Brief Reply in refutation of the calumnies of a certain worthless person

in which he attempted to pollute the Doctrine of the Eternal Predestination of God

There has come to my notice the foolish writing of a worthless individual, who nevertheless presents
himself as a defender and vindicator of the glory of God, because he contests the principle that God
rules the world so that nothing happens but by his secret counsel. This wretched fellow does not see
that, by snatching at false pretexts for excusing the justice of God, he thereby subverts his power. This is
just as if he were to try to rend God himself in pieces. For the rest, to give colour to his sacrilege, with as
much malice as wickedness he remarks in his preface that God is not the cause of evil, nor wills sin. As if,
when we attribute supreme dominion to God, we call him the author of sin!
It is certain that Calvin is reproached in this writing; though indeed it is well known that he is too far
removed from the blasphemy with which this worthless person charges him to need any extended
defence. Everywhere in his writings, he declares, whenever sin is discussed, that the Name of God is not
to be mixed up with it, since nothing is congruous with the nature of God but perfect uprightness and
equity. How wicked therefore is the calumny which involves a man, so well-deserving of the Church, in
the charge that he makes God the author of sin!
This person teaches everywhere that nothing happens unless by the will of God. But at the same
time he affirms that the things done wickedly by men are overruled in such a way by Gods secret
counsel that he is not implicated in the vice of men. The sum of his doctrine is that God marvellously and
by ways unknown to us directs all things to whatever end he wills, so that his eternal will may be the
first cause of them all. But why God wills what seems to us not at all harmonious with his nature, he
confesses is incomprehensible. Hence he declares that this is not a matter to be too curiously or
audaciously investigated. Because the judgments of God are a great deep (Ps. 36) and his mysteries
surpass the limits of our understanding, it is proper rather to adore them reverently than to crossexamine them. Meanwhile he maintains the principle that, although the reason of his counsel lies hid,
yet praise is always to be accorded to God for his justice, because his will is the supreme rule of equity.
Whoever desires to bring against the man who teaches thus a charge so terrible as that of making
God the author of sin, must first of all prove that, because impious men by crucifying Christ did what the
counsel and hand of God decreed, God is an accomplice in crime and participant in guilt. But the words
impious men did what the counsel and hand of God decreed are not Calvins, but Peters (Acts 2:23)
and belong to the whole primitive Church.
Let these ridiculous men therefore desist from defiling the pure and lucid doctrine of the Holy Spirit
with their spots and stains, and from so deluding the simple that, on hearing the word sin, and not
understanding the nature of the question, they flee away from so hateful a precipice. After David

complained that he was oppressed unjustly by the violence of his enemies, he nevertheless added that
God did this (2 Sam. 16:10). Job, despoiled by robbers and vexed by the devil, declares that even these
things proceed from God. If anyone should conclude that thus God is the author of sin, he must contend
with the holy prophets of God, and even with the Holy Spirit. But while they maintained this holy
distinction, that all things are so ordained by God that whatever he wills and decrees is right and just,
they did not hesitate to place him upon the highest level, who curbs Satan and all the wicked by a
hidden rein.
This brief reply might have sufficiently refuted the baseness of this man, who so perversely corrupts
and deforms the views of Calvin. But to uncover it more fully, it will be worthwhile to discuss further his
fulminations. Because he proposes to deprive God of his supreme rule and impudently censures the
opinion that the counsel of God is the first cause of all things, I shall touch lightly upon the reasons he
brings forward.
He affirms Plato to have been in the right in not allowing God to be called the author of evil. But
what Plato thought or said, this worthless fellow has never learned. For this profane scribbler so shrinks
from the term evil, that he clearly denies those adversities by which we are injured to proceed from
God. This is nothing else than to deprive God of the office of judge. But nothing was further from the
mind of Calvin, or before him of Luther, and Bucer, and even of Augustine long ago, and the other pious
teachers of the Church, while proclaiming the will of God to be the supreme cause of all things that
happen in the world, than to involve God in any guilt. Calvin everywhere sharply repudiates and affirms
to be detestable the idea of the absolute power of God which is propounded in sophistic schools,
because the power of God cannot be rightly separated from his wisdom and justice. This is sufficient
refutation of the impudence of this unclean dog, when he makes decent and faithful teachers of the
Church utter words, blasphemous, horrible and hitherto unspoken, and which after all are the product,
as futile as they are malignant, of his own workshop. Besides he proves God not to be the cause of evil,
first by the law of nature, then on the authority of the divine Plato (as he styles him) according to whom
God is termed the cause of all good. The solution is simple: the image of the rectitude which all confess
to be in God is stamped in the natural knowledge of good and evil. Thus as each shapes his life according
to the law of nature, he so far represents the nature of God. For righteousness pleases God, just as
iniquity is an abomination to him. But how by his secret judgment he overrules all the things that men
do wrongly is not for us to define, except that we must affirm that, whatever he does, he never deviates
from his own justice.
I reply similarly to the second argument. This noble champion of God demands why, if God is the
author of sin, he prohibits it being done, and why he does not give men free rein? Now first, what is all
this yelping about God being the author of sin? This man manufactures monsters for himself and then
fights with them. What if I should retort (though in a different manner), what can truly be said for the
vindication of Gods omnipotence: If God does not will to be done what is done, why does he not
prevent it? And why give men rein to do it? But out of this kind of contradiction, it is convenient to cite
what Augustine says: God in a marvellous and secret way wills justly to be done what is done unjustly, so
that in the law his will is truly expressed, that he has iniquity in abhorrence and takes pleasure in
rectitude. From this source flow the curses which are attached to the law. For unless wickedness

displeased God, as contrary to his nature, he would neither denounce it nor exact punishment for it.
Therefore all this worthless fellow has accumulated to clear God from this ignominy is quite vain, and
only suggests that he himself is anxiously labouring in a dubious cause to show that God is good.
After he has babbled out his calumnies for long enough, he draws nearer, and affirms that some
men in these perilous times, though they do not dare to teach openly that God is the cause of evil,
suggest the same thing by other forms of speech. They say that Adam sinned by the will of God, and that
the impious not merely by Gods permission but by his impulse perpetrate all their wickedness. Here this
fine rhetorician exclaims with dismay: O wretched man! how can it be that God willed this, when he had
created Adam in his own image? As if it were for me to render a precise reason for the hidden
judgments of God, so that mortal men might understand to a nicety that heavenly wisdom, whose
height they are commanded to adore. No: let Moses rather intervene upon this foolish garrulity, with an
exact reply, when he says: The secret things belong unto the Lord our God: but those things which are
revealed belong unto us (Deut. 29:29). We see how Moses, commanding the people to be content with
the doctrine of the law, declares at the same time that Gods counsels remain his own, and are to be
adored and not investigated.
Now, because he sees his pen to have become rather bent or blunted, he sharpens it afresh against
those who say that crimes are perpetrated not only by the will of God, but by his impulse. And here
indeed he exults as if in a limitless field, omitting no kind of abuse against those pious and venerable
teachers, whose virtues, I would to God, he might imitate in even a hundredth part. First, he classes
them with the libertines. If there were any distinction between him and them, he would still lose the
best of causes through sheer ignorance. Now seeing there exists a book by Calvin against the libertines,
affirming both powerfully and rightly the justice of God, what impudence is this that accords so
unworthy a reward to a work so useful and holy? He contends that, if he impel men to sin, God is worse
than the devil. Suppose this to be conceded, what concern of the servants of Christ is all this furious
war? But let us see on what grounds it rests. Let Satan do and attempt what he will, he cannot compel
mans will; but God who holds the human heart in his hand can compel the will; therefore if he will to
force it, he will do it, whether we will or not. Here then it is apparent how audacious is this mans folly.
All men of sound mind are agreed that there is none but voluntary sin. No one will be found to say
men sin involuntarily. But from the Word of God Calvin, following Augustine and other pious writers,
teaches that when men sin voluntarily, God nevertheless gives to Satan the power of delusion, so that
he drives the reprobate hither and thither, as Paul says (2 Thess. 2:11). So also Satan goes forth by the
command of God, to be a lying spirit in the mouth of all the prophets for the deception of Ahab (1 Kings
22:22). For the rest, I do not propose to gather here the evidence of Scripture, but only to show briefly
how preposterously this barker inveighs against the innocent. How, he says, is a man known to be evil,
except by doing evil? God therefore, if he do evil, is evil. As if we indeed, attributing to the judgments of
God whatever licence he allows Satan, should be saying that he is the author of sin, and should not be
rather clearly testifying that he is as remote as can be from contact with all guilt; because it is only justly
and rightly that he blinds and hardens. But then, he says, the will of God and of the devil will be the
same. But there is, as I have shown before, a great difference, because, though they will the same thing,
they will it in different ways. For who will deny that Satan eagerly longs for the destruction of the

impious, which, however, proceeds from God? But the reason of the Judge is different from that of the
Enemy, who breathes out sheer cruelty. God willed that Jerusalem be destroyed; Satan also willed it.
However, I rather loose this knot in the words of Augustine than in my own. In Enchiridion ad
Laurentium ch. 101, he clearly discusses how a man wills with evil will what God wills with good will, for
example a bad son willing the death of his father, and God willing the same thing; and finally how
through the impious desires of men God often accomplishes what he decreed, rather than through the
good wills of his servants. If then a diversity of end does not prevent the wills being the same, would it
not have been better that this champion of God had been drowned in the profoundest depths, rather
than spit upon his majesty with his rank jeers?
Yet he dares to charge us with denying in our hearts that justice which we confess with our mouths.
He dares, with unbridled insolence, to deny to those against whom he fights any hearty desire for
integrity of life, while indulging himself as though there were no judge on the throne! By way of jest I
ask: Is the justice of God more likely to be found in the heart of someone in whom desire for piety and
sanctity of life flourishes, or of someone who gives free rein to licentiousness? For this good critic hates
nothing worse in Calvin and his associates than the unswerving rigour of their discipline. But, however
stupid and unlettered he may be, he yet summons facetious scurrilities to his aid, asking who willed
Adam to sin, God or Satan; as if pious and religious men permitted themselves to chatter about such
great mysteries facetiously, or to snap at them wantonly: while they confess that Adam fell not without
the secret providence of God, they never doubt that the intention of his counsel was right and just. But
because the reason is hidden, they quietly await its revelation, on the day when face to face they will
behold God, whom now they see obscurely and enigmatically.
But after taking his fill of raving against the best of men, he demands that their tongues be torn out
and thrown on to the fire. But what if the hostility he shows to Calvin be really all for the sake of
Servetus? so that, lamenting the death of his associate, he cannot otherwise avenge it but by surpassing
even hangmen in savagery. Concerning the double will of God, which Calvin, after Augustine and other
pious teachers, attributes to God, this good critic says that he marvels at such childish talk. Who would
not think him a very learned man that can make much ado about the childish talk of others? But such
unnatural affectation shows clearly that he babbles with no other desire than achieving vainglory.
Afterwards he adds that this distinction was thought out by us, because otherwise we should have lain
open to the charge of blaspheming God. In fact by this one word, the frenzied madness of this fellow is
exposed; for he himself forgets that he has so often reproached innocent men with plain blasphemies.
Was it a doubtful blasphemy that he made God to be the author of sin, to will sin, to impel to sin, as
though he renounced his own nature and fed upon and rejoiced in crimes? After impudently bringing up
these things, he now, as if forgetting himself altogether, declares that we cover up our blasphemies with
some kind of colour lest they should be apparent.
It is worth while to see what he says by way of refutation. He charges me with attributing
inconstancy to God, because he speaks otherwise than he thinks, against the testimony of Scripture: I
am the Lord, I change not (Mal. 3:6); with him is no variableness (James 1:17). But this man does not
perceive that it is not Calvin and his associates only who are involved in this calumny, but Moses himself.
For he declared the law to be given to the Jews and their children, but leaves his hidden counsels to

God. There is no difficulty in refuting this calumny, because God, commanding what is right, testifies
thereby what pleases him; nor indeed does he conceal any other counsel, by which in himself he might
love and excuse that wickedness which in men he condemns. But he exercises his judgments
marvellously, so as by his inestimable wisdom and equity to direct and ordain to a good end things that
are evil. Nor will Calvin concede that God wills what is evil in itself, that is in so far as it is evil; but the
judgments of God shine forth in the crimes of men, as when he punished Davids adultery by the
incestuous licentiousness of Absalom. God therefore, commanding Adam not to eat of the tree of good
and evil, exacts and tests obedience. Meanwhile he not only knew what was about to happen, but
decreed it. If this seem harsh to our fastidious censor, let him attribute it to his own peevishness and
distaste, rather than to the savour of the doctrine. For when he wants to bludgeon the hearts of all with
the weighty iron hammer of his words, declaring that the will of God is one only, and this he will make
plain by the prophets and Christ himself, Augustine bravely repels the attack with his authority. These,
he says, are the mighty works of the Lord, perfected to his desires, and so wisely perfected that, when
the angelic and human creation had sinned, that is had done not what God willed but what it itself
willed, even through the same creaturely will by which was done what the Creator did not wish, he
fulfilled what he willed, as the supreme good using even evil deeds well, for the damnation of those
whom he justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom he graciously
predestined to grace. As regards themselves, they did what God did not will; as regards Gods
omnipotence, they were by no means able to prevail against it. In this itself they did what was against
the will of God; yet through them Gods will was done. Therefore the mighty works of the Lord are
carried out according to all his desires, so that in a marvellous and ineffable way even what is done
against his will is not done beyond his will; because it would not be done did he not allow it. Nor does he
allow it unwillingly but willingly. Nor as good would he allow evil to be done, unless as omnipotent he
were able to make good out of the evil. So then, let him hurl these horrible heresies and blasphemies,
which he desires to bring against the best doctors of our day, against the head of Augustine. It is indeed
true that the will of God is not to be sought elsewhere than in Scripture. But while this swine of a man is
rooting up everything with his snout, he does not consider that, while reverence and sobriety are
cultivated by the faithful, the secret judgments of God are not reduced to nothing. But it is one thing to
contemplate with the modesty of faith that great deep; another to reject it with contumacy because it
overwhelms the human senses.
Now in order to do away with all the evidence of Scripture, by which we are instructed to proclaim
the admirable providence of God, this fellow holds it sufficient to declare that heretics always have
made use of the pretext of piety and in the name of God initiated all kinds of evil. As if indeed it were
enough to hurl this abuse; as if for the same reason it would not be permissible to subvert all heavenly
doctrine, and obliterate the very name of God.
Afterwards he adds that he will reply in two ways to everything we can object against him. First, he
will show that all these Scripture passages, which seem to credit God with the origin of evil, refer not to
his effectual will, but to his permissive will, his leaving a thing to be done. But away with this calumny on
the name of good and evil: for we know nothing more alien to Gods nature than sin. Men act from their
own wickedness, so that the whole fault rests on them. For the rest, to turn those Scripture passages, in

which the effect of action is expressly described, into permission, is too frivolous a means of escape. The
fathers indeed did so understand the matter. For when this harshness of speech offended certain
people on first hearing, they became too anxious for its mitigation, wished to extricate themselves in
some way, and were too little attentive to the truth of the matter. But even here this worthless fellow,
who cites the fathers as though they were familiar acquaintances, betrays his ignorance. For seizing
what escaped from Augustine when young and less well versed in Scripture, he omits the clearest
passages, where the judgments of God are recognized in the real and, as I may say, actual blinding of
certain men. The same ignorance is exemplified when he says, on the authority of Jerome, that the
expression: God does evil, is to be understood figuratively. But if evil is nothing else than adversity, as
has been adequately stated above, why look for a figure in a matter so plain?
Now we must consider briefly the conception of permission. Joseph (Gen. 37:27) is scandalously sold
by his brothers; yet he declares that it is God by whom he is sent, not his brothers, and on this reasoning
he declares God to have done this, in order that the family of his father might be nourished. But is this
permission? Job says that God took from him what the robbers and thieves stole. Does this took away
denote no act? God is said to have directed the heart of the peoples, so that they might hold his own
people in detestation. Do we declare him passive, where Scripture plainly pronounces him to operate
actively? When now he is said to deliver men over to a reprobate mind or to their vile affections, it
is certain that his awful judgments are being commended, by which he punishes the reprobate. If in a
merely inactive way he permitted this to happen, would he then fulfil the role of judge? God calls
Nebuchadnezzar the axe in his hand (Isa. 10:5), the Assyrians the staff of his indignation, and all
wicked men his rod. He thus clearly asserts that he through them accomplishes what he decreed.
What place can here be found for mere permission? Jeremiah (48:10), addressing the Medes, exclaims:
Cursed be he that doeth the work of the Lord deceitfully. Look: whatever savagery these violent men
commit, the prophet in another respect calls it the work of God, because by their hand he exacts
punishment from the Babylonians. David declares that, whatever evils he suffered, it was God that did
it: and therefore he was dumb (2 Sam. 16:10). By what figures will do be changed into permit?
Finally, Paul affirms that it is God that sends upon the wicked strong delusions, so that they believe a
lie (2 Thess. 2:11). Where efficacy of work appears, by what device can counsel and will be removed?
This good critic prescribes as a canon, that all passages which seem to attribute evil to God be
interpreted by that which says: Thou art a God that hatest iniquity. But what has this to do with the
present case, when no spot of iniquity is imprinted on God, but quite the reverse, that rather he rules all
the events of the world with supreme rectitude? If anyone divide his power from his justice, the
objection would be opportune that nothing is more contrary to the power of God than tyranny. But
now, because he is said to have no pleasure in wickedness, is he on this pretext to be torn from his
throne, lest he be judge of the world? For, while he frequently exercises his judgments by the hands of
the impious, whoever confines him within the bounds of permission, deposes him from his office as
judge. The sons of Eli wickedly and unworthily abused their priesthood, and they perished by the hand
of the Philistines. This was done by Gods permission, our interpreter would say, using his own canon.
But what does Scripture say? That God willed to slay them. See then where their fury drives them, who

are without religion, shame and modesty, to restrain them from subjecting God and men to their
fictions.
But because it would be absurd that anything be done against Gods will, since he is free to prohibit
anything he does not will, it may be shown in a few words how ingenious this workman is in ridding
himself of this objection. First, he says it is ridiculous to ask this. Why did Augustine not make contact
with such a monitor to prevent him making himself ridiculous by asking it? For by this argument, he
proves more than once that whatever happens on earth is efficaciously ruled by the hidden providence
of God; nor does he hesitate to conclude that all things are done by Gods will, because the Psalmist
testifies: But our God is in the heavens: he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased (Ps. 115:3).
But why is the question ridiculous? The reply is: Because it is not right to exact from God a reason
for his actions. But why in this case does he not himself observe this modesty? For whence come these
wild clamours and tumults, unless because proud and unlearned men fastidiously reject the judgments
of God, because they cannot comprehend their immensity? Let this liberty remain with God, that by his
will he ordains all things, and all strife will be composed. But it is right that frenzied men should contest
thus with one another, so that by their vehemence they destroy each other.
We return again to our opponents point that many things are done against Gods will. We willingly
concede this, provided that this matter of will be not carried too far. God often willed to assemble the
Jews together; but they would not; even though rising early that he might himself speak, he called them
constantly to himself through his prophets. But since conversion is his peculiar gift, he converts in fact
those whom he effectually wills to be converted. In what sense Paul teaches that God wishes all to be
saved, readers may learn from the context itself. The mode of salvation is that they come to a
knowledge of the truth; but he does not please that by his external Word all should come; and he makes
only a few partakers of his hidden illumination. Moreover, to extricate himself the better, he puts
forward free will as shield, denying that it is astonishing that God does not hinder men acting by free
impulse as seems good. But why does he inflict upon us this term fabricated out of nothing? Scripture
everywhere declares that man is captive, servant and slave of the devil, is carried away by all his
inclinations into vice, and is unable to understand what the things of God are, let alone perform them.
In this refutation of dog-like depravity, since the omnipotence of God is affirmed honestly and
clearly against all calumnies, I am confident that I have accomplished a work not less useful and
gratifying to the Church of God than it is acceptable to God.