Andersen Senior Thesis

RESURGENT ROMANIAN NATIONALISM
In the Wake of the Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures March 1990
Christoffer M. Andersen
c.andersen@seznam.cz
B.A. Thesis in Politics & Society
September 2005
Advisor:
Tracy Dove
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The idea to write about this topic came over three years ago when I first heard about the
incident. At that time I did not know how difficult it would be to find sources on the
topic, especially English ones. I did finally, but not completely on my own; several people
are worth mentioning and thanking. This paper does not fully reflect the complete and
objective truth about the events, it is however my attempt of doing so. The people below
have helped me come to that conclusion, but at the same time they are not responsible
for what I have written. My advisor, Tracy Dove, has come with invaluable comments on
the outline and content in the beginning of my research. My supervisor at Ethnocultural
Diversity Resource Center in Cluj-Napoca, Monica Robotin, reviewed my paper and
made me realize a few shortcomings, so did the President of the organization and head
of the political faculty at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Levente Salat, who
commented on pitfalls and theories I should be aware of. Im in great gratitude to Gabor
Adam who went out of his way to trace down an unpublished documentary on the
events, and to Bori Kovacs who helped me translate the movie from Romanian and
Hungarian into English. Amelia Gorcea helped me with small details I could not have
otherwise found on my own. Also thanks to Alexander Ohrn who has helped me with
spelling and grammar checking the paper in the finalization period. To all of these people
Im in deep gratitude for their help.
Institutions I am grateful for having received help and co-operation from is the
Open Society Archives in Budapest, who provided me with much of the articles I have
needed, the EDRC Documentation Center in Cluj-Napoca, who provided me with
books I have long been looking for, and the Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center,
their staff and expertise, who made this possible.
I also have to thank all my friends and colleagues in Romania, Prague and Oslo,
who have supported me, discussed and helped me during the years I have worked on
Romania. Last but not least, a deep thanks to my parents who again and again have
respected me for not seeing them but instead spent my time in Romania and for their
economic support during my research on this topic. Without them I would be nowhere.
ABSTRACT
How ingrained is nationalism in Romanian institutions, history and political culture?
Through the interethnic clashes in Tirgu Mures, March 1990, in this thesis I will try to
illuminate the roots of Romanian nationalism, how it resurfaced, and the elements which
played a part for its fast resurrection. To make the reader aware of the background of the
ethnic conflict in the region, I will first explain the historical and ethnographic
foundation of ethnic tension in Romania, and how the last twenty years of communism
paved the way for the resurgence of nationalism in the 1990s. In part two and three I
will first explain in detail the chronological events of the street clashes, before presenting
each element of organization and how nationalist parties and intelligence officers were
involved in pulling the strings during the clashes and how they benefited from it. The
response of the government and the following political polemics after the clashes will be
given weight, and in the fourth and last part this will be continued by looking at the
outcome of the interethnic clashes. Then I will briefly examine the political elections in
the decade after the clashes, as well as ethnic relations and progress in RomanianHungarian relations during the fifteen years after the incident. This will show the peak of
nationalism in the beginning of the 1990s and its on-going decline during the last five
years. The sources used throughout the document mainly rely upon reports from
Helsinki Watch and Radio Free Europes staff of writers, especially the political scientist
Michael Shafir who has touched upon the topic several times in the last decade. Although
I have found few monographers especially dedicated to Tirgu Mures, I have consulted
several books on theoretical, historical and political developments in Romania during this
period. Of those worth mentioning, and who have given me invaluable inspiration, are
authors such as Katherine Verdery and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. The facts expressed in this
paper attempt to give a balanced and objective view of the ethnic tension and their
impact on Romanian-Hungarian relations. However, as I have been prone to use mainly
foreign sources the views might be biased toward the west. At the same time, I have tried
to do my best to weigh the information in a balanced matter between the Hungarian and
Romanian view of the happenings. As the topic is still touchy, some might disagree with
the findings. All the opinions expressed here belong fully to the author.
One argument might be that nationalism is the form of

political discourse preferred by those who want to retain
maximum power for the socialist state upon which they
had become such adept parasites, and which openness to
foreign capital would compromise. In other words,
nationalists and ex-Communists share a defense not so
much of the nation as of the state, which they wish to
shield from foreign predation.
- Katherine Verdery, 1996: 14
ABBREVIATIONS: *
AUR
CDR
CNS
CPUN
FDSN
FSN
PCR
PD
PDSR
PRM
PUNR
SRI
UDMR
Aliana pentru Unitatea Romniei / Alliance for Romanian Unity

Convenia Democrat Romn / Romanian Democratic Convention
Consiliul Naional al Secuilor / Szekely National Council
Consiliul Provizoriu al Unitii Naionale / Provisional Council of National Unity
Frontul Democraiei Salvrii Naionale / National Democratic Salvation Front
Frontul Salvrii Naionale / National Salvation Front
Partidul Comunist Romn / Romanian Communist Party
Partidul Democrat / Democratic Party
Partidul Democraiei Sociale din Romnia / Romanian Social Democratic Party
Partidul Romnia Mare / Greater Romania Party
Partidul Unitii Naionale din Romnia / Party of Romanian National Unity
Serviciul Romn de Informaii / Romanias Information Service
Uniunea Democrat a Maghiarilor din Romnia / Democratic Alliance of
Hungarians in Romania
(SzNC)
(NSF)
(RCP)
(DP)
(DAHR)
*Throughout the document all abbreviations are given in the Romanian form, although some studies and
sources sometimes use the English abbreviation of it (put in parentheses on the right) if existing, however
this is not the standard norm. To not create confusion I consequently stick with the Romanian
abbreviation. Since there is no consensus on the English translations of these names, they might vary
throughout the text.
CONTENTS:
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Introduction
Background: History, Communism and Ethnic Relations
1.1
Historical Outline of Transylvania
1.2
Historical Demography
1.3
Communist Historiography and Indoctrination
1.4
Roots of Romanian Nationalism
1.5
The Hungarians of Romania
11
The Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures
12
2.1
Prior to the Events
13
2.2
Day 1
16
2.3
Day 2
18
2.4
Days After: Counting the Dead and Injured
20
Forces Behind the Violent Clashes
22
3.1
Elements of Organization
23
3.2
Vatra and the Rise of Nationalism in the Wake of Tirgu Mures
24
3.3
Political Polemics: the Response of the Interim Government
27
3.4
Romanias Secret Police and its Traditional Aim
30
After the Clashes: 15 Years of Thwarted Politics
34
4.1
Justice Served? Trials to Appease in Tirgu Mures
35
4.2
Democracy at Birth: Elections and Politics in Romania
36
4.3
Minority Rights Disputed: Hungarian Claims Continues
39
4.4
More Polemics from Tirgu Mures
40
4.5
Whats Next?
41
Conclusion
43
Appendix 1: Maps
46
Appendix 2: Ethno-demographic Data
48
Bibliography
52
Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 1
INTRODUCTION
In March 1990 interethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians left behind eight dead
and several hundred injured. The political psychologist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, one of Romanias
well-known contemporary scholars on ethnic relations in Transylvania, pointed out that: this
minor clash doesnt indeed seem noteworthy compared to the other Balkan contemporary
disputes, it nevertheless carries importance beyond the Transylvanian context since it was the
first ethnic clash in East Europe since the fall of communism in 1989 (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000: 2).
Daniel Vighi, a professor and fiction writer in Romania, noted that no one can deny today that
the unhappy events in the Balkans sprang from an extreme development of that March 1990 in
Romania (Vighi 2004: 431). The entire incident began March 19, 1990, when some Romanians
in Tirgu Mures1 demonstrated outside the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR) building. This
event left several Hungarians injured after that the Romanians put a siege on it. The next day,
Hungarians as well as sympathetic Romanians gathered on the main square of the city to voice
their concern for what happened that previous day. The group of approximately 15,000
Hungarians gathered on the square were attacked by a group of comparable size of Romanians,
many whom had been bussed in to the city from surrounding villages during the day. Violence
erupted between the two ethnic inhabitants of Tirgu Mures, and did not cease until the morning
of 21 March.
The interethnic clashes in Tirgu Mures created wounds that would take a long time to
heal. The slow response or rather lack of, by the local police and army has been questioned and
contested. The reaction and statements by the government during and shortly after the incident
have opened the way to speculations on its nature. The government did not repress the
nationalist organizations for fuelling the violence, but rather consoled them while at the same
time attempting to appease the Hungarian minority. The government largely blamed Hungary
1
The name Tirgu Mures is normally used in most international documents regarding the town, but other writing of
Tirgu could be found, such as Targu, Trgu and Trgu Mure. Some people do write the city name Tirgu-Mures. The
itself, claiming that circles in Hungary had created the situation so that the unity between the
Hungarians and Romanians created during the revolution of December 1989 would be
disrupted. Subsequently, this was to create a situation where Hungarian claims for a more
autonomous Transylvania under the influence of Hungary would take place. Elements that came
to the surface in response to the clashes carry many historical references, which need to be
examined. The situation resembles an aspect of nationalism similar to that of the Second World
War when Transylvania was divided between Hungary and Romania. Forty years of national
communism left Romania with the mental scar of indoctrination, historical untruths and
misinformation. The power gap left behind by the communists after the December revolution
was slowly going to be filled up by a growing Romanian nationalism in an organized form, while
the Hungarians were demanding more equal rights than they had been granted before. This
culminated in the clashes in Tirgu Mures and created violence on a scale that modern Romania
had never experienced before or after. I will try to show how nationalist parties were behind and
organized the events of Tirgu Mures, and how former, current and becoming intelligence service
agents involvement in it, gives it a more dubious character. At the same time, the interim
government managed to create a political base that insured their victory in Romanias first
democratic election in May 1990. There are clear indicators that the build up, consequences and
fall-out of March 1990 shaped the political environment in the years to follow. As ethnic
relations soured, the dismantled Securitate was re-assembled March-April 1990 under the name
Romanias Intelligence Service (SRI).
Regarding historiography on the incident, there have been no books dedicated especially
to this topic. However, a few Hungarian books have been written on the subject, some of them
highly biased personal accounts, while the Romanians have often distorted to a protectionist
attitude when commenting on the topic. Also international observers have sometimes failed to
report on the event unbiased, just as there is a problem of both Romanian and Hungarian
Hungarian name for the city is Marosvasarhely, while in German it is called Naumarkt an der Mieresch. I have chosen to
scholars from outside Transylvania writing about it, as they do not fully understand what really
was going on in Transylvania itself.
1.0 Background: History, Communism and Ethnic Relations

Historiography during the reign of Ceausescu together with the ethnic tension that surfaced in
the case of Tirgu Mures has given roots to a resurgence of ethno-chauvinism, native populism
and fascisms akin to the programs and policies of the Iron Guard2. A student of Romanian
history can discover many similarities between the 1930s and the situation in 1990 (Gilberg
1990: 412). During communism, nationalism had been used to create adherence to the country,
and subsequently a threat to communism became bound to a threat to the nation in nationalistic
terms. This reached a peak during the years of Ceausescu, and as an external threat Romania
sought Hungary as the main enemy to distort the focus from Ceausescus failing policies. When
communism fell, nationalism with its strong roots in history surfaced to fill in the power
vacuum left behind. One should never underestimate the power of history, especially in the
Balkans where it most often is used to justify presence in one area or claiming another.
1.1 Historical Outline of Transylvania

Both the Hungarians and the Romanians view Transylvania as their cradle of civilization. For
both nations, Transylvania substitutes the hearth of their historical existence. While the
Romanians claim their historical presence from before the establishment of the Roman province
of Dacia (106-271)3, the Hungarians claim that they came to an abandoned Transylvania, and
use the most common name Tirgu Mures, while the other names might occur in quotations.
2 The Iron Guard was a nationalist anti-Semite organization operating on Romanian lands during the Second World
War. One of their aims was the suppression of Hungarians living in southern Transylvania. Hungary had been
granted northern Transylvania, including Tirgu Mures, after the Second Vienna Award in 1940.
3 The official version of the Daco-Roman continuity theory states that when the emperor Trajan occupied Dacia
and made it a part of the Roman Empire, the Dachs became assimilated and integrated with the Romans. When the
Romans had to evacuate Dacia in the wake of the barbarian invasions, the now so-called Daco-Romans had become
such a homogenous group that they constitute todays Romanians ancestors. In other words, the melting pot of the
Dacian and Latin cultures resulted in the birth of the Romanian culture and language.
subsequently the area was included under the crown of Saint Stephen (r. 957-1038)4. When the
Ottoman Empire expanded itself as far as to the city walls of Vienna (1529), Transylvania
became an Ottoman vassal state from 1541 and a stronghold of anti-Habsburg Hungarian
political traditions (Magocsi 2002: 46). While Transylvania was either a vassal state or a part of
the Habsburg Empire, a Hungarian prince and administration always controlled it. Yet from
1691 and until 1867 it was ruled directly under Vienna. After Ausgleich (compromise) in 1867,
when the Habsburg Empire was reformed into Austria-Hungary, a dual monarchy, Transylvania
became directly under Hungarian control and again incorporated into Hungary.
Only for a short period would Mihai of Wallachia (the Brave, r. 1593-1601) expand his
rule to also include Transylvania and Moldova (Magocsi 2002: 64). Mihais rule over the three
provinces (1599-1600) has been seen by Romanian historiographers as the first united Romanian
state. Under the Habsburgs, the Romanians did not constitute any recognised nation in
Transylvania. A nation was a description of a respected ethnic group, which could participate in
the Transylvanian Diet. However, nations, properly nationes, represented the nobility against the
other classes and should in no sense be regarded as nation in the modern usage; in the
Transylvanian case they were the Magyars, the Saxons and the Szeklers (Schpflin and Poulton
1990: 8). Romanians were predominantly farmers, while the Hungarians constituted the majority
in the cities. Since Romanian serfs did not own their own land, they were not a nation, they were
simply acknowledged. Actually, the true classification was tolerated. In essence, the Romanian
population in Transylvania were not acknowledged any rights.
The collapse of the Habsburg dynasty and the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary after
World War I, led to the creation of rump-Hungary. At the Trianon peace conference in 1920
Transylvania was granted to Romania. The northern part of Transylvania was given back to
The Hungarian historiography states that the Hungarians arrived in the Transylvania in the 11th Century, and found
a Transylvania that was mostly uninhabited except by a small group of Slavs. They imported Germans and Szeklers
to settle down and build a civilization. Hungarian historiographers emphasize that the (Daco-) Romanians had
retreated completely up in the Carpathian Mountains after the fall of Dacia, and did not return to Transylvania until
the 13th Century. Thus, the Hungarians were first and put claims to it.
Hungary at the Second Vienna Award 1940. The psychological impact the Romanians felt by
giving up parts of Transylvania without a fight would haunt the government until its restoration
at the final days of the war. Hungary found itself again in the loosing camp of the war, and
Transylvania was re-united with Romania in 1944. Since the First World War Hungary has
suffered from the Trianon-trauma and not until recently did it acknowledge the fact that
certain part of St. Stephen land will never again be reunited with Hungary.
1.2 Historical Demography

Ethnic Hungarians live predominantly in Transylvania. Historically, Hungarians and Romanians
have cohabited with each other for centuries, except remote areas in the Carpathian Mountains
often described as Szekely Land. However, since Transylvania became a part of Romania in
1918 there has been an increase in ethnic Romanians. This has not only been at the expense of
ethnic Hungarians, but rather by the assimilation of other smaller ethnic groups (Mogocsi 2002:
150). If one compares the census of 1910 with one conducted in 1992 we see a sharp increase of
Romanians. In 1910, before Transylvania was incorporated into the rest of Romania, 53,8
percent was of Romanian descent, 31,6 percent Hungarian, while 14,6 percent constituted
others, mainly Germans. However, in 1992 the conditions had changed to 73,6 percent
Romanians, 20,7 percent Hungarians, and only 5,7 percent others (Svanberg & Srhman 1996:
72). Although some Hungarians have emigrated in real numbers the Romanians have increased
on the expense of the Hungarian percentage. 5 The national census for all of Romania the same
year were 89,9 percent Romanians, 8,9 percent Hungarians, 0,4 percent German and 1,6 percent
others6 (European Forum 1999). 7
5 At least until the fall of communism, since recent consensus data on Romanias population and minorities indicates
that 200,000 Hungarians have emigrated between 1992 and 2002. In 2002 the Hungarians constituted an
unprecedented low of 6,6 percent of Romanias total population (Database: Ethno-demographic Structure of
Romania at http:www.edrc.ro).
6 Others constitute Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, Russian, Turk and Roma. However, some estimates the Roma
population to be between 1,6 million and as many as 2,5 million, of a total population of Romanias 22,5 million
people. Therefore, Roma constitute a minimum of 6-10 percent of Romanias total population.
The sharp decline of Germans is due to emigration and Ceausescus sale of Germans
to Germany during the 1970s and 80s. Historically, there has been little emigration of
Hungarians to Hungary. However, due to the poor and brutal conditions of Romania in the
1980s some Hungarians chose to illegally flee the country (Brubaker 1996: 156-159), and even
more moved to Hungarys more lucrative labour market after the Revolution; only a few chose
to do so after both World Wars.
Hungarians, as well as Romanians, have a strong tendency to preserve their ethnic
identity. In cases of mixed ancestry, there are stronger tendencies to declare oneself as
Hungarian. When heterogeneity appears in the generation of grandparents, the declared identify
has a greater importance that favours the identify shift of the Hungarians. In case of ethnically
homogenous Hungarian grandparents the proportion of those who declare themselves
Romanian was only 2%, even when one of the parents was Romanian (Csepeli & Szekelyi
1999).
The demographic change in Transylvania his due to urbanisation, the influx of other
Romanians from other parts of Romania (notable by Moldova) to Transylvania, and emigration
of Germans and assimilation of other ethnic groups. In real terms, this has left the Hungarians in
some areas of Transylvania with the feeling of becoming colonised by the increase of
Romanians, and together with other factors, this has produced a psychologically unpleasant
feeling among the Hungarians.
1.3 Communist Historiography and Indoctrination

The Daco-Roman continuity theory provides Romania with the historical precedence in the
area and justifies their claims to Transylvania. Hungarian historiography, on the other hand, is
also articulating a diagonal claim to Transylvania. Thus, Transylvania is a unique case since both
Romanians and Hungarians consider the region a cradle essential to their whole image of
7
For newer numbers (from 2002) on ethno-demographic structure in all of Romania, Mures County and Tirgu
national identity and the historiography of both countries was dedicated in modern and
contemporary times primarily to the task of proving the legitimacy of claims to Transylvania or
the other way around (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000: 5). Mythical history writing helps nations
remember their history, though flawed, in a national-romantic way. However, it becomes a
problem when it is used in exploiting superior terms, just as one can perceive degrees of positive
and negative nationalism.
The Communists in Romania after World War II went further than forging an
organized solidarity, but also used the origins of Romanians to keep them loyal to the regime.
Ceausescu was probably the one who exploited the Daco-Roman theory to the fullest, imprinting
it in every Romanians head. This has led Romanian historians and researchers to use every
possible means to prove their Romanian ancestry and their Dacian-Roman origin8. This
exploded to an academic and politicised war between Hungary and Romania on research
concerning who was first in Transylvania. Ceausescus arguments also paved the way for
identifying the Romanian Communist Party [PCR] not just with the proletariat but with the
entire Nation (Verdery 1991: 118). Dragos Petrescu, in Historical Myths, legitimating discourses, and
identity politics in Ceausescus Romania, has identified four different pillars which Romanian writing
and teaching of national history were based on after the PCRs program was imposed in 1974:
(1) the ancient roots of the Romanians; (2) continuity; (3) unity; and (4) independence9 (Petrescu
2004). This came at the same time the PCR announced their attempt to create a new socialist
man, which included the reshaping of national identity (e.g. see Verdery 1991; Helsinki Watch
1989). This was furthered in the 1980s with the destruction of rural areas, which had an impact
on all aspects of Romanian life but was felt hard by the Hungarian minority. However, for the
Hungarians not even communist indoctrination can match the effectiveness of national
Mures see Appendix II.

8 One has to keep in mind that under Communist regimes scholars were often restricted to ancient and pre-war
history, and as Katherine Verdery points out that especially in Romania this included also support for work in
defence of the Nation (1991: 102).
9 The Daco-Roman continuity theory evolves around several of these aspects.
socialization in a matter seen essential (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000: 11), such as cross-border

Hungarian Radio, circulation of Hungarian books and Hungarian national unity.
Romanian nationalism during four decades of communism was a state affair. This can be
shown through the ethno-demographic changes in Romania previously shown, especially in
Transylvania. A system of forced or encouraged Romanianization10 in regions historically
inhabited by Hungarians took place. One of the ways of doing this was to place state officials of
Romanian ethnicity such as policemen, railroad employees, in the postal service, or in the local
administration to work in predominantly Hungarian villages, thus increasing the Romanian
presence and dominance. Ethnic Romanians were also encouraged to move and settle down in
such areas. Romanian orthodox churches would be built in villages scarcely populated by
Romanians, often built in dominant size and architecture overshadowing the Hungarian more
modest and smaller church. In schools the pupils were taught, or indoctrinated, with their DacoRoman origin. Ceausescu put into force the four pillars in history writing and created a period of
Dacomania in Romania up to 1990, which would last much later. Consequently, one of the
major lessons of national history as taught until December 1989, was that the Romanian unitary
nation-state has been continuously contested and threatened, and that it was the patriotic duty of
all responsible people to defend it at all cost (Petrescu 2004). Since the communists had created
the picture that they were the protectors of Romanian unity and independence, a rise of
nationalist parties naturally replaced the gap created by the revolution. More precisely, socialism
produced a characteristic organisation of the self one characterised by an internalised
opposition to external aliens, seen as them; it also produced specific conditions from which
This is one of the typical views of the (forced) urbanization which took place especially in the seventies and
eighties when peasants were forcefully moved into concrete apartments buildings in the outskirts of every Romanian
city. However, urbanization is a naturally phenomena in all industrialist countries, although in Romania the shape of
it was more of a forced one. The term Romanianization means that Romanians were moved into Hungarian cities to
make them more Romanian, although this might be true, another aspect of it is important to mention. Historically
the Hungarians lived in the cities, and Romanians lived in villages. Thus, when urbanization took place, it was
mostly Romanian peasants who were forced into the cities and new settlements. This happened all across Romania,
but the impact on i.e. Tirgu Mures has been described as Romanianization because the ethnic map changed radically.
However, it can be argued that it might would happened naturally, and not as a policy to undermine the Hungarian
majority.
10
scape-goating emerged as an effective political tactic, one that uses stereotypes of other
nationalities as means to explain social problems (Verdery 1997: 97). Social problems are one
thing Romania has enough of, and subsequently ethnic Romanians felt insecure about their
nations future from 1990 and onwards.
Still today, Romanian scholars are influenced by their communist past. Therefore, many
have been unable to escape the reminiscence of communist indoctrination and are unable to
comment objectively or balanced on interethnic tension and the Tirgu Mures incident.
Publications, writings and other comments about ethnic diversity and Transylvanian Hungarians
shows a picture of continued use of ideas, language and fear of the other that Ceausescu so
vehemently indoctrinated the Romanian population with for two decades.
1.4 Roots of Romanian Nationalism

Romanian nationalism in the beginning of 1990s can be described as integral nationalism.
That is nationalism of a more extreme sort, which happens when a nation feels threatened by
neighbours or have had a blow to their self-esteem and other factors. This kind of nationalism
grows under extreme conditions, such as during or after a revolution. Integral nationalism is also
a tool, which can create extreme conditions. It is a system where the individual belongs fully to
the nation, and only to the nation. Exponents of integral nationalism are prepared
unscrupulously to assert the interest of their own nation at the expense of others (Alter 1994:
26). The definition fits the Romanian political environment post-1989, since integral nationalism
grows in extreme political environments when sentiments were generally preceded by a crisis of
national self-confidence, extraordinary events from the outside, or a real or self-perceived
threats to the continued existence of the nation (Alter 1994: 32). Romanians after the
Revolution felt intimidated by the Hungarians; they had initiated the Revolution, and afterwards
they increased their cries for equal rights. Many Hungarians were left with the immediate feeling
that nationalism had disappeared along with communism, while the Romanians still believed
what Ceausescu had told them; that the Hungarian question had been solved. As historically,
Transylvania had been a part of Greater-Hungary, more demands for Hungarian rights
sparked off a fear of possible federalism, or even secession plans of Transylvania from the rest
of the country11. In this respect many Romanians were scared of Hungarian revisionism. As both
nations put diagonal claims to Transylvania many believed that there would always exist distrust
between Romanians and Hungarians. The ghost of federalism will always hunt Romanians (Sugar
1995: 500), and this was one of the initial fears that erupted after 1989 when ethnic Hungarians
demanded more cultural and educational autonomy. Under President Iliescu, ethnic minorities
such as Hungarians (and Gypsies) were described by government-connected media as disloyal,
potentially treacherous and inferior to the Romanians (Tismaneanu 1999: 435).
The self-image the Transylvanian Romanians come up with is shaped under the pressure of the constant
threat they feel coming from the other. The collective defence mechanism set off by this permanent fear
and defiance favours the shaping of an original self-image that feverishly tends to make up compensating
myths, security meant to provide symbolic protection to threatened identity and injured national pride.
(Mitu 2001: 4)
At the same time, communism has produced more tightly knit ethnic groups, which
enforced the separation between Romanian and Hungarians. As the shortage economy created
bribery, it also produced the use of ethnicity as basis for personlistic connections (Verdery
1996: 86). Thus, while the strongest group, in most areas the Romanians, created a shortage for
Hungarians (and in some cases vice versa), the Hungarians would despise the Romanians even
more. In this sense, the economic failure of communism was anti-integrationist, and together
with Ceausescus more obvious attempts of trying to destruct Hungarian identity, it rather
strengthened it and created more separation between the two groups. Subsequently it laid the
roots for Romanian nationalism.
11 Although a lot of sentiments are attached to Transylvania, Hungary would not want the territory if it were offered
to them for free. A border change between the countries is as unrealistic as them going to war with each other. But
this does not undermine the historical and psychological sentiments this region means to both nations.
1.5 The Hungarians of Romania

Since the Trianon treaty in 1920 many Hungarians have dreamt of reuniting Transylvania with
Hungary proper. As it has been showed, this has increased the Romanian fear and nationalism in
response to a perceived Hungarian separatism. For the Hungarians in Romania, the Vienna
dictate, which granted northern Transylvania to Hungary in 1940, was a blessing; for the
Romanians, an unforgiving curse upon the Romanian nation, which would last for four years.
For the first time in over two decades the Hungarians felt like first-class citizens again. Still
today, many old Hungarians remember Horthys regime of northern Transylvania as a golden
age (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999). Equally, the Romanians felt they were degraded as citizens under
Hungarian rule. In southern Transylvania, Hungarians were equally mistreated and to some
extent persecuted, as Romanians felt they were in the north.
After World War II, Transylvania was restored under Romanian rule, although the
central region of Transylvania, an Hungarian dense area, including the counties Covasna,
Harghita and Mures, experienced some kind of autonomy12. This was gradually stripped in the
1960s, and during the 1970s Ceausescus policy of state nationalism and discrimination against
the Hungarians detoriated the Hungarians status even more. The situation for the Hungarian
minority was to reach a peak during the 1980s. However, it is well to remember that during the
last decade of communism economic hardship, state (secret) police control and isolationists
foreign policy affected everyone in Romania, Hungarians as well as Romanians. Some of the
measures were not always directly aimed at the Hungarian minority, but in many instances they
suffered the most. As Romania became Romanianized Hungarians were not allowed to give
Hungarian names to their children that could not be translated into Romanian, nor to attend
school in Hungarian; Romanian language became the absolute norm in all institutions, and to
speak Hungarian in public was impossible without fear of police intimidation; books and
newspapers were increasingly limited (in extreme cases only Romanian nationalist propaganda
was translated into Hungarian); Hungarian radio ceased to exist; and Hungarians suffered more
work discrimination than other ethnic groups (Helsinki Watch 1989).
These injustices laid the roots for international minority rights pressure on Romania well
into the 1990s. This has repeatedly been boosted by Hungarian demands for equal rights and
Hungarian nationalism, both from Transylvanian Hungarians, Hungary and the Hungarian
diaspora. In this respect, the hardship Romania went through in the 1980s, including the
discrimination of the Hungarian minority stipulated above, laid the groundwork for Hungarian
nationalism in the region, which again fuelled the increasing interethnic tension and helped the
resurfacing of Romanian nationalism in the 1990s.
2.0 The Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures

Tirgu Mures is lying in the heart of Transylvania, and the city served as the capital of the
Hungarian autonomous region between 1952 and 1968. Tirgu Mures has historically been
predominantly Hungarian, but during the forced urbanisation during communism the city saw an
influx of Romanians. Today the city is approximately fifty-fifty Romanian and Hungarian. The
Hungarian autonomous region included the counties Mures, Harghita and Covasna, and still
today these three counties are dubbed Szekely Land after the historically Hungarian sub-group
who inhabits the area. The Szeklers is a Hungarian tribe of a slightly different ancestry, and lives
in an enclave in the Carpathian Mountains surrounded by Romanians. However, most
inhabitants of this area view themselves first as Hungarian and only secondly as Szekely
(Mungiu-Pippidi 1999). Only a small group of people praises their Szekely ancestry as a separate
unit, although the name is still in use, such as for the Szekler National Council (CNS) that works
in close association with UDMR. Actually, the Szeklers had been better off referring to
themselves as Hungarians to receive a stronger minority status; the more united and bigger
12
See Appendix I for county map and the map of the historical Szekely region.
minority, the greater voice and influence. Therefore, the Hungarian Szeklers constitutes a
problem in the Romanians eyes. Not only because the area they live in is the most homogenous
Hungarian area in Romania, but also because for a century they have refused Romanian
assimilation.
The Szekely identity survived only as a local identity. With one exception, the rest of the Szkelys we
discussed with considered it is the Romanian nationalists who say that Szekelys are anything else than
Hungarians. Due to their homogenous presence in their areas, Szekely are in fact less interested in
cohabitation [with the Romanians] than other Hungarians. [] Cohabitation in the Szekely area is viewed
differently in the rest of Transylvania, especially in towns, since at the country side there are almost no
Romanians except one policeman per village (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999).
This strong self-consciousness among the Hungarians in the area is threatening to most
Romanians. This was one of the elements that sparked off the ethnic tension in 1990. What is
more irritating for the Romanians, especially in Szekely land and in Tirgu Mures, is that
Hungarians are more united than the Romanians are. One can still trace [] fundamental
Romanian inferiority and feeling of rejection and [a] fundamental superiority and pride as
Hungarians as the basis of nationalistic feelings of today (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999). Thus, in this
region Romanians have low self-esteem compared to Hungarians, since in the predominantly
Hungarian-inhabited area Szekler counties [] Romanians felt that they were in a minority and
that their culture was neglected (Schopflin 1993: 28). The Szekler capital Tirgu Mures was to
become the stage for the events that would stir Romanian-Hungarian relations for a decade to
come.
2.1 Prior to the Events

When communism collapsed, some feared that Romania would disintegrate. Some claim that it
was a real threat, others a manipulated one. One of the initials factors that started the revolution
in 1989 was when the Hungarians demanded more equal rights, such as respect of cultural and
language autonomy. The police in response tried to evict a Hungarian Protestant pastor, Laszlo
Tks, from his parish house in Timisoara (a city in the western region Banat, on the border to
Serbia). A demonstration for his release sparked a nation-wide reaction. In a few days
communism had collapsed, and an interim government consisting of dissidents, former
communist and scholars were put up under the name National Salvation Front (FSN). The
fraction of former high-ranking communists in its leadership is of dubious character, and the
revolution has often been named a coup detat or a stolen revolution13. Nonetheless, entering
the year 1990 Hungarian-Romanian ethnic relations seemed harmonious. Hungary had been the
first country to send help-packages of food and clothes into Romania, almost immediately after
the revolution. The interim government (FSN) dismantled the secret police Securitate, which main
aim was to control, intervene and arrest any Hungarian counter-revolutionary attempts. Ethnic
Hungarians were as well automatically promised more cultural rights in Transylvania, however
any fundamental changes were held off until after the coming May elections.
For the Hungarians developments went too slow, and they continued to demand and
press for more rights, and asked for the immediate development of an educational system
guaranteeing minority-language instruction at every level; the re-establishment of the
independent Hungarian University in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvar); the introduction of mandatory
bilingualism in Transylvania, with administrative and judicial proceedings being conducted in the
Romanian and Hungarian languages and the creation of a Ministry of Nationalities (Deletante
1991: 29). On February 8, this reached a peak when approximately 5,000 Romanian attended an
anti-Hungarian demonstration in the local sports hall in Tirgu Mures to voice their opposition to
the Hungarians demands that the Bolyai High School and other University branches in the city
to resume teaching in Hungarian instead of Romanian. The Hungarians retaliated, February 10,
13 Several scholars agree on this statement, but for elaborate discussion on this topic see: Hall, Richard Andrew,
1999. The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. East
European Politics and Societies, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp 501-542.
with a silent protest to demand equal rights with Romanians in Tirgu Mures, Sfintu Georghe (in
Covasna) and several other towns.
On the Hungarian national day, March 15, an influx of Hungarian tourists from Hungary
proper accompanied the Transylvanian Hungarians in their celebration. March 15 escalated the
ethnic tension already present in Transylvania. Although, several of the arrangements where
done in Romanian as well as Hungarian language, Hungarian flags, speeches and songs
dominated the day. This was the first free celebration in over 40 years for Transylvanian
Hungarians. In a historical context, March 15 is the anniversary of the 1848 Hungarian
revolution14. On March 16, Vatra15 supporters in Tirgu Mures were angered by two bilingual
signs placed in the city centre that read Justice for Minorities and Schools in Hungarian. The
supporters subsequently began molesting Hungarians in the street (Socor 1990: 38). It seems
like the anger that developed on March 16 was the first big event of a build up to the clashes. A
pharmacy in the city had put up a bilingual sign in response to a newly passed law that stated that
medicine could be labelled in both languages. Some Romanians attacked the female pharmacist
working there and threatened to kill her. The police did not intervene. Soon the crowd of 200
Romanians outside the pharmacy escalated into a crowd of 2000 people who demonstrated
against the Hungarians. From video footage and interviews16 it seems like March 16 marked one
of the first violent mass protests by Romanians against the Hungarians. On March 17 a
Hungarian drunk driver ran his Trabant into a group of Romanians, raising suspicion of a violent
Hungarian counter attack. However, these two days resulted only in a small number of injuries
(Socor 1990: 38).
14 This was a revolution, which the Hungarians lost, while Romanians sided with the Austrians to crush the attempt
of Hungarian independence. The Romanians mainly did this to gain more rights from Vienna, but when the
revolution or War of Independence as the Hungarians have dubbed it ended in 1849, the Romanians gained
nothing. When the dual monarchy was established in 1867 and Transylvania fell under the rule from Budapest it was
clear that the Hungarians had lost the war but won the peace. The opposite was the case for the Romanians.
15 The organizations nature and program will be fully explained and explored later.
16
From an unpublished documentary After Ten Years: A Documentary Film on the Events in Tirgu Mures, March
1990, produced by the Civitas Foundation in Cluj, funded by Soros Open Network. Bori Kovacs simultaneously
translated this part for me.
On March 18-19, students rallies against Hungarian demands were held in Bucharest,
Iasi, Craiova, Suceava, and Constanta (all outside Transylvania) and Cluj. The demonstrations
had small participation, but gained good media coverage.
2.2 Day 1
In the morning March 19 a crowd of Romanians had gathered outside the City Hall. The County
Council was supposed to hold a meeting on the topic of the rising tension between Hungarians
and Romanians. At 10 oclock some of the Romanians from the crowd entered the City Hall,
and at least one secretary was hit by the mob. The crowd had gathered to demand the
resignation of Kiraly Karoly, Vice Chairman of the Provisional Council of National Unity
(CPUN) and Elod Kincses, a Hungarian Vice President of the County Council. The meeting was
subsequently cancelled, and the crowd moved to the headquarters of the Democratic Union of
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) (Helsinki Watch 1990: 3).
The UDMRs building came immediately under attack. Two of the 65-70 members inside
the building, Istvan Kiraly and Andras Suto requested protection against the crowd. Kiraly
Karoly, who at that time was in Bucharest, said in an interview17 that:
When I found out that Suto and the others were at the headquarters [of the UDMR], I met with Iliescu,
and Petre Roman, the minister of the interior, the minister of defense, with Cambrea, the head of the
police, with general Cojocaru and they all told me to calm down, that there was no problem. On the
contrary, on the contrary, they called the minister of the interior and he told me around 6 oclock that the
tanks were out and that Suto and the others were not there anymore. I didnt believe it and so I called
Sutos wife, Eva. And she told me that Andras wasnt there, that she didnt know where he was. And then
she says, and I have it here, on tape. And the minister of the interior tells me, Mr. Vice-president, these are
all hooligans. They are lying.
17
The interview takes place in the unpublished documentary previously mentioned. Bori Kovacs translation, Im in
gratitude.
Even if the police station was only 300 meters away from the building, neither the police nor the
army responded to calls for help. The crowd was armed with sticks, bottles and farm tools as
they began to force themselves into the building. The police and army did not respond to the
UDMRs calls for protection until several hours after the attack began. Many ethnic Hungarians
trapped inside were seriously injured (HRW 1990). Most of the Hungarians inside had hid in
the attic, and the Romanians threatened to put the building on fire. At this point the police were
seen outside, acting as mere observers of the events. The crowd was reinforced with more
people, and at least one busload of peasants arrived from the nearby villages of Hodac and
Ibanesti arrived. Helsinki Watch reported that they were unable to confirm the involvement of
Vatra in the organization of the busses and trucks that day, but a representative of the Vatra
Romaneasca, stated that the armed peasants were in Tirgu Mures to attend a musical festival and
responded to requests for help from Romanians (Helsinki Watch 1990: 3-4). Around 8 p.m.
approximately 30 soldiers finally arrived and promised the Hungarians safe exit18, and a truck was
put at the back entrance to take them away. Colonel Judea19 told those in the attic that the
building would be cleared and he personally guaranteed their safety. At 9 p.m., Suto and about 15
other members of UDMR left the attic and were attacked by Romanians still in the building. Col.
Judea and all of the other army officers were nowhere to be seen. As the Hungarians came out
the building, they had to walk through the crowd for about 10-15 meters to reach the truck.
They were sporadically beaten and humiliated on the way, and further injuries occurred as it took
the truck 10 minutes to leave the area. The remaining people in the attic escaped later at 10 p.m.
when the crowd had dispersed (Helsinki Watch 1990: 4).
18 One of those interviewed in the documentary says that they were first told to come down to negotiate, and not
until this seemed impossible did they choose to escape. Nevertheless, all sources indicate that they were promised a
safe exit by the military.
19 A retired army officer and president of the Front of National Salvation in the County Council, often portrayed in
military uniform during City Hall meetings in the spring of 1990. He is still involved in politics on local level in
Tirgu Mures today.
Seven Hungarians were hospitalised after the attack, among them was Andras Suto who
was treated in a hospital in Boston many months afterwards. He was blinded in one eye
(Deletante 1991: 32).
2.3 Day 2
The next morning around 15,000 Hungarians and sympathetic Romanians and Gypsies gathered
at the main square outside the City Hall to demonstrate against the incident the previous day.
Not much later 3,000 Romanians gathered at the opposite side of the square, some of them
carrying signs of Vatra. At this moment the first calls to President Iliescu and Minister of
Defence Stanculescu in Bucharest was made (Helsinki Watch 1990: 4). Speeches from the City
Hall, both in Romanian and Hungarian, were made to the crowd on the square, and promises
that President Iliescu would come to solve the problems were made. One of the Hungarian
speakers told the crowd20:
I am begging you, dear brothers. We have to behave calmly, we must not break apart, get demoralized.
What today is really about is to learn to live together, to be together. This way we can maintain the
cleanliness of our revolution. In the afternoon we are expecting Kirly Kroly and president Iliescu.
After several promises that Iliescu would come from Bucharest, he oddly enough didnt show
up. General Scrieciu, a reserve officer and member of the County Council, admitted that he
personally talked to Iliescu and told him that it was unnecessary for him to come. A videotaped
speech from the City Hall balcony confers that Scrieciu said that Ilescu would come in two-three
days to huge outcry form the crowd in the square.
At 2 p.m. the situation became more infuriated with tension when rumours spread that
busses of Romanian peasants were approaching the city to join the Romanians on the square,
and there was near mass hysteria among the Hungarian crowd (Helsinki Watch 1990: 4). By
2:30 p.m., General Scrieciu told the crowds that the city was sealed off such that no
reinforcement from outside the city would be possible, and some 50 policemen placed
themselves between the two crowds. The roadblock proved itself to be insufficient and
corrupted, since busloads continued to pour in long after the roads should have been closed. The
people arriving were mainly Romanian peasants armed with farm tools and such, but it is
possible that a few trucks with ethnic Hungarians also arrived. Hungarian villagers around Tirgu
Mures responded that the Romanians attacked them when they saw the trucks approaching the
city. One of them said that by then they understood that something was going on, and another
stated that they called and warned their Hungarian kinsmen in Tirgu Mures about the
approaching trucks21.
The influx of Romanian peasants increased the Romanian crowd to equal that of the
15,000 Hungarian. Both Hungarian and Romanian leaders insider the Town Hall repeatedly
called the army asking that all necessary steps be taken to prevent violence. At about 3 p.m., the
army promised that troops would be sent. The government in Bucharest also claims that it gave
an order at about 3 p.m. to the army in Tirgu Mures to go to the scene. The army in Tirgu
Mures, however, claims it did not receive such an order (Helsinki Watch 1990: 5). Between 5
and 5:30 p.m. violence erupted as ethnic Romanians surged forward and attacked the
Hungarians, breaking the single line of 50 police that the authorities had sent to divide the two
groups (HRW 1990). A film shows General Scrieciu on the phone saying that no military
intervention is needed, while he added, we dont want to frighten anybody.22 The Hungarians
responded by retreating away from the crowd. In most of the previous demonstrations, including
this one, the Hungarians leaders had warned against any confrontations asking the Hungarians
not to respond to violence, and most of all not to act violent, provocative or even hit back when
Taken from the unpublished documentary on the Tirgu Mures incident. Since the film was not finished, the
names of the people appearing in it were not given. Bori Kovacs translation.
21 Interviews from the unpublished documentary on the Tirgu Mures incident. Simultaneously translated by Bori
Kovacs.
22
Ibid.
20
beaten. Initially the Romanians who had gathered at the square first were also unarmed, but their
reinforcement from surrounding villages brought with them farming tools and other weapons.
Some signs of organisation were observed as weapons were handed out to busloads of people
upon their arrival. However, it is clear that the Hungarians arrived unarmed, and did not
anticipate any violence and fighting. They only armed themselves in self-defence when the first
attack came. As Dr. Zoltan Kolozsvary, later a Vice President of the County Council, observed
the events from the City Hall told Helsinki Watch:
We have heard some cries that those from Hodac have arrived and they are coming. It was awful, what I
have seen. They were destroyed in that moment because the Hungarians had no weapons at all. They
were empty-handed, that is for sure. I have seen from the window [of the City Hall] the terror of the
people as they tried to obtain something, sticks from here, from the building. They destroyed some of the
fences here and destroyed benches just to obtain something to use as a weapon. It was awful. It was truly
awful (cited in Helsinki Watch 1990: 5).
However, as the Romanians were seen beating up Hungarians at the square, and fighting
continued, this was supported by chants in Hungarian from the City Hall who screamed through
the microphone, Hit them, Dont Run and other similar phrases23.
At around 7 p.m., five or six tanks entered the city centre. Attempts to split the crowds
by then were impossible, and the interethnic clashes moved and continued in nearby streets.
Street fighting and mob violence would continue through the evening and night, and it was not
before the morning that the widespread violence had ended.
2.4. Days After: Counting the Dead and Injured

Most of the fighting ended by the morning March 21, but isolated incidents continued on the
citys outskirts until March 23 (Socor 1990: 36). The fighting in the square and streets of Tirgu
Mures left eight dead and hundreds injured (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000: 2). The numbers of the actual
23
Ibid.
death toll have varied immensely. Everything from five (Andreescu 2003: 30) and as many as
thirty has been noted (Griffiths 1993: 23). This might be due to how death occurred, if it was
instantly or later by injuries. The figure of some thirty people is far too high and is possibly an
estimate of deaths connected to ethnic violence all over Romania, and then especially towards
the Roma population. Therefore, I find Mungiu-Pippidis estimate far more trustworthy, a
number that agrees with normal accepted figures. Also Vladmir Socor in Radio Free Europes
report Forces of Old Resurfaces in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu-Mures refers to estimates by
foreign correspondents in Tirgu Mures claimed that local police and medical sources put the
final casualty figure at 8 dead and 300 injured. One of the dead men is said to be Romanian; the
others are reported or presumed to be Hungarians (Socor 1990: 36). The one Romanian death
seems to be a self inflicted accident. One of the trucks that first broke the police line and drove
into the Hungarian crowd24 hit the Orthodox Churchs stairs, one Romanian fell off the truck
and presumably later died of the injuries (Helsinki Watch 1990: 5).
The Romanian authorities did not manage to give an exact number on deaths and
injuries, and came out with several sets of different figures that conflict in details but one: the
suggestion that ethnic Romanians sustained far more than the Hungarians did (Socor 1990: 3637). The media was also unable to report on this objectively, taking sides based on ethnic
considerations and failing to discuss the implications of the events for the countrys future
political development (Socor 1990: 37).
The events of the clashes tell the shocking truth that Romanian nationalism had
resurfaced, and that on those faithful days it had taken a violent form. At the end of December
1989 not one well-intended Romanian or Hungarian would have imagined that the dark days
of March 1990 would come (Gal 2004: 153). The attack on 19 and 20 March, which left 8 dead
Helsinki Watch reported this somehow inaccurately. Tapes from the clashes shown in the documentary shows the
truck come from behind the Hungarian crowd while they were throwing stones at the Romanians. The truck then
went of the street and into the Church stairs. It is clear that the fighting had already been going on for a while from
the footage, however, it is impossible to say exactly when this happened, except that from the light it had to be still
late afternoon or early evening.
24
and several hundred injured, were not anticipated, but should not be underestimated. The truth
behind it is blurry, but the facts tell a shocking tale.
3.0 Forces Behind the Violent Clashes

The clashes in Tirgu Mures contain certain elements that point to the fact that there were circles
in Romania, and not in Hungary, that provoked the violence to take place. Although several
Romanians participated on the Hungarian side of the protest, and many Romanians in the crowd
who attacked first did not anticipate or want the violence, it is clear that certain elements in the
clash were primary fuelled by Romanian nationalists. The only main criticism, although weak,
towards the Hungarian minority could be said to be their careless provocation in asking for too
many rights at one time, the extended celebration on March 15, their stubborn demonstrations
for bilingualism and the influx of Hungarian tourists, which intimidated Romanians who had
lived in a country so long closed to foreigners. That said, the growth of Romanian nationalist
groups that had begun to get a strong foothold by the time the ethnic clashes in Tirgu Mures
took place, has undoubtedly links to the violence that erupted there. Also the mixed messages
and refusal of General Scrieciu to call in the Army and ask Iliescu to come immediately, together
with the fact that Kiraly Karloy was constantly misinformed25 in Bucharest of what was
happening, indicates that some people in the FSN might have escalated, or even been behind,
the incident. The involvement of former Securitate members, the handing out of weapons to
arriving peasants and the transport of people from villages outside of Tirgu Mures to the event
gives strong evidence that there were some kind of organization behind the tension that
escalated.
25 This is at least Kiraly Karalys own interpretation of the incident. The fact given that many Hungarians blamed
him for his impassivity and absence (although he visited Tirgu Mures a few times those days, he spent most of the
time in Bucharest) might underpin this argument.
3.1 Elements of Organization

The unanticipated violence that happened in Tirgu Mures March 20 can be described as a
psychological response produced by mass mentality that is easily aroused in crowds and by
community feelings. As several participants in the violence noted that afterwards they came to
the realization how ridiculous and unnecessary the whole thing had been, but during the clashes
such logic was overshadowed by irrational feelings26. However, it is clear [] that the violence
was stage-managed, the question of by whom inevitable arose (Deletante 1991: 32). Many details
will remain unclear, but several aspects are evident. The main form of organization can be seen
in the arrival of buses and trucks with aroused Romanian peasants and the presence of
nationalist groups. The attack on Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures were apparently spearheaded by a
group of up to 1000 peasants, mostly from the outlying mountain villages of Hodac and Ibanesti,
who had been mobilized by known Vatra followers, including their local mayors and other local
notables (Socor 1990: 39). In Ibanesti, the mayor had promised a sum of 3000 lei (then the
equivalent sum of the average monthly wage of a manual worker) to go to Tirgu Mures to defend
Romanians there against Hungarian attacks on Romanians (Deletante 1991: 32). In a different
village, the local priest had ran into a meeting with the mayor and other community members
screaming to them: You sit here and do nothing while Romanians are killed in Tirgu Mures?27
On both 19 and 20 March, the peasants were transported in trucks and busses in and out of
Tirgu Mures given alcohol on the way. They used identical axes and standardized clubs, which
were picked up from a storage site reportedly located near the main scene of action (Socor
1990: 39). Such weapons were stored in factories as an arsenal for Ceausescus civilian defence
unit, the so-called patriotic guards, and were supervised by Securitate. It is likely that such
From the unpublished documentary on the interethnic clashes.

The name of the priest was Boila, however, the village name was not identified. Taken from the unpublished
documentary on the Tirgu Mures incident. Bori Kovacs translation.
26
27
primitive arsenals were supplied to the villagers of Hodac and Ibanesti on the orders of Securitate
members who were sympathizers of Vatra Romaneasca (Deletante 1991: 32).28
3.2 Vatra and the Rise of Nationalism in the Wake of Tirgu Mures
Three main nationalist organizations who got increased support after the Tirgu Mures incident
were the cultural organization Vatra who already had a stronghold in Tirgu Mures long before
the clashes, the political organization PUNR who was established in Tirgu Mures days before the
clash and the national political party PRM who was established later, but grew out of a
nationalistic weekly established with support by leading members of the FSN the summer of
1990. The main actor in Tirgu Mures, Vatra Romanesca had strong ties to the political groups such
as PUNR and PRM, but they also had a membership mass consisting mainly of former Securitate
members, local politicians and bureaucrats of the communist apparatus and new politicians and
intellectuals with ties to the FSN. Several of the members in either group had dual membership
in another one.
Most sources date the organization of Vatra back to January 1990 (Socor 1990: 38), but
its first mass meeting was held February 1 in Alexandru Papiu Ilaria Secondary School in Tirgu
Mures, and a week later another meeting was held in a bigger sports hall that attracted an even
larger audience (Deletante 1991: 30). The organization was established mainly by holdovers from
the Ceausescu regimes local nomenklatura in Mures County and had spread to several other
Transylvanian counties during February-March 1990 (Socor 1990: 38). Since many of its
members had held power before 1990 they had in some areas good access and control over
official local media. Securitate agents had been integrated into local governments especially in
predominantly Hungarian and mixed-population areas even if in many regions these old
holdovers from the former regime lost most of their position, they seemed to be still
28 When Col. Judea, who was at the City Hall March 20, was asked about the arrival and handouts of weapons he
responded that they came around lunch time, so he went for lunch, so he didnt notice that they came. Taken from
the unpublished documentary on the Tirgu Mures incident.
entrenched in Mures and other counties with mixed population (Socor 1990: 38). The language
of appeal that Vatra and other nationalist groups used is similar to the language of propaganda
used during the years of Ceausescus rule. Romanian nationalism is based on this external fear
fostered during communism, and it was this fear who prompted the creation of Vatra, as indeed
its president, Radu Ceontea has pointed out. Mistrust of Hungarian motives, fear of Hungarian
revanchism, concern about an erosion of Romanian dominance in Transylvania, general unease
about the future of the economy; all these factors have contributed to the climate of interethnic
tension (Deletant 1991: 29). It was easy for nationalists to create this fear in the Romanian mind
when the Hungarians demanded more cultural, educational and linguistically rights. Vatra played
on the typical aspects of Romanian nationalism that build up under this fear, and especially in the
belief that Transylvania is the Hearth (the meaning of the word Vatra) or the cradle of the
Romanian civilization.
Next to Vatra, was the emergence of the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR),
which was established 15 March 1990 in Tirgu Mures, at the beginning of the violent conflict.
Also PUNRs members consisted of regional supporters of the former Ceausescus regime,
Securitate members and a dual membership in the cultural organization Vatra was predominant.
The question of PUNRs involvement is beyond doubt (RFE/RL 2000), as evidence has pointed
out that they played a role as agitators on the square that faithful day. PUNR later recruited
Mihala Cafariu as the party leader, a resident of Tirgu Mures and a hero of the March 1990
interethnic clashes (Shafir 1997). During the street fighting in Tirgu Mures he was badly injured,
something that only infuriated him even more to fight against Hungarians and other minorities
in politics.
Although Vatra was to receive a strong support by ethnic Romanians, it was limited as a
cultural organization. PUNR was by the end of the decade not to achieve the same political
support as the would-to-be Greater Romanian Party (PRM). PUNR would remain a local
political movement, while PRM had parliamentary ambitions. PRMs existence can be traced
back to a weekly newspaper established in the summer, 1990. The weekly Romnia Mare had a
strong nationalistic and racist character to their journalism29. The two most prominent figures in
both the weekly and later in the party were editor in chief Cornelius Vadim Tudor (party
president from the establishment until today30) and its director Eugen Barbu. The two writers are
renowned for their conspicuous contribution to hagiography under former dictator Nicolae
Ceausescu [and] for their links with the former secret police (Shafir 1991: 25). Both of them were
skilful journalists and therefore managed to achieve many supporters, and by their success they
were encouraged to establish its political wing, PRM, in May 1991. The partys emergence owes
much to the support of the National Salvation Front and, in particular, Prime Minister Petre
Roman31 (Shafir 1991: 25). PRM and Tudor would achieve blooming support throughout the
beginnings of the 1990s32, however they had little impact on what happened in Tirgu Mures
March 1990 they rather gained from it.
Even if the nationalist were supported by elements from the former regime, it is
important to keep in mind that Not all nationalists are former communists, nor all excommunist nationalists (Verdery 1996: 92). Nevertheless, the participation and involvement of
29 In one year its editor, Tudor, was sued for libel close to a hundred times for his statements. One example is from
his weekly, reprinted in the opposition paper Revista 22, 4-10 February, 1993, p. 12: Romanian, Hungarians fascism
is attacking us openly. . . .In twenty-four hours we must ban by law all anti-Romanian groupings: the Hungarian Democratic Union
of Romania and Soros Foundation, as well as their stooges, the Civic Alliance Party, Group for Social Dialogue, Literary Romania,
Democratic Convention! Romanians, dont be afraid of the wild beast of Hungarian revisionism; we have put its nose out of a joint few
times already, and now well crush it decisively and without pity! They want autonomy? Expel tem! (cited in Verdery 1996: 100,
emphasis in original).
30 However, he stepped down early in 2005 so that the party would have better chances to join European Popular
Party. It proved to be to little help and in June 2005 strong indicators shows that he might presume power again.
Nevertheless, he still controls PRM behind the curtains.
31 A letter dated March 2 from Tudor and Barbu addressed to Petre Roman, asking for permission to start a
nationalist magazine, it was reprinted in full in the opposition paper 22, 17-23 December, 1992: We would not have
emerged from our self-imposed silence had we not been more and more revolted by the scandalously antinational
character of certain publications. . . . These publications have become a sort of agent of denunciation, maintaining a
climate of tension and terror over the people of good faith of this country. This isnt good. We cannot remain
passive before the attempt of these hypocrites, ulcerated with political ambitions for aggrandizement and
enrichment, to destabilize the country and worse and to enslave it to foreign powers. . . . We see that the most
perilous politics (draped in the garb of democracy, naturally!) comes from the [opposition] publications
manipulated openly and diabolically by the same old pig-sty at Radio Free Europe. All these people were traitors
before and still are today (cited in Verdery 1996: 112-113).
32 PRM would replace PUNR as the strongest nationalist party, and by the 2000 election PUNR had withdrawn to
local politics, while PRM achieved a astonishing 20 percent in the elections, by 2004 PRM was down to around 13
percent again. Although, ethnic tension is on the decline, there is still strong electoral support for PRM. One of the
these and other elements in nationalist parties, and in the interethnic clashes have not been
exaggerated. In sum, Vatra emerged from the Tirgu-Mures incidents substantially strengthened
(Socor 1990: 41).
3.3 Political Polemics: the Response of the Interim Government

In the spring of 1990, the interim government FSN were to come with statements and
proclamations that would contradict each other. One day it would encourage positive progress
towards minority rights and democracy, and another blaming them for the problems transition.
Over all, many of the statements baffled international observers. Especially during and the days
after the clashes, the polemics the government would use would change from day to day, from
person to person and so on. Although certain aspect of the clashes in Tirgu Mures were accurate,
these were among the few, most of them resorted to focus on the damage inflicted on
Romanians while putting the blame on Hungary. Romanian politics had not only taken the form
of nationalism, but on the official level it had sunken to the same means as Ceausescu in the use
of political language: Blame any problems on outside forces to secure your power as long as
possible.
On January 5, the National Salvation Front (FSN) Solemnly declared that it would
guarantee individual and collective rights and freedom for minorities (quoted in RFE/RL
2000). The interim government would stand by this statement, thus granting minorities rights
step by step. However, an outsider might easily criticize that this was too little, but one have to
keep in mind that minority rights were absent during Ceausescus years and changes can hardly
come over night. But by the time of the interethnic clashes in Tirgu Mures, the response of the
provisional government can be best described as political polemics. Both Interim President Ion
Illiescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman issued several astonishing insensitive statements that
failed to condemn the violence unequivocally regrettable events was the operative
reason is that the other parties, such as the Social Democrats, have been more serious the last years, and left much
euphemism (Socor 1990: 40). It seemed that the FSN, approaching the May elections, would
not alienate the nationalistic forces growing in Romanian circles. In other words, they would stay
friends with Vatra members and not loose votes to the political party PUNR. Therefore, it chose
to play the nationalistic card without completely alienating themselves to the Hungarian
minority, a two sided policy began crystallize (Deletante 1991: 33). In an interview to John
Kifner in New York Times (NYT) March 22, Prime Minister Roman diplomatically stated that the
violence was lead by the local mayors, the attack by the Romanian villager who came to Targu
Mures was the result of a manipulation of public opinion by extremist elements (Kifner 1990: A17,
Romans exact words in italics). In the article he continues: A revival of the Iron Guard, a
Fascist and anti-Semite movement, that came into power shortly before World War II could also
have played a role, Mr. Roman and other Governmental officials said. But Roman came also
with accusation towards Hungary itself as he claimed that 9000 Hungarians had crossed the
border to participate on the March 15 celebrations, and that the Hungarians committed
unpleasant acts that inflamed Romanian national feelings (Kifner 1990: A17). Petre Roman managed
to play the card of reconciliation toward the Hungarians in Transylvania and of hostility toward
the Hungarian government (Deletante 1991: 33), or as the NYT sub-headline read: Bucharest
Blames Hungary.
In the evening of March 19, however, President Iliescu condemned the devastation of
the UDMR building and the individual injuries. He also expressed regret that local authorities,
who should have kept order, had not managed to provide security to the UDMR headquarters
and had failed to control extremist elements (Helsinki Watch 1990: 6). On March 20, Romanias
Executive Bureau of the Provisional Council of National Unity (CPUN) issued a quite different
statement than Iliescu the night before, emphasising the privileges sought by the Hungarians and
the behaviour of the Hungarians which had offended the national feeling of the Romanian people
(Helsinki Watch 1990: 6, official statement in italics). It continued saying that the violence only
of their nationalist sentiments behind.
served Hungarys best which would give Transylvanian Hungarians more reasons to seek
reunification with Hungary proper. On March 21, the Romanian government accused Budapest
of fermenting anti-Romanian irredentist activities in what it called action taken by officials from
the Republic of Hungary who had further helped to undermine the necessary steps that the
Romanian government had done in order to restore calm and public order in all the localities in
the region (quoted in Shafir 1990: 44). It further accused Hungarian interim president Matyas
Szuros of stirring up the problem of claiming that Transylvania was ancestral Hungarian land
(Kifner 1990: A17). The Romanian government further accused Szuros that he had aroused
Hungarians in Romania to intensify their activity and to organize themselves in accordance with
the idea that Transylvania is an ancient Hungarian land (quoted in Shafir 1990: 44). Szuros
speech which the Romanian government referred to was from March 18, where he had come to
criticize Romanian historiography and national indoctrination under Ceausescu, claiming that if
Romanian could claim that Transylvania was their ancestral land, the Hungarians could do so
too. However, he quickly added that he by no means claimed Transylvania back (Shafir 1990:
45).
On March 22, the CPUN set down a commission to be sent to Tirgu Mures to
investigate the incident. The commission was headed by eight high-ranking military and civilian
leaders from the old regimes law enforcement agencies, and consisted by only one ethnic
Hungarian. A local investigation commission was also set up consisting of 3 Romanians and 3
Hungarians, representatives from both Vatra, UDMR and the local administration included. The
commissions findings were never made public, but Helsinki Watch obtained a copy of the
report, but unfortunately, the report did not address the critical question raised by the violence:
What role did the army and the police play in initiating the violence, and why did they fail to
respond immediately to calls for help (HRW 1990).
On March 23, a communiqu published in Bucharest said that the government
dissociated itself from how the mass media had portrayed Tirgu Mures regarding tendencies
of separation [and] nationalism (quoted in Shafir 1990: 45). However, this communiqu
restricted the withdrawal of accusations only to the counties Harghita and Covasna, and did
not include the Mures county where Tirgu Mures is situated. Apparently, the statement was a
response to Petre Romans telephone conversations to leaders in those two counties, and only
said that no citizens from Hungary had been involved in any violence there (Shafir 1990: 45). On
the same day, a message from Petre Roman to European prime ministers, the UN Secretary
General and various international bodies, stating that 10,000 Hungarian citizens had participated
in the violence around the country and that certain circles in Hungary was behind the interethnic
clashes in Tirgu Mures (Shafir 1990: 46), seriously underpinning what he said to Bucharest the
same day.
The [FSNS] reaction was an ominous sign that the Ceausescu policy of forced
Romanianization had survived the revolution. In [the] subsequent months, the number of
ethnic Hungarians refugees fleeing Transylvania reached unprecedented levels (Country Studies
1990). Michael Shafir from Radio Free Europe wrote that the reaction of the Romanian
government was nothing but a reminiscent of the Ceausescu regimes position on the
nationality issue in Romania (Shafir 1990: 43). The main explanation FSN had given was that
there had been provocative behaviour of local Hungarians, [and that] tourists from Hungary
proper and the government in Budapest had been involved in the clashes (Gilberg 1990). No
better assessments of why the clashes took place where given.
3.4 Romanias Secret Police and its Traditional Aim

On 30 December 1989 the Securitate was officially disbanded, but its employees across the
country still went to work, either at the local police station or at the regional headquarters, as
nothing had happened. The Securitate members arrested after the December revolution had soon
been released again, all but a few. As already seen, former agents were represented in
nationalist groups such as Vatra and PUNR in the wake of the Tirgu Mures incident, implying
that the secret service was still operational on a certain level in the penetration or cohabitation of
these nationalistic movements. Their involvement can be exemplified through the hand out of
weapons during the clashes that only the former Securitate had access to. On March 2, the head of
the Hungarian secret service declared: Our information proves that almost without exception,
the members of the Securitate are still in place (Sturdza 1990: 34). Ion Conja, deputy of Vatra
later admitted their involvement in an interview (RFE/RL 2000). Katherine Verdery labels
PUNR and PRM as unruly coalitions, and that these groups were led primarily by local
officials of the [old] Communist Party, one or another fraction of the old/new Secret Police,
members of the local police, and the henchmen of all these (Verdery 1996: 197). Therefore, the
involvement of secret agents in the Tirgu Mures incident seems perceptible. However, Verdery
points out that her personal belief (which she cannot prove) is that much of the violence of
Romanias first three or four postsocialist years [do not come] from central directives but from
self-organizing groups of ex-Securitate who had lost out in power scuffle and hoped to improve
their place by preserving a climate of political instability (Verdery 1996: 217).
The Securitate had been given a three-month period to be completely dismantled, and
officials were still supposed to be paid by the government during this period. The fact that the
interethnic clashes took place ten days before the dismantling would have been completed,
throws another light on the intention of the clashes. People employed by Securitate would not
receive their money by March 30, and there was a growing concern for the government to what
to do with them. What could one do with an organisation that was that huge? How could one
just take it away, after not even knowing the true number of people employed in the sector?
The public opinion was vehemently hostile to setting up a similar institution again [] Based
on the argument that such events [as in Tirgu Mures] are a threat, the Romanian Intelligence
Service was set up immediately afterward (Andreescu 2003:85-86), bypassing legal measures and
public opinion. This has lead people to speculate that the Tirgu Mures incident was as well
planned and staged by the government. It has so far been impossible to verify the direct
involvement of politicians with certainty33, although their passivity is well documented. Further
suspicion is added to this by the fact that Iliescu several times promised to come to Tirgu Mures
on March 20th to talk to the crowds, but never even tried to leave Bucharest while the violence
started to crystallize. One of the most complex conspiracy theories states that the Tirgu Mures
incident was planned to create a situation of political havoc in Romania, and to split the
Hungarians and Romanians in two hostile fractions. Some even note that Tirgu Mures was really
intended to start a civil war where hatred towards the Hungarians would diminish the minority
for good. Although the latter might be exaggerated, it brings into the light several facts about the
situation in Romania at that time. The only other city that is split in fifty-fifty between
Hungarians and Romanians in Romania is the north-western city Satu Mare (Szatmarnemeti).
This theory states that this city was initially intended for the interethnic violence to take place,
but since Satu Mare is located too close to the Hungarian border, fears that it could escalate into
war between the two countries cancelled the plan. For this reason Tirgu Mures was picked
instead. According to this theory, together with several facts, the former Securitate had a major
role in planning and staging the violence. As a whole, this theory seems a little bit too speculative
to be completely true. However, the fact that the clashes, the scheduled final dismantling of
Securitate by the end of March and the re-establishment of a new secret police in the weeks after
the Tirgu Mures incident happened in so tight time span is too coincidental to be ignored.
Soon after the Tirgu Mures interethnic clashes, the interim government published on
March 25 a decree on a new intelligence service. The Tirgu Mures incident had obviously
benefited the government by giving them an excuse to set up a new secret service. An official
explained that the dismantling of the Securitate had seriously compromised Romanias security,
and timely intelligence would have permitted the authorities to react more quickly to the violence
33
This is clear from the fact that no politician, including Iliescu, has not yet been indicted for being involved in
planning the violence in Tirgu Mures. Former President Ion Iliescu is currently waiting to appear in court on charges
(he was indicted June 2005) for calling the miners from Jiu Valley to crush a opposition protest in June 1990, which
killed 21 people and injured several more.
in Tirgu-Mures (quoted in Sturdza 1990: 34). On April 24 Romanias Intelligence Service (SRI)
was set up.
Upon its establishment in March 1990, the Romanian Intelligence Service took over the department of the
former Securitate that had used to monitor the activities of Hungarians in Romania, labelled as
irredentism. National minorities and the Hungarians in particular used to be regarded as a threat to
Ceausescus policy of assimilation. Most members of the former Securitate were trained from the
perspective of national-communism whose main guarantors they were. After 1990, many of them have
become SRI members. The department on irredentism continued its activities. At a certain point, the
department was renamed defence of the Constitution, but hard facts demonstrate that the SRI attitude
has not changed (Andreescu 1999: 7)
It is obvious that the ethnic conflict in Tirgu Mures apparently gave the government the excuse
it had sought to announce on March 25 that Romania needed a new, strong intelligence network
to protect the country (Sturdza 1990: 28). The establishment meant that the Securitate could
again operate legally under a new name, with the only difference that they were put under the
supervision of the Ministry of Defence rather than during communism, Ministry of Interior. It is
difficult to estimate how many former Securitate members were included in the new SRI. The SRI
chief Virgil Magureanu34 pointed out in November 1990 that one-quarter or a little bit more
of the former intelligence apparatus of the Securitate has been taken over by the newly
established body"(quoted in Helsinki Watch 1991: 8). These were well-trained, specialised and
component officers, or as Verdery call them the liberal faction of Securitate. It is difficult to
know what the ones not included in the SRI were up to, but forming nationalist parties and
building pyramids are one reasonable possibility (Verdery 1996: 198).
However, today it is believed that the former SRI chief Virgil Magureanu masterminded
the Tirgu Mures riots (Shafir 1999; Andreescu 2003: 57). Magureanu was also one of those who
initially helped establishing nationalist organizations in Tirgu Mures in the beginning of 1990.
34 Magureanu was Intelligence Chief from 1990 to 1996, by the 2000 election he had moved into politics as the
chairman of the Romanian National Party, another nationalist group. He is currently professor in Sociology at the
University of Bucharest.
Mircea Chelaru, who headed the Romanian army during the clashes, where he did
nothing to defuse (or prevent) the conflict, for this reason he later participated in the
establishment of the Romanian Intelligence Service, was appointed head of the
Counterespionage Division, and had prerogatives in the surveillance of irredentist activities
(Andreescu 2003: 20). He was also well known for his anti-Hungarian statements in the
Parliament, and for other nationalistic tendencies.
It is evidently that the mix of Romanian nationalist and former secret agents made it
possible to manipulate the crowds and police in Tirgu Mures. This might also be the answer to
why the Romanian peasants brought in from villages were so easy let through the roadblock.
However, it gives little answer to why the military did not respond to calls both from the
president and the local government to intervene earlier. Since several of those participating and
organizing the violence presumably came from the communist nomenklatura and Securitate, in
consideration with the instability the country was in March 1990, one can only speculate in their
motives. Undoubtedly, the Tirgu Mures incident created a strong separation between Romanians
and ethnic Hungarians, the resurgence of Romanian nationalism, and an unstable relationship
between the to respective countries. If the reason for the involvement of former secret agents
and supporters of Ceausescu was to underpin the chances of a new democratic Romania, they
failed, but they certainly damages relations that had an impact on how democracy could have
been in the beginning of the 1990s. As interethnic co-operation dwindled in Romania, so did
chances for stable governing of the country as Romanian nationalist parties won more support
and the Hungarians predominantly voted ethnic and not ideological.
4.0 After the Clashes: 15 Years of Thwarted Politics

Not long after the clashes, the Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall35 said that he was also
Prime Minister for those Hungarians living outside Hungarys borders. By granting them
Hungarian identification cards,36 Hungary infuriated its neighbours. As Istvan Horvath, an

Hungarian professor in the Transylvanian city Cluj, notes that the impact of this meant
unconditional support for the political aspirations of the Hungarian minority in Romania, []
this support [also] led primarily to gradually increasing confrontation and its perverse impact was
the institutionalization of Romanian nationalism (Horvath 2004: 203). Tension between the two
states would continue, and a slow progress of reconciliation would take place. The Hungarians in
Romania slowly gained more rights, but it was too slow and too little. Subsequently, the impact
of Tirgu Mures, and the resurfaced Romanian nationalism, created political polemics and a
situation, which have confused many about where the Romanian government really is headed.
The trials that preceded the clashes in Tirgu Mures did not serve the justice as it was hoped for;
the interethnic dialogue that looked so bright in the end of December 1989 had been buried; and
the immediate political developments didnt make it brighter.
4.1 Justice Served? Trials to Appease in Tirgu Mures

Soon after the Tirgu Mures incident, trials to find those responsible for the violence and deaths
began. They can only be described as a farce. The Helsinki Watch reported in their 1990 May
newsletter, that 31 persons were already under investigation. Out of these, two were Romanian,
five Hungarians and 24 Gypsies (Helsinki Watch 1990: 7). Considering that the majority of
deaths during the clashes were Hungarians, and that few of Tirgu Mures Roma inhabitants
participated in the clashes, and those who did sided with the Hungarians, the investigation of the
perpetrators of the violence clearly failed. Consequently, Gypsies had been made into
scapegoats and held responsible for the clashes (HRW 1990). Between the 14 and 18 Gypsies
were tried and convicted for offenses such as possession of weapons and disturbance of the
peace (Helsinki Watch 1991: 17). In the end, none Romanians were convicted, while a couple of
He was Prime Minister from May 1990 to December 1993.
Hungary did not consult neighboring states on this issue. A Hungarian referendum in 2004 resulted in a negative
vote for granting all Hungarians outside Hungary Hungarian citizenship.
35
36
Hungarians received prison sentences (pardoned by President Emil Constantinescu in 1997). The
Roma on trial was forced by the police to sign their confession, or did not know what they were
signing (Helsinki Watch 1990: 7). Military helicopters were continuously circling around the
courthouse. This further intimidated the defence. No appeal was granted after the verdicts were
given, and its clear that the trials were political charged. The fact that mainly Gypsies were
blamed shows the nature of the Romanian legal system at the time. The fact that few Hungarians
(and no Romanians) were convicted indicates that the trials were an attempt to console the
Romanians while appeasing the Hungarians (instead of making it a mass trial) seem plausible.
Once more the Romanian governments policy of finding an outer threat as solution to
the national problems had surfaced and was a proof that communist indoctrination and policies
prevailed as Hungary got the blame for provocating the violence and the Gypsies (as an outer
threat since they are the least respected minority in Romania) were blamed for the violence.
4.2 Democracy at Birth: Elections and Politics in Romania

When FSN declared that it would hold free elections in the spring 199037, some saw it unrealistic
that the elections would possibly be fair when held so early (Ionescu 1990: 27). Just as the
interethnic clashes had been controlled by elements from the old system, the same people would
ensure FSN victory in the elections. Although, the May 1990 elections are in many respects
misleading, results from the 1992 election, when political parties were established and a political
elite had emerged, are more descriptive of the political landscape of Romania at that given time.
In the spring 1990, the FSN used the old communist infrastructure to secure their
victory, and they were endorsed by those who feared to lose from change change to a
competitive market economy or to political democracy. Further, this constituency included not
only bureaucrats, security agents, and apparatchiks, but also miners working low-grade seams,
Initially FSN had promised right after the revolution that they would not to stand in the up-coming elctions, but
only serve as an interim government. Their promises were not upheld, although by the 1992 elections FSN had
37
blue-collar workers in inviolable rust belt plants, peasants whose work ethic had been sapped,
rhetorical technocrats and so fourth (Rothschild & Wingfield 2000: 249). The opposition parties
in Romania who chose unfamiliar returned migrs, at the same time that they had little time to
organize, suffered from harassment from FSN connected institutions and were given little prime
time on national television. Consequently, FSN were secured a landslide victory on May 20th,
1990. The result showed that Iliescu had won more than 85 percent of the popular vote for
presidency, and FSN collected 92 out of 119 seats in the Senate and 263 of 396 in the Assembly
of Deputies38. Respectively, FSN had got 66 percent, UDMR 7 percent and PUNR39 as little as 2
percent of the vote. International observers generally agreed that despite some intimidation by
the [FSN], the outcome of the elections reflected the majority will (Country Studies 1990). The
lack of democratic tradition in Romania and the basic authoritarianism in much of the working
class and the peasantry was the main reason for the return of communists (though former) to
power (Gilberg 1990: 412).
The FSN had exploited long-simmering interethnic tension to gain votes (Country
Studies 1990), and their lack of criticizing Vatra and other nationalist groups after the incident in
Tirgu Mures was a well-staged strategy not to lose voters to the growing nationalist parties. In
other words, FSN robbed PUNR for votes, and the latter only achieved a small electoral support
in the 1990 election. As mentioned before, many in Vatra and FSN had dual membership,
therefore the victory of FSN can not be viewed as a defeat of the nationalists, since several such
elements were present in FSN politics and apparatus. The Hungarians formed an ethnic party,
and voted for it in a compact bloc, and a Romanian politician living in [this region] would stand
a chance of winning only if he could persuade all voters of his own nationality that their group is
under terrible threat from the other group (Verdery 1996: 91). As a consequence of the
dissolved and split up in several fractions, Ilisecu would run the Social Democrats (PDSR) and Petre Roman
established the Democratic Party (PD).
38 Detailed election results from 1990-2000 can be found at: http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electer/ro_er_nl.htm
39 Officially called Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR) in the 1990 election only, but normally referred to as PUNR
then and in later elections.
interethnic clashes in Tirgu Mures, UDMR had the fuel to gather all the votes from the
Hungarian minority in Romania, and PUNR had the equal opportunity to gain Romanian voters
propagating a perceived Hungarian threat.
By the 1992 elections, Romania seemed more like a multi-party state. Iliescu remained
President, while the Social Democrats (PDSR)40 achieved the biggest single vote, 28 percent,
followed by Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) got 20 percent, while UDMR got 7,5
percent41, PUNR got 7,7 percent and PRM 3,9 percent. The new PDSR government relied
heavily on support from PUNR, PRM and other parties to receive majority in parliament.
Although one can point out that only around 12 percent voted nationalistic in the 1992
election, while close to all Hungarians did so. However, this understates their influence since
they formed the most important bloc of swing votes and their [PUNR and PMR] natural political
allies have been the parties of former Communist apparatchiks (Verdery 1996: 90). One can
also argue that Romanian nationalism never reached the unprecedented level as seen in the mass
movement in the Tirgu Mures incident. However, this becomes an over-simplification and is not
quite true, even if not all Romanians voted nationalistic, several of the other parties carried
indirectly nationalistic undertones in their election campaign42, and on local levels a great number
of people were involved in nationalist organizations such as the cultural organization Vatra. This
is especially true in mixed areas, such as the Mures County and other places in Transylvania
where Romanian and Hungarians live side-by-side. Strong sympathizers of nationalism are still
found across Romania.
In the election the party was called FDSN - Democratic National Salvation Front but later merged and changed
name to PDSR.
41 This number shows that close to 80 percent of the Hungarians voted UDMR, since the Hungarians constitute 8,9
percent of the Romanian population and UDMR received 7 percent of the popular vote. This would say that
probably all Hungarians who voted in the election voted for UDMR if one deduct those who did not vote and not
eligible to vote, i.e. those under-age or in prison.
42 Political figures frequently supported nationalists and were seen together with them on several occasions. One
such example is President Ion Iliescu who during the national holiday in 1991 was sharing a toast with extreme
nationalist, all of them apparatchiks of yore (Verdery 1996: 90)
40
4.3 Minority Rights Disputed: Hungarian Claims Continues

Although bilingual signs in Romanian and Hungarian soon became the norm in areas populated
by Hungarians, debate arose again in 1995 when the parliament decided on an Education Law
instead of Bill on Minority Rights, which would have included the same as the law on education.
The repeated Hungarian demands for establishing a separate Hungarian University in Cluj
sparked off further tension. Even if the University in Cluj had (and still have) several good offers
to the Hungarians, and the most important classes are found either in Romanian or Hungarian,
the demands for separation have prevailed. As the demands still continues today, the Romanians
are repeating that a full separation of the University would create more separation, less
interethnic understanding, and they argue that a common university produces integration, as well
as cross-cultural understanding. Basically, young Romanians have been afraid that they would
come out of touch with their Hungarian peers, and that this might create more tension. Even if
Romania has not adopted several of the demands that sparked off the tension in 1990, several
other new laws on Minority Rights have appeared in Romania after 1989. However, they have
not come easily. One of the most important changes came with political shift in January 1996
when Emil Constantinescu became President and the CDR created a government with support
from UDMR and others. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Guyla Horn had for years tried to
improve Hungarian-Romanian relations, and they finally reached an agreement in September
1996, five years later than scheduled. Despite these favorable developments, a majority of the
Hungarians still perceive a conflict between the Hungarians and Romanians. After the 2000
elections, when PDSR and Iliescu came to power again they invited PRM into the coalition
government, which showed that the link between Iliescu, the social democrats and the
nationalists has continued for more than a decade. Nevertheless, a Law on Local Public
Administration was decided in April 2001. This law grants minorities, if they substitute more
than twenty percent of the local population, the right to be understood and informed in their
own language by the public administration. Additionally, if one third of the elected deputies in
the town hall represent a minority group, meetings may be held in both languages43.
In 2004, the government declined again demands proposed by UDMR together with the
Szekely National Council (CNS) for the autonomy of Szekely Land, where Tirgu Mures would
be likely to become again the regional center. When the government changed once more after
the November 2004 election, hopes for the law were revived and CNS filed for the law to be
passed in June 2005. However, this time UDMR responded that they would only lodge the draft
in Parliament after the draft on national minorities had been adapted, then the question of
decentralization and establishment of an autonomous region could be revived. Despite a huge
outcry from CNS and other Hungarians, it seems like UDMR have learned the lesson to take
one step at the time instead of trying to have everything at once.
4.4 More Polemics from Tirgu Mures

Political polemics peaked again in the build-up to the 2000 election, as several politicians would
launch their Transylvanian campaign on ethnic issues related to the Tirgu Mures incident. Since
the interethnic violence in 1990, politicians had made the city the playground for announcements
on minority issues, ethnic harmony and Romanian-Hungarian relations. When Petre Roman
announced his candidacy for the Presidency in mid-August 1999, he did this in Tirgu Mures.
Roman called for cooperation between the regions minorities and the Romanian majority,
which he said is now possible because no one questions Romanias territorial integrity today.
But visiting the headquarters of the Targu Mures garrison, Roman professed that the officer
corps concern about an alleged attempt about Transylvania destabilization had made a big
impression on him. Those familiar with [Romans] double-talk were hardly surprised (Shafir
1999). President Constantinescu also went to Tirgu Mures that fall and expressed that as a
guarantor of the constitution he would never agree to separatist ideas. (quoted in Shafir
43
George Funar, mayor from 1992-2004 in Cluj-Napoca, refused to adapt the former measure in his city that is
1999). Since PDSR had lost the election in 1996 because of Transylvania it had become the
battleground for the 2000 election, and Hungarian minority issues was at the core of the
campaigns. After PDSR had won the 2000 election, Prime Minister Adriane Nastase asked the
SRI to investigate any sign regarding about Hungarian revisionism. The Hungarian Human
Rights Foundation claims that several politicians in the Tirgu Mures region had been searched,
detained and interrogated by the police under orders from the SRI for carrying political material
in 2003. Among them was Imre Fodor, the Deputy Mayor of Tirgu Mures, who was carrying
political posters for the Szekely National Council (CNS), and Arpad Andrassy, President of the
Ludus branch of UDMR, who distributed invitation for the same council. Also Lajos Marto,
member of the Civic Association of the Hungarians was detained in Tirgu Mures while posting
invitations to a meeting of the council (HHRF 2004).
4.5 Whats Next?

Although the Tirgu Mures incident cannot be attributed to the sole cause of rising nationalist
sentiments in Romania, it seems that March 1990 marked the point when Romanian nationalism
became institutionalized. Tensions are still present in Romania, and Tirgu Mures is not a
forgotten accident. However, little has been done to find out more about who was behind and
many Hungarians are still waiting for the government to come with an excuse and to bring those
who are responsible in front of justice. The immediate response of the government, and the
following investigations and trials can be nothing but described as a public play. Still minority
and human rights groups are waiting for a proper explanation to be given.
Fifteen years later, it seems like nationalism is on the decline and the seeds of democracy
have finally taken roots. What we have to wait for now is to see if it will blossom. The main
reason for the decline of nationalism in Romania is the fact that the countrys democracy has
matured, and the economic conditions are more stable. The aspects of Romania joining the EU
inhabited by at least 23 percent Hungarians.
in a close future have led people to realize that pushing the nationalist card only is counterproductive and will isolate Romania from the west44. Subsequently, Hungarys Relations with
Romania in the second half of the decade have been civil, with Bucharests hope for Budapests
support for its membership in the EU and NATO providing the impetus for improving
Hungarian-Romanian relations in Transylvania (Rothschild & Wingfield 2000: 281). As
Hungary has become a member of the European family, the situation between the two nations
has changed. Today, Romania depends more on Hungarys willingness to cooperate, and the
economic ties to Hungary are becoming more and more important. One can see it as Sandor
Janko Sep, a member of UDMR, noted: from a geopolitical view, all roads to Europe go
through Hungary (Janko Sep 2004: 221). As communist shortage-economy can be described
as anti-integrationist, the prospects of a capitalist Romania might prove the opposite. As
businesses start to flourish, ethnic division might become over-shadowed, and a new generation
of Romanians seems willingly to lead Romania in the right direction. Multiculturalism in
Transylvania is beginning to get a positive grasp among people, as they have started to appreciate
the positive influence an ethnic diverse society can give. It is the majority society that defines
the parameters of success during the nation-state development working on the project of
national homogenization. For the minority group assimilation could be the more advantageous
way to higher social conditions. On the other hand, the higher status in the social hierarchy
supposes higher qualifications, that theoretically, permits a more accepting and permitting
attitude towards multiculturalism (Csepeli & Szekelyi 1999). Even though the Hungarian
minority in Transylvania in most cases chooses not to assimilate, the prospect of social success in
the whole of the Romanian society indicates that ethnic tension will dwindle for good.
The historical and political connection to the upsurge of violence in the days of March
1990 is comparable to the societal response to the territorial losses of Romania in the summer
44 Nationalism in Romania has been mostly build on anti-western sentiments, both preceding 1989 and in the
interwar period. This attitude dwindles when the process of democratization is strengthening while closer political
and economic ties and prosperity shows its fruits.
of 1940 with societal reaction stirred by the perceived threat of loosing Transylvania in JanuaryMarch 1990 (the Targu Mures interethnic clashes), one must conclude that while ethnic majority
were passive in face of a genuine threat in 1940, in 1990 a great proportion was active when
faced with a manipulated danger of an allegedly similar threat (Petrescu 2004). There are little
chances for new confrontations today, although relations still need to improve. In 1990 it
seemed like the Hungarians miscalculated the situation preceding the revolution in 1989. They
thought that Romanian nationalism was an accessory to the Ceausescu regime, and its fall
would diminish the nationalism as well (Enyedi 2004: 141), but when communism fell
throughout Central and Eastern Europe it found itself being increasingly replaced by nationalist
elements. Nationalism, an affliction that Adam Michnick aptly called the terminal disease of
communism, already has been played ad nausean in Romania. While it is true that national
sentiment is strong, there is little reason to believe that it will take aggressive, violent forms
(Tismaneanu 1997: 443). Over a decade later, it seems like stability and future hopes have
replaced the uncertainty that proceeded the 1989 revolution, and over a decade of nationalism is
now, hopefully, closing down.
5.0 CONCLUSION
Romanian nationalism resurfaced after the collapse of communism, and it is a burden that future
Romanians will have to carry along with them for a long time to come. The first interethnic
clashes, in a post-Communist country after 1989, resulted in little, compared to other areas in the
Balkans. Nevertheless, it changed and affected the political situation in Romania and that spring
the democratization process was halted, if not misguided. Instead of a unified Hungarian and
Romanian attempt to create democracy that seemed so promising in December 1989, it created a
split between the two ethnic groups. The events in Tirgu Mures (March 19-21, 1990),
exemplified how deep rooted nationalist sentiments were in different institutions. The historical
components together with the political culture of reducing problems to a nationality one should
not be ignored in this context. Although the involvement of former, current and new security
agents during the clashes is difficult to pin-point; comments, interviews and other facts have
made it highly presumably that they are partly to blame. Not only the interim governments
response to the clashes, but also their involvement in establishing PRM and Iliescus continued
coalitions with nationalist parties, shows the nature of FSNs leadership. As forces behind the
Tirgu Mures incident as well as Romanian politics have shown, both secret agents and the
government played a vital role in the establishment and success of Romanian nationalism in
1990.
Although the clashes had great impact on the Romanian society in 1990 it has now been
mostly forgotten or reduced to an interest in the elements behind the clashes, rather than the
clashes itself. Sources on the subject have still not completely come to terms with what actually
happened, and still Romanian and Hungarians contradict each other even if both sides agree that
certain Romanians are to blame. As one highly respected scholar in the field, an ethnicHungarian, who wished not to be quoted by name, told me that one should not ignore the forces
of Hungarian nationalism when one examines what happened between Hungarians and
Romanians. Hungarians in Hungary, as well as Romanians in other regions than Transylvania,
fail to understand the interethnic mix in Transylvania, and keep blaming each other. In one way,
it is the two camps outside Transylvania who continuously perceive a problem in the region and
propagate against the other. While most Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania do
experience some kind of interethnic harmony, cooperation and cohabitation, scholars and
politicians, most often non-Transylvanians, fails to see this. In this way, ethnicity has been
politicised and institutionalised to an extent far more than desirable, and has begun to suffer
from the same internal problems as nationalism in itself. On the other hand, economic
improvements the last few years seem to diminish ethnic divisions. The solution seems to be
economical rather than political.
Luckily enough, Transylvanian mentality, which to a high degree is common for the
Hungarians and Romanians, has never been extremely violent. If otherwise, the interethnic
clashes in 1990 might have escalated into civil war if either side had been tempted to use heavy
arms in the fighting. Even if the conflict did not get balkanised as in former Yugoslavia, the
incident should not be forgotten. First of all, the outcome of the clashes could have been far
worse, and secondly, it shows how ingrained national sentiments and opposition to change were
hidden in all corners of Romanian society in 1990. In this way, the resurfacing of Romanian
nationalism became a tool to preserve certain Communist institutions and served as an
opposition to western democracy. Therefore, the legacy of what happened in 1990 and
Romanian nationalism deserves a more thorough examination.
APPENDIX I: Maps
County Map: CIA, 1990. Atlas of Eastern Europe, Washington D.C.
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/romania_pol96.jpg)
Map of historical Szekely Land

In Hupchich, Dennis P. & Harold E. Cox, 2001. The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of
THE BALKANS. New York: Palgrave, map 38.
APPENDIX II: Ethno-Demographic Data

Year: 2002
Region:
All (Romania)
County: All
Locality:
Population structure by ethnicity
Romanians:19.399.597
Hungarians:1.431.807
Roma (Gypsies):535.140
Ukrainians:61.098
Germans:59.764
Russian-Lipovans:35.791
Turks:32.098
Tatars:23.935
Serbs:22.561
Slovaks:17.226
Bulgarians:8.025
Croatians:6.807
Greeks:6.472
Jews:5.785
Czechs:3.941
Poles:3.559
Italians:3.288
Chinese:2.243
Armenians:1.780
Csangos:1.266
Other ethnics:16.850
Non-stated:1.941
89.47 %
6.60 %
2.46 %
0.28 %
0.27 %
0.16 %
0.14 %
0.11 %
0.10 %
0.07 %
0.03 %
0.03 %
0.02 %
0.02 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.07 %
0.0 %
Total:21.680.974
Population structure by mother tongue
Romanian:19.736.517
Hungarian:1.443.970
Romani (Gypsy):237.570
Ukrainian:57.407
German:44.888
Russian-Lipovan:29.246
Turkish:28.115
Tatar:21.272
Serbian:20.411
Slovak:16.027
Bulgarian:6.735
Croatian:6.355
Greek:4.170
Yiddish (Hebrew):951
91.03 %
6.66 %
1.09 %
0.26 %
0.20 %
0.13 %
0.12 %
0.09 %
0.09 %
0.07 %
0.03 %
0.02 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
Czech:3.381
Polish:2.690
Italian:2.531
Chinese:2.266
Armenian:721
Other Mother Tongue:13.621
Non-stated:2.130
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.06 %
0.0 %
Total:21.680.974
Region:
Centre
County: Mure
Locality:
Romanians:309.375
Hungarians:228.275
Ukrainians:72
Germans:2.045
Russian-Lipovans:69
Turks:45
Tatars:6
Serbs:23
Slovaks:8
Bulgarians:14
Croatians:3
Greeks:17
Jews:150
Czechs:4
Poles:18
Italians:67
Chinese:4
Armenians:12
Csangos:4
Other ethnics:127
Non-stated:88
53.26 %
39.30 %
6.95 %
0.01 %
0.35 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.02 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.02 %
0.01 %
Total:580.851
Romanian:324.546
Hungarian:231.381
Ukrainian:41
German:1.742
Russian-Lipovan:61
Turkish:46
Tatar:6
55.87 %
39.83 %
3.90 %
0.0 %
0.29 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
Serbian:7
Slovak:3
Bulgarian:11
Croatian:1
Greek:11
Yiddish (Hebrew):27
Czech:3
Polish:12
Italian:49
Chinese:4
Armenian:6
Other Mother Tongue:115
Non-stated:70
Total:580.851
County:
Mure
Region:
Centre
Locality:
TRGU MURE /
MAROSVSRHELY / NEUMARKT
AN DER MIERESCH

Romanians:75.533
Hungarians:70.108
Ukrainians:31
Germans:304
Russian-Lipovans:32
Turks:21
Tatars:6
Serbs:5
Slovaks:5
Bulgarians:7
Croatians:1
Greeks:10
Jews:115
Czechs:3
Poles:12
Italians:40
Chinese:4
Armenians:11
Csangos:2
Other ethnics:75
Non-stated:56
Total:150.041
50.34 %
46.72 %
2.43 %
0.02 %
0.20 %
0.02 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.07 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.02 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.04 %
0.03 %

Romanian:76.258
Hungarian:71.707
Ukrainian:12
German:246
Russian-Lipovan:34
Turkish:21
Tatar:6
Serbian:2
Slovak:3
Bulgarian:6
Greek:5
Yiddish (Hebrew):21
Czech:3
Polish:9
Italian:31
Chinese:4
Armenian:6
Other Mother Tongue:71
Non-stated:44
50.82 %
47.79 %
1.03 %
0.0 %
0.16 %
0.02 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.01 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.02 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.04 %
0.02 %
Total:150.041
Population structure by religion
Orthodox:70.136
Roman-Catholic:20.258
Reformed:45.104
Pentecostal:1.049
Greek-Catholic:3.909
Baptist:332
Seventh Day Adventist:1.409
Muslim:59
Unitarian:3.873
Christian by the Gospel:92
Old Rite Christian:6
Synod-Presbyterian Lutheran
369
Evangelic:
Evangelic:87
Augustan Evangelic:87
Mosaic:126
Other religion:2.196
No religion:561
Atheist:150
Non-stated:238
Total:150.041
CRDE 2002
46.74 %
13.50 %
30.06 %
0.69 %
2.60 %
0.22 %
0.93 %
0.03 %
2.58 %
0.06 %
0.0 %
0.24 %
0.05 %
0.05 %
0.08 %
1.46 %
0.37 %
0.09 %
0.15 %
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RESURGENT ROMANIAN NATIONALISM

In the Wake of the Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures March 1990

One argument might be that nationalism is the form of

Aliana pentru Unitatea Romniei / Alliance for Romanian Unity

Background: History, Communism and Ethnic Relations

Historical Outline of Transylvania

Communist Historiography and Indoctrination

Roots of Romanian Nationalism

The Hungarians of Romania

The Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures

Prior to the Events

Days After: Counting the Dead and Injured

Forces Behind the Violent Clashes

Vatra and the Rise of Nationalism in the Wake of Tirgu Mures

Political Polemics: the Response of the Interim Government

Romanias Secret Police and its Traditional Aim

After the Clashes: 15 Years of Thwarted Politics

Justice Served? Trials to Appease in Tirgu Mures

Democracy at Birth: Elections and Politics in Romania

Minority Rights Disputed: Hungarian Claims Continues

More Polemics from Tirgu Mures

Appendix 2: Ethno-demographic Data

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 1

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 2

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 3

1.0 Background: History, Communism and Ethnic Relations

1.1 Historical Outline of Transylvania

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 4

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 5

1.2 Historical Demography

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 6

1.3 Communist Historiography and Indoctrination

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 7

Mures see Appendix II.

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 8

socialization in a matter seen essential (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000: 11), such as cross-border

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 9

1.4 Roots of Romanian Nationalism

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 10

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 11

1.5 The Hungarians of Romania

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 12

2.0 The Interethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 13

2.1 Prior to the Events

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 14

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 15

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 16

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 17

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 18

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 19

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 20

2.4. Days After: Counting the Dead and Injured

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 21

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 22

3.0 Forces Behind the Violent Clashes

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 23

3.1 Elements of Organization

From the unpublished documentary on the interethnic clashes.

Resurgent Romanian Nationalism: 24