JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

Serrano vs Muoz
11-27-1967
In Perez Cardenas vs. Camus,3 we held that jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein a matter that can be
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may
the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion
to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant.
De Villa vs CA
4-8-1991
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested
for administering justice, that is, for hearing and
deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary,
157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings
(Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the statute in force at the time of commencement of
the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).

property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where

the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land
not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.

In the present case, the records show that the

assessed value of the land was P590.00 according to
the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed
with the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way
belowP20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case. However, petitioners argued that the action was
not merely for recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages but also for annulment of deed
of sale.Since annulment of contracts are actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.

Heirs of Padilla vs Magdua

9-15-2010

Petitioners
are
correct. In Singson
Sawmill, we held that:

With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC,

we hold that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of
the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following
actions:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of

which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise

known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the

jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all
civil actions which involve title to or possession of real

v.

Isabela

When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they

sought to recover ownership and possession of the
land by questioning (1) the due execution and
authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in
favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who
also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land,
and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed
between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the
principal action sought here is something other than
the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the
RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether

the party is entitled to all or some of the claims

asserted.[

Equitable PCI Bank vs Apurillo

11-5-2009
A Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue
only when the following requirements are alleged in
the petition and established: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Excess of
jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of
jurisdiction means that an act, though within the
general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not
authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular
proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect
of it are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or
want of legal power, right or authority to hear and
determine a cause or causes, considered either in
general or with reference to a particular matter. It
means lack of power to exercise authority.
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
Lacson Hermanas Inc. vs Heirs of Ignacio
6-29-2005
At the outset, the instant petition for certiorari should
have been filed with the Court of Appeals and not with
this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Disregard of this rule warrants the outright
dismissal of the petition. While the Courts original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals
in certain cases, we emphasized in Liga ng mga
Barangay National v. Atienza, Jr. that such concurrence
does not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum, thus
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefore will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs

against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the

Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Courts docket.

In the present case, petitioner adduced no special and

important reason why direct recourse to this Court
should be allowed. Thus, we reaffirm the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of
its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the resort to the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.
Although the invocation of this Courts jurisdiction is
available to petitioner on the ground that this case
raises a pure question of law, specifically, the issue of
jurisdiction, the proper recourse is not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 but an appeal via a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which should have
been filed within 15 days from notice of the denial of
its motion for reconsideration on October 22, 2004.
Even if we treat the instant petition as an appeal under
Rule 45, the same will not prosper having been filed
only on November 30, 2004, way beyond the 15 day
reglementary period.
Then too, even if we gloss over these procedural
infirmities, the instant petition must fail for lack of
merit.
Section 1 of PD 1344 vests the National Housing
Authority (now HLURB) with exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases: (a) unsound real
estate business practice; (b) claims involving refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium
unit
buyer against
the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman;
and (c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a
motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent upon the whims of the defendant.
Here,
the
allegations
in private
respondents
complaint clearly vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
Nothing therein shows that the questioned property is
a subdivision lot and sold by petitioner as a subdivision
developer. It simply referred to petitioner as a
corporation and the seller of a lot described as portion
of a parcel of land, particularly a 1,000 sq. m. area
thereof covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
261974-R
Mere assertion by petitioner that it is a subdivision
developer and the land involved is a subdivision lot,

will not automatically strip the trial court of its

jurisdiction and authorize the HLURB to take
cognizance of the complaint. Indeed, it does not always
follow that each sale made by petitioner is undertaken
in its capacity as a subdivision developer, in the same
manner that sales made in such capacity are not at all
times intended for subdivision development.
Heirs of Hinog vs Melicor
4-12-2005
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an
imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b)
it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases,
which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and
compelling circumstances were held present in the
following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens right
to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of
America
vs.
Purganan on
bail
in
extradition
proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. QuijanoPadilla on government contract involving modernization
and computerization of voters registration list;
(d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and
existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs.
Corona on the so-called Win-Win Resolution of the
Office of the President which modified the approval of
the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In this case, no special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance analogous to
any of the above cases has been adduced by the
petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to this Court.
The present petition should have been initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is
sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition at bar.
Interlocutory Orders Remedy?
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is
generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court
issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order. Such special circumstances are absolutely
wanting in the present case.
Baviera vs Paglinawan
515 SCRA 171

Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the

investigating prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction
is that courts will not interfere with the conduct
of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations
or in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient probable cause for the filing of the
corresponding
information
against
an
offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute
their own judgment for that of the executive
branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether to
prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part,
courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he
finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant
the filing of an action in court. In sum, the
prosecutors findings on the existence of
probable cause are not subject to review by the
courts, unless these are patently shown to have
been made with grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be as patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
In determining whether the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion, it is expedient to know if
the findings of fact of herein public prosecutors were
reached in an arbitrary or despotic manner.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners evidence is
insufficient
to
establish
probable
cause
for
syndicatedestafa. There is no showing from the record
that private respondents herein did induce petitioner
by false representations to invest in the GTPMF
securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to
misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather,
they invested it in accordance with his written
instructions. That he lost his investment is not their
fault since it was highly speculative.
Records show that public respondents examined
petitioners evidence with care, well aware of their duty
to prevent material damage to his constitutional right
to liberty and fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this
Court made it clear that a public prosecutors duty is
two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath of office
to prosecute persons where the complainants
evidence
is
ample
and
sufficient
to
show prima facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on the other
hand, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent
persons
from groundless, false,
or malicious
prosecution.
Dacanay vs Yrastorza
9-3-2009
The RTC decision sought to be executed has long
attained finality. Hence, petitioner can no longer
question it.

Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable

and unalterable. A final and executory judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. This is the doctrine of finality of
judgment.
It
is
grounded
on
fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that,
at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders
of courts must become final at some definite time fixed
by law. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations,
thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist
in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

The next most logical step then is for us to simply set

aside the challenged resolutions and to direct the Court
of Appeals to resolve on the merits the petition in CAG.R. SP No. 40670. But, that would further delay the
case. Considering the special importance of the lone
legal issue raised, which can be resolved on the basis
of the pleadings heretofore filed, and the fact that this
Court has concurrent jurisdiction over petitioners
special action in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, we deem it
more practical and in the greater interest of justice not
to remand the case to the Court of Appeals but,
instead, to take direct cognizance thereof and resolve it
once and for all.

Morales vs CA
12-12-1997

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an

action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over it,
are the allegations in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought. In the determination of jurisdiction,
the status or relationship of the parties, as well as the
nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy, is also considered.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, with exclusive original
jurisdiction
over
all
matters
involving
the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources. Original
jurisdiction
means
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its
inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and
facts, while exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of
co-existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to the
exclusion of others.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had no

jurisdiction over petitioners special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals has concurrent original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(1) of Article VIII
of the Constitution and Section 17(1) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, and with the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs
of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto. These are original actions, not
modes of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670
was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals thereon
is beyond doubt.
This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its
misapplication of Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and of that portion of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 vesting upon the Supreme Court
exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue. It forgot that this constitutional and
statutory
provisions
pertain
to
the appellate -not original-- jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as
correctly maintained by the petitioner. An appellate
jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a
continuation of the original suit, not a commencement
of a new action, such as that of a special civil action
for certiorari. The general rule is that a denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash in criminal cases is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an appeal or
of a special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this
Court
has
allowed
a
special
civil
action
for certiorari where a lower court has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in denying a motion to dismiss or to
quash. The petitioner believed that the RTC below did
so; hence, the special civil action for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals appeared to be the proper
remedy.

Cubero
vs
Cooperative
12-5-2006

Laguna

West

Multi-Purpose

The DARAB has been created to assume the

adjudicative powers and functions of the DAR. Thus,
the DARAB has been vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Program
(CARP). Its jurisdiction encompasses cases involving
the "rights and obligations of persons, whether natural
or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands" covered by Republic
Act No. 6657 and other agrarian laws.
DAR vs Cuenca
9-23-2004
All controversies on the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that
are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts
should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law
has granted it special and original authority to hear
and adjudicate agrarian matters.
Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining
jurisdiction in these cases. First, jurisdiction is
conferred by law. And second, the nature of the action

and the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material

averments of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. The defenses resorted to in the answer or
motion to dismiss are disregarded; otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the
whim of the defendant.
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction
over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La
Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to
issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That
Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such
nullity is particularly true in the light of the express
prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts
Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 382002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly
observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS

Valdez vs China Bank Corp.
4-12-2005
Under Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments or decisions of
regional trial courts. Here, there is no issue at all that
petitioner had perfected his appeal from the decision of
the trial court. The well-settled rule is that jurisdiction,
once acquired, continues until the case is finally
terminated.[7] Since petitioner invoked the authority of
the Court of Appeals when he filed his appellants brief
in that court, that same court can resolve petitioners
appeal regardless of the dismissal of that of his
adversarys.
Under Rule 9, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, defenses
which were not raised in the answer are deemed
waived. Petitioner never pleaded in his answer the
defense he presently invokes, namely, the alleged lack
of consideration for the subject credit agreement. His
newly minted defense of lack of consideration must
therefore be struck down, the time for interposing the
same having been already passe.

Polanco vs Cruz
2-13-2009
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that petitioners
raised the matter of respondents alleged forum
shopping for the first time only in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Issues not previously ventilated
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, [18] much
less when first raised in the motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the appellate court.
Sixto vs SEC
11-21-2002
The first allegation that the SEC en banc erred in
reversing the orders of the hearing officer, Esteves, is
the same ground raised by the petitioner in CA-G.R. No.
SP 17435. The issue is frivolous for the authority of the
SEC en banc to review, revise, reverse, or affirm orders
of its hearing officers is too elementary to warrant any
debate.
The records show that Crisostomo had two actions
pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435
and CA-G.R. No. 20285 CV) when he filed the petition
for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this Court on July 27,
1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV, is
his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of
the Memorandum of Agreement and the Stock
Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese
investors. CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 is his petition for
certiorari to review the SEC's en banc resolution
upholding those transactions and ordering the holding
of a stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the
UDMC, and of a board of directors meeting to elect the
officers.
Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in
the Court of Appeals, Crisostomo filed this petition for
certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27, 1989 where he
raises the same issues that he raised in the Court of
Appeals.
Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of
Court for it trifles with the courts and abuses their
processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority, 101
SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Courts
provides:
17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., No petition for
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo
warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if
another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme
Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in
the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the
action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the
petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
(Interim Rules of Court.)

Tan vs People
4-12-2002