Csc-Master-Ver5 1-10 7 2014

The Critical Security Controls
for
Effective Cyber Defense
Version 5.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................3
CSC 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices ..............................................................................9
CSC 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software ........................................................................ 15
CSC 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops,
Workstations, and Servers .......................................................................................................................................... 20
CSC 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation .................................................................. 28
CSC 5: Malware Defenses ............................................................................................................................................ 34
CSC 6: Application Software Security ..................................................................................................................... 39
CSC 7: Wireless Access Control ................................................................................................................................. 44
CSC 8: Data Recovery Capability .............................................................................................................................. 49
CSC 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps ................................................ 52
CSC 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches....... 55
CSC 11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services ............................................. 59
CSC 12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges ....................................................................................... 63
CSC 13: Boundary Defense ......................................................................................................................................... 69
CSC 14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs ..................................................................... 76
CSC 15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know ................................................................................... 81
CSC 16: Account Monitoring and Control .............................................................................................................. 85
CSC 17: Data Protection ............................................................................................................................................... 90
CSC 18: Incident Response and Management....................................................................................................... 96
CSC 19: Secure Network Engineering ..................................................................................................................... 99
CSC 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises ...................................................................................... 102
Appendix A: Attack Types ........................................................................................................................................ 106
Introduction
We are at a fascinating point in the evolution of what we now call cyber defense.
Massive data losses, theft of intellectual property, credit card breaches, identity theft,
threats to our privacy, denial of service these have become a way of life for all of us in
cyberspace.
Ironically, as defenders we have access to an extraordinary array of security tools and
technology, security standards, training and classes, certifications, vulnerability
databases, guidance, best practices, catalogs of security controls, and countless security
checklists, benchmarks, and recommendations. To help us understand the threat, weve
seen the emergence of threat information feeds, reports, tools, alert services, standards,
and threat sharing schemes. And to tie it all together, we are surrounded by security
requirements, risk management frameworks, compliance regimes, regulatory
mandates, and so forth. There is no shortage of information available to security
practitioners on how they should secure their infrastructure.
But all of this technology, information, and oversight has become a veritable Fog of
More: competing options, priorities, opinions, and claims that can paralyze or distract
an enterprise from vital action. The threats have evolved, the actors have become
smarter, and our users have become more mobile. Our data is now distributed across
multiple locations, many of which are not within our organizations infrastructure
anymore. With more reliance on clouds, our data and even our applications are
becoming more distributed. The organizational network is now just one of the locations
for users to access applications and data. And since in our complex, interconnected
world, no enterprise can think of its security as a standalone problem, this situation
makes collective action nearly impossible.
So how can we as a community the community at large, as well as within industries,
sectors, partnerships, and coalitions - band together to establish priority of action,
support each other, and keep our knowledge and technology current in the face of a
rapidly evolving problem and an apparently infinite number of possible solutions?
What are the most critical areas we need to address, how should an enterprise take the
first step to maturing their risk management program? Rather than chase every new
exceptional threat and neglect the fundamentals, how can we get on track with a
roadmap of fundamentals, and guidance to measure and improve? Which defensive
steps have the greatest value?
These are the kinds of issues that led to and now drive the Critical Security Controls.
They started as a grass-roots activity to cut through the Fog of More and focus on the
most fundamental and valuable actions that every enterprise should take. And value
here is determined by knowledge and data the ability to prevent, alert, and respond to
the attacks that are plaguing enterprises today.
The Critical Security Controls have matured into an international community activity to
create, adopt, and support the Critical Security Controls. As a community, these
individuals and institutions:
share insight into attacks and attackers, identify root causes, and translate that
into classes of defensive action;
document stories of adoption and the use of tools to solve problems;
track the evolution of threats, the capabilities of adversaries, and current vectors
of intrusions;
map the Controls to regulatory and compliance frameworks and bring collective
priority and focus to them;
share tools, working aids, and translations; and
identify common problems (like initial assessment, building implementation
roadmaps) and solve them as a community instead of alone.
The activities ensure that the Critical Security Controls are not just another list of good
things to do, but a prioritized, highly focused set of actions that have a community-wide
support network to make them implementable, usable, scalable, and compliant with all
industry or government security requirements.
Why the Critical Security Controls Work: Methodology and Contributors
The Critical Security Controls reflect the combined knowledge of actual attacks and
effective defenses of experts that include: every part of the ecosystem (companies,
governments, individuals); with every role (threat responders and analysts,
technologists, vulnerability-finders, tool makers, solution providers, defenders, users,
policy-makers, auditors, etc.); and within many sectors (government, power, defense,
finance, transportation, academia, consulting, security, IT) who have banded together to
create, adopt, and support the Controls. Top experts from all these organizations pool
their extensive first-hand knowledge from defending against actual cyber-attacks and
develop a consensus list of the best defensive techniques to prevent or track them. This
ensures that the Critical Security Controls are the most effective and specific set of
technical measures available to detect, prevent,
The Council on CyberSecurity was
respond, and mitigate damage from the most common
established in 2013 as an
to the most advanced of those attacks.
independent, expert, not-for-profit
The Controls are not limited to blocking the initial
compromise of systems, but also address detecting
already-compromised machines and preventing or
disrupting attackers follow-on actions. The defenses
identified through these Controls deal with reducing the
initial attack surface by hardening device
configurations, identifying compromised machines to
address long-term threats inside an organizations
network, disrupting attackers command-and-control of
4
organization with a global scope

committed to the security of an
open Internet. The Council is
committed to the ongoing
development, support, and
adoption of the Critical Controls; to
elevating the competencies of the
cybersecurity workforce; and to the
development of policies that lead to
measurable improvements in our
ability to operate safely, securely
and reliably in cyberspace. For
additional information, go to
(www.counciloncybersecurity.org)
implanted malicious code, and establishing an adaptive, continuous defense and

response capability that can be maintained and improved.
The five critical tenets of an effective cyber defense system as reflected in the Critical
Security Controls are:
1. Offense informs defense: Use knowledge of actual attacks that have compromised
systems to provide the foundation to continually learn from these events to build
effective, practical defenses. Include only those controls that can be shown to
stop known real-world attacks.
2. Prioritization: Invest first in Controls that will provide the greatest risk
reduction and protection against the most dangerous threat actors, and that can
be feasibly implemented in your computing environment.
3. Metrics: Establish common metrics to provide a shared language for executives,
IT specialists, auditors, and security officials to measure the effectiveness of
security measures within an organization so that required adjustments can be
identified and implemented quickly.
4. Continuous diagnostics and mitigation: Carry out continuous measurement to
test and validate the effectiveness of current security measures, and to help
drive the priority of next steps.
5. Automation: Automate defenses so that organizations can achieve reliable,
scalable, and continuous measurements of their adherence to the Controls and
related metrics.
The Critical Security Controls and Other Risk Management Approaches
The Critical Security Controls allow you to use the power of an incredible community to
prioritize and focus your resources on the most valuable defensive actions but they
are not a replacement for comprehensive mandatory compliance or regulatory
schemes. The Critical Security Controls instead prioritize and focus on a smaller
number of actionable controls with high-payoff, aiming for a must do first philosophy.
In fact, the actions specified by the Critical Security Controls are demonstrably a subset
of any of the comprehensive security catalogs or Control lists.
Although lacking the formality of traditional Risk Management Frameworks, it seems
reasonable to refer to the Critical Security Controls process as a foundational risk
assessment one that can be used by an individual enterprise as a starting point for
immediate, high-value action, is demonstrably consistent with formal risk management
frameworks, and provides a basis for common action across diverse communities (e.g.,
that might be subject to different regulatory or compliance requirements).
The Critical Security Controls also proactively align with and leverage ongoing work in
security standards and best practices. Examples include: the Security Content
Automation Program (SCAP) and Special Publication 800-53 (Recommended Security
Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations) sponsored by the National
5
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the Australian Signals Directorates Top
35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions; and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) 27002:2013 Information technology Security techniques Code of practice
for information security controls. References and mappings to these can be found at
www.counciloncybersecurity.org
How to get started
The Critical Security Controls are a relatively small number of prioritized, well-vetted,
and supported set of security actions that organizations can take to assess and improve
their current security state. It also changes the discussion from what should my
enterprise do to what should we ALL be doing to improve security across a broad
scale.
But it is not a one-size-fits-all solution, in either content or priority. You must still
understand what is critical to your business, data, systems, networks, and
infrastructures, and you must consider the adversary actions that could impact your
ability to be successful in the business or operations. And even a relatively small
number of Controls cannot be executed all at once, so you will need to develop a plan
for assessment, implementation, and process management.
Some of the Critical Security Controls, in particular CSC 1 through CSC 5, are
foundational to success, and should be considered as the first things to be done. This is
the approach taken by, for example, the DHS Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation
(CDM) Program, one of the partners in the Critical Security Controls.
For those wanting a highly focused and direct starting point, we have emphasized the
First Five Quick Wins: sub-controls that have the most immediate impact on
preventing attacks. These actions are specially noted in the Controls listings, and
consist of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
application whitelisting (found in CSC 2);

use of standard, secure system configurations (found in CSC 3);
patch application software within 48 hours (found in CSC 4);
patch system software within 48 hours (found in CSC 4); and
reduced number of users with administrative privileges (found in CSC 3 and CSC
12).
A similar approach is recommended by our partners in the Australian Signals

Directorate (ASD) with their Top Four Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Intrusions1 a
well-regarded and demonstrably effective set of cyber-defense actions that map very
closely into the Critical Security Controls and the First Five Quick Wins.
Another approach is to learn from other enterprises that are part of the Critical Security
Controls community. Use Cases of adoption, samples of Initial Assessment
methodologies, mappings to formal Risk Management Frameworks, pointers to
assessment tools, and many other working aids are available from the Council on
CyberSecurity (www.counciloncybersecurity.com).
Structure of the Critical Security Controls Document
The presentation of each Critical Security Control in this document includes:
A description of the importance of the Control in blocking or identifying

presence of attacks and an explanation of how attackers actively exploit the
absence of this control.
Listing of the specific actions that organizations are taking to implement,
automate, and measure effectiveness of this control. The sub-controls are
grouped into four categories:
o Quick wins that provide significant risk reduction without major financial,
procedural, architectural, or technical changes to an environment, or that
provide such substantial and immediate risk reduction against very
common attacks that most security-aware organizations prioritize these
key controls.
o Visibility and attribution measures to improve the process, architecture,
and technical capabilities of organizations to monitor their networks and
computer systems to detect attack attempts, locate points of entry,
identify already-compromised machines, interrupt infiltrated attackers
activities, and gain information about the sources of an attack.
o Improved information security configuration and hygiene to reduce the
number and magnitude of security vulnerabilities and improve the
operations of networked computer systems, with a focus on protecting
against poor security practices by system administrators and end-users
that could give an attacker an advantage.
o Advanced sub-controls that use new technologies or procedures that
provide maximum security but are harder to deploy or more expensive or
require more highly skilled staff than commoditized security solutions.
Procedures and tools that enable implementation and automation.
Metrics and tests to assess implementation status and effectiveness.
http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/top-4-strategies-explained.htm
Sample entity relationship diagrams that show components of implementation.
CSC 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all hardware devices on the
network so that only authorized devices are given access, and unauthorized and
unmanaged devices are found and prevented from gaining access.
Why Is This Control Critical?
Attackers, who can be located anywhere in the world, are continuously scanning the
address space of target organizations, waiting for new and unprotected systems to be
attached to the network. Attackers also look for devices (especially laptops) which
come and go off of the enterprises network, and so get out of synch with patches or
security updates. Attacks can take advantage of new hardware that is installed on the
network one evening but not configured and patched with appropriate security updates
until the following day. Even devices that are not visible from the Internet can be used
by attackers who have already gained internal access and are hunting for internal jump
points or victims. Additional systems that connect to the enterprises network (e.g.,
demonstration systems, temporary test systems, guest networks) should also be
managed carefully and/or isolated in order to prevent adversarial access from affecting
the security of enterprise operations.
As new technology continues to come out, BYOD (bring your own device) where
employees bring personal devices into work and connect them to the network is
becoming very common. These devices could already be compromised and be used to
infect internal resources.
Managed control of all devices also plays a critical role in planning and executing
system backup and recovery.
How to Implement This Control
ID #
CSC 1-1
CSC 1-2
Description
Category
Deploy an automated asset inventory discovery tool and use it Quick win
to build a preliminary asset inventory of systems connected to
an organizations public and private network(s). Both active
tools that scan through network address ranges and passive
tools that identify hosts based on analyzing their traffic
should be employed.
Deploy dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server
Quick win
logging, and utilize a system to improve the asset inventory
and help detect unknown systems through this DHCP
information.
CSC 1-3
CSC 1-4
CSC 1-5
CSC 1-6
CSC 1-7
Ensure that all equipment acquisitions automatically update

the inventory system as new, approved devices are connected
to the network.
Maintain an asset inventory of all systems connected to the
network and the network devices themselves, recording at
least the network addresses, machine name(s), purpose of
each system, an asset owner responsible for each device, and
the department associated with each device. The inventory
should include every system that has an Internet protocol (IP)
address on the network, including but not limited to desktops,
laptops, servers, network equipment (routers, switches,
firewalls, etc.), printers, storage area networks, Voice Over-IP
telephones, multi-homed addresses, virtual addresses, etc.
The asset inventory created must also include data on
whether the device is a portable and/or personal device.
Devices such as mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and other
portable electronic devices that store or process data must be
identified, regardless of whether they are attached to the
organizations network.
Deploy network level authentication via 802.1x to limit and
control which devices can be connected to the network. The
802.1x must be tied into the inventory data to determine
authorized versus unauthorized systems.
Deploy network access control (NAC) to monitor authorized
systems so if attacks occur, the impact can be remediated by
moving the untrusted system to a virtual local area network
that has minimal access.
Utilize client certificates to validate and authenticate systems
prior to connecting to the private network.
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
CSC 1 Procedures and Tools

This Control requires both technical and procedural actions, united in a process that
accounts for and manages the inventory of hardware and all associated information
throughout its life-cycle. It links to the business by establishing information/asset
owners who are responsible for each component of a business process that includes
information, software, and hardware. Organizations can use large-scale, comprehensive
enterprise products to maintain IT asset inventories. Others use more modest tools to
gather the data by sweeping the network, and manage the results separately in a
database.
Maintaining a current and accurate view of IT assets is an ongoing and dynamic
process. Organizations can actively scan on a regular basis, sending a variety of
different packet types to identify devices connected to the network. Before such
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scanning can take place, organizations should verify that they have adequate bandwidth
for such periodic scans by consulting load history and capacities for their networks. In
conducting inventory scans, scanning tools could send traditional ping packets (ICMP
Echo Request) looking for ping responses to identify a system at a given IP address.
Because some systems block inbound ping packets, in addition to traditional pings,
scanners can also identify devices on the network using transmission control protocol
(TCP) synchronize (SYN) or acknowledge (ACK) packets. Once they have identified IP
addresses of devices on the network, some scanners provide robust fingerprinting
features to determine the operating system type of the discovered machine.
In addition to active scanning tools that sweep the network, other asset identification
tools passively listen on network interfaces looking for devices to announce their
presence by sending traffic. Such passive tools can be connected to switch span ports at
critical places in the network to view all data flowing through such switches,
maximizing the chance of identifying systems communicating through those switches.
Many organizations also pull information from network assets such as switches and
routers regarding the machines connected to the network. Using securely authenticated
and encrypted network management protocols, tools can retrieve MAC addresses and
other information from network devices that can be reconciled with the organizations
asset inventory of servers, workstations, laptops, and other devices. Once MAC
addresses are confirmed, switches should implement 802.1x and NAC to only allow
authorized systems that are properly configured to connect to the network.
Wireless devices (and wired laptops) may periodically join a network and then
disappear, making the inventory of currently available systems churn significantly.
Likewise, virtual machines can be difficult to track in asset inventories when they are
shut down or paused. Additionally, remote machines accessing the network using
virtual private network (VPN) technology may appear on the network for a time, and
then be disconnected from it. Whether physical or virtual, each machine using an IP
address should be included in an organizations asset inventory.
CSC 1 Effectiveness Metrics
In order to test the effectiveness of the automated implementation of this control,
organizations should measure the following:
1. How long does it take to detect new devices added to the organizations network
(time in minutes)?
2. How long does it take the scanners to alert the organizations administrators
that an unauthorized device is on the network (time in minutes)?
3. How long does it take to isolate/remove unauthorized devices from the
organizations network (time in minutes)?
4. Are the scanners able to identify the location, department, and other critical
details about the unauthorized system that is detected (yes or no)?
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CSC 1 Automation Metrics

In order to automate the collection of relevant data from these systems, organizations
should gather the following information with automated technical sensors:
1. How many unauthorized devices are presently on the organizations network
(by business unit)?
2. How long, on average, does it take to remove unauthorized devices from the
organizations network (by business unit)?
3. What is the percentage of systems on the organizations network that are not
utilizing Network Access Control (NAC) to authenticate to the organizations
network (by business unit)?
4. What is the percentage of systems on the organizations network that are not
utilizing Network Access Control (NAC) with client certificates to authenticate to
the organizations network (by business unit)?
CSC 1 Effectiveness Test
To evaluate the implementation of Control 1 on a periodic basis, the evaluation team
will connect hardened test systems to at least 10 locations on the network, including a
selection of subnets associated with demilitarized zones (DMZs), workstations, and
servers. Two of the systems must be included in the asset inventory database, while the
other systems are not. The evaluation team must then verify that the systems generate
an alert or e-mail notice regarding the newly connected systems within 24 hours of the
test machines being connected to the network. The evaluation team must verify that the
system provides details of the location of all the test machines connected to the
network. For those test machines included in the asset inventory, the team must also
verify that the system provides information about the asset owner.
CSC 1 System Entity Relationship Diagram
Organizations will find that by diagramming the entities necessary to fully meet the
goals defined in this control, it will be easier to identify how to implement them, test the
controls, and identify where potential failures in the system might occur.
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A control system is a device or set of devices used to manage, command, direct, or

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining
hardware devices on the organizations network. These systems should be able to
identify if new systems are introduced into the environment that have not been
authorized by enterprise personnel. The following list of the steps in the above diagram
shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control.
The list also delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify potential
failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Active device scanner scans network systems
Step 2: Passive device scanner captures system information
Step 3: Active scanner reports to inventory database
Step 4: Passive scanner reports to inventory database
Step 5: Inventory database stored offline
Step 6: Inventory database initiates alert system
Step 7: Alert system notifies security defenders
Step 8: Security defenders monitor and secure inventory database
Step 9: Security defenders update secure inventory database
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Step 10: Network access control continuously monitors network

Step 11: Network access control checks and provides updates to the asset inventory
database.
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CSC 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software on the network so
that only authorized software is installed and can execute, and that
unauthorized and unmanaged software is found and prevented from installation
or execution.
Attackers continuously scan target organizations looking for vulnerable versions of
software that can be remotely exploited. Some attackers also distribute hostile web
pages, document files, media files, and other content via their own web pages or
otherwise trustworthy third-party sites. When unsuspecting victims access this content
with a vulnerable browser or other client-side program, attackers compromise their
machines, often installing backdoor programs and bots that give the attacker long-term
control of the system. Some sophisticated attackers may use zero-day exploits, which
take advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities for which no patch has yet been
released by the software vendor. Without proper knowledge or control of the software
deployed in an organization, defenders cannot properly secure their assets.
Poorly controlled machines are more likely to be either running software that is
unneeded for business purposes, introducing potential security flaws, or running
malware introduced by an attacker after a system is compromised. Once a single
machine has been exploited, attackers often use it as a staging point for collecting
sensitive information from the compromised system and from other systems connected
to it. In addition, compromised machines are used as a launching point for movement
throughout the network and partnering networks. In this way, attackers may quickly
turn one compromised machine into many. Organizations that do not have complete
software inventories are unable to find systems running vulnerable or malicious
software to mitigate problems or root out attackers.
Managed control of all software also plays a critical role in planning and executing
system backup and recovery.
ID #
CSC 2-1
Description
Deploy application whitelisting technology that allows
systems to run software only if it is included on the whitelist
and prevents execution of all other software on the system.
The whitelist may be very extensive (as is available from
commercial whitelist vendors), so that users are not
inconvenienced when using common software. Or, for some
special-purpose systems (which require only a small number
15
Category
Quick win (One
of the First
Five)
CSC 2-2
CSC 2-3
CSC 2-4
CSC 2-5
CSC 2-6
CSC 2-7
CSC 2-8
CSC 2-9
of programs to achieve their needed business functionality),

the whitelist may be quite narrow. When protecting systems
with customized software that may be seen as difficult to
whitelist, use item 8 below (isolating the custom software in a
virtual operating system that does not retain infections.).
Devise a list of authorized software and version that is
required in the enterprise for each type of system, including
servers, workstations, and laptops of various kinds and uses.
This list should be monitored by file integrity checking tools to
validate that the authorized software has not been modified.
Perform regular scanning for unauthorized software and
generate alerts when it is discovered on a system. A strict
change-control process should also be implemented to control
any changes or installation of software to any systems on the
network. This includes alerting when unrecognized binaries
(executable files, DLLs and other libraries, etc.) are found on a
system, even inside of compressed archives. This includes
checking for unrecognized or altered versions of software by
comparing file hash values (attackers often utilize altered
versions of known software to perpetrate attacks, and file
hash comparisons will reveal the compromised software
components).
Deploy software inventory tools throughout the organization
covering each of the operating system types in use, including
servers, workstations, and laptops. The software inventory
system should track the version of the underlying operating
system as well as the applications installed on it. Furthermore,
the tool should record not only the type of software installed
on each system, but also its version number and patch level.
The software inventory systems must be integrated with the
hardware asset inventory so that all devices and associated
software are tracked from a single location.
Dangerous file types (e.g., .exe, .zip, .msi) should be closely
monitored and/or blocked.
Virtual machines and/or air-gapped systems should be used
to isolate and run applications that are required for business
operations but based on higher risk should not be installed
within a networked environment.
Configure client workstations with non-persistent, virtualized
operating environments that can be quickly and easily
restored to a trusted snapshot on a periodic basis.
Deploy software that only provides signed software ID tags. A
software identification tag is an XML file that is installed
alongside software and uniquely identifies the software,
providing data for software inventory and asset management.
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Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
Advanced
Advanced

Whitelisting can be implemented using commercial whitelisting tools or application
execution tools that come with anti-virus suites and with Windows. Commercial
software and asset inventory tools are widely available and in use in many enterprises
today. The best of these tools provide an inventory check of hundreds of common
applications used in enterprises, pulling information about the patch level of each
installed program to ensure that it is the latest version and leveraging standardized
application names, such as those found in the common platform enumeration
specification.
Features that implement whitelists of programs allowed to run are included in many
modern endpoint security suites. Moreover, commercial solutions are increasingly
bundling together anti-virus, anti-spyware, personal firewall, and host-based intrusion
detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS), along with application
white and black listing. In particular, most endpoint security solutions can look at the
name, file system location, and/or cryptographic hash of a given executable to
determine whether the application should be allowed to run on the protected machine.
The most effective of these tools offer custom whitelists based on executable path, hash,
or regular expression matching. Some even include a gray list function that allows
administrators to define rules for execution of specific programs only by certain users
and at certain times of day.
1. How long does it take to detect new software installed on systems in the
organization (time in minutes)?
that an unauthorized software application is on a system (time in minutes)?
3. How long does it take to alert that a new software application has been
discovered (time in minutes)?
details about the unauthorized software that is detected (yes or no)?
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1. How many unauthorized software applications are presently located on business

systems within the organization (by business unit)?
2. How long, on average, does it take to remove unauthorized applications from
business systems within the organization (by business unit)?
3. What is the percentage of the organizations business systems that are not
running software whitelisting software that blocks unauthorized software
applications (by business unit)?
4. How many software applications have been recently blocked from executing by
the organizations software whitelisting software (by business unit)?
must move a benign software test program that is not included in the authorized
software list to 10 systems on the network. Two of the systems must be included in the
asset inventory database, while the other systems do not need to be included. The
evaluation team must then verify that the systems generate an alert or e-mail notice
regarding the new software within 24 hours. The team must also verify that the alert or
e-mail is received within one additional hour indicating that the software has been
blocked or quarantined. The evaluation team must verify that the system provides
details of the location of each machine with this new test software, including
information about the asset owner. The evaluation team must then verify that the
software is blocked by attempting to execute it and verifying that the software is not
allowed to run.
On systems where blocking is not allowed or blocking functionality is not available, the
team must verify that the execution of unauthorized software is detected and results in
a notification to alert the security team that unauthorized software is being used.
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A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate

the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining software
installed on the organizations network systems. These systems should be able to
identify if new software is introduced to the environment that has not been authorized
by enterprise personnel. The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how
the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also
delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in
the overall control.
Step 1: Active device scanner
Step 2: Active scanner reports to inventory database
Step 3: Inventory database compares to inventory baseline
Step 4: Inventory database initiates alerting system
Step 5: Alert system notifies security defenders
Step 6: Security defenders monitor and secure inventory database
Step 7: Security defenders update software inventory database
Step 8: Whitelisting tool continuously monitors all systems on the network
Step 9: Whitelisting checks and makes updates to the software inventory database.
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CSC 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile

Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the
security configuration of laptops, servers, and workstations using a rigorous
configuration management and change control process in order to prevent
attackers from exploiting vulnerable services and settings .
As delivered by manufacturers and resellers, the default configurations for operating
systems and applications are normally geared to ease-of-deployment and ease-of-use not security. Basic controls, open services and ports, default accounts or passwords,
older (vulnerable) protocols, pre-installation of unneeded software; all can be
exploitable in their default state.
Developing configuration settings with good security properties is a complex task
beyond the ability of individual users, requiring analysis of potentially hundreds or
thousands of options in order to make good choices. Even if a strong initial
configuration is developed and installed, it must be continually managed to avoid
security decay as software is updated or patched, new security vulnerabilities are
reported, and configurations are tweaked to allow the installation of new software or
support new operational requirements. If not, attackers will find opportunities to
exploit both network-accessible services and client software.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 3-1
Establish and ensure the use of standard secure

configurations of your operating systems. Standardized
images should represent hardened versions of the underlying
operating system and the applications installed on the system.
Hardening typically includes: removal of unnecessary
accounts (including service accounts), disabling or removal of
unnecessary services, configuring non-executable stacks and
heaps, applying patches, closing open and unused network
ports, implementing intrusion detection systems and/or
intrusion prevention systems, and use of host-based firewalls.
These images should be validated and refreshed on a regular
basis to update their security configuration in light of recent
vulnerabilities and attack vectors.
Implement automated patching tools and processes for both
applications and for operating system software. When
outdated systems can no longer be patched, update to the
Quick win (One

of the First
Five)
CSC 3-2
20
Quick win (One

of the First
Five)
CSC 3-3
CSC 3-4
CSC 3-5
CSC 3-6
CSC 3-7
CSC 3-8
latest version of application software. Remove outdated,

older, and unused software from the system.
Limit administrative privileges to very few users who have
both the knowledge necessary to administer the operating
system and a business need to modify the configuration of the
underlying operating system. This will help prevent
installation of unauthorized software and other abuses of
administrator privileges.
Follow strict configuration management, building a secure
image that is used to build all new systems that are deployed
in the enterprise. Any existing system that becomes
compromised should be re-imaged with the secure build.
Regular updates or exceptions to this image should be
integrated into the organizations change management
processes. Images should be created for workstations,
servers, and other system types used by the organization.
Store the master images on securely configured servers,
validated with integrity checking tools capable of continuous
inspection, and change management to ensure that only
authorized changes to the images are possible. Alternatively,
these master images can be stored in offline machines, airgapped from the production network, with images copied via
secure media to move them between the image storage
servers and the production network.
Negotiate contracts to buy systems configured securely out of
the box using standardized images, which should be devised
to avoid extraneous software that would increase their attack
surface and susceptibility to vulnerabilities.
Do all remote administration of servers, workstation, network
devices, and similar equipment over secure channels.
Protocols such as telnet, VNC, RDP, or others that do not
actively support strong encryption should only be used if they
are performed over a secondary encryption channel, such as
SSL or IPSEC.
Utilize file integrity checking tools to ensure that critical
system files (including sensitive system and application
executables, libraries, and configurations) have not been
altered. All alterations to such files should be automatically
reported security personnel. The reporting system should
have the ability to account for routine and expected changes,
highlighting unusual or unexpected alterations.
For investigative support, the reporting system should be able
to show the history of configuration changes over time and
identify who made the change (including the original logged21
Quick win (One

of the First
Five)
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
CSC 3-9
CSC 3-10
in account in the event of a user ID switch, such as with the su

or sudo command). These integrity checks should also
identify suspicious system alterations such as owner and
permissions changes to files or directories; the use of
alternate data streams which could be used to hide malicious
activities; as well as detecting the introduction of extra files
into key system areas (which could indicate malicious
payloads left by attackers or additional files inappropriately
added during batch distribution processes).
Implement and test an automated configuration monitoring
system that measures all secure configuration elements that
can be measured through remote testing using features such
as those included with tools compliant with Security Content
Automation Protocol (SCAP), and alerts when unauthorized
changes occur. This includes detecting new listening ports,
new administrative users, changes to group and local policy
objects, (where applicable), and new services running on a
system.
Deploy system configuration management tools, such as
Active Directory Group Policy Objects for Microsoft Windows
systems or Puppet for UNIX systems that will automatically
enforce and redeploy configuration settings to systems at
regularly scheduled intervals. They should be capable of
triggering redeployment of configuration settings on a
scheduled, manual, or event-driven basis.
Advanced
Configuration/
Hygiene

Rather than start from scratch developing a security baseline for each software system,
organizations should start from publicly developed, vetted, and supported security
benchmarks, security guides, or checklists. Excellent resources include:
The Center for Internet Security Benchmarks Program (www.cisecurity.org)

The NIST National Checklist Program (checklists.nist.gov)
Organizations should augment or adjust these baselines to satisfy local policies and
requirements, but deviations and rationale should be documented to facilitate later
reviews or audits.
For a complex enterprise, the establishment of a single security baseline configuration
(for example, a single installation image for all workstations across the entire
enterprise) is sometimes not practical or deemed unacceptable. It is likely that you will
need to support different standardized images, based on the proper hardening to
22
address risks and needed functionality of the intended deployment (example, a web
server in the DMZ vs. an email or other application server in the internal network). The
number of variations should be kept to a minimum in order to better understand and
manage the security properties of each, but organizations then must be prepared to
manage multiple baselines.
Commercial and/or free configuration management tools can then be employed to
measure the settings of operating systems and applications of managed machines to
look for deviations from the standard image configurations. Typical configuration
management tools use some combination of: an agent installed on each managed
system, or agentless inspection of systems by remotely logging in to each managed
machine using administrator credentials. Additionally, a hybrid approach is sometimes
used whereby a remote session is initiated, a temporary or dynamic agent is deployed
on the target system for the scan, and then the agent is removed.
1. How long does it take to detect configuration changes to a network system (time
in minutes)?
that an unauthorized configuration change has occurred (time in minutes)?
3. How long does it take to block/quarantine unauthorized changes on network
systems (time in minutes)?
details about the systems where unauthorized changes occurred (yes or no)?
5. Are the scanners able to trigger different notifications / workflows based on the
severity of the configuration variance detected?
For all of the above, consider that system priority, service level commitments, system
role, and other factors may drive varying objectives for scan frequency and alert time
frames on different systems. Ensure that the rationale for these classifications is clear,
consistent, documented, and consistently applied. Verify that target detection and
notification results are aligned with service level commitments and policies for each
class of system.
In order to automate the collection of relevant data from these systems, the
organization should gather the following information with automated technical
sensors:
23
1. What is the percentage of business systems that are not currently configured
with a security configuration that matches the organizations approved
configuration standard (by business unit)?
2. What is the percentage of business systems whose security configuration is not
enforced by the organizations technical configuration management applications
(by business unit)?
3. What is the percentage of business systems that are not up to date with the latest
available operating system software security patches (by business unit)?
4. What is the percentage of business systems that are not up to date with the latest
available business software application security patches (by business unit)?
5. What is the percentage of business systems not protected by file integrity
assessment software applications (by business unit)?
6. What is the percentage of unauthorized or undocumented changes with security
impact (by business unit)?
To evaluate the implementation of Control 3 on a periodic basis, an evaluation team
must move a benign test system that does not contain the official hardened image, but
that does contain additional services, ports, and configuration file changes, onto the
network. This must be performed on 10 different random segments using either real or
virtual systems. The evaluation team must then verify that the systems generate an
alert regarding the changes to the software within the target service window, or within
24 hours whichever is less. It is important that the evaluation team verify that all
unauthorized changes have been detected. The team must also verify that the alert or email is received within one additional hour indicating that the software has been
blocked or quarantined. The evaluation team must verify that the system provides
details of the location of each machine with the unauthorized changes, including
information about the asset owner.
The evaluation team must also introduce undocumented / out-of-band configuration
settings and binaries using real or virtual systems on 10 random segments. The test
should include making a non-persistent change, in which a change is introduced to the
primary program location (/bin, Program Files, etc.), left in place for 30-60 minutes,
then reverted to the original configuration.
The evaluation team must verify that all configuration changes and binaries are
detected, and that there is a record of the non-persistent changes mentioned above.
The detection data should include the nature of the change made (addition, removal,
alteration, owner, permissions, contents, etc.), as well as the user account that made the
change.
24
The evaluation team must also verify that unauthorized software is blocked by
attempting to execute it and verifying that it is not allowed to run. On systems where
blocking is not allowed or blocking functionality is not available, the team must verify
that the execution of unauthorized software is detected and results in a notification to
alert the security team that unauthorized software is being used.
In addition to these tests, the following tests must be performed:
1. File integrity checking tools must be run on a regular basis. Any changes to
critical operating system, services, and configuration files must be checked on an
hourly basis. Any changes must be detected and either blocked or trigger an
alert that follows the above notification process.
2. Detection software must detect the disabling of system logging, as well as the
truncation, modification or deletion of log files. Note that growth of logs should
not trigger notifications, but suspicious changes associated with malicious
activities should; examples include deletion or truncation of logs, modification of
past log events, owner or permission changes, etc. Any inappropriate changes to
logs must trigger an alert that follows the above notification process.
3. System scanning tools that check for software version, patch levels, and
configuration files must be run on a daily basis. Any changes must be detected
and either blocked or trigger an alert that follows the above notification process.
Organizations will find that by diagramming the entities necessary to fully meet the goals
defined in this control, it will be easier to identify how to implement them, test the controls,
and identify where potential failures in the system might occur. As with any configurations,
all changes must be approved and managed by a change control process.
25
A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate the
behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining the devices, software,
and entities used to manage and implement consistent configuration settings to workstations,
laptops, and servers on the network. The following list of the steps in the above diagram
shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The
list also delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points
in the overall control.
Step 1: Secured system images applied to computer systems
Step 2: Secured system images stored in a secure manner
Step 3: Configuration management system validates and checks system images
Step 4: Configuration policy enforcement system actively scans production systems for
misconfigurations or deviations from baselines
Step 5: File integrity assessment systems monitor critical system binaries and data sets
Step 6: Whitelisting tool monitors systems configurations and software
26
Step 7: SCAP configuration scanner validates configurations

Step 8: File integrity assessment system sends deviations to alerting system
Step 9: Whitelisting tool sends deviations to alerting system
Step 10: SCAP configuration scanner sends deviations to alerting system
Step 11 and 12: Management reports document configuration status.
27
CSC 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation

Continuously acquire, assess, and take action on new information in order to
identify vulnerabilities, remediate, and minimize the window of opportunity for
attackers.
Cyber defenders must operate in a constant stream of new information: software
updates, patches, security advisories, threat bulletins, etc. Understanding and managing
vulnerabilities has become a continuous activity, requiring significant time, attention,
and resources.
Attackers have access to the same information, and can take advantage of gaps between
the appearance of new knowledge and remediation. For example, when new
vulnerabilities are reported by researchers, a race starts among all parties, including:
attackers (to weaponize, deploy an attack, exploit); vendors (to develop, deploy
patches or signatures and updates), and defenders (to assess risk, regression-test
patches, install).
Organizations that do not scan for vulnerabilities and proactively address discovered
flaws face a significant likelihood of having their computer systems compromised.
Defenders face particular challenges in scaling remediation across an entire enterprise,
and prioritizing actions with conflicting priorities, and sometimes-uncertain side
effects.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 4-1
Run automated vulnerability scanning tools against all

systems on the network on a weekly or more frequent basis
and deliver prioritized lists of the most critical vulnerabilities
to each responsible system administrator along with risk
scores that compare the effectiveness of system
administrators and departments in reducing risk. Use a SCAPvalidated vulnerability scanner that looks for both code-based
vulnerabilities (such as those described by Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures entries) and configurationbased vulnerabilities (as enumerated by the Common
Configuration Enumeration Project).
Correlate event logs with information from vulnerability scans
to fulfill two goals. First, personnel should verify that the
activity of the regular vulnerability scanning tools themselves
is logged. Second, personnel should be able to correlate attack
Quick win
(Supports the
First Five)
CSC 4-2
28
Quick win
CSC 4-3
CSC 4-4
CSC 4-5
CSC 4-6
CSC 4-7
CSC 4-8
CSC 4-9
detection events with earlier vulnerability scanning results to

determine whether the given exploit was used against a target
known to be vulnerable.
Perform vulnerability scanning in authenticated mode either
with agents running locally on each end system to analyze the
security configuration or with remote scanners that are given
administrative rights on the system being tested. Use a
dedicated account for authenticated vulnerability scans, which
should not be used for any other administrative activities and
should be tied to specific machines at specific IP addresses.
Ensure that only authorized employees have access to the
vulnerability management user interface and that roles are
applied to each user.
Subscribe to vulnerability intelligence services in order to stay
aware of emerging exposures, and use the information gained
from this subscription to update the organizations
vulnerability scanning activities on at least a monthly basis.
Alternatively, ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools you
use are regularly updated with all relevant important security
vulnerabilities.
Deploy automated patch management tools and software
update tools for operating system and software/applications
on all systems for which such tools are available and safe.
Patches should be applied to all systems, even systems that
are properly air gapped.
Carefully monitor logs associated with any scanning activity
and associated administrator accounts to ensure that all
scanning activity and associated access via the privileged
account is limited to the timeframes of legitimate scans.
Compare the results from back-to-back vulnerability scans to
verify that vulnerabilities were addressed either by patching,
implementing a compensating control, or documenting and
accepting a reasonable business risk. Such acceptance of
business risks for existing vulnerabilities should be
periodically reviewed to determine if newer compensating
controls or subsequent patches can address vulnerabilities
that were previously accepted, or if conditions have changed,
increasing the risk.
Measure the delay in patching new vulnerabilities and ensure
that the delay is equal to or less than the benchmarks set forth
by the organization. Alternative countermeasures should be
considered if patches are not available.
Evaluate critical patches in a test environment before pushing
them into production on enterprise systems. If such patches
break critical business applications on test machines, the
29
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
CSC 4-10
organization must devise other mitigating controls that block

exploitation on systems where the patch cannot be deployed
because of its impact on business functionality.
Establish a process to risk-rate vulnerabilities based on the
exploitability and potential impact of the vulnerability, and
segmented by appropriate groups of assets (example, DMZ
servers, internal network servers, desktops, laptops). Apply
patches for the riskiest vulnerabilities first. A phased rollout
can be used to minimize the impact to the organization.
Establish expected patching timelines based on the risk rating
level.
Configuration/
Hygiene

A large number of vulnerability scanning tools are available to evaluate the security
configuration of systems. Some enterprises have also found commercial services using
remotely managed scanning appliances to be effective. To help standardize the
definitions of discovered vulnerabilities in multiple departments of an organization or
even across organizations, it is preferable to use vulnerability scanning tools that
measure security flaws and map them to vulnerabilities and issues categorized using
one or more of the following industry-recognized vulnerability, configuration, and
platform classification schemes and languages: CVE, CCE, OVAL, CPE, CVSS, and/or
XCCDF.
Advanced vulnerability scanning tools can be configured with user credentials to log in
to scanned systems and perform more comprehensive scans than can be achieved
without login credentials. The frequency of scanning activities, however, should
increase as the diversity of an organizations systems increases to account for the
varying patch cycles of each vendor.
In addition to the scanning tools that check for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations
across the network, various free and commercial tools can evaluate security settings
and configurations of local machines on which they are installed. Such tools can provide
fine-grained insight into unauthorized changes in configuration or the inadvertent
introduction of security weaknesses by administrators.
Effective organizations link their vulnerability scanners with problem-ticketing systems
that automatically monitor and report progress on fixing problems, and that make
unmitigated critical vulnerabilities visible to higher levels of management to ensure the
problems are solved.
The most effective vulnerability scanning tools compare the results of the current scan
with previous scans to determine how the vulnerabilities in the environment have
30
changed over time. Security personnel use these features to conduct vulnerability
trending from month to month.
As vulnerabilities related to unpatched systems are discovered by scanning tools,
security personnel should determine and document the amount of time that elapses
between the public release of a patch for the system and the occurrence of the
vulnerability scan. If this time window exceeds the organizations benchmarks for
deployment of the given patchs criticality level, security personnel should note the
delay and determine if a deviation was formally documented for the system and its
patch. If not, the security team should work with management to improve the patching
process.
Additionally, some automated patching tools may not detect or install certain patches
due to an error by the vendor or administrator. Because of this, all patch checks should
reconcile system patches with a list of patches each vendor has announced on its
website.
1. How long does it take vulnerability scanning systems, if they detect
unauthorized devices on the network, to generate an alert (time in minutes)?
2. How long after a scan successfully completes does it take to generate an alert
indicating that it completed (time in minutes)?
3. If a scan does not complete, how long does it take to generate an alert that the
scan failed to run (time in minutes)?
4. How long does it take automated patch management tools to alert or send e-mail
to administrative personnel regarding the successful installation of new patches
(time in minutes)?
For all of the above, consider that system priority, service level commitments, system
role, and other factors may drive varying objectives for scan frequency and alert time
frames on different systems. Ensure that the rationale for these classifications is clear,
consistent, documented, and consistently applied. Verify that target detection and
notification results are aligned with service level commitments and policies for each
class of system.
31
1. What is the percentage of the organizations business systems that have not
recently been scanned by the organizations approved, SCAP compliant,
vulnerability management system (by business unit)?
2. What is the average SCAP vulnerability score of each of the organizations
business systems (by business unit)?
3. What is the total SCAP vulnerability score of each of the organizations business
systems (by business unit)?
4. How long does it take, on average, to completely deploy operating system
software updates to a business system (by business unit)?
5. How long does it take, on average, to completely deploy application software
updates to a business system (by business unit)?
must verify that scanning tools have successfully completed their weekly or daily scans
for the previous 30 cycles of scanning by reviewing archived alerts and reports to
ensure that the scan was completed. If a scan could not be completed in that timeframe,
the evaluation team must verify that an alert or e-mail was generated indicating that
the scan did not finish.
32

the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, the vulnerability scanners,
management system, patch management systems, and configuration baselines all work
together to address an organizations vulnerability management and remediation
strategy. The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities
work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates
each of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall
control.
Step 1: Vulnerability intelligence service provides inputs to vulnerability scanner
Step 2: Vulnerability scanners scan production systems
Step 3: Vulnerability scanners report detected vulnerabilities to a vulnerability management
system (VMS)
Step 4: The VMS compares production systems to configuration baselines
Step 5: The VMS sends information to log management correlation system
Step 6: The VMS produces reports for management
Step 7: A patch management system applies software updates to production systems.
33
CSC 5: Malware Defenses

Control the installation, spread, and execution of malicious code at multiple
points in the enterprise, while optimizing the use of automation to enable rapid
updating of defense, data gathering, and corrective action.
Malicious software is an integral and dangerous aspect of Internet threats, and can be
designed to attack your systems, devices, or your data. It can be fast-moving, fastchanging, and enter through any number of points like end-user devices, e-mail
attachments, web pages, cloud services, user actions, and removable media. Modern
malware can be designed to avoid defenses, or to attack or disable them.
Malware defenses must be able to operate in this dynamic environment through largescale automation, rapid updating, and integration with processes like Incident
Response. They must also be deployed at multiple possible points-of-attack to detect,
stop the movement of, or control the execution of malicious software. Enterprise
endpoint security suites provide administrative features to verify that all defenses are
active and current on every managed system.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 5-1
Employ automated tools to continuously monitor

workstations, servers, and mobile devices with anti-virus,
anti-spyware, personal firewalls, and host-based IPS
functionality. All malware detection events should be sent to
enterprise anti-malware administration tools and event log
servers.
Employ anti-malware software that offers a remote, cloudbased centralized infrastructure that compiles information on
file reputations or have administrators manually push updates
to all machines. After applying an update, automated systems
should verify that each system has received its signature
update.
Configure laptops, workstations, and servers so that they will
not auto-run content from removable media, like USB tokens
(i.e., thumb drives), USB hard drives, CDs/DVDs, FireWire
devices, external serial advanced technology attachment
devices, and mounted network shares,.
Configure systems so that they automatically conduct an antimalware scan of removable media when inserted.
Quick win
CSC 5-2
CSC 5-3
CSC 5-4
34
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
CSC 5-5
CSC 5-6
CSC 5-7
CSC 5-8
CSC 5-9
CSC 5-10
CSC 5-11
Scan and block all e-mail attachments entering the

organizations e-mail gateway if they contain malicious code
or file types that are unnecessary for the organizations
business. This scanning should be done before the e-mail is
placed in the users inbox. This includes e-mail content
filtering and web content filtering.
Enable anti-exploitation features such as Data Execution
Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR), virtualization/containerization, etc. For increased
protection, deploy capabilities such as Enhanced Mitigation
Experience Toolkit (EMET) that can be configured to apply
these protections to a broader set of applications and
executables.
Limit use of external devices to those that have a business
need. Monitor for use and attempted use of external devices.
Ensure that automated monitoring tools use behavior-based
anomaly detection to complement traditional signature-based
detection.
Use network-based anti-malware tools to identify executables
in all network traffic and use techniques other than signaturebased detection to identify and filter out malicious content
before it arrives at the endpoint.
Implement an incident response process that allows the IT
support organization to supply the security team with
samples of malware running on corporate systems that do not
appear to be recognized by the enterprises anti-malware
software. Samples should be provided to the security vendor
for out-of-band signature creation and later deployed to the
enterprise by system administrators.
Enable domain name system (DNS) query logging to detect
hostname lookup for known malicious C2 domains.
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Advanced
Advanced

To ensure anti-virus signatures are up to date, organizations use automation. They use
the built-in administrative features of enterprise endpoint security suites to verify that
anti-virus, anti-spyware, and host-based IDS features are active on every managed
system. They run automated assessments daily and review the results to find and
mitigate systems that have deactivated such protections, as well as systems that do not
have the latest malware definitions.
Some enterprises deploy free or commercial honeypot and tarpit tools to identify
attackers in their environment. Security personnel should continuously monitor these
tools to determine whether traffic is directed to them and account logins are attempted.
35
When they identify such events, these personnel should gather the source address from
which this traffic originates and other details associated with the attack for follow-on
investigation.
1. How long does it take the system to identify any malicious software that is
installed, attempted to be installed, executed, or attempted to be executed on a
computer system (time in minutes)?
2. How long does it take the system to send e-mail notification to a list of enterprise
personnel via their centralized anti-malware console or event log system after
malicious code has been identified (time in minutes)?
3. Does the system have the ability to block installation, prevent execution, or
quarantine malicious software (yes or no)?
4. Does the system have the ability to identify the business unit in the organization
where the malicious software was identified (yes or no)?
5. How long does it take the organization to completely remove the malicious code
from the system after it has been identified (time in minutes)?
1. How many instances of malicious code have been detected within a period of
time by host based anti-malware systems (by business unit)?
2. How many instances of malicious code that were detected within a period of
time were automatically remediated by the organizations host based antimalware systems (by business unit)?
3. How many instances of malicious code have been detected within a period of
time by network based anti-malware systems (by business unit)?
4. How many instances of malicious code that were detected within a period of
time were automatically remediated by the organizations network based antimalware systems (by business unit)?
5. Percentage of applications on a system that are not utilizing application
sandboxing products (by business unit)?
6. Percentage of systems with anti-malware systems deployed, enabled, and up-todate (by business unit)?
36

must move a benign software test program that appears to be malware (such as an
EICAR file or benign hacker tools), but that is not included in the official authorized
software list, to 10 systems on the network via a network share. The selection of these
systems must be as random as possible and include a cross-section of the organization's
systems and locations. The evaluation team must then verify that the systems generate
an alert or e-mail notice regarding the benign malware within one hour. The team must
also verify that the alert or e-mail indicating that the software has been blocked or
quarantined is received within one hour. The evaluation team must verify that the
system provides details of the location of each machine with this new test file, including
information about the asset owner. The team must then verify that the file is blocked by
attempting to execute or open it and verifying that it is not allowed to be accessed.
Once this test has been performed transferring the files to organization systems via
removable media, the same test must be repeated, but this time transferring the benign
malware to 10 systems via e-mail instead. The organization must expect the same
notification results as noted with the removable media test.
37

the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining anti-malware
systems and threat vectors such as removable media. The following list of the steps in
the above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal
defined in this control. The list also delineates each of the process steps in order to help
identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Anti-malware systems analyze production systems and removable media
Step 2: Removable media is analyzed when connected to production systems
Step 3: Email/web and network proxy devices analyze all incoming and outgoing traffic
Step 4: Network access control monitors all systems connected to the network
Step 5: Intrusion/network monitoring systems perform continuous monitoring looking for
signs of malware.
38
CSC 6: Application Software Security

Manage the security lifecycle of all in-house developed and acquired software in
order to prevent, detect, and correct security weaknesses.
Attacks often take advantage of vulnerabilities found in web-based and other
application software. Vulnerabilities can be present for many reasons, including coding
mistakes, logic errors, incomplete requirements, and failure to test for unusual or
unexpected conditions. Examples of specific errors include: the failure to check the size
of user input; failure to filter out unneeded but potentially malicious character
sequences from input streams; failure to initialize and clear variables; and poor
memory management allowing flaws in one part of the software to affect unrelated
(and more security critical) portions. There is a flood of public and private information
about such vulnerabilities available to attackers and defenders alike, as well as a robust
marketplace for tools and techniques to allow weaponization of vulnerabilities into
exploits. Attackers can inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection
attacks, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, and click-jacking of code to gain
control over vulnerable machines. In one attack, more than 1 million web servers were
exploited and turned into infection engines for visitors to those sites using SQL
injection. During that attack, trusted websites from state governments and other
organizations compromised by attackers were used to infect hundreds of thousands of
browsers that accessed those websites. Many more web and non-web application
vulnerabilities are discovered on a regular basis.
ID #
Description
CSC 6-1
For all acquired application software, check that the version

Quick Win
you are using is still supported by the vendor. If not, update to
the most current version and install all relevant patches and
vendor security recommendations.
Protect web applications by deploying web application
Quick Win
firewalls (WAFs) that inspect all traffic flowing to the web
application for common web application attacks, including but
not limited to cross-site scripting, SQL injection, command
injection, and directory traversal attacks. For applications that
are not web-based, specific application firewalls should be
deployed if such tools are available for the given application
type. If the traffic is encrypted, the device should either sit
behind the encryption or be capable of decrypting the traffic
prior to analysis. If neither option is appropriate, a host-based
web application firewall should be deployed.
(NEW)
CSC 6-2
Category
39
CSC 6-3
CSC 6-4
CSC 6-5
CSC 6-6
CSC 6-7
CSC 6-8
(NEW)
CSC 6-9
CSC 6-10
CSC 6-11
For in-house developed software, ensure that explicit error

checking is performed and documented for all input, including
for size, data type, and acceptable ranges or formats.
Test in-house-developed and third-party-procured web
applications for common security weaknesses using
automated remote web application scanners prior to
deployment, whenever updates are made to the application,
and on a regular recurring basis. Include tests for application
behavior under denial-of-service or resource exhaustion
attacks.
Do not display system error messages to end-users (output
sanitization).
Maintain separate environments for production and
nonproduction systems. Developers should not typically have
unmonitored access to production environments.
Test in-house-developed web and other application software
for coding errors and potential vulnerabilities prior to
deployment using automated static code analysis software, as
well as manual testing and inspection. In particular, input
validation and output encoding routines of application
software should be reviewed and tested.
For acquired application software, examine the product
security process of the vendor (history of vulnerabilities,
customer notification, patching/remediation) as part of the
overall enterprise risk management process.
For applications that rely on a database, use standard
hardening configuration templates. All systems that are part
of critical business processes should also be tested.
Ensure that all software development personnel receive
training in writing secure code for their specific development
environment.
For in-house developed applications, ensure that development
artifacts (sample data and scripts; unused libraries,
components, debug code; or tools) are not included in the
deployed software, or accessible in the production
environment.
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene

The security of applications (in-house developed or acquired) is a complex activity
requiring a complete program encompassing enterprise-wide policy, technology, and
the role of people. These are often broadly defined or required by formal Risk
Management Frameworks and processes.
40
A comprehensive treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of the Critical Security
Controls. However, the actions in CSC 6 provide specific, high-priority steps that can
improve Application Software Security. In addition, we recommend use of the many
excellent comprehensive resources dedicated to this topic. Examples include: the DHS
Build Security In Program < buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov >, and The Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP) < www.owasp.org >.
1. Can the application system detect attacks & block them within 24 hours of being
detected (yes or no)?
2. Are all Internet facing applications scanned by web application vulnerability
scanners at least weekly (yes or no)?
3. How long does it take for alerts to be generated & sent to system administrators
that a vulnerability scan has or has not completed (time in minutes)?
4. Are all vulnerabilities detected by the scanning tools fixed or remediated within
15 days of detection (yes or no)?
1. What percentage of the organizations custom applications have not been
recently scanned by an application security code scanner (by business unit)?
2. What percentage of the organizations database systems have not been recently
scanned by a database specific vulnerability scanner (by business unit)?
3. What is the aggregate vulnerability rating for all application and database
system in the organization (by business unit)?
To evaluate the implementation of Control 6 on a monthly basis, an evaluation team
must use a web application vulnerability scanner to test for each relevant type of flaw
identified in the regularly updated list of the "25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors"
by MITRE and the SANS Institute. The scanner must be configured to assess all of the
organization's Internet-accessible web applications to identify such errors. The
evaluation team must verify that the scan is detected within 24 hours and that an alert
is generated.
41
In addition to the web application vulnerability scanner, the evaluation team must also
run static code analysis tools and database configuration review tools against Internetaccessible applications to identify security flaws on a monthly basis.
The evaluation team must verify that all high-risk vulnerabilities identified by the
automated vulnerability scanning tools or static code analysis tools have been
remediated or addressed through a compensating control (such as a web application
firewall) within 15 days of discovery.
The evaluation team must verify that application vulnerability scanning tools have
successfully completed their regular scans for the previous 30 cycles of scanning by
reviewing archived alerts and reports to ensure that the scan was completed. If a scan
was not completed successfully, the system must alert or send e-mail to enterprise
administrative personnel indicating what happened. If a scan could not be completed in
that timeframe, the evaluation team must verify that an alert or e-mail was generated
indicating that the scan did not finish.

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining the
process of monitoring applications and using tools that enforce a security style when
developing applications.
The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work
together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates each
of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall
control.
42
Step 1: Web application firewalls protect connections to internal web applications

Step 2: Software applications securely connect to database systems
Step 3: Code analysis and vulnerability scanning tools scan application systems and
database systems.
43
CSC 7: Wireless Access Control

The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the security use
of wireless local area networks (LANS), access points, and wireless client
systems.
Major thefts of data have been initiated by attackers who have gained wireless access to
organizations from outside the physical building, bypassing organizations security
perimeters by connecting wirelessly to access points inside the organization. Wireless
clients accompanying traveling officials are infected on a regular basis through remote
exploitation during air travel or in cyber cafes. Such exploited systems are then used as
back doors when they are reconnected to the network of a target organization. Still
other organizations have reported the discovery of unauthorized wireless access points
on their networks, planted and sometimes hidden for unrestricted access to an internal
network. Because they do not require direct physical connections, wireless devices are
a convenient vector for attackers to maintain long-term access into a target
environment.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 7-1
Ensure that each wireless device connected to the network

matches an authorized configuration and security profile, with
a documented owner of the connection and a defined business
need. Organizations should deny access to those wireless
devices that do not have such a configuration and profile.
Configure network vulnerability scanning tools to detect
wireless access points connected to the wired network.
Identified devices should be reconciled against a list of
authorized wireless access points. Unauthorized (i.e., rogue)
access points should be deactivated.
Use wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS) to identify
rogue wireless devices and detect attack attempts and
successful compromises. In addition to WIDS, all wireless
traffic should be monitored by WIDS as traffic passes into the
wired network.
Where a specific business need for wireless access has been
identified, configure wireless access on client machines to
allow access only to authorized wireless networks.
For devices that do not have an essential wireless business
purpose, disable wireless access in the hardware
configuration (basic input/output system or extensible
Quick win
CSC 7-2
CSC 7-3
CSC 7-4
CSC 7-5
44
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
CSC 7-6
CSC 7-7
CSC 7-8
CSC 7-9
CSC 7-10
firmware interface), with password protections to lower the

possibility that the user will override such configurations.
Ensure that all wireless traffic leverages at least Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption used with at least WiFi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protection.
Ensure that wireless networks use authentication protocols
such as Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer
Security (EAP/TLS), which provide credential protection and
mutual authentication.
Disable peer-to-peer wireless network capabilities on wireless
clients, unless such functionality meets a documented
business need.
Disable wireless peripheral access of devices (such as
Bluetooth), unless such access is required for a documented
business need.
Create separate virtual local area networks (VLANs) for BYOD
systems or other untrusted devices. Internet access from this
VLAN should go through at least the same border as corporate
traffic. Enterprise access from this VLAN should be treated as
untrusted and filtered and audited accordingly.
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene

Effective organizations run commercial wireless scanning, detection, and discovery
tools as well as commercial wireless intrusion detection systems.
Additionally, the security team should periodically capture wireless traffic from within
the borders of a facility and use free and commercial analysis tools to determine
whether the wireless traffic was transmitted using weaker protocols or encryption than
the organization mandates. When devices relying on weak wireless security settings are
identified, they should be found within the organizations asset inventory and either
reconfigured more securely or denied access to the organization network.
Additionally, the security team should employ remote management tools on the wired
network to pull information about the wireless capabilities and devices connected to
managed systems.
45
1. Are systems capable of identifying unauthorized wireless devices or

configurations when they are within range of the organizations systems or
connected to their networks (yes or no)?
2. How long does it take to generate alerts about unauthorized wireless devices
that are detected (time in minutes)?
3. How long does it take for unauthorized wireless devices to be blocked from
connecting or isolated from the network (time in minutes)?
4. Are additional alerts generated every 24 hours after the initial alert until the
system is isolated or removed from the network (yes or no)?
5. Is the system able to identify the location, department, and other details of
where authorized and unauthorized wireless devices are plugged into the
network (yes or no)?
1. How many rogue wireless access points have been discovered recently in the
organization (by business unit)? This should include non-persistent, temporary
and transient access points.
2. What is the average time that it takes to remove rogue access points from the
organizations network (by business unit)?
3. How many wireless access points or clients have been discovered using an
unauthorized wireless configuration recently in the organization (by business
unit)?
must configure 10 unauthorized but hardened wireless clients and wireless access
points to the organization's network and attempt to connect them to its wireless
networks. In the case of wireless access points, these access points must not be directly
connected to the organization's trusted network. Instead, they must simply be
configured to act as a wireless gateway without physically connecting to a wired
network interface. In the case of scanning for wireless access points from a wired
interface, the connected access point must have the wireless radio disabled for the
duration of the test. These systems must be configured to test each of the following
scenarios:
A wireless client with an unauthorized service set identifier configured on it.

A wireless client with improper encryption configured.
A wireless client with improper authentication configured.
46
A wireless access point with improper encryption configured.

A wireless access point with improper authentication configured.
A completely rogue wireless access point using an unauthorized configuration.
When any of the above-noted systems attempt to connect to the wireless network, an
alert must be generated and enterprise staff must respond to the alerts to isolate the
detected device or remove the device from the network.

configuration and management of wireless devices, wireless IDS/scanners, wireless
device management systems, and vulnerability scanners. The following list of the steps
in the above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal
Step 1: Hardened configurations applied to wireless devices
Step 2: Hardened configurations managed by a configuration management system
Step 3: Configuration management system manages the configurations on wireless devices
Step 4: Wireless IDS monitor usage of wireless communications
47
Step 5: Vulnerability scanners scan wireless devices for potential vulnerabilities

Step 6: Wireless clients utilize wireless infrastructure systems in a secure manner.
48
CSC 8: Data Recovery Capability

The processes and tools used to properly b ack up critical information with a
proven methodology for timely recovery of it.
When attackers compromise machines, they often make significant changes to
configurations and software. Sometimes attackers also make subtle alterations of data
stored on compromised machines, potentially jeopardizing organizational effectiveness
with polluted information. When the attackers are discovered, it can be extremely
difficult for organizations without a trustworthy data recovery capability to remove all
aspects of the attackers presence on the machine.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 8-1
Ensure that each system is automatically backed up on at least

a weekly basis, and more often for systems storing sensitive
information. To help ensure the ability to rapidly restore a
system from backup, the operating system, application
software, and data on a machine should each be included in
the overall backup procedure. These three components of a
system do not have to be included in the same backup file or
use the same backup software. There should be multiple
backups over time, so that in the event of malware infection,
restoration can be from a version that is believed to predate
the original infection. All backup policies should be compliant
with any regulatory or official requirements.
Test data on backup media on a regular basis by performing a
data restoration process to ensure that the backup is properly
working.
Ensure that backups are properly protected via physical
security or encryption when they are stored, as well as when
they are moved across the network. This includes remote
backups and cloud services.
Ensure that key systems have at least one backup destination
that is not continuously addressable through operating
system calls. This will mitigate the risk of attacks like
CryptoLocker which seek to encrypt or damage data on all
addressable data shares, including backup destinations.
Quick win
CSC 8-2
CSC 8-3
CSC 8-4
(NEW)
49
Quick win
Configuration/
Hygiene

Once per quarter (or whenever new backup equipment is purchased), a testing team
should evaluate a random sample of system backups by attempting to restore them on a
test bed environment. The restored systems should be verified to ensure that the
operating system, application, and data from the backup are all intact and functional.
In the event of malware infection, restoration procedures should use a version of the
backup which is believed to predate the original infection.
Percentage of systems with current backups within their target frequency

(targets can vary by system role, type, and criticality)

None
The evaluation team should identify 5 systems in the environment and restore to a test
system (physical or virtual) using the most recent backup. Verify that the system has
been restored properly by comparing the restore results to the original system.
50

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining an
organizations capability to restore systems in the event that data need to be restored
because of a data loss or breach of a system. While backups are certainly an important
part of this process, the ability to restore data is the critical component. The following
list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the
business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates each of the process steps in
order to help identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Production business systems backed up on a regular basis to authorized
organizational backup systems
Step 2: Backups created are stored offline at secure storage facilities.
51
CSC 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

For all functional roles in the organization (prioritizing those mission -critical to
the business and its security), identify the specific knowledge, skills, an d
abilities needed to support defense of the enterprise; develop and execute an
integrated plan to assess, identify gaps, and remediate through policy,
organizational planning, training, and awareness programs.
It is tempting to think of cyber defense primarily as a technical challenge, but the
actions of people also play a critical part in the success or failure of an enterprise.
People fulfill important functions at every stage of system design, implementation,
operation, use, and oversight. Examples include: the actions of end users (who can fall
prey to social engineering schemes such as phishing); IT operations (who may not
recognize the security implications of IT artifacts and logs); security analysts (who
struggle to keep up with an explosion of new information); system developers and
programmers (who dont understand the opportunity to resolve root cause
vulnerabilities early in the system life-cycle); and executives and system owners (who
struggle to quantify the role that cybersecurity plays in overall operational/mission
risk, and have no reasonable way to make relevant investment decisions).
Attackers are very conscious of these issues and use them to plan their exploitations by,
for example: carefully crafting phishing messages that look like routine and expected
traffic to an unwary user; exploiting the gaps or seams between policy and technology
(e.g., policies that have no technical enforcement); working within the time window of
patching or log review; using nominally non-security-critical systems as jump points or
bots.
No cyber defense approach can begin to address cyber risk without a means to address
this fundamental vulnerability. Conversely, empowering people with good cyber
defense habits can significantly increase readiness.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 9-1
Perform gap analysis to see which skills employees need and

which behaviors employees are not adhering to, using this
information to build a baseline training and awareness
roadmap for all employees.
Deliver training to fill the skills gap. If possible, use more
senior staff to deliver the training. A second option is to have
outside teachers provide training onsite so the examples used
will be directly relevant. If you have small numbers of people
Quick win
CSC 9-2
52
Quick win
CSC 9-3
CSC 9-4
CSC 9-5
to train, use training conferences or online training to fill the

gaps.
Implement an online security awareness program that (1)
focuses only on the methods commonly used in intrusions that
can be blocked through individual action, (2) is delivered in
short online modules convenient for employees (3) is updated
frequently (at least annually) to represent the latest attack
techniques, (4) is mandated for completion by all employees
at least annually, and (5) is reliably monitored for employee
completion.
Validate and improve awareness levels through periodic tests
to see whether employees will click on a link from suspicious
e-mail or provide sensitive information on the telephone
without following appropriate procedures for authenticating a
caller; targeted training should be provided to those who fall
victim to the exercise.
Use security skills assessments for each of the mission-critical
roles to identify skills gaps. Use hands-on, real-world
examples to measure mastery. If you do not have such
assessments, use one of the available online competitions that
simulate real-world scenarios for each of the identified jobs in
order to measure skills mastery.
Quick win
Visibility/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene

An effective enterprise-wide training program should take a holistic approach and
consider policy and technology at the same time as the training of people. For example,
policies should be designed with technical measurement and enforcement when
possible, reinforced by training to fill gaps; technical controls can be implemented to
bound and minimize the opportunity for people to make mistakes, and so focus the
training on things that cannot be managed technically.
To be effective in both cost and outcome, security training should be prioritized,
focused, and specific (for example, using a S.M.A.R.T. metrics program). A key way to
prioritize training is to focus first on those jobs and roles that are critical to the mission
or business outcome of the enterprise. One way to identify these mission-critical jobs is
to reference the list prepared by the Council on CyberSecurity (which builds upon the
work of the 2012 Task Force on Cyber Skills established by the Secretary of Homeland
Security): 1) System and Network Penetration Testers, 2) Application Penetration
Testers, 3) Security Monitoring and Event Analysts, 4) Incident Responders In-Depth, 5)
Counter-Intelligence/Insider Threat Analysts, 6) Risk Assessment Engineers, 7) Secure
Coders and Code Reviewers, 8) Security Engineers/Architecture and Design, 9) Security
Engineers/Operations, and 10) Advanced Forensics Analysts. The Council has validated
this list as consistent with the broader NIST National Initiative on Cybersecurity
53
Education (NICE) framework, and with the needs of many enterprises in government
and industry. Training for these mission critical roles should be supplemented with
foundational security training for all users.
< http://www.counciloncybersecurity.org/workforce/>.
General awareness training for all users also plays an important role. But even this
training should be tailored to functional roles and focused on specific actions that put
the organization at risk, and measured in order to drive remediation.
The key to upgrading skills is measurement through assessments that show both the
employee and the employer where knowledge is sufficient and where there are gaps.
Once the gaps have been identified, those employees who have the requisite skills and
knowledge can be called upon to mentor employees who need to improve their skills. In
addition, the organization can develop training plans to fill the gaps and maintain
employee readiness.
A full treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of the Critical Security Controls.
However, the actions in CSC 9 provide specific, high-priority steps that can improve
enterprise security, and should be a part of any comprehensive security training
program.
Control 9 Effectiveness Metrics
1. Participation rate for online training courses percentage of staff completing
security training (by business unit)
2. Average scores of online tests, compared to baseline (previous tests, industry
data if available, etc.) by business unit
3. Average scores of periodic tests (e.g. click rates for test phishing emails) by
business unit
4. Individual scores on skill assessment tests for individual mission critical roles by
business unit
5. Retention (or job opening fill rate) of mission critical roles (org/unit metric)
None
None
54
CSC 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls,

Routers, and Switches
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the
security configuration of network infrastructure devices using a rigorous
configuration management and change control process in order to prevent
attackers from exploiting vulnerable services and settings .
As delivered from manufacturers and resellers, the default configurations for network
infrastructure devices are geared for ease-of-deployment and ease-of-use - not security. Open
services and ports, default accounts (including service accounts) or passwords, support for
older (vulnerable) protocols, pre-installation of unneeded software; all can be exploitable in
their default state.
Attackers take advantage of network devices becoming less securely configured over time as
users demand exceptions for specific business needs. Sometimes the exceptions are deployed
and then left undone when they are no longer applicable to the business needs. In some cases,
the security risk of the exception is neither properly analyzed nor measured against the
associated business need and can change over time. Attackers search for vulnerable default
settings, electronic holes in firewalls, routers, and switches and use those to penetrate
defenses. They exploit flaws in these devices to gain access to networks, redirect traffic on a
network, and intercept information while in transmission. Through such actions, the attacker
gains access to sensitive data, alters important information, or even uses a compromised
machine to pose as another trusted system on the network.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 10-1
Compare firewall, router, and switch configuration against

standard secure configurations defined for each type of
network device in use in the organization. The security
configuration of such devices should be documented,
reviewed, and approved by an organization change control
board. Any deviations from the standard configuration or
updates to the standard configuration should be
documented and approved in a change control system.
All new configuration rules beyond a baseline-hardened
configuration that allow traffic to flow through network
security devices, such as firewalls and network-based IPS,
should be documented and recorded in a configuration
management system, with a specific business reason for
Quick win
CSC 10-2
55
Configuration/
Hygiene
CSC 10-3
CSC 10-4
CSC 10-5
CSC 10-6
each change, a specific individuals name responsible for

that business need, and an expected duration of the need.
Use automated tools to verify standard device
configurations and detect changes. All alterations to such
files should be automatically reported to security
personnel.
Manage network devices using two-factor authentication
and encrypted sessions.
Install the latest stable version of any security-related
updates.
Manage the network infrastructure across network
connections that are separated from the business use of
that network, relying on separate VLANs or, preferably, on
entirely different physical connectivity for management
sessions for network devices.
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced

Some organizations use commercial tools that evaluate the rule set of network filtering
devices to determine whether they are consistent or in conflict, providing an automated
sanity check of network filters and search for errors in rule sets or access controls lists
(ACLs) that may allow unintended services through the device. Such tools should be run
each time significant changes are made to firewall rule sets, router ACLs, or other
filtering technologies.
1. How long does it take to detect configuration changes to a network system (time
in minutes)?
that an unauthorized configuration change has occurred (time in minutes)?
3. How long does it take to block/quarantine unauthorized changes on network
systems (time in minutes)?
details about the systems where unauthorized changes occurred (yes or no)?
56

1. What is the percentage of network devices that are not currently configured with
a security configuration that matches the organizations approved configuration
standard (by business unit)?
2. What is the percentage of network devices whose security configuration is not
enforced by the organizations technical configuration management applications
(by business unit)?
3. What is the percentage of network devices that are not up to date with the latest
available operating system software security patches (by business unit)?
4. What is the percentage of network devices do not require two-factor
authentication to administer the device (by business unit)?
must make a change to each type of network device plugged into the network. At a
minimum, routers, switches, and firewalls need to be tested. If they exist, IPS, IDS, and
other network devices must be included. Backups must be made prior to making any
changes to critical network devices. It is critical that changes not impact or weaken the
security of the device. Acceptable changes include but are not limited to making a
comment or adding a duplicate entry in the configuration. The change must be
performed twice for each critical device. The evaluation team must then verify that the
systems generate an alert or e-mail notice regarding the changes to the device within 24
hours. It is important that the evaluation team verify that all unauthorized changes have
been detected, the account making the changes has been recorded, and the changes
have resulted in an alert or e-mail notification. The evaluation team must verify that the
system provides details of the location of each device, including information about the
asset owner. While the 24-hour timeframe represents the current metric to help
organizations improve their state of security, in the future organizations should strive
for even more rapid alerting and isolation, with notification about unauthorized
configuration changes in network devices sent within two minutes.
If appropriate, an additional test must be performed on a daily basis to ensure that
other protocols such as IPv6 are being filtered properly.
Control 10 System Entity Relationship Diagram
57

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case we are examining the
network devices, test lab network devices, configuration systems, and configuration
management devices. The following list of the steps in the diagram above shows how
the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also
Step 1: Hardened device configurations applied to production devices
Step 2: Hardened device configuration stored in a secure configuration management system
Step 3: Management network system validates configurations on production network devices
Step 4: Patch management system applies tested software updates to production network
devices
Step 5: Two-factor authentication system required for administrative access to production
devices
Step 6: Proxy/firewall/network monitoring systems analyze all connections to production
network devices.
58
CSC 11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
Manage (track/control/correct) the ongoing operational use of ports, protocols,
and services on networked devices in order to minimize windows of vulnerability
available to attackers.
Attackers search for remotely accessible network services that are vulnerable to
exploitation. Common examples include poorly configured web servers, mail servers,
file and print services, and domain name system (DNS) servers installed by default on a
variety of different device types, often without a business need for the given service.
Many software packages automatically install services and turn them on as part of the
installation of the main software package without informing a user or administrator
that the services have been enabled. Attackers scan for such issues and attempt to
exploit these services, often attempting default user IDs and passwords or widely
available exploitation code.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 11-1
Ensure that only ports, protocols, and services with

validated business needs are running on each system.
Apply host-based firewalls or port filtering tools on end
systems, with a default-deny rule that drops all traffic
except those services and ports that are explicitly
allowed.
Perform automated port scans on a regular basis
against all key servers and compared to a known
effective baseline. If a change that is not listed on the
organizations approved baseline is discovered, an alert
should be generated and reviewed.
Keep all services up to date and uninstall and remove
any unnecessary components from the system.
Verify any server that is visible from the Internet or an
untrusted network, and if it is not required for business
purposes, move it to an internal VLAN and give it a
private address.
Operate critical services on separate physical or logical
host machines, such as DNS, file, mail, web, and
database servers.
Place application firewalls in front of any critical
servers to verify and validate the traffic going to the
Quick win
CSC 11-2
CSC 11-3
CSC 11-4
CSC 11-5
CSC 11-6
CSC 11-7
59
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
server. Any unauthorized services or traffic should be

blocked and an alert generated.
Port scanning tools are used to determine which services are listening on the network
for a range of target systems. In addition to determining which ports are open, effective
port scanners can be configured to identify the version of the protocol and service
listening on each discovered open port. This list of services and their versions are
compared against an inventory of services required by the organization for each server
and workstation in an asset management system. Recently added features in these port
scanners are being used to determine the changes in services offered by scanned
machines on the network since the previous scan, helping security personnel identify
differences over time.
1. How long does it take systems to identify any new unauthorized listening
network ports that are installed on network systems (time in minutes)?
2. How long does it take for alerts to be generated about new services being
installed (time in minutes)?
3. Are alerts then sent every 24 hours until the listening network port has been
disabled or it has been authorized by change management (yes or no)?
4. Do alerts indicate the location, department, and other details about the system
where authorized and unauthorized network ports are running (yes or no)?
In order to automate the collection of relevant data from these systems, organization
1. What is the percentage of the organizations systems that are not currently
running a host based firewall (by business unit)?
2. How many unauthorized services are currently running on the organizations
business systems (by business unit)?
3. How many deviations from approved service baselines have been discovered
recently on the organizations business systems (by business unit)?
60

must install hardened test services with network listeners on 10 locations on the
network, including a selection of subnets associated with DMZs, workstations, and
servers. The selection of these systems must be as random as possible and include a
cross-section of the organization's systems and locations. The evaluation team must
then verify that the systems generate an alert or e-mail notice regarding the newly
installed services within 24 hours of the services being installed on the network. The
team must verify that the system provides details of the location of all of the systems
where test services have been installed.

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining how
active scanning systems gather information on network devices and evaluate that data
against the authorized service baseline database. The following list of the steps in the
above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal defined
in this control. The list also delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify
potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Active scanner analyzes production systems for unauthorized ports, protocols, and
services
Step 2: System baselines regularly updated based on necessary/required services
61
Step 3: Active scanner validates which ports, protocols, and services are blocked or allowed
by the application firewall
Step 4: Active scanner validates which ports, protocols, and services are accessible on
business systems protected with host-based firewalls.
62
CSC 12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the use,
assignment, and configuration of administrative privileges on computers,
networks, and applications.
The misuse of administrative privileges is a primary method for attackers to spread
inside a target enterprise. Two very common attacker techniques take advantage of
uncontrolled administrative privileges. In the first, a workstation user running as a
privileged user, is fooled into opening a malicious e-mail attachment, downloading and
opening a file from a malicious website, or simply surfing to a website hosting attacker
content that can automatically exploit browsers. The file or exploit contains executable
code that runs on the victims machine either automatically or by tricking the user into
executing the attackers content. If the victim users account has administrative
privileges, the attacker can take over the victims machine completely and install
keystroke loggers, sniffers, and remote control software to find administrative
passwords and other sensitive data. Similar attacks occur with e-mail. An
administrator inadvertently opens an e-mail that contains an infected attachment and
this is used to obtain a pivot point within the network that is used to attack other
systems.
The second common technique used by attackers is elevation of privileges by guessing
or cracking a password for an administrative user to gain access to a target machine. If
administrative privileges are loosely and widely distributed, or identical to passwords
used on less critical systems, the attacker has a much easier time gaining full control of
systems, because there are many more accounts that can act as avenues for the attacker
to compromise administrative privileges.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 12-1
Minimize administrative privileges and only use

administrative accounts when they are required.
Implement focused auditing on the use of
administrative privileged functions and monitor for
anomalous behavior.
Use automated tools to inventory all administrative
accounts and validate that each person with
administrative privileges on desktops, laptops, and
servers is authorized by a senior executive.
Configure all administrative passwords to be complex
and contain letters, numbers, and special characters
Quick win (One

of the First
Five)
CSC 12-2
CSC 12-3
63
Quick win
Quick win
CSC 12-4
CSC 12-5
CSC 12-6
CSC 12-7
CSC 12-8
CSC 12-9
CSC 12-10
CSC 12-11
(NEW)
intermixed, and with no dictionary words present in the

password. Pass phrases containing multiple dictionary
words, along with special characters, are acceptable if
they are of a reasonable length.
Before deploying any new devices in a networked
environment, change all default passwords for
applications, operating systems, routers, firewalls,
wireless access points, and other systems to have
values consistent with administration-level accounts.
Ensure that all service accounts have long and difficultto-guess passwords that are changed on a periodic
basis, as is done for traditional user and administrative
passwords.
Passwords should be hashed or encrypted in storage.
Passwords that are hashed should be salted and follow
guidance provided in NIST SP 800-132 or similar
guidance. Files containing these encrypted or hashed
passwords required for systems to authenticate users
should be readable only with super-user privileges.
Utilize access control lists to ensure that administrative
accounts are used only for system administration
activities, and not for reading e-mail, composing
documents, or surfing the Internet. Web browsers and
e-mail clients especially must be configured to never
run as administrator.
Through policy and user awareness, require that
administrators establish unique, different passwords
for their administrative and non-administrative
accounts. Each person requiring administrative access
should be given his/her own separate account. Users
should only use the Windows administrator or UNIX
root accounts in emergency situations. Domain
administration accounts should be used when required
for system administration instead of local
administrative accounts.
Configure operating systems so that passwords cannot
be re-used within a timeframe of six months.
Configure systems to issue a log entry and alert when
an account is added to or removed from a domain
administrators group, or when a new local
administrator account is added on a system.
Configure systems to issue a log entry and alert when
unsuccessful login to an administrative account is
attempted.
64
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 12-12
CSC 12-13
(NEW)
CSC 12-14
Use multifactor authentication for all administrative

access, including domain administrative access. Multifactor authentication can include a variety of
techniques, to include the use of smart cards with
certificates, One Time Password (OTP) tokens, and
biometrics.
When using certificates to enable multi-factor
certificate-based authentication, ensure that the private
keys are protected using strong passwords or are
stored in trusted, secure hardware tokens.
Block access to a machine (either remotely or locally)
for administrator-level accounts. Instead,
administrators should be required to access a system
using a fully logged and non-administrative account.
Then, once logged on to the machine without
administrative privileges, the administrator should
transition to administrative privileges using tools such
as Sudo on Linux/UNIX, RunAs on Windows, and other
similar facilities for other types of systems. Users
would use their own administrative accounts and enter
a password each time that is different than their user
account.
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene

Built-in operating system features can extract lists of accounts with super-user
privileges, both locally on individual systems and on overall domain controllers. To
verify that users with high-privileged accounts do not use such accounts for day-to-day
web surfing and e-mail reading, security personnel should periodically gather a list of
running processes to determine whether any browsers or e-mail readers are running
with high privileges. Such information gathering can be scripted, with short shell scripts
searching for a dozen or more different browsers, e-mail readers, and document editing
programs running with high privileges on machines. Some legitimate system
administration activity may require the execution of such programs over the short
term, but long-term or frequent use of such programs with administrative privileges
could indicate that an administrator is not adhering to this control.
To enforce the requirement for strong passwords, built-in operating system features for
minimum password length can be configured to prevent users from choosing short
passwords. To enforce password complexity (requiring passwords to be a string of
pseudo-random characters), built-in operating system settings or third-party password
complexity enforcement tools can be applied.
65

1. Does the system report on log-in to administrative accounts?
2. Does the system report on the elevation to administrative access, to include
traceability to the user account that performed the elevation?
3. Does the system provide an inventory of all administrative accounts?
4. Does the system report on the addition of new administrative accounts?
5. Does the system allow limitations to be placed on the use of administrative
accounts, to include not allowing web browsers and email clients to run as
administrator?
6. Does the system prevent administrative accounts from logging into machines,
either locally or remotely, instead requiring elevation of privileges once logged
in with a user account?
7. Does the system require strong passwords for all administrative accounts and
does the system require update of administrator passwords on a regular basis?
8. Does the system audit all attempts to gain access to password files within the
system?
9. Does the system comply with password policies detailed in the control (yes or
no)?
10. How long does it take for administrators to be notified about user accounts
being added to super user groups (time in minutes)?
11. Are additional alerts generated every 24 hours until the user account has been
removed from or authorized to be a part of the super user group (yes or no)?
1. How many unauthorized elevated operating system accounts (local
administrator/root) are currently configured on the organizations systems (by
business unit)?
2. How many unauthorized elevated application accounts are currently configured
on the organizations systems (by business unit)?
3. What percentage of the organizations elevated accounts do not currently adhere
to the organizations password standard (by business unit)?
4. What percentage of the organizations elevated accounts do not require twofactor authentication (by business unit)?
5. How many attempts to upgrade an account to administrative privileges have
been detected on the organizations systems recently (by business unit)?
6. How many attempts to gain access to password files within the system have
66
been detected on the organizations systems recently (by business unit)?
Control 12 Effectiveness Test

must attempt a variety of techniques to gain access and exploit administrative accounts
within the system. Each of the following tests must be performed at least three times:
Attempt to gain access to a cross section of devices within the system, using
default administrative passwords.
Attempt to log-in remotely to machines using administrative accounts directly.
Verify that this is disallowed by policy.
Attempt to log-in directly to a workstation or server with root or administrator
accounts. Verify that this is disallowed by policy.
Attempt to gain access to password files within the system using unauthorized
accounts. Verify that access is disallowed and that attempts are logged and
reported.
Attempt to elevate to a privileged account on the system. Verify that the
administrator password is required to perform the elevation and that the
elevation is logged and reported by the system. Verify that traceability within
the audit logs is provided to detail the user account that performed the elevation.
Attempt to configure weak administrator passwords that are non-compliant
with established policy. Verify that the system does not allow weak passwords
to be used.
Attempt to re-use an administrator password that was previously used for the
account. Verify that the system requires unique new passwords during each
update.
Each of these tests must be performed from multiple, widely distributed systems on the
organization's network in order to test the effectiveness of administrator controls.
67
5
Password Assessment
System
Authentication
Systems
Standard
User Accounts
User Groups
Production Business
Systems with ACLs
Administrative
User Accounts
Log Management
System / SIEM

components of user account provisioning and user authentication. The following list of
the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the
business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates each of the process steps in
order to help identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Production systems use proper authentication systems
Step 2: Standard and administrative user accounts use proper authentication systems
Step 3: Standard and administrative user accounts properly managed via group
memberships
Step 4: Administrative access to systems properly logged via log management systems
Step 5: Password assessment system validates the strength of the authentication systems.
68
CSC 13: Boundary Defense

Detect/prevent/correct the flow of information transferring networks of
different trust levels with a focus on security -damaging data.
Attackers focus on exploiting systems that they can reach across the Internet, including
not only DMZ systems but also workstation and laptop computers that pull content
from the Internet through network boundaries. Threats such as organized crime groups
and nation-states use configuration and architectural weaknesses found on perimeter
systems, network devices, and Internet-accessing client machines to gain initial access
into an organization. Then, with a base of operations on these machines, attackers often
pivot to get deeper inside the boundary to steal or change information or to set up a
persistent presence for later attacks against internal hosts. Additionally, many attacks
occur between business partner networks, sometimes referred to as extranets, as
attackers hop from one organizations network to another, exploiting vulnerable
systems on extranet perimeters.
To control the flow of traffic through network borders and police content by looking for
attacks and evidence of compromised machines, boundary defenses should be multilayered, relying on firewalls, proxies, DMZ perimeter networks, and network-based IPS
and IDS. It is also critical to filter both inbound and outbound traffic.
It should be noted that boundary lines between internal and external networks are
diminishing as a result of increased interconnectivity within and between organizations
as well as the rapid rise in deployment of wireless technologies. These blurring lines
sometimes allow attackers to gain access inside networks while bypassing boundary
systems. However, even with this blurring of boundaries, effective security
deployments still rely on carefully configured boundary defenses that separate
networks with different threat levels, sets of users, and levels of control. And despite
the blurring of internal and external networks, effective multi-layered defenses of
perimeter networks help lower the number of successful attacks, allowing security
personnel to focus on attackers who have devised methods to bypass boundary
restrictions.
69
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 13-1
Deny communications with (or limit data flow to) known

malicious IP addresses (black lists), or limit access only
to trusted sites (whitelists). Tests can be periodically
carried out by sending packets from bogon source IP
addresses (non-routable or otherwise unused IP
addresses) into the network to verify that they are not
transmitted through network perimeters. Lists of bogon
addresses are publicly available on the Internet from
various sources, and indicate a series of IP addresses
that should not be used for legitimate traffic traversing
the Internet.
On DMZ networks, configure monitoring systems (which
may be built in to the IDS sensors or deployed as a
separate technology) to record at least packet header
information, and preferably full packet header and
payloads of the traffic destined for or passing through
the network border. This traffic should be sent to a
properly configured Security Information Event
Management (SIEM) or log analytics system so that
events can be correlated from all devices on the
network. .
To lower the chance of spoofed e-mail messages,
implement the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) by
deploying SPF records in DNS and enabling receiver-side
verification in mail servers.
Deploy network-based IDS sensors on Internet and
extranet DMZ systems and networks that look for
unusual attack mechanisms and detect compromise of
these systems. These network-based IDS sensors may
detect attacks through the use of signatures, network
behavior analysis, or other mechanisms to analyze
traffic.
Network-based IPS devices should be deployed to
complement IDS by blocking known bad signature or
behavior of attacks. As attacks become automated,
methods such as IDS typically delay the amount of time
it takes for someone to react to an attack. A properly
configured network-based IPS can provide automation
to block bad traffic. When evaluating network-based IPS
products, include those using techniques other than
signature-based detection (such as virtual machine or
sandbox-based approaches) for consideration.
Quick win
CSC 13-2
CSC 13-3
CSC 13-4
CSC 13-5
70
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 13-6
CSC 13-7
CSC 13-8
CSC 13-9
CSC 13-10
CSC 13-11
CSC 13-12
Design and implement network perimeters so that all

outgoing web, file transfer protocol (FTP), and secure
shell traffic to the Internet must pass through at least
one proxy on a DMZ network. The proxy should support
logging individual TCP sessions; blocking specific URLs,
domain names, and IP addresses to implement a black
list; and applying whitelists of allowed sites that can be
accessed through the proxy while blocking all other
sites. Organizations should force outbound traffic to the
Internet through an authenticated proxy server on the
enterprise perimeter. Proxies can also be used to
encrypt all traffic leaving an organization.
Require all remote login access (including VPN, dial-up,
and other forms of access that allow login to internal
systems) to use two-factor authentication.
All enterprise devices remotely logging into the internal
network should be managed by the enterprise, with
remote control of their configuration, installed software,
and patch levels. For third-party devices (e.g.,
subcontractors/vendors), publish minimum security
standards for access to the enterprise network and
perform a security scan before allowing access.
Periodically scan for back-channel connections to the
Internet that bypass the DMZ, including unauthorized
VPN connections and dual-homed hosts connected to the
enterprise network and to other networks via wireless,
dial-up modems, or other mechanisms.
To limit access by an insider, untrusted
subcontractor/vendor, or malware spreading on an
internal network, devise internal network segmentation
schemes to limit traffic to only those services needed for
business use across the organizations internal network.
To minimize the impact of an attacker pivoting between
compromised systems, only allow DMZ systems to
communicate with private network systems via
application proxies or application-aware firewalls over
approved channels.
To help identify covert channels exfiltrating data
through a firewall, configure the built-in firewall session
tracking mechanisms included in many commercial
firewalls to identify TCP sessions that last an unusually
long time for the given organization and firewall device,
alerting personnel about the source and destination
addresses associated with these long sessions.
71
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
Advanced
CSC 13-13
Deploy NetFlow collection and analysis to DMZ network

flows to detect anomalous activity.
Configuration/
Hygiene

The boundary defenses included in this control build on Critical Control 10. The
additional recommendations here focus on improving the overall architecture and
implementation of both Internet and internal network boundary points. Internal
network segmentation is central to this control because once inside a network, many
intruders attempt to target the most sensitive machines. Usually, internal network
protection is not set up to defend against an internal attacker. Setting up even a basic
level of security segmentation across the network and protecting each segment with a
proxy and a firewall will greatly reduce an intruders access to the other parts of the
network.
One element of this control can be implemented using free or commercial IDS and
sniffers to look for attacks from external sources directed at DMZ and internal systems,
as well as attacks originating from internal systems against the DMZ or Internet.
Security personnel should regularly test these sensors by launching vulnerabilityscanning tools against them to verify that the scanner traffic triggers an appropriate
alert. The captured packets of the IDS sensors should be reviewed using an automated
script each day to ensure that log volumes are within expected parameters and that the
logs are formatted properly and have not been corrupted.
Additionally, packet sniffers should be deployed on DMZs to look for Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. By sampling traffic regularly, such
as over a three-hour period once a week, information security personnel can search for
HTTP traffic that is neither sourced by nor destined for a DMZ proxy, implying that the
requirement for proxy use is being bypassed.
To identify back-channel connections that bypass approved DMZs, network security
personnel can establish an Internet-accessible system to use as a receiver for testing
outbound access. This system is configured with a free or commercial packet sniffer.
Then, security personnel can connect a sending test system to various points on the
organizations internal network, sending easily identifiable traffic to the sniffing
receiver on the Internet. These packets can be generated using free or commercial tools
with a payload that contains a custom file used for the test. When the packets arrive at
the receiver system, the source address of the packets should be verified against
acceptable DMZ addresses allowed for the organization. If source addresses are
discovered that are not included in legitimate, registered DMZs, more detail can be
gathered by using a traceroute tool to determine the path that packets take from the
sender to the receiver system.
72

1. Are all unauthorized packets entering or leaving the network detected (yes or
no)?
2. Do all network connections to the Internet, business partners, or other third
parties currently utilize inbound & outbound network filters, and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) (yes or no)?
3. How long does it take before unauthorized network packets are alerted on when
passing through perimeter systems (time in minutes)?
4. How long does it take to apply configuration changes to block unauthorized
traffic passing through perimeter systems (time in minutes)?
1. What percentage of the organizations remote access users are not required to
use two-factor authentication to remotely access the organizations network (by
business unit)?
2. What percentage of remote business systems are not managed using the same
security standards as internal network systems (by business unit)?
3. What percentage of the organizations internal systems are not on dedicated
Virtual LANs (VLANs) that are segmented with access control lists (by business
unit)?
4. How many events of interest have been discovered recently on the
organizations network through analysis of NetFlow configured on network
devices (by business unit)?
must test boundary devices by sending packets from outside any trusted network to
ensure that only authorized packets are allowed through the boundary. All other
packets must be dropped. In addition, unauthorized packets must be sent from a
trusted network to an untrusted network to make sure egress filtering is functioning
properly. The evaluation team must then verify that the systems generate an alert or email notice regarding the unauthorized packets within 24 hours. It is important that the
evaluation team verify that all unauthorized packets have been detected. The evaluation
team must also verify that the alert or e-mail indicating that the unauthorized traffic is
73
now being blocked is received within one hour. The evaluation team must verify that
the system provides details of the location of each machine with this new test software,
including information about the asset owner. It is also important that the evaluation
team test to ensure that the device fails in a state where it does not forward traffic when
it crashes or becomes flooded.

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case we are examining the
network boundary devices and the supporting systems such as authentication servers,
two-factor authentication systems, network monitoring systems, and network proxy
devices. The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities
work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates
each of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall
control.
Step 1: Hardened device configurations applied to production devices
74
Step 2: Two-factor authentication systems required for administrative access to production

devices
Step 3: Production network devices send events to log management and correlation system
Step 4: Network monitoring system analyzes network traffic
Step 5: Network monitoring system sends events to log management and correlation system
Step 6: Outbound traffic passes through and is examined by network proxy devices
Step 7: Network systems scanned for potential weaknesses.
75
CSC 14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs

Collect, manage, and analyze audit logs of events that could help detect,
understand, or recover from an attack.
Deficiencies in security logging and analysis allow attackers to hide their location,
malicious software, and activities on victim machines. Even if the victims know that
their systems have been compromised, without protected and complete logging records
they are blind to the details of the attack and to subsequent actions taken by the
attackers. Without solid audit logs, an attack may go unnoticed indefinitely and the
particular damages done may be irreversible.
Sometimes logging records are the only evidence of a successful attack. Many
organizations keep audit records for compliance purposes, but attackers rely on the fact
that such organizations rarely look at the audit logs, so they do not know that their
systems have been compromised. Because of poor or nonexistent log analysis
processes, attackers sometimes control victim machines for months or years without
anyone in the target organization knowing, even though the evidence of the attack has
been recorded in unexamined log files.
ID #
Description
CSC 14-1
Include at least two synchronized time sources (i.e.,

Quick win
Network Time Protocol NTP) from which all servers and
network equipment retrieve time information on a regular
basis so that timestamps in logs are consistent, and are set
to UTC (Coordinate Universal Time).
Validate audit log settings for each hardware device and
Quick win
the software installed on it, ensuring that logs include a
date, timestamp, source addresses, destination addresses,
and various other useful elements of each packet and/or
transaction. Systems should record logs in a standardized
format such as syslog entries or those outlined by the
Common Event Expression initiative. If systems cannot
generate logs in a standardized format, log normalization
tools can be deployed to convert logs into such a format.
CSC 14-2
Category
76
CSC 14-3
Ensure that all systems that store logs have adequate

storage space for the logs generated on a regular basis, so
that log files will not fill up between log rotation intervals.
The logs must be archived and digitally signed on a
periodic basis.
Develop a log retention policy to make sure that the logs
are kept for a sufficient period of time. Organizations are
often compromised for several months without detection.
The logs must be kept for a longer period of time than it
takes an organization to detect an attack so they can
accurately determine what occurred.
Quick win
Have security personnel and/or system administrators

run biweekly reports that identify anomalies in logs. They
should then actively review the anomalies, documenting
their findings.
Configure network boundary devices, including firewalls,
network-based IPS, and inbound and outbound proxies, to
verbosely log all traffic (both allowed and blocked)
arriving at the device.
Quick win
CSC 14-7
For all servers, ensure that logs are written to write-only

devices or to dedicated logging servers running on
separate machines from the hosts generating the event
logs, lowering the chance that an attacker can manipulate
logs stored locally on compromised machines.
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 14-8
Deploy a SIEM (Security Incident and Event Management)

or log analytic tools for log aggregation and consolidation
from multiple machines and for log correlation and
analysis. Using the SIEM tool, system administrators and
security personnel should devise profiles of common
events from given systems so that they can tune detection
to focus on unusual activity, avoid false positives, more
rapidly identify anomalies, and prevent overwhelming
analysts with insignificant alerts.
Monitor for service creation events and enable process
tracking logs. On Windows systems, many attackers use
PsExec functionality to spread from system to system.
Creation of a service is an unusual event and should be
monitored closely. Process tracking is valuable for
incident handling.
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 14-4
CSC 14-5
CSC 14-6
CSC 14-9
77
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Advanced
CSC 14-10
(NEW)
Ensure that the log collection system does not lose events Advanced
during peak activity, and that the system detects and
alerts if event loss occurs (such as when volume exceeds
the capacity of a log collection system). This includes
ensuring that the log collection system can accommodate
intermittent or restricted-bandwidth connectivity through
the use of handshaking / flow control.

Most free and commercial operating systems, network services, and firewall
technologies offer logging capabilities. Such logging should be activated, with logs sent
to centralized logging servers. Firewalls, proxies, and remote access systems (VPN, dialup, etc.) should all be configured for verbose logging, storing all the information
available for logging in the event a follow-up investigation is required. Furthermore,
operating systems, especially those of servers, should be configured to create access
control logs when a user attempts to access resources without the appropriate
privileges. To evaluate whether such logging is in place, an organization should
periodically scan through its logs and compare them with the asset inventory
assembled as part of Critical Control 1 in order to ensure that each managed item
actively connected to the network is periodically generating logs.
Analytical programs such as SIM/SEM solutions for reviewing logs can provide value,
but the capabilities employed to analyze audit logs are quite extensive, even including,
importantly, just a cursory examination by a person. Actual correlation tools can make
audit logs far more useful for subsequent manual inspection. Such tools can be quite
helpful in identifying subtle attacks. However, these tools are neither a panacea nor a
replacement for skilled information security personnel and system administrators.
Even with automated log analysis tools, human expertise and intuition are often
required to identify and understand attacks.
1. Does each system log appropriately to a central log management system (yes or
no)?
2. Does each log event generated include a date, timestamp, source address,
destination address and other details about the packet (yes or no)?
3. If a system fails to log properly, how long does it take for an alert about the
failure to be sent (time in minutes)?
78
4. If a system fails to log properly, how long does it take for enterprise personnel to
receive the alert about the failure (time in minutes)?
1. What percentage of the organizations systems do not currently have
comprehensive logging enabled in accordance with the organizations standard
(by business unit)?
2. What percentage of the organizations systems are not currently configured to
centralize their logs to a central log management system (by business unit)?
3. How many anomalies / events of interest have been discovered in the
organizations logs recently (by business unit)?
must review the security logs of various network devices, servers, and hosts. At a
minimum the following devices must be tested: two routers, two firewalls, two
switches, 10 servers, and 10 client systems. The testing team should use trafficgenerating tools to send packets through the systems under analysis to verify that the
traffic is logged. This analysis is done by creating controlled, benign events and
determining if the information is properly recorded in the logs with key information,
including a date, timestamp, source address, destination address, and other details
about the packet. The evaluation team must verify that the system generates audit logs
and, if not, an alert or e-mail notice regarding the failed logging must be sent within 24
hours. It is important that the team verify that all activity has been detected. The
evaluation team must verify that the system provides details of the location of each
machine, including information about the asset owner.
79

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining audit
logs, the central log database system, the central time system, and log analysts. The
following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work together to
meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates each of the
process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Production systems generate logs and send them to a centrally managed log database
system
Step 2: Production systems and log database system pulls synchronize time with central time
management systems
Step 3: Logs analyzed by a log analysis system
Step 4: Log analysts examine data generated by log analysis system.
80
CSC 15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct secure access to
critical assets (e.g., information, resources, systems) according to the formal
determination of which persons, computers, and applications have a need and
right to access these critical assets based on an approved classification.
Some organizations do not carefully identify and separate their most sensitive and
critical assets from less sensitive, publicly accessible information on their internal
networks. In many environments, internal users have access to all or most of the critical
assets. Sensitive assets may also include systems that provide management and control
of physical systems (e.g., SCADA). Once attackers have penetrated such a network, they
can easily find and exfiltrate important information, cause physical damage, or disrupt
operations with little resistance. For example, in several high-profile breaches over the
past two years, attackers were able to gain access to sensitive data stored on the same
servers with the same level of access as far less important data. There are also examples
of using access to the corporate network to gain access to, then control over, physical
assets and cause damage.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 15-1
Locate any sensitive information on separated VLANS

with firewall filtering. All communication of sensitive
information over less-trusted networks should be
encrypted.
Enforce detailed audit logging for access to nonpublic
data and special authentication for sensitive data.
Segment the network based on the trust levels of the
information stored on the servers. Whenever
information flows over a network with a lower trust
level, the information should be encrypted.
Use host-based data loss prevention (DLP) to enforce
ACLs even when data is copied off a server. In most
organizations, access to the data is controlled by ACLs
that are implemented on the server. Once the data have
been copied to a desktop system, the ACLs are no longer
enforced and the users can send the data to whomever
they want.
Quick win
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CSC 15-3
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Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced

It is important that an organization understand what its sensitive information is, where
it resides, and who needs access to it. To derive sensitivity levels, organizations need to
put together a list of the key types of data and the overall importance to the
organization. This analysis would be used to create an overall data classification scheme
for the organization. At a base level, a data classification scheme is broken down into
two levels: public (unclassified) and private (classified). Once the private information
has been identified, it can then be further subdivided based on the impact it would have
to the organization if it were compromised.
Once the sensitivity of the data has been identified, the data need to be traced back to
business applications and the physical servers that house those applications. The
network then needs to be segmented so that systems of the same sensitivity level are on
the same network and segmented from systems with different trust levels. If possible,
firewalls need to control access to each segment. If data are flowing over a network
with a lower trust level, encryption should be used.
Job requirements should be created for each user group to determine what information
the group needs access to in order to perform its jobs. Based on the requirements,
access should only be given to the segments or servers that are needed for each job
function. Detailed logging should be turned on for all servers in order to track access
and examine situations where someone is accessing data that they should not be
accessing.
1. Can the system detect all attempts by users to access files on local systems or
network-accessible file shares without the appropriate privileges (yes or no)?
2. How long does it take the system to generate an alert or e-mail for
administrative personnel of a user inappropriately accessing the file shares
(time in minutes)?
1. What percentage of the organizations data sets have not been classified in
accordance with the organizations data classification standards (by business
unit)?
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2. What percentage of sensitive data sets are not configured to require logging of
access to the data set (by business unit)?
3. What percentage of the organizations business systems are not utilizing host
based Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software applications (by business unit)?
must create two test accounts each on 10 representative systems in the enterprise: five
server machines and five client systems. For each system evaluated, one account must
have limited privileges, while the other must have privileges necessary to create files on
the systems. The evaluation team must then verify that the non-privileged account is
unable to access the files created for the other account on the system. The team must
also verify that an alert or e-mail is generated based on the attempted unsuccessful
access within 24 hours. Upon completion of the test, these accounts must be removed.

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, the data classification
system and permission baseline is the blueprint for how authentication and access of
data is controlled. The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the
entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also
83
Step 1: An appropriate data classification system and permissions baseline applied to
production data systems
Step 2: Access appropriately logged to a log management system
Step 3: Proper access control applied to portable media/USB drives
Step 4: Active scanner validates, checks access, and checks data classification
Step 5: Host-based encryption and data-loss prevention validates and checks all access
requests.
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CSC 16: Account Monitoring and Control

Actively manage the life-cycle of system and application accounts their
creation, use, dormancy, deletion - in order to minimize opportunities for
attackers to leverage them.
Attackers frequently discover and exploit legitimate but inactive user accounts to
impersonate legitimate users, thereby making discovery of attacker behavior difficult
for network watchers. Accounts of contractors and employees who have been
terminated and accounts formerly set up for Red Team testing (but not deleted
afterwards) have often been misused in this way. Additionally, some malicious insiders
or former employees have accessed accounts left behind in a system long after contract
expiration, maintaining their access to an organizations computing system and
sensitive data for unauthorized and sometimes malicious purposes.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 16-1
Review all system accounts and disable any account that

cannot be associated with a business process and owner.
Ensure that all accounts have an expiration date
associated with the account.
Ensure that systems automatically create a report that
includes a list of locked-out accounts, disabled accounts,
accounts with passwords that exceed the maximum
password age, and accounts with passwords that never
expire. This list should be sent to the associated system
administrator in a secure fashion.
Establish and follow a process for revoking system
access by disabling accounts immediately upon
termination of an employee or contractor. Disabling
instead of deleting accounts allows preservation of audit
trails.
Regularly monitor the use of all accounts, automatically
logging off users after a standard period of inactivity.
Configure screen locks on systems to limit access to
unattended workstations.
Quick win
Monitor account usage to determine dormant accounts,

notifying the user or users manager. Disable such
accounts if not needed, or document and monitor
Quick win
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CSC 16-4
CSC 16-5
CSC 16-6
(NEW)
CSC 16-7
85
Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
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CSC 16-9
CSC 16-10
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(NEW)
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CSC 16-17
exceptions (e.g., vendor maintenance accounts needed

for system recovery or continuity operations).
Require that all non-administrator accounts have strong
passwords that contain letters, numbers, and special
characters, be changed at least every 90 days, have a
minimal age of one day, and not be allowed to use the
previous 15 passwords as a new password. These
values can be adjusted based on the specific business
needs of the organization.
Use and configure account lockouts such that after a set
number of failed login attempts the account is locked for
a standard period of time.
Require that managers match active employees and
contractors with each account belonging to their
managed staff. Security or system administrators should
then disable accounts that are not assigned to active
employees or contractors.
Monitor attempts to access deactivated accounts
through audit logging.
Configure access for all accounts through a centralized
point of authentication, for example Active Directory or
LDAP. Configure network and security devices for
centralized authentication as well.
Profile each users typical account usage by determining
normal time-of-day access and access duration. Reports
should be generated that indicate users who have logged
in during unusual hours or have exceeded their normal
login duration. This includes flagging the use of the
users credentials from a computer other than
computers on which the user generally works.
Require multi-factor authentication for accounts that
have access to sensitive data or systems. Multi-factor
authentication can be achieved using Smart cards with
certificates, One Time Password (OTP) tokens, or
biometrics.
For authenticated access to web services within an
enterprise, ensure that account usernames and
passwords are passed over an encrypted channel and
associated password hash files are stored securely if a
centralized service is not employed.
Configure all systems to use encrypted channels for the
transmission of passwords over a network.
Verify that all password files are encrypted or hashed
and that these files cannot be accessed without root or
86
Quick win
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
Advanced
Advanced
Advanced
(NEW)
administrator privileges. Audit all access to password

files in the system.
CSC Procedures and Tools

Although most operating systems include capabilities for logging information about
account usage, these features are sometimes disabled by default. Even when such
features are present and active, they often do not provide fine-grained detail about
access to the system by default. Security personnel can configure systems to record
more detailed information about account access, and use home-grown scripts or thirdparty log analysis tools to analyze this information and profile user access of various
systems.
Accounts must also be tracked very closely. Any account that is dormant must be
disabled and eventually removed from the system. All active accounts must be traced
back to authorized users of the system, and it must be ensured that their passwords are
robust and changed on a regular basis. Users must also be logged out of the system
after a period of no activity to minimize the possibility of an attacker using their system
to extract information from the organization.
1. Does the system audit and report on valid and invalid log-ins to user accounts?
2. Does the system audit and report on valid and invalid log-ins to network and
security device user accounts?
3. Does the system lock users out after five (5) invalid attempts?
4. Do user account passwords expire at least every 90 days?
5. Does the system report on dormant accounts that have not been used for a
configurable period of time?
6. How long does it take to send an alert or e-mail to administrative personnel that
the comparison report has been created (time in minutes)?
Control 16 Automation Metrics
In order to automate the monitoring and control of user accounts, organizations should
gather the following information with automated technical sensors:
1. How many invalid attempts to access user accounts have been detected within a
period of time?
2. How many accounts have been locked out within a period of time?
87
3. How many attempts to gain access to password files in the system have been
detected within a period of time?
4. Perform authorized password cracking against password files and identify the
number of administrator account passwords that are cracked during the
attempt. Remediate any compromised passwords immediately.
5. Is an automated list of user accounts on the system created daily & compared to
a baseline (yes or no)?
6. How long does it take to send an alert or e-mail to administrative personnel that
the comparison report has been created (time in minutes)?
must attempt a variety of techniques to gain access to user accounts within the system.
Each of the following tests must be performed at least three times:
1. Attempt to configure weak user account passwords that are non-compliant with
established policy. Verify that the system does not allow weak passwords to be
used.
2. Attempt to re-use a user account password that was previously used for the
account. Verify that the system requires unique new passwords during each
update.
3. Attempt to capture passwords by monitoring network traffic to server
resources. Remediate any instances where passwords are transmitted in clear
text.
4. Attempt to gain access to password files stored on the system. If successful,
identify whether passwords are cryptographically secured.
organization's network in order to test the effectiveness of user account controls.
88

regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining user
accounts and how they interact with the data systems and the log management systems.
Another key component of these systems is the reports generated for management of
user accounts.
The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work
together to meet the business goal defined in this control. It also delineates each of the
process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: User accounts are properly managed on production systems
Step 2: User accounts are assigned proper permissions to production data sets
Step 3: User account access is logged to log management system
Step 4: Log management systems generate user account and access reports for management
Step 5: Account baseline information is sent to log management system
Step 6: Critical information is properly protected and encrypted for each user account.
89
CSC 17: Data Protection

The processes and tools used to prevent data exfiltration , mitigate the effects of
exfiltrated data, and ensure the privacy and integrity of sensitive information.
Data resides in many places. Protection of that data is best achieved through the
application of a combination of encryption, integrity protection and data loss
prevention techniques. As organizations continue their move towards cloud computing
and mobile access, it is important that proper care be taken to limit and report on data
exfiltration while also mitigating the effects of data compromise.
The adoption of data encryption, both in transit and at rest, provides mitigation against
data compromise. This is true if proper care has been taken in the processes and
technologies associated with the encryption operations. An example of this is the
management of cryptographic keys used by the various algorithms that protect data.
The process for generation, use and destruction of keys should be based on proven
processes as defined in standards such as NIST SP 800-57.
Care should also be taken to ensure that products used within an enterprise implement
well known and vetted cryptographic algorithms, as identified by NIST. Re-evaluation
of the algorithms and key sizes used within the enterprise on an annual basis is also
recommended to ensure that organizations are not falling behind in the strength of
protection applied to their data.
For organizations that are moving data to the cloud, it is important for organizations to
understand the security controls applied to data in the cloud multi-tenant environment,
and determine the best course of action for application of encryption controls and
security of keys. When possible, keys should be stored within secure containers such as
Hardware Security Modules (HSMs).
Encrypting data provides a level of assurance that even if data is compromised, it is
impractical to access the plaintext without significant resources, however controls
should also be put in place to mitigate the threat of data exfiltration in the first place.
Many attacks occurred across the network, while others involved physical theft of
laptops and other equipment holding sensitive information. Yet, in most cases, the
victims were not aware that the sensitive data were leaving their systems because they
were not monitoring data outflows. The movement of data across network boundaries
both electronically and physically must be carefully scrutinized to minimize its
exposure to attackers.
The loss of control over protected or sensitive data by organizations is a serious threat
to business operations and a potential threat to national security. While some data are
leaked or lost as a result of theft or espionage, the vast majority of these problems
90
result from poorly understood data practices, a lack of effective policy architectures,
and user error. Data loss can even occur as a result of legitimate activities such as eDiscovery during litigation, particularly when records retention practices are
ineffective or nonexistent.
Data loss prevention (DLP) refers to a comprehensive approach covering people,
processes, and systems that identify, monitor, and protect data in use (e.g., endpoint
actions), data in motion (e.g., network actions), and data at rest (e.g., data storage)
through deep content inspection and with a centralized management framework. Over
the last several years, there has been a noticeable shift in attention and investment from
securing the network to securing systems within the network, and to securing the data
itself. DLP controls are based on policy, and include classifying sensitive data,
discovering that data across an enterprise, enforcing controls, and reporting and
auditing to ensure policy compliance.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 17-1
Deploy approved hard drive encryption software to

mobile devices and systems that hold sensitive data.
Verify that cryptographic devices and software are
configured to use publicly-vetted algorithms.
Quick win
Perform an assessment of data to identify sensitive

information that requires the application of encryption
and integrity controls
Review cloud provider security practices for data
protection.
Quick win
Deploy an automated tool on network perimeters that

monitors for certain sensitive information (i.e.,
personally identifiable information), keywords, and other
document characteristics to discover unauthorized
attempts to exfiltrate data across network boundaries
and block such transfers while alerting information
security personnel.
Conduct periodic scans of server machines using
automated tools to determine whether sensitive data (i.e.,
personally identifiable information, health, credit card,
and classified information) is present on the system in
clear text. These tools, which search for patterns that
indicate the presence of sensitive information, can help
identify if a business or technical process is leaving
behind or otherwise leaking sensitive information.
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 17-2
(NEW)
CSC 17-3
(NEW)
CSC 17-4
(NEW)
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CSC 17-6
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Quick win
Quick Win
Visibility/
Attribution
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(NEW)
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(NEW)
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(NEW)
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(NEW)
Move data between networks using secure,

authenticated, and encrypted mechanisms.
If there is no business need for supporting such devices,
configure systems so that they will not write data to USB
tokens or USB hard drives. If such devices are required,
enterprise software should be used that can configure
systems to allow only specific USB devices (based on
serial number or other unique property) to be accessed,
and that can automatically encrypt all data placed on
such devices. An inventory of all authorized devices must
be maintained.
Use network-based DLP solutions to monitor and control
the flow of data within the network. Any anomalies that
exceed the normal traffic patterns should be noted and
appropriate action taken to address them.
Only allow approved Certificate Authorities (CAs) to
issue certificates within the enterprise; Review and verify
each CAs Certificate Practices Statement (CPS) and
Certificate Policy (CP).
Perform an annual review of algorithms and key lengths
in use for protection of sensitive data.
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Monitor all traffic leaving the organization and detect any

unauthorized use of encryption. Attackers often use an
encrypted channel to bypass network security devices.
Therefore it is essential that organizations be able to
detect rogue connections, terminate the connection, and
remediate the infected system.
Block access to known file transfer and e-mail exfiltration
websites.
Define roles and responsibilities related to management
of encryption keys within the enterprise; define
processes for lifecycle.
Where applicable, implement Hardware Security
Modules (HSMs) for protection of private keys (e.g., for
sub CAs) or Key Encryption Keys.
Advanced
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
Advanced
Advanced

Commercial tools are available to support enterprise management of encryption and
key management within an enterprise and include the ability to support
implementation of encryption controls within cloud and mobile environments.
92
Definition of lifecycle processes and roles and responsibilities associated with key
management should be undertaken by each organization.
Commercial DLP solutions are available to look for exfiltration attempts and detect
other suspicious activities associated with a protected network holding sensitive
information. Organizations deploying such tools should carefully inspect their logs and
follow up on any discovered attempts, even those that are successfully blocked, to
transmit sensitive information out of the organization without authorization.
1. Does the system identify and report on unauthorized data being exfiltrated,
whether via network file transfers or removable media?
2. Does the system identify the attachment of unencrypted USB tokens and require
encryption of tokens?
3. Does the system store cryptographic key material securely?
4. Does the system use only NIST approved encryption algorithms?
5. Within one hour of a data exfiltration event or attempt, enterprise
administrative personnel must be alerted by the appropriate monitoring system.
6. Do alerts notifying of data exfiltration also note the system and location where
the event or attempt occurred?
7. Are the systems able to identify the location, department, and other critical
details about where the sensitive data originated from (yes or no)?
8. How long does it take before a data leakage risk has been remediated from the
time it was detected (time in minutes)?
In order to automate the protection of data using cryptography and DLP functions,
organizations should gather the following information with automated technical
sensors:
1. How many unauthorized data exfiltration attempts have been detected within a
period of time by DLP software?
2. How many plaintext instances of sensitive data have been detected within a
period by automated scanning software?
3. How many attempts to access known file transfer and e-mail exfiltration
websites have been detected within a period of time?
93

must attempt to move test data sets that trigger DLP systems but do not contain
sensitive data outside of the trusted computing environment via both network file
transfers and removable media. Each of the following tests must be performed at least
three times:
Attempt to transfer large data sets across network boundaries from an internal
system.
Attempt to transfer plaintext test data sets of personally identifiable information
(that trigger DLP systems but do not contain sensitive data) across network
boundaries from an internal system (using multiple keywords specific to the
business).
Attempt to transfer encrypted test data sets across network boundaries from an
internal system to identify if the exfiltration is reported.
Attempt to maintain a persistent network connection for at least 10 hours across
network boundaries between an internal and external system, even though little
data may be exchanged.
Attempt to maintain a network connection across network boundaries using an
anomalous service port number between an internal and external system.
Insert a USB token into an organization system and attempt to transfer example
test data to the USB device.
organization's network in order to test the effectiveness of the monitoring systems.
Once each of these events has occurred, the time it takes for enterprise staff to respond
to the event must be recorded.
CSC 17 Entity Relationship Diagram

and identify where potential failures in the system might occur.
94
A control system is a device or set of devices used to manage, command, direct, or regulate
the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining the flow of
information in and out of the organization in an attempt to limit potential data loss via
network or removable media sources. The following list of the steps in the above diagram
shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this control. It
also delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify potential failure points in
Step 1: Data encryption system ensures that appropriate hard disks are encrypted
Step 2: Sensitive network traffic encrypted
Step 3: Data connections monitored at the networks perimeter by monitoring systems
Step 4: Stored data scanned to identify where sensitive information is stored
Step 5: Offline media encrypted.
95
CSC 18: Incident Response and Management

Protect the organizations information, as well as its reputation, by developing and
implementing an incident response infrastructure (e.g., plans, defined roles,
training, communications, management oversight) for quickly discovering an attack
and then effectively containing the damage, eradicating the attackers presence,
and restoring the integrity of the network and systems.
Cyber incidents are now just part of our way of life. Even large, well-funded, and technically
sophisticated enterprises struggle to keep up with the frequency and complexity of attacks.
The question of a successful cyber-attack against an enterprise is not if but when.
When an incident occurs, it is too late to develop the right procedures, reporting, data
collection, management responsibility, legal protocols, and communications strategy that
will allow the enterprise to successfully understand, manage, and recover. Without an
incident response plan, an organization may not discover an attack in the first place, or, if
the attack is detected, the organization may not follow good procedures to contain damage,
eradicate the attackers presence, and recover in a secure fashion. Thus, the attacker may
have a far greater impact, causing more damage, infecting more systems, and possibly
exfiltrate more sensitive data than would otherwise be possible were an effective incident
response plan in place.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 18-1
Ensure that there are written incident response procedures

that include a definition of personnel roles for handling
incidents. The procedures should define the phases of
incident handling.
Assign job titles and duties for handling computer and
network incidents to specific individuals.
Define management personnel who will support the
incident handling process by acting in key decision-making
roles.
Devise organization-wide standards for the time required
for system administrators and other personnel to report
anomalous events to the incident handling team, the
mechanisms for such reporting, and the kind of information
that should be included in the incident notification. This
reporting should also include notifying the appropriate
Community Emergency Response Team in accordance with
Quick win
CSC 18-2
CSC 18-3
CSC 18-4
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Quick win
Quick win
Quick win
CSC 18-5
CSC 18-6
CSC 18-7
all legal or regulatory requirements for involving that

organization in computer incidents.
Assemble and maintain information on third-party contact
information to be used to report a security incident (i.e.,
maintain an e-mail address of security@organization.com or
have a web page http://organization.com/security).
Publish information for all personnel, including employees
and contractors, regarding reporting computer anomalies
and incidents to the incident handling team. Such
information should be included in routine employee
awareness activities.
Conduct periodic incident scenario sessions for personnel
associated with the incident handling team to ensure that
they understand current threats and risks, as well as their
responsibilities in supporting the incident handling team.
Quick win
Quick win
Configuration/
Hygiene

After defining detailed incident response procedures, the incident response team should
engage in periodic scenario-based training, working through a series of attack scenarios
fine-tuned to the threats and vulnerabilities the organization faces. These scenarios help
ensure that team members understand their role on the incident response team and also
help prepare them to handle incidents.
A full treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of the Critical Security Controls. However,
the actions in CSC 18 provide specific, high-priority steps that can improve enterprise
security, and should be a part of any comprehensive incident and response plan.
None
None
None
97
Control 18 System Entity Relationship Diagram

the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining the incident
handling process and how prepared organizations are in the event that an incident occurs.
The following list of the steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work together
to meet the business goal defined in this control. The list also delineates each of the process
steps in order to help identify potential failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Incident handling policies and procedures educate workforce members as to their
responsibilities during an incident
Step 2: Some workforce members designated as incident handlers
Step 3: Incident handling policies and procedures educate management as to their
responsibilities during an incident
Step 4: Incident handlers participate in incident handling scenario tests
Step 5: Incident handlers report incidents to management
Step 6: The organizations management reports incidents to outside law enforcement and the
appropriate computer emergency response team, if necessary.
98
CSC 19: Secure Network Engineering

Make security an inherent attribute of the enterprise by specifying, designing, and
building-in features that allow high confidence systems operations while denying or
minimizing opportunities for attackers. .
System or security designers rarely get to start from scratch and build in all of the security
features they might want. And even if they did, systems constantly evolve, new business
imperatives appear, attackers develop new techniques, and new technologies emerge to
complicate the security problem. In such an environment, attackers take advantage of
missing security features, time gaps in deploying new defenses or moving information, and
the seams between defensive controls. Defenders are quickly overwhelmed with new
operational requirements, managing tools and changes, new information, and firefighting.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 19-1
Design the network using a minimum of a three-tier

architecture (DMZ, middleware, and private network). Any
system accessible from the Internet should be on the DMZ,
but DMZ systems should never contain sensitive data. Any
system with sensitive data should reside on the private
network and never be directly accessible from the Internet.
DMZ systems should communicate with private network
systems through an application proxy residing on the
middleware tier.
To support rapid response and shunning of detected attacks,
engineer the network architecture and its corresponding
systems for rapid deployment of new access control lists,
rules, signatures, blocks, blackholes, and other defensive
measures.
Deploy domain name systems (DNS) in a hierarchical,
structured fashion, with all internal network client machines
configured to send requests to intranet DNS servers, not to
DNS servers located on the Internet. These internal DNS
servers should be configured to forward requests they
cannot resolve to DNS servers located on a protected DMZ.
These DMZ servers, in turn, should be the only DNS servers
allowed to send requests to the Internet.
Quick win
CSC 19-2
CSC 19-3
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Configuration/
Hygiene
Visibility/
Attribution
CSC 19-4
Segment the enterprise network into multiple, separate trust

zones to provide more granular control of system access and
additional intranet boundary defenses.
Configuration/
Hygiene

To help ensure a consistent, defensible network, the architecture of each network should
be based on a template that describes the networks overall layout and the services it
provides. Organizations should prepare diagrams for each of their networks that show
network components such as routers, firewalls, and switches, along with significant servers
and groups of client machines.
Although the Critical Security Controls overall provide many specific, high-priority steps
that will improve enterprise security, a comprehensive treatment of Secure Network
Engineering is beyond the scope of this document. In CSC 19, we describe capabilities that
should be built-in to any security architecture.
None
None
None
100
the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining the network
engineering process and evaluating the controls that work together in order to create a
secure and robust network architecture. The following list of the steps in the above
diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal defined in this
control. The list also delineates each of the process steps in order to help identify potential
failure points in the overall control.
Step 1: Network engineering policies and procedures dictate how network systems function to
include dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) servers
Step 2: DHCP servers provide IP addresses to systems on the network
Step 3: Network devices perform DNS lookups to internal DNS servers
Step 4: Internal DNS servers perform DNS lookups to external DNS servers
Step 5: Network engineering policies and procedures dictate how a central network management
system functions
Step 6: Central network management systems configure network devices.
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CSC 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

Test the overall strength of an organizations defenses (the technology, the
processes, and the people) by simulating the objectives and actions of an attacker.
Attackers often exploit the gap between good defensive designs and intentions and
implementation or maintenance. Examples include: the time window between
announcement of a vulnerability, the availability of a vendor patch, and actual installation
on every machine; well-intentioned policies which have no enforcement mechanism
(especially those intended to restrict risky human actions); failure to apply good
configurations and other practices to the entire enterprise, or to machines that come inand-out of the network; and failure to understand the interaction among multiple defensive
tools, or with normal system operations that have security implications.
In addition, successful defense requires a comprehensive program of technical defenses,
good policy and governance, and appropriate action by people. In a complex environment
where technology is constantly evolving, and new attacker tradecraft appears regularly,
organizations should periodically test their defenses to identify gaps and to assess their
readiness.
Penetration testing starts from the identification and assessment of vulnerabilities that can
be identified in the enterprise. It complements this by designing and executing tests that
demonstrate specifically how an adversary can either subvert the organizations security
goals (e.g., the protection of specific Intellectual Property) or achieve specific adversarial
objectives (e.g., establishment of a covert Command and Control infrastructure). The result
provides deeper insight, through demonstration, into the business risks of various
vulnerabilities.
Red Team exercises take a comprehensive approach at the full spectrum of organization
policies, processes, and defenses in order to improve organizational readiness, improve
training for defensive practitioners, and inspect current performance levels. Independent
Red Teams can provide valuable and objective insights about the existence of
vulnerabilities and the efficacy of defenses and mitigating controls already in place and
even of those planned for future implementation.
ID #
Description
Category
CSC 20-1
Conduct regular external and internal penetration tests to

identify vulnerabilities and attack vectors that can be used to
exploit enterprise systems successfully. Penetration testing
should occur from outside the network perimeter (i.e., the
Quick win
102
CSC 20-2
CSC 20-3
CSC 20-4
CSC 20-5
CSC 20-6
CSC 20-7
CSC 20-8
Internet or wireless frequencies around an organization) as

well as from within its boundaries (i.e., on the internal
network) to simulate both outsider and insider attacks.
Any user or system accounts used to perform penetration
testing, should be controlled and monitored to make sure
they are only being used for legitimate purposes, and are
removed or restored to normal function after testing is over.
Perform periodic Red Team exercises to test organizational
readiness to identify and stop attacks or to respond quickly
and effectively.
Include tests for the presence of unprotected system
information and artifacts that would be useful to attackers,
including network diagrams, configuration files, older
penetration test reports, e-mails or documents containing
passwords or other information critical to system operation.
Plan clear goals of the penetration test itself with blended
attacks in mind, identifying the goal machine or target asset.
Many APT-style attacks deploy multiple vectorsoften social
engineering combined with web or network exploitation.
Red Team manual or automated testing that captures pivoted
and multi-vector attacks offers a more realistic assessment of
security posture and risk to critical assets.
Use vulnerability scanning and penetration testing tools in
concert. The results of vulnerability scanning assessments
should be used as a starting point to guide and focus
penetration testing efforts.
Devise a scoring method for determining the results of Red
Team exercises so that results can be compared over time.
Create a test bed that mimics a production environment for
specific penetration tests and Red Team attacks against
elements that are not typically tested in production, such as
attacks against supervisory control and data acquisition and
other control systems.
Quick win
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Visibility/
Attribution
Configuration/
Hygiene
Advanced
Advanced

Penetration testing and Red Teaming only provide significant value when basic defensive
measures have already been put into place, and when they are performed as part of a
comprehensive, ongoing program of security management and improvement. These are
often specified and required by formal Risk Management Frameworks and processes.
Each organization should define a clear scope and rules of engagement for penetration
testing and Red Team analyses. The scope of such projects should include, at a minimum,
systems with the organizations highest value information and production processing
103
functionality. Other lower-value systems may also be tested to see if they can be used as
pivot points to compromise higher-value targets. The rules of engagement for penetration
tests and Red Team analyses should describe, at a minimum, times of day for testing,
duration of tests, and the overall test approach.
A full treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of the Critical Security Controls. However,
the actions in CSC 20 provide specific, high-priority steps that can improve enterprise
security, and should be a part of any comprehensive penetration testing and Red Team
program.
None
None
None
104
the behavior of other devices or systems. In this case, we are examining red team and
penetration exercises and how those efforts can be valuable to enterprise personnel when
identifying which vulnerabilities are present in the organization. The following list of the
steps in the above diagram shows how the entities work together to meet the business goal
Step 1: Penetration testers perform penetration tests of production systems
Step 2: Automated pen-testing tools perform penetration tests of production systems
Step 3: Automated pen-testing tools inform penetration tester of vulnerabilities discovered
Step 4: Penetration testers perform more extensive penetration tests of test lab systems
Step 5: Auditors evaluate and inspect the work performed by automated pen-testing tools
Step 6: Auditors evaluate and inspect the work performed by penetration testers
Step 7: Penetration testers generate reports and statistics about the vulnerabilities that have
been discovered.
105
Appendix A: Attack Types

The following Attack Types were the primary ones considered when developing the Critical
Security Controls. Each is listed with the most relevant and direct Critical Security Controls (by
number) to help block, detect, or manage this problem.
Critical
Security
Control
Attack Summary
Attackers continually scan for new, unprotected systems, including test or
experimental systems, and exploit such systems to gain control of them.
Attackers distribute hostile content on Internet-accessible (and sometimes

internal) websites that exploit unpatched and improperly secured client software
running on victim machines.
2, 3
Attackers continually scan for vulnerable software and exploit it to gain control
of target machines.
2, 4
Attackers use currently infected or compromised machines to identify and

exploit other vulnerable machines across an internal network.
2, 10
Attackers exploit weak default configurations of systems that are more geared to
ease of use than security.
3, 10
Attackers exploit new vulnerabilities on systems that lack critical patches in

organizations that do not know that they are vulnerable because they lack
continuous vulnerability assessments and effective remediation.
4, 5
Attackers compromise target organizations that do not exercise their defenses to

determine and continually improve their effectiveness.
4, 5, 11, 20
Attackers use malicious code to gain and maintain control of target machines,
capture sensitive data, and then spread it to other systems, sometimes wielding
code that disables or dodges signature-based anti-virus tools.
5, 15, 17
Attackers scan for remotely accessible services on target systems that are often
unneeded for business activities, but provide an avenue of attack and
compromise of the organization.
5, 10, 11
Attackers exploit weak application software, particularly web applications,

through attack vectors such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and similar
tools.
Attackers exploit wireless access points to gain entry into a target organizations
internal network, and exploit wireless client systems to steal sensitive
information.
Attackers exploit users and system administrators via social engineering scams
that work because of a lack of security skills and awareness.
106
6, 20
7
9, 12, 16
Attackers exploit and infiltrate through network devices whose security

configuration has been weakened over time by granting, for specific short-term
business needs, supposedly temporary exceptions that are never removed.
10, 13
Attackers trick a user with an administrator-level account into opening a

phishing-style e-mail with an attachment or surfing to the attackers content on
an Internet website, allowing the attackers malicious code or exploit to run on
the victim machine with full administrator privileges.
9, 12
Attackers exploit boundary systems on Internet-accessible DMZ networks, and

then pivot to gain deeper access on internal networks.
13, 19
Attackers exploit poorly designed network architectures by locating

unneeded or unprotected connections, weak filtering, or a lack of separation
of important systems or business functions.
13, 19
Attackers operate undetected for extended periods of time on compromised

systems because of a lack of logging and log review.
14
Attackers gain access to sensitive documents in an organization that does

not properly identify and protect sensitive information or separate it from
non-sensitive information.
Attackers compromise inactive user accounts left behind by temporary
workers, contractors, and former employees, including accounts left behind
by the attackers themselves who are former employees.
Attackers escalate their privileges on victim machines by launching
password guessing, password cracking, or privilege escalation exploits to
gain administrator control of systems, which is then used to propagate to
other victim machines across an enterprise.
15, 17
16
12, 16
Attackers gain access to internal enterprise systems and gather and

exfiltrate sensitive information without detection by the victim
organization.
17
Attackers compromise systems and alter important data, potentially

jeopardizing organizational effectiveness via polluted information.
15, 17
Attackers operate undiscovered in organizations without effective incidentresponse capabilities, and when the attackers are discovered, the
organizations often cannot properly contain the attack, eradicate the
attackers presence, or recover to a secure production state.
107
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The Critical Security Controls

organization with a global scope

implanted malicious code, and establishing an adaptive, continuous defense and

application whitelisting (found in CSC 2);

A similar approach is recommended by our partners in the Australian Signals

A description of the importance of the Control in blocking or identifying

Sample entity relationship diagrams that show components of implementation.

CSC 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

Ensure that all equipment acquisitions automatically update

CSC 1 Procedures and Tools

CSC 1 Automation Metrics

A control system is a device or set of devices used to manage, command, direct, or

Step 10: Network access control continuously monitors network

CSC 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

of programs to achieve their needed business functionality),

CSC 2 Procedures and Tools

1. How many unauthorized software applications are presently located on business

A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate

CSC 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile

Establish and ensure the use of standard secure

Quick win (One

Quick win (One

latest version of application software. Remove outdated,

Quick win (One

in account in the event of a user ID switch, such as with the su

CSC 3 Procedures and Tools

The Center for Internet Security Benchmarks Program (www.cisecurity.org)

Step 7: SCAP configuration scanner validates configurations

CSC 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation

Run automated vulnerability scanning tools against all

detection events with earlier vulnerability scanning results to

organization must devise other mitigating controls that block

CSC 4 Procedures and Tools

A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate

CSC 5: Malware Defenses

Employ automated tools to continuously monitor

Scan and block all e-mail attachments entering the

CSC 5 Procedures and Tools

CSC 5 Effectiveness Test

A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate

CSC 6: Application Software Security

For all acquired application software, check that the version

For in-house developed software, ensure that explicit error

CSC 6 Procedures and Tools

A control system is a device or set of devices used to manage, command, direct, or

Step 1: Web application firewalls protect connections to internal web applications

CSC 7: Wireless Access Control

Ensure that each wireless device connected to the network

firmware interface), with password protections to lower the

CSC 7 Procedures and Tools

1. Are systems capable of identifying unauthorized wireless devices or

A wireless client with an unauthorized service set identifier configured on it.

A wireless access point with improper encryption configured.

A control system is a device or set of devices used to manage, command, direct, or

Step 5: Vulnerability scanners scan wireless devices for potential vulnerabilities

CSC 8: Data Recovery Capability

Ensure that each system is automatically backed up on at least

CSC 8 Procedures and Tools