A Theory of Role Strain

Author(s): William J. Goode

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Aug., 1960), pp. 483-496
Published by: American Sociological Association
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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

levels, for example, the conditions of small
experimental groups as a subtype of social
system. Only in so far as codification reveals
uniformities in the cognate features of many
different types of operationally studied system do the more general theorems have a
prospect of approaching rigorous empirical
verification.
This specification should not be assumed
to be capable of being carried out by simple
"common sense;" it requires careful technical analysis through a series of concatenated steps. I believe, however, that the
theory of action in its present state provides
methods for successfully carrying out this
specification, and conversely, generalization
as well from lower-level uniformities to
higher levels. Perhaps the most important
key to this possibility is the conception of
all systems of action as systematically articulated with others along system-subsystem
lines. The basic system types designated here
as organisms, personalities, social systems,

483

and cultural systems must be regarded as

subsystems of the general category of action system. Each of these in turn is differentiated into further subsystems at different
levels of elaboration.Any subsystem is articulated with other subsystems by definable
categories of input-output interchange, the
processes, in sufficiently highly differentiated
subsystems, being mediated by symbolictype mechanisms such as those discussed
above.
In many respects, this possibility of dealing with multiple system references and of
keeping straight the distinctions and articulations between them, has turned out to be
the greatest enrichment of theoretical analysis developed from Dubin's "Model II." A
"flat" conception of a single system reference which must be accepted or rejected on
an all-or-none basis for the analysis of complex empirical problems, cannot possibly do
justice to the formidable difficulties in the
study of human action.

A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN *

J. GOODE
Columbia 'University

WILLIAM

When social structures are viewed as made up of roles, social stability is not explicable as a
function of (a) the normative consensual commitment of individuals or (b) normative integration. Instead, dissensus and role strain-the difficulty of fulfilling role demands-are
normal. In a sequence of role bargains, the individual's choices are shaped by mechanisms,
outlined here, through which he organizes his total role system and performs well or ill in
any role relationship. Reduction of role strain is allocative or economic in form, but the
economic model is different. "Third parties" interact with an individual and his alter, to keep
their bargain within institutionalized limits. The larger social structure is held in place by role
strains. The cumulative pattern of all such role bargains determines the flow of performances
to all institutions. The research utility of this conception is explained.

THE

presentpaperis basedon the general seen as a sequence of "role bargains,"and as

view that institutions are made up of

role relationships, and approaches both
social action and social structure through the
notion of "role strain," the felt difficulty in
fulfilling role obligations. Role relations are
* Completed under National Institute of Mental
Health Grant No. 2526-S.
I am indebted to several of my colleagues for
criticism of this and related papers, and especially
to Amitai Etzioni, Johan Galtung, Robert K.
Merton, Charles H. Page, Morris Zelditch, and Hans
L. Zetterberg.

a continuing process of selection among alternative role behaviors, in which each individual seeks to reduce his role strain. These
choices determine the allocations of role performances to all institutions of the society.
Within the limited compass of this paper,
only a few of the possible implications of
role strain as a theoretical approach can be
explored.
The widespread notion that institutions
are made up of roles is fruitful because it
links a somewhat more easily observable

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484

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

phenomenon, social behavior, to an important but less easily observable abstraction, social structure. In functionalist terms,
this notion also links the observed acts and
inferred values of the individual with the institutional imperatives or requisites of the
society. At the same time, by focusing on
the elements in the individual's action decision, it avoids the pitfall of supposing that
people carry out their obligations because
these are "functional"for the society.
Approaching role interaction in terms of
role strain offersthe possibility of buttressing
more adequately the empirical weaknesses
of the most widely accepted theoretical view
of society,' accordingto which the continuity
of social roles, and thus the maintenance of
the society, is mainly a function of two major
variables: the normative, consensual commitment of the individuals of the society;
and the integration among the norms held
by those individuals. Although this view is
superior to earlier ones,2 it fails to explain
how a complex urban society keeps going3
because it does not account for the following
awkwardempiricalfacts: 4

social position, for example, age, sex,

occupation, geographic region, and religion.
4. Even when individuals accept a given
value, some of them also have a strong
or weak "latent commitment" to very
different or contradictory values.5
5. Conformity with normative prescriptions is not a simple function of value
commitment; there may be value commitment without conformity or conformity without commitment.
6. When individuals' social positions
change, they may change both their behavior and their value orientations.
7. The values, ideals, and role obligations
of every individual are at times in conflict.

Under the current conception of roles as

units of social structures, presumably we
should observe the role decisions of individuals in order to see how the society
continues. On first view, as can be seen from
the above list of points, the basis of social
stability or integration seems precarious,
and the decisions of the individual puzzling.
1. Some individuals do not accept even For even when "the norms of the society"
supposedly central values of the society. are fully accepted by the individual, they are
2. Individuals vary in their emotional not adequate guides for individual action.
commitment to both important and less Order cannot be imposed by any general
important values.
solution for all role decisions, since the total
3. This value commitment varies by class set of role obligations is probably unique for
strata, and by other characteristics of every individual. On the other hand, the individual may face different types of role
' I prefer to call this the "Lintonian model" demands and conflicts, which he feels as
(Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, New York:
"role strains" when he wishes to carry out
Appleton-Century, 1936), although Linton is not, of
specific
obligations.
course, the creator of this model. Rather, he summed
In the immediately following sections, the
up a generation of thought about social structure
in a clear and illuminating fashion, so that for major sources and types of role strain are
many years the definitions and statements in this specified, and thereafter the two main sets
book were widely cited by both anthropologists and of
mechanismswhich the individual may use
sociologists. Of course, "everyone knows" these
weaknesses, but our basic model is not thereby to reduce role strain are analyzed.
changed to account for them.
2 For a systematic statement of several earlier
models, see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social
Action, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937, Chapter 2.
3 For an earlier discussion relevant to this paper,
see William J. Goode, "Contemporary Thinking
about Primitive Religion," Soziologus, 5 (1955), pp.
122-131; also in Morton Fried, editor Readings in
Anthropology, New York: Crowell, 1959, Vol. II,
pp. 450-460.
4 For a good exposition of certain aspects of dissensus as they apply to American society, see
Robin W. Williams, American Society, New York:
Knopf, 1956, esp. pp. 352 ff.

TYPES OF ROLE STRAIN

It is an axiom, rarely expressed, of social

theory that the individuals who face common
5 Charles H. Page has
reminded me that role
diversity is not confined to modern societies, as the
work of functionalist anthropologists (e.g., Malinowski's Crime and Custom and Benedict's Patterns
of Culture) has shown. This empirical fact is of
considerable theoretical consequence, especially for
the relations between adjacent social strata or castes,
or between conquerors and the conquered.

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

role obligations can generally fulfill them.
Indeed, most theories of stratification and
criminality require such an assumption, and
common opinion uses it is as a basis for its
moral demands on the individual. We may
suppose, as a corollary, that there are theoretical limits to the specific demands which
societies may make of men. In addition, the
"theorem of institutional integration"s is
roughly correct as an orienting idea: people
generally want to do what they are supposed to do, and this is what the society
needs to have done in order to continue.
Yet, with respect to any given norm or
role obligation, there are always some persons who cannot conform, by reason of individuality or situation: they do not have
sufficient resources, energy, and so on. A
wider view of all such obligations discloses
the following types or sources of role strain:
First, even when role demands are not
onerous, difficult, or displeasing, they are required at particular times and places. Consequently, virtually no role demand is such
a spontaneous pleasure that conformity with
it is always automatic.
Second, all individuals take part in many
different role relationships, for each of which
there will be somewhat differentobligations.7
Among these, there may be either contradictory performancesrequired (the bigamous
husband; the infantry lieutenant who must
order his close friend to risk his life in
battle) or conflicts of time, place, or resources. These are conflicts of allocation
(civic as against home obligations).
Third, each role relationship typically demands several activities or responses. Again,
there may be inconsistencies (what the husband does to balance his family budget may
impair his emotional relations with the members of his household). There may be different but not quite contradictory norms
6 This is the label which Talcott Parsons has suggested for the view, generally accepted since Durkheim's Division of Labor, that the maintenance of
the society rests on desires of individuals to do
things which must be done if the society is to
survive. The Social System, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1949, pp. 36-43.
7 In this paper, I distinguish role and status on
the basis of only "degree of institutionalization":
all role relations are somewhat institutionalized, but
statuses are more fully institutionalized.

485

which may be applied to the various behavioral demands of the same role (the
clergyman as the emotionally neutral counselor, but as a praising or condemnatory
spiritual guide). Perhaps most jobs fall into
this category, in that their various demands
create some strain as between the norms of
quantity and quality, technical excellence
and human relations skills, and universalism
and particularism.
Finally, many role relationships are "role
sets," that is, the individual engages, by
virtue of one of his positions, in several role
relationships with different individuals.8
The individual is thus likely to face a
wide, distracting, and sometimes conflicting
array of role obligations. If he conforms fully
or adequately in one direction, fulfillment
will be difficult in another. Even if he feels
lonely, and would like to engage in additional
role relationships, it is likely that he cannot
fully discharge all the obligations he already faces. He cannot meet all these demands to the satisfaction of all the persons
who are part of his total role network. Role
strain-difficulty in meeting given role demands-is therefore normal. In general, the
individual's total role obligations are overdemanding.
Consequently, although the theorem of
institutional integration, or the assumption
of norm commitment, offers an explanation
for the fulfillment of the duties imposed by
a single norm, it does not account for the
integration of an individual's total role system, or the integration among the role systems of various individuals, which presumably make up the social structure. The individual's problem is how to make his whole
role system manageable, that is, how to allocate his energies and skills so as to reduce
role strain to some bearable proportions.For
the larger social structure, the problem is
one of integrating such role systems-by allocating the flow of role performancesso that
various institutional activities are accomplished.
8 Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social
Theory and Social
Structure, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957, pp. 369 ff.
For its use in an empirical study, see Mary Jean
Huntington, "The Development of a Professional
Self Image," in R. K. Merton et al., editors, The
Student-Physician, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957, pp. 180 if.

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486

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
THE

REDUCTION

OF ROLE STRAIN:

EGO'S CHOICE

A sensitizing or orienting notion in functionalist as well as system theory-perhaps

more properly called one element in the
definition of a "system"-is that a strain is
likely to be associated with some mechanisms
for reducing it.9 The individual can utilize
two main sets of techniques for reducing
his role strain: those which determine
whether or when he will enter or leave a role
relationship; and those which have to do
with the actual role bargain which the individual makes or carries out with another.
Ego's Manipulation of His Role Structure.
-Ego has at his disposal several ways of
determining whether or when he will accept
a role relationship:
1. Compartmentalization: This may be
defined on the psychological level as the
ability to ignore the problem of consistency.
Socially, role relations tend toward compartmentalization because the individual makes
his demands on another and feels them to be
legitimate, in specific situations where he
can avoid taking much account of the claims
on that person. There seems to be no overall set of societal values which explicitly requires consistency or integration from the
individual. The process of compartmentalization works mainly by (a) location and context and (b) situational urgency or crisis.
The latter process permits the individual to
meet the crisis on its own terms, setting aside
9Merton's "mechanisms" operate to articulate
role sets; see Robert K. Merton, "The Role Set:
Problems in Sociological Theory," British Journal
of Sociology, 8 (June, 1957), pp. 113 ff. Here, we
are concerned with a more general problem, which
includes role sets as a special source of role strain.
Moreover, Merton is concerned with only one of
our problems, integrating the total role systems of
all individuals in a demarcated social system; while
we are, in addition, concerned with the problem of
the individual in integrating his own role system.
Several of our mechanisms, then, are parallelled by
Merton's. Compartmentalization partly corresponds,
for example, to two of his-observability of the individual's role activities and observability of conflicting demands by members of the role set. Our
mechanism of hierarchy or stratification, assigning
higher or lower values to particular role demands,
corresponds to two of Merton's-the relative importance of statuses and differences of power among
members of the role set.

for the moment the role demands which he

was meeting prior to the crisis.
2. Delegation: This may be seen, at least
in part, as one way of achieving compartmentalization. If, for example, secular counseling is inconsistent with the clergyman's
moral leadership role, he may be able to
delegate it. If secular manipulation by a
church is inconsistent with its sacredness, it
may delegate some secular acts to lay leaders
or to specialized religious orders. A wife may
delegate housekeeping, and some of the socialization and nursing of the child. Note,
however,that the societal hierarchyof values
is indicated by what may not be delegated:
for example, the professor may not hire a
ghost writer to produce his monographs,
and the student may not delegate examinations.
3. Elimination of role relationships: 10
Curtailment may be difficult, since many of
our role obligations flow from our status
positions, such as those in the job or family,
which are not easily eliminated. Of course,
we can stop associating with a kinsman because of the demands he makes on us, and
if our work-group sets norms which are too
high for us to meet we can seek another
job. Aside from social and even legal limits
on role curtailment, however, some continuing role interaction is necessary to maintain the individual's self-image and possibly
his personality structure: for example, many
people feel "lost" upon retirement-their
social existence is no longer validated.
4. Extension: The individual may expand
his role relations in order to plead these commitments as an excuse for not fulfilling certain obligations. A departmental chairman,
for example, may become active in university affairs so that he can meet his colleague's demands for time with the plea
that other duties (known to his colleagues)
are pressing. In addition, the individual may
expand his role system so as to facilitate
other role demands, for instance, joining an
exclusive club so as to meet people to whom
he can sell stocks and bonds.
5. Obstacles against the indefinite expansion of ego's role system: Although the in10 This, again, is a general case of
which Merton's
"abridging the role-set" is a special example (ibid.,
p. 117).

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

dividual may reduce his felt strain by expanding his role system and thereby diminishing the level of required performance
for any one of his obligations, this process
is also limited: After a possible initial reduction, Role strain begins to increase more
rapidly with a larger number of roles than
do the correspondingrole rewardsor counterpayments from alter. This differential is
based on the limited role resources at individual's commands. The rewards cannot
increase at the same rate as the expansion
even if at first he increases his skill in role
manipulation, because eventually he must
begin to fail in some of his obligations, as he
adds more relationships; consequently, his
alters will not carry out the counter-performances which are expected for that role
relationship. Consequently, he cannot indefinitely expand his role system.
6. Barriers against intrusion: The individual may use several techniques for preventing others from initiating, or even
continuing, role relationships-the executive
hires a secretary through whom appointments must be made, the professor goes on a
sabbatical leave. The administratoruses such
devices consciously, and one of the most
common complaints of high level professionals and executives is that they have no
time. This feeling is closely connected with
the fact that they do have time, that is, they
may dispose of their time as they see fit.
Precisely because such men face and accept
a wider array of role opportunities,demands,
and even temptations than do others, they
must make more choices and feel greater
role strain. At the same time, being in demand offers some satisfaction, as does the
freedom to choose. At lower occupational
ranks, as well as in less open social systems
where duties are more narrowly prescribed,
fewer choices can or need be made.
Settling or Carrying Out the Terms of the
Role Relationship.-The total role structure
functions so as to reduce role strain. The
techniques outlined above determinewhether
an individual will have a role relationship
with another, but they do not specify what
performances the individual will carry out
for another. A common decision process underlies the individual's sequence of role performance as well as their total pattern.
1. The role relationship viewed as a trans-

487

action or "bargain": In his personal role

system, the individual faces the same problem he faces in his economic life: he has
limited resources to be allocated among alternative ends. The larger social system, too,
is like the economic system, for the problem
in both is one of integration, of motivating
people to stop doing X and start doing Y,
whether this is economic production or
religiousbehavior.
Because economic structures are also social structures, and economic decisions are
also role decisions, it might be argued that
economic propositions are simply "special
cases" of sociological propositions." In a
more rigorousmethodologicalsense, however,
this claim may be viewed skeptically, since
at present the former body of propositions
cannot be deduced from the latter.12Rather,
economic theory may be a fruitful source of
sociological ideas, because its theoretical
structure is more advanced than that of
sociology. Since the precise relation between
economic and sociological propositions is
not yet fully ascertained, economic vocabulary and ideas are mainly used in the succeeding analysis for clarity of presentation,
11 Some structural differences between the two
cases, however, should be noted: (1) There are
specialized economic producers, for example, wheat
farmers who offer only one product on the market,
but no corresponding sociological positions in which
the individual offers only one type of role performance. Some political, religious, military, or occupational leaders do "produce" their services for a
large number of people, but they must all carry out
many other roles as well in the "role market."
Every adult must take part as producer in a minimum number of such role markets. (2) Correspondingly, in the economic sphere all participate in
several markets as buyers; in the role sphere they act
in several markets as both sellers and buyers. (3)
Correlatively, our entrance into the economic producer or seller activities may be long delayed, and
we may retire from them early if we have enough
money, but as long as we live we must remain in
the role market: we need other people, and they
demand us. (4) We may accumulate enough money
so as to be able to purchase more than we can
use, or produce more than we can sell, in the
economic sphere; but in the role system we probably always ask more on the whole than our alters
can give, and are unable to give as much as they
demand.
12 The most elaborate recent attempt to state the
relations between the two is Talcott Parsons and
Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society, Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, 1956.

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488

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

and the correctnessof propositionswhich are

developed here is independent of their possible homologs in economics.13In this view,
economic performance is one type of role
performance, a restricted case in which
economists attempt to express role performance, reward, and punishment in monetary terms.14 In both, the individual must
respond to legitimate demands made on him
(role expectations, services, goods, or demands for money) by carrying out his role
obligations (performances, goods, or money
payments). Through the perception of alternative role strains or goods-services-money
costs, the individual adjusts the various demands made upon him, by moving from one
role action to another. Both types of transactions, of course, express evaluations of
goods, performances,and money.
In his role decisions, as in his economic
decisions, the individual seeks to keep his
felt strain, role cost, or monetary and performance cost at a minimum, and may even
apply some rationality to the problem. At
the same time, a variety of pressures will
force him to accept some solutions which are
not pleasant. His decisions are also frequently habitual rather than calculated,
and even when calculated may not achieve
his goal. Rather, they are the most promising, or the best choice he sees. Since the
analysis of such behavior would focus on the
act and its accompanying or preceding decision, the research approach of "decision
13 Again, however,
correctness is independent
of their origin. It is equally clear that they parallel
certain conceptions of psychodynamics, but again
their sociological value is independent of their usefulness in that field.
"Anthropologists have noted for over a generation that economic theory needs a more general
framework to take account of the non-monetary
aspects of economic action in non-Western societies.
Cf. Bronislaw Malinowski, "Primitive Economics
of the Trobriand Islanders," Economic Journal 31
(March, 1921), pp. 1-16. See also Malinowski's
earlier article, "The Economic Aspects of the Intichiuma Ceremonies," Festskrift Tillagnad Edward
Westermarck, Helsingfors: 1912; and Argonauts of
the Western Pacific, London: Routledge, 1922. Also
Raymond Firth, Primitive Economics of the New
Zealand Maori, New York: Dutton, 1929. For a
discussion of the interaction of economic roles and
religious roles, see William J. Goode, Religion
Among the Primitives, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1951, Chapters 5, 6.

analysis" seems appropriate to ascertain the

course of events which led to the act.15
In role behavior, we begin to experience
strain, worry, anxiety, or the pressures of
others if we devote more time and attention
to one role obligation than we feel we should,
or than others feel we should. This strain
may be felt because, given a finite sum of
role resources, too much has already been
expended; or because the individual feels
that relative to a given value the cost is too
high. The relative strength of such pressures
from different obligations determines, then,
the individual's role allocation pattern within
his total role system. This system is the
resultant of all such strains. Analysis of
role allocation requires, of course, that we
know the individual's internal demands, that
is, the demands which he makes on himself, and which thus contribute to his willingness to perform well or not."6
The process of strain allocation is facilitated somewhat, as noted above, by ego's
ability to manipulate his role structure. On
the other hand, the structure is kept in existence by, and is based on, the process of
allocation. For example, with reference to
the norms of adequate role performance, to
be considered later, the White child in the
South may gradually learn that his parents
will disapprove a close friendship with a
Negro boy, but (especially in rural regions)
may not disapprove a casual friendship.
The "caste" role definitions state that in
the former relationship he is over-performing, that is, "paying too much." Such social
pressures, expressed in both individual and
social mechanisms, are homologous to those
in the economic market, where commodities
also have a "going price," based on accepted
relative evaluations. Correspondingly,the individual expresses moral disapproval when
15 See the several discussions in
Paul F. Lazarsfeld
and Morris Rosenberg, editors, The Language of
Social Research, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955, pp.
387-448.
16 Price in an elementary economics textbook,
determined by the intersection of supply and demand, requires no such datum (i.e., why or whence
the demand is not relevant), and thus the model
is simpler than the role model. However, more
sophisticated economics, as well as the economic
practitioner, must distinguish various components
or sources of demand.

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

his role partner performsmuch less well than
usual, or demands far more than usual.
In all societies, the child is taught the
"value of things," whether they are material
objects or role performances, by impressing
upon him that he must allocate his role performances, and how he should allocate
them.17 These structural elements are considered in a later section.
2. Setting the role price in the role bargain:
The level of role performancewhich the individual finally decides upon, the "role
price," is the resultant of the interaction between three supply-demand factors: (a) his
pre-existing or autonomous norm commitment-his desire to carry out the performance; (b) his judgment as to how much his
role partner will punish or reward him for
his performance; and (c) the esteem or disesteem with which the peripheral social networks or important reference groups ("third
parties") will respond to both ego's performance and to alter's attempts to make ego
performadequately.
The individual will perform well ("pay
high") if he wants very much to carry out
this role obligation as against others. He will
devote much more time and energy to his
job if he really enjoys his work, or is deeply
committed normatively to its aims. The
individual's willingness to carry out the role
performance varies, being a function of the
intrinsic gratifications in the activity, the
prospective gain from having carried out the
activity, and the internal self-rewardor selfpunishment from conscience pangs or shame
or a sense of virtue, or the like.
With reference to what ego expects alter
to do in turn, he is more likely to over-perform, or perform well if alter can and will
(relative to others) reward ego well or pay
him well for a good or poor execution of his
role obligations. Thus, my predictions as to
what will make my beloved smile or frown
will affect my performance greatly; but if
she loves me while I love her only little,
then the same smiles or frowns will have less
effect on my role performances for her.18
17 Doubtless, however, the
lessons can be made
more explicit and conclusive when the "value" can
be expressed in dollars rather than in the equally
intangible (but more difficult to measure) moral
or esthetic considerations.
18 Cf. Willard Waller's
"Principle of Least In-

489

Similarly, as will be noted below in more

detail, alter's power, esteem, and resources
affect ego's performance because they allow
alter to punish or reward ego more fully.
The individual perceives these consequences
cognitively and responds to them emotionally. If, then, the individual aspires to be accepted by a higher ranking individual or
group, he may have to perform more adequately than for one of his own rank.
This last proposition requires a further distinction. Alter may be able, because of his
position, to reward ego more than alter rewards others in a similar status, but this
additional reward may be no more than a
socially accepted premium for extra performance. On the other hand, the additional
reward may sometimes be viewed by those
others as beyond the appropriate amount.
Or the individual may over-perform in one
activity of his role relationshipto compensate
for a poor performancein another-say, the
poor breadwinner who tries to be a good
companion to his children. Such further consequences of higher performance and higher
reward may at times be taken into account
by both role partners in making their role
bargain.
If alter asks that ego perform consistently
better than he is able or willing to do, then
he may ease his allocation strain by severing
his relationshipwith that individual or group
and by seeking new role relationships in
which the allocation strain is less.19
3. Limitations on a "free role bargain":
The third component in ego's decision to
perform his role bargain is the network of
role relationships-"the third party" or parties-with which ego and alter are in interaction. If either individual is able to exploit
the other by driving an especially hard role
bargain, such third parties may try to influence either or both to change the relationship back toward the "going role price."
Not only do they feel this to be their duty,
terest" in Willard Waller and Reuben Hill, The
Family, New York: Dryden, 1952, pp. 191-192.
19 Cf. Leon Festinger's Derivation C, in "A
Theory of Social Comparison Processes," Reprint
Services No. 22, Laboratory for Research in Social
Relations, University of Minnesota, 1955, p. 123.
Also see No. 24, "Self-Evaluation as a Function
of Attraction to the Group," by Leon Festinger, Jane
Torrey, and Ben Willerman.

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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

but they have an interest in the matter as

well, since (a) the exploiting individual may
begin to demand that much, or pay that
little, in his role relations with them; and
(b) because the exploited individual may
thereby performless well in his role relations
with them. These pressures from third parties include the demand that either ego or
alter punish or reward the other for his
performances or failures.20
It is not theoretically or empirically clear
whether such third parties must always be
a limited reference group, or can at times
be the entire society. Many of the norms of
reference groups appear to be special definitions or applications of similar norms of the
larger society. Certain groups, such as criminal gangs or power cliques in a revolutionary
political party, may give radical twists of
meaning to the norms of the larger society.
Under such circumstances,the interaction of
pressureson ego and alter from various third
parties can be complex. We suppose that
which third party is most important in a
given role transaction between ego and alter
is a function of the degree of concern felt
by various third parties and of the amount
of pressure that any of them can bring to
bear on either ego or alter.

strain, they determine which of the first

set of mechanismsego may use, and on what
terms. Similarly, they determine whether
ego and alter may or must bargain freely, to
either's disadvantage, or to what extent
either can or must remainin an advantageous
or costly bargaining position. The most important of such elements are perhaps the
following:
1. Hierarchy of evaluations: Social evaluations are the source of the individual's
evaluations, but even if only the frequently
occurringtypes of choices are considered,such
evaluations reveal complex patterns.2' Some
sort of overall value hierarchy seems to be
accepted in every society, but aside from
individual idiosyncrasies, both situational
and role characteristics may change the
evaluation of given acts. Indeed, all individuals may accept contradictory values in
some areas of action, which are expressed
under differentcircumstances.Here, the most
importantof these qualifying factors are: (a)
the social position of ego (one should pay
some respect to elders, but if one is, say, 30
years of age, one may pay less); (b) the
social position of alter (the power, prestige,
or resources of alter may affect ego's decision); (c) the content of the performance
by ego or alter (mother-nurseobligations are
more important than housekeeper-laundress
STRUCTURAL LIMITS AND DETERMINANTS
duties); and (d) situational urgency or
Strain-Reducing Mechanisms.-The indi- crisis. When ego gives the excuse of an urvidual can thus reduce his role strain some- gent situation, alter usually retaliates less
what: first, by selecting a set of roles which severely. However, when several crises occur
are singly less onerous, as mutually suppor- simultaneously, the allocation of role pertive as he can manage, and minimally con- formances is likely to be decided instead
flicting; and, second, by obtaining as gratify- by reference to more general rankings of
ing or value-productive a bargain as he can value.22
with each alter in his total role pattern.
These illustrations suggest how structural
As the existence of third parties attests, factors help to determine ego's willingness
however, both sets of ego's techniques are to perform or his performance,in an existing
limited and determined by a larger struc- role relationship (Type lb), and though
tural context within which such decisions they reduce his uncertainty as to what he
are made. Not all such structural elements
21 Norman Miller has
reduce ego's role strain; indeed, they may
used data from the Cornell
increase it, since they may enforce actions Values Study to show how various combinations of
which are required for the society rather social positions affect expressions of value in Social
Class Differences among American College Students,
than the individual. Essentially, whether Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1958.
they increase or reduce the individual's role
22 In an unpublished paper on "doubling" (the
Note, for example, the potential "seduction"
of the mother by the child; the mother wishes to
please the child to make him happy, and may have
to be reminded by others that she is "spoiling" him.
20

living together of relatives who are not members

of the same nuclear family), Morris Zelditch has
used approximately these categories to analyze the
conditions under which the claim to such a right
is likely to be respected.

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

should or must do, they also may increase
his obligations. At the same time, these same
factors also determine in part whether or
when ego will include the relationship at
all (Type la) in his total role system (for
example, a noted physicist should engage in
a technical correspondencewith a fellow physicist, but may refuse to appear on a popular television show; even a passing stranger
is expected to give needed aid in a rescue
operation).
This set of interacting factors is complex,
but gives some guidance in role interaction.
Since there is a loose, society-wide hierarchy
of evaluations, and' both individuals and
their referencegroups or "third parties" may
be committed to a somewhat different hierarchy of values, at least the following combinations of evaluations may occur:
Evaluations
Evaluations

Task
Content

by:

Rank of
Alter

of:

Situational
Urgency

Society
Reference Groups or
Third Parties
Alter
Ego

2. Third parties: Though third parties

figure most prominently in the bargaining
within an existing role relationship, especially those which are more fully institutionalized (statuses), they also take part in ego's
manipulation of his role structure, since they
may be concerned with his total social position. For example, families are criticized by
kinsmen, neighbors, and friends if they do
not press their children in the direction of
assuming a wider range of roles and more
demanding roles as they grow older.
3. Norms of adequacy: These define what
is an acceptable role performance.23Norms
of adequacy are observable even in jobs
which set nearly limitless ideals of performance, such as the higher levels of art and
science, for they are gauged to the experience,
age, rank, and esteem of the individual. For
example, a young instructor need not perform as well as a full professor; but to
achieve that rank he must perform as well
23 This mechanism is akin to, though not identical
with, Merton's "mutual social support among status
occupants." Merton, "The Role Set . . . ," op. cit.,
p. 116.

491

as his seniors believe they performed at his

rank. Such norms also apply to the total
system of roles assumed by the individual.
The individual may criticize another not
only when the latter's specific performance
fails to meet such criteria, but also when the
latter's range of roles is too narrow (the
wife complains, "We never go out and meet
people") or too wide (the husband complains, "You take care of everything in the
communityexcept me").
The individual must assume more roles
in an urban society than in primitive or
peasant society, and the norm of functional
specificity applies to a higher proportion of
them. This norm permits individuals to bargain within a narrower range, but also, by
limiting the mutual obligations of individuals (and thus tending to reduce role
strain), it permits them to assume a larger
number of roles than would otherwise be
possible. This, then, is a role system basis
for the generally observed phenomenon of
Gesellschaft or secondary relations in urban
society.
4. Linkage or dissociation of role obligations in different institutional orders: The
fulfillment of role obligations in one institutional order either rests on or requires a performance in another.24 Thus, to carry out
the obligations of father requires the fulfillment of job obligations. Such doubled obligations are among the strongest in the society, in the sense that ego may insist on rather
advantageous terms if he is asked to neglect
them in favor of some other obligation. Linking two institutional orders in this fashion
limits ego's freedom to manipulate his role
system.
At the same time, there are barriers
against combining various roles, even when
the individual might find such a linkage
congenial. (For example: a military rule
against officers fraternizing intimately with
enlisted men; a regulation forbidding one
to be both a lawyer and a partner of a certified public accountant). In an open society,
some role combinations are permitted which
would be viewed as incongruousor prohibited
in a feudal or caste society.
24 I have described this mechanism of institutional integration in some detail in Religion Among
the Primitives, op. cit., Chapters 5-10.

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492

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

Such pressures are expressed in part by

the punishments which the individual may
have to face if he insists on entering disapproved combinations of roles. The barriers
against some combinations also apply to a
special case of role expansion: entrance into
certain very demandingstatuses, those which
require nearly continuous performance, are
subject to frequent crises or urgencies, and
are highly evaluated.25 Even in our own
society there are not many such statuses.
The combination of two or more sets of
potential crises and responsibilities would
make for considerablerole strain, so that few
individuals would care to enter them; but in
addition organizationalrules sometimes, and
common social attitudes usually, oppose such
combinations.-The priest may not be a
mother; the head of a hospital may not be
a high political leader.
5. Ascriptive statuses: All statuses, but
especially ascriptive statuses, limit somewhat ego's ability to bargain, since social
pressures to conform to their norms are
stronger than for less institutionalized roles.
Some of these require exchanges of performances between specific individuals (I cannot
search for the motherwho will serve my needs
best, as she cannot look for a more filial
child) while others (female, Negro, "native
American") embody expectations between
status segments of the population. The
former are more restrictive than the latter,
but both types narrow considerably the area
in which individuals can work out a set of
performancesbased on their own desires and
bargaining power. Because individuals do
not usually leave most ascriptive statuses,
some may have to pay a higher role price
than they would in an entirely free role
market, or may be able (if their ascription
status is high in prestige and power) to exact
from others a higher role performance.26
25 Perhaps the third characteristic is merely a
corollary of the first two.
28 Although the matter cannot be pursued here,
it seems likely that in economic terms we are dealing here with the phenomena of the "differentiated
product"-ego cannot accept a given role performance from just anyone, but from the specific people
with whom he is in interaction-and of oligopolyego can patronize only a limited number of suppliers or sellers. Moreover, with respect to certain
roles, both supply and demand are relatively
inelastic.

The psychological dimensions of these limitations are not relevant for our discussion.
It should be noted, however, that at least
one important element in the persistence of
personality patterns is to be found in these
limitations: the role structure remains fairly
stable because the individual cannot make
many free role bargains and thus change
his role system or the demands made on him,
and consequently the individual personality
structure is also maintained by the same
structural elements.27
6. Lack of profit in mutual role deviation: Since two role partners depend in part
on each other's mutual performancefor their
own continuing interaction with other persons, mutual role deviation will only rarely
reduce their role strain. It might be advantageous to me if my superior permits me to
loaf on the job, but only infrequently can
he also profit from my loafing. Consequently,
both ego and alter have a smaller range of
choices, and the demands of the institutional
order or organization are more likely to be
met. When, moreover, in spite of these interlocking controls, ego and alter do find a
mode of deviation which is mutually profitable-the bribed policeman and the professional criminal, the smothering mother and
the son who wants to be dependent-concerned outsiders, third parties, or even a
larger segment of the society are likely to
disapprove and retaliate more strongly than
when either ego or alter deviates one-sidedly.
On the other hand, there is the special case
in which ego and alter share the same status
-as colleagues or adolescent peers, for example. They are then under similar pressures
from others, and may seek similar deviant
solutions; they may gang together and profit
collectively in certain ways from their
deviation.28
Less Desirable Statuses: Efforts to Change
the Role Bargain.-The preceding analysis
of how ego and alter decide whether, when,
27 Cf. C. Addison Hickman and Manford H.
Kuhn, Individuals, Groups, and Economic Behavior,
New York: Dryden, 1956, p. 38.
28 Albert K. Cohen has discussed one example of
this special case at length in Delinquent Boys,
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. It requires, among
other factors, special ecological conditions and the
possibility of communication among those in the
same situation.

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

493

is allocating his total role energies, managing

his whole role system; or that he is spending
"too much" time in one role obligation and
retiring from others. Consequently, family
relations form the most immediate and persistent set of interactions which are of importance in social control. Formal withdrawal from these relationships is difficult,
and informal withdrawal arouses both individual guilt feelings and pressures from
others.
Moreover,since the family is a role allocation center, where one's alters know about
one's total role obligations and fulfillments,
it also becomes a vantage point from which
to view one's total role system in perspective.
Because it is a set of status obligations which
change little from day to day and from which
escape is difficult, role alternatives can be
evaluated against a fairly stable background.
Consequently,other family memberscan and
do give advice as to how to allocate energies
from a "secure center." Thus it is from this
center that one learns the basic procedures
of balancingrole strains.
Finally, family roles are "old shoe" roles
in which expectations and performanceshave
become well meshed so that individuals can
relax in them. In Western society, it is mainly
the occupational statuses which are graded
by fine levels of prestige, just as achievement
within occupations is rewarded by fine degrees of esteem. It is not that within jobs
one is held to standards,while within families
one is not.29It is rather that, first, socialization on the basis of status ascription within
the family fits individual expectations to
habitual performancesand, second, rankings
of family performances are made in only
very rough categories of esteem. The intense
sentiments within the family cushion individual strain by inducing each person to
THE FAMILY AS A ROLE BUDGET CENTER
make concessions, to give sympathy, to the
For adult or child, the family is the main others. Of course, greater strain is expericenter of role allocation, and thus assumes enced when they do not. These status rights
a key position in solutions of role strain. and obligations become, then, "role retreats"
Most individuals must account to their or "role escapes," with demands which are
families for what they spend in time, en- felt to be less stringent, or in which someergy, and money outside the family. And what more acceptable private bargains have
ascriptive status obligations of high evaluation or primacy are found in the family.
29 See Melvin Tumin's discussion of
incentives in
More important, however, is the fact that various
non-occupational statuses in "Rewards and
family members are often the only persons Task Orientations," American Sociological Review,
who are likely to know how an individual 20 (August, 1955), pp. 419-422.

or how well they will carry out their role

obligations permits the deduction of the
proposition that when an individual's norm
commitment or desire to perform is low with
respect to a given status-in our society,
many women, Negroes, and adolescents reject one or more of the obligations imposed
on them; perhaps slaves in all societies dothen alter must bring greater pressure to
bear on him in order to ensure what alter
judges to be an adequate performance. If
the individual does under-perform,he is less
likely to have strong feelings of self-failure
or disesteem; he may feel no more than some
recognition of, and perhaps anxiety about,
possible sanctions from alter.
Individuals are especially conscious that
they are "training" others in both child and
adult socialization, if those others are suspected of being weakly committed to their
role obligations. Thus, most Whites in the
South have for generations held that all
Whites have an obligation to remind the
Negro by punishment and reward that he
"should keep in his place," and that punishment of the Negro is especially called for
when he shows evidence that he does not
accept that place. It is the heretic, not the
sinner, who is the more dangerous. It is
particularly when the members of a subordinate status begin to deny normatively
their usual obligations that third parties become aroused and more sensitive to evidence
of deviation in either performance or norm
commitment. On the other hand, individuals
in a formerly subordinate status may, over
time, acquire further bargainingpower, while
those in a superior status may gradually
come to feel less committed to the maintenance of the former role pattern.

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494

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

been made among the various members of

the group. One's performanceis not graded
by the whole society, and one's family compares one's family performance to only a
limited extent with that of other people in
other families.
The existence of unranked or grossly
ranked performance statuses or roles may
permit the individual to give a higher proportion of his energy to the ranked performance
statuses. The institutions which contain such
statuses vary. For example, in contemporary
Western society, the layman's religious performances, like his familial performances,
are ranked only roughly, but at one time
evaluation of the former was more differentiated. However, familial performanceapparently is never ranked in fine gradation
in any society.30Here, an implicit structural
propositionmay be made explicit: the greater
the degree of achievement orientation in a
system of roles, the finer the gradation of
prestige rankings within that system or

of the social structure. While these role performances accomplish whatever is done to
meet the needs of the society, nevertheless
the latter may not be adequately served. It
is quite possible that what gets done is not
enough, or that it will be ineffectively done.
As already noted, the role demands made by
one institutional order often conflict with
those made by another-at a minimum, because the "ideal" fulfillment in each is not
qualified by other institutional demands and
would requiremuch of any person'savailable
resources. Many such conflicting strains frequently result in changes in the social structure. Within smaller sub-systems, such as
churches, corporations,schools, and political
parties, the total flow of available personal
resourcesmay be so disintegrative or ineffective that the system fails to survive. In addition, the total role performances in some
societies have failed to maintain the social
structureas a whole.
Thus, though the sum of role performances
organization.31
ordinarily maintains a society, it may also
change the society or fail to keep it going.
There is no necessary harmony among all
ROLE STRAIN AND THE LARGER SOCIAL
role performances, even though these are
STRUCTURE
based ultimately on the values of the society
Social structures are made up of role re- which are at least to some extent harmonious
lationships, which in turn are made up of with one another. Role theory does not, even
role transactions. Ego's efforts to reduce his in the general form propoundedhere, explain
role strain determine the allocation of his why some activities are ranked higher than
energies to various role obligations, and thus others, why some activities which help to
determine the flow of performances to the maintain the society are ranked higher, or
institutions of the society. Consequently, the why there is some "fit" between the role
sum of role decisions determineswhat degree decisions of individuals and what a society
of integration exists among various elements needs for survival.
The total efforts of individuals to reduce
their
role strain within structural limitations
30 Partly because of the difficulty of outsiders
directly determines the profile, structure, or
observing crucial performances within it; partly,
also, because of the difficulty of measuring relative pattern of the social system. But whether
achievement except in universalistic terms, as against the resulting societal pattern is "harmonious"
the particularistic-ascriptive character of familial
or integrated, or whether it is even effective
roles. Note, however, the creation by both Nazi
in maintaining that society, are separate
Germany and Soviet Russia of a family title for
empiricalquestions.
very fertile mothers (an observable behavior).
31 Note in this connection the case of China, the
most family-oriented civilization. In comparison
with other major civilizations, the Chinese developed
a more complex ranking of kinship positions-and
a more explicit ranking of familial performances.
(See Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution
in Modern China, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1949, esp. Chapter 3). Various individuals
have figured in Chinese history as "family heroes,"
that is, those who performed their family duties
exceedingly well.

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS

The present paper attempts to develop

role theory by exploiting the well-known
notion that societal structures are made up
of roles. The analysis takes as its point of
departure the manifest empirical inadequacies, noted in the first section, of a

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A THEORY OF ROLE STRAIN

widely current view of social stability,
namely, that the continuity of a social system is mainly a function of two major variables: (a) the normative, consensual commitment of the individuals of the society;
and (b) the integration among the norms
held by those individuals. Accepting dissensus, nonconformity, and conflicts among
norms and roles as the usual state of affairs,
the paper develops the idea that the total
role system of the individual is unique and
over-demanding.The individual cannot satisfy fully all demands, and must move
through a continuous sequence of role decisions and bargains, by which he attempts to
adjust these demands. These choices and the
execution of the decisions are made somewhat easier by the existence of mechanisms
which the individual may use to organize his
role system, or to obtain a better bargain in
a given role. In addition, the social structure
determines how much freedom in manipulation he possesses.
The individual utilizes such mechanisms
and carries out his sequences of role behaviors through an underlying decision process, in which he seeks to reduce his role
strain, his felt difficulty in carrying out his
obligations. The form or pattern of his process may be comparedto that of the economic
decision: the allocation of scarce resourcesrole energies, time, emotions, goods-among
alternative ends, which are the role obligations owed by the individual. The role performances which the individual can exact
from others are what he gets in exchange.
It is to the individual'sinterest in attempting to reduce his role strain to demand as
much as he can and perform as little, but
since this is also true for others, there are
limits on how advantageous a role bargain
he can make. He requiressome role performance from particular people. His own social
rank or the importance of the task he is to
perform may put him in a disadvantageous
position from which to make a bargain. Beyond the immediate role relationship of two
role partners stands a network of roles with
which one or both are in interaction, and
these third parties have both a direct and
an indirect interest in their role transactions.
The more institutionalized roles are statuses,
which are backed more strongly by third
parties. The latter sanction ego and alter

495

when these two have made a free role bargain which is far from the going role price.
The demands of the third parties may include the requirementthat ego or alter punish the other for his failure to perform
adequately.
Under this conception of role interaction,
the bargains which some individuals make
will be consistently disadvantageousto them:
the best role price which they can make will
be a poor one, even by their own standards.
However, no one can ever escape the role
market. The continuity of the individual's
total role pattern, then, may be great even
when he does not have a strong normative
commitment to some of his less desirable
roles. Like any structure or organized pattern, the role pattern is held in place by both
internal and external forces-in this case, the
role pressures from other individuals. Therefore, not only is role strain a normal experience for the individual, but since the individual processes of reducing role strain
determine the total allocation of role performances to the social institutions, the total
balances and imbalances of role strains
create whatever stability the social structure
possesses. On the other hand, precisely because each individual is under some strain
and would prefer to be under less, and in
particular would prefer to get more for his
role performances than he now receives,
various changes external to his own role system may alter the kind of role bargains he
can and will make. Each individual system
is partly held in place by the systems of
other people, their demands, and their counter-performances-which ego needs as a
basis for his own activities. Consequently, in
a society such as ours, where each individual
has a very complex role system and in which
numerous individuals have a relatively low
intensity of norm commitment to many of
their role obligations, changes in these external demands and performances may permit considerable change in the individual's
system.
The cumulative pattern of all such role
bargainsdeterminesthe flow of performances
to all social institutions and thus to the needs
of the society for survival. Nevertheless, the
factors here considered may not in fact insure the survival of a society, or of an organization within it. The quantity or quality

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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

496

of individual performances may undermine

or fail to maintain the system. These larger
consequences of individual role bargains can
be traced out, but they figure only rarely in
the individual role decision.
With respect to its utility in empirical research, this conception permits a more
adequate delineation of social structures by
focussing on their more observable elements,
the role transactions.This permits such questions as: Would you increase the time and
energy you now give to role relationship X?
Or, granted that these are the ideal obliga-

tions of this relationship, how little can you

get away with performing? Or, by probing
the decision, it is possible to ascertain why
the individual has moved from one role
transaction to another, or from one role organization to another. Finally, this conception is especially useful in tracing out the
articulation between one institution or organization and another, by following the
sequence of an individual's role performance
and their effects on the role performancesof
other individuals with relation to different
institutional orders.

ALTER VERSUS EGO: AN EXPLORATORY ASSESSMENT

OF ALTRUISM
ROBERT W. FRIEDRICHS
Drew University
"Altruism,"definedoperationallyby means of mutual ratings of a cohort's generaltendency
to inhibit his own desiresin the light of the desiresof others,is found to possessan identity
which cannot be equated with estimates of social acceptability,popularity, degree of acquaintance,or sociability.Although extrapolationbeyond in-group relationshipsappearsunwarranted,a considerabledegree of consensus,discrimination,and reliabilityis apparent.Its
relationship to measures of religiosity, authoritarianism,urbanization, faith, neurotic
symptomology,socio-economicstatus, economicinvolvement,toleranceof egoism, projection,
internalization,and socialization are noted. Factor analysis suggests that altruism is an
integral part of a "sacred"configuration,while the latter is a fundamentaldimension of
socialinteraction.
ATHOUGH

coined by Auguste Comte volvement with the concept of such a scholar

about the time he created the term

sociologie and utilized by Durkheim
in his typology of suicide,' the term altruisme has received almost no systematic attention from writers in the mainstream of
contemporarysociology or social psychology.
Gordon Allport suggests that the psychologist tends to overlook affiliative desires in
over-reacting to the struggle to free his discipline from an affect-laden theology.2 Similarly the sociologist, burdenedwith a clerical
and reformist heritage, is understandably
distressed when he notes the passionate in-

as Sorokin.3
Piaget, Hartshorne and May, and Murray
report studies of a suggestive nature undertaken in the twenties and thirties, but none
R. L. Simpson writes: ". . . he has not kept
his promise to write dispassionately.... his infusion

of metaphysicsand crusadingzeal into sociological

works has obscuredfor some of the more naturalistically inclined sociologists the value of his many
contributions.

." "Pitirim Sorokin and His

Sociology," Social Forces, 32 (December, 1953),

pp. 120-131. Sorokin has published the following
volumes which deal directly with altruism: The
Reconstructionof Humanity,Boston: Beacon,1948;
1 See the recent discussionin Bruce P. Dohren- Explorationsin Altruistic Love and Behavior, op.
wend, "Egoism, Altruism, Anomie, and Fatalism: cit.; Altruistic Love: A Study of AmericanGood
A Conceptual Analysis of Durkheim's Types," Neighbors and Christian Saints, Boston: Beacon,
AmericanSociologicalReview, 24 (August, 1959), 1950; Social Philosophiesof an Age of Crisis,Bospp. 466-473.
ton: Beacon, 1950; S. 0. S.: The Meaning of Our
2 Gordon Allport, "A PsychologicalApproachto
Crisis, Boston: Beacon, 1951; editor, Forms and
the Study of Love and Hate," in P. A. Sorokin, Techniquesof Altruisticand SpiritualGrowth,Boseditor, Explorations in Altruistic Love and Be- ton: Beacon, 1954; The Ways and Power of Love,
havior, Boston: Beacon, 1952, pp. 145-146.
Boston: Beacon,1954.

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