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TragedyoftheCommons
byGarrettHardin
AbouttheAuthor

n1974thegeneralpublicgotagraphicillustrationofthetragedy
ofthecommonsinsatellitephotosoftheearth.Picturesof
northernAfricashowedanirregulardarkpatch390squaremilesin
area.Groundlevelinvestigationrevealedafencedareainsideof
whichtherewasplentyofgrass.Outside,thegroundcoverhadbeen
devastated.

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Theexplanationwassimple.Thefencedareawasprivateproperty,
subdividedintofiveportions.Eachyeartheownersmovedtheiranimalstoa
newsection.Fallowperiodsoffouryearsgavethepasturestimetorecover
fromthegrazing.Theownersdidthisbecausetheyhadanincentivetotake
careoftheirland.Butnooneownedthelandoutsidetheranch.Itwasopen
tonomadsandtheirherds.ThoughknowingnothingofKARLMARX,the
herdsmenfollowedhisfamousadviceof1875:Toeachaccordingtohis
needs.Theirneedswereuncontrolledandgrewwiththeincreaseinthe
numberofanimals.But SUPPLYwasgovernedbynatureanddecreased
drasticallyduringthedroughtoftheearly1970s.Theherdsexceededthe
naturalcarryingcapacityoftheirenvironment,soilwascompactedand
eroded,andweedyplants,unfitforcattleconsumption,replacedgood
plants.Manycattledied,andsodidhumans.
Therationalexplanationforsuchruinwasgivenmorethan170yearsago.In
1832WilliamForsterLloyd,apoliticaleconomistatOxfordUniversity,looking
attherecurringdevastationofcommon(i.e.,notprivatelyowned)pasturesin
England,asked:Whyarethecattleonacommonsopunyandstunted?Why
isthecommonitselfsobareworn,andcroppedsodifferentlyfromthe
adjoininginclosures?

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Lloydsanswerassumedthateachhumanexploiterofthecommonwasguided
Goto1stEdition
byselfinterest.Atthepointwhenthecarryingcapacityofthecommonswas
fullyreached,aherdsmanmightaskhimself,ShouldIaddanotheranimalto
myherd?Becausetheherdsmanownedhisanimals,thegainofsodoingwouldcomesolelyto
him.Butthelossincurredbyoverloadingthepasturewouldbecommonizedamongallthe
herdsmen.Becausetheprivatizedgainwouldexceedhisshareofthecommonizedloss,aself
seekingherdsmanwouldaddanotheranimaltohisherd.Andanother.Andreasoninginthesame
way,sowouldalltheotherherdsmen.Ultimately,thecommonpropertywouldberuined.
Evenwhenherdsmenunderstandthelongrunconsequencesoftheiractions,theygenerallyare
powerlesstopreventsuchdamagewithoutsomecoercivemeansofcontrollingtheactionsofeach

individual.Idealistsmayappealtoindividualscaughtinsuchasystem,askingthemtoletthe
longtermeffectsgoverntheiractions.Buteachindividualmustfirstsurviveintheshortrun.Ifall
decisionmakerswereunselfishandidealisticcalculators,adistributiongovernedbytheruleto
eachaccordingtohisneedsmightwork.Butsuchisnotourworld.AsJamesMadisonsaidin
1788,Ifmenwereangels,noGovernmentwouldbenecessary(Federalist,no.51).Thatis,ifall
menwereangels.Butinaworldinwhichallresourcesarelimited,asinglenonangelinthe
commonsspoilstheenvironmentforall.
Thespoilageprocesscomesintwostages.First,thenonangelgainsfromhiscompetitive
advantage(pursuinghisowninterestattheexpenseofothers)overtheangels.Then,asthe
oncenobleangelsrealizethattheyarelosingout,someofthemrenouncetheirangelicbehavior.
Theytrytogettheirshareoutofthecommonsbeforecompetitorsdo.Inotherwords,every
workabledistributionsystemmustmeetthechallengeofhumanselfinterest.Anunmanaged
commonsinaworldoflimitedmaterialwealthandunlimiteddesiresinevitablyendsinruin.
Inevitabilityjustifiestheepithettragedy,whichIintroducedin1968.
Wheneveradistributionsystemmalfunctions,weshouldbeonthelookoutforsomesortof
commons.Fishpopulationsintheoceanshavebeendecimatedbecausepeoplehaveinterpreted
thefreedomoftheseastoincludeanunlimitedrighttofishthem.Thefishwere,ineffect,a
commons.Inthe1970s,nationsbegantoasserttheirsolerighttofishouttotwohundredmiles
fromshore(insteadofthetraditionalthreemiles).Buttheseexclusiverightsdidnoteliminatethe
problemofthecommons.Theymerelyrestrictedthecommonstoindividualnations.Eachnation
stillhastheproblemofallocatingfishingrightsamongitsownpeopleonanoncommonizedbasis.
Ifeachgovernmentallowedownershipoffishwithinagivenarea,sothatanownercouldsue
thosewhoencroachonhisfish,ownerswouldhaveanincentivetorefrainfromoverfishing.But
governmentsdonotdothat.Instead,theyoftenestimatethemaximumsustainableyieldandthen
restrictfishingeithertoafixednumberofdaysortoafixedaggregatecatch.Bothsystemsresult
inavastoverinvestmentinfishingboatsandequipmentasindividualfishermencompetetocatch
fishquickly.
SomeofthecommonpasturesofoldEnglandwereprotectedfromruinbythetraditionofstinting
limitingeachherdsmantoafixednumberofanimals(notnecessarilythesameforall).Such
casesarespokenofasmanagedcommons,whichisthelogicalequivalentof SOCIALISM .Viewed
thisway,socialismmaybegoodorbad,dependingonthequalityofthemanagement.Aswithall
thingshuman,thereisnoguaranteeofpermanentexcellence.TheoldRomanwarningmustbe
keptconstantlyinmind:Quiscustodietipsoscustodes?(Whoshallwatchthewatchers
themselves?)
Underspecialcircumstancesevenanunmanagedcommonsmayworkwell.Theprincipal
requirementisthattherebenoscarcityofgoods.EarlyfrontiersmenintheAmericancolonies
killedasmuchgameastheywantedwithoutendangeringthesupply,themultiplicationofwhich
keptpacewiththeirneeds.Butasthehuman POPULATIONgrewlarger,huntingandtrappinghadto
bemanaged.Thus,theratioofsupplyto DEMANDiscritical.
Thescaleofthecommons(thenumberofpeopleusingit)alsoisimportant,asanexaminationof
Hutteritecommunitiesreveals.ThesedevoutlyreligiouspeopleinthenorthwesternUnitedStates
livebyMarxsformula:Fromeachaccordingtohisability,toeachaccordingtohisneeds.(They
givenocredittoMarx,howeversimilarlanguagecanbefoundseveralplacesintheBible.)At

firstglanceHutteritecoloniesappeartobetrulyunmanagedcommons.Butappearancesare
deceiving.Thenumberofpeopleincludedinthedecisionunitiscrucial.Asthesizeofacolony
approaches150,individualHutteritesbegintoundercontributefromtheirabilitiesandoverdemand
fortheirneeds.TheexperienceofHutteritecommunitiesindicatesthatbelow150people,the
distributionsystemcanbemanagedbyshameabovethatapproximatenumber,shamelosesits
effectiveness.
Ifanygroupcouldmakeacommonisticsystemwork,anearnestreligiouscommunitylikethe
Hutteritesshouldbeableto.Butnumbersarethenemesis.InMadisonsterms,nonangelic
membersthencorrupttheangelic.Wheneversizealtersthepropertiesofasystem,engineers
speakofascaleeffect.Ascaleeffect,basedonhumanpsychology,limitstheworkabilityof
commonisticsystems.
Evenwhentheshortcomingsofthecommonsareunderstood,areasremaininwhichreformis
difficult.NooneownstheEarthsatmosphere.Therefore,itistreatedasacommondumpinto
whicheveryonemaydischargewastes.Amongtheunwantedconsequencesofthisbehaviorare
acidrain,thegreenhouseeffect,andtheerosionoftheEarthsprotectiveozonelayer.Industries
andevennationsareapttoregardthecleansingofindustrialdischargesasprohibitively
expensive.Theoceansarealsotreatedasacommondump.Yetcontinuingtodefendthefreedom
topollutewillultimatelyleadtoruinforall.Nationsarejustbeginningtoevolvecontrolstolimit
thisdamage.
Thetragedyofthecommonsalsoaroseinthesavingsandloan(S&L)crisis.Thefederal
governmentcreatedthistragedybyformingtheFederalSavingsandLoanInsuranceCorporation
(FSLIC).TheFSLICrelievedS&Ldepositorsofworryabouttheirmoneybyguaranteeingthatit
wouldusetaxpayersmoneytorepaythemifanS&Lwentbroke.Ineffect,thegovernmentmade
thetaxpayersmoneyintoacommonsthatS&Lsandtheirdepositorscouldexploit.S&Lshadthe
incentivetomakeoverlyriskyinvestments,anddepositorsdidnothavetocarebecausetheydid
notbearthecost.This,combinedwithfalteringfederalsurveillanceoftheS&Ls,ledtowidespread
failures.Thelosseswerecommonizedamongthenationstaxpayers,withseriousconsequences
tothefederalbudget(see SAVINGSANDLOANCRISIS).
Congestiononpublicroadsthatdonotchargetollsisanotherexampleofagovernmentcreated
tragedyofthecommons.Ifroadswereprivatelyowned,ownerswouldchargetollsandpeople
wouldtakethetollintoaccountindecidingwhethertousethem.Ownersofprivateroadswould
probablyalsoengageinwhatiscalledpeakloadpricing,charginghigherpricesduringtimesof
peakdemandandlowerpricesatothertimes.Butbecausegovernmentsownroadsthatthey
financewithtaxdollars,theynormallydonotchargetolls.Thegovernmentmakesroadsintoa
commons.Theresultiscongestion.

AbouttheAuthor

ThelateGarrettHardinwasprofessoremeritusofhumanecologyattheUniversityofCaliforniaatSantaBarbara.
Hediedin2003.

FurtherReading

Berkes,Fikret.CommonPropertyResources.London:BelhavenPress,1989.
Hardin,Garrett.FiltersAgainstFolly.NewYork:VikingPenguin,1985.

Hardin,Garrett.LivingonaLifeboat.BioScience24(1974):561568.
Hardin,Garrett.TheTragedyoftheCommons.Science162(1968):12431248.
Hardin,Garrett,andJohnBaden,eds.ManagingtheCommons.SanFrancisco:W.H.Freeman,1977.
Hiatt,HowardH.AmericasHealthintheBalance.NewYork:HarperandRow,1987.
McCay,BonnieJ.,andJamesM.Acheson,eds.TheQuestionoftheCommons.Tucson:UniversityofArizona
Press,1987.
McGoodwin,JamesR.CrisisintheWorldsFisheries.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1990.
Ostrom,Elinor.GoverningtheCommons.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990.
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