the somatic
and the mental, the virtual area of demarcation (Abgrenzung) between body and
soula space, that is, before language as we know it and thus not yet in history.
I have called queer the space in which Freud imagines the drive to operate, moving from the body to the mind and vice versa, because it is a space not
just nonhomogeneous but more precisely heterotopic: it is the space of a transit, a
displacement, a passage and transformation, not a referential but a figural space.
For this reason a psychological reading of Nightwood falls short of appreciating
what I think is the novels more original achievement, namely, the figural inscription of sexuality as drive, a psychic excitation that the ego, in the case of Robin,
is unable to bind to itself or to objects, and in Noras case and the doctors as well,
that disrupts the emotional coherence and threatens the self-possession of the ego
by the violence of its affective charge. It is in this violence, in this unmanage-
able quantity of affect and the shattering effects it has on the ego, that sexuality
is figured in Nightwood as a psychic force that is at once sexual and death drive.
Indeed the latter, according to Freud, is a thing beyond representation, something
that pertains to the primary process alone and typically remains unconscious,
silent, undetectable, except when directed outward in the form of aggression
toward others.
Another text that inscribes sexuality as both sexual and death drive is
David Cronenbergs film Crash (1996), scripted from J. G. Ballards novel of the
same name (1973). In the film, the language of reality is compromised by the
flatness of its glossy surfaces, no depth of field, the metallic sound of electric
guitars, staccato editing, and lingering shots of the protagonists empty looks. In
representing this cold, distant, inhospitable space and the corresponding absence
of psychic depth in the characters, the film links the compulsion to repeat to the
eroticization of traffic accidents and the wounded or scarred bodies of people
and cars. Crash after crash, sexual encounter after sexual encounter, the body is
invaded by the sexual as a drive with no reachable aim or object choice, beyond
gender and beyond desire.
The concern with sexuality and death is omnipresent in Cronenbergs cinema since his 1960s shorts (the psychosexual experiments with orality in Stereo
[1969] and Crimes of the Future [1970]) and his first feature Shivers, released in
the United States as They Came from Within (1975), which earned him the title
of originator of the body horror film genre by introducing the figure of the parasite bursting out of the human body that Ridley Scott later popularized in Alien
(1979). If horror films deal with such primal issuesparticularly death and
therefore also sexuality, Cronenberg has said, it is because death is the basis
of all horror.9
In the 1980s and 1990s films, from Videodrome (1982) to Crash and
eXistenZ (1999), as the topos of the scientific experiment gone awry gives way to
the topos of individual metamorphosis, what instigates the transformation is the
humans attraction to the abnormal, the perverse, the abject, the nonhuman in its
contingent phenomenal appearance as disease, violence, and death. Their relation
to the sexual, barely veiled in the symptomatology and epidemic character of venereal disease in the early, experimental films, is later refigured in extreme forms of
somatization as body horror, from the hyperbolic conversion hysteria of The Brood
(1978), the sadomasochism hallucinated in Videodrome, narcissism in Dead Ringers (1988), and fetishism practically everywhere, to the marked emphasis of the
later films on what Freud called the narcissistic neuroses: melancholia in M. Butterfly (1993), paranoia in eXistenZ, and schizophrenia in Spider (2002).
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Sexuality is figured as infectious in the youthful transgressivity of Shivers, where disease, as one of his characters says, is the love of two kinds of alien
creatures for each other, or in his own words, indicates the presence of some
other life form.10 In Crash this viral imaginary takes on a more somber hue. As
the fatal car accidents of immortal movie stars (James Dean, Jane Mansfield)
or beloved writers (Albert Camus, Nathanael West) are staged and relived in a
spectacular, unredemptive Passion play, the film itself stages the encounter with
the Real beyond the pleasure principle. Repetition drives each character toward
his or her own crash, toward the place beyond pleasure, beyond mortality, where
one becomes immortal. Crash visually literalizes Freuds figure of the death drive:
the crash is not merely the end of life but the drive, both drivenness and passage,
toward another, virtual form of life.
It cannot but be clear to every spectator that Crash is about more than
sex. Some have called it sick; I am calling it queer. Again, not just because of the
nonnormative sex scenes between bodies able and disabled, the fetish objects,
the kinkiness of the sex. What makes this text queer is its heterotopic vision of
sexuality as drive and of the radical irrelevance of gender, sexual identity, or
anatomy to sexuality as such. In Freuds words, often cited and seldom heeded,
The object of the [drive] [Das Objekt des Triebes] is the thing in regard to which
or through which the [drive] is able to achieve its aim. It is what is most variable
about a [drive] and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it
only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible.11
This leads to the next phrase in my title, by which I mean to highlight a
disconnect between sexuality and gender, and the repressive function that a discursive emphasis on gender performs vis--vis sexuality, or what in sexuality is
more than sex.
Bad Habits
It seems to me that the terms currently employed in much of the Western world
to designate a nonnormative sexual identity, LGBIT (T for transgender or transsexual, whether specified as F2M and M2F, transmen and transwomen, or left
ungendered in trans), have come to privilege gender over sexuality, or the social
bond over the sexual proper, by which I mean sexuality in the Freudian sense,
the work of the drives with their obstinate, often destructive character, and the
difficulties this causes to both the self and the social. The current term queer, too,
while still carrying something of its historical connotations of sexual abnormality, quickly covers them up by presenting itself as gender-inclusive, democratic,
multicultural, and multispecies, and thus effectively shifts the ground away from
the nitty-gritty of sexualitythe polymorphous-perverse that Mario Mieli theorized in the visionary, radical 1970s.12 If we are to reclaim queer in its contestatory sexual meaning, and as truly inclusive of the sexual, we need a conception
of sexuality that goes beyond the nebulous equivocations of gender as well as the
medical concerns with reproductive functionality. I suggest that we have such a
conception in what Freud theorized as a sexuality of partial drives and saw most
clearly in its uncluttered manifestations in childhood: a sexuality polymorphous,
nonreproductive, pleasure-seeking, compulsive, and unruly.
It is a commonplace that infantile sexuality develops in two successive
stages, the oral stage and the anal stage, which precede the development of the
sexual organs and the kicking-in of certain hormones at puberty. The commonplace implies that only the latter really count as sexuality, that is to say, that sexuality is first and foremost genital. But this popular and medical view is contradicted by obvious considerations. The infantile manifestations of sexual pleasure,
oral and anal, remain fully active in adult sexuality; moreover, these and other
partial drives can actually be more powerful than genital activity, as they are,
for example, in what psychoanalysis calls perversions and psychiatry now calls
paraphilias: fetishism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, pedophilia, zoophilia, necrophilia, coprophilia, and urophilia, to name a few. Clearly, then, among the known
sexual behaviors, there are several that hark back to infantile pleasures and produce sexual satisfaction even independently of genital activity.
The term paraphilia was adopted by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of the American Psychiatric Association in 1980. John Money traces it back to the
entrance of sexology into the criminal justice system in the late nineteenth century
by way of forensic psychiatry. Forensic psychiatry borrowed the nomenclature
of the law in classifying sexual offenders as sexual deviants and sexual perverts.
[It] also borrowed from the criminal code its official list of the perversions. Eventually, the terms perversion and deviance would give way to paraphilia.13 Now,
paraphilia may sound more neutral, less pathologizing than perversion, but it
still names sexual behaviors that are considered abnormal. The normal is not
open to question in criminal law or forensic psychiatry: as is well known, Money
himself initiated the clinical practice of treating infants born with genital organs
that medicine considers indeterminate, through surgery or hormones to normalize their bodies as either male or female.14
Psychoanalysis, unlike psychiatry and psychology, is not about sexual normality. On the contrary, for Freud, sexuality is the most pervasive dimension of
human life, ranging from perversion to neurosis to sublimation; it is compulsive,
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noncontingent, and incurable. With psychoanalysis, queer theory could extend its
range of concerns to all forms of sexual behavior, not to classify or criminalize
them, not to protect society or shore up human sociality, but to understand its
conditions of possibility. For, while we theorize queer sociability and attachment
in local and global contexts, we cannot ignore the compulsive, perverse, ungovernable aspects of sexuality that confront us in the public sphere, in the family, in
ourselves. The problem is, how can we think queer bonds together with the countersocial forces at work in them? How can we think together, say, gay marriages
and barebacking, or serial murder and the search for spiritual community?
Freuds theory of sexuality hypothesizes the presence of two contrary psychic
forces or drives, coexisting and acting together in different combinations at different
times in the individuals psychic life. The life drives are psychic energy bound to
objectspeople, fantasies, ideals, the ego itselfand therefore attachment, social
bond, creativity (not for nothing did he use the Platonic term Eros, specifying: the
Eros of the poets and philosophers).15 The death drive, on the other hand, is sheer
negativity; it is unbound, unattached psychic energy that undermines the coherence
of the ego and, consequently, the cohesion of the social. Freud, to be sure, was no
optimist. His metapsychology does not offer so-called practical solutionsnor was
it meant to. But precisely because it is speculative, nonsystematic, even contradictory, it remains open to the new. Take the issue of gender.
Recently, Jean Laplanche, one of Freuds closest and most original readers,
has introduced the question of gender in psychoanalysis in the context of his own
theory of primal seduction.16 Succinctly stated, Laplanche maintains that sexuality is not innate or present in the body at birth but comes from the adult other(s)
and is an effect of seduction. It is implanted in the newborn infanta being without language (as the etymology of the word infant implies) and initially without an
egoby the necessary actions of maternal care, feeding, cleaning, holding, and
so on, through the enigmatic messages they transmit, enigmatic not only because
the baby is not able to translate them but also because they are imbued with the
(un)conscious sexual fantasies of the adult(s), parent(s), or caretaker(s). Untranslatable, these enigmatic signifiers are subjected to primal repression and constitute
the first nucleus of the childs unconscious, the primal unconscious. Partial translations occur as the child grows and the ego is formed and develops, but they, too,
leave untranslated residues that live on in the individuals mental apparatus as
the unremembered memory of bodily excitations and pleasures. Such unconscious
memory traces act, in Laplanches words, like a splinter in the skin, or we might
say, like a virus installed in a computer.17 They remain live, though undetected,
and are reactivated in adult sexuality, at times in forms that we find shameful or
unacceptable. From this come the conflicts, whether moral or neurotic, that we all
experience in sexual life.
Unlike sexuality, gender is a message sent and received at the conscious
or preconscious level. Although it, too, comes from the other, is assigned by parents and medical practitioners, often before birth, gender is not implanted in the
physical body but assumed by the ego during its formation; it is not, like sexuality,
the somatic implant of a psychophysical excitation particularly insistent in the
so-called erogenous zones. Undoubtedly, parental fantasies conscious and unconscious play a partI think a large partin the childs gender identifications
or disidentifications, and hence the multiple articulations of gender identity in
adulthood, when sexual object choice intervenes in line or in conflict with gender
identifications. Ones sense of ones gender may be unclear, confused, contradictory, conflicted, but it is so in a conscious or preconscious way; gender pertains to
the ego, not to the unconscious.
Typically, socially and legally, gender is assigned on the basis of sexual
anatomy, or rather, of the adults perception of it, which in turn is based on the
visibility of the external genital organ. When it is unclear whether the infant body
has a penis or an elongated clitoris, or when a discrepancy later appears between
external and internal genital organs, then parental and medical authorities decide
which gender to assign and how, or whether, to modify the body accordingly. This
was spectacularly demonstrated in the recent sports scandal involving the Olympic gold medal and eight-hundred-meter title won by South African athlete Caster
Semenya.18 Paradoxically, it is the existence of physical intersexuality in nature
that conclusively proves gender to be a social and normative construction, and
thus also provides its most convincing deconstruction.
The category of gender, like that of sex (as Monique Wittig remarked long
ago), falls under the binary, digital logic of the phalluseither with or without,
male or female, one or zero, a logic that, in its rigid binarism and genital bias,
erases or disavows the polymorphous and, above all, unconscious dimensions of
infantile sexuality brought to light by Freud.19 Laplanche suggests that the displacement of the question of sexual identity onto that of gender identity in current discourses may be a mark of repression (refoulement), the repression of infantile sexuality and its replacement by gender as a category more acceptable to the
adults self-understanding. I think, he writes, that even in our time, infantile
sexuality is what is most repugnant to the adults vision. Still today what is most
difficult [for adults] to accept are, as one says, bad habits.20 (Think of Pedro
Almodvars film La mala educacin and its clever pun on, precisely, bad habits
learned in school.)
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In referring the notion of gender back to Robert Stollers Sex and Gender
(1968), Laplanche seems to ignore or disregard the practices of gender de(con)
struction of the past four decades; he dismisses the arguments of feminist sociologists from Simone de Beauvoir to Judith Butler to Wittig for opposing gender to
sex as culture to nature, or sociology to biology, in a dualism that is not disrupted
by the claim that the former denaturalizes the latter. In this uncharacteristically
reductive reading and in the denomination sociologists, one detects the traditional parti pris against feminism shared by most psychoanalysts, starting with
Freud himself. Feminists, Laplanche asserts, dismiss psychoanalysis as complicit
with the ideology that subordinates gender to sex and disregard what Freud had to
say about sexuality. 21 Apart from overgeneralizing, however, he is not altogether
wrong. With few exceptions, feminist discussions of gender have been guided by
the original, anthropological concept of the sex-gender system made famous by
Gayle Rubins Traffic in Women and have tended to avoid the issue of sexuality
except as reproductive or genital sexuality. Lacanian feminists, on the other hand,
have mostly avoided the issue of gender as a matter of principle, for in Lacanian
psychoanalysis it is indeed a nonissue.
The value of Laplanches discussion for queer theory is its taking on
both gender and sexuality, and articulating their relations in a triadic interplay
of gender, sex (anatomical-physiological), and the sexual proper; by the sexual
proper I mean sexuality in the Freudian sense of polymorphous-perverse, based
on repression, fantasy, and the unconscious.22 He agrees with Ethel Person and
Lionel Ovesey that gender identity is formed earlier than sexual identity but does
not agree with their conclusion that gender organizes sexuality.23 On the contrary, Laplanche contends, while gender is assigned and acquired very early on,
its meaning becomes clear to the child only with the apperception of sex, that is
to say, of anatomical sexual difference, and hence with the coming into play of
the castration complex. Despite the questions and doubts that have been raised
about the universality of the castration complex, he observes, the binary logic predominant in Western culture also appears to reign at the level of the individual,
if the memories linked to the castration complex that surface in analysis are to be
believed.24 But are they?
Here Laplanche adds something that, coming from a psychoanalytic theorist, seems to me quite exceptional and worth noting. What sex and its secular
arm, one could say, the castration complex, tend to repress is infantile sexuality. To repress it is precisely to create it in repressing it.25 To paraphrase: not
only the social institution of sex-gender but also the psychoanalytic concept of
the castration complex, which justifies it and enforces it (as its secular arm),
have the effect of repressing or containing le sexual, the sexuality that was the
crucial discovery of Freudthe perverse, polymorphous sexuality that is oral,
anal, paragenital, nonreproductive, upstream of sex and gender differences, and
ultimately uncontainable by them, uncontainable because repressed, outside the
egos purview, yet capable of being reactivated.
The castration complex, like the Oedipus complex or the murder of the
father, Laplanche argues, are preformed narrative schemata, mytho-symbolic
codes transmitted and variously modified by culture, that help the small human
subject to deal with, that is to say, to bind and symbolize, or again translate, the
enigmatic, traumatizing messages coming from the adult other (212); they help
the child find a place in the family, the community, the socius; they help us historicize ourselves. But nothing, Laplanche quips, is less sexual than the myth of
Oedipus or Sophocles tragedy. These collective and more or less contingent, that
is, culture-specific narrative structures get inscribed in the psychic apparatus not,
as commonly assumed, on the side of the repressed but on the side of the repressing (non pas du ct du refoul, mais du refoulant) (212), not on the side of the
sexual but on the side of what represses it, giving rise to neurosis, or in the best
of cases, on the side of what restrains the sexual, contains it, organizes it, and
ultimately desexualizes it in the name of attachment, the social bond, the law of
alliance, procreation, the future.
In other words, those infamous psychoanalytic notions, castration and the
Oedipus complex, are not the enemies but the allies of gender; they are instrumental in constructing it, affirming itand reaffirming it as necessary. What troubles
gender identity are the bad habits, the repressed, unconscious dimensions of the
sexual. Let me put it this way: the trouble with gender is the kink in sexthe
perverse, the infantile, the shameful, the disgusting, the sick, the destructive
and self-destructive aspects of sexuality that personal identity seldom avows and
the political discourse on gender must elide or deny altogether. For the issue of
gender, as the claims for legal recognition of new or changing gender identities
demonstrate, is one that requires social acceptance and validation.
The discourse on gender has been political from its inception, whether
covertly conservative in the scientifically neutral studies of Money and Stoller,
or explicitly contestatory in the 1960s and 1970s feminist critique of gender as
an oppressive social structure. That critical understanding of gender, attained
in the context of an oppositional and initially radical political movement, was
the basis of all the gender-deconstructive practices and discourses that followed
in its wake. Today, LGBTIQ notwithstanding, we are confronted with the fact
that the political issue of gender/sexual identities, especially those stigmatized
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as paraphilias or identity disorders, runs aground on the sexual, on sexuality in

the Freudian sense.
The malaise of civilization, as he saw it, consists in its foundational paradox: the institutions of civil society, the family, and secular education no less than
religion are meant to curb or contain the sexual and organize it toward the social
bond and the common good. The incest taboo is to yield kinship and sociality,
the Oedipus complex to bind attachment to physical and social reproduction, the
castration complex to produce gender and ensure a smooth articulation of reproductive labor. The paradox is that the curbing, what Freud called repression (and
which showed how the ego carries out psychic repression more efficiently than the
state does political repression), also produces sexuality as something more than
sex, as symptom, compulsion, aggression.
The impasse, the negativity inherent in this view of human society, is at
odds with the politics of gender or indeed with any politics, if by politics we mean
action aimed at achieving a social goal, whether that is the common good or the
good of some. This being at odds of sexuality and politics is at the core of what I
have called the equivocations of gender, the confusion of gender and sexuality. I
think that it also subtends the arguments for an antisocial politics of queer theory.
Political contestation, opposition, or antagonism is anything but antisocial; it is
constitutive of a democratic society. What is antisocial is sexuality, the pleasure
principle, and most of all the death drive.
The antisocial thesis in queer theory, so named and encapsulated in a
panel held at the 2005 MLA convention, was first associated with Leo Bersanis
Homos (1995), as nearly all the panelists concurred, but the 2005 panel discussion identified itand possibly overidentified it, as Robert Caserio suggests
with Lee Edelmans book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004).26
This is not surprising, even disregarding the latters more recent publication date,
in that Bersanis view of sexuality in Homos was closer to Freuds than in sub
sequent works concerned with theorizing affirmative forms of queer sociability
and impersonal intimacy. Thus it is the negativity of Bersanis definition of sex as
anticommunitarian, self-shattering, and anti-identitarian in Homos, as one panelist remarks, that returns in Edelmans No Future as perhaps the most powerful
and controversial recent contribution to antisocial queer theory.27
The Issue of a Future

I first read parts of No Future when I was writing my own book on the death drive
and did not have the time or the energy to think about it, though I knew someday
I would. All I could manage then was a paragraph on the uncanny coincidence
of our respective critical projects, quite unrelated and unaware of one another:
we both read visual, literary, and cultural texts with psychoanalytic theory and a
focus on figurality. Our books converged on the linked tropes of queerness and the
future, while diverging in their respective readings of the death drive, Edelmans
with Lacan, mine with Freud and Laplanche. Edelman, I wrote, urges queers
to embrace a figural identification with the death drive as jouissance, a figure for
the undoing of identity and the heteronormative order of meaning. My reading of
Freuds drive offers no program, no ethical position, no polemic, only queer figures
of passing in the uninhabited space between mind and matter.28
Now, after some reflection, I see that the divergence I sensed in our
respective critical works consisted in the intimation of a political project in Edelmans book (I called it a manifesto), a political intent that was both affirmed and
denied. The future negated in No Future seemed to me both metaphorical and
empirical. I was and am not interested in the empirical future, which will happen anyway, even to those of us who would vote for no future, if we could. The
future that concerns me is precisely the future one would vote for, that is to say,
the idea, the trope of the future, or, to paraphrase Freud, the illusion of a future.
The issue of a future, therefore, would not concern me were it not for the political
stakes it has raised in queer theory and in the queer community since the publication of Edelmans book.
On one side, there are the proponents of queer utopianism who see in
queerness the potential for a better collective future: For queerness to have any
value whatsoever, it must be considered visible only on the horizon, states Jos
Esteban Muoz in his response to No Future, a preview of his forthcoming book
Cruising Utopia.29 Others, instead, focus on positive affects and want to think
about feeling good in the present, as Michael Snediker puts it in Queer Optimism.
Dustin Friedman, reviewing the book, finds that its critique of queer theorys tendency to obsess over negative forms of affect is salutary, whereas he is less convinced by Heather Loves Feeling Backward, which, despite its stated attachment
to non-redemptive emotional states, ultimately has optimistic aspiration.30
On the other side are those who think No Future is not political enough.
Judith Halberstam, for one, finds its vision narrow when it comes to material
political concerns and argues for a more explicitly political framing of the antisocial project, one that would articulate the ways of an explicitly political negativity as does, in one of her examples, the deeply antisocial politics of Valerie
Solanas. 31 The phrase political negativity, which Edelman picks up in responding to Halberstam, appears to be the term of equivocation. While aligning himself
255
256
with her as advocates of political negativity, Edelman is troubled by Halberstams affirmation of an angry, uncivil politics of negativitya politics in which
what troubles me isnt its negativity but its affirmation. No Future, he says to
clarify the distinction, approaches negativity as societys constitutive antagonism,
which sustains itself only on the promise of resolution in futurity.32
Negativity, then, is not an attribute of politics or one kind of politics among
others but an inherent character or structural aspect of society, which the book
identifies with the death drive: In a political field whose limit and horizon is
reproductive futurism, queerness embodies this death drive, this intransigent
jouissance, by figuring sexualitys implication in the senseless pulsions of that
drive.33 Queerness names the negativity of the drive, the antisocial that is in
sexuality, the death drive that always informs the Symbolic order as it inheres
in each individual subject. The link between the negativity of the drive in the
Symbolic and in the subject, in the social order and in the social subject, is made
by linguistic parallelism in the words I italicize in the following passage, two
pages earlier:
Queerness, therefore, is never a matter of being or becoming but, rather,
of embodying the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order.
One name for this unnameable remainder, as Lacan describes it, is jouissance. . . . jouissance evokes the death drive that always insists as the
void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self-realization, beyond the
pleasure principle. (second emphasis added) 34
This, it seems to me, is a restatement in Lacanian terms (jouissance, the
Symbolic, the Real) of what I described earlier as the paradox in Freuds view
of society, the impasse of civilization, the blockage to progress that civilization
itself produces in repressing the sexual. Excluded by the social bond, the sexual
remains within the social as an unmasterable, uncontainable excess, a force of
conflict, disaggregation, unbinding. This is, in Freuds conception, the negativity
of the death drive. 35 This is why No Future, as I read it, links queer theory and
the death drive, pushing the conceptual boundaries of queer thinking beyond the
comfort zone of the pleasure principle.
When Edelman urges queers to embrace a figural identification with the
death drive, and throughout the book, the tone of his impassioned critique of society can be heard as a call to action, but the words negate or undercut its possibility: By assuming the truth of our queer capacity to figure the undoing of the
Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, we might undertake the impossible
project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to

reproduce the politics of signification . . . which can only return us, by way of the
Child, to the politics of reproduction (emphasis added).36 The dissonance between
tone and words, a tell-tale token of the two contrary impulses toward affirmation
and negation, the political and the theoretical, is again present in his concluding
statement for the published MLA debate: The aim of queer negativity [is] to face
up to political antagonism with the negativity of critical thought.37
I may be particularly attuned to the dissonance for having felt the two contrary impulses in my own work. When I first used the expression queer theory
as the theme of a working conference I organized at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, in 1990, I thought of it as the term of a project at once critical and
political, aimed at resisting the cultural and sexual homogenization in academic
gay and lesbian studies, then taken to be a single, unified field of study. The
project was a call to lesbians and gay men to confront our respective sexual histories and deconstruct our own constructed silences around sexuality and its interrelations with gender and race, and from there to recast or reinvent the terms of
our sexualities, to construct another discursive horizon, another way of thinking
the sexual.38
To my mind, the emphasis on nonnormative sexuality and the focus on the
theoretical work of new discourse production joined in the words queer theory went
hand in hand with a political project in which critical dialogue [would] provide a
better understanding of the specificity and partiality of our respective histories, as
well as the stakes of some common struggles.39 The dialogue I had hoped for did
not take place, although some specificand controversialworks on gay and
lesbian sexualities were published in that decade.40 While mine was definitely
not a utopian project, I did see political and theoretical practices as mutually
enabling. In light of later developments in queer theory and, most recently, the
reception of Edelmans book, I am no longer confident in their compatibility.
I still see No Future as a manifesto written to impact the twenty-first century as some of its predecessors did the twentieth century, a manifesto that, with
the passion and risk-taking intelligence of the best examples of the genre, proposes queerness as the figure for an ethical position against reproductive futurism and especially, not by chance, against the democratic literality that marks
the futurism of the left.41 One problem with its address, and thus with its reception, is that literality, or referentiality, is a mainstay of political discourse, where
rhetoric is primarily instrumental, as in Mark Antonys speech on Caesars coffin.
Self-reflexive irony, however, is incompatible with the business of politics, as are
all rhetorical figures that fissure the solidity of meaning. The ironic language
257
258
of the writer, the poet, the philosopher, those who deal in language, as Paul de
Man remarked of Charles Baudelaire, splits the subject into an empirical self
that exists in a state of inauthenticity and a self that exists only in the form of a
language that asserts the knowledge of this inauthenticity.42
The difficulty here is one of hearing two discursive registers at once, the
ironic and the literal, the figural and the referential, the literary or speculative
register of theory and the empirically or fact-based register of politics. The best
illustration of this problem of reading is Edelmans figure of the Child as the Imaginary that secures the future. When the figure is read referentially, through the
political (and he baits us to do so, punning on the Child as the one true access
to social security), that Child, despite the capital letter that marks its figural
being, becomes literally the empirical, living child next door, the child who has a
claim on our love, the child human society is there to protect, the sickly or hungry
child for whom charitable donations are solicited, or perhaps the polymorphousperverse, queer child of Freuds Three Essays; it becomes the child we have
and/or were.43
In his political mode, Edelman hopes that, while no one can ever be outside the Symbolic . . . we can, nonetheless, make the choice to accede to our
cultural production as figureswithin the dominant logic of narrative, within
Symbolic realityfor the dismantling of such a logic and thus for the death drive
it harbors within (22). But to pitch the death drive, however abstractly articulated (for that is what it is: a conceptual figure of Freudian or Lacanian theory),
against that mental image of a child is unbearable because it threatens nothing less than the immortality of the ego, which is so hard pressed by reality,
as Freud well knew.44 We could stand the (in)famous image of Bersanis Is the
Rectum a Grave? because it bespoke the shattering of the ego in masochistic
pleasurewhich he would later rearticulate in less-threatening terms as the
ascetic spirituality of the barebacker or the self-divestiture of pure love.45
What few, if any, of us can bear is the thought of a drive to the virtual place from
which no traveler returns.
In these times, when civil rights and the pursuit of happiness are deemed
to inhere in the socially reproductive coupleand not, as I would auspicate, in the
individualEdelmans No Future may remain unreadable like the hybrid word
he coins to figure the ethical task for queers (109), sinthomosexual: a word, a
book, a task without a future. One can always count on poetic justice. But let us go
back for a moment to the antisocial thesis debate and an important question incidentally raised by Halberstam. Speaking of Homos, Halberstam wonders whether
one can identify a political trajectory in a radically nonteleological project.46

The question is just as relevant to No Future and to queer theory in general.
To the extent that it is theory, a conceptual, critical, or speculative vision
of the place of sexuality in the social, queer theory does not map out a program
of political action. Which is not to say that a nonteleological queer politics cannot
exist, but that a kind of translation is needed from one to the other, from the figural to the referential, from words to things. The value of Solanass SCUM manifesto was not in the action of shooting Andy Warhol but in the statement itself, in
its charge of negativity and the critical space it opened up, regardless of its failed
political translation.47 SCUM, too, like Edelmans queerness, is a figure of negativity, whether or not we remember what the acronym stands for. Figures travel
through time and language, and reappear metamorphosed at times as utopias that
permit fables and discourse, at times as heterotopias that dissolve our myths
and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.48
Foucaults distinction between utopias and heterotopias informs my thinking about gender and sexuality and politics and theory in this essay because it
is not a binary opposition like utopia/dystopia. As we know from science fiction,
both of the latter permit fables and discourse . . . run with the very grain of
language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; their opposition takes place within the fabula, on the imaginary axis of good and bad, within
the moral norm. It is not there that I locate the distinction between gender and
sexuality or between politics and theory, but precisely on the axis of language,
as Foucault does, taking his cue from Jorge Luis Borges. Gender and politics
run with the referential grain of language; they name this and that and make
words and things . . . hold together, while sexuality and theory, like heterotopias, secretly undermine language in working with its figural dimension: they
stop words in their tracks and make them mean something else or displace
them onto another scene.49
Heterotopias are disturbing. The point is, as Foucault concludes in the
preface to his book about words and things, to make the ground once more stir
under our feet.
259
260
Notes
1. See Teresa de Lauretis, Freuds Drive: Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Film (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). In particular, the Queer Texts section of the
present essay condenses and at times excerpts verbatim, for the sake of clarity and
brevity, chapters 4 and 5 of Freuds Drive.
2. See The Odor of Memory: On Reading Djuna Barnes with Freud, in de Lauretis,
Freuds Drive, 11450.
3. Daniela Caselli, Improper Modernism: Djuna Barness Bewildering Corpus (Farnham,
UK: Ashgate, 2009), 258.
4. Pier Paolo Pasolini, The Written Language of Reality (1966), reprinted in Heretical
Empiricism, trans. Ben Lawton and Louise K. Barnett (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 197.
5. Tim Dean, Perversion, Sublimation, and Aesthetics: A Response to Elizabeth Grosz,
umbr(a) (2001): 162, 163.
6. Cited in Djuna Barnes, Nightwood: The Original Version and Related Drafts, ed.
Cheryl J. Plumb (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1995), xxi.
7. Djuna Barnes, Nightwood (New York: New Directions, 1961), 170.
8. Kenneth Burke, Version, Con-, Per-, and In-: Thoughts on Djuna Barness Novel
Nightwood, in Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), 253.
9. Cronenberg on Cronenberg, ed. Chris Rodley (London: Faber and Faber, 1997),
57, 58.
10. David Cronenberg, Interviews with Serge Grnberg (London: Plexus, 2006), 167.
11. Sigmund Freud, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, in The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey,
24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 195374), 14: 122. I replaced the word instinct with
drive in the quotation.
12. Mario Mieli, Elementi di critica omosessuale, ed. by Paola Mieli and Gianni Rossi
Barilli (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2002), translated as Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique, trans. David Fernbach (London: Gay Mens, 1980).
13. John Money, The Lovemap Guidebook: A Definitive Statement (New York: Continuum,
1999), 55. I thank Timothy N. Koths, a doctoral candidate in history of consciousness
at the University of California, Santa Cruz, for sharing this source.
14. See, for example, Beatriz Preciado, Technologiquement votre, Actes du colloque
pistmologies du genre: regards dhier, points de vue daujourdhui (Paris: Conservatoire National des Arts et Mtiers, June 2324, 2005).
15. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey,
24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 195374), 18: 50.
16. Laplanche is the scientific director and general editor of the new French translation
of Freuds Oeuvres compltes (1988). He first sketched out his theory of sexuality as psychic trauma in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), and reelaborated it as a theory of
primal seduction in New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989) and Essays on Otherness, selected and introduced by John
Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999).
17. Jean Laplanche, Masochism and the General Theory of Seduction, in Essays on
Otherness, 209.
18. See Ariel Levy, Either/Or: Sports, Sex, and the Case of Caster Semenya, New
Yorker, November 30, 2009. I owe this reference to Gloria Careaga Prez, co-secretary
general of International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association.
19. Monique Wittig, The Category of Sex, in The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon, 1992), 18.
20. Je crois que, mme de nos jours, la sexualit infantile proprement dite est ce qui
rpugne le plus la vision de ladulte. Encore aujourdhui, le plus difficilement
accept, ce sont les mauvaises habitudes, comme on dit (Jean Laplanche, Le genre,
le sexe, le sexual, in Sexual: La sexualit largie au sens freudien: 20002006
[Paris: PUF, 2007], 157). All citations from this text are my translation.
21. Laplanche, Le genre, le sexe, le sexual, 161.
22. To convey the specific meaning of sexuality in Freud, Laplanche coins the French
neologism sexual, which replicates the German word, to distinguish it from the
common French word sexuel. I have tried to render his le sexual with the phrase
the sexual proper.
23. Ethel Person and Lionel Ovesey, Psychoanalytic Theories of Gender Identity, Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis 11, no. 2 (1983), cited by Laplanche,
Le genre, le sexe, le sexual, 166.
24. Laplanche, Le genre, le sexe, le sexual, 173.
25. Ce que le sexe et son bras sculier, pourrait-on-dire, le complexe de castration, tendent refouler, cest le sexuel infantile. Le refouler, cest--dire prcisement le crer
en le refoulant (Laplanche, Le genre, le sexe, le sexual, 173).
26. The Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory was the title of a panel organized by Robert Caserio for the MLA Division on Gay Studies in Language and Literature at the
2005 MLA convention in Washington, DC. The respective positions of Caserio and
panelists Lee Edelman, Judith Halberstam, Jos Esteban Muoz, and Tim Dean were
subsequently published, with the same title and under the rubric Forum: Conference
Debates, in PMLA 121 (2006): 81928.
27. Judith Halberstam, The Politics of Negativity in Recent Queer Theory, PMLA 121
(2006): 823.
28. De Lauretis, Freuds Drive, 87.
261
262
29. Jos Esteban Muoz, Thinking beyond Antirelationality and Antiutopianism in

Queer Critique, PMLA 121 (2006): 825.
30. Michael D. Snediker, Queer Optimism: Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 3; Dustin Friedman,
review of Michael Snedikers Queer Optimism and Heather Loves Feeling Backward:
Loss and the Politics of Queer History, Textual Practice 24 (2010): 179.
31. Halberstam, Politics of Negativity, 824.
32. Lee Edelman, Antagonism, Negativity, and the Subject of Queer Theory, PMLA 121
(2006): 82122.
33. Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2008), 27.
34. Edelman, No Future, 25.
35. As Caserio points out, No Future rewrites Freuds The Future of an Illusion (Antisocial Thesis, PMLA 121 (2006): 820). Ironically, Edelman himself may miss the
Freudian basis of his own Lacanian thinking when he relies on blatant misreadings of
Freud such as the following: The drives always seek a form of satisfaction that, from
a Freudian or traditional moralistic standpoint, is considered perverse (Bruce Fink,
A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997], 211; cited in No Future, 114).
37. Edelman, Antagonism, Negativity, and the Subject of Queer Theory, 822.
38. Teresa de Lauretis, Queer Theory. Lesbian and Gay Sexualities: An Introduction,
differences 3, no. 2 (1991): iv. This special issue gathered contributions to the conference by Toms Almaguer, Sue-Ellen Case, Julia Creet, Samuel R. Delany, Elizabeth A.
Grosz, Earl Jackson Jr., Ekua Omosupe, and Jennifer Terry.
39. De Lauretis, Queer Theory, xi.
40. Notably Leo Bersanis Homos (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) and my
The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994).
42. Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Temporality, in Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 213, 214.
44. At the most touchy point in the narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego, which
is so hard pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child. Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents
narcissism born again (On Narcissism, in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, 24 vols.
[London: Hogarth, 195374], 14: 91). Cf. Edelmans pun about the Child as the one
true access to social security (No Future, 75): Few can bring up a child without
constantly bringing it up, where the it does not refer to the child but to the bringing
up, the upbringing of the child, that is, the fact of being parents.
45. Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? in AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism,
ed. Douglas Crimp (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 212; Leo Bersani and Adam
Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 55, 75.
46. Halberstam, Politics of Negativity, 823.
47. Valerie Solanas, SCUM Manifesto (New York: Olympia, 1968).
48. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New
York: Random House, 1973), xviii.
49. Foucault, Order of Things, xviii.
263

Queer Texts, Bad Habits, and The Issue of A Future

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Queer Texts, Bad Habits,

and the Issue of a Future

My reflections on some themes of this special issue on queer bonds, sexuality

GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN and GAY STUDIES