People Vs Corpuz

G.R. No.
148198
October 1, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH "BETH"

CORPUZ, appellant.
On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private
complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellants
sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from
participation in the case against appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Appeal
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. 99-176637 finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b)
of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of l995," and sentencing her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.
When arraigned on March 21, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty. Whereupon,
trial on the merits ensued.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego,
Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila
to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were
accompanied by a certain "Aling Josie" who introduced them to the agencys
President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes
asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told to
return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.
On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the
processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called
appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees.
Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the
Taiwan employers.
Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private
complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant who
told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs.
Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she
received from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus, on January
13, 1999, private complainants filed their complaint with the NBI which led to
the arrest and detention of appellant.
For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal
recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs.
Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement
Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary for three
months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on the
telephone and told her to receive private complainants processing fees. In
compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was absent,
she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she thereafter
remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agencys license was
suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.
On November 16, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision finding
accused Elizabeth "Beth" Corpuz is hereby found guilty of the offense charged
in the Information for violation of Sec. 6 (l), (m) in relation to Sec. 7 (b) of R.A.
8042. Her body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the
Bureau of Correction for Women, Mandaluyong City thru the City Jail Warden
of Manila. She shall be credited with the full extent of her preventive
imprisonment under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction
of the recruitment agency. NO
Ruling:
The Information charged appellant for Illegal recruitment in large scale under
Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
Appellant contends that she is not liable for the foregoing illegal recruitment
activities considering that she was merely an employee having no control over
the recruitment business of the Alga-Moher International Placement Services
Corporation and that she did not actually recruit the private complainants.
Moreover, she did not appropriate for her own use the processing fees she
received and she had no knowledge that the agencys license was suspended
by the POEA.
The trial court convicted appellant based on its findings that despite the
suspension of the agencys license, appellant still convinced the applicants to
give their money with the promise to land a job abroad. Moreover, as the
registered secretary of the agency she had management control of the
recruitment business.
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the
trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct,
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial
court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The
exception obtains in this case.
The records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement
Service Corporation is a licensed land-based recruitment agency. Its license
was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant was its registered
secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager.
Part of its regular business activity is to accept applicants who desire to work
here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the
custody and documentation of the overseas contracts.
On July 30, 1998, appellant received the processing fees of the private
complainants since the cashier was absent that day. Her receipt of the money
was in compliance with the order of her employer, Mrs. Reyes. She did not
convince the applicants to give her their money since they went to the agency
precisely to pay the processing fees upon the earlier advice of Mrs. Reyes.
All appellant did was receive the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs.
Reyes. She neither convinced the private complainants to give their money
nor promised them employment abroad.
Moreover, as stated in the last sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons
who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices
and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,

management or direction of their business shall be liable.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and
found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary,
had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency.
Appellant started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and
she was tasked to hold and document employment contracts from the
foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no
discretion over how the business was managed. The trial courts finding
that appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its
business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may
be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule
that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the
corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to
commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and
through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The
employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally
aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as
principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he
consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight
his contribution may be. The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no
application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he
participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted
as an agent of any party. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on
his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission.
Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of
his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not
be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.
Anent the issue of whether or not appellant knowingly and intentionally
participated in the commission of the crime charged, we find that she did
not.
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the
prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for
the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui
negat, i.e., "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove." The conviction
of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength
of the prosecutions evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency.
As already established, appellant received the processing fees of the private

complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to receive the
same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to deploy them
abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More importantly, she
had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received
the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to the suspension of the
license, an event which appellant did not have control of. Her failure to refund
their money immediately upon their demand was because the money had
been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she received it from them.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. 99176637 finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec.
6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Elizabeth Corpuz is ACQUITTED of the offense charged on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant
unless she is lawfully held for another offense, and to inform this Court of the
date of her release, or the ground for her continued confinement, within ten
days from notice.

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G.R. No.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH "BETH"

and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,

As already established, appellant received the processing fees of the private

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