Russia and Constantinople: Count Kokovtzov's Evidence

Author(s): Michael T. Florinsky

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Oct., 1929), pp. 135-141
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE:

EVIDENCE
COUNT KOKOVTZOV'S
By Michael

T. Florinsky

of Constantinople
and the Straits oc
in the question
policy
an
in
the
those
of
historians who are
^
argument
important place
RUSSIAN cupies
inclined to ascribe to the former Empire of the Tsars a rather heavy share of
for the outbreak of the war.
responsibility
the fullest version of which will be
thesis (the latest and probably
Their
found in Professor Sidney B. Fay's "The Origins of theWorld War ") runs along
the desire of Russia to ful
the following lines. The decline of Turkey stimulated
on the shores of the Bosphorus.
failures to
fil her "historic mission"
Isvolsky's
secure the opening of the Dardanelles
and especially
by diplomatic methods,
his defeat in 1909, convinced Isvolsky himself and his successor at the Russian
that this could be achieved only in connection
Foreign Office, M. Sazonov,
war and that such a conflict was "inevitable."
with a general European
and the Pan-Slavs.
Sazonov was under the strong influence of the militarists
than those
His purpose was (we are told by Professor Fay) more far-reaching
of Isvolsky: while the latter was merely
trying to open the Straits for Russian
was planning
to obtain possession of the Straits and control
warships, Sazonov
was so alarmed by the Liman von Sanders
he
That
is
why
Constantinople.
but failed, thanks to the
Mission. He urged strong measures
against Germany,
in
of Berlin and to the restraining
concessions made by the Government
the
The spring of 1914 was spent in strengthening
fluence of Count Kokovtzov.
re
In July 1914," with the restraining hand of Kokovtzov
ties of the Entente.
that this Entente
Sazonov believed
moved,
assured,
solidarity was virtually
ultimatum
of the Archduke
and the Austrian
when the murder
caused the
that Russia
could
by means of which he calculated
'European complications'
l
mission.'"
achieve
her
'historic
finally
This simple historical scheme, which at first sight explains so well the motives
in July
and purpose of Russia's Balkan policy before the war and her attitude
want
us
as
to
so
its
believe.
is
established
not, perhaps,
1914,
proponents
firmly
it
From certain documents
recently by the Soviet Government2
published
of
and
the
appears that the idea of a military
against
Constantinople
operation
lead
in general was not as popular among Russian military
"historic mission"
as is usually
ers (the Grand Duke Nicholas,
General Alexeev, General Danilov)
supposed, and that there were men of considerable weight at the Foreign Of
at the
fice, for instance, Prince Kudashev?
representative ? of the Foreign Office
on
to
who
maintained
later
Ambassador
and
Peking
openly
Headquarters,
that Russia was not "morally and physically"
ready for the annexation of the
Straits. So the theory of militarist
influence should not be accepted without
adequate proof.
Let us now turn to another

link in the argument

which we are dissecting,

1
New York,
of the World War,"
Fay, "The Origins
1928. Vol. I, pp. 542-545.
2
"A Page of Diplomatic
Cf. the author's
Leaders
and the Problem
Russian Military
History:
in Political
Science Quarterly, March
the War,"
1929.
during
Constantinople

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the
of

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

136

at the Conference
of December
of Sazonov
31, 1913 (January
13,
will
reader
the
remember, was called to discuss the situation
1914), which,
von Sanders
as commander
of Liman
of the
created by the appointment
in
which
Turkish
become
known
had
troops
appointment
Constantinople,
a month or so earlier. Professor Fay traces the history of the negotiations
and
at which Sazonov
the Conference,
certain measures
of
describes
proposed
be
which
takes
could
He
of
this
brought against Turkey.3
advantage
repression
to draw a vivid picture of the supposed
the
struggle between
opportunity
Count Kokovtzov
and conciliatory"
and the "aggressive"
"wise, peace-loving,
of Foreign Affairs. "This Conference,"
he says, "reveals
Minister
sharply the
contrast
between Kokovtzov's
in
and restraining
moderate,
conciliatory,
fluence on the one hand, and, on the other, the dangerous policy of military
as
and naval officials. Kokovtzov,
pressure urged by Sazonov and the military
of Finance,
looked at the affairs more from a business man's point of
Minister
. . .He was not blinded
view than from that of a politician.
by the diploma
tist's shibboleths about Pan-Slav
Russia's
interests,
'prestige,' and her 'historic
. . .When he
a war with
the
Is
mission.'
de
question,
bluntly put
Germany
were forced to agree with him
of the Conference
sirable ? the other members
that it was not. It was therefore an incalculable misfortune
for Russia and the
world that, a few days after the Conference, M. Kokovtzov
followed Count
to
into political
and
left
the
field
free
M.
Witte
Sazonov
and the
retirement,
and militarists."
Russian Pan-Slavs
And Professor Fay dismisses
the question
with the following remark: "It is interesting to speculate on how the course of
if Kokovtzov
at
have been changed,
had replaced
history might
Isvolsky
a
or
as
to
exert
if
still
able
at
he
been
had
Premier
influence
Paris,
restraining
in July, 1914. With his sweet reasonableness,
St. Petersburg
his fine character,
and his friendly personal relations with the Kaiser and the Berlin authorities,
he might have been able to prevent the over-hasty
steps which helped cause the
that she discarded real statesmen
World War. It was Russia's misfortune
like
in favor of prestige diplomats
Count Witte
and M. Kokovtzov
like Isvolsky
attitude

and

Sazonov."

The importance of these quotations

will be made clear, I hope, from what
follows. It seems that the statement made by Professor Fay as to the complete
between Kokovtzov
and Sazonov
is based solely on the minutes
disagreement
of the conference. But the reader who approaches
the question from a different
to
it
of
in
view
find
difficult
discover
the
minutes
sufficient evidence
may
point
to warrant Professor Fay's conclusions. Nor can they be
accepted without
one
a
who
has
first-hand
however
any
limited, of the
by
challenge
knowledge,
of the former Russian Government
members
and of the general attitude of the
circles of St. Petersburg.
I ventured,
government
therefore, to write to Count
now
was
who
is
in
and
fortunate enough to secure
Paris,
Kokovtzov,
residing
his consent for the publication
of his reply. It is dated April 23,1929,
and runs
as follows:
"I have read very carefully
the passages
in the book of Professor
Fay
marked
and giving you com
hesitation,
by you, and I may tell you without
8The

text of the minutes

full English
of the Conference
the World War,"
London,
1926, pp. 219 sqq.

will

be found

in F. Stieve,

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"
Isvolsky

and

RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

137

at your discretion,
that I do not share his
plete freedom in using my statement
was used by S. D.
from the Government
that my retirement
conclusion
in order to enforce a more rigorous policy in the conduct of Russia's
Sazonov
foreign affairs.
"The personal relationship between men who, by the force of circumstances,
have to work together on the solution of political problems, especially at critical
moments
of their development,
should be judged, generally
speaking, not so
much by an analysis of personal feelings and hypotheses which do not admit of
an
as by an examination
of external, concrete mani
impartial investigation,
facts.
festations
well-established
supported by
the problem from this point of view, I may say that even now,
"Approaching
from the active service of my country, I still
fifteen years after my withdrawal
sure that during the term of almost three years when I was the
feel perfectly
no divergency
of opinion on any question
President of the Council of Ministers,
of Foreign Af
of importance arose between myself
and the former Minister
the jurisdic
the laws of the former Russian Empire
fairs, M. Sazonov. Under
in questions of international
tion of the President
of the Council of Ministers
foreign policy was entirely
policy was very indefinite. The conduct of Russia's
in the hands of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. He took his orders directly from
In spite of this, M.
the Emperor who himself decided all vital questions.
Sazonov never made the slightest attempt to prevent me from taking an active
part in the direction of the most important and responsible problems of Russian
our collaboration
foreign policy and on many occasions was the first to suggest
for
in the discussion of such problems. A number of questions were submitted
the approval of the Emperor after I had examined them jointly with the Minis
ter of Foreign Affairs, and not unfrequently
Sazonov himself asked my opinion
to his attention.
without my having to bring the matter
"The vast realm of Russian policy in the Balkans between September
1911
and December
1913 was invariably the subject of our concerted efforts and not
a
single decision dealing with these problems was reached without my opinion
I cannot recollect a
being given and brought to the attention of the Emperor.
Sazonov
and
of
instance
between
single
myself and all the out
disagreement
or rather of St. Petersburg,
bursts of public opinion of Russia,
during the
Balkan war of 1912, outbursts which manifested
in the well-known
themselves
'A cross on St.
of the Pan-Slavonic
demonstrations
Society which claimed
?
as
were
and
'Scutari
for
directed
Sophia'
Montenegro,'
against myself
to
much as against Sazonov,
because we were both taking decisive measures
were
to
the
of
and
the
Balkans
preserve
peace
pacify
Europe
endeavoring
of the Great Powers.
through a timely mediation
on the
"In particular,
of
of the appointment
the negotiations
question
General Liman von Sanders as inspector of the Turkish Army and Commander
of the Second Army
at Constantinople,
and the protest of
Corps stationed
on the
was entrusted
Russia against this appointment,
to me by the Emperor,
initiative of Sazonov, without my even knowing
that this problem had arisen:
inOctober
to be abroad and learned about the appointment
of
1913 I happened
Liman von Sanders only in Berlin from a telegram of the Minister
of the
Imperial Household.
"I had to take upon myself
all the burden and responsibility
of asking ex

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i38

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

from the Emperor

of Germany
and I prepared
the report for the
planations
on the negotiations
which took place between
Russian Emperor
the Russian
and the German Government.
Sazonov merely
added the statement
that he
was in complete agreement with my views, and all the negotiations
inDecember
1914 which resulted in the winding up of this incident were
1913 and January
conducted
of Foreign Affairs as a matter
of routine on the
by the Ministry
I had obtained
in Berlin.
basis of the explanations
"As to the report of the Emperor made by Sazonov
in December
1913, and
to
I
to
which
the conference
called
effect
the
decisions
(over
give
presided)
resulting from the report, and especially as to the personal attitude of Sazonov
in the question of the Straits and Turkey,
the point of view of Professor Fay
seems hardly
justified.
at first under the
the whole of our collaboration
in the Government,
"During
of Stolypin and then later when I succeeded him, until the very day
presidency
of my resignation, Sazonov never was in favor of an aggressive policy of Russia
a
is advan
against Turkey. His fundamental
point of view, that weak Turkey
to
not
Russia
and
that
hasten
Russia
should
her
is clearly
tageous
collapse,
stated in his report and recurs over and over again in his declarations. His point
of view was open to only one criticism:
in exposing his argument
to the Em
as
he
discussed
the
Turkish
and
peror,
problem
something disparate
independ
ent, outside the realm of general European politics where grave complications
are apt to arise most
and from innumerable causes. He believed,
unexpectedly
as it appears from his report, that the interests of Russia
in the Turkish ques
tion might be safeguarded by reaching an agreement with France and England
on terms favorable
to Russia;
and he was certainly remote from the idea of
a
a
careless
world-wide
step
starting by
cataclysm.
aware of our military
"He was perfectly
and on this par
unpreparedness
ticular question we were in complete agreement. He was a constant witness of
of War over the question of the organization
my arguments with the Minister
of national defense, arguments
in which I was usually supported by the State
I never kept secret from Sazonov the information which I possessed
Controller.
to the information
in addition
at the disposal of the Council
of Ministers,
and we invariably agreed that the opinions of the Minister
of War were far
too optimistic
and were due to his complete
ignorance of the actual condi
tions.

his report to the Emperor,

it could not
"Indeed, when Sazonov presented
occur to him that his views would one
become
be sub
and
would
day
public
to the critical examination
mitted
of outsiders; his sole purpose was to draw the
to one of the routine
attention of the Emperor
At
problems of his department.
the same time he approached
in a much more critical spirit than
the question
was usual at that time, that is, he
the desire that his conclusions
expressed
to the examination
of the departments
should be submitted
is
concerned. That
how the idea of the discussion of his report in a conference under my chairman
ship came into being. The report itself was far from suggesting a solution of the
Turkish problem by aggressive methods.
It was limited to an outline of meas
ures to be taken in case of the
of
and laid emphasis upon the
Turkey
collapse
of being ready for such an emergency
necessity
by increasing the influence of
in the course of events which might occur without her consent or with
Russia

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RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

139

out her being in any way involved in bringing them into being. If Sazonov did
not mention
in his report that the measures
he proposed
(which were utterly
under the prevailing
and hardly practicable
conditions)
might
inadequate
become the source of a world crisis, it was simply because the whole of his
and
report was in the nature of an academic discussion of future preparations,
was absolutely
remote from the idea of directing Russia
along the path of
immediate and aggressive policy in the Turkish question.
"I may also add that, contrary to the conclusions of Professor Fay, Sazonov
was not at that time, in January
of
1914, under the influence of our Ministry
of
War and of the Admiralty.
He was not under the influence of the Ministry
War because, as I have pointed out, he was well aware of our unpreparedness;
as for the
in its policy and
it never showed the least aggressiveness
Admiralty,
was conspicuous
for its extreme caution. I am in an exceptionally
good position
to bear witness
to this particular matter because until the very day of my re
in
tirement from the Government
12, 1914) I worked
(January 30/February
our
on
naval
close collaboration
of
all
with Admiral Grigorovich
questions
defense and their influence on our general policy.
shows
of fact, the exposition
of Professor Fay himself
"But, as a matter
of War nor the Admiralty
displayed
clearly enough that neither the Ministry
of the report of Sazonov
any aggressiveness
by the
during the discussion
Conference. They did not lend their support either to the idea of an expedition
or to the
and
of Trebizond
against Constantinople,
proposed
occupation
Bayazid.
"As to my own part in the conference,
I still retain, in spite of the fifteen
which
have
and
the
absence of any contemporary
years
elapsed
complete
a very vivid and detailed memory
of the discus
records at my disposal,
sion.

in trying to prove that the measures

sug
"My part consisted not so much
in principle and at
of Foreign Affairs were inacceptable
gested by the Minister
as in arguing the two following propositions:
the same time impracticable,
(1)
the complete
that
the point of view of the report would be ac
improbability
of
and (2) the close connection
cepted by France and especially by England;
this problem with the general problem of European
peace and the danger of
even
of explaining my views, which, as a matter
raising it. I had an opportunity
of fact were already well-known
to the members
of the conference, with much
more detail than appears from the written records which have been
preserved.
And if I succeeded, in winning
the consent of my colleagues with very little
trouble and certainly with less effort than I had to use in a number of in
it is because no member of the conference,' and cer
finitely smaller problems,
the starting of a world war, and none of
tainly not Sazonov, was contemplating
them would even admit the possibility
of any step on our part which would
disturb the peace of the Balkans,
only just reestablished.
"One should not forget that by that time my personal influence, as head of
the government, was not too strong. A short
a
period of mere four weeks inter
vened before I was to withdraw
from the position of President of the Council of
Ministers
and Minister
of Finance. And this was known to myself as well as to
the members
of the conference.
"I should like to add that it seems extremely doubtful
that my resignation

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

140

was received by Sazonov with a feeling of relief, as the

from the Government
removal of a limitation on his freedom of action; and I believe
it still more
doubtful
that he was pleased by it and was even seeking it. I have excellent
proofs, on the contrary, that he looked upon my retirement with considerable
regret, and Sazonov himself repeatedly
spoke in this sense to me and to our
common

friends.

in what he says about my proposed ap

Fay is right, however,
as Ambassador
to Paris, which never took place. I have reasons to
pointment
believe that my appointment
would have met with the approval of the French
Government.
The Emperor gave his consent to my nomination
and spoke with
me about it in very flattering
to my
terms. Sazonov did not show any hostility
but rather a lack of interest; and, perhaps taking into
proposed appointment,
account the protests of Isvolsky against his transfer to another embassy, let the
"Professor

matter

drop."

The statement
of Count Kokovtzov
is so lucid that it hardly needs any
comment.
to emphasize
I should like, however,
that it represents a complete
refutation of Professor Fay's theory. To begin with, it appears that Professor
to the declaration made to the Conference
Fay attaches too much
importance
the
of
and the Chief of the General
Minister
General
War,
Sukhomlinov,
by
to the effect that
Staff, General Zhilinsky. After reporting their statements
Russia was ready for a war against Germany
and Austria, Professor Fay re
marks: "This categorical
statement
of the Russian militarists
disposes of the
war
not think her
not
want
in
because
that
Russia
did
did
argument
1914
they
were
are
Count
Kokovtzov
sufficient."4
We
told, however,
preparations
by
that he and Sazonov "were perfectly aware" of Russia's military
unprepared
ness, that he had at his disposal information other than that of the Council of
and that he and Sazonov "invariably
Ministers,
agreed that the opinions of the
Minister
ofWar were far too optimistic and were due to his complete ignorance
of the actual conditions." The statement of Count Kokovtzov
is fully corrob
in
orated by what we know from other sources of the position of Sukhomlinov
the Government.
with his intimate friend, General Yan
His correspondence
Chief of Staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas,
vushkevich,
covering the first year of
the war, was published by the Soviet Government
in 1922-1923.5 It contains
of War did not enjoy the confidence
of his
ample proof that the Minister
was
to
His
influence
due
the
of
the
colleagues.
exclusively
friendship
Emperor.
And in spite of this and the powerful support of Rasputin,
he was imprisoned
and sent for trial long before the downfall of the Empire. Sazonov,
fortunately,
has put on record his opinion of his former colleague: "It was very difficult to
make him [Sukhomlinov] work, but to get him to speak the truth was well
statement
of
nigh impossible."6 Is it reasonable to assume that Sukhomlinov's
Russia's preparedness
for war presents sufficient ground for "disposing
of the
was not
that Russia did not want war" because her preparation
agrument
sufficient ?As for General Zhilinsky, he was merely a subordinate
officer and he
left the General
In short, Professor
Staff soon after the conference.
Fay's
evidence on this important point seems inadequate. And then, of course, the
4
Fay, op. cit., vol. I, p. 534~535
5
Krasni Arkhiv
Vols.
{Red Archives),
I?III, Moscow-Petrograd,
6
"Fateful
Sazonov,
Years," New York,
1928, p. 286.

1922-1923.

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RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

rather
foreign policy of Russia was in the hands of Sazonov and Kokovtzov
than in those of Sukhomlinov.7
As to the nature of the relationship which existed between Count Kokovtzov
of the former Prime Minister
and Sazonov,
of Russia
the statement
is so
seems
to
to
Count
that
it
it.
Kokovtzov
add
hardly necessary
anything
explicit
it perfectly clear that he never had to use a "restraining
makes
hand" because
between himself and the Minister
there always existed the closest collaboration
of Foreign Affairs; that in spite of the vagueness of the jurisdiction of the Prime
in questions of international policy, Sazonov always consulted him on
Minister
all important matters
and especially on Balkans affairs; that he does not rec
ollect "a single instance of disagreement"
between Sazonov and himself on
as to what would have
any such question. It seems therefore that speculations
at the head of the Russian
to
Kokovtzov
the
remained
world
had
happened
or had he been
to Paris are due to a
Government
appointed Ambassador
misunderstanding.
It did not escape the attention of the reader, I am sure, that Count Kokovtz
statesmen who have written
ov's evidence, unlike that of most of the European
on the
not
in
for
is
An apology, how
the
self-defense.
war,
given
responsibility
ever sincere and convincing,
is always apt to create a presumption
that the plea
is not an exact and impartial exposition of the facts and that the author, some
times unwittingly,
puts the emphasis where it should not be. Count Kokovtzov
is in the fortunate position of a man who has no excuse to make because no
accusations
have been brought against him. On the contrary, he is one of the
statesmen who have earned from an American
his
very few modern European
torian the qualifications
of "wise, peace-loving,
The whole of
conciliatory."
this reputation he is willing to risk by declaring his solidarity
(in the question
of the Straits!) with the traditional villain of the revisionist school, Sazonov.8
His evidence is not to be taken lightly.
?
But if we accept his evidence ?
and I do not think we have any choice
what is going to happen to the elaborate theory of Sazonov's
aggressive and
militaristic
is the very foundation
of the accusations
policy, which
brought
and conciliatory?"
against Russia? Shall we call Sazonov "wise, peace-loving
Or shall we condemn Count Kokovtzov
and class him, too, among the mili
In that case, what about Jris "sweet reasonableness,
tarists and the Pan-Slavs?
his firm character,"
and so forth? I see no way out of the dilemma unless we
admit
that
the
of the Russian Government
attitude of the members
in
frankly
the question of the Straits is not correctly pictured by Professor Fay. It may be
that he found in the minutes
to
of the Conference merely what he expected
?
find there.9 Unfortunately
a
one
the question
is an extremely
important
vital link, indeed, in the argument
that lays responsibility
in Russia.
7

one of the most

of Imperial
discredited
Sukhomlinov,
though undoubtedly
representatives
still is quoted with confidence
in some quarters.
See Alfred von Wegerer,
"The Russian
Russia,
Mobilization
of 1914," in Political
Science Quarterly,
June 1928, pp. 204 sqq.
8M.
Sazonov
died in December
cannot
be suspected,
of
1927. Count Kokovtzov
therefore,
a service.
trying to do his former colleague
9
a
Count
to justify
Kokovtzov's
letter seems
made
Incidently
recently
by M.
prediction
Pierre Renouvin:
"I believe
that in trying to load a preponderance
of responsibility
upon the St.
a more
certain historians
fall into an error which
exact estimate
of the
government
Petersburg
facts will not fail to reveal."
(Foreign
Affairs,
1929, p. 397.)
April

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