G.R. No.

149848

November 25, 2004

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.
At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for Muslim
Mindanao which is the epoch-making, Constitution-based project for
achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction1 (Petition) are the constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No.
8999 (R.A. 8999),2 entitled "An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the
First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119)3 on the subject, "Creation of Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office."
The Background
The uncontested legal and factual antecedents of the case follow.
For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines
ordained the establishment of regional autonomy with the adoption of the
1987 Constitution. Sections 14 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Section 15
specifically provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." To effectuate this mandate, the Charter devotes a number of
provisions under Article X.5
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734),
entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The
law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan,
Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog,
General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. 6
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In the ensuing plebiscite held on 19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces
voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).7 The law contains elaborate provisions
on the powers of the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction
which are reserved for the National Government. 8
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12
October 1990, Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled "Placing the
Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and
Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the
Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes." Sections 1 to 3 9
of the Executive Order are its operative provisions.
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C.
Aquino flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the
inauguration. At that point, she had already signed seven (7) Executive
Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven (7) cabinet departments,
namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3) science and
technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare and
development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources. 10
Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119
which reads, thus:
Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30
January 1987, there is hereby created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City
and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the
Marawi City Engineering Office.
Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall
be made up of employees of the National Government Section of the
former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the
Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as may be determined by the
DPWH Region XII Regional Director. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law reads:

Page 2 of 23

AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST

DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the
First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur are hereby constituted
into an engineering district to be known as the First Engineering
District of the Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall be
established in Marawi City, Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act
shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the maintenance and continued operation of the
engineering district office shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled "An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled
An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended." Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the
powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of governance of
the National Government.11
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law12 on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite
held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also
voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are
collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and
Ramir M. Dimalotang (Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH
Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and
the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the
petition.13
Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant
petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer
II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the Department of Public
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Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWHARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O.
119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119
and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for
public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao
del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only;
and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects
within its jurisdictional area.14
The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, to
enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from releasing funds for public works
projects in Lanao del Sur to entities other than the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, and also to restrain the DPWH
Secretary from allowing others besides the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur to implement public works projects in Lanao del
Sur.15
To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of
the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department Order has tasked
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already
been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del
Sur.16
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not
intelligently and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House
Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable.
Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public
hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House
Committee on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a
single official from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law
was skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada
during the pendency of the impeachment proceedings.17
In its resolution of 8 October 2001, the Court required respondents to file
their comment.18 In compliance, respondents DPWH Secretary and DBM
Secretary, through the Solicitor General, filed on 7 January 2002, their
Comment.
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In their Comment,19 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

maintain the validity of D.O. 119, arguing that it was issued in accordance
with Executive Order No. 124 (E.O. 124). 20 In defense of the constitutionality
of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not
diminish the legislative power of Congress.21 Respondents also contend that
the petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that
petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.22
Asserting their locus standi, petitioners in their Memorandum 23 point out that
they will suffer actual injury as a result of the enactments complained of.24
Jurisdictional Considerations
First, the jurisdictional predicates.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It
establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty.25
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of
judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for
the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be
ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act
must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality
must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.26
In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on
the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v. Angara, 27 "where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute." But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this
petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the
Court will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike
them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality
and (2) grave abuse of discretion.28
For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent
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acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to

be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.29
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal
standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest"
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.30
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show
"not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. 31
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit
although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a
liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.32
In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV.
When he filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District
Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On
the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the
rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM
in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of
supervising and implementing all public works projects to be undertaken and
being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.33
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of
funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A.
8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners
and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with
functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being
eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material
and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of
D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can
legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant
case.
Page 6 of 23

Points of Contention
In the petition before us, petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are
unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree in part.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No.
8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is
that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question unless it is the lis
mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed of or settled on other
grounds.34
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was
superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than
ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. 35 Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A.
8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am bringing this up. This thing
involves some rather far-reaching consequences also in relation to the
issue raised by Commissioner Romulo with respect to federalism. Are
we, in effect, creating new categories of laws? Generally, we have
statutes and constitutional provisions. Is this organic act equivalent to
a constitutional provision? If it is going to be equivalent to a
constitutional provision, it would seem to me that the formulation of
the provisions of the organic act will have to be done by the
legislature, acting as a constituent assembly, and therefore, subject to
the provisions of the Article on Amendments. That is the point that I
am trying to bring up. In effect, if we opt for federalism, it would really
involve an act of the National Assembly or Congress acting as a
constituent assembly and present amendments to this Constitution,
and the end product itself would be a constitutional provision which
would only be amendable according to the processes indicated in the
Constitution.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express my personal opinion in this
respect.
Page 7 of 23

I think to require Congress to act as a constituent body before enacting

an organic act would be to raise an autonomous region to the same
level as the sovereign people of the whole country. And I think the
powers of the Congress should be quite sufficient in enacting a law,
even if it is now exalted to the level of an organic act for the purpose of
providing a basic law for an autonomous region without having to
transform itself into a constituent assembly. We are dealing still with
one subordinate subdivision of the State even if it is now vested with
certain autonomous powers on which its own legislature can pass laws.
FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so far with respect to this
organic act are: What segment of the population will participate in the
plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it
passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative
body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to
ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to
amend this organic act, what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now
appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the
regions should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second, the
organic act has the character of a charter passed by the Congress, not
as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and,
therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the
ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentlemen
has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.
MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the plebiscite are those
who are directly affected, the inhabitants of the units constitutive of
the region. (Emphasis supplied)36
Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the
plebiscite requirement.37 In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later
ARMM Organic Act, was subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426,
devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del
Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)38 to the Regional Government. By
creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence,
sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain
the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect.
Page 8 of 23

Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become
operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A.
9054. Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect.
Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. 39 Implied
repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes
cover the same subject matter; they are clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;
and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced
without nullifying the other.40
The Court has also held that statutes should be construed in light of the
objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief and secure the benefits intended.41
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the
constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG
covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its
jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,
ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over
infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent
with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both
ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism
and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts
ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999
contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and
unequivocal answer to the cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful
autonomy.42 According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the
Committee which drafted the provisions, it "is an indictment against the
status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the
hands of progress in our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are
factors
to
capitalize
on
to
attain
national
strength
through
43
decentralization."
Page 9 of 23

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to

allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and
traditions.44 These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to
flourish.45
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine
society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives
to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the
assimilationist approach.46 Policies emanating from the legislature are
invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for
minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the
minority group.47
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary
sessions in their own inimitable way. Thus, Commissioner Blas Ople referred
to the recognition that the Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras "do not
belong to the dominant national community" as the justification for
conferring on them a "measure of legal self-sufficiency, meaning selfgovernment, so that they will flourish politically, economically and
culturally," with the hope that after achieving parity with the rest of the
country they would "give up their own autonomous region in favor of joining
the national mainstream."48 For his part, the Muslim delegate, Commissioner
Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity of cultures as the framework for nationbuilding.49 Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of Commissioner Ponciano
Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:
. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of
struggle against oppression and exploitation. For so long, their names
and identities have been debased. Their ancestral lands have been
ransacked for their treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures have been
defiled, their very lives threatened, and worse, extinguished, all in the
name of national development; all in the name of public interest; all in
the name of common good; all in the name of the right to property; all
in the name of Regalian Doctrine; all in the name of national security.
These phrases have meant nothing to our indigenous communities,
except for the violation of their human rights.
...
Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of
the decision to be made by every single one of us in this Commission.
We have the overwhelming support of the Bangsa Moro and the
Cordillera Constitution. By this we mean meaningful and authentic
regional autonomy. We propose that we have a separate Article on the
autonomous regions for the Bangsa Moro and Cordillera people clearly
spelled out in this Constitution, instead of prolonging the agony of their
Page 10 of 23

vigil and their struggle. This, too is a plea for national peace. Let us not
pass the buck to the Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our
hands of our responsibility to attain national unity and peace and to
settle this problem and rectify past injustices, once and for all.50
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino
Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Their
political struggle highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness
of the unitary system to their aspirations.51 The Moros' struggle for selfdetermination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines.
Even at present, the struggle goes on.52
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious
peace and order problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically,
autonomy, decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have
become politically acceptable answers to intractable problems of
nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession. 53
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the
establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be
installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."54
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local
government unit vis--vis the central government.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood
as a right to political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political
relations between a certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the
right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the
support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the
community's internal decision-making processes and the management of
collective matters by themselves.55
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for
homogeneous, independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal
application without massive disruption. However, if self-determination is
viewed as a means to an endthat end being a democratic, participatory
political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the
identity of minority communities are protectedits continuing validity is
more easily perceived.56
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government
powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and
supervision from the central government. 57
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The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a

common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely
their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their
own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special
governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own
authorities from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional
authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.58
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more
positive means for national integration. It would remove the wariness among
the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the
unhampered implementation of the development programs in the region. 59
Again, even a glimpse of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
could lend a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true
decentralization:
MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations
to come, not only for the present but for our posterity. There is no harm
in recognizing certain vital pragmatic needs for national peace and
solidarity, and the writing of this Constitution just happens at a time
when it is possible for this Commission to help the cause of peace and
reconciliation in Mindanao and the Cordilleras, by taking advantage of
a heaven-sent opportunity. . . . 60
...
MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of
the of the Philippines that Mindanao autonomy will be granted to them
as soon as possible, more or less, to dissuade these armed men from
going outside while Mindanao will be under the control of the national
government, let us establish an autonomous Mindanao within our effort
and capacity to do so within the shortest possible time. This will be an
answer to the Misuari clamor, not only for autonomy but for
independence.61
...
MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the
consideration of the Congress of the organic acts and their passage is
that we live in abnormal times. In the case of Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, we know that we deal with questions of war and peace.
These are momentous issues in which the territorial integrity and the
solidarity of this country are being put at stake, in a manner of
speaking.

Page 12 of 23

We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social

Justice can contribute to a climate of peace so that any civil strife in
the countryside can be more quickly and more justly resolved. We are
providing for autonomous regions so that we give constitutional
permanence to the just demands and grievances of our own fellow
countrymen in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao. One hundred thousand
lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this day, the
Cordilleras is being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a peaceful
and militant struggle.
...
Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how
sympathetic to the Philippines, to contribute to the settlement of this
issue, I think the Constitutional Commission ought not to forego the
opportunity to put the stamp of this Commission through definitive
action on the settlement of the problems that have nagged us and our
forefathers for so long.62
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. 63
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise
authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. It
is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to
delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies
some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the
sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess
any claim of right against the central government. 64
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of
functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national
office to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is also
referred to as administrative decentralization.65
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the
transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of
certain functions from the central government to local government units. 66
This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer
of powers and responsibilities. 67 It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make
them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.68
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This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin, 69

thus:
Autonomy
is
either
decentralization
of
administration
or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central
authorities.
According
to
a
constitutional
author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that
event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion of a member from the
Sangguniang Pampook, Autonomous Region. It held that the Court may
assume jurisdiction as the local government unit, organized before 1987,
enjoys autonomy of the former category. It refused, though, to resolve
whether the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration.70
A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, 71 the Court,
with the same composition, ruled without any dissent that the creation of
autonomous regions contemplates the grant of political autonomyan
autonomy which is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to
local government units. It held that "the constitutional guarantee of local
autonomy in the Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation
of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions."72
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And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean "meaningful and

authentic regional autonomy."73 As articulated by a Muslim author,
substantial and meaningful autonomy is "the kind of local self-government
which allows the people of the region or area the power to determine what is
best for their growth and development without undue interference or
dictation from the central government."74
To this end, Section 16, Article X75 limits the power of the President over
autonomous regions.76 In essence, the provision also curtails the power of
Congress over autonomous regions.77 Consequently, Congress will have to reexamine national laws and make sure that they reflect the Constitution's
adherence to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the underlying spirit
which should guide its resolution is the Constitution's desire for genuine local
autonomy.78
The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was confirmed
in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 79 wherein this Court held that "the omission
(of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore
local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' 'control'
over local government affairs."
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as
specified in Sections 18 and 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly
not included therein are powers over certain areas. Worthy of note is that the
area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the
National Government. The key provisions read, thus:
SEC. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.

Page 15 of 23

SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of general welfare of the people of the region. (Emphasis supplied)
E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM
to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG). Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 426
provide:
SECTION 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) within the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) including their
functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment,
properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control
and supervision of the Autonomous Regional Government.
In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District
Engineering Offices (DEO) in each of the four provinces respectively
and the three (3) Area Equipment Services (AES) located in Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu and Maguindanao (Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).
SEC. 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall
be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource development
systems, and other public works within the ARMM and shall exercise the
following functions:

Page 16 of 23

1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and

works supervision for the infrastructure projects whose location and
impact are confined within the ARMM;
2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the
ARMM and supervise the maintenance of such local roads and other
infrastructure facilities receiving financial assistance from the National
Government;
3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and
regulations regarding infrastructure projects as well as all public and
private physical structures within the ARMM;
4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other
agencies within the ARMM, especially the local government units;
5. Coordinate with other national and regional government
departments, agencies, institutions and organizations, especially the
local government units within the ARMM in the planning and
implementation of infrastructure projects;
6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take
appropriate measures to make the services of the Autonomous
Regional Government responsive to the needs of the general public
and recommend such appropriate actions as may be necessary; and
7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the
ARMM as may be assigned or delegated by the Regional Governor or as
may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved
the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for
public works to the ARG. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 provides:
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual

budget of the Regional Government shall be enacted by Regional
Assembly. Funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region
allocated by the central government or national government
shall be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works
Act.
Page 17 of 23

Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works

funds allocated by the central government or national
government for the Regional Government or allocated by the
Regional Government from its own revenues may be disbursed,
distributed, realigned, or used in any manner.
The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples,
the people of Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to selfdeterminationa right to choose their own path of development; the
right to determine the political, cultural and economic content of their
development path within the framework of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. 80 Self-determination
refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the
autonomous peoples' uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for
self-expression and self-construction.81
In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao
are to be given freedom and independence with minimum interference
from the National Government. This necessarily includes the freedom
to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and
infrastructure projects within the autonomous region. The devolution of
the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the
ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. This
unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at
the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino
electorate, on the centrality of decentralization of power as the
appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate
unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National
Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the
autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which,
by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWHARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of
the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM, including their functions,
powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and
budgets to the ARG. Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM,
under the control of the Regional Government shall be responsible for
highways, flood control and water resource development systems, and
other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of power includes the
planning, design, construction and supervision of public works.
Page 18 of 23

According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables

it to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated
for the region by the central government.
The use of the word "powers" in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable
case of devolution.
In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S. 1991 82 of the
Secretary of Justice on whether the national departments or their
counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for
implementation of roads, rural water supply, health, education, women
in development, agricultural extension and watershed management.
Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates the
powers of the ARG, he states:
It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas
of executive power mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be
exercised by the Autonomous Regional Government ("ARG") of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that programs
relative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in
development, agricultural extension and watershed management do
not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted
provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these
spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to the ARG.
Reinforcing the aboveview (sic) are the various executive orders issued
by the President providing for the devolution of the powers and
functions of specified executive departments of the National
Government to the ARG. These are E.O. Nos. 425 (Department of Labor
and Employment, Local Government, Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources, Social Welfare and Development and Science and
Technology), 426 (Department of Public Works and Highways), 459
(Department of Education, Culture and Sports) and 460 (Department of
Agriculture). The execution of projects on infrastructure, education,
women, agricultural extension and watershed management within the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao normally fall within the
responsibility of one of the aforementioned executive departments of
the National Government, but by virtue of the aforestated EOs, such
responsibility has been transferred to the ARG.
E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic
Act, R.A. 6734the validity of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v.
Commission on Elections.83 In Section 4, Article XVIII of said Act, "central
government or national government offices and agencies in the autonomous
region which are not excluded under Section 3, Article IV 84 of this Organic
Page 19 of 23

Act, shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional
Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the oversight committee."
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the
national government to the autonomous government in order to effectuate a
veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs
afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which
have previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise
the Organic Acts' desire for greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance
with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears stressing that national laws
are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the
autonomy of autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987
Constitution states:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy
illusory with respect to infrastructure projects. The Congressional Record
shows, on the other hand, that the "lack of an implementing and monitoring
body within the area" has hindered the speedy implementation, of
infrastructure projects.85 Apparently, in the legislature's estimation, the
existing DPWH-ARMM engineering districts failed to measure up to the task.
But if it was indeed the case, the problem could not be solved through the
simple legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the
central government in the ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995 which
ultimately became R.A. 8999 was passed in record time on second reading
(not more than 10 minutes), absolutely without the usual sponsorship speech
and debates.86 The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of R.A.
8999 is difficult to comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the
amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could not take
effect without first being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more baffling is that
in March 2001, or barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January
2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic Act, where it
reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and
Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued
pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation of the constitutionallymandated autonomous region87 and which defined the basic structure of the
autonomous government.88 E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the
Page 20 of 23

control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering
Offices in each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.89 Accordingly, the First Engineering District
of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes
back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive
order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order,
like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed
and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no
moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a
special provision or law prevails over a general one. 90 Lex specialis derogant
generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,91 "another basic principle of statutory construction
mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the
same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails
over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should
prevail."
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the
Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law
transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies
to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the
instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in
effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two
laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later
legislative will.92
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it
necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the
ARMM Organic Acts.
Page 21 of 23

Grave abuse of discretion

Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They
implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put
in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in
accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the
ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot
uphold petitioners' argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under
suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was a capricious
and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once more, this Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the
legislative branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected
agency during the inception of the law does not render the law infirm. This
Court holds that the Congress did not transgress the Constitution nor any
statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person from the DPWHARMM during the Committee meeting. Section 27, Rule VII of the Rules of the
House94 only requires that a written notice be given to all the members of a
Committee seven (7) calendar days before a regularly scheduled meeting,
specifying the subject matter of the meeting and the names of the invited
resource persons. And it must be emphasized that the questions of who to
invite and whether there is a need to invite resource persons during
Committee meetings should be addressed solely to Congress in its plenary
legislative powers.95
Conclusion
The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the
necessary basis for the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought
by the petitioners. However, there is no similar basis for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent DBM Secretary to release funds
appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to
the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to compel
respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that
"(f)unds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central
government or national government shall only be appropriated through a
Regional Assembly Public Works Act" passed by the Regional Assembly. There
is no showing that such Regional Assembly Public Works Act has been
enacted.

Page 22 of 23

WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act
No. 8999 and rendered DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the
petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to
desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining the
DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First Engineering
District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and
the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the
petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against respondents is
DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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