WBSO

CASE

STUDY

Yugoslavia, USA and NATO in the 1950s

Nemanja Miloevi

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

UDK 327(497.1:73)"195"
327.51(497.1)"195"

ABSTRACT: The Serbian state is today a member of the

Partnership for Peace and has stepped on the road of further EuroAtlantic integration. The issue of its membership in NATO is still outstanding. That matter is also closely connected with the countrys
relations with the USA. Numerous debates unfolding of late in the
professional as well as general public revolve around two confronted
positions, based on the view that, historically speaking, close relations
with the USA and NATO do not exist and a diametrically opposed
stand that during the 1950s Yugoslavia was for all intents and purposes a NATO member. This article shall offer clear and well documented facts attempting to prove that neither of these two positions
is entirely correct. We shall here analyse the events related to the
Yugoslav state relations with the USA and NATO in the 1950-1955
period.
Introductory remarks

The end of the Second World War placed two super powers - the
USA and the Soviet Union - on the international scene. Their struggle
for supremacy in matters of international politics was marked in the
next forty five years of European and world history as a period of the
Cold War and the formation of two blocks (NATO and the Warsaw
Pact). Under conditions of a bipolar division of power, the fate of formerly large and regional powers, as well as small states was turned
towards one or the other pole. In this whirlpool between Scylla and
Charibdis Yugoslavia followed its route bypassing both blocs, definitely siding with neither. Until the conflict with the Cominform it did
not seem that Yugoslavia would in any way leave the eastern bloc
or establish closer military-political relations with the USA. The
1950s however represent a period of most intensive relations between
Yugoslavia, the USA and NATO. At that time, the North Atlantic
Alliance was still in the initial period of its creation and an actually
Author is independent researcher from Belgrade

64

STUDY

relevant military power in south-eastern Europe would have

really been a desirable addition to the NATO camp. On the
other hand, the Yugoslav state considered it important to obtain
Western support at the time of its conflict with the Soviets, but
accession to NATO was bound to result in the change of the
internal order of the state, which was naturally inadmissible to
the party leadership. In the period of time examined in this
paper, both sides had clear political and military-strategic interests to establish and deepen mutual cooperation. For the USA
and NATO this cooperation was naturally conducive to
Yugoslavias accession to NATO, while the Yugoslavs believed
that closer contacts could only be realized through a Balkan
Pact.
Beginnings of Yugoslav-American rapprochement
After a period of almost hostile relations, accompanied by
numerous incidents, starting from deprecatory press writings to
the downing of American planes over Yugoslavia after WWII,
the year 1950 was uncertain for both the Yugoslav and
American sides, as well as marked by a completely different
quality of relations that were, compared with the period after
WWII, distrustful and probing. The rapprochement of the two
sides started after the rift between Tito and Stalin, i.e.
Yugoslavia and the USSR. The wedge strategy, still in the
stage of initial theoretical and practical development by circles
that created the American foreign policy, could be applied precisely to Yugoslavia. Separation of a respectable military power
from the eastern bloc represented the backbone of that strategy. The Yugoslav political leadership needed political, economic and military assistance to defend its independent position
towards the supper powers, especially the Soviet Union, and to
ensure the survival of their state. The danger threatening from
the Soviet Union was judged as real by both administrations and
in itself pointed to the need for cooperation. George Kennan, the
famous author of the Long telegram,1 a State Department
advisor at that time, concluded that Titos defection substantially contributed to the success of communists in China. Paul
Nitze, who in that same period headed the PPS (Policy Planning
Staff), believed in a real danger of an armed attack on
Yugoslavia due to the Soviet fear that the Chinese could follow

65

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

1 http://www.coldwarfiles.org/files/
Documents/ Kennantelegram.pdf
Keenans Long telegram, known in
history precisely because he, while
serving as a diplomat in Moscow on
22 February 1946 sent an eight
thousand word telegram to
Washington presenting his ideas as
to what kind of policy towards the
Soviets should be pursued.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

WBSO

2 L. Lis, Odravanje Tita na povrini.

Sjedinjene Drave, Jugoslavija i
hladni rat, Beograd 2003, p. 122.

CASE

STUDY

in Titos footsteps, bearing in mind that they did not receive the
expected degree of support from Stalin and the USSR for their
own revolution.2
Representatives of the US administration feared that a Soviet
attack on Yugoslavia may indeed happen, while the Yugoslav statesmen actually kept expecting it to come if not today, than tomorrow.
Contacts between the two sides grew increasingly frequent and their
mutual talks gained diversity in terms of both their contents and participants.
The American administration did not plan to ask for any political concessions from Yugoslavia, in exchange for assistance, not
because of Yugoslavias principled policy, its reputation and the

respect it commanded, but simply because it was the US interest.

Finally, the USA, same as the Yugoslav leadership, had a simple calculation to preserve Yugoslavia just as it was. If Yugoslavia made a
definite turn, crossed to the West and, eventually, took the western
state and social system, it would blunt the wedge strategy, since in that
case, Yugoslavia would no longer be a country snatched from the
eastern bloc but a fully-fledged western ally and, as such, no longer
an attractive model for other countries with communist constitution.
At the same time, confrontation of the two super powers reached the
peak of tensions. A direct conflict was inconceivable, even for the
American and Soviet officials, in view of the catastrophic consequences of a possible atomic war. The famous Pax Atomica! But, that
is why a war on the peripheries of the two powers spheres of interests was a high possibility. A similar conclusion is given in NSC-68,

66

STUDY

rightly inferring that the Soviets do not wish a big war but are prepared to intimidate, spend their resources and test the firmness of the
Americans and their allies.3 Soviet expansionism, embodied in an
uncompromising Stalin and his rigid attitude towards the West was
according to the analyses of American analysts, politicians and military experts - faced with the dilemma of whether to turn the cutting
edge of its attack towards Europe, the Balkans and Yugoslavia or the
Far East, southeaster Asia and Korea?
The uncertainty concerning the attack on Yugoslavia was dispelled on Sunday 25 June 1950 when North Korean units crossed the
38th parallel, thus starting the Korean War.4 This naturally did not
rule out the possibility that the Soviets will start another hot bed of
crisis on the European soil, as they did in Asia. The assumptions of
the CIA and PPS analysts rested on the premise that the attack in
Korea was the Soviet overture to a more extensive war, although
Kennan dismissed this assumption. The circles of the US foreign policy decision makers divided along two lines, one of which was headed by Kennan who supported the thesis that the Korean war was a
limited conflict the Soviets would not expand any further, and the
other by Acheson (who had the majority support in the Department
of State and the General Staff), who believed that similar conflicts
should be expected in Western Germany and Yugoslavia.5 This turn
of events made the reinforcement of NATO a priority task for the
American administration. Admission of West Germany, Greece and
Turkey was presented as the most important task and entrusted to the
new NATO commander, General Eisenhower.6 From that time
onwards the American administration did not see Yugoslavia only as
a model for the application of the wedge strategy but also as part
of a strategic defence of Europe from a Soviet invasion.
American assistance to Yugoslavia was increasingly based on
strategic and military requirements. Appearing before the Congress
the US administration explained its assistance proposal in terms of
direct interests of the USA and their allies in Western Europe, as well
as Greece and Turkey, and pointed out that the Alliances countries
had agreed to provide the assistance, considering the defence ability
of Yugoslavia vital for the security of the North Atlantic area.
Opponents of the assistance in the Congress who condemned the policy of giving concessions to Titos regime, for the first time broached
the idea of requesting Yugoslavia to join NATO.7 Meanwhile, the
western allies in their talks discussed a tripartite programme of possible military assistance to Yugoslavia. Harmonization of the allies
views was slow and political issues at hand controversial, which is

67

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

3At:

http://www.coldwarfiles.
org/files/Documents/NSC 68.pdf
4

D. Beki, Jugoslavija u hladnom

ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 19491955, Zagreb 1988, p.160.

L. Lis, op.cit, p. 127, D. Beki,

op.cit, p.168.

6
7

L. Lis, op.cit, p. 129.

Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (A JBT),

Kabinet Marala Jugoslavije (KMJ),
I-3-b/789, Marjan Saviek, Uloga
vojne pomoi u spoljnoj politici SAD,
Beograd, 1963, p. 36.

WBSO

STUDY

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

why the representatives of the US government realized that they have

to mount an independent political action. Still, in early October the
first meeting of the tripartite commission for military assistance was
held in Washington. The Americans demonstrated their readiness to
deliver to Yugoslavia large quantities of arms and equipment free of
charge and to receive a Yugoslav officer who would explain and
negotiate the military and technical details.
Yugoslav-American negotiations on military assistance

I. Lakovi, Zapadna vojna pomo

Jugoslaviji 1951-1958, 28-34,
Beograd, 2005, MSc. Paper at the
Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade;
D. Beki, op.cit., pp .207- 209, Bojan
B. Dimitrijevi, Jugoslavija i NATO
(1951-1957), Beograd 2003, p.16.

9 Lorejn Lis, op. cit, 142-143. I.

Lakovi, op.cit, p. 34, D. Beki,
op.cit, pp. 193-194, 232-233, B.
Dimitrijevi, op.cit, p. 16.
10

http://www.dni.gov/nic/ NIC_foia_
yugoslavia.html National Intelligence Council, CIA Historical Review
Program Release in full: NIE 29,
Probability of an invasion of
Yugoslavia in 1951.
11

CASE

L.Lis, op.cit, p. 143-144.

Vladimir Velebit, a member of the negotiating team sent to

work out the agreement of the World Bank to finance several economic projects met Black, as well as a number of American politicians and intelligence men, including president Trumans foreign
policy advisor Averell Harriman, deputy chief of the PPS Robert
Joyce, deputy director of CIA Frederick Reinhardt and others,
and broached the issue of a possibility to obtain free military assistance from the USA.8 Following Velebits return, a meeting was
called of the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) highest leadership
comprising Tito, Kardelj, Rankovi, Gonjak and the chief of staff
Koa Popovi, who decided to draw up a list of the required war
material. The decision was confirmed at a session of the LCY
Central Committee Politburo. The meeting elected Koa Popovi,
chief of general staff at that time, to act as the Yugoslav representative.9 The CIA-developed evaluation solicited by the US administration in 1951 stressed that an attack of Soviet satellites on
Yugoslavia was a serious possibility and that high Yugoslav officers were concerned over the movements of troops towards the
Yugoslav border with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.10 An
attack of this kind could endanger Yugoslavias independence and
the administration found it inadmissible. In early 1951,
Yugoslavia actually started preparations, as if a war was impending and, in addition to military measures, the government microfilmed the archived and other documents and stored them in
secret caves in the central part of the country.11
Despite the clear position of the American administration
that Yugoslav defection from the Soviet Union should be supported, the crucial impetus to finally take the view that this assistance, in addition to its military part, must be equally political and
economic, came from a conversation between president Truman
and the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe gener-

68

STUDY

al Dwight Eisenhower. In a very concise manner, guided by the

basic postulates of the American geopolitical thought, the General
conceived the defence of Europe by comparing it with a bottle, the
neck of which - Western Europe was surrounded on all sides by
seas controlled by the Americans who concentrate large naval and
air forces on the north of Europe (Denmark, Norway) and in the
Mediterranean. He, therefore, believed that it was necessary to
give arms to the Turks and Yugoslavs. In line with his vision of
Yugoslavias strategic role, the embargo on the delivery of strategic material to Yugoslavia was lifted on 2 February. When, in
early February, V. Velebit came to learn the response of the State
Department to the list made in Belgrade and submitted by him, he
was given a catalogue of available material.12 In March that year
President Truman endorsed the NSC18/6, which anticipated a
more active role of the USA and NATO in sustaining Yugoslavias
independence. In mid-April president Truman approved assistance to Yugoslavia based on the Act on mutual defence assistance. The agreement was concluded by means of an exchange of
notes.13 In mid-May, general Popovi arrived in Washington with
his wife Lena. He did not travel incognito but under his full name,
Konstantin. However, he stated that the reason for his travel was
personal to visit ambassador V. Popovi. The Americans thus
concluded that the Yugoslavs do not wish to give this issue too
much publicity.14 General Popovi used his visit to Washington
for a conference with general Edelman and talks with other representatives of the US administration. In his talks with A.
Harriman, American presidents foreign policy advisor, Popovi
said he had expected the talks to have a wider basis in terms of
defining the military political situation in the region and the relation between the level of danger for Yugoslavia and the USA
readiness to help. A. Harriman responded that the Yugoslav representatives could not expect the quality of their relations with the
USA to equal that of Great Britain or France, due to the fact that
Yugoslavia was not a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Responding to this clear allusion ambassador Popovi said that
Yugoslavias accession to NATO would be in contravention with
the overall interest to preserve peace in the region and that precisely the Yugoslav non-accession to either of the blocks had substantially contributed to fighting the aggression. Harriman
expressed his understanding of the Yugoslav positions, but said
they must realize that the American concept of joint defence from
aggression in Europe is the system of collective security, as the

69

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

12

D. Beki, op.cit, p. 253-255.

13

L.Lis, str.147-150; A JBT, KMJ, I3-b/800.

14 Vojni arhiv (VA), G-2, k 14, f 7, rb

1/1; L. Lis, op.cit, p..150; I. Lakovi,

op.cit, p..38, B. Dimitrijevi, op.cit,
p..17, D. Beki op.cit, p.. 282.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

WBSO

15 A JBT, KMJ, I-3-b/796,

Zabeleka o razgovoru s Averel
Harimanom i R. B. Dojsom,
lanom Policy Planning Staff u
State Departmentu, 10 juna
1951 na veeri kod ambasadora V. Popovia, 198-200.
16 United States Department of
State / Foreign relations of the
United States, 1951. Europe:
political and economic developments (in two parts), Volume IV,
Part 2 (1951), Yugoslavia, No.
908,
Memorandum
of
Conversation by the Secretary
of State, 1815-1816; ? ???,
???, I-3-?/796, Zabeleka o
razgovoru u State Departmentu
kod dravnog sekretara,
Achesona 18. juna 1951, 204.
Information on talks with general Bradley comes from indirect
sources, namely already quoted documents: D. Beki, op. cit.,
p. 286.
17 L. Lis, op. cit, p.152, B.
Dimitrijevi, op. cit., p. 20, D.
Beki, op. cit., p..302-303. Beki
gives a wrong date for the
meeting, as rightly pointed out
by B. Dimitrijevi.
18

L. Lis, op. cit., p.152; B.

Dimitrijevi, op.cit, p. 20-21.

19

L. Lis, op. cit, p.152-153.

CASE

STUDY

Atlantic Alliance clearly demonstrates, and that a form of a collective contract would be required for reasons of military
nature.15 General Popovi also spoke with the US chief of staff
General Omar Bradley and the secretary of state D. Acheson. He
went to see the state secretary immediately before he left the USA.
This half-hour meeting, which was more of a courtesy call,
brought nothing new. Both sides repeated the positions they had
during military talks, although general Popovi did ask why the
talks had not been of a wider scope and said that he thought it too
early to establish a major American military mission and organize
a technical conference on the Yugoslav soil.16 Following his
return from the USA on 10 June 1951, general Popovi met
NATO commander general D. Eisenhower at the American
embassy in Paris.17 Popovi told Eisenhower that a consignment
of military material had already been dispatched to Yugoslavia
and that the second one was under preparation. Eisenhower
brought up the possibility of equipment transfer between
Yugoslavia and Italy, in view of the crisis with Trieste. Popovi
readily answered that he saw no obstacles to that. The most interesting question, both due to its directness and substantial importance, was asked by NATO commander and addressed to the
Yugoslav chief of staff: Would the Yugoslav army based on a
communist order fight against the Soviet system alongside western capitalism? Popovi explained that the Yugoslav authorities
have broken their friendly relations with the Soviets due to the
imperialist nature of the Soviet state and that Yugoslav soldiers
would fight that aggression together with West-European soldiers.
At the same time he dismissed the matter of coordinated military
planning with the West prior to the outbreak of hostilities.18
Eisenhower wrote down in his diary that these talks opened topics beyond the gains anticipated by the wedge strategy. He
believed that the problem of European security could be solved by
creating the United States of Europe, wherein, in addition to
the countries belonging to Western Europe at that time, he also
saw Western Germany, Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece.19
The talks in Paris were important primarily because that is
when the possibility for joint military engagement of Yugoslav
and NATO troops was mentioned. The refusal of the Yugoslav
general to undertake harmonization of plans with the NorthAtlantic strategists, defined the future thinking of the American
planners who sought to develop a mode acceptable to both sides,
taking into account Eisenhowers views on the need to include

70

STUDY

Yugoslavia into a defence system aimed at preserving the necessary security of Europe. During 1951 the American administration approached its most loyal allies, the UK and France, in order
to resolutely continue economic assistance to Yugoslavia. At the
first tripartite conference held in London in mid-June, the allies
even agreed on the percentage of assistance each of them should
provide to Yugoslavia. According to this agreement the USA were
to share with 65% in the anticipated program of economic aid,
followed by the UK with 23% and France with 12%.20
In the second half of the year, Broz used every opportunity,
addressing the people on the occasion of celebrations, or in interviews to foreign and domestic press, to present Yugoslavias relations with the West as partnership. At a celebration of the uprising in Montenegro (13 July) he said the Yugoslav people needed
modern armaments, to be obtained with no strings attached. In
his speech at the construction site of the Doboj-Banja Luka railway, he repeated that although Yugoslavia received western assistance it did not sell out, which increased its reputation in the
eyes of that same western world even more. Some time later in
Uice, he characterized the relations with the West as an agreement between equals and pointed out that Yugoslavia freely
pursued its independent foreign policy. We have never wanted to
be satellites of Russia and neither shall we be satellites to the West.
We want to be an equal member of the international community.
On one occasion, asked by the foreign press what exactly
America gained from its military assistance to Yugoslavia, Broz
promptly responded that America gained a lot, as did the whole
of Europe.21
While these talks were going on the US Congress adopted a
Mutual Security Act (MSA) and anticipated Mutual Security
Programs (MSP) to include diverse military and economic assistance schemes such as the MDAP and ECA. The Act furthermore
enabled the expansion of military and economic assistance to
NATO member states and any European country the president
found of direct importance for the preservation of peace and security in the north Atlantic and the USA. This law formally ended
the existence of the Marshal Plan. However, assistance could not
be provided to a state which would not agree to help the promotion of international understanding and preservation of peace and
would not undertake all measures to develop its own defence
capacities. In order to make Yugoslavia eligible for military assistance, the Department of State requested the incorporation of the

71

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

20 United States Department of

State / Foreign relations of the
United States, 1951. Europe: political and economic developments (in
two parts), Volume IV, Part 2 (1951),
Yugoslavia, No. 906, Final Report of
the Tripartite Official Conversations
Concerning Economic Aid to
Yugoslavia, 1802-1814.
21

B. Dimitrijevi, op. cit., pp. 27-28;

J.B. Tito, Govori i lanci, knj.VI, pp.
48, 151-152, 164-165, 248-249.

WBSO

CASE

STUDY

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

American-Yugoslav military assistance agreement into the text of

this law prior to its adoption.22
During the visit of the US General Collins to Yugoslavia, the
strategic importance of Ljubljana gate for the Americans, as well as
for NATO, was clearly emphasized. This visit left three questions outstanding Yugoslavias support to NATO defence plans, expansion
of western assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of war and Yugoslav
needs for assistance in creating a respectable air force. John Campbell
said he believed the Yugoslavs never really intended to use the military material obtained only for the Alliances defence of the Ljubljana
gate.23 This fact notwithstanding, on 14 November 1951 the
Agreement on military assistance between the Federal Peoples
Republic of Yugoslavia and the US was signed by Marshal Tito and
the US ambassador to Yugoslavia Allen.
Balkan pact instead of NATO

22 A JBT, KMJ, I-3-b/800; L. Lis, op.

cit., p. 154; M.Saviek, Uloga vojne
pomoi u spoljnoj politici SAD,
Beograd 1963p.35; B. Dimitrijevi,
op. cit., p. .36-37.
23

L.Lis, op. cit., p. 157.

24

L.Lis, op. cit., p..160.

In early 1952 the Yugoslav press published that the country

had overcome the consequences of the Cominfrom blockade
owing to its links with the West, that it was an esteemed and
respected member of the United Nations and contributed to the
western collective security system.24 Yugoslavia managed to survive under the threat of the Soviet Union and J.V. Stalins rage, but
her resistance did not attain the very goal that prompted the
American decision makers to conclude that it would be useful for
the USA to support the resistance of the Yugoslav communists,
namely the successful implementation of the wedge strategy, bearing in mind that not a single satellite in the eastern bloc followed in the steps of Yugoslav dissidence. That meant that the US
administration had to turn towards the second best gain from
Yugoslav dissidence, namely the completion of the strategic
wall towards the Soviet Union, the main pillars of which were to
be Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Western Germany. Accession,
or at least rapprochement to NATO was a priority in the next
period of Yugoslav- American military and political relations. In
contrast to the Truman administration which primarily sought to
attain clear benefits using the wedge strategy, that of Eisenhower
was more concerned with luring Yugoslavia into joining NATO.
Therefore, the resources sent to Yugoslavia were intended as
a catalyst for Yugoslav integration into a series of strategic negotiations leading to firmer links with NATO and the creation of a

72

STUDY

joint defence concept. NATO military experts already in 1951

considered the possibility of defending Western Europe in the
event of an attack from the east, even before Greece and Turkey
officially joined the Alliance. That is why their accession to
NATO was necessary, since if an attacker came in possession of
the Mediterranean area, the most important mainstays for
Europes defence would have been lost. We have found this same
position with General Eisenhower in the previous chapter. NATO
strategists believed it was important to provide Yugoslavia guarantees for its security, although they did not reckon with its membership of the Alliance.25 The Yugoslav leadership sought reliance
in the West fearing possible attacks by the USSR and its allies, and
tried to obtain financial and military support to deter these
attacks without at the same time assuming any obligations with
respect to NATO. In other words, the prevailing view considered
it useful to conclude certain arrangements that would indirectly
incorporate the country into the western defence system, and
simultaneously preserve the maximum of foreign-policy and military-defence independence. The action aiming to attain that
objective developed in two directions: towards the conclusion of
a regional military political alliance with Greece and Turkey and
towards joint strategic planning, coordinated military action and
NATO logistic support in case of an aggression on Yugoslavia.26
In early July 1952, generals Edelman and Olmsted arrived in
Belgrade with an officially proclaimed objective to learn about the
Yugoslav military requirements and the possibilities of the countrys military industry. A conference with American generals took
place from 7-13 July and was, on the Yugoslav side, attended by
generals Peko Dapevi, Danilo Leki, Mile Kilibarda, Milo
umonja and Franc Poglajen. Deputy chief of staff general
Dapevi welcomed the guests and pointed out that Edelman and
Olmsted were the first US generals who understood the need to
help the Yugoslav Army and expressed his hopes that the visit
would deepen the relations that kept improving since General
Collins visit. The Yugoslav army is the first echelon facing the
aggression threatening from the east, believed Dapevi, and
those who give it arms may rest assured that it would be properly used. Edelman expressed his appreciation of the warm welcome
and noted that it was a good thing they had a meeting with marshal Tito scheduled for tomorrow, expecting the talks to be useful
for both sides. Despite the US engagement in Korea and
Indochina, which used up large resources from the military budg-

73

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

25

A JBT, KPR I -4/3, Strateka

situacija snaga Atlantskog pakta.

26

D. Beki, Jugoslavija u hladnom

ratu, Zagreb, 1988, 414.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

WBSO

27 VA, G-2, k 14, f 9, 1/1.

28 VA, G-2, k 14, f 9, 1/58.
29 United States Department of
State. Foreign relations of the
United States, 1952-1954.
Eastern Europe; Soviet Union;
Eastern Mediterranean,Volume
VIII, 1952-1954, No. 645, The
Ambassador in Yugoslavia
(Allen)to the Department of
State,1297-1298; L.Lis, op. cit.,
p. 163-164.
30 VA, G JNA, Sedmo odeljenje, k 374, f 1, eksp. br. 84 Militry
envoy in Washington Leki
reported to the general staff that
he had talks on the harmonization of defence plans of
Yugoslavia with the basic plans
of NATO, as well as Greece and
Turkey, but that the whole thing
required more time, since they
were all NATO members, except
Yugoslavia, although it did not
mean that the western powers
wanted or pressured Yugoslavia
to join NATO; D. Bogeti,
Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955,
Beograd, 2000, 76.
31 VA, G JNA, Sedmo odeljenje, k 374, f 1, eks. br. 220. The
Americans warned the Greeks
that they should not hurry with
the conclusion of a military pact
for two reasons: first, it would
create them (the Americans) difficulties in Italy and politically
reinforce the position of
Yugoslavia and, secondly, once
this arrangement was made,
any pressure on Yugoslavia to
join NATO would be superfluous
because NATO would undertake
obligations indirectly through the
Greeks and Turks, which was
the best solution for Yugoslavia
(VA, Sedmo odeljenje G JNA,
k 374, f 1, eks. br. 199)
32

D. Beki, op. cit.,, 508.

CASE

STUDY

et, Yugoslavia will be the first to obtain assistance in case of an

aggression. As for the program, they had to manage within the
framework of funds placed at Yugoslav disposal by the highest
bodies of the American state.27 During their talks with Tito they
expressed the American intention to realize the appropriated
assistance with the delivery of 200 tanks, while Yugoslavia was
expected to deploy the forces so armed in the north-western part
of the country, so as to make them available for the defence of
Ljubljana gate and northern Italy in the event of a Soviet aggression. Tito himself made a positive move stressing that the time had
come for talks to agree on the modalities of joint defence and the
best use of the existing military capacities. The American generals
had a series of meetings with the JNA general staff where they formulated an Additional program of military assistance for 1952,
which partly removed the largest deficiencies of the previous
arrangements.28 At the same time the US assistant defence secretary Frank Nash visiting Josip Broz hinted at additional military
assistance if Yugoslavia established close cooperation with
NATO. Tito was very grateful for the assistance given, but said
that he had no intention of sharing his defence plans with NATO,
although he did not object British and French participation in military contacts or talks on closer cooperation with Greece and
Turkey.29 In early 1953 already, more intensive communication
between Yugoslavia Greece and Turkey was established with
active participation of NATO, the USA and other western countries.30 NATO military circles were concerned that a tripartite
pact would do more to distance Greece and Turkey from NATO
than to bring Yugoslavia closer to it.31 What the West really cared
about were the modalities of linking the Balkan pact with NATO.
Thus the US secretary of state Dulles visited Turkey, the closest US
ally in the Balkans.32 Furthermore, the regular NATO session in
April and May 1953 discussed the Balkan pact. A sub-commission of the political council was given the task to examine whether
the tripartite cooperation was at variance with NATO interests,
and concluded that it should still be tolerated without however,
making an official public statement to that effect, since that was
bound to damage NATOs interests. The Americans and the
British already had different views on the Yugoslav role. The
Americans believed that it should be viewed as a military factor
enabling the continuity of the front towards the eastern block,
while the British underlined the Yugoslav role in separating the
satellite countries from the USSR. Most member countries on

74

CASE

STUDY

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

NATOs political committee believed that Yugoslavia would join

the Atlantic Treaty and that the Tripartite Agreement was only a
roundabout way to get there.33 In effect, NATO gave an unofficial agreement to continue military cooperation with Yugoslavia.
In early 1954 Yugoslav military attach in Athens Vojvodi
reported that in his talks with the high military representatives of
Greece he learned of Americans open disagreement with the policy of regional pacts. They attached more importance to bilateral
agreements such as the one they had with Greece, and even placed
the policy of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance second,
stressing the Trieste problem as the largest obstacle for the conclusion of a military arrangement between three Balkan countries.34
But, since a high degree of agreement on all disputable issues was
achieved on 31 May 1954 the USA, UK and Yugoslavia signed an
agreement solving the problem of Trieste. The Trieste zone was
not de jure abolished by the agreement, but was de facto, divided
between Yugoslavia and Italy. Governments of the USA and the
UK undertook to make a statement not to support anyones territorial aspirations, after the agreement was also signed by Italy. It
was anticipated that France should join this statement, too.
Finally, with the adoption of a memorandum of understanding
between Yugoslavia, USA, UK and Italy on 5 October 1954, the
Trieste problem was taken off the agenda.35
Contours of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation
At the same time, ever since Stalins death until early 1955,
the new Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev tried to normalize relations with the Yugoslav state and party leadership. Titos
voyage to India and Burma in late 1954 testified to the beginning
of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. All these facts
worried the American representatives. On January 27 1955 Ale
Bebler told the American ambassador Riddlberger that the
Yugoslav government agreed with the American initiative to
negotiate cooperation with NATO. The western powers responded with an Aide memoire of February 10, proposing to hold consultations between Yugoslavia and representatives of Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). However, this open
approach of the western powers was not received well by the
Yugoslav leadership. Koa Popovi told Riddleberger that
Yugoslavias rapprochement with NATO was out of question and

75

33 VA, G JNA, k 374, Sedmo odeljenje f 1, eksp. br. 835 i eksp. br. 903.
34 VA, G JNA, Sedmo odeljenje k
375, f 1, eksp. br. 24.
35

D. Bogeti, op.cit, p. 140-141; D.

Beki, op. cit., 652; ed. John C.
Campbell, Successful Negotiation:
Trieste 1954. An appraisal by the
Five Participants,p.20.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

WBSO

36

D. Bogeti, op. cit., p..192.

37

Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva

spoljnih poslova (DA MSP), PA, st.
pov, 1955., f-2,214. Zabeleka o prijemu
admirala
Kasadija
Predsedniku, na Brionima 29.marta
1955.godine; D. Beki, op. cit.,
p..741.

38
39

J.B.Tito, op. cit., p.,knj.X, str.84.

More on the end of Balkan pact

functioning see in: D. Bogeti,
Jugoslavija i Zapad..., pp. 232-237;
T. Lei, Uzroci krize u funkcionisanju Balkanskog saveza, saoptenje
sa meunarodnog naunog skupa
Balkanski
pakt
1953/1954
odranom u Beogradu novembra
2005.

CASE

STUDY

as for cooperation, a technical conference could be arranged. This

kind of refusal preceded by trade agreements with eastern countries, recognition of the Peoples Republic of China and the support to its requests to join Formosa (Taiwan) to the mainland,
indicated the West that the Yugoslav foreign policy was gradually moving towards neutrality.36 The visit of American admiral
Cassady to Josip Broz in late March was intended to confirm or
deny what the West interpreted as a new foreign policy orientation. The motive for the visit was the hostile attitude of the
Yugoslav administration towards the US military mission headed by General Haynes. Cassady proposed two joint military
exercises naval and combined manoeuvres of the fleet and
land forces. Tito refused the former proposals saying that an
exercise of the type had already been agreed with the British
and entirely dismissed the latter, on political grounds, reducible
to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership believed that the Soviets
had abandoned their aggressive policy, or had been gradually
doing that from the time of Stalins death.37
Even before these talks one could note that the year 1955
was a turning point for the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. It was announced by Tito having returned from a trip to
southern Asia, in a speech to the people of Rijeka. He said that
we wish friendship with all countries those in the West as
well as those on the East. I think that this road is the only right
one if we want mankind not to fear the danger of a new war
ever again38 Decreasing interest in a Balkan pact from the
Yugoslav side, additionally affected by antagonisms between
Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus, clearly revealed the
Yugoslav tendency to pull out of closer military arrangements with the West.39
In the talks with American and British representatives that
ensued during the following months the Yugoslav leaders maintained that it was not the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation
that had changed but rather the situation in the world, that
Yugoslav foreign policy commitment remained the same namely struggle for peace, implying cooperation with all who supported the preservation of peace in the world and worked towards
that end. Military talks with the Western powers were now out of
question for the Yugoslav state leadership. In a conversation with
western diplomats Tito once said that if Yugoslavia was made to
choose between talks with NATO and discontinuance of assistance it would opt for the latter.

76

STUDY

When it was finally released that a Soviet delegation headed

by Khrushchev would visit Belgrade in late May, the information
caused a lot of anxiety among the diplomatic representatives of
the USA, UK, France, Greece and Turkey in Belgrade. The
Yugoslav foreign minister received them all and briefly informed
them about the history of normalization of relations and the facts
related to the visit itself. In his explanation to foreign diplomats
he pointed out that this was not a change of the Yugoslav foreign
policy, but that the visit represented the victory of all peace-loving
forces.40
The fact that an alliance of Eastern block countries was
formed in Warsaw in mid-May could not leave the Americans
indifferent to the obvious change in the Yugoslav foreign policy
orientation.. Dulles believed that Tito had three possibilities to
form closer links with the West, to pursue a policy of benevolent
neutrality or revert to his pre-1948 policy. The American secretary
of state thought that Tito would opt for the second possibility.41
Still there were serious concerns that the Soviets were trying to
supplement the only just created military pact with a belt of neutral states from Finland to Yugoslavia that would largely weaken
the effect of West Germanys entry into NATO intended to give
the North Atlantic Alliance final supremacy over Soviet military
power. All Western speculations appearing these days and even
weeks were dispelled by the Belgrade Declaration of the Soviet
and Yugoslav governments. It clearly revealed that the Soviets
came to Belgrade to revert the renegade Belgrade to the Eastern
block, while the Yugoslavs sought the confirmation of their independent policy in both ideological and political sense. The
Declaration was signed on the basis of the Yugoslav concept following Khrushchevs withdrawal of the substantially different
Soviet proposal.42
Belgrade declaration had thus partly alleviated the fears of
the American administration and western allies but it did not fully
neutralize the concern about what could happen in the coming
period. Still, this position of Yugoslavia showed the American
political planners that they cannot reckon with the possibility of
gains in the military political sense, i.e. with the Yugoslav entry
into NATO and that it was necessary to focus on the somewhat
forgotten benefits that might derive from the wedge strategy
implementation. The US representatives and western allies were
still more concerned over the news that Tito accepted an invita-

77

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

40ed.

Glennon, John P., United

States Department of State Foreign
relations of the United States, 19551957. Central and southeastern
Europe, Volume XXVI ,Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1955-1957,Telegram from
the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the
Department of State, 650-651; D.
Bogeti, op. cit., p. 199-200.

41 ed. Glennon, John P., United

States Department of State Foreign
relations of the United States, 19551957. Central and southeastern
Europe, Volume XXVI ,Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1955-1957, 645-647.
42

D. Bogeti op. cit., p..205-206.

WBSO

44

STUDY

tion of the Soviet leadership to visit Moscow.43 The YugoslavAmerican military cooperation in this period was also blocked,
even with respect to the most important deliveries of the
American side, i.e. jet aircraft. Still greater shock for Washington
was the news that the chief commander of the Yugoslav air force
general Zdenko Ulepi was heading a military delegation on a
visit to Moscow to negotiate the delivery and licence sale of soviet MIG-15 fighter planes.44 In mid-August the US state secretary
Dulles informed President Eisenhower that experts no longer saw
any future in military assistance to Yugoslavia. Dulles still
believed that Tito did not seek to revert under the leadership of
Moscow but rather had aspirations to lead a block of non-aligned
communist countries.

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

43

CASE

Conclusion

D. Bogeti, op. cit., p.,213-218.

DA MSP, PA, st.pov., 1955, f-4,

332.

The Yugoslav political leadership saw a possibility of passing

between Scylla and Charibdis exploiting the fact that on the global level the gains of one side were clearly the losses of another.
Whether the Yugoslavs were aware of the wedge strategy and the
possibility that it would be used on them is not overly important.
What does matter for a foreign policy of a country is to have a
leadership capable of perceiving the nature of international relations in a specific historical moment and thus clearly estimate its
position and then, based on that position, make moves leading to
the increased power of the state by adding gains of all the parties
who considered it their interest to draw it to their camp. If the
Americans were aware that the Yugoslav dissention of 1948
would serve as a practical experiment for the theoretical assumptions of the wedge strategy, so were the Yugoslavs clear that the
West did not need an ideological convert but rather an ideological example. Immediately following the rift with the USSR the
Yugoslav leadership had to ask itself a question of whether it
could preserve the power in the country on the principles built
over the past few years, i.e. whether it was possible to safeguard
the ideological identity and at the same time protect itself from the
Soviets counting on the unconditional assistance of those who
until recently were their enemies from the West? Once the question was answered positively, the throttle was opened to normalize the relations with the West, primarily the USA and then
also to achieve a rapprochement that will, in the future, enable a

78

STUDY

partnership and, perhaps, alliance. As the years went by it became

clear that no one from the eastern bloc would follow the Yugoslav
example in an equally drastic way, and the appetites of the
American side increased in the sense that implied specific steps
towards a military political partnership. That was a new challenge
for the Yugoslav political elite. That challenge was bridged in a
remarkably resourceful diplomatic way: instead of joining NATO
Yugoslavia formed a military political pact with two NATO
member countries and thus remained sufficiently close/far from
siding with either pole. This did not mean that the Yugoslav leadership was not faced with serious pressures, such as the Trieste
problem, but the art of sailing the ship through a stormy see of
complicated international relations was manifested by the
Yugoslav leadership towards the end of 1954 when it successfully dealt with the Trieste crisis and signed the military pact with
Greece and Turkey. In this way, I dare say, Yugoslavia acquired
complete freedom in conducting and creating its foreign policy.
This bold statement is supported by pictures of the visit by the
Soviet leader Khrushchev and US secretary of State Dulles in
1955. These pictures clearly show that the USA and the USSR, the
only two superpowers in the world, actually competed for the
favours of the Yugoslav leadership. Titos voyage to India and
Burma in 1954 and subsequent development of close relations
with the Egyptian leader Nasser, represented the guidelines of the
new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation which implied equidistance from both blocks, with the emphasis on developing a leading position in a movement that will yet emerge one of the nonaligned countries. The Yugoslav political elite did not, in the period covered by this paper, have an intention to join the Alliance
and still less to embrace the western values and become a fullfledged factor of the system we could call Western civilization. For
the Yugoslavs, these values were backward and retrograde, and
above all imperialist, just as the ones of the Soviets. But, in contrast to the relations towards the West the Yugoslavs believed that
only the Soviet leadership was imperialistic, and still shared the
values that were the heritage of the Russian and Soviet elite. The
Yugoslav state in the mid-1950s managed to use great diplomatic skill, and, counting on sharp block divisions which ensured that
poor relations with one side spelled good relations with another,
managed to preserve an independent position and ensure its survival. The survival of the state was the supreme national interest,
the constant and unchangeable value all Yugoslav political lead-

79

No 5 APRILJUNE 2007

CASE

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

WBSO

CASE

STUDY

ers were attached to. Ideology was irrelevant in the relations of

the two countries until the time that the Yugoslavs achieved what
mattered to them most the survival of the state. This achievement was largely realized due to the economic and military assistance provided by the USA. In this way Yugoslavia increased its
own hard, as well as soft power, having emerged out of the isolation it found itself in immediately following the break with the
Cominform. The hard power, embodied in substantial military
assistance in theoretical real politics frameworks meant that the
main principle of international policy self-help was achieved.
Waltz believed that the power of the state may be increased in two
ways by means of armament in internal policy and, in foreign
policy, by making alliances that last as long as the state has an
interest for participation. Yugoslavia did both. It acquired arms,
modernized its army, joined the Balkan alliance to bridge the pressure to enter NATO. When in 1954 Yugoslavia found itself in a
highly favourable international position it could turn towards
increasing soft power. Historical facts show that the road it started to clear in 1955 led Yugoslavia into the position of a respected
state in international politics. That reputation was based on a
respectable military force and a large quantity of soft power. Still,
it is important to note that at the moment when the survival of the
state was secured ideology once gain resumed an essential role.
For the Yugoslav state the road towards the West was not the
headway proclaimed as its objective but a sideway on route to creating a special socialist system embodied in self-management. The
Americans have only partly attained what they wanted with
Yugoslavia. The momentary success in implementing the Wedge
strategy and pulling an important regional actor from the
Soviet orbit. However, in a military strategic sense the American
foreign policy failed on the issue of Yugoslavia. This scenario
largely contributed to increasing the number of Yugoslavias enemies in the US Congress and Senate and in the US foreign policy
in general. Using a superpower without concrete and tangible
concessions has never been a recommended course of action in
foreign policy. It may be yet another factor that cannot be
bypassed in considering Serbias present day position in international relations. 

80