PLAINTIFF : NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO

DEFENDANT: HIDALGO
FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known
as mill site) and also its adjoining plantation Hacienda
Begona. He constructed a road adjoining the mill
site and the Provincial highway. Plaintiff allows
vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for
each one; pedestrians are allowed free passage.
Defendant owns the adjoining Hacienda Sangay
wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon (as in
drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only
means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay.
At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the
said road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his
Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda
Begona in a passage way used by the carabaos.
Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant
from entering/passing through his properties (road &
Hacienda).
ISSUE: WON injunction should be granted.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: For injunction to be granted, it must be
established that the right sought to be protected exists,
but also that the acts against which the injunction to be
directed are violative of said right.
In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right
and that the defendant has committed/attempts to
commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint
does not state how and why the mere passage of
defendant over plaintiffs estate conveying tuba to his
Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiffs property
rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid
is the fact that tuba is disposed of at defendants
hacienda in which the plaintiffs laborers have access
(apparently, the plaintiff hates that his laborers are
getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant). This
however, is a nothing more than an exercise of
legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What
the law does not authorize to be done directly, cannot
be done indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant
from selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction to
prevent him from passing over its property to transport
tuba).

(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road

was constructed by the plaintiff on his own land and it
made this road accessible to the public, regardless of
class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary
easement constituted in favor of the community.
Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure
as no period has been fixed when the easement was
constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not
capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the
road devoted to the public in general, the road is
charged with public interest and while so devoted, the
plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions
against any private person. He may withdraw his grant
by discontinuing its use, but so long as he maintains it,
he must submit to the control.
Furthermore there exists a forcible right of way in favor
of the defendant (CC 564) because those living in
Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial road
except through the road in question.
AMOR v. FLORENTINO
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin
(warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to
Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino.
Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then
demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new
2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the
light and air that come in through the window of the
adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for
prohibition claiming there is a negative easement
prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any
height that would block the window. Amor counters
that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of
testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules
on easement do not apply.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting
Amor
from
doing
said
construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied
RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the
owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the
doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is
subsequently owned by two different persons and the
service (it cannot be an easement before the transfer)
is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is
established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it

involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is

acquisition by title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator
occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The
facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the
said code so the law on easement is already applicable.
In any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the
law on easement was already integrated into the
Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the
warehouse above the level of the window.
DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.
1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice
when it ignored the evidence produced by Amor that
the testators death occurred before the effectivity of
the Code.
2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply.
Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas provided
for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract
2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision
similar to the doctrine of apparent sign.
3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish
Tribunal regarding the doctrine.
4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air
conditioning devices, the easement of light and view
would be obsolete and deterrent to economic progress
especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side
with each other.
RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by
prescription because it is not a continuous easement.
FACTS:
Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga
Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right
of way through the land of the Respondents, which they
have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953,
however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle
of the road, blocking their usual path to the
marketplace. One year after, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of
the land where the easement was situated, planted
wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road,
closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad
St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be
acquired by prescription?
HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and
apparent easements may be acquired by prescription.
The easement of a right of way cannot be considered
continuous because its use is at intervals and is
dependent on the acts of man.
Minority Opinion (including the ponente):
Easements of right of way may already be acquired by
prescription, at least since the introduction into this
jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through
the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law,
particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as
to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and
there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the
writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path
or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the
public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of
the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it,
cannot give said party a vested right to such right of
way through prescription.
The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a
right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession
does not require the use thereof every day for the
statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right
more or less frequently according to the nature of the
use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)
"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even
discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by
prescription, provided it can be shown that the
servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to
all other claimants'."

NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. VS HIDALGO

October 31,
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as mill
site) and also its adjoining plantation Hacienda
Begona. He constructed a road adjoining the mill
site and the provincial highway. Plaintiff allows
vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for
each one; pedestrians are allowed free passage.

Defendant owns the adjoining Hacienda Sangay

wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon (as in
drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only
means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay.

charged with public interest and while so devoted, the

plaintiff may not establish discriminatory.

At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the

said road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his
Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda
Begona in a passageway used by the carabaos.

The municipality applied for registration of parcels of

land claiming that there were owners since time
immemorial. Bishop opposed saying that the church
had been in possession also since time immemorial.

Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant

from entering/passing through his properties (road &
Hacienda).

Since the construction of the church, there had been a

side door in the wall through which the worshippers
attending mass enter and leave ,passing and entering
the land in question. As this use of the land has been
continuous, it is evident that the church has acquired a
right to such use by prescription, in view of the time
that has elapsed since the church was built and
dedicated to religious worship, during which period the
Municipality has not prohibited the passage over the
land by persons who attend services held by the church.

ISSUE: WON injunction should be granted.

HELD: NO.
RATIO:
For injunction to be granted, it must be established that
the right sought to be protected exists, but also that the
acts against which the injunction to be directed are
violative of said right.
In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right
and that the defendant has committed/attempts to
commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint
does not state how and why the mere passage of
defendant over plaintiffs estate conveying tuba to his
Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiffs property
rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid
is the fact that tuba is disposed of at defendants
hacienda in which the plaintiffs laborers have access
(apparently, the plaintiff hates that his laborers are
getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant). This
however, is a nothing more than an exercise of
legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What
the law does not authorize to be done directly, cannot
be done indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant
from selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction to
prevent him from passing over its property to transport
tuba).
(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road
was constructed by the plaintiff on hisown land and it
made this road accessible to the public, regardless of
class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary
easement constituted in favor of the community.
Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure
as no period has been fixed when the easement was
constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not
capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the
road devoted to the public in general, the road is

MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS V. BISHOP OF JARO

VALDERRAMA V. THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.

What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the
line or repairing or using the same, a larger area of land
is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are
outside the area occupied not by causing wagons to
pass just because of a change of ownership of the
objects being transported.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental
Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of
a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling and
grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the
hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central
with all the cane they might produce in their estates for
30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on,
Osorios rights and interests were acquired by the North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino
Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made
other milling contracts identical to the first one with the
North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners,
however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane
for milling as required by its capacity, so the North
Negros made other milling contracts with the various
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This
prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint
against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling

in Valderrama et. als favor finding that North Negros
had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda
owners for the transportation of sugar cane not grown
from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was
restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the
hacienda owners lands
HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda
owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the
period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity
since it could permit the transportation of sugar cane
which they did not produce which is contrary to their
intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement
was established for the benefit of all producers and of
the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous
easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is
contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only
limited to canes produced by the servient estates since
it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by
reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.
The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing
in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining
other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it
more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543
of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it,
it should occupy a greater area or deposit excavations
outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in
this case when the North Negros transports sugar cane
from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it
continues to occupy the same area and the
encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number
of times it passes through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the
period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners no
longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the
North Negros still has the right to the easement for the
remaining period so the contention that it should be
limited to the canes produced by the owners has no
basis.

QUIMEN V. CA
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.
FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and
sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They
agreed to subdivide the property equally among
themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings
were next to the municipal road. Anastacias was at the
extreme left of the road while the lots on the right were
sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the
lots behind Anastacias were sold by her (as her
brothers adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first
because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia
prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give
her a right of way on her adjoining property (which was
in front) for p200 per square meter.
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought
using as her passageway to the public highway a portion
of anastacias property. But when yolanda finally
offered to pay for the use of the pathway anastacia
refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through
her property.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from
the Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway
gratis et amore between their house, extending about
19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store
of one brother, and Anastacias perimeter fence.
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court
praying for a right of way through Anastacias property.
The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting
from the back of the sari-sari store and extending
inward by 1m to her property and turning left for about
5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal
road. The way was unobstructed except for an avocado
tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause

of action, explaining that the right of way through the
brothers property was a straight path and to allow a
detour by cutting through Anastacias property would
no longer make the path straight. They held that it was
more practical to extend the existing pathway to the
public road by removing that portion of the store
blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the
public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacias property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a

right of way on Anastacias property. The court,
however, did not award damages to her and held that
Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted the
claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be
considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it
does not abut or adjoin the property of private
respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a right
of way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the
second lot, the easement of right of way she provided
was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in
one person so that there was no longer any compelling
reason to provide private respondent with a right of
way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the
purpose.
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of
way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely
to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income
of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her
avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an
average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an
easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda
is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties
HELD: YES to both
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted
by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of
persons to pass over anothers property when his
tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others

without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The

owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of
way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of
his property.
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right
of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant
estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
These elements were clearly present. The evidence
clearly shows that the property of private respondent is
hemmed in by the estates of other persons including
that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per
square meter for her right of way as agreed between
her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation
of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are
confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of
court, more so that the trial court itself declared that
[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were
purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were
totally isolated from the public highway and there
appears an imperative need for an easement of right of
way to the public highway.
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that the
easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When
the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.

TCs findings:
> Yolandas property was situated at the back of her
fathers property and held that there existed an
available space of about 19m long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store
which was made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to
the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter
wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of
way to the public highway.
CAs finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m
wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacias
property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage
as compared to the suggested passage through the
property of Yolanda s father which would mean
destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion
are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so
glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will
only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the
second alternative should be preferred.
PACITA DAVID-CHAN
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC.G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of
around 635 square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San
Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R,
located around the property are the following:
Northern and western sides: various business
establishments .Southern boundary: land of the Pineda
family East-northeastern boundary: a lot with an area of
approximately 161 square meters owned by private
Philippine Rabbit Lines, which lied between her
property and the MacArthur Highway.On September 29,
1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended
petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from
fencing its property and depriving her of access tothe
highway. In short, petitioners lot was almost
completely surrounded by other immovables and cut
off from the highway. Her only access to the highway
was a very small opening measuring two feet four

inches wide through the aforementioned property of

private respondent, which was now being obstructed by
the bus lines construction of aconcrete fence.
Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider
compulsory easement of right of way through thesaid
property of private respondent.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is legally entitled to a right of
way through private respondents property?
HELD: Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,
petitioner submits that the owner of an estate may
claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she)
has established the existence of four requisites, namely:
(1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity is paid;(3) the isolation is not due to the
proprietors own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed
is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.While petitioner may be correct in her
theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence
to satisfy their requirements .Evaluating her evidence,
respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not without
adequate outlet to a public highway since she built a
concrete fence on the southern boundary of her
property to separate it from the property of the Pineda
family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she
closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a
means to reach the National Highway without passing
through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a
bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion
of the concrete fence which she erected and pass
through the property of the Pineda family which, as
shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioners
Report, has an open space on the southern boundary of
plaintiffs land .The appellate court likewise found that
petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement
because she caused her own isolation by closing her
access through the Pineda property, The Court of
Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she
made a valid tender of the proper indemnity, since her
complaint contained no averment that demand for the
easement of right of way had been made after
payment of the proper indemnity.
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right
of Way
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary
easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary

recession of the contract establishing the servitude or

renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way
in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the
edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the
Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on
the south. The said road was originally owned by the
Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine
Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or
7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said
corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the
tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to
Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason
developed their land which is now known as La Vista.
On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged
the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way
wherein the parties would allow the other to use their
half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use
AdMUs 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the
other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola
Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the
right to negotiate the easement on the road. However,
La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus
they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and
some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the
entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid
Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a
third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the
arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents
had adequate outlet to a public highway using other
roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of
way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which
was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and
Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the
Tuasons but I dont think I can find the details regarding
it in the case I just saw the one regarding
acknowledgement between admu and the Tuasons.)
Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement
need not be met. And like any other contractual
stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by

voluntary recession of the contract establishing the

servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant
lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest
of both parties recognized the existence of such
easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke
the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan
Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus
demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an
easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing
as a judicial easement).
VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS
For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of
way, 4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must
be surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment
of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to
the propietors own acts and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is
bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south
by the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot
1028 and on the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of
1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.
Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for
the establishment of a permanent and perpetual
easement of right of way for him to have access to the
provincial road. The RTC dismissed the complaint for it
found 2 other passageways. The CA reversed the
decision for it found that there was a strip of land used
by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for
30 years until it was closed and that the 2 other
passageways were only temporary and was granted to
Panganiban when the right of way was closed. Thus the
case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement
of right of way
RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an
easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present.
(1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables

and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2)

after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation
is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the right
of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st
requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by
immovables, the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon
and by the river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a
remand to the lower court for the determination of the
proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was
found that Panganiban bought the land from the
Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own
acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage
claimed is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio
Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites
therefore is entitled to the easement.
DE LA CRUZ VS RAMISCAL
FACTS:
Ramiscalowner of a parcel of land.
Sps De la Cruz occupants of land at the back of
Ramiscals property.
Subject matter of this case: 1.10 m x 12.6 m pathway
being used by Sps De La Cruz aspathway to and from
18Th avenue, the nearest public highway from their
property.
Ramiscal filed a complaint seeking to demolish the
structure illegally constructed by the SpsDe La Cruz. She
asserted that petitioners have an existing right of way
to a public highway other than the pathway in litigation.
Defense of the De La Cruz spouses: such use was with
knowledge of respondent.
ISSUES/HELD:
(1) WON Sps De La Cruz are entitled to legal easement
of right of way, assuming no voluntary right of way
was granted to them by respondent. NO.
(2) WON operative equitable principle of laches bar the
respondent from depriving the petitioners
continued use of the said right of way. NO.
RATIO:
(1)Sps De La Cru are NOT entitled to right of way.
Easement/Servitude
: real right constituted on corporeal immovable
property of another, by virtue of which the owner has
to refrain from doing or allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of another
thing/person.

In the case at bar, Ramiscal did not voluntarily accord

to the spouses the right of way. The spouses failed to
show competent evidence other than their bare claim
that they entered into an agreement with Mang Puling,
Ramiscals foreman, to use the pathway, which would
be reciprocated with an equivalent easement by owner
of another adjacent estate.
Conferment of legal easement has 5 requisites:
(1) it is surrounded by other immovable and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (lacking in
this case as TC found adequate ingress and
egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue)
(2)payment of proper indemnity; (lacking as no
indemnity was paid) (3)the isolation is not the
result of its own acts; (lacking as isolation was
due to acts of Conception de la Pena (the real
owner of the lot occupied by Sps DeLa Cruz),
who is required by law to grant right of way to
the occupants of her property) .(4)right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent
with the foregoing rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
Furthermore, under CC 649, it is the owner OR any
person who by virtue of a realright may cultivate/use,
who is entitled to demand a right of way in the
neighboring estates. In the case at bar, the De La Cruz
spouses that it fell under either of the 2classifications.
The title to both lots are still registered under the name
of Concepcion De La Pena.(2)
Sps De La Cruz cannot find sanctuary in the equitable
principle of laches.
Essential elements of laches are:(a)conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of; (b)delay in
asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge
of defendants acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue;(c) lack of knowledge or notice by
defendant that the complainant will assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and(d)injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the
complainant.
Second and third elements are lacking because it was
only in 1995 that respondent Ramiscal found out that
the pathway being used by petitioners was part of her
property when a relocation survey and location plan of
her property and the adjacent land bought by San
Benito Realty were prepared.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right

of Way
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary
easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or
renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way
in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the
edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the
Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on
the south. The said road was originally owned by the
Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine
Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or
7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said
corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the
tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to
Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason
developed their land which is now known as La Vista.
On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged
the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way
wherein the parties would allow the other to use their
half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use
AdMUs 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the
other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola
Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the
right to negotiate the easement on the road. However,
La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus
they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and
some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the
entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid
Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a
third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the
arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents
had adequate outlet to a public highway using other
roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of
way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which
was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and
Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the
Tuasons but I dont think I can find the details regarding

it in the case I just saw the one regarding

acknowledgement between admu and the Tuasons.)
Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement
need not be met. And like any other contractual
stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the
servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant
lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest
of both parties recognized the existence of such
easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke
the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan
Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus
demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an
easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing
as a judicial easement) titled to the easement.