G.R. No.

L-27455 June 28, 1973

ANA GONZAGA, SERVILLANO IGNACIO and ANASTACIA SAN JUAN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BONIFACIO EVANGELISTA, JOSE EVANGELISTA CHUA, PAULINO EVANGELISTA,
PEDRO TRINIDAD, FORTUNATA TRINIDAD, RUPERTA DE ROSAS, ANASTACIA DE ROSAS, PATRICIA
EVANGELISTA, and JUANA EVANGELISTA, respondents-appellees.
Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo, Severino C. Domiguez and Manolo E. Tolentino for petitioners-appellants.
Isabelo V. Gandionco & Teresita Gandionco Oledan for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:
It must have been well-founded doubts about the strength on the original position taken by petitioners both in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and subsequently in respondent Court Appeals, that in this appeal by certiorari from
the decision of the latter tribunal, a novel aspect is sought to be introduced them. It represents a last-ditch effort in
their thus far hopeless quest for excluding private respondents, nephews and nieces of the late Juan Evangelista,
from any share in that portion of his estate sold by his widow, petitioner Ana Gonzaga, to the other petitioners. The
point raised by them, not previously passed upon by this Court, is that the requirement in Section 20 of the Public
Land Act, 1 couched in absolute terms, of the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
for the proposed sale of the rights of one seeking a free patent, does not apply unless the application deals with a
homestead. 2 It is their contention that if such interpretation be adopted, then the decision adverse to them, both in the
lower court as well as in respondent Court of Appeals, should be reversed. We do not feel called upon to rule
squarely on such an issue, as the factual basis thereof is completely lacking, not only as shown in the decision of
respondent Court sought to be reviewed, but also as reflected in the answer of petitioners in the lower court as well
as in their brief with the respondent Court. Such an commission has consequences fatal to their belated claim. What
is more, the approach followed by petitioners is not in conformity with our past pronouncements, with had indicated
the fullness of the power of the state as to how public lands may be acquired and under what conditions, as well as
the restrictions imposed on original applicants, who could thus legally be prevented from being victimized as a result
of improvidence or even poor judgment, by requiring such approval. As thus viewed, it would clearly appear that this
appeal by way of certiorari lacks merit. We affirm.
There was a stipulation of facts before the lower court which was quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Thus: "1. That on October 13, 1958, Juan Evangelista died intestate leaving among others, a parcel of land situated
in Barrio Darangan, [Municipality] of Binangonan, [Province] of Rizal covered by [Original Certificate] of Title No. 183
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Tax [Declaration] No. 12131 of the [Provincial] Assessor of Rizal, which parcel is
now the subject of this litigation; 2. That said Juan Evangelista was survived by the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and
plaintiffs, the latter being the sons and daughters of the brothers an sisters of the deceased; 3. That during the
lifetime of Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana Gonzaga on April 21, 1956 sold for valuable consideration several
parcels of land to the spouses, Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio (defendants herein) including that parcel
of land describe in the foregoing paragraph (1) and as a consequence which sale, the corresponding tax declaration
was transferred (to) said vendees; that at the time of said sale, there was a pending application of Juan Evangelista
an Ana Gonzaga over the land in question with the Bureau Lands, but the title thereto was not issued until November
28, 1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; 4. That on April 21, 1962, defendant Ana Gonzaga alleging to (be)
the surviving spouse of the deceased Juan Evangelista, executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of the sum
parcel of land in question in favor of the same vendees, herein defendants, Servillano Ignacio and Anastasia San
Juan; 5. That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same parcel of land was sold on March 6,
1963 by the spouses Servillano Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan to the defendant R & R Realty Co., Inc. and the
latter, together with other properties owned by it, mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by reason
of these subsequent conveyances that defendants Filipinas Agricultural & Realty Co., Inc. and the Continental Bank
were impleaded as party defendants." 3 On the above facts, the lower court relying on the aforesaid Section 20,
declared he 1956 sale void and consequently ruled in favor of the successional rights of private respondents as heirs
of the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed.

As set forth at the outset, there is no legal basis for reversing the decision of respondent Court.
1. Petitioners are well aware and therefore cannot deny that unless the sale made by the deceased Juan Evangelista
in his lifetime of the disputed lot was valid, then the rights of private respondents as his heirs should be respected.
Both the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals were agreed that considering the express and categorical
language of Section 20 of the Public Land Act, such sale "shall be null and void" there being no "previous approval" of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It could not have been otherwise, for there is nothing in the
stipulation of facts that would, in any way, take this transaction out of the operation of that legal provision. It has been
repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do
except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have
consistently been to that effect. 4 Now petitioners before this Court apparently would try to extricate themselves from
what for them is an untenable situation by alleging that it was not a homestead that was applied for by the deceased.
Such a contention does not carry persuasion. There was no such allegation in their answer filed before the lower
court. 5 There was nothing to that effect in the stipulation of facts. After losing in the lower court, there was not even a
motion for reconsideration filed. The matter was immediately taken respondent Court of Appeals. In their brief before
respondent Court of Appeals, again, such a defense now interposed is conspicuous by its absence, the two
paragraphs devoted to the point merely confining itself to the assertion that the Public Land Act does not prohibit an
applicant from selling his right and interests during his application for a free patent. 6
Apparently realizing the weakness that characterized their vain effort to prevent private respondents from enjoying
their successional rights, an attempt is made by petitioners in the appeal by way of certiorari as well as in their brief,
to mitigate its shortcoming by raising what in effect is a new matter, namely, that the application was not for a
homestead. Outside of such an assertion lacking support in the facts as found by respondent Court, to which we must
accord deference, there is another obstacle to its being considered. Such an issue was not raised before the lower
court. It was not even brought to the attention of respondent Court of Appeals. What was said, therefore, in the recent
case of Arangco v. Baloso 7 has relevance. Thus: "As far back as 1904, in Tan Machan v. Trinidad, for the appellate
tribunal to consider a legal question, it must be raised in the court below. Such a principle has been consistently
adhered to. As was categorically announced in City of Manila v. Roxas by Justice Hull, 'the rule is almost universal,
and it has been repeatedly followed by this court ....'" 8 It cannot be said then that respondent Court erred in affirming
the decision of the lower court, declaring the nullity of the sale dated April 21, 1956 executed without the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus is the first assigned error disposed of.
2. The principal argument, thus exposed as devoid of any persuasive force, was sought to be strengthened in the
second assignment of error by an attempted distinction between the limitation placed on the grantee after the free
patent is issued and the absence thereof prior thereto, except if the application is for a homestead. That, in effect, is
the error imputed to respondent Court under this category. Petitioners again labor under a misapprehension. Section
118 of the Public Land Act 9 reads: "Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops of the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations." Is it not a clear expression then of the state policy to
assure that the original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is deprived for a period of five years of his
freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected from his own weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business
acumen, the purpose being, in the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Artates v. Urbi, 10 to keep and preserve for him
"or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State, so that being a property owner, he may become and
remain a contented and useful member of our society." 11 Considering that such is policy, does it not logically follow
that he is precluded disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the patent? Both policy and reason, therefore,
unite in conclusion that no such distinction should be made. Then, it is not to be forgotten that the state is possessed
of plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under
what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership? 12
3. The third assigned error impugning the judgment respondent Court of Appeals in favor of appellees before now
private respondents, being a logical consequence of the foregoing, need not be discussed at all.
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 24, 1967 affirmed. With costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. L-23783

April 25, 1968

JRS BUSINESS CORPORATION and JOSE R. DA SILVA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and THE IMPERIAL
INSURANCE, INC., respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondents.
Felipe N. Aurea for petitioners.
FERNANDO, J.:
This present petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction against the then respondent Judge, now
retired, Agustin P. Montesa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, has its roots in a 1964 decision of this Court.1
Petitioners JRS Business Corporation and Jose R. Da Silva were two of the petitioners in the above proceeding. The
principal respondent in this petition, Imperial Insurance, Inc., had a similar role therein.
As set forth in the opening paragraph of the decision then rendered: "Petitioner J. R. Da Silva, is the President of the
JRS Business Corporation, an establishment duly franchised by the Congress of the Philippines, to conduct a
messenger and delivery express service. On July 12, 1961, the respondent, Imperial Insurance, Inc., presented with
the CFI of Manila, a complaint . . ., for a sum of money against the petitioner corporation. After the defendants therein
have submitted their Answer, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, assisted by their respective
counsels. . . ."2 The compromise agreement noted an indebtedness of petitioners, as defendants, in the amount of
P61,172.32, an obligation, joint and several in character, and contained a promise to pay to then plaintiff, respondent
Imperial Insurance, Inc., such amount within sixty (60) days from March 16, 1962 or, on or before May 14, 1962. The
failure for any reason to pay in full such amount on that date would entitle respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc., as
plaintiff, "to move for the execution of the decision to be rendered" based on such compromise agreement. Then
came, on March 17, 1962, the lower court decision embodying the contents of the aforesaid compromise agreement,
the dispositive portion thereof reading: "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby approves the above-quoted compromise
agreement and renders judgment in accordance therewith, enjoining the parties to comply faithfully and strictly with
the terms and conditions thereof, without special pronouncement as to costs."
One day after the failure to pay such judgment debt, on May 15, 1962, respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc. filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On May 23, 1962, a writ of execution was issued by the Sheriff of
Manila, the auction sale being set for June 21, 1962. As noted in the 1964 decision of this Court: "In the sale which
was conducted in the premises of the JRS Business Corporation at 1341 Perez St., Paco, Manila, all the properties of
said corporation contained in the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1962, and June 2, 1962 (the latter notice being for
the whole capital stocks of the defendant, JRS Business Corporation, the business name, right of operation, the
whole assets, furnitures and equipments, the total liabilities and Net Worth, books of accounts. . .), were bought by
respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc., for P10,000.00, which was the highest bid offered. Immediately after the sale,
respondent Insurance Company took possession of the properties and started running the affairs and operating the
business of the JRS Business Corporation."
That was the background for that previous certiorari proceeding, the main question raised being whether the business
name or trade name, franchise and capital stocks of the then petitioner JRS Business Corporation were properties or
property rights which could be the subject of levy, execution and sale?
This Court in its 1964 decision answered in the negative. It made clear why: "The compromise agreement and the
judgment based thereon, do not contain any special decree or order making the franchise answerable for the
judgment debt. The same thing may be stated with respect to petitioner's trade name or business name and its
capital stock. Incidentally, the trade name or business name corresponds to the initials of the President of the
petitioner corporation and there can be no serious dispute regarding the fact that a trade name or business name and
capital stock are necessarily included in the enjoyment of the franchise. Like that of a franchise, the law mandates
that property necessary for the enjoyment of said franchise can only be sold to satisfy a judgment debt if the decision
especially so provides. As we have stated heretofore, no such directive appears in the decision. Moreover, a trade
name or business name cannot be sold separately from the franchise and the capital stock of the petitioner

corporation or any other corporation, for that matter, represents the interest and is the property of stockholders in the
corporation, who can only be deprived thereof in the manner provided by law. . . ."
It was then the decision of the Court in that proceeding "that the inclusion of the franchise, the trade name and/or
business name and the capital stock of the petitioner corporation, in the sale of the properties of the JRS Business
Corporation, has no justification. The sale of the properties of petitioner corporation is SET ASIDE, in so far as it
authorizes the levy and sale of its franchise, trade name and capital stocks."
The present petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction is premised on the contention that
respondent Judge failed to execute properly the above decision.
According to the present petition, on September 2, 1964, after the aforementioned decision became final and
executory, "a certified copy of said decision had been duly transmitted by this Honorable Court to the Court of First
Instance of Manila. . . ."3 Then came "a motion for execution and an amended motion for execution, respectively, of
said decision," in which the above-named petitioners prayed among other things "for the immediate return or
restitution of the aforesaid franchise, trade name and capital stocks" as well as for indemnification in the amount of
P132,500.4 After such motions were heard by respondent Judge Montesa, an order was issued by him quoting the
dispositive portion of the decision of this Court and emphasizing that the sale at the public auction must "conform with
the above-quoted decision of the Supreme Court and nothing else."5 Clearly, he pointed out that the writ of execution
could not include anything not embodied in the decision. He admitted that he could not modify it, stressing that it is
only such decision, "that must be enforced, nothing more, nothing less." He therefore enjoined "the Sheriff of
Manila . . . to act accordingly in the sale of properties of defendants." He likewise disallowed the claim for damages
against the then plaintiff, now respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc.6 In pursuance of the above order of September 18,
1964, the Sheriff of Manila, wrote a letter on October 2, 1964, to respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc., the highest
bidder at the public auction sale then in possession of the properties of petitioner JRS Business Corporation, notifying
it of the above order of respondent Judge.7
Then came the motion for restitution, the denial of which is the basis of the present petition, wherein after setting forth
the issuance of the above order of respondent Judge of September 18, 1964 and the notice of the Sheriff of Manila in
compliance of such order to respondent Imperial insurance, Inc. that the franchise, trade name and the capital stocks
of defendant JRS Business Corporation are excluded from the public auction sale, immediate restitution thereof is
prayed for by present petitioners.8 The above motion for restitution was denied by respondent Judge in an order of
October 19, 1964, for lack of merit.9
The above denial by respondent Judge is alleged in the present petition to be a grave abuse of his discretion and a
neglect as well as a refusal to perform an act specifically enjoined upon him as a duty by virtue of which mandamus,
in the opinion of petitioners, is the proper remedy.10 Petitioners likewise sought a preliminary mandatory injunction in
order allegedly to prevent further injury to them.11 This Court did not issue a preliminary mandatory injunction.
In the answer of respondents, which was joined by petitioner JRS Business Corporation, having come under a
different management after such public auction sale, there was an admission of respondent Judge Montesa issuing
an order of September 18, 1964 directing the Sheriff of Manila to act in accordance with the decision of this Court of
July 31, 1964, as well as of the step taken by the Sheriff of Manila in a communication of October 2, 1964, to
respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc. notifying it of such order with the qualification "that petitioner JRS Business
Corporation has always been in possession of its franchise, tradename, and capital stock and respondent Imperial
Insurance, Inc. was never in possession thereof. That the respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc. actually purchased on
the public auction sale of the Sheriff of Manila were, among other things, "the rights, interests and participation of the
herein petitioner Jose R. Da Silva in the JRS Business Corporation. The decision of this Honorable Court in G.R. No.
L-19891 does not set aside the sale of the rights, interests and participation of the herein petitioner Jose R. Da Silva
in the JRS Business Corporation."12
Further, the denial of the motion for restitution of petitioner Da Silva was in the answer alleged to be "fully justified
since respondent Imperial Insurance, Inc. never took actual or physical custody and possession thereof and petitioner
Jose R. Da Silva lost his rights, interests and participation therein."13 It is the stand therefore of respondents that
mandamus does not lie in the present case, petitioner Da Silva not being excluded from any lawful right resulting from
a failure of respondent Judge Montesa to comply with the duty specifically enjoined upon him by law. Respondents

likewise denied liability for any alleged actual or moral damages, as well as for attorney's fees. The prayer is for the
dismissal of the petition.
Mandamus does not lie, and the petition must be dismissed. With petitioner JRS Business Corporation having joined
in the answer filed by respondents, the sole petitioner, in effect, is Jose R. Da Silva whose rights, if any, in this
present petition, are traceable to the decision of this Court of July 31, 1964. It is quite categorical; its dispositive
portion reads thus: "The sale of the properties of petitioner corporation is SET ASIDE, in so far as it authorizes the
levy and sale its franchise, trade name and capital stocks." The winning party clearly is the JRS Business
Corporation, the franchise, trade name and capital stocks of which were held as not being included in the sale at
public auction.
As admitted in the petition, the above decision was, by virtue of the writ of execution filed by petitioners, carried out.
Such order in part reads: "The sale at public auction of the properties of the petitioner must, therefore, conform with
the above-quoted decision of the Supreme Court and nothing else. The writ of execution can not include anything not
embodied in the decision rendered by this Court. It can not modify the said decision. It is only the said decision that
must be enforced, nothing more, nothing less."14
What is even more decisive insofar as petitioner Jose R. Da Silva's plea is concerned is the undeniable fact that the
right recognized in the 1964 decision of this Court is a right appertaining to the JRS Business Corporation. The
decision is silent as to any alleged right of petitioner Jose R. Da Silva, which might have been mistakenly included in
the public auction sale. Such being the case, there is no clear legal right that he could invoke, which could have been
the basis of a motion for restitution, the denial of which would have given rise to a petition for mandamus.
Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the
performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use
and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.15 On the face of the motion for restitution, which was denied, no
motion for reconsideration having been thereafter filed, the failure to perform a duty resulting from an office as well as
the exclusion of petitioner Jose R. Da Silva from the use and enjoyment of a right could not be predicated. Such
being the case, mandamus cannot be availed of.
According to former Chief Justice Moran, "only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear
and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be
dismissed.16 In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright,17 was cited. As was there
categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be
those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have clear, legal
right to the thing demanded and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act."18
As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well established that only specific legal rights
are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not
issue in cases where the right is doubtful."19 To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice
Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed."20
WHEREFORE, this petition for mandamus is denied. Without special pronouncement as to costs.1wph1.t
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-9558

May 24, 1957

LEONCIO MONGE, SEVERA POLVOROSA and MARIA MONGE plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
LINO ANGELES and SOCORRO MOLINA, defendants-appellees.
Ezekiel S. Grageda for appellants.
Reyes and Dy-Liacco for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On July 30, 1948, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendants a deed of sale of a parcel of land acquired by plaintiffs
under a homestead patent with right to repurchase it within one year from the date of sale. Because of the failure of
plaintiffs to repurchase the land as stipulated, the sale became absolute on July 30, 1949, although defendants
actually consolidated their ownership over the land on January 17, 1953 in accordance with an order of consolidation
issued in Special Proceeding No. 548 (Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur). However, plaintiffs claim that they
can still exercise the right to repurchase the land within the period of five years from July 30, 1949 under Section 119
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law) and to that effect they tendered to defendants the repurchase price
of P1,200, and when the latter refused, they consigned the money with the clerk of court and instituted the present
action.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that it does not state a cause of action (2) that, in any
event, the action was not commenced within the period prescribed by law. The court sustained the motion and
dismissed the case without costs. Hence this appeal.
The question to be determined is whether the period of five years which Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
allows a homesteader to repurchase a homestead sold by him should be counted from the date of the sale even if the
same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of
the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to repurchase it.
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides: "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within
the period of five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature. The word conveyance is of
American origin. It may refer not only to an absolute sale but also to mortgage or any other transaction. It has been
defined as signifying "every instrument by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged,
or assigned" (13 C. J., 900; 18 C. J. S., 92). When the law is clear, it admits of no interpretation. It follows therefore
that the pretense of appellants to the effect that the 5-year period should be counted from the date the ownership of
appellees over the land had become consolidated is untenable.
The above interpretation finds support in recent decisions of this Court. In Blanco vs. Bailon, G.R. No. L-7342, April
28, 1956, the question raised was whether the 5-year period of redemption began from the date of the execution of
the contract or from the date of its registration in the office of the register of deeds, considering that the homestead
was registered under the Torrens system. This court held that it is the former because in so far as the owner of the
homestead is concerned, the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 of the Public Land Law is the actual date thereof,
and not the date of registration of the deed of sale. (Citing Galasinao vs. Austria, 97 Phil., 82, 51 Off Gaz., 2874).
In Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, 50 Off. Gaz., 4213, the question that arose was "whether the period to
repurchase the land in question shall be counted from the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase or
from the issuance of transfer certificate of title to the herein defendant" and the Court held that appellant's title had
already become absolute because of appellee's failure to redeem the land within five years from the date of sale. The
Court added: "Both under Section 50 of the Land Registration Law and under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141,
the owner of a piece of land is neither prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an agreement whereby his
right of repurchase is for a certain period starting from the date of the deed of sale." In other words, the date of the
sale is of paramount consideration.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-4091

May 28, 1952

MARIANO M. PARAS, SR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LAZARO LEODONES and DEMETRIO LEODONES, respondents.
Bausa and Ampil for petitioner.
Pedro D. Maldia for respondents.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Respondent Lazaro Leodones was originally the owner of lot No. 2817 of the Penaranda Cadastre No. 226, with an
area of about seventeen hectares acquired by him by virtue of Homestead Patent No. 32378, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2443 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. It was assessed for tax purposes in the sum of
P3,283.68.
On July 31, 1935, Lazaro mortgage the homestead in favor of the Philippine National Bank, Cabanatuan Branch, to
secure the payment of a loan in the sum of P650.00. Failing to pay said loan, the Bank instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings under the provisions of Act 3135 as amended. At the auction sale held on September 7,
1940, the Bank was the sole bidder and bought the land for P400 although the mortgage indebtedness of Lazaro at
the time of the auction amounted to P668.25, thereby leaving Lazaro still indebted to the Bank in the sum of P268.25.
Because of his failure to repurchase the lot within one year, the Bank on October 23, 1941, executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership, and upon the registration of the same in the office of the Register of Deeds, Homestead
Patent No. 32378 as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 2443, both in the name of Lorenzo, were cancelled and in
lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18876 was issued in favor of the Bank.
On October 7, 1942, The Philippine National Bank executed a deed of promise to sell the land in question in favor of
petitioner Mariano M. Paras Sr. upon his making a down payment of P1,000; and because Paras complied with the
terms contained in said promise to sell, the Bank on May 25, 1943 executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
to him for the total sum of P1,800. By virtue of this deed of absolute sale, the Register of Deeds issued in favor of
Paras Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19339.
On November 19, 1941, however, about a year before the Bank executed the deed of promise to sell in favor of
Paras, and about a month after said Bank had consolidated its ownership over the property, Lazaro made a written
offer to the Bank to repurchase the property subject to the auction sale, and show his good faith, he deposited the
sum of P200 with the Bank. According to the evidence as found by the Court of Appeals, on November 20, 1942,
Lazaro withdrew this deposit because Paras after he had received the deed of promise to sell by the Bank in October
1942, approached Lazaro and persuaded him to make the withdrawal, telling him that he was unnecessary inasmuch
as he (Paras) would reconvey the same land to him when it shall have been definitely sold to him (Paras), for a sum
in genuine Philippine currency not a centavo more than what he paid the Bank.
The Court of Appeals equally found that immediately after liberation Lazaro offered to repurchase the land from the
appellant with genuine Philippine currency but the appellant turned down the offer unless he was paid P4,000. Again
Lazaro offered to buy the land from Paras on November 23, 1945 and on February 12, 1946, but Paras refused both
offers.
Despite the purchase of the land at the auction sale by the Bank and its subsequent conveyance to Paras, Lazaro
Leodones and his son Demetrio Leodones continued in possession of the property and presumably in the enjoyment
of the fruits thereof. Because of this, Paras brought the original action, Civil Case No. 44, in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija against Lazaro and Demetrio to have himself declared absolute owner of the property, to
obtain possession from defendants, and to compel them render accounting of the products of the land from the year
1943. In an amendment decision, Judge Melendres of the trial court annulled the auction sale on foreclosure on the
ground that it was not held in the place required by law and also because the inadequacy of the price of P400 paid by
the Bank was shocking to the conscience, and so ordered that upon payment by Lazaro of the sum of P668.25 with

interest at the rate of P0.13 a day from June 30, 1940, the Register of Deeds was to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 19339 in the name of Paras, and in lieu thereof issue a Certificate of Title in the name of Lazaro, with the
annotation of the mortgage in favor of the Bank originally noted in Original Certificate of Title No. 2443, but with a
memorandum to the effect that said mortgage was already redeemed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals by Paras,
this Tribunal affirmed the decision appealed from. We quote:
. . ., the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in so far it grants appellee Lazaro Leodones the right to
redeem the property described in Original Certificate of Title No. 2443 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, upon payment by said appellee to the appellant of the sum of P668.25 with interest thereon at the rate
of P0.13 daily from June 20, 1940 until fully paid; and in so far it orders the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, after such payment-to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19339, issued to the appellant, and to
issue in lieu thereof, another in the name of appellee Lazaro Leodones making appear therein the mortgage
in favor of the Philippine National Bank executed on July 31, 1935 (Exhibit D) with subsequent
memorandum to the effect that the same has been paid and redeemed. With the costs against the appellant.
The Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial court as to the annulment of the auction sale, and considered that
sale valid. However, it held that Lazaro had offered to purchase the land within the five-year period provided by the
Public Land Act. Paras has now brought the case to us on appeal by certiorari.
Although petitioner assigns six errors said to have been committed by the Court of Appeals, all of them may be
consolidated into the single question of how to compute the five-year within which a homesteader may repurchase his
homestead of having conveyed the same.
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 reads as follows:
SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from
the date of the conveyance. (Emphasis supplied).
In this connection the Court of Appeals said:
In the instant case, we believe, and so hold that the five-year period shall be counted from October 27, 1941
when the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18876, Exhibit N, was issued to the Philippine National Bank or, at
most, from September 8, 1941, the day following the expiration of the right to redemption reserved to the
appellee pursuant to the Certificate of Sale, Exhibit 1, and from which date the final Ceritificate of Sale could
have been properly issued in favor the bank as purchaser, Certificate Exhibit I, issued to the Bank, was only
provisional in character and intended to be a mere memorial of the fact that purchase was made by the
person named therein as buyer. "It is not intended to operate as an absolute transfer of the property but
merely to identify the property, to show the price paid and the date when the right of redemption expires.
The effective conveyance of the land is accomplished by the deed which is issued only after the period of
redemption has expired." (Gonzales vs. Calimbas and Poblete, 51 Phil., 355-358, Emphasis supplied.) "The
rights secured by an execution purchaser are inchoate before the deed, and it is necessary for the
purchaser to procure his deed to complete his title." (Pike vs. Halpin, 181 Mich. 447, 450). Since the term
"conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title to land from one person or class of persons to another
(Frame vs. Bivens, 89 F., 789 citing Bouviers" Law Dictionary, p. 434) it stands to reason that only from the
dates above mentioned; after the expiration of the term of the redemption, should the property be
considered as conveyed for the purposes of sec. 119 of Act 141. It being conceded that the defendantappellee herein "offered to buy the land in question on November 23, 1945 and on February 25, 1946 but
that the plaintiff (appellant) refused the offer" (See No. 20 Stipulation of Facts) said offer to redeem was
seasonably made. Hence the trial court was correct in granting appellee Lazaro Leodones the right to
redeem the land in question.
We share the feeling of the trial court as to the inadequacy of the price paid by the Bank at the auction sale. It will be
remembered that the homestead mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, Cabanatuan Branch, was assessed for
purposes of taxation in the sum of P3,283.68. To realize the extreme discrepancy between the real value of the
property and price at which the Bank bought it, we all know that the assessed value of real property, especially in the

provinces is much below its real market value, sometimes only a fraction thereof. So that at the time of the auction
sale, the homestead must have been worth several thousand pesos. In fact, the Bank sold it to Paras for P1,800, and
the latter demanded P4,000 as sales price to Lazaro. At the time of the foreclosure of the mortgage, homesteader
Lazaro was indebtedness to said Bank in the sum of P668.25 and yet said Bank in the absence of the other bidders
purchased the mortgaged property not even in the same amount of the indebtedness but only for the merge sum of
P400, leaving still a balance of P268.25 against the mortgage-debtor. The Bank certainly not only was able to recover
the full indebtedness of the mortgage-debtor but also made a clean profit of P1,000 in the transaction. One cannot
say that the mortgagor-homesteader received a fair deal. That the price paid by the Bank at the auction sale for the
homestead was grossly inadequate and shocking to the conscience, is obvious, and for this reason alone, we are
disposed to annul said sale. However, because of our view as to the validity of the offer repurchase made by Lazaro,
resulting in the return of the land to him upon payment of his indebtedness, we find that to hold the auction sale void,
would be unnecessary.
After a careful study of the point raised in the present appeal by certiorari, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
five year period within which a homesteader or his widow or heirs may repurchase a homestead sold at public auction
or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 as amended, begins not at the date of the sale when merely a certificate is issued
by the Sheriff or other official, but rather on the day after the expiration of the period of repurchase when the deed of
absolute sale is executed and the property formally transferred to the purchaser. As this Court said in the case of
Gonzales vs. Calimbas and Poblete, 51 Phil., 355, the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser at an auction sale is
intended to be a mere memorandum of the purchase. It does not transfer the property but merely identifies the
purchaser and the property, states the price and the date when the right of redemption expires. The effective
conveyance is made by the deed of absolute sale executed after the expiration of the period of redemption.
In the present case it is clear that whether the five-year period fixed by section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be
computed as commencing to run from the date of the expiration of the one year for repurchase or from the date of the
affidavit of consolidation of ownership and the issuance of the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of
the Bank, the offer repurchase by Lazaro in November 1945, was made on time. Not only this, but according to the
findings of the Court of Appeals, Lazaro made the first offer to repurchase the property as early as November 1941,
although he desisted from it because of the promise made by Paras. Again Lazaro made another offer immediately
after liberation which must have been around April or May, 1945, considering the date when Nueva Ecija was
liberated from the Japanese, which date was certainly less than five years even from the day of the auction sale
made in September, 1940. So that in all respects and from whatever angle we view this case, respondent Lazaro
Leodones is entitled to repurchase his homestead.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with
costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-9664

July 31, 1957

FERNANDO MANUEL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Fernando A. Pascua for appellant.
Crescenciano L. Saguing for appellees.
REYES, A., J.:
The plaintiff Fernando Manuel was the registered owner of a piece of land acquired by him as a homestead. In 1937,
he mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank as security for a loan. As the loan was not paid, the mortgage
was foreclosed in accordance with Act No. 3135 and the land sold at public auction on September 8, 1941, the
provincial sheriff giving the buyer, the Philippine National Bank, the corresponding certificate of sale, which was
recorded in the register of deeds on the 13th of that month.
Plaintiff had, under said Act No. 3135, the right to redeem his land within one year "from and after the date of the
sale" in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court. But he failed to exercise that right within the
period given, which expired on September 9, 1942, and under the Rules of Court, the purchase at public auction was,
from this latter date, entitled to a final deed from the sheriff. However, for reasons which do not appear, it was not until
September 2, 1950, or some 9 years after the auction sale, that the final deed was given by the sheriff and recorded
in the register of deeds and the corresponding certificate of title issued to the bank.
The land was subsequently sold by the bank to Roberto Avena and by the latter, in turn, to Lucia L. Babaran who,
upon the sales being recorded, was, on September 4, 1950, issued the corresponding transfer certificate of title.
In October, 1954, plaintiff, invoking the homesteader's right of redemption under 119 of the, Public Land Law, offered
to repurchase the land, and upon the offer being rejected, deposited the redemption money in court and brought the
present action against the Philippine National Bank and the subsequent buyers to compel them or any of them to
reconvey the land to him.
The defendants set up the defense that plaintiffs right to redeem the land had already expired. And the lower court
having upheld that defense and dismissed the complaint for that reason, plaintiff appealed the case directly to this
Court, the questions raised being purely legal.
The case hinges on whether the 5-year redemption period fixed in section 119 of the Public Land Law should, in the
case of a homestead sold as a result of an extrajudicial foreclosure, be counted from the date of the sale or from the
date of the sheriff's final deed of sale.
The said section provides:
SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the Free Patent or Homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of 5 years
from the date of the conveyance.
In Galanza vs. Nuesa (50 Off. Gaz. 4213), where a homestead was sold with pacto de retro, we ruled that the buyer's
title became absolute when the seller failed to repurchase the homestead within five years from the date of the sale.
Applying that ruling in a recent case (Leoncio Monge, et al. vs. Lino Angeles, et al.* G.R No. L-9558, May 24, 1957),
where a homestead was sold subject to redemption within one year, we held that the 5-year redemption period
prescribed in the above section should be counted from the date of the sale and not from the date the ownership of
the land "had become consolidated" in the buyers.
Appellant, however, cites an earlier decision, that of Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al. * (G.R. No. L-4091, May 28,
1952) and on the authority thereof contends that the final deed issued by the sheriff in the present case on
September 2, 1950 should be taken as the conveyance referred to in section 119 of the Public Land Law, so that the

5-year redemption period provided for in that section should be counted from that date and not from the date of the
execution sale. The citation does not necessarily help appellant's position. For while we there expressed agreement
to the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the 5-year redemption period provided for in the Public Land Law does not
begin from the date of the sale when a mere provisional certificate of sale is issued by the sheriff we at the
same time accepted that court's view that the said 5-year period begins "on the day after the expiration of the period
of repurchase" provided for in foreclosure sales. And there is no question that appellant in the present case did not
attempt to repurchase his homestead until after 12 years after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase
allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of
that one-year period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the
purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact.
Section 50 of the Land Registration Law does not militate against this view. That section provides in effect that a deed
in itself does not effect a conveyance and that it is the act of registration that effects such conveyance. As repeatedly
declared by this Court, "the registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third persons arising from
subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect as between the parties to their
deed of sale." (Galanza vs. Nuesa, supra, Galasinao et al., vs. Austria, et al., 97 Phil., 82, 51 Off. Gaz. 2874 and
cases therein cited.) In other words, as between the parties themselves, the conveyance is effective from the date of
the sale and not from the date of the registration of the deed.
It follows from the foregoing that appellant's attempt to exercise his right of redemption under the Public Land Law
some 13 years from the auction sale of 12 years from the expiration of his right of redemption under the Rules of
Court, was too late, so that the lower court did not err in dismissing his complaint.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.